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Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 THE SINO.SOVIET DISPUTE INTER-PARTY DEVELOPMENTS AT AND AFTER THE RUMANIAN WORKERS PARTY CONGRESS?BUCHAREST, 20-25 JUNE 1960 The background of the dispute (1957-1960) 1. The present dispute between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) has its origins in differences which date back at least three years-- that is, to the summer of 1957. On the Chinese side, antecedent resentments may date as far back as the formative period of the CPC in the twenties, when Stalin's policy of alliance with the Kuomintang drove the CPC to disaster, as well as to the war and early post-war perion, when Soviet support for the Chinese Com- munist cause was minimal and did not inhibit the stripping of Manchuria. There is clearly no single cause for the current dispute. Rather, it would appear, an accumulation of Chinese policies and actions increasingly displeased and challenged Khrushchev and, presumably, a majority of the Soviet leadership. In the field of domestic policy, it is now known that Mao's "Let a hundred flowers bloom" program aroused Soviet doubts about its usefulness. The program for the "great leap forward" beginning in early 195$ and the communes program, adopted by the CPC in May 1958 were readily recognisable as s. considerable irritant in Sino-Soviet relations by the silent treatment which they received in the Soviet Union. 2. Disagreement over foreign policy manifested itself in August 1958 when Khrushchev, after four days of discussion with Mao Tse-tung, publicly rejected, on 5 August, Vestern proposals for a summit meeting within the U. N. Security Council on the crisis in the Middle East?proposals which he had accepted in July. Nevertheless, on 23 August the Chinese began shelling of the off-shore islands. On 23 May 1958 the Coplimder of the Chinese Air Force predicted that China would make atomic bombs "in the not too distant future" and the Chinese press ceased to amismaimea. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 li?i plan for an 4 his concept of for "the Far East and the entire Pacific Basin' e 21st CPS, Cngrse a in February 1959. Chinese reactions were not enthusiastic, and, from April 1939. an, refurtnc. to the plan disappeared altogether. In the light of these and other indicetions, it Can be fairly assumed that Soviet unwillingness to deliver atomic weapons to Chinese control had become a serious issue. It is now known that the Soviets cited as the reason for their reluctance their apprehension over Chinese policies and pronouncements in the external field which were in conflict with Khrushchevis "peaceful coexistence" tactics, which affirmed that global or limited war need not be avoided, and Which objected to Khrushchev's aid programs for "bourgeois" regimes in underdeveloped countries on the grounds that they would delay revolution. Chinese objections to peaceful coexistence tactics manifested themselves after 1957 in the deliberations of the International Communist Front organisations, especially within the World Peace Council and the International Union of Students...two organisations which were most directly and in- tensely engaged in building their appeal on the unity campaign so typical of the peaceful coexistence perioe. They desired to Involve bourgeois and nationalist groups in mass action and therefore advocated informal conversations, negotiations, and concessions to such groups. The Chinese refused to "sit around the table" with them except in formal meetings of designated representatives, and resisted Soviet efforts to broaden the scope of concessions on program and organisation questions. Chinese resistance was particularly manifest after the Soviet decision of June 1959 concerning Ithrushcbev's visit to the United States. . In August 1959, the Chinese overran Indian border Longju and reopened the border dispute wialt India, after years of quiet. The Soviet position on this dispute signifi. failed to give full endorsement to the Chillt61V claims, earlier Chinese repressive actions in Tibet had been Sanitized - Approveujftingalissibma? IA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 promptly supported as just and as an "internal affair." Khrushchev, as was known later, did not interpret the reopening of the dispute as a mere attempt to register opposition to his trip to the United States, but as an un-Marxist blunder which needlessly undermined Indian neutralist attitudes and potential value in the peace and disarmament campaign and impaired the appeal of CP India. When Khrushchev visited Peiping, after his trip to the United States, for the October anniversary cele- brations in 1959. the Si1110?117Lgon dispute was dne topic of discussion sad it is virtually certain that Khrushchev presented his views on improving USSR-U.S. relations. Sine-Soviet discussions were ? unsatisfactory, however, and no communique was published. According to three widely separated and reliable sources, in QEARAgimaSamirailligig5t-.44tter tra at 1_,Lat the b1o!Ues, In bol IEWS-QA-UPWrUgici, re24#944. November 1959, V. Uyitchev, Chief of the Agitprop Department of the CPSU, published an article in Problems of Peace and Socialism that justified the policy of peaceful coexistence as Vtlase struggle on the international plane" and significantly noted Lenin's criticism of "Left Communists." It is known that the Chinese have since been accused of criticising the November 1959 joint program of the European parties, which is clearly based upon the same premises as the article. In December 1959, Khrushchev warned the Chinese in stating at the Hungarian Party Congress that "we must all synchronise our watches." 4. In January 1960, the Chinese positions hardened. At the Rome meeting of the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council in January 1960 it transpired that the Chinese had charged the USSR with seeking to isolate China in the interest of achieving a =Lofts vivendi with the U.S. A reliable source states that the USSR in January 1960 informally broached to the Chinese the idea that the Sino-Soviet differences required discussion, only to be told by the Chinese that the differences were between the parties and should not be mentioned. The CPC appears to have reached during January important decisions which had a major effect on the dispute. On 21 January the 3 Seeliernelerfrr Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 People's Congress adopted t which specified that treaties it takes part in framing; meeting of the foreign ministers the Chinese observer, Kiang ant in his speech, broadening greements." The contrast descriptions of theworld, situation in Xiang Shang those given by the European bloc speakers was the 1957 Mo*cew declarat port the conflicting position February 1960 asserted that "the opulent of tit* onal situation has borne out the as of the ration." It appears likely, therefore, se decided in late .7extuary to take the initiative the debate. 