THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE INTER-PARTY DEVELOPMENTS AT AND AFTER THE RUMANIAN WORKERS PARTY CONGRESS--BUCHAREST, 20-25 JUNE 1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 25, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE SING-SOVIET DISPUTE
INTER-PARTY DEVELOPMENTS AT AND AFTER THE
RUMANIAN WORKERS PARTY CONGRESS--BUCHAREST,
20-25 JUNE 1960
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THE SING-SOVIET DISPUTE
INTER.-PARTY DEVELOPMENTS AT AND AFTER THE
RUMANIAN WORKERS PARTY CONGRESS--BUCHAREST, 20-25 JUNE 1960
The background of the dispute (1957-1960)
1. The present dispute between the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) has
its origins in differences which date back at least three years-
.that is, to the.summer of 1957. On the Chinese side, antecendent
resentments may date as far back as the formative period of the
CPC in the twenties, when Stalin?s policy of alliance with the
Kuomintang drove the CPC to disaster, as well as to the war and
early post-war period, when Soviet support for the Chinese Com--
munist cause was minimal and did not inhibit the stripping of
Manchuria. There is clearly no single cause for the current
dispute. Rather, it would appear, an accumulation of Chinese
policies and actions increasingly displeased and challenged
Khrushchev and, presumably, a majority of the Soviet leadership.
In the field of domestic policy, it is nowhnown that Mao's "Let
a.hundred flowers bloom" program aroused Soviet doubts about
its usefulness. The program for the "great leap forward"
beginning in early 1958 and the communes program, adopted by
the CPC in May 1958, were readily recognizable as a considerable
irritant in Sino-Soviet relations by the silent treatment which
they received in the Soviet Union.
2. Disagreement over foreign policy manifested itself in
August 1958 when Khrushchev, after four days of discussion with
Mao Tse-tung, publicly rejected, on 5 August, Western proposals
for a summit meeting within the U. N, Security Council on the
crisis in the Middle East--proposals which he had accepted in
July. Nevertheless, on 23 August the Chinese began shelling of
the off-shore islands. On 23 May 1958 the Commander of the
Chinese' lair Force paiedicted that China would make atomic bombs
"in the not too distant future" and the Chinese press ceased to
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refer to Khrushchev's earlier plan for an atom-free zone in
Asia. Khrushchev revived his concept of an atom-free ?done
for "the Far East and the entire Pacific Basin" at the 21st
CPSU Congress in February 1959. Chinese reactions were
not enthusiastic, and, from April 1959, on, reference to the
plan disappeared altogether. In the light of these and other
indications, it can be fairly assumed that Soviet unwillingness
to deliver atomic weapons to Chinese control had become a
serious issue. It is now known that the Soviets cited as the
reason for their reluctance their apprehension over Chinese
policies and pronouncements in the external field which were
in conflict with Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" tactics,
which affirmed that global or limited war need not be avoided,
and which objected to Khrushchev's aid programs for "bourgeois"
regimes in underdeveloped countries on the grounds that they
would delay revolution. Chinese objections to peaceful coexistence
tactics manifested themselves after 1957 in the deliberations of
the International Communist Front organizations, especially
within the World Peace Council and the International Union of
Students--two organizations which were lost directly and in-
tensely engaged in building their appeal on the unity campaign
so typical of the peaceful coexistence period. They desired to
involve bourgeois and nationalist groups in mass action and
therefore advocated informal conversations, negotiations,
and concessions to such groups. The Chinese refused to "sit
around the table" with them except in formal meetings of
designated representatives, and resisted Soviet efforts to
broaden the scope of concessions on program and organization
questions. Chinese resistance was particularly manifest after
the Soviet decision of June 1959 concerning Khrushchev's visit
to the United States.
3. In August 1959, the Chine-se overran the Indian border
post at Longju and reopened the border dispute v4tlkIndia, after
eight years of quiet. The Soviet position on this dispute signifi-
cantly failed to give full endorsement to the Chinese claims,
although earlier Chinese repressive actions in Tibet had been
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promptly supported as just and as an "internal affair. "
Khrushchev, as was known later, did not interpret the reopening
of the dispute as a mere attempt to register opposition to his
trip to the United States, but as an un-Marxist blunder which
needlessly undermined Indian neutralist attitudes and potential
value in the peace and disarmament campaign and impaired the
appeal of CP India. When Khrushchev visited Peiping, after
his trip to the United States, for the October anniversary cele-
brations in 1959, the Sino-In&.an dispute was one topic of discussion
and it is virtually certain that Khrushchev presented his views on
improving USSR-U.S. relations. Sino-Soviet discussions were
unsatisfactory, however, and no communique was published.'
According to three widely separated and reliable sources, in
October 1959 the CPSU sent a letter to at least the bloc parties,
holding fast to Khrushchev's views on USSR-U. S. relations.
In November 1959, V. Ilyitchev, Chief of the Agitprop Department
of the CPSU, published an article in Problems of Peace and
Socialism that justified the policy of peaceful coexistence as eblass
struggle on the international plane" and significantly noted Lenin's
criticism of "Left Communists. " It is mown that the Chinese
have since been accused of criticizing the November 1959 joint
program of the European parties, which is clearly based upon
the same premises as the article. In December 1959, Khrushchev
warned the Chinese in stating at the Hungarian Party Congress
that "we must all synchronize our watches."
4. In January 1960, the Chinese positions hardened. At
the Rome meeting of the Presidential Committee of the World
Peace Council in January 1960 it transpired that the Chinese
had charged the USSR with seeking to isolate China in the
interest of achieving a modus vivendi with the U. S. A reliable
source states that the USSR in January 1960 informally broached
to the Chinese the idea that the Sino-Soviet differences required
discussion, only to be told by the Chinese that the differences
were between the parties and should not be mentioned. The
CPC appears to have reached during January important decisions
which had a major effect on the dispute. On 21 January the
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Standing Committee of the National People's Congress adopted
a resolution concerning disarmament which specified that
China would be bound only by treaties it takes part in framing;
and in February 1960, at the meeting of the foreign ministers
of the Warsaw Pact countries, the Chinese observer, K'ang
Sheng, incorporated the statement in his speech, broadening
it to include "all international agreements. " The contrast
between the descriptions of the world situation in K'ang Sheng's
speech and those given by the European bloc speakers was
striking.
5. It is at this point that the 1957 Moscow declaration
first began to be quoted to support the conflicting positions,
when the People's Daily of 6 February 1960 asserted that "the
development of the international situation has borne out the
correctness of the declaration." It appears likely, therefore,
that the Chinese decided in late January to take the initiative
in broadening the debate. But also on 6 February a verbal
message from the Central Committee of the CPSU asking the
CPC to attend a meeting to discuss outstanding problems was
reportedly delivered in Peiping.
6. In mid-April 1960 the Chinese took advantage of the
90th anniversary of Lenin's birth to make their most serious
public attack on the theoretical innovations developed by the
CPSU at and after the 20th Party Congress in January 1956.
Using oblique but unmistakable arguments, the Chinese
challenged the premises underlying Soviet foreign policy and
by implication disparaged Khrushchev's stature as a Communist
theorist. The Chinese attack comprised three major statements:
two articles in the party's theoretical monthly Red Flag (issues
no. 7 and 8, 1 and 16 April), the first entitled "On Imperialism
as the Source of War in Modern Times" and the second entitled
"Long Live Leninism, " as well as an editorial on 22 April in
the authoritative newspaper, the People's Daily.
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7. The Soviets replied in the speech delivered in Moscow
on 22 April by Otto Kuusinen of the CPSU Central Committee and
Secretariat. A very strong defense of current Soviet foreign
:policy and of the general lines endorsed at the 20th and 21st
CPSU Congresses, his speech confined its critical comments
to general statements condemning "dogmatic positions as back-
ward positions." On the same day a Chinese Politburo alternate,
Lu Ting-i, gave a speech in Peiping which incorporated many
of the arguments of the "Long Live Leninism" article. The
divergences between the two speeches were so great that when
one Communist party seriously affected by the dispute, the
Indian party, published both speeches side by side in the 8 May
issue of its newspaper N! Are, without comments, its action
aroused considerable comment and created confusion among
party members.
8. The Chinese then began to carry their case to the
other parties. "Long Live Leninism, " the Lu Ting-i speech,
and the People's Daily editorial of 22 April were translated
and published in the widely circulated English language Peking
Review of 26 April. At the same time, the first edition of
a book containing the three articles was produced by the
Foreign Languages Press in Peiping in many languages for
distribution abroad. Two further editions of this book were
produced, one in May and the other, after the Bucharest
confrontations, in August. The book is known to exist in
English, Spanish, French, the Eastern European languages
(including Russian), and Vietnamese. It has been distributed
in India and in certain countries at least of Latin America
and Western Europe. It appears that the Chinese later at-
tempted to circulate the articles in the USSR in one of their
two Russian language publications, Druzhba, an action which
the Soviets protested. The magazine was in fact suspended
from circulation in the USSR after the publication of the June
issue. Earlier instances of Soviet refusals to circulate
Chinese doctrinal writings in the USSR have recently been
reported by reliable sources, who heard the details during
party discussions of the Sino-Soviet differences.
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9. After the Kuusinen rebuttal of Chinese charges, the
CPSU took advantage of the 40th anniversary of the publication
of Lenin's book Leftwing Communism, an Infantile Disorder
(10 June 1960) to carry the public ideological debate with the
Chinese to new heights, including the use of the charge of
"deviation." Two Soviet articles published on 10 June, one
by D. Shevlyagin in the newspaper Soviet Russia and one by
N. Matkovsky in the party newspaper Pravda, expressed this
criticism by attacking "contemporary left-wing deviationism"
in terms which referred to the positions held by the Chinese
party. Both articles highlighted the significance of the 12
Party Declaration of November 1957. Matkovsky characterized
it as a "programmatic document of the international Communist
movement, " and as a validation of the general line expressed
by the CPSU. Shevlyagin, one-the other hand, referred parti-
cularly to the declaration as authorizing and requiring a struggle
against "leftist opportunism" as well as against "rightist
opportunism" such as that of the Yugoslavs. In discussing
manifestations of left opportunism he made the significant
point that " ntyonly groups of Communists but the leadership
of individual parties have veered into leftist deviationism."
