THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT AN INTERPRETATION OF THE MOSCOW MEETINGS OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 27, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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.2 7 FEB 1961
THE ti/NO-SOVLET RUT
AN INTZIMPRETATWN OF YRS MOSCOW MEETINGS
OCTODER-NOVZhinlait ISO
Th. Uoote of the Chinone r. caftion
I. Mum Xhrushclaev rose to power on a program promising do-
Stalinizstion and liberalisation of the regime, centrifugal forces in
Eastern Europe began to endanger the cohesion *file bloc. National
Communism of the Yugoslav variety asserted itself in ihavarar and
Polead, only to be bloodily repriansed or neutralised through arms or
pressure by the Soviet Union. Today the Chinae. Communist
resistance to the Soviet Union a resistance amounting at time* to
open defiance is essentially akin to the fermentation of national
Communism* in Laster* Europe. The differerace in the cats of the
Chinese Communists is that their outlook is fundamentalist) whereas
the Eastern Xuropean movements were revisionist. The common
denominator of both forms of opposition. however is the ctbjection to
Soviet hegemony within the bloc sad the Intonational Conammist
movement and to the practices of Soviet hegemony in the fields of
ideology, policy making. and policy coordination. Althotgh Soviet
hogomerdetic practices Cr. no Unger as ends as they IVOINIS'under
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Stalin, natieeal and racial pride may rends Chinese national
Communism particularly eeneitivs to encroachments. The Chinese
Communists themselves claim that the conflict began when
ilhrushchev rose to power and attempted to impose his views and
international racism on world COM321#411131.0 Their clue against
the CPSU and illarushcher is 'based on the charge that their objections
to the Khrushcher program have net hoes heard, that they have no
voice in the policy.making preemie although they are the second
largest Communist power. At the Octoller-Vorember 1960 meetings
in Moscow. iihru.shcher anti the CP= in control a the majority of
the Communist parties in the bloc and irt the free world attempted' -
to overcome the Objections of the Chinese by imposing majority rule
**them. This maneuver did not succeed.
U. The Sycantiost a the Chinese Position
Chime* lave insisted Unit, contrary to Soviet accusations,
thity have (awl* sew& tO resolve their differences with the CSU through
bilateral cotioultation. We know that they did maks their views known en
ausksber of amidst questions (Poland, Uungary tint Sues crisis) to the
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CPSU during 1954. and that the CPSU. at least norninally. sought
Chinni* concurrence on such matters as the anti-Stalin ,campaign.
But it is equally clear that the Chinese were ever more critical of
Soviet unilateral actions until November 1957. At that time they
achieved What they considered a real bilateral consultation through
Mao's visit to Moscow sad the joint Sbto-Soviet drafting of the 1957
Moscow Declaration. Since then they assert. the Soviets have unilaterally
abandoned the common positions of this declaration.
? 3. In 1958 the CPC telt free to demonetrate publicly its autonomy
tat least on domestic policy) when it launched the communes and the
"great leap forward" program* Both in 1958 and 1959 consultations
between Mao mind Xbrushehev were considered unsatisfactory by the
Chines.. Chinese moves to re-open the border question with India1
which began in mid-1958. were also proof that in the Chinese opinion
this autonomy applied in the foreign policy field as well. By mid-1959
Chinese representatives in the decision-making bodies of the inter-
national Communist front organisations were opposing Soviet initiatives.
challenging Soviet control of both personnel and policy, and refusing
to cooperate in reaching urgently required policy decisions
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4. At the beginning of 1960 the Chinese made pii&b1Ic declaration
of their autoaoray in foreign policy, both in a statement by the party'e
Central Committee and in a speech (4 February) by Wang Slang to the
Political Consultative Committee of the Wareaw Pact States. in April
1960 the Chinese gave clear public statement a their ideological dissent
by publishing and circulating to Communist parties.throughout the world
summation of their ideological views in the book ".Long Liver Leninism.'
In June 1960, at the meeting of the Executive Council of the World
Federation at Trade Unions in Peking. the Chines. went from public
dissent to public criticism of the CP3U.