13ut also on 6 February a verbal the Central Committee of the CPSU asking the CPC to &ttend a meeting to discuss outstanding problem* was trend in Peiping. mid.April 1960 the Chinese took advantage sexy of Lenin's birth to make their most on the theoretical innovations developed by the CPSU at and after the 10th Party Congress in January 1956. Using oblique but unmistakable arguttemts. the Chinese challenged the premises underlying Soviet foreign policy and by implication disparaged Ithrushchev's stature as a Communist theorist. The Chinese attack comprised three major statements: two articles in the party's theoretical monthly Red mks (issues alls. 7 and 14 1 sad 16 APT11), the first entitled "On Imperialism as the Source of War in Modern Times" end the second entitled "Lettig Live Leninism i " as well as an editorial on 22 April in the authoritative newspaper. the People's 4 as, .r.dis 4Z4s Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 7. The Soviet. replied in the speech delivered in MOSCOW April by Otto the CPSU Central Committee and start**. A very defense of current Soviet foreign and of the general lines endorsed at the 20th and 21st Cengresses, his speech confined its critical comments Amoral statements condemning "dogmatic positions as back positions." On the same day * Chinese Politburo alternate, Lu Tingd, gave a speech in Peiping which incorporated many of the arguments of the "Long Live Leninism" article. The divergences between the two speeches were so great that when one Commie:dot party seriously affected by the dispute. the Indian party, published both speeches side by side in the $ May lima of its newspaper New Age, without comments, its action aroused considerable comment and created confusion among party members. I. The Chine then began to carry their ea ether parties. "Long Live Leninism, " the Lu T 104 the People's Daily editorial of 22 Aprils ated sad published in the widely circulated English language poking of 16 April. At the same time, the first edition of containing the three articles was produced by the Languages Press in Peiping in many languages for on abroad. Two further editions of this book were pduced, one in May and the other, after the Suchnrest tions, in August. The book is known to exist in vanish. French, the Eastern European languages Russian), and Vietnamese. It has been distributed 4 in certain countries at least of Latin America and Western Europe. It spears that the Chinese later at- tempted to circulate the arUcles in the USSR in ono of their two Russian language publications. Drushba? an action which the Soviets protested. The magasine was in fact suspended from circulation in the USSR after the publication of the June issue. earlier inetances of Soviet refusals to circulate Chinese doctrinal writings in the USSR have recently been reported by reliable sources, who heard the details during party discussions of the Sino-Soviet differences. 5 Sanitized - Approveei. - DP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 al o Chinese anniversary of ? the ligation PIns al.P.114,#1 der lic ideological debate v4th the the use of the charge of published on 10 Juba. one r Soviet Russia, end one by per Pravda, expressed this rary tattooing deviationisrn" positions held by the Chinese d the significance of the 11 Party Dec1*rstion of November 1937. Matkovsky characterised it as of the international Communist of the general line expressed other hand, referred parti- authorizing and requiriag a struggle m" as well as against "rightist the Yugoslays. In discussing pportunism he mad. the significant oups of Communists but the leadership ve veered into leftist deviationisna." explicitly identified the Chinese as but their relevance to the dispute g of this intensification of the Soviet *Oa k s coincides with a CPS11 letter on the h was circulated, shortly after Et following the collapse of the con. parties of the bloc and those of the text of this letter is not have been unacceptable to the Om rstid?May on that the course proved the validity of the Imperialism and the illusory gotiation. Perhaps the worst Chinese, in Soviet eyes, Nmes their argument 6 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 mmunist participation urely tactical advan ? Of the true eharec nation was precisely the kind o U Wes most *WIT to avert. 11. it is lihely too that the CPSU decided at this time d a sharp letter or criticism to the CPC. One eat Free World Communist who visited Moscow in y stated that he learned from a member of the CPSU tat that a "sharp" letter was being sent to the CPC. re calling for a conference was reportedly sent to on 2 June and on 7 June, sad it appears likely that 2 June was the "sharp" one. it is also worth e CPC le/Were went into closed conference in * move which may well have been prompted two CPSU letters. They were in fact still see delegation left for the Illuslutrest Chinese too made a major move in the now *ping dispute. They did this in early June at the Connell meeting of the 'World Federation of in Peiping. On 2 June they presented an ultimatum WFTU report to the chief Soviet representative. d it. The Chinese claimed that the report contained features1 including attacks on the communes. tin& which opened on S June after a five-day delay. ? of both WFTU affiliate* and representatives five unaffiliated national trade union federations, as figures Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-ch'i, 1.4u ping, and Liu Chang-sheng publicised the peace struggle, the threat of imperialism. *used by the campaigns for peaceful co. programs for giving substantial economic aid d underdeveloped countries. Using a tactic they d earlier in April, the Chinese leaders accompanied 7 milinewIPPOPPERINIm Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 All.. Ili.. al.? A expressions of approva U.S. at the time nce. This approval of by expressions of soli stt.S. sets of aggression. U was particularly stung by the Chang.sheng. nod a private meeting of of CPSU doctrines, representatives pposed the continuation of the talks ge that the Chia**, action was a of the 11 Party Declaration of November the authority of the Moscow decla. apple' in the Shevlynia article charge has since figured esentation of its case. According a virTU session Teas liaise e CPC, accused the CPSU in *w declaration overboard." pro to. pting, gsn.ral seers turn of2 "Aro:ging ox x 14 et er CP's against the Chinese. Tb.. representative rld CP was told, by a representative of the Central Council of Trade Unions, that the in Peiping was interested in knowing if he In Moscow after the end of the conference. 