Neither of the articles explicitly identified the Chinese as
the target of criticism, but their relevance to the dispute
was unmistakable.
10. The timing of this intensification of the Soviet attack
on the Chinese views coincides with a CPSU letter on the
Summit Conference which was circulated, shortly after
Khrushchev's return home following the collapse of the con-
ference, to the Communist parties of the bloc and those of
France and Italy. Although the text of this letter is not
available, it seems likely to have been unacceptable to the
Chinese, Who emphasized from mid-May on that the course
of events before and at Paris proved the validity of the
Chinese arguments concerning imperialism and the illusory
and fruitless character of negotiation. Perhaps the worst
offense of the Chinese, in Soviet eyes, was their argument
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that the only value of Communist participation in such peace
negotiations was the purely tactical advantage that came out
of their eventual exposure of the true character and intentions
of the enemy. This observation was precisely the kind of
statement which the CPSU was most eager to avert.
11. It is likely too that the CPSU decided at this time
to send a sharp letter ofd criticism to the CPC. One
prominent Free World Communist who visited Moscow in
late May stated that he learned from a member of the CPSU
Secretariat that a "sharp" letter was being sent to the CPC.
CPSU letters calling for a conference vAre reportedly sent to
the Chinese on 2 Ju'1e and on 7 June, and it appears likely that
the letter of 2 June 4was the "sharp" one. It is also worth
noting that the CPC leaders went into closed conference in
Shanghai on 8 June, a move which may well have been prompted
by the receipt of the two CPSU letters. They were in fact still
meeting when the Chinese delegation left for the Bucharest
party congress.
12. The Chinese too made a major move in the now
rapidly developing dispute. They did this in early June at the
XIth General Council meeting of the World Federation of
Trade ? Unions in Peiping., On 2 June they presented an ultimatum
on the official WFTU report to the chief Soviet representative,
who rejected it. The Chinese claimed that the report contained
objectionable features, including attacks on the communes.
At this meeting, which opened on 5 June after a five-day delay,
in the presence of both WFTU affiliates and representatives
of some twenty-five unaffiliated national trade union federations,
the leading Chinese figures Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-ch'i, Liu
Ningri, Teng Hsiao-ping, and Liu Chang-sheng publicized
the Chinese views on the peace struggle, tke threat of imperialism,
and the "illusions" aroused by the campajgns for peaceful co-
existence and by programs for giving substantial economic aid
to bourgeois-led underdeveloped countries. Using a tactic they
had employed earlier in April, the Chinese leaders accompanied
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those criticisms with fulsome expressions of approval of
the Soviet posture towards the U. S. at the time of the
collapse of the Summit Conference. This approval of the
Soviet actions was accompanied by expressions of solidarity
with the USSR in its stand against U.S. acts of aggression.
It was learned that the CPSU was particularly stung by the
speeches of Liu Ning-yi and Liu Chang-sheng.
13. When the Chinese convened a private meeting of
Communist party members among the delegates to hear a
statement of the Chinese criticisms of CPSU doctrines, rep-
resentatives of the CPSU promptly opposed the continuation
of the talks and made the ominous charge that the Chinese
action was violation of the terms of the 12 Party Declaration
of November 1957. This Soviet appeal to the authority of
the Moscow declaration paralleled the similar appeal in the
Shevlyagin article published in Moscow, and the charge has
since figured prominently in the CPSU's presentation of its
case. According to credible reports, during the WFTU session
Teng Hsiao-ping, general secretary of the CPC, accused
the CPSU in turn of "throwing the Moscow declaration over-
board. "
14.
Soviet representatives in Peiping not only criticized the Chinese
actions in eri"e i ldiscussions with foreign Communist rep-
resentatives but by 9 June took concrete steps to enlist the
support of other CP?s against the Chinese. The representative
of one Free World CP was told, by a representative of the
Soviet All Union Central Council of Trade Unions, that the
Soviet embassy in Peiping was interested in knowing if he
could stop over in Moscow after the end of the conference.
15. When a group of European and African delegates to
the WFTU meeting arrived in Moscow on 13 June, a number
of CPSU officials conferred with members of this group. One
of the delegates in the group is known to have talked privately
with a top official, V. Tereshkin, of the CPSU Foreign
Section, concerning the Sino-Soviet dispute. The delegate was
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informed of the interpretation the CPSU placed on recent
Chinese actions, and Tereshkin asked that he have a plenum
of his party's central committee convened after his return
home to discuss the Chinese at Peiping and to condemn them
as violations of the Moscow declaration. A second person,
tentatively identified as L. I. Brezhnev, chairman of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, was also reported present
at this meeting. According to a statement broadcast while
the Bucharest congress was in session, representatives of
the French and Spanish Communist parties held a meeting
on 14 and 15 June, at which they reaffirmed their adherence
to the 12 Party Declaration. Because the leadership of both
these parties was represented in the group of WFTU delegates
in Moscow at this time, it appears possible that the meeting
in question took place there and that the reaffirmation was
a reaction to the Peiping events.
16. In contrast to these cryptic endorsements of the
Moscow declaration, on 19 June 1960 a statement by Agostino
Novella, a leading Italian Communist and president of the
WFTU, was published in the Italian Party newspaper Unita.
In this statement, which was also broadcast in Italian from
Czechoslovakia on 20 June, Novella described the Chinese
criticism of the resolutions proposed at the WFTU Council
meeting in Peiping and, like the 10 June Soviet articles,
characterized the Chinese views as "deviations. " So far as
can be determined, this was the first instance in which a
Free World Communist party publicized this charge against
the Chinese. The appearance of the statement coincided
with the opening of the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian
Workers Party in Bucharest, where the next phase of the
dispute developed.
The Nucharest debates (20-27 June 1960)
17. The Chinese determination to press at Bucharest
for Soviet adoption of a militant line is suggested by an
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article in the 16 June issue of Red Flag, which, in an obvious
reference to the CPSUts earlier justification of its views on
peace and peaceful coexistence, observed that 'tone cannot
separate oneself from the revisionists merely by stating that
the forces of socialism predominate over the forces of
imperialism." The Chinese delegation to the congress of
the Rumanian Workers Party stopped in Moscow for an
exchange of views on 17 June. It presented a letter from the
CPC which limited its powers to agreeing on a date for a
party conference to discuss Sino-Soviet differences and ex-
changing views, without, however, adopting any formal
resolution, The CPSU representatives were not successful
in obtaining an admission from the Chinese delegation of
the errors of the CPC. The Chinese, however,. reportedly
expressed a willingness to correct their positions if in an
exchange of views with the delegates at Bucharest a majority
should prove them wrong. The CPSU, justifying its action
by invoking the November 1957 Peace Manifesto (not the 12
Party Declaration adopted at the same time), insisted that
the views of all the Communist parties should eventually be
ascertained before attempting a meeting to reach a final
solution. In this context, the Bucharest session should
presumably have involved nothing but *n exchange of views.
The Chinese stated at Bucharest that in Moscow the CPSU
had first made the proposal that other parties be brought
into the debate, but had wished to confine the group to
delegates from the bloc parties only. The Chinese said that
they had rejected this proposal. It would appear, then, that
the Chinese adherence to their instruction forced the Soviets'
hand.
18. A.though there are reports that the CPSU intended
by the end of May to attack the Chinese at Bucharest, the
Soviet decision to make a major effort there to enlist the
support of other parties appears to have been reached as a
result of the Chinese stand on 17 June. Virtually none of
the major Free World parties sent top-level delegates to the
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congress,.:.,. The fact that Khrushchev was to lead the Soviet
delegation was announced only on June 18, the day of his
departure, All the European satellite delegations except
Albania were led by persons of national stature equal to that
of Khrushchev, but the late arrival of Gomulka of Poland
and the early departure of Novotny of Czechoslovakia suggest
that this top-level representation was organized on short
notice. The leader of the Chinese delegation, P'eng Chen,
was clearly outranked by this group. Fifty parties were
represented at the congress. Twenty-five of the thirty-five
i3on-,bloc fraternal delegations identified as present were
composed of second and third echelon party leaders and
none of the more significant Free World parties, except
Chile and Syria, were represented by their leaders.
19. The Soviet delegation to Bucharest included
B. Ponomarev and Y. A. Andropov, the heads of the two
Central Committee sections for relations with the non-bloc
pasties and bloc parties, respectively. During the first days
of the congress they and their colleagues concentrated on
briefing fraternal delegates, It is known that a group of
English-speaking delegates and a second group comprising
those who spoke Spanish were called together separately and
briefed from a long letter which the CPSU intended to issue
to all parties. The letter had apparently been either com-
pleted or revised at the last moment, for it contained the
Soviet account of the Moscow exchanges of 17 June and
explained the Soviet view of how the inter-party discussion
should be handled. The inclusion of Wu Hsiu-ch!uan, the
deputy director of the CPC's International Liaison Depart-
ment, as one of the four Chinese delegates suggests that the
Chinese too planned to exploit their supporters and acquaintances
among the delegates.