S. At the special meeting of Communist parties convened in,
Bucharest later in jun*. the Chinese made explicit their fundamental
opposition to the CPSU domination of the intorestional Communist
movement, and theretvon launched their attack upon librushcbev as the
head of the CPU. 'Surprised in Bucharest by the hastily .orgaoleed
Soviet counterattacki and provoked try punitive Xrdilkeilltall taken against
them by the CP3U in July sod Augusts She Chinese in their letter to
the CP313 of 10 September (codified their challenge to Soviet hegemony
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and to the methods used to enforce it. This document was clearly
the first move in the Chinese campaign to exploit the coming October
and November meetings, agreed upon at Bucharest, for an all-out
challenge to the position of the CPSU within the international Communist
2110VOMOriti
M. The Chinese Case A. airtst the He *mon of the CPSU and the USSR
6. The essence of the'Chinese case as presented at Moscow is
embodied in two charges* first, the USSR had sought to infringe upon
Chinese national or state sovereignty; second, the CPSU had infringed
upon the political and ideological sovereignty of the CPC.
T. Under the first title the Chinese stated that the USSR had
demanded the formation of a joint fleet under Soviet command in the
Pacific, had sought to establish naval bases in China, had insisted on
the establishment of radar stations in China under Soviet command; and
had proposed the creation of a joint Sino-Soviet stock company to
construct and manage s long-wave radio transmitter in China, The
Chiniese, furthermore, rejected as pressure the Soviet criticisms of
the Chinese domestic policy on the great leap forward and the COMMtUalla
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saying that, while they did not ask for approval of such programs.
they denied that any outsider had the right to criticize them. Such
criticism, they said, was unwarranted intervention in Chinese internal
affairs. The Chinese also rejected Khrushchev's insistence that Sovist
scientific planning methods were necessary for China, saying that they
were determined to go ahead through their own efforts and that inter,
national cooperation on a voluntary basis would be feasible only when
their own efforts had achieved their *ad..' The Chinese spokesman
specified that the CPSU considered this Chinese position a "nationalist
deviation."
8. Under this first title the Chinese, with valuable Albanian support,
also charged infringement of their sovereignty by Soviet effort* to use
state.to.state relationships for coercive purposes. In these terms they
condemned the Soviets for violating treaties and agreements, using their
economic power coercively, and fabricating issues to gain political
advantage. The Chinese also charged that the CPSU had used the same "
methods against the Albanians. and the presentation by the Albanians of
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their own case showed that the Chines* bad informed them of statements
made by Soviet officials on the matter. kioxha charged that the CPSU had
sought to subvert and mobilise specific Albanian party leaders againat
the Chinese. that the Soviet ambassador had interfered in Albanian
foreign affairs, and that the Soviets bad tried to provoke Albanian military
leaders to act against their government. Haulm said the USSR had
reduced grain deliveries drastically in September and October 1960 during
& time of famine and. further, that the Soviet marshals Matinevslty and
Grechko had refused to give "certain arms" to the Albanian forces and
had been threatening. while the November conferences were in session,
to exclude Albania from the Warsaw Pact. Haub& dramatized his charges
by saying that Khrushchev himself had told the Chinese on 6 November
that the Soviets would employ the same methods against Albania that they
had used. against Yugoslavia and had contemptuously said that the USSR
bad lost an Albanian ally while the Chinese had gained one.
14 Detailing infringements of the political and ideological sovereignty
Of the CPC the Chinese first pointed to the specific efforts of the CPSU
to impose its views And on China and the international Communist
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en-7.-nr7
movement. In particular they charged that the CPSU had attempted
to impose the decisions of the 20th and Zlet CPSU Congresses upon
the international Communist moviment without any prior consultaticns.