5. When a group of European and African delegates to U meeting arrived in Moacow on 13 dune, a number U officials conferred with members of this group. One legates in the group is limey/a to have talked privately official, V. Tereshkin, of the CPSU Foreign oncoming the Slap-Soviet dispute. The delegate was 4mtaarmarmliitmtimir Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 "Weireope. rotation the CPSU placed on recent Tereshkin asked that lie have a plenum connnittee convened after his return Chinese at Peiping and to condemn them scow declaration. A second parson, s L. I. lireabsev, chairman of the Soviet, was also reported present to a statement brroadcast s in session, representatives el t parties held * meeting y rsaftlmed their adherence . because the leadership of both seated in the group of WFTU delegates pears possible that the meeting and that the reaffirm/piton was s. e cryptic endorsements of the 19 June 1960 a ststement by Agostino Communist and president of the the Italian Party newspaper Unita. was also broadeast in Italian from Novella described the Chinese proposed at the WFTU Council the 10 June Soviet ewe as "devistione." So far as the first iustance in which a publicised this charge against of the statement coincided d Congress of the Rumaniaa Bucharest, where the newt phase of the 17. The for Soviet adoption Ion to press at Bucharesi We is suggested by an 9 arimioreedkarillf"' Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 the 14 June issue ofit.ed, Flag, which, in an obvious reference to the CPSU's earlier justification of its views on peace and peaceful colaxistence, observed that "one cannot separate oneself from the revisionists merely by stating that the forces of socieliem predominate over the forces of imperialism." The Chitteseitslletieulo the .ctristreos the Rumanian Workers PariLatoppstria-hioacow for an of views iT7 iune. It presented a. litter from the CPC which limited its powers to agreeing on * dote for a party conference to discuss Stop-Soviet differences and ex. changing views, without, however, adopting any formal resolution. The CPSU representative, were not successful In obtaining an admiseion from the Chinese delegation of e errors of the CPC. The Chinese, however, reportedly expressed. willingness to correct their positions if in an exchange of views with the delegates *buctieres* a majority should prove them wrong. The CPSUclust_i_fring i scton by luiokIn the November 1957 Peace Mangesto Shall Pa tilt MN tiMek intitted that stpaxtries ialuallid mutually be trk.X,Cokeit a final e Bucharest session should but an exchange of views. at Bucharest that in Moscow the CPSU reposal that other parties be brought d wished to confine the group to blocparties only. The Chinese said that d this proposal. It would appear. then, that ence to their instruction forced the Soviets' hand. 18...Ithough there are reports that the CPSU intended by the end of May to attck the Chinese at Bucharest, tile Soviet decision to make a major effort there to enlist the support of other parties appears to have been reached as a result of the Chinese stand on 17 June. Virtually none of the major Free World parties sent top.lsvel delegates to the 10 iltreseparensinom Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 congresses, The 1&ct thst hrushchev wa to ad the Soviet delegation was announced only on June le, the dity of his departure. All the European satellite delegations except Albania were led by per eons of national stature equal to that 01.101ruehchev, but the late arrival of Comullra of Feland and the early departure of Novotny of Csechosievehis, suggest that this top4evel representation was organized on abort notice. The leader of She Chinese delegation, Film; Chen, was clearly outranked by this group. Fifty parties were represented at the congress. Twenty.ftve of the thirty.five bon-bloc fraternal delegations identified as present were composed of second and third echelon party leaders and none of the more significant Fre* World parties, except Chile and Syria, were represented by their leaders. 19. The Soviet delegation to Bucharest included B. Ponontarev and Y. A. Andropov, the heads of the two Central Committee sections for relations with the non*bloc parties and bloc parties, respectively. During the first days of the congress they and their colleagues concentrated on briefing fraternal delegates. It is knovm that a group of En lishospeaking delegates and a second group comprising those who spoke Spanish were called together separately and briefed from a long letter which the CPSU intended to issue to all parties, The letter had apparently been either corn. plated or revised at this last moment, for it contained the Soviet account of the Moscow oxchaages of 17 June and explained the Soviet view of how the inter?party discussion should be handled. The inclusion of Wu lisiu-ch'uan, the deputy director of the CPC's International Liaison Depart merit. as one of the four Chinese delegates suggests that the Chine.. too planned to exploit their supporters and acquaintances among the delegates. 20. The reporting on the sequence of events at ucharest concerning the Sino?Soviet dispute is in some respects contra- dictory. The following probable chronology, however, emerges Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 from a. a. its open sessions. to the congress, p criticised "mechanical "children", onions ble Information. Rumanian party coti ? Ithrushchev. in his fi ed the essentials of the (mestere of what Lenin " imperialism.called such p ess began at public speech Soviet line and said on and attacked nthoee wtto do not understand that war is, laider present circumstances, not inevitable." Other public speeches by Rumanians and fraternal delegates. including the Chinese. Pseng Chen, occupied most of the 21st. 22nd, and 23rd. b. On 22 lune P'ests Chen spoke publicly the ming. He included in his remarks a characterisation of recent U. S. actions as a "peace fraud," and he 'warned that "imperialism can never be trusted." Referrbig on a number of points to the 12 Party Declaration, he emphasised the doctrinal statements previously highlighted in the Chinese criticisms of the Soviet line. He praised the Cuban and Alger an struggles and said that war could be averted and peace pre- served by aiding liberation movements and revolutionary struggles. He also sailed for Communist unity and the "broadest possible anti.imperialist united front with this unity at its core." He further charged, as his party had done earlier, that the imperialists were using modern revisionists (Tito) to disrupt Comnamist unity, and he called ler a struggle to the end against modern revisionism. He made no mention of "peaceful coexistence." an omission for which he was later upbraided by Khrushchev. It was on this day that the CPSU reportedly begun caucusing with the fraternal delegates. 