20. The reporting on the sequence of events at Bucharest
concerning the Sino-Soviet dispute is in some respects contra-
dictory. The following probable chronology, however, emerges
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from an analysis of the available information.
a. On 21 June the Rumanian party congress began
its open sessions. N. S. Khrushchev, in his first public speech
to the congress, presented the essentials of the Soviet line and
criticized "mechanical repeaters of what Lenin said on
imperialism," called such persons "children", and attacked
"those who do not understand that war is, under present
circumstances, not inevitable." Other public speeches by
Rumanians and fraternal delegates, including the Chinese,
P'eng Chen, occupied most of the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd.
b. On 22 June P'eng Chen spoke publicly in the
morning. . He included in his remarks a characterization of
recent U. S. actions as a "peace fraud, " and he warned that
"imperialism can never be trusted." Referring on a number
of points to the 12 Party Declaration, he emphasized the
doctrinal statements previously highlighted in the Chinese
criticisms of the Soviet line. He praised the C4xban and Algerian
struggles and said that war could be averted and peace pre-
served by aiding liberation movements and revolutionary
struggles. He also called for Communist unity and the
"broadest possible anti-imperialist united front with this unity
at its core." He further charged, as his party had done
earlier, that the imperialists were using modern revisionists
(Tito) to disrupt Communist unity, and he called for a struggle
to the end against modern revisionism. He made no mention
of "peaceful coexistence, " an omission for which he was later
upbraided by Khrushchev. It was on this day that the CPSU
reportedly begun caucusing with the fraternal delegates.
21. Three inter-party meetings dealing with the Sino-
Soviet dispute appear to have been held. The first occurred on
24 June, when the Soviet bloc representatives met all day to
draft a communique. No information is available on this meeting
beyond a statement that the first draft of the communique was
presented by the Soviet representative and that the Chinese felt
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obliged to refer the final draft to the Central Committee in
Peiping for possible amendment. The move to produce a
communique appears, in the light of the CPC instructions to
its delegation, to have been a surprise pressure move by the
CPSU. The Chinese delegates were obviously faced with
a dilemma, but succumbing to pressure, they did sign the
communique on the 24th.
2.2. On 25 June, after the conclusion of the congress
at mid-day, a closed meeting of approximately 140 delegates
from 50 parties was convened. This second meeting, a full-
scale debate, was opened by the first secretary of the
Rumanian party, Gheorghiu-Dej, who read the draft com-
munique. A number of other delegates then spoke, including,
at least, representatives of East Germany, the UK, France,
and Italy. In fact, according to one source, morea.than
twenty delegates spoke before the Chinese representatives
took the floor. The Soviet caucusing and briefings had had
some effect, for most of the speakers are reported to have
adhered in general to the Soviet line of argument. It is also
worth noting that Pospelov, the Soviet representative at this
meeting, reportedly did not speak. This tactic--in which
others take the lead in a Soviet-inspired attack--is well known
and is usually employed to permit the CPSU to have the last
word and to appear as an objective mediator rather than
merely as one more partisan participant in a debate. When
the Chinese representative finally spoke, he attacked the
line taken by most of the preceding speakers, charging that
it was unrealistic, slanderous, and groundless, and based
upon incomplete evidence. He also criticized negative
attitudes toward certain Chinese domestic policies and
asserted that the reports prepared for the WFTU Peiping
meeting had contained attacks against the communes and great-
leap forward programs. (See note.) He refuted charges
that the Chinese had not played their full part in the peace
struggle, referring to their support of Khrushchev's visit to
the U. S. and to Chou En-lairs negotiations with many countries.
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He also insisted that the Chinese had supported peaceful
coexistence, noting in particular their role in the 1955 Bandung
conference. According to another source, the Chinese rep-
resentative also stated that China would stand on the Moscow
declaration of 1957, supported the idea that a reappraisal of
the international situation was necessary, and endorsed a
proposal that the reappraisal should be carried out on a
multiparty basis. Pospelov too endorsed this proposal. This
Chinese reaction appears to have been mainly defensive; what
new facts the Chinese delegate brought forward were apparently
selected to prove that the Soviet case was a biased and and
incomplete presentation.
(Note. This Chinese charge is particularly interesting
because the two main WFTU reports presented at Peiping, by
Marcel Bras and Ibrahim Zakaria, did not criticize these
Chinese policies. In fact, the Bras report contained two
laudatory references to the communes. It is known, however,
that on 2 June (i.e., three days before the delayed opening of
the Peiping meeting) the Chinese informed V. Grishin, the
head of the Soviet delegation, that the treatment of the peace
and disarmament themes in the draft WFTU reports was
inacceptable and would be openly attacked if the drafts were
not amended before presentation. It is also known that these
sections were not amended to meet Chinese demands--in fact,
a number of amendments actually made in the final report
strengthened the WFTU's support for the Soviet peace line.
At least one amendment, dealing with the question of Free
World economic trade and aid with under-developed countries,
was, in fact, of such a nature as to be particularly unpalatable
to the Chinese. It has also been reported that the French
representatives at Bucharest were particularly incensed with
the Chinese for having brought this question.into the debate,
but no one is reported to have refuted the Chinese charge as
untrue. One report provides a clue to a plausible explanation
of this matter by noting that the Chinese said that "such a
WFTU report would have been rejected by the Chinese people."
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It seems likely then that the Chinese charges referred to the
original draft of the WFTU report prepared by Louis Saillant.
The offending language probably was edited out, at Soviet
insistence, before Bras actually delivered the report to the
council. The involvement of the two Frenchmen, Saillant and
Bras, in this matter would explain the vigorous reaction of the
French delegates at Bucharest,)
23. Delegates at this second meeting received a number
of papers, including an 80-plus page Chinese translation of a
CPSU document. This document appears to be a critical factor
in the further development of the dispute. Its existence has
been reported by a number of independent and widely separated
sources, and at least two reports indicate that it was a sharp,
wide ranging, and bitterly critical summary of Soviet criticisms
of the CPC. One source has reported that, prior to the Bucharest
congress, the CPSU addressed a "sharp" letter to the CPC
embodying its criticisms of Chinese doctrines and actions, in-
cluding charges against the Chinese foreign policy toward India
and Algeria, as well as charges that Chinese actions were
destroying "bourgeois" confidence in Communist desires for
peace and arousing Afro-Asian suspicions of international
Communism. The fact that the CPSU sent a letter "raising
various issues" to the CPC was also stated by P'eng Chen at
Bucharest. A third source, describing the contents of the
document, also notes its sharpttx,e and its charges of Chinese
errors in the foreign policy toward India. In addition, this
source says that it criticized Chinese nationalism and Chinese
noncooperation with the USSR in military matters. On the
basis of this series of reports it seems probable that the
Chinese -translated Soviet-document distributed at this second
meeting on 25 June was in fact the full text of the "sharp"
CPSU letter to the CPC,(see above para 11). If this was the
case, its presentation by the Chinese was clearly a part of
their effort to set the record straight, and undoubtedly
disrupted the Soviet tactical plans for the meeting. Such a
significant decision must necessarily have been made by the
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CPC Central Committee, probably during its early June
meeting, and suggests that the CPC's attitude toward the
Bucharest meeting was predicated, at least to some extent,
on the use of this tactic. There is some question whether
Khrushchev was present at this first day of debate. At least
one source indicates that he was present, but there is no
evidence that he participated in the discussion.
24. On 26 June came the final meeting, another closed
session that was attended by those present on the preceding
day. It was at this second installment of the debate that
Khrushchev personally presented his general indictment of
the Chinese and provoked a heated exchange with P'eng Chen.
A number of reports state that the Khrushchev speech opened
the proceedings. The speech was a long one and reportedly
involved direct attacks on Mao Tse-tung, comparing him to
Stalin as "always thinking in his own terms" and "formulating
theories without coming into contact with the events of the
modern world. " One source states that Khrushchev's speech
was arranged at short notice. The reporting on the speech
suggests that it was at least partly extemporaneous, with
Khrushchev injecting facts, anecdotes, and direct charges
that effectively demolished the attitude of restraint, tact,
and adherence to principle which the CPSU had previously
tried to maintain in the debate. Speaking angrily, with
violent gestures, he described the CPC doctrines as ultra-
leftist, as dogmatic, and, finally, as left revisionist. He
said the Chinese did not understand the nature of modern
war, and rejected Chinese protests over the fact that the
USSR had failed to support China in her border dispute with
India, characterizing the dispute as a conflict of purely
national interests in which the interests of world Communism
were not involved. There is reason to suspect that his attack
also included charges directed against some elements of
other Communist parties of complicity with the Chinese. He
attacked P'eng Chen himself, chiding him for his failure to
refer to peaceful coexistence in his public address to the
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congress on the 22nd. In general he apparently reiterated in
stronger and less ambiguous terms virtually all the charges
embodied in the original CPSU letter to the CPC. Since
his speech is described by some sources as a systematic and
detailed presentation of the Soviet charges, it seems likely
that it was in fact built around the argumentation of the draft
cirualar letter of 21 June earlier shown to Free World
delegates,!
25. P$eng Chen is reported to have replied in very
heated terms. He said he had asked for a discussion to he
held on equal terms, and that the CPC respected the CPSU
as an "elder brother" but not as a "father" party. Counter-
attacking strongly, he accused Khrushchev of organizing the
meeting to make an attack on the CPC and Mao Tse-tung and
to cover up a Soviet effort to undermine the prestige of the
CPC; He defended Mao{as "more in contact with the modern
world than Khrushchev, and more active than ever since
leaving the government chairmanship." Referring to
Khrushchev himself in terms reminiscent of the 16 June Red
Flag article, he charged that "Khrushchevds policy is a policy
of revisionism, creating illusions about imperialism and under-
estimating its true nature." Speaking of the abrupt shifts in
Khrushchev's policy toward the imperialist powers, he reportedly
asked the delegates whether "any conclusions can be drawn re-
garding Khrushchev's policy toward the imperialist powers.
He stated finally that the CPC had no trust in Khrushchev's
analysis of the world situation and especially his policy toward
the imperialists. Refuting Khrushchev's charges that the
Chinese did not understand modern war, Paeng aaid the Chinese
had proved in Korea as well as against the Japanese that they
have more experience than other peoples of the world. He
further registered a protest, saying that he had asked for delay
in the issuance of the communique but had been told on 24 June
that it had to be signed in the interest of unity. He stated for
the benefit of other delegates the instructions under which he
was working, and said that if the communique were published
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without the approval of the CPCds Central Committee cor-
rections might later be required.
