SINO-SOVIET RIFT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240018-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 18
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240018-3
SINO-SOVIET RIFT
Chinese to. account at the buonarest mooting n
on between Moscow and Peiping since the Soviets cad:
June
We have now roc
which enable us to reconstruct a good deal'of.what.has gone
led the
slued reports from a6-number of isouroea
o
t
2. For more a" y
the Soviet Union and China had been publicly' quarreling about-
-
sera the. Co=unjgt`..,. Parties Of."
h tw
n
vxia Brice
1, .11 in underdeveloped areas,'by the'mora militant revolus.-.
.i' . ? ` n44o V..v.q ....a - - a- - --- -
d detente should be replaced, especially.
X'- t "a
Whether the Sino-Soviet Bloc'should seek to
b
?
of , stead should to'
`avoid local ware (Soviet.view)"or in
-. 1.7Swa4--h?1. A4 aaTMM1AVnAnt should be 'seriously nego-
Peiping clearly says no.);
tinted with the West (Moscow seems tio..sax ..yam,
IT It
tionary policy-advocated by Chinas
support and even inoitq "lib'erition and other.?vus
wars (Chinese view);
A Whether'it is s.&missible doctrine,in some
circumstances for Communist -parties"to contemplate
e Whether'Coaununist parties in non-Bloc..ooun-
-program.with close ogoperation whereas t e nee
favor a.ruthless, uncompromising attitude).
'Q At the WFTU meetingtin June' the Chinese party stressed
views so strongly as to exert a disruptive influence and,
7 -a - fM UM * 0.%v4 ,m4- r-9b1'?4't1 "A-'
anted with an 84-page letter distributed to all Communist
"A'.;'parties, which reaffirmed the Soviet positions in the above-
~' listed disputes, rebuked.the Ch.neIe for "disloyal and unoom-
1 A_~__H %L-1..---4^.... ....A ..1w.~A 4.1+ art Amnlin1$ WAi+fifl that
Communiatd (the Soviets in most cases favor a."minimum"
U Chi
this possibility and that the technique is demon-
strably feasible);
Communist' doctrine is sufficiently flexible to admit
,tries'should ur-ess a "minimum"' or "maximum" program,
anlnese failure Lo -craw-neaeadsrv aVnuiwoiv?o r.v.ai.v . ooM_??
Ain reduction or withdrawal:of'Soviet-aid, Khrushohev followed
speech'- emphasiging .the same ' points .
` 11 ? this letter with a bitter
.
We now have reason to believe that the Chinese party,
of the': Bucharest meeting ("1.0.,
about a week after the' close'.
:
in early July), sent, s~ .harsh letter to'-.the Soviet party.
,,down, China would expel Soviet techninie.ns and would pub 46V-&j
;ounce all Soviet, economic ' aid.
at, Bucharest by. warning that,:unless 'the -Soviet, party backed
.that the Chinese letter responded ' to >the implicit. Soviet . threat
Approved or Release IA.RDP78-00915800120024001 8-3
 The+ Soviet party shot back a ketter, reaffirming its -.positions
&nfi: statin its ,refusal to' be dictated to by its junior.?'The.
Soviet Home Service. also' began to prepare the Kussz.an,peupie
.,for a possible break by,ceasing?comment on Chinese affairs.
-e,b.strong an--the Cominform :resp1U}t ,oa o! Jane, l1 whiff
expelled the !ugoelav party.
Chinese were -guilty of "leftwing sectarian deviation a
"narrow nationalism." These chargep.,were similar to--but not,,
blasts, but the plenum-resolution expl3oitly charged that the
I *%A
.bM&'VJ WV&AV6"4Ai? VVYW9.4.VVV4 ..Vrv w.4 +.--v
the Chinese had not been publicly named in te.Soviet,?dootrinal.
-This letter apparentl3r'.made, the?-Soviet;party furious.
6. The next development came-at the plenum of the Soviet
a
s
no ?
the initiative--that is,- whether the' Soviets carried 'out their
threat?to withdraw aid or whether?the.,technicians were, in
in Peiping estimate that one. half td?two thirds.of the.tech-
have left the country We also do not know who took
n
i c
VV e
how extensive the withdrawal hap been,.'-put Dritish,officials .
Shortly a ter'the Soviet'party-plenum,ya number of
hnicians?in.China'beganxto-,leave, We do not know
i t
effect, expelled.
8. Concurrently with this withdrawal,.and''just.after a
.secret meeting of. Chinese party leaders-?In-Shanghai, it'is
noteworth that a- Shanghai'iournal published an emotional
pointedly that "we have a :beily-fy13,1 o anger ana mU5 U5
this anger for strength... a `..- .
article emphasizing the advisability of relying on "one's own
efforts. This article'observed'that ."reactionaries in some
..countries ... are trying to ? isolate us,", and are refusing ' "to
selves. The same article; discussed a.?new'policy of giving
greater attention to the development of'agriculturi. Such
a. policy reflects a`natural 'concern over' food shortages, but
.may-also suggest that , theChinese party desires to direct
attention away from industry.in?anticipation of reduced So-
viet aid. ,
denounced imperialists and 'those who echo-them," declaring
that their "anti-Chinese activity" simply proved that "we
are the real.Marxist-Leninists." It then went~an,to say
that those trying to "isolate' us will' just. isolate them-
. actions appeared in Soviet media. These charge the Chinese ;,
,.with "blasphemy,:' with drawing "absurb" conclusions-; from' the.
10. During the Bucharest meeting the Soviet party arranged
to.have.another bloc conclave in.Moscow'in November .at which.
Communist parties were to try to resolve the..Sino-Soviet dis-
pute, 'In-preparation for the November meeting the Soviets
have -in fact been -taking actions. calculated..to_ isolate the
Chinese party in the world Communist - movement..: During August,
for example, several harsh attaokke.: on Chinese -policies and
:current world situation, and with departing"from and failing
to . understand Marxism. 'a:.They also ''charge the Chinepe .implicitl
with "disorganizing" and "disorienting other,' Commmunist par-
. in preparation .for a Soviet charge at- Some '
future- blos meeting that. Chinese are ,"splitting", the world
Approved For ReleaMOWM DP78-009151O0i 200240018-3
 Approved For Rel RDP78-00915R001200240018-3
. 11. Also in August, Moscow sent-further letters to all
Communist parties stating its case against Peiping. .Through
a high-level penetration we have learned.the.contentu~of the
letter received by one of these parties. The letter contains
a -formal and sober appraisal of admitted."sharp *and strong"
differences with Peiping, and reaffirms the-Soviet positions ?
taken at Bucharest. .It further says that Sino-rSoviet -differ-
ences should not be "publicly fanned," as,this only helps the
West, and that. another attempt to. resolve the differences will
be made at the-November meeting.
? 12.. Between now and November it. ' ill'probably become
apparent to the Chinese that they are not going to-get'much
support'from other Communistpartiea;'they will also be under
heavy Soviet pressure to get" back in 'line,` These developments
may induce Peiping to bank ;down--to'.the extent'of refraining
from publicly. shouting its digagrjeqients with-Moscow and, from
lobbying among other bloo .parties.The-..Chineso: may also agree
,at-Moscow to sign another; irmoouous'oommunique,. ,as at Bucharest.
13. Any such "reeoneIliatiorx~ ;,would be ..merely nominal,
however. We see little prospect.that..the dispute can be
resolved under the-preserit leadershipa*of -the Soviet and
.Chinese parties. The issues are too fundamental, and the'lea-
dershave too heavily ogmmitted'their.-prestige, against each
14. In any case, the next 'move .is up to 'Peiping. .
Appro~ed For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240018-3