21. Three Inter-party meeting. dealing with the Sino' ? et dispute smear to have been held. The first occurred OA 24 June, when the Soviet bloc representatives met all day to draft a communique. No information is *visitable on this meeting beyond a statement that the first draft of the communique was presented by the Soviet representative and that the Chinese felt 12 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 obliged to refer the Peiping for possible communique appears, Its. delegation. to have CPSU. The Chinese dole a dilemma, but succumbing COMITItUliqUO on the 24th the Central Committe in . The move to produce light of the CPC instructions to iurpriss pressure move by the were obviously faced with pressure, they did sign the ZZ. On ZS June, altar the conclusion of the Congress at rnidsday, a closed meeting of approximately 140 ate* from 50 parties was convened. This ameond meeting, a full* scale debate, was opened by the first secretary of the Rumanian party. Cateerglska..Dej, who read the draft corn mutaique. A number of other delegate' then spoke, including, at least, representatives of East Germany, the UK, France, and Italy. In fact, according to one source, more than twenty delegates spoke before the Chinese representatives took the floor. The Soviet caucusing and briefings had had me effect, for most of the speakers are reported to have erred in general to the Soviet line of argtuttent. It is also lb noting that PasPolovi the Soviet representative at this reportedly did not speak. This which ? the lead in a Soviet-inspired attack- -is well known and is usually employed to permit the CPSU to have the last word and to appear all aa objective mediator rather than merely as one more partisan participant in a debate. When the Chinese representative finally spoke, he attacked the line taken by most of the preceding speakers, chartists that It Was unrealistic, slanderous, and groundless, and based upon incomplete evidence. He also criticised negative attitudes toward certain Chinese domestic policies and asserted that the reports prepared for the WFTU Peiping meeting had contained attacks against the communes and great.. step forward programs. (Se. note.) He refuted charges that the Chinese had not played their full part in the peace struggle, referring to their support of /Chruslichev's visit to the U.S. and to Mau En.lai's negotiations with many countrie 13 11 T Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Be els* insisted that the Chine.. had supported peaceful coexistence, noting in particular their role in the 1935 Bandung conference. According to another source, the Chinese rep. resentative also stated that China would stand on the Moscow declaration of 1957, supported the idea that a reappraisal of the international situation was necessary, and endorsed a proposal that the reappraisal should be carried out on a multiparty basis. Pospelov too endorsed this proposal. This Chinese reaction appears to have been mainly defensive; what new facts the Chinese delegate brought forward were apparently selected to prove that the Soviet case was t biased and and incomplete presentation. (Note. This Chinese charge is particularly interesting because the two main WFTU reports presented at Peiping, by Marcel Bras and Ibrahim Zakaria, did not criticize these Chinese policies. In fact, the Bras report contained two laudatory references to the communes. It is known, however, that on 2 June (i.s.. three days before the delayed opening of the Peiping meeting) the Chinese informed V. Grishin, the head of the Soviet delegation, that the treatment of the peace and disarmament themes in the draft V rTu reports was inacceptable and would be openly attacked if the drafts were not amended before presentation.. It is also known that these sections were not amended to meet Chinese demands?in fact, a number of amendments actually made in the final report strengthened the WTI'U's support for the Soviet peace line. At least one amendment, dealing with the question of Free World economic trade and aid with under-developed countries, was, in fact, of such a nature as to be particularly unpalatable to the Chinese. It has *leo been reported that the French representatives at Bucharest were particularly incensed with the Chinese for having brought this question into the debate, but no one is reported to have refuted the Chinese charge as untrue. One report provides a clue to a plausible explanation of this matter by noting that the Chinese said that "such a WFTU report would have been rejected by the Chinese people." si?iimewitmneglin Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 It seems likely then that the Chines* charges referred to original draft of the WTTU report prepared by Louis SsUlant. The offending language probably was edited out. at Soviet insistence, before Bras actually delivered the report to the council. The involvement of the two Frenchmen. Saillant and Bras, in this matter would explain the vigorous reaction of the French delegates at Bucharest.) Z3. Delegates at this second meeting received a numb?r of papers, including en 80-plue page Chinese translation of a CPSU document. This document appears to be a critical factor In the further development of the dispute. Its existence has been reported by a number of independent and widely separated sources, and at least time reports indicate that it was a sharp. wide ranging, and bitterly critical summary of Soviet criticisms of the CPC. One source has reported that, prior to the Bucharest congress, the CPSU addressed a "sharp" letter to the CPC embodying its criticisms of Chinese doctrines and actions in.- luding charges against the Chinese foreign policy toward India and Algeria, as well as charges that Chinese actions were straying "bourgeois" confidence in Communist desires for peace end arousing Afro 'Asian suspicions of international Communism. The fact that the CPSU sent a letter "raising various issues" to the CPC was also stated by Vans Chen at Bucharest. A third source, describing the contents of the document, also notes its sharp.tone and its charges of Chinese tors in the foreign policy toward India. In addition, this source says that it criticised Chinese nationalism and Chinese non-cooperation with the USSR in military matters. On the basis of this series of reports it seems probable that the Chinese?translated Soviet document distributed at this second meeting on ZS June was in fact the full text of the "sharp" CPR! letter to the CPC (see above pars U). If this was the case its presentation by the Chinese was clearly a part of their effort to set the record straight, and undoubtedly disrupted the Soviet tactical plans for the meeting. Such a significant decision must necessarily have been mode by the Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 4mesempessi Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 CPC Central Committee, probably during its rly June meeting, and suggests the CPC's attitude ?toward the Bucharest meeting was predicated, at least to some extent, on the Use of this tactic. There is some question whether librushchev was present at this first day of debate. At least one source indicates that he was present, but there is no evidence that he participated in the discussion. 