26. A number of statements by others were then made
in a general discussion. Todor Zhivkov first spoke and gave
full support to Khrushchev's position; others, while less
warm than Zhivkov, were, it is reported, generally pro-
Khrushchev in their views. No one spoke against the Soviet
position. Khrushchev reportedly ended the session by saying
that further bilateral discussions between the CPSU and the
CPC were necessary.
27. A commission (or committee) was set up at these
sessions to prepare for a conference to be held during the
next November anniversary celebrations in Moscow, where
all parties were to present their views, Divergent reports
on the composition of the committee have been received. In
general they agree that the committee was to involve about
twenty parties and that all the bloc parties were to be rep-
resented. At least two separate reports state that the parties
of Argentina, Cuba, Brazil, Japan, and West Germany were
also to be represented on the commission. One of these re-
pol3ts, supported by a third separate one, also states that Italy
and France were to participate. Other parties to participate,
listed only in single reports, are those of the U.S., the U.K.,
India, Syria, and Australia. At least one source states that
the commission was to be composed only of representatives
of the bloc parties. The terms of reference of this commission
are not known. The commission has since been called to meet
in Moscow at the end of September. A.-separate CPSU committee
has allegedly been set up as well, to prepare a new CPSU
document on the dispute. It seems probable that the CPSU is
planning to use it in November as the draft letter of 21 June
was used at Bucharest, to predetermine the outcome of the
conference. According to one source, Khrushchev gave in-
structions to the delegates at the end of the session that they
were to report back to their Central Committees that a plenum
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should be convened to discuss the doctrinal dispute, with the
results of these plenums to be disseminated at all levels of
the party. On the basis of other information, however, it
appears probable that most parties did not construe his state-
ment,:as a command, for there were few such program-is
initiated before the CPSU's plenum of mid-July.
28. The final communique approved by the fraternal
delegates was released by TASS in Moscow on 27 June.
According to one source, it was adopted primarily to conceal
the fact that the meeting had failed to accomplish anything;
but the CPSU, particularly Khrushchev, clearly wanted it
as a device to exert pressure for prompt resolution of the
dispute. A short and virtually mechanical reaffirmation of
the validity of the 12 Party Declaration of November 1957,
its text did not in fact clarify any of the is sues in the dispute.
This became apparent in a few days with the appearance of
the Soviet and Chinese press statements on the communique.
The signatures of the 12 Bloc parties (including the CPC)
registered on 24 June, and the unanimous approval given by
the fifty parties represented were to prove the only significant
feature of the communique.
29. The principal results of the Bucharest meetings appear
to be the following. The Chinese succeeded in making known
to a large audience of bloc and non-bloc Communist party
delegates their strong exceptions to Khrushchev's policies and
some of the less "principled" actions taken against them by
the CPSU. They may have hoped that their adamant tactics
would create fear of an open split and thus force the Soviets
to break down or compromise. Their actions left the Soviets
and their supporters in other parties little choice but to
defend the Soviet position as the supreme authority and policy
maker in the international Communist movement and to apply
against the Chinese all their influence within the bloc and Free
World Communist parties, It would appear that the final
Chinese position was one from which they will have to retreat
if they desire a settlement. It is premised that this will be
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the situation with which the Soviets will attempt to confront
them in November 1960, when the world Communist leadership
meets in Moscow on the occasion of the celebration of the
October Revolution.
The CPSU Document of 21 June 1960
30. The CPSU circular of 21 June consisted of some seventy
pages. In an introductory section it outlined the history of the
dispute in "recent"* years. In succeeding sections it analyzed
and refuted the Chinese arguments and it presented a bill of
particularb on instances of Chinese violation of discipline.
31. Soviet views on the background of the dispute. The
document stated that, despite a long history of friendly re-
lations and cooperation between the USSR and the CPR, the
Soviets noted that the Chinese had "recently" begun to take
divergent positions on very important questions and that this
stand threatened to disrupt good relations and the solidarity
of the international movement. This divergence was mani-
fested in the Chinese articles on the anniversary of Lenin's
birth in April, statements within the WFTU and other inter-
national organizations, and Chinese statements at variance
with the 1957 Moscow Declaration and Peace Manifesto. The
CPSU had made no move against these Chinese statements,
considering it necessary to hold a meeting to discuss them.
32. According to the Soviets, Chou En-lai told the
Soviet Ambassador to China in January that the problem was
essentially a Party matter and that he preferred not to discuss
it.
Excerpts set off in quotation marks in this account are
based on a number of summaries of the document, and
do not necessarily reflect the exact text of the original.
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33. On 6 February 1960, the Central Committee of the
CPSU proposed a discussion to resolve the differences, The
Chinese refused to attend such a meeting and began publicizing
their views.
34. At the time of the meeting of the General Council of
the WFTU in Peking in early June, the Chinese revealed to
the Soviets their great dissatisfaction with CPSU positions
and they also told other Communists of their attitude. On
Z June Liu Ning-yi told Grishin that the Chinese were very
dissatisfied with the position of the WFTU on the question of
peace and disarmament. Liu Ning-yi sad that "to sit down at
the same table with imperialists" meant the "betrayal of all
mankind". He warned Grishin that if the report of the WFTU
were not changed, the Chinese would criticize the WFTU and
expose its "right opportunism."
35. At a session of the General Council, Liu Ning-yi
presented views that differed from the Soviet positions, the
CPSU document charged. Then, at a supper and meeting to
which the Chinese Politburo invited some delegates, Liu
Shao-chi said that there were important differences of opinion
among the Communist Parties. Teng Hsiao'-p'ing then spoke
on "War and Peace", accusing the Soviets of errors in the
20th Congress thesis on "peaceful coexistence" and "throwing
overboard" the Moscow Declaration"-at the same time,
according to the CPSU document, as he himself contradicted
the Moscow Declaration. He attacked, Soviet efforts to negotiate
with the West as a "betrayal" of world Communism. Chou
En--1ai was going to speak, but the delegates asserted that they
would not condone criticism or discussions "behind the backs"
of the Communist Parties.
36. The CPSU document criticized the Chinese methods
as incorrect, unacceptable and opposed to proletarian inter-
nationalism. The Soviets had been informed by comrades of
other Parties that the Chinese had many times asked for meetings
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and had been making known criticisms and disagreements
going back to as early as 1956.
37. The Chinese said that because of the opposition
expressed against their attitude, they would not speak in the
WFTU sessions; but they did so nevertheless, even in
discussion with non-Communist delegates. Thhn, the
Chinese speakers at the WFTU meeting tried to impose the
Chinese line on the WFTU and openly to line the WFTU up
against the CPSU.
38. In addition, the Soviet document charged, the Chinese
were distributing "Long Live Leninism" and other critical
articles within the Bloc, without the permission of the other
CPs.
39. It is necessary to discuss the problems of, the
"character of the present epoch", "war and peace", "co-
existence", and "road to socialism", the CPSU document
states, because the "Communist movement does not see these
problems clearly. "
40. "Character of the present epoch". The document
criticized as one-sided the Chinese characterization of the epoch
as one of "imperialism, wars, and revolutions." The Chinese
claim that any other attitude is a departure from Lenin's views.
The CPSU believes tht.t:the Chinese fail to take into account
the changes in the correlation of class forces and that they
misunderstand and misinterpret Lenin's thesis. The Chinese
analysis is "incomplete" and it conflicts with the Soviet
characterization of the "epoch" as one also of "disintegration
of imperialism, transition to socialism, and of formation and
consolidation of the world system of socialism." Developing
further the well-established Soviet concepts in this regard, the
document stated that the definition of the character of the epoch
has "great fundamental importance", for from this definition
are derived different conclusions regarding "strategy and
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tactics, peaceful transition, peaceful coexistence, war, peace,
and disarmament. "
41. The Chinese claim that the CPSU has departed from
Leninism in appraising the nature of "imperialism",. but they
are wrong. The document cited statements at the 20th and
21st Congress and by Khrushchev on his return from the U. S.
and later, from France, to support the Soviet refutation of the
Chinese charges.
42. War and Peace. At one time, the CPSU document
said, the Chinese adhered to the Khrushchev thesis on peace-
ful coexistence. Lately, in the April articles and at the WFTU
meeting, the Chinese have departed from this thesis. In Red
Flab, the Chinese said that only the "imperialist general staff",
and not the Communists, could decide whether there would be
war or peace, whether to launch local or general war, or
whether to intervene abroad. This attitude is based on a wrong
analysis of forces. The document reiterated the Soviet
argument that "war is not merely an economic phenomenon",
but depends upon the correlation of forces, and that the forces
of peace may be able to prevent the "imperialists" from re-
sorting to war. The most "decisive" factor is the Communist
camp,
43. To take the position that war is inevitable leads to
"fatalism", "paralyzes the struggle", and "disarms the people.
Events after the 20th Congress confirm the Soviet thesis. By
'-11965"'even, the most rash imperialists Will see that war is
impossible. "
44. At the Moscow conference in 1957 Mao himself said
that p1 'Everything reduces itself to gaining fifteen years. Lasting
peace will be assured throughout the world. ! " Today, the
Chinese are inconsistent. On the one hand, they call imperialism
a "paper tiger". On the other hand, they say that the imperialists
cannot be restrained. The CPSU, however, says that the
imperialists should neither be over or underestimated.
23
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45. According to Chinese articles, whoever defends the
thesis /of averting war/ is " 'opposed to wars of liberation' ".
This is false. Coexistence "does not mean renunbiation of
proletarian class war, or of national liberation, including
armed struggle." The contrary is true: class struggle will
increase once the threat of war has been eliminated.