But the Chinese also devoted much time to stating the positive side of
their cm, which centered in the thesis that "consultation between equals"
was the only proper method of achieving aolt insuring unity within, the
International Communist movement. They pointed to the Moscow
Declaration .1 1957 as the good and proper precedent since it was arrived
at through real consultation and a joint drafting effort and since it
covered only those points upon which there was agreement. Cent:citing
these good and bad precedents. the Chinese charged that the CPSU had
in fact 4f...emphasised and virtually iiinored Oa policies agreed upon and
embodied in the 1957 declaration. ,and had instead pressured the mova..
meat into conforming to the decisions of its own congresses.
3/3. Developing their argument. the Chine.e emphasised that they
had been milling to consult with the GPM. after the November 1957 meeting
in an attempt to iron out the remaining differences. They also said they
were willing to do the same thing after the November. 1940 recertizig. They
STE718
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stated that they sought no special privileges and that sincere consultation
was the true expression of the equality between parties. They made it
clear that for them there were two conditions for unity. First, rejecting
the Soviet insistence that they approve majority decisions., they asked
for an acknowledgment by the movement of their right of assent. This
they spelled out by insisting upon the need for unanimous decisions.
Second, they affirmed that they also had the right of dissent. This
they embodied in their demand that at conferences unresolved questions
be carried over for future consideration rather than be made the subject
of pressure and "crusade." organized by one party against another. Ca
the basis of sovereignty the Chinese rebuffed the Soviet attempts to attack
the "Sinification" of Marxism-Leninism by Mao as an expression of
nationalism. Not only did they declare. at Moscow that it was their
sovereign right to determine how Marxism-Leninism was. to be applied
within China; their late 1960 campaign.demanding that all Chines* accept
Mao's "world outlook showed their determination to assert their autonomy
in foreign affairs as well.
U. In attacking the CPSU for imposing- its views on the international
Communist movement. the Chinese first sought to pro** the fallibility of
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the CPSU, to show that it had no right to impose its views. Further.
by proving that the CPSU used improper methods and pressures. the
Chinese sought to invalidate the CMU claim to moral superiority.
objectivity, or adherence to high principles in its dealings with other
parties. The case against the infallibility of the CPSU was presented
mainly in the form of a three-pronged attack against Ithrushchev's
personal infallibility as an interpreter of Marxism-.Leninism. as a
maker of international policy, and as a Communist activist at the
diplomatic level.
?
? 12. The Chinese desire to discredit IChrushchev in the ideological
field is one of the main reasons why their case against the CPSU depanded
heavily upon ideological argumentation. Their use of this approach tends
to overshadow their positions on other matters, which are more easily
recognizable as manifestations of national Communism. The attack on
Khrushchev as a policy maker justified the Chinese attention to what the
Soviets called the "old issues "Stalin, Hungary. and Poland. The
.Albanian case, of obvious, topical interest, reinforced this Chinese
approach drarnatkally. The very fact that Hosha was able to present his
accusations with impunity was itself a proof that the CPSU under l?hrushchev's
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leadership had clearly failed to achieve its objectives in Albania.
The detailed critical treatment the Chinese gave to Khreshchevls
performance as a diplomat was intended to round out the case againet
him by showing his incompetence as an activist. A particularly shrewd
device employed by the Chinese in this presentation was the description
of the way the French Communist Party had been obliged to scold ita
members for their display of undue enthusiasm at the time of
Eisenhower's visit to Paris. it made clear to free world parties how
Soviet maneuvers and mistakes could force them into difficult
positions and create internal disciplinary problems for them.
13. in attacking the infallibility of ichrushchav as a maker of
? international policy, the Chinese first returned to the denigration of
Stalin. The Chinese charged that ic.hrushchevis denunciation of Stalin
at the 10th Congress of the GPM, in 1956 had been improperly carritsd
out and was devoid of a proper Marxist analysis of Stalin's actions;
they declared also that it had provided ammunition to the enemy. The
Chinese spokesman in November 1960 declared that, although the CPC
had endorsed the criticism of Stalin, it had never agreed with the way
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the attack was carried out. ECAtha went even further and blanied
the Polieh and Hungarian crises of 1956 on the Theneer in which
Stalin was exposed. Klaruehchev protested that the Chinese leaders
and other bloc leaders including Hoxha had approved the anti-Stalin
campaign in advance. The Chinese denied this. They aseerted further
that the attack on the cult of personality had been carried too far by
the CPSU, for, they said. Communist parties needed pereonal leaders
and it was improper to toreleten the rightful honoring of influential
persoas. The bead of at least ens European Communist party. De Groot
of the Netherlande CP, echoed this Chinese sentiment.