24. On 26 June came the final meeting, another closed *ion that was attended by those present on the preceding it was at this second installment of the debate the chev personally presented his general indictment of Chinese and provoked a heated exchange with Vent Chen. A number of reports state that the Khrushchev sppech opened the proceedings. The speech was a long one and reportedly Involved direct attacks on Liao Tse-tung, comparing him to Stalin as "always thinking in his own terms" and "formulating theories without coming into contact with the events of the modern world." One source states that Khrushchev's speech was arranged at short notice. The reporting on the speech suggest* that it was at least partly extemporaneous, with Khroshchev injecting facts, anecdotes, and direct charge*. that effectively demolished the attitude of restraint, tact, and adherence to principle wlich the CPSV had previously tried to maintain in the debate. Speaking angrily, with violent gestures, he described the CPC doctrine* as ultra- leftist, as dogmatic, and, finally, as left revisionist. He said the Chinese did not understand the nature of modern war, and rejected Chinese protests over the fact that the USSR had failed to support China in her border dispute with India characterizing the dispute as a conflict of purely national interests in which the interests of world Communism re not involved. There is reason to suspect that his attack o included charges directed against some elements of r Communist parties of complicity with the Chinese. He attacked Pleng Chen himself, chiding him for his failure to refer to peaceful coexistence in his public address to the 16 4.111199111011.1P141$41Mom Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized -Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 congress on the 22nd. In generalapparently reiterated in ronger and less ambiguous terms virtually all the charges embodied in the original CPSU letter to the CPC. Since s speech is described by sem* sources as a systematic and detailed presentation of the Soviet charges, it seems likely that it was in fact built around the argumentation of the draft ciruclar letter of 21 June earlier shown to Free World delegate., 25. Pleas Chen is reported to have replied very heated tonna. He said he had asked for on to he held on equal terms, and that the CPC respected the CPSU as an "elder brother" but not as a "father" party. Counter. attacking strongly, he accused Khrushanv of orgsaieing the meeting to make an attack on the CPC and Mao Tse.tung and to cover up a Soviet effort to undermine the prestige of the CPC. He defended Mao'es "more in contact with the modern world than Xhruslachev, and more active than ever since leaving the government chairmanship." Referring to Khrushchev himself in terms reminiscent of the 16 June Red Fin article, he charged that HIChrushchev's policy is a policy of revisionism, creating illusions about imperialism and under estimating its true nature." Speaking of the abrupt shifts in Khrushchev's policy toward the imperialist powers, he repor tei asked the delegates whether "any conclusione can be drawn re gerding 1Chrushchevis policy toward the imperialist powers." Hs stated finally that the CPC had no trust in Xhrushchev's analysis of the world situation and especially his policy toward the imperialists. Refuting Ithrushchev's charges that the Chinese did not understand modern 'oar, Pleas said the Chinese had proved in Korea as well as against the Japanese that they have more experience than other peoples of the world. He further registered a proteet, saying that he had asked for delay in the iseuance of the communique but had been told on 24 June that It had to be aimed ia the interest of unity. He stand for the benefit of other delegates the instructions under which he was working, and said that if the communique were published 17 Sanitized - Approved ForAgiiiirigiiii.aliedDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 mammal* -11,11nli!riT' 0 ? Central Committee car squired. 26. A SUM.ber of state ts by others wer. then made In a general discussion. Todor Zhivkov first spoke d gave full support to Khrushchev's position.; others, 4611 less warm than Zhivkov, were, it is reported. generally pro- Khrusitcherv in their views. No one spoke against the Soviet position. Khrushchev reportedly ended the session by saying that further bilateral discussions between the CPSU and the CPC were necessary. 21. A commission (or comm et up sessions to prepare for a. conference to be held dur next November anniversary celebrations In Moscow1 etere arties were to present their views. Divergent reports on e composition of the committee have been received. In Emeriti they agree that the committee was to involve about parties and that all the bloc parties were to be rop- ed. At least two separate reports state that the polities gentina, Cuba, Brazil, Japan, and West Gerrnaity were to be represented on the commission. One of these re supported by a third separate one, also states that Italy since were to participate. Other perties to participate, listed only in single reports, are those of the U.S., the U.K., India. Syria. and Australia. At least one source states that the commission was to be composed only of representative* of the bloc parties. The terms of reference of this COIXOW I Sian are not known. The commission has since been called to meet in Moscow at the end of September. ALseparate CPSU committee has allegedly been set up as well, to prepare a new CPSU ? document on the dispute. It seems probable that the CPSU is plownong to use it in November as the draft letter of 21 June was used at Bucharest, to predetermine the outcome of the conference. According to one source. Khrushchev gave in. structione to the delegates at the end of the session that they were to report back to their Central Committees that a plenum 18 aieszeitios Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 shou d be convened to discuss the doctrinal dispute, with the results of these plenums to be disseminated at all 1eels of the party. On the basis of other information however, it appears probable that most parties did not construe his *tate- ment as a command, /or there were few such programs initiated before the CPSU4s plenum of mid?July. 28. The final co unique approved by the fraternal delegates was relessed by TAMS in Moscow on 27 Sun.. According to one source, it was adopted primarily to conceal the fact that the meeting had fated to accomplish anything, but the CPSU, particularly lihrushchev, clearly wanted it as a device to exert pressure for prompt resolution of the dispute. A short and virtually mechanical reaffirmation of the validity of the 12 Party Declaration of November 1957, its text did not in fact clarify any of the issues in the dispute. This became apparent in a few days with the appearance of the Soviet and Chinese press statements on the communique. The signatures of the 12 Bloc parties (including the CPC) registered on 24 June, and the unanimous approval given by the fifty parties represented were to prove the only significant feature of the communique. 