46. The Chinese have persisted in their view that "as
long as imperialism exists...the succession of periods of
war and peace will be permanent and inevitable. " (The
document cited Red Flag and People's Dail.) At the WFTU
meeting, Liu Chang-sheng said that it was an "illusion" to
think that there mould be a world without wars and without
arms so long as imperialism exists. At a public session
of the WFTU, members of the Chinese Central Committee
launched a polemic against the Peace manifesto which had
been signed by "all" Parties, including the Chinese.
47. The CPSU document declared: that peaceful co-
existence means "gaining time" for the "consolidation of
the Socialist system and the acceleration of the building of
socialism and Communism." The "Communist Parties
cannot permit society to be thrown back hundreds of years"
and the destruction of "hundreds of millions" of people.
48. It is impossible to accept the arguments of Red
Flag: " 'We need not fear war. Atom bombs are paper
tigers /used by the imperialists// to subjugate people. The
losses from war will be compensated by the victory of
socialism.' "
49. The Soviet position, the CPSU document said, is
that ten or fifteen years of peace will assure the supremacy
of Socialism and it will then be possible to exclude war, ""even
if capitalism remains in part of the world." (The document
cited Lenin in support of this policy.)
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50. Coexistence, the Soviets asserted, will encourage
cer*rifugal forces within the "imperialist bloc" and will
I'sharpen contradictions" within "imperialist countries" and
between them.
51. The Chinese say that coexistence means "class peace".
This is wrong. The Soviets never included within the concept
of coexistence relations between colonies and colonialist
countries, between dependent and imperialist countries, or
between the proletariat and the exploiters. Coexistence, on
the contrary, is a "form of class war" on the international
level. It opens up possibilities for solidarity ti th the masses
for the eventual defeat of capitalism. (The document cited
the November 1959 Rome "Appeal" of the 17 West European
CPs).
52. The Chinese say that, in connection with the struggle
for national liberation, "the CPSU is flirting with the national
bourgeoisie" and "abandoning class positions." This is
wrong. The Soviet position on participation of the national
bourgeoisie in the national liberation struggle is "Leninist".
53. Soviet economic aid to the "liberated countries"
is justified by the fact that "objectively" such aid promotes
the cause of peace and weakens imperialism. The Chinese
say that the policy should be "revised" on the ground that
when the national boureoisie gains power it loses its ability
to fight imperialism /'India, Egypt, and Indonesia were
cited/ and "are themselves becoming imperialists".
54. The Soviets answered this by saying that it is
necessary not to "skip stages in the revolution". To do
so can cause "serious danj~Sp. " It is essential to "look at
the correlation of class forces. " The "imperialists" try to
exploit "splits in the national liberation movements". The
Communists must try to increase their "friends" among
the neutralists. This used to be the policy of the Chinese,
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with. their slogan of "unity and struggle", but no longer.
55. The CPSU document said that it was necessary to
exploit "contradictions in the enemy capap" and cited Lenin's
statements on this subject. The Chinese argument that one
should " 'not sit at the table with the imperialists' " is a
denial of this Leninist policy.
56. The Soviets consider it essential not to minimize
the military strength of the "imperialists" because to do so
would make it impossible to "mobilize the masses against
the threat of war. "
57. The document denied that coexistence weakens the
military ability of the "Socialist camp", and refuted Chinese
insinuations at the WFTU meeting that disarmament proposals
encouraged "illusions". The current Soviet approach to
disarmament is "new". It is based on the belief that the
Soviet policy would make it possible to create "broad popular
fronts" and mass movements, and that it makes it difficult
for "bellicose circles to intensify the arms race." The
Soviet effort to get rid of U.S. overseas bases is a major
aim of the disarmament campaign, and events in Japan have
shown the effectiveness of Soviet policy. The Chinese are
wrong to oppose the disarmament slogan and this opposition
is in conflict with Soviet program. The Chinese concppt of
a "third way" which was put forward at the WFTU meeting
means nothing less than continuation of the cold war and of
the arms race, and causes political difficulties for the peace
policies of the USSR by substantiating imperialist charges that
Communists want war.
58. Different forms of transition to socialism. The
CPSU document refuted the Chinese charge that the CPSU had
been advocating the idea that the "peaceful way" was the "only
way of transition." It cited the 20th Congress thesis on this
point and the statement in the 1957 Moscow Declaration. The
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Chinese, the document said, had apparently departed from
their previous agreement with the CPSU, and if they no longer
agreed, they should say so.
59. Chinese activities in the "international democratic
organizations". Within these international /fronts/ the CPSU
charged, the Chinese had been taking a separate position which
made it difficult to arrive at decisions.
60. Within the World Peace Council, the Chinese had
refused to vote on key resolutions.
61. At the IUS meeting at Tunis in February 1960, the
Chinese had opposed "broader contacts with student organi-
zations in capitalist countries" and had instead emphasized
the need for "uncompromising struggle". At a WFDY meeting
in March, and at the Afro-Asian conference in April, the
Chinese had opposed discussion of disarmament on the ground
that the "call for disarmament lulls the popular masses and
demobilizes them in the struggle against imperialism."
62. As early as 1949, at the conference of Asian trade
unions in Peking, the Chinese had proposed " 'unfolding bitter
struggle in colonial and semi-colonial countries' " and formation
of "liberation armies" under Party direction. This had been
done without consulting the Parties and had helped the "imperialists"
in their fight; against the W'FTU. The Chinese had later revised
this attitude, the document said.
63. In May 1954, the Chinese Central Committee had sent
to the CPSU a report ofithe Communist fraction of the Chinese
trade unions which agreed with the WFTU positions. However,
the Chinese were opposing WFTU decisions which applied to
all countries. This caused trouble between the WFTU and
some CPs. "Now", the CPSU document said, "the Chinese
talk of WFTU opportunism, and this threatens the unity of its
ranks. "
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64. Chinese divergence from the 1957 Declaration and
Peace Manifesto. The CPSU charged the Chinese with departing
from the Moscow documents of 1957 on six main counts.
1. They had "revised" the characterization of the
present "epoch" so as to make it read that this is "an epoch
of wars and revolutions".
2. They say that the "Leninist principle of peaceful
coexistence", as it is spelled out in the Moscow Declaration,
creates "illusions" and that "peaceful coexistence is impossible;
it only gratifies the imperialists and enables them to murder
the peoples of Asia and Africa with impunity. "
1 3. The Chinese say that the thesis in the Moscow
Declaration that "the struggle for peace /is/ the foremost
task" of the Communist Parties is "erroneous and anti-Leninist"
and that it encourages the "delusion that there can be peace
with capitalism."
4. The Chinese reject the Moscow Declaration's
thesis on " 'different forms of transition' It as coming from
an " 'incorrect understanding of imperialism.' rr
5. The Chinese question the thesis of the Moscow
Declaration that the 20th CPSU Congress had opened "a new
stage" in the international movement, and they want to re-
open the question of the "cult of personality. " The Chinese
had endorsed the CPSU's action regarding the "cult of Stalin",
and Mao-Tse-tung himself had done so at the 1957 Moscow
meetings. The new proposal to reopen the discussion "de-
tracts from important Party tasks, and weakens the struggle
against the consequences of the cult of personality" in some
other parties, the document declared.
6. In violation of the principle of correct "fraternal
relations" of Communist Parties, the Chinese have criticized
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Parties "behind their backs". This criticism of the policies
of the CPSU "does not contribute to the prestige or unity" of
the international movement. In particular, the Chinese
had disagreed with the November 1959 "Appeal" of seventeen
West European CPs and had called thidocument "opportunist".
In this way, the Soviets say, the Chinese have set themselves
up as the "judges over the group of most experienced parties",
and they did it in the absence of these parties, at a meeting
at Peking. In criticizing the CPSU itself, the Chinese CP
has not been direct, but has made use of "indirect methods
and functionaries. It
65. The need for closer unity between the socialist camp
and the international Communist movement. The CPSU docu-
ment said that the Chinese position threatens serious damage
to the unity of the socialist camp and that "many" Chinese
actions have been "disloyal and uncomradely".
66. Although the Chinese 'say that } , 'USSR should lead
the "camp", behind the back of the CPSU they have attacked
the CPSU, through "trade union representatives, representatives
of the national liberation movement and other representatives
of the Communist parties." This shows a lack of "sincerity"
and is a violation of the "principles of proletarian internationalism.
67. The document cited cases when the CPSU had disagreed
with the Chinese Party, but had not intervened: the "hundred
flowers"" program; the Chinese abandonment /in the commune
program/ of the "Leninist principle of material incentive under
socialism." In Soviet eyes, "loyalty to Leninism is tested not
only by pards but by deeds", the document said, and it cited
Soviet aid to the Chinese (15 billion rubles in deliveries and
6. 6 billion rubles credit.)
68. The document said that it was necessary and possible
for the differences between the Chinese and the Soviets to be
overcome "without compromising principles." The Chinese
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must take into account the "interests of the world Communist
movement"; dissension can only benefit "imperialism, the
common enemy. "
69. On 17 June, CPSU representatives met with CPC
Relegates en route to the Rumanian Party Congress. The
Soviets told the Chinese that they considered the Tatters'
"views and methods erroneous." The Chinese refused to
change their stand, but said that they would be willing to
"admit their errors" if a majority at the Bucharest conference
"proved" them to be wrong.
70. The GPSU document said that, in view of the fact
that the issues in dispute had been defined in the Peace
Manifesto of 1957, signed by all Communist Parties, the
CPSU considered it necessary to exchange views with rep-
resentatives of all parties.
71. The doonment concluded with an expression of
confidence that the CPC would "weigh our comradely
criticism in a Marxist way and draw the necessary conclusions,
bearing in mind the interests of the entire Socialist camp and
the international Communist movement, which are inseparable
from the interests of the building of Communism in the Chinese
Peoples Republic."
Developments after Bucharest
72. In the three months following Bucharest, the dispute
continued unresolved, and indeed, there was no serious at-
tempt to resolve it. Each side continued to argue the merits
of its respective position; each continued its effort to get
support within the world movement. The Soviets sent a series
of letters to the Chinese criticizing Chinese propaganda
activities and putting the Chinese on notice that Soviet technicians
would be withdrawn during August. The Chinese replied to these
letters and, on 10 September, produced a comprehensive rebuttal
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of the charges which the Soviets had made in the circular
draft letter of 21 June. The contents of the Chinese letter
of 10 September were made known to some foreign Com-
munist leaders, just as the Soviets had done with their
21 June circular. As of mid-September, leading circles
throughout the international movement were well aware
of the gravity of the dispute and many were disturbed by
the prospects of an international meeting, scheduled for
9 November in Moscow, at which they would be called
upon to commit themselves.
73. The developments during these three months will
be treated chronologically and in summary form.
June.", .,
74. On 29 June both Pravda and the Peiping People's
Daily carried editorials on the Bucharest communique
that made it abundantly clear that both Parties remained
firm in their divergent views. Neither of the articles
criticized the opponent, but the "principled" statements
of position were clearly divergent.
75. Pravda falsely claimed that in signing the com-
munique the entire Bloc had endorsed the thesis of the
20th and 21st CPSU Congresses, as well as the proven
validity of both Moscow Declaration and the Peace Manifesto
of 1957. The article was clearly intended to create the
impression that the CPSU had the full support of the world
movement.
76. People's Daily disposed of the communique
biaefly, using it mainly as a peg for a lengthly presentation
of the correctness of the Chinese interpretation of the
Moscow Declaration, with emphasis on "revisionism" as
the "main danger".
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77. In.late June, representatives of the French, Italian,
and Danish CPs were in Moscow and were presumably briefed,
on how to handle the dispute.
July
78. During $uly the CPSU took action against Chinese
propaganda activities in the USSR, arranged to withdraw
Soviet technicians from China, reasserted the fundamentals
of the Soviet position, and adopted a resolution which formally
endorsed Khrushchev's actions at Bucharest while sharply
attacking Chinese views.
79. The CPC leadership apparently held a long conference
during the month. It is believed that the Chinese decided to
withdraw temporarily from open disputation, to concentrate
on strengthening domestic controls in order to counter Soviet
pressures, and, in preparation for a resumption of open
debate, to exert pressures on the international movement.
80. On 6 July, the CPSU informed the CPC that, in
carrying two offensive editorials, the Chinese Russian-
language journal Druzhba had violated an agreement that
neither country should publish articles against the other.
The two articles were characterized as against Marxism-
Leninism and the Moscow Declaration. The Soviets told
the Chinese that the Soviet publication in Peking was being
stopped and they asked that Druzhba also be stopped. #
81. Kommunist No. 10, signed to the press 11 July 1960,
carried an important article by F. Konstantinov and K.
Momdzhyan, who proceeded to uphold the CPSU positions
In addition to suspending the distrii+bution of Druzhba,
the Chinese illustrated periodical Kitai was dmppped for
at least two issues. It is not known whether or not this
was also mentioned in the 6 July letter.
32
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and refute the Chinese arguments on the basis of "revolutionary
dialectics" and "creative Marxism". "Only doctrinaires, and
not revolutionaries" could fail to understand the significance
of peaceful coexistence in the "changed conditions" of today,
they said. Those who argue (as the Chinese have) that
coexistence "could disarm the peoples ideologically and
demobilize them" are guilty of a "blunder". Those who deny
the possibility of "peaceful transition" (as the Chinese have
tended to do) are guilty of "misleading" some CPs. "They
can only drag these parties to the positions of sectarianism
and dogmatism". Anyone who acts to create disunity in' the
Bloc, the authors charged, are "willy, or nilly" working
against the "success of the struggle for peace and sokialism.
the sacred duty" of all Communists.
82. On 12 July the Central Committee of the CPSU
convened in plenary session; and its final resolution, dated
16 July, went far beyond a mere criticism of left-wing
dogmatism. The resolution gave unusually heavy emphasis
of the CPSU's approval of the conduct of the Soviet delegation
to Bucharest, and it actually distorted the result of the
Bucharest debate to make it appear that it had formally
endorsed the theses of the 20th and 21st CPSU Congresses
and that it had included denunciation of "narrow nationalism".
For the first time, the Central Committee formally
characterized as "deviations" such views such as those
held by the Chinese.
83. The strong commitment by the Central Committee
to the Khrushchev line at Bucharest reflected new, disturbing
developments in Sino-Soviet relations during the two weeks
following Bucharest. Military relationships snagged, and
the matter of the Soviet technicians was reaching a critical
stage,
84. A Soviet military mission dispatched to China
after Bucharest to conclude certain defense arrangements
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reportedly found that the Chinese had abruptly decided that
they, and not the Russians, should control the facilities in
question. A CPSU foreign section official told a leading
Free World Communist in July that problems had arisen
from Chinese demands for modern (presumably atomic)
weapons.
85. On 21 July the CPSU sent a letter to the CPC
complaining about the Chinese attitude toward Soviet
technicians. According to the CPSU, the withdrawal of
Soviet technicians for work at home had been requested
at the end of 1956 (and/or early in 1957), on the ground
that local technicians had been trained. The other Bloc
countries agreed to this, but the Chinese did not. Again,
when the Chinese complained about the behavior of some
technicians in August 1958, the Soviets considered their
withdrawal, but the Chinese demurred. Recently, the
CPSU letter charged, the Chinese had added to their
disrespectful treatment of the technicians by circulating
"anti-Marxist" literature among them in an effort to
subvert them. The Chinese pamphlet entitled "Long Live
Leninism", containing three April ideological refutations
of the Soviet line was cited as an example of the type of
subversive literature being used by the Chinese.
86. In a letter dated 25 July, without waiting for
a reply from Peking, the CPSU served notice that all
Soviet technicians would be withdrawn during the period
28 July - 1 September.
87. Less is known of Chinese activities during the
month of July. "Long Live Leninism" ;was widely distri-
buted abroad in an effort to publicize the Chinese views
within the world movement. A theoretical journal
(Hsiang River Critic), which had played a key role during
the period in the 1920's and 30's when Mao was opposing
Soviet influence on Chinese Communism, was revived in
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the middle of July. Liu Ning-=i, leading a delegation to
Japan at the end of July, subsequently demonstrated by his
actions in Japan the content of the hard Chinese line in
foreign policy. The Chinese leadership, apparently in
extended conference from 2 July to 22 July, prepared its
answers to the CPSU letters, and it seems likely that
the Chinese were then in favor of conciliating the Soviets
as much as possible without, however, retreating from
positions of principle.
Au 9_u -St
88. Relations continued to worsen during August. The
month opened with a Chinese letter (or possibly, two
separate letters) dealing with the technicians and the question
of publications. Later, the Chinese leadership appears
again to have met and probably to have decided to take a
harder position against Soviet pressures. In mid-August
the Chinese began again to participate in the open disputation.
The CPSU continued to publish articles attacking Chinese
positions and employed the Bulgarian Party leader Zhivkov,
to push pro-Soviet, anti-Chinese theses in the international
Communist journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism.
A "conciliatory" ];bitter was sent to the CPC on 20 August,
but late in the month the CPSU was circulating to foreign
CPs a revised and strengthened version of the 21 June letter
which had been shown to foreign CP delegations at Bucharest.
89. In a letter (or letters) dated 1 August the Chinese
answered the CPSU letters of July regarding the publications
and technicians.
9P. The Chinese said that, although the CPSU publi-
cation in Peking had been writing objectionable pieces since
September 1959, they had not demanded a stoppage, on the
ground that they trusted their own cadres to be able to
determine fight from wrong. The Chinese pointed out that
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the U. S. Embassy in Moscow was permitted to distribute
Amerika in 50, 000 copies and suggested that it was "curious"
that the U. S. should be able to publicize the "American way of
live" an."imperialism". The Chinese acknowledged that they
must accede to Soviet insistence but requested reconsideration.
91. Concerning the Soviet technicians, the Chinese
refuted the CPSU charges. In 1958 the CPC had asked that the
technicians be called "technical experts" rather than "advisers".
This had been agreed to. The CPC had only complained about
a few technicians, and this had been settled. It was not true
that the advice of the technicians had been "demonstratively
burnt" as the CPSU had charged; the advice had been accepted
in the main. The technicians themselves had asked for Chinese
literature at the very beginning, and it was not unusual that
they had attended occasional lectures. The distribution of
"Long Live Leninism" was not exceptionable: the technicians
had not been forced to discuss it.
92. The Chinese said that if the Soviets continued to
object to these practices, they could be discussed, but the CPC
did strongly object to the unilateral Soviet action as wrong--
legally, morally, and politically. It constituted a violation
of the Sino-Soviet treaty of Friendship. It would damage
the Chinese construction program, create difficulties, weaken
the Bloc, and encourage the "imperialists".
93. An Orientalists Congress, which had been long and
widely-heralded by the Soviets attid at which Sinology had been
given high booking, opened in Moscow on 9 August--without
the Chinese. Their withdrawal, without explanation, and
with lame explanation by the Soviets, was probably intended
to demonstrate disapproval of "opportunist" Soviet efforts to
attract participants from the West.
94. Another meeting of the Chinese leadership appears to
have been held between 2 and 13 August. No details are available.
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95. In mid-August, Problems of Peace and Socialism
carried an article by Bulgarian Party chief Todor Zhivkov, who
had signally supported Khrushchev at Bucharest. Zhivkov's
defense of Khrushchev's peace strategy as both necessary and
-feasible followed the line previously enunciated by Khrushchev,
Gomulka, Novotny, and Togliatti, and indicated that the CPSU
was beginning to step up its use of Problems of Peace and
Socialism as a weapon in the dispute.