29. The principal result. of the Bucharest tinge appear to be the following. The Chinese succeeded in making known to a large audience of bloc and non-bloc Communist party gates their strong exceptions to Khrushchevos policies and orne of the less "principled" actions taken against them by the CPSU. They may have hoped that their adamant tactics would create fear of an open split and thus force the Soviets to break down or compromise. Their actions left the Soviet and their supporters in other parties little CAOL4411 but to defend the Soviet position as the supreme suthority and policy maker in the international Communist movement and to apply against the Chinese all their influence within the bloc and Free World Communist parties. It would appear that the final Chinese position was one from Which they will have to retreat U they desire a settlement. it is premised that this will be 19 Sanitized - Approve1A-or-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 the situation with them in November 1940, meets in Moscow on the October Revolution. The CPSU 213 ets will Mt* the world Communis sion of the celebration of the 30. The CPU circular of 21 June cossiated of some s ages. In an introductory section it outlined the history of dispute in "recent:ft* years. In succeeding sections it analysed and refuted the Chinese arguments and it presented a bill of particulars on instances of Chinese violative of discipline. 31. Soviet views or the beckground of the di9ute. The =wet stated that, deapits a long history of friendly re. as and cooperation between the USSR *ma the CPR, the .it* noted that the Chinese had "recently" begun to take gent positions on very important questions and that this tend threatened to disrupt good relations and the solidarity of the international movement. This divergence was mari. fasted in the Chinese articles on the senivarsery of Lenin's birth in April, statements within the WFTU and other inter. national organizations, and Chinese statements at variance with the 1957 Moscow Decleration and Peace Ma:life:go. The CPSU had made no move against these Chime. statements, considering it necessary to bold a meeting to discuss them. 32. According to the Soviet*, Chou En lei told the Soviet Ambassador to China in January that the problem was essentially a Party matter and that he preferred not to discuss it. ExeCrpts set rigs in this *CCouflt are basefd on a number of summaries of the document, and do not necessarily reflect ct text of the original. ZO eleelleeMteeseeliimmo Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 ? 33. On 6 February 1940, this Catrai Canunittee of the CPSU proposed a discussion to resolve the dlffersnc?a. The Chinese retailed to attend such a meeting and began publicising their views. 34. At the time of the meeting of the General Council of the WFTU in Peking in early June, the Chinese revealed to the Soviets their great dissatisfaction with CPSU positions and they also told other Communists of their attitude. On Z JUJU Liu Ning-yi told Grishin that the Chinese were very dissatisfied with the position of the WITU one question of peace and disarmament. Liu Ning-yi said that "to sit down at the same table with imperialists" meant the "betrayal of ell mankind". He warned ?dab that U the report of the WETU were not changed, the Chinese would criticize the WFTU and expo** its "right opportunism." 3. At a session of the General Council, Liu Ning?yi presented views that differed from the Soviet positions, the CPSU document charged. Than. at a suppor and meeting to which the Chinese Politburo invited some delegates, LAu Shao-,chi said that there wore important differences of opinion among the Communist Parties. Tang Hein0441ini then spoke on "War and Peace", accusing the Soviets of errors in the ZOth Congress thesis on 'peaceful coexistence" end "throwing overboard" the Moscow Declaration--at the some time, according to the CPSU document, as he himself contradicted the Moscow Declaration. He attacked Soviet efforts to negotiate with the West as 11 "betraysl" a world Communism. Chou En.lai was going to *peak, but the delegates aeserted that they wod4 not condone criticism or discussions "behind the backs" of the Communist Porties. 36. The CPSU document criticized the Chinese methods correct, unacceptable and opposed to proletarian inter alum. The Soviets had been informs!d by comrades of Parties that the Chinese had many ttmee asked for meeting ? -otwenismoTomma Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 and bad bSen in going 'back to as early a 'cisme and di 37. The Chinese said that because of the opposition expressed against their ottitude, they would not speak in the WFTU sessions; but they did so nevertheless. even in discussion with non?Corrirnunist delegates. Then, the Chinese speekers at the WFTU meeting tried to impose the Chinese line on the WFTU and openly to line the WFTU up against the CPSU. ? 34. In addition, the Soviet document were distributing "Long Live Leninism" and o articles within the Blot, without the permission CPs. 39. It is necessary to discuss the problems of the "character of the present epoch", "war and peace", "cod. existence", and "road to socialism". the CPSU document totes, because the "Communist movement does not see these problems clearly." 40. "Chars pilntwsr: The document cised as one. sided the Chinese characterisation of the epoch is of "imperialism, wars, and revolutions." The Chinese claim that any other attitude is a departure from L011/21/111 views. The CPSU believes that the Chinese fail to take into account the changes in the correlation of class forcer and that they misunderstand and misinterpret Lenin's thesis. The Chinese analysis is "incomplete" and it conflicts with the Soviet cheracteriastion of the "epoch" as oat also of "disintegration of imperialism, transition to socialism, and of formation and consolidation of the world system of socialism." Developing further the well-established Soviet concepts in this regard, the document stated that the definition of the character of the epoch has "great fundamental importence", for from this definition are derived different conclusions regarding "strategy and 22 Sanitized - Approved Feirkerti,&4411*RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 ceful transition, nt." CO ? 