96. Li Fu-ch'un, Politburo member and Chairman of
the State Planning Commission, reopened the Chinese campaign
in the overt debate. His 16 August article in Red Flag (like
the April "Long Live Leninism" article) was published in
English in Peking Review, 23 August. He charged that the
""modern revisionists" who had been trying to isolate China
since 1958 would only isolate themselves (as the CPC had
said privately to the CPS'; in late 1959 or early 1960). In
mid-month, the deputy director of the CPC's international
Liaison department lead a strong Chinese delegation for
the Cuban Party congress to Habana, where he concentrated
on lobbying among foreign delegates to line them up against
the "modern revisionists",
97. Also in mid-August, a speech by Li Wei-han as=
serted that the Chinese were the only correct interpreters
of Leninism: "The Mao Tse-tung ideology is Marxism-
Leninism in its fullest developed form in the era of socialist
revolution by the proletariat." Characteristically, the speech
added a second major thesis reminiscent of 1949: "armed
struggle is the principal form of waging the revolution. "
It is of considerable significance that this speech was not
published until 24 September, by which time the CPC had
definitely decided upon a much more intransigeant attitude
toward the CPSU.
98. Meanwhile, the CPSU in mid-August was continuing
to elaborate its ideological position. Following an important
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article by Frantsev in Pravda of 7 August against a 'rebirth
of views similar to those of the left-wing Communists", a
leading spokesman for the foreign section of the Party,
B. N. Ponomarev, declared in Pravda that peaceful coexistence
was "nothing else but a higher form of class struggle." On
16 August, an article by S. Titarenko explicitly singled out
the Chinese for warning against the dangers of "isolation."
99. Almost coincidentally, on 16 August Li Fu-ch'un
wrote in Red Flag about the need for the Chinese to i'rely
mainly on our own efforts".
100. Sometime after mid-August the CPSU. sent what
was described by a high Soviet official as a "conciliatory"
letter to the CPC. Nothing is known about this letter, or why
the spokesman considered it "conciliatory". Other very good
evidence suggests that the Chinese saw nothing very "con-
ciliatory" in the Soviet actions. .
101. On 26 August the leading CPSU expert on Com-
munist tactics in underdeveloped countries, Ye. Zhukov,
wrote in Pravda on "Some Questions of the Contemporary
National Liberation Movement." This was a sharp rebuttal
of Chinese hostility toward "bourgeois nationalists", which
"haughty attitude", Zhukov said, constituted "sectarianism
of the most dangerous kind."
102. Late in August it appeared that the CPSU had
circulated among the Free World CP's a revised and
strengthened version of the 21 June circular which had been
shown to delegates at Bucharest. The CPSU seems to have
told the recipients that they would noty have sufficient time
to digest the Soviet charges and to reach clear-cut decisions
prior to the scheduled meeting in Moscow in November. The
letter emphasized that the CPSU intended to seek clarification
and to reach a clear agreement with the CPC: this purpose may
have had something to do with the "conciliatory" letter mentioned
above.
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September
103. Chinese determination to stand firm on its positions,
demonstrated by statements in the Chinese press and at the
Vietnamese Party Congress, was communicated to the CPSU
in the Chinese letter of 10 September. Soviet statements
during the first half of the month indicated that Moscow was
also not prepared to retreat.
104. On 4 September the Chinese belatedly published
the full text of a speech delivered on 22 July to the Chinese
Writers Congress. The speech included a direct attack
on the concept of "humanism"--theme in both the domestic
and foreign programs of the CPSU.
105. The following day Li Fu-ch?un, who headed the
Chinese delegation to the Vietnamese congress, delivered a
speech reasserting the correctness of the basic Chinese
positions. The response of the leading Soviet delegate
N. A. Mukhitdinov on 11 September was a violent attack on
the Chinese.
106. The Chinese letter of 10 September 1960. By far
the most important development, however, was the 10
September CPC letter to the CPSU, which was outlined by
the Chinese for the benefit of foreign CPs in continuation of
the Chinese effort to enlist their sympathy. The letter is
organized on a pattern similar to that of the 21 June CPSU
circular for the purpose of countering each of the charges
in that circular.
107. Chinese views on the background of the current
dispute. It was not true, as the CPSU had.alleged, that the
CPC had agreed with the CPSU in the past and had only
recently diverged from the CPSU. Actually, the letter statdd~i,
the differences began at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, when
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the CPSU wrongfully atruck off Stalin's "positive role"* without
prior discussion with the fraternal parties, and when the CPSU
put forward an erroneous theory of "peaceful transition", also
without consulting the other CP's. The CPC had registered
tbs objection to these CPSU actions, both in principle. and in
the unilateral way they had been taken.
108. In October 1956, the Chinese letter stated, the.
CPSU had mobilized armed forces against Poland and the
CPC had objected. The Soviets eventually agreed with the
Chinese. The CPSU had wanted the fraternal. CP's (apparently
in a joint meeting) to condemn the Polish Party, but the CPC
had advised the Soviets that the parties should individually
advise the Poles. Again, the CPC letter states, the CPSU
eventually agreed.
109. In the case of the Hungarian uprising, the Chinese
had again been obliged to intervene with the Soviets to get
them to crush the uprising by force. The Soviets had at one
point been determined to withdraw their forces from Hungary.
110. At the 1957 Moscow conference of CP's the CPC
had been instrumental in forcing significant revisions in the first
draft of the 12 Party Moscow Declaration. The first draft had said
nothing the subject of state power of class struggle, but
rather outlined a purely "parliamentary path" for "transition".
The CPC had sent a letter of objection, but, in order to save
the "prestige" of the CPSU, had agreed that the Declaration
should show a link between the formulations contained in the
The full text of the Chinese letter is not available.
Excerpts enclosed in quotation marks are taken from
notes made by Party representatives to whom the Chinese
showed the letter, and do not necessarily reflect the
language of the original text.
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Declaration and the 20th CPSU Congress theses.*
Ill.. At the Moscow conference, Mao had carefully specified
that the CPSU should "lead" the Bloc. ** This preeminence
carries with it the responsibilities of leadership, the 10 September
letter stated, and the CPSU should discuss matters with the
other CP's on an equal basis.
112. The CPC letter, in refuting Soviet charges to the
contrary, asserted that the CPC had not discussed these
differences with other CP's.
113. The Chinese declared that the CPSU had gradually
deviated from the Moscow Declaration and had gone back to the
"wrong theses" of the 20th CPSU Congress. Khrushchev,
especially, was guilty of this from September 1959, and of
open. criticism of the CPC and its leaders. The letter cited
numerous examples of the incorrect CPSU attitude: allegations
that the Chinese want to maintain the cold war, characterization
of the.Sino-Indian border dispute as "foolish and stupid", in-
sinuation that "an old man (Mao presumably) like one of a pair
of galoshes can be kept in a corner to be admired"; "'testing
stability of capitalism by arms"; Khrushchev's friendly
characterizations of Eisenhower and his statements about
"1960--a new era"; talk about banishing war; etc. Kuusinen's
A key symbol of the current dispute is the consistent
Chinese avoidance of the theses of the 20th and 21st CPSU
Congresses in their affirmations of the Moscow Declaration.
The CCP and the Albanian CP have employed the term "led",
rather, than "headed", referring to the CPSU position. within
the Bloc, advisedly. The other East European satellites
in general use the Soviet formula, "camp headed by the
CPSU".
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Lenin day article, the Chinese claimed, did not even mention
the Moscow Declaration-which shows how far the CPSU
had departed from it. Even if Khrushchev sars that no names
have been mentioned in these statements, it is clear to eveyy-
one according to the Chinese, who is meant.
114. The CPC letter defended the Chinese actions at the
WFTU meeting in Peking in June 1960 and pointed out the
inconsistency of the Soviet position: it is correct for the
CPSU to attack the CPC in the presence of non-Communists
and "imperialist reporters at Warsaw and Bucharest", but
wrong for the Chinese to call a meeting of leading Communists
at Peking. Furthermore, the CPC letter reveals the main
point of the Chinese objection to the Saillant report (written with the
help of a Soviet comrade, the letter states) to the WFTU meeting:
the report mentioned the free world without quotation marks,
whereas communes and the Leap Forward were put in quotation
marks. This styling constituted an open criticism of the CPC's
policy.
115. According to the 10 September Chinese letter, the
CPSU had sent a letter to the CPC on Z June calling for an
international meeting to resolve the differences. The CPC
had agreed but had asked for time to prepare itself. Then,
on 7 June, the CPSU suggested that there be held at Bucharest
a preliminary conference to discuss tactics following the
collapse of the Summit. The CPSU assured the CPC that no
resolution would be adopted at this meeting. Again, the
Chinese agreed. But at Bucharest Khrushchev surprised the
Chinese by launching on their positions a full scale attack
for which they were not prepared. Instead of an attack on
"imperialism", as the CPSU had proposed, the discussion was
diverted to a "harmful and disruptive" attack on the CPC.
After Bucharest, a press campaign was launched against the
Chinese. The CPC letter criticized the CPSU for rashness
and said that the latter seemed not to have understood how
much this had damaged Soviet prestige as the leader of the
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"camp". The letter then took up the basic questions raised in
the CPSU circular of_,Zl June.
116. "Present Epoch". The CPC letter reasserted the
correctness of its assessment of the present balance of forces
and its interpretation of this shift as meaning "greater op-
portunities for struggles for Socialism, for national liberation,
for peace, to expand and to succeed." Khrushchev's views on
the significance of the shift (which Mao recognized as early as
1949) are erroneous. The CPSU and Khrushchev have deviated
from the Moscow Declaration in talking about "banishing war
for ever", "would without arms and weapons", "export of
capital helping the development of colonial people", local %var s
leading "inevitably to world war", etc. The CPSU, by "attaching
exclusive importance to discussions with imperialist statesmen",
promotes the "personality cult." These views harm the
"liberation struggle'". Khrushchev overestimates the weakening
of "imperialism"; and his views are "subjective", "idealist",
and left'".
117. "War and peace". The CPC letter challenged the
CPSU attitudes toward this question. The CPSU has turned
the slogan "war is not fatalistically inevitable" into "war is
fatalistically avoidable". The CPSU "always hesitates" to,.
support "liberation struggles" and "even opposes" them. Of
all the "props" for maintaining peace cited in the Moscow
Declaration, the strength of the camp is the most important,
but the CPSU is weakening the camp by withdrawing technicians.
The letter justified Mao's "paper tiger" thesis by quoting Lenin
to the effect that "Anglo-French imperialism has feet of clay".
The well-known Chinese emphasis on "vigilance" and "struggle"
was reiterated, and the letter argued that not the Chinese but
the Soviet argument about the "destruction of mankind" by
nuclear war "is to create panic and lead to surrender and
blackmail. '"
118. "Peaceful Coexistence". In this section the Chinese
letter conceded that negotiating with "imperialists" may be
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necessary but objected to :anything that would "beautify and
prettify them." It might also be necessary to compromise,
but the Chinese would trust more in the efficacy of "exposing
and mass struggles" than in the "good wishes" of the
imperialists. The letter held out for what the 21st June CPSU
circular had called the "third way": ''world war can and
must be avoided, but the alternative may not, be peaceful
coexistence. It may be something like what obtains at present,
call it cold war or, anything you like." The letter objected to
specific. Soviet form 1ations, such as calling peaceful coexistence
"the highest form of class struggle"* and. saying that the
"'upsurge of liberation struggles is the result of,coexisten-ce".*41
It said :that Zhivkov had carried this (false). line of reasomjl;
.further in:saying that "coexistence is the road to socialism.
The Chinese attitude toward bourgeois. nationalists was reaf-
firmed.
3 119. "Peaceful transition." Here the ,Chinese claimed
that the CPSU had taken a "one-sided" view, had sought in the
first draft of the Moscow Declaration to "evade" the hard
facts of :"state power, class struggle, dictatorship, smashing
the state. machinery", and had been guilty of turning "Leninism
into bourgeois humanism". The question of "peaceful transition"
mu'at not be confused with the "parliamentary path": "we
should knave no illusion about the possibilities of bringing about
structural changes through Parliament."
120. . "Tactics.,in the International Mass Organizations."
The CPC letter defended the Chinese attitude toward the
See reference to the IlyitcheV;axticle of November 1959, ~n
para 3 above.
??i* Possibly, a reference to the Pravda article of 26 August 1960
by Ye. Zhukov, in which such an argument is implicit.
An elided excerpt from the article by Zhivkov in Problems
of Peace and Socialism, August 1960.
44
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international fronts: they should be "fighting organizations";
they must fight "imperialism, particularly U. S. imperialism";
they must "support unequivocally all national liberation
struggles" and "democratic struggles inside capitalist countries
they must be "flexible" and not merely rubber-stamp Bloc
policies. But the Soviets were "all along opposed to support
of national liberation struggles by the World Peace Council"
and the International Union of Students "nearly was liquidated
due to Soviet insistence on the merger of reactionary students'
organizations.'"
121. "Revisionism and Dogmatism." The Chinese letter
reaffirmed the Moscow Declaration assertion that "inter-
nationally revisionism is the main danger" and rebuked the
CPSU for holding that " 'revisionism has already been smashed'
It sought to turn around the Soviet attack on "dogmatism" by
pointing out that it was "dogmatic" to attack such "concrete
applications" of Marxism as the Communes and Great Leap
Forward.
122. "International Solidarity" Finally, the 10 September
letter returned to the CPC's views on the way the CPSU
should conduct itself as the "leader" of the Communist "Camp".
The relationship must be on a basis of equality and responsi-
bility. The CPSU violated this principle when it said that
I'all the fifty parties at Bucharest supported us." This assertion
was not true, the Chinese said: some CP's had taken different
positions. Also, it was "unfortunate" that the CPSU had
raised the dispute to the level of state relations in the matter
of the technicians. The letter expressed the Chinese con-
viction that "Socialist unity is basic, while the differences are
temporary." As for the November meeting in Moscow, the
Chinese believed that it would be a good thing if there could
be an agreement, but they feared that one meeting might not
be sufficient. Meanwhile, they would continue to emphasize
issues on which agreement existed, while continuing to discuss
unresolved differences.
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123. Following the issuance of the 10 September CP.C
letter, the last development to be accounted for in this survey`
is the publication in mid-September of two Soviet-inspired
articles in Problems of Peace and Socialism, and an article
in Kommunist. The PPS articles, by Leon Bohr and Jean
Dienne, further develop the validity of the Soviet argumentation
and present a number of the anti-Chinese charges. Neither
writer has been identified. The names may well be pseudonyznns,
and the CPSU's "use of functionaries" to conceal its hand is
interesting in view of the fact that it had accused, the CPC of
using this same device earlier.
124. An article by A. Belyakov and F. Burlatsky in
Konumunist No. 13 (10 September 1960) systematically criticized
"dogmatic" (Chinese) positions on peaceful coexistence, class
struggle and national liberation movements, and the possibility
of "peaceful transition." Significantly, the article upheld the
"creative approach" of the November 1959 Rome "Appeal" of
the seventeen West European Communist Parties, which the
Chinese had been covertly attacking as "opportunist."
The Mb Parties.
125. In the first three weeks after Bucharest (i.e., prior
to the CPSU.plenum), the Soviet effort to. get full support for
their positions on the part of the other Bloc parties met. with
mixed success. The.CPSU plenum of mid-July stimulated
further developments in this direction.
126. By mid-September the following Bloc parties were
on record as formally committed to the Soviet side on the
issues in dispute: Hungarian (29 June), Bulgarian (13 July),
East German (24 July), Rumanian (1 August), North Korean
(11 August), Polish (15 September). In addition, Novotny of
Czg slovakia early in July made. statements endorsing the
CPSU line. His statement and.a similar one by Gomulka
at that time were sufficiently satisfactory. to the CPSU for
publication in Pravda (8 July).
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127. The Mongolian Party on 4 July and the Albanian
Party on the 11th adopted resolutions which clearly failed to
satisfy the CPSU, and they were ignored by the Soviet press
in a 20 July roundup. The CPSU evidently exerted pressure
on these two parties, for on 14 August the Mongolian party
publication finally presented a vigorous criticism of "dog-
matists" and aligned itself with the CPSU, and on 2 August,
Enver Hoxha of Albania spoke in support of the Soviet view
on war and the desirability of peaceful coexistence. He
did not, however, retreat from the Albanian party's firm
insistence that right revisionism remains the main danger
to the Communist movement, and in fact the Albanian CP is
clearly on the Chinese side in the dispute.
128. The North Vietnamese Party at the outset indicated
that it wished to remain neutral in the dispute and has
continued to do so despite evidence of Soviet pressure. In
private conversation in September, Ho Chi Minh reportedly
stated that he was determined to remain neutral. He
considered it important that an agreement between Mao
and Khrushchev be reached before the November meeting
in Moscow, but he feared that neither would give in. On
the questions of "transition" and Chinese policy toward.India,
Ho appeared to support the Chinese views.
129. In addition to the adoption of formal positions on
the dispute, "explanatory" programs were observed in some
IIloc countries.
130. Following a conference reportedly held at Varna
among Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish, Czech, and Rumanian
representatives in the last week in July, the Bulgarian party
leadership discussed the launching of a "mass explanation"
within the .party in order to explain the issues in dispute, to
justify Bulgarian support of the CPSU, and to allay what was
described as a feeling of "general tension border#ag'on panic"
in the upper echelons of the Party as-a result of the gino-
Soviet dispute.
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131. The East German party also launched a briefing
campaign at the same time. Lower cadres were briefed on
the. basis of extracts from the report of an SED delegate to
Bucharest. An attempt was made to create the impression
that the dispute involved practical matters rather than basic
policy considerations.
13Z. In both the Bulgarian and East German parties
it seems that Party officials were told to watch out for mani-
festations of deviations similar to those of the Chinese, and
countermeasures against "nationalist" deviations figured
in the plans for the anti-Chinese effort in both countries.
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APPENDIX I
A Recapitulation of CPSU and CPC Communications
Relevant to the Sino-Soviet Dispute
1. October 1960 CPSU letter to Bloc CP's defending Khrushchev's
views on U.S.-Soviet relations.
2. January 1960 Chervenkov proposes discussions to Chou En-lai.
3. 6 February 1960 Oral message from CPSU to CPC proposing a
meeting to discuss problems.
4. Late May-early CPSU letter to Bloc CP's and possibly other
June 1960 CP's, concerning post-Summit situations and
problems'. (Text not available).
5. 2 June 1960 "Sharp" CPSU letter to CPC. (Probably, an
80-plus page letter which the Chinese later
showed to other CP representatives at Bucharest.)
6. 7 June 1960 CPSU letter to CPC concerning a conference.
(No details.)
7. 21 June 1960 CPSU circular letter (70-plus pages) intended
to be sent to CP's detailing Soviet charges against
Chinese. (Probably not sent,.. but was shown to
CP leaders).
8. 6 July 1960 CPSU complaint (possibly, a letter) to CPC about
Chinese polemical material in publications
distributed in USSR.
9. 21 July 1960 CPSU letter to CPC complaining about Chinese
propagandizing Soviet technicians.
10. 25 July 1960 CPSU letter to CPC announcing withdrawal of
Soviet technicians.
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11.
1 August 1960
CPC reply (or replies) to CPSU complaints
about Chinese publications and treatment of
Soviet technicians.
1Z,
13 August 1960
CPSU letter (presumably to CPC--no details
known)
13,
Second half of
CPSU "conciliatory" letter to CPC.
August 1960
14. Late August 1960
CPSU letter to CP's summarizing and strengthening
the charges of the 21 June circular. (May be
identical with item 13.)
15. 10 September 1960 CPC letter (150-plus pages) to CPSU:detailing
. Chinese counter-charges.
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