41. The Chinese the CPU Leninism appraising e nature of "Lave re wrong. The document cited statements at 21st Congress and by KhrusItchev on his return and later, from France, to support the Soviet r Chinese charges. 42. 'War and POSC ? At one time, the CPSU dOcument said, the Chinese labored to the Iihrusheltev thesis on peace. ful coexistence. Lately, in the April articles and at the V FTU meeting, the Chine** have departed from this thesis. In B.ed Flag the Chinese said that only the "imperialist general staff" and not the Communists. could decide whether there would be was or pewee, whether to launch local or general war, or whether to intervene eltroad. This attitude is based on a wrong analysis of forces. The document reiterated the Soviet argument that "war is net merely an economic phenomenon", but depends upon the correlation of forces, and that the forces of peace may be able to prevent the "imperialists" from req. sorting to war. The most "decisive" fatter is the Cornmuniet camp. 43. To take the position vi 4 to "fatalism", "paralyses the struggle".and disarms the people." Events after the ZOth Congress confirm the Soiviet thesis. By 1963 "wtku the most rash imperialists will see that war is impossible." 44. At the Moscow conference in 1957 Mso himself 'Everything reduces itself to gaining eri years. Lasting peace will be assured throughout the world.'Today, the Chinese are inconsistent. On the one hand, they call imperialism a "paper tiger". On the other hand, they say that the imperialists cannot be restrained. The GPSU, however, says that the imperialist* should neither be over or underestimated. rem t they U.S. of the Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 45,According to Gbi*esearticles, whoever defends the is / 'opposed to wars of liberation' ". is false. Coext5tenc5"does not mean renuatistion of national liberation, including sty is true: class struggle Will e throat of r has been eliminated. 46. The Chinese have persisted in their view that as long as imperialism cadets... the succession of period' of war and peace will be permanent and inevitable." (The document cited Red Flag end people's Daily.) At the WFTU meeting, Liu Ching.slieng said that it was an "illusion" to think that there could be a world without wars and without ms so long as imperialism exists. At a public session of the WFTU, members of the Chinese Central Committee launched a polemic against the Pease manifesto which had been signed by "all" Parties, including the Chinese. 47. The CPSU document declared that peaceikil co- tence means "gaining time" for the "consolidellon of Socialist system and the acceleration of the building of socialism and Communism." The "Communist Parties cannot permit society to be thrown back hundred of years' and the destruction of "hundreds of millions" of people. 46. It is Impossible to accept the arguments of "'WS toed not fear war. Atom bombs are pap ger* rased by the iroperialistil to subjugate people. The losses Fron2 war will be compensated by the victory of socialism. " 49. The Soviet position, the CPSU document said, is that ten or fifteen years of peace will assure the supremacy of Socialism and it will then be possible to exclude war, "even if capitalism remains in part of the world." (The document cited Lenin in support of this policy.) 24 Sanitized - ApprdlIMPROMMIlin : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 'sharp. *between them. oexistence, the Soviets asserted, will encourage forces within the "imperialist bloc" and will ontradictions" within "imperialist countries" and 51. The Chinese say that coexistence me lass peace". This is wrong. The Soviets never included within the concept of coexistence relations between colonies and colonialist countries, between dependent and imperialist countries, between the proletariat and the exploiters. Coexistence, on the contrary, is a "form of class war" on the international level. It opens up possibilities for solidarity with the masses for the eventual defeat of capitalism. (The document cited the November 1959 Rome "Appeal" of the 17 West European CPO. 52. The Chinese say that, in connecti for national liberation, "the CPSU is flirting with the nati bourgeoisie" and "abandoning class positions." This is wrong. The Soviet position on participation of the national bourgeoisie in the national liberation struggle is "Leninist". 53. Soviet economic aid to the "liberated countries" Is justified by the fact that "objectively" such aidpromotU the causeic4Aeakens imperialism. The Chinese say that the policy, should be "revised" on the ground that when the national bouueoisie gains power it loses its ability to fight imperialism /India.. Egypt. and Indonesia were cited/ and "are themselves becoming imperialists". 54. The Soviet?nswered. this by saying that it is necessary not to "skip stages in the revolution". To do so can cause "serious danger." It is essential to "look at the correlation of class forces." The "imperialists" try to exploit "splits in the national liberation movements". The Communists must try to increase their "friends" among the neutralists. This used to be the policy of the Chinese, Sanitized - Approve or eleaie : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized -Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 slogan f " 55. The CPSU document said that it was necessary to exploit "contradictions in the enemy camp" and cited Lenin's statements on this subject. The Chinese argument that one sh0144. IllaktimitAtoto_vdtli th imporialiste " is a denial of this Leninist policy. 56. latti.StovtalL.M444er itASIOntia, tia-WIAILMAT40$401-Of1ltt 1.sittoPoOsillete" aowilo to wou4d...m*1 itimpoesible to, "mobilize the SPoinit the tkmt of war." 57. ThiApsIseittdivoltd that coexis_ mMA,..4ia.,gikkl-ktY?RC,A11?:AiKMktkft_c4PA.R!!, insinuations at,the !FIR melt4i,affiitt disarmai encouraged Tho",,cw'' _Pak 40Y!,44,114)._ t is "new". lt is based on the belief that the Set 11?44 P#1 it ye s$6,41. to cYltaPP-17rOld-Plaukfir la !naTarninffillf._111.11040.i/IngEttit4ifOralt traiikt_taq 4143311 Jr_age,21 soviet effort .bowthffaim of the rfaament caltotipp .a.n4 fyintp in. tiventittpf s-Sraft 2.047",_ ?Tb t CAilltse ST* tymagirse.ggatu,, the theA,1,44.11741at 01010in and thi. aPPP0.4i0n is in conflict with ff,pyift pmpaze. The Qiinese concept of a "third way" which was put forward at the WTTU meeting means nothing less than continuation of the cold war and Of the arms race and causes political difficulties for the peace policies of the USSR by substantiating imperialist charges that Communists want war. 58. Different tossnajttutaktioxpoitaslisina., T cpsy document soNte4 Chtnefe cheAtitt Oat the. GPSIL had_ tReallefekliTieloitte. the .!!eltlY way of trau.Otict%T..,_ 4t4t4 tkti_414S4mtareictaknots.on,this poi* and .:he *.te,,teln!ont 41,44-1 11,57, MOVVr*W X.41411trat494L, the 26 Sanitized -Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 40i 59. Chin ?raw:sleet s". charged, the Chines made it difficult to ar 60. use s in the "inter *se internation been taking a s e at decisions. c atic CPSU which .P.AtKALcomef 1141,9As? 61. At the IUS meeting at Tunis In Iebruary 1960, the Chinese had opposed "broader contacts with student organi- zations in capitalist countries" and had instead emphasized the need for "u:ncompromising struggle". At a WFDY meeting in March, and at the Afro-Asian conference in April, the Chinese had opposed discussion of disarmament on the ground that the "call for disarmament lulls the popular masses and demobilizes them in the struggle against imperialism." 62, As early as 1949, at the conference of Asian trade unions in Peking. the Chinese had r ropoeed "unfolding bitter struggle in colonial and semi-colonial countries' "and formation of "liberation armies" under Party direction. This bad been done without consulting the Parties and had helped the "imperiali in their fight against the VETT.% The Chinese had later revised this attitude, the document said. 63. In May 1954, the Chinese Central Committee had sent e CPSU a report cf the Communist fraction of the Chine.. unions which agreed with the WFTU position'. However Mese were opposing WFTU decisions Which applied to all countries. This caused trouble between the WITTY and some CPs. "Now", the CPSU document said, "the Chinese talk of NkFTU opportunism, and this threatens the unity of its ranks. 27 61391DPIPiamermam, Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 64. Chinese divergence from the 1957 Declaration and ice Manifesto. The CPSU charged the Qtinese with departing the Moscow documents of 1957 on sin main count.. 1. They had "revised" the characterisation of the pre epoch's so as to make it read that this is "az epoch of wars and revolutions". 2. They say that the "Leninist pr pie of peaceful coiucistencess1 as it is spelled out in the Moscow Declarations creates "illusions" and that "peaceful coexistence is impossib e it only gratifies the imperialists ane enables them to murder the people* of Asia and Africa with impunity." 3. 3. The Chinese say that the thesis in the Moscow Declaration that "the struggle for peace /1s7 the foremost task" of the Communist Parties is "erroneous and anti-Leninist' and that it encourages the "delusion that there can be peace with capitalism." 4. The Chines, reject the Moscow De n' thesis on" 'different form. of transition' "as corning from an" 'incomrect understanding of " 5. The Chinese question the thesis of the Moscow Declaration that the Zeth CPR; Congress had opened "a new stage" in the international movement, and they want to re. open the question of the "cult of personality." The Chinese had endorsed the CPSU's action regarding the "cult of Stalin". and Mao-Tse.tung himself had done so at the 1957 mo?covir meetings. The new proposal to reopen the discussion "de. tracts from important Party tasks, end weakens the struggle against the consequences of the cult of personality" in some other ituttes? the document declared. 6. In violation of the principle of correct "fraternal " of Communist Parties. the Chinese have criticized 28 morlimrinaiff410101YIPPw' Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Parties "behind their This criticismof the policis of the CPSU "does not contribute to the prestige or unity' o the intermit:lonet movement. In particular. the Chinese had disagreed with the November 1959 "Appeal" of .e' teen West European CPs and had called *Li mlocuznent "opportunist". In this way. the Soviets say. the Chinese have set themselves up as the "judges over the group of moat experienced parties'. and they did it in the absence of these parties, at a meeting at Peking. _l_n_aiticisiniz itsalfx AitcCA4ese?Cg has not been direct. but Its' made use of "indirect me ode and function_axtsc. " 65. The need for closer unity between the eocisU?t camp national, Cornrmmist moven:tent. The CPSU docu- that the Chinese position threatens serious damage of the socialist camp and that "many" Chinese s have been "disloyal and uncornradely". 66. Although the Chinese say that tho (USSR should lead the camp", behind the back of the CPSU they have attacked the cPsui th. 2-2.9a0.-!,3049-410-2-4-ttartlealtinti-MtnitatiOttr9o. be national tion movement and othstisp_r_esentattys, " This shows a lack of "sincerity" violation of"principles of proletarian internationaii 67. The document cited cases when the CPSU had disagreed '4th the Chinese Party, but had not intervened: the "hundred flower s"...program; the Chinese abandonment Fin the commune program/ of the "Leninist principle of material incentive under socialism. In Soviet eyes. lualti,to Leniptem iLlteltakw4 n1words but deeds", the document said, and it cited ovtet aid to the s (15 billion rubies in deliveries and 6.6 billion rublescredit.) 68. The document said that it was necessary and po ible for the differences between the Chinese and the Soviets to be overcome 'without compromising principles." The Chinese 29 trifoorommorteismim Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7 46...Z.s..t.o.P.Itt....r.a4 J. must take into account the "interests of At"; ditunAticanstm, btxmat counnon enemy." d Communist pm the 69. On 17 June. CPSU representatives met with CPC delegates en route to the Rumanian Party Congress. The Soviets told the Chinese that they considered the letters' "views and methods erroneous." The Chinese refused to change their stand, but said that they would be willing to "admit their errore if a majority at the Bucharest conference "proved" them to be wrong. CPSU co s tiered it necessary,ts,,FhArtnje_ ?es_ stttarsts of a.l..21 a _et 71. Th ent concluded with asimussion of S9?W4PASSAVAILSMWd$,,,I,,:.:Alligh4.09,E.S.01M4SAL criticLezt,. isKa hiapciet wa_Ltrid dralvthe uses sear conclusions, liembigt Jthi'n,Ld the interests orthe eniire the r tio I C.14,M2X.Ittee inittalgAt from 4:1.4 of Cornrg In the Chinese Developments after Bucharest 72. in the three months following Bucharest. the dispute continued unresolved, and indeed, there was no serious at- tempt to resolve it. Each side continued to argue the rneritil of its respective position; each continued b effort to get support within the world movement. The Soviets sent a series of letters to the Chinese criticising Chinese propaganda activities and putting the Chinese on notice that Soviet technicians would be withdrawn during August. The Chinese replied to these lettere and. on 10 September, produced a comprehensive rebuttal 30 Sanitized - Approv=a4- sfy_CIA-RDP78-0091