- .14. The Chinese next charged that the Soviet Unica bad intended
at the end of October 1956 to withdraw their forces from Hungary and
that they had protested thle move. Since their audience was fully aware
of the impact of the military Lite *talon decided upon on 4 November
1956, the import of this Chinese charge waa clear. Again, lioxha
carried this charge of Soviet failure even farther when be *aid that the
causes of the Hungarian debacle lay fa the fact that Khruebehav and
Sualov had allowed themselves to be deceived by Imre Nagy. The
U
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Chinese took just the opposite position on Poland, charging that the
CPSU. had prepared for military intervention in Poland and for a
conference of Communist parties to condemn the Poles, and asserting
that they had successfully opposed these policies. The inference was
that they had prevented the CPSU from blundering.
15. The specific Chinese accusations of CPSU use of unfair
methods were linked together in their most brutal accusation when
they characterized the Soviet misdeeds as manifestations of "great
nation chauvinism". They charged the CPSU with anti-Chinese
attitudes and with expressing these in slander and smear attacks on
the CPC general line. on Mao, and on the CPC leadership in their
crusade against China at and after the Eucharest conference.
Vih.en the Chinese were accused of acting in collusion with the Albanians,
they asked pointedly what interpretation could be placed on the fact -
that other delegations expressed identical views. They accused
Khrushcb,ev of making common cause with former CPC leaders who
had been expelled as anti-party elements. They charged that the
Soviets wished to split the Chinese people away from the CPC and that
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they had tried to undermine the whole leadership of the Chinese party.
The Soviet press release of late 1959 on the Sino-India border dispute
was also treated as a manifestation of Ws anti-Chinese attitude. The
Chinese said that this release was a horrible scolding publicly
administered to the Chinese, and that the Soviets had taken this anti
Chinese position to ingratiate themselves with imperialism at Chinese
expense.
16. The Chinese also charged that the Soviet use of state-to-state
relationships to exert pressure on the Chinese was chauvinistic. The
Soviet withdrawal of techaicians from China, they described as a viola-
tion of treaties.. They also exposed the fact that the Soviets had demanded
the recall of an information officer.from the Chinese embassy in Moscow.
had threatened China in a Pravda article with economic blockade, had
violated agreement. by stopping the circulation of Chinese publications
in the 'USSR, and had/artificially created a diplomatic issue by protostin
as a Chinese border encroachment the accidental presence of Chinese
shepherds on Soviet territory. The Chinese also labelled as manifestations
of chauvinism the Soviet charge of Chinese lack of gratitude for the
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economic and technical aid that China had received from the Soviet
Union, and the contemptuoue attitude the 5oviets adopted in the
5 November letter to the. Chinese contributions to the corornon cause.
The Albanians again drove home the charge. 1Ioxha, speaking emotion-
ally about the suspension of grain deliveries, said that Soviet rats
were eating at a time when Albanian people were ftarving.
17. The charges and specifications set out in the preceding para-
graphs were the core of the Chinese case ag Last the CPSU. While the
evident polemic overstatements and distortions employed in the debate
make it difficult to say that all the Chinese charges were true, precedent
clearly supports them. The CPSU has used such reethode in the past,
as the cane of Yugoslavia clearly demonstrates.
W. The 'Zovint Reaction
18. Characteriatically. the Soviet resonse to the Chinese case
was to impugn the Chineee motives and to turn around every one of
the charges and airn each of them back at the Chinese. Rejecting the
accusation of great-nation chauviniem as vile and worthy only of the
imperialist enemy. the CPU charged that the Chinese sought a special
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role within the international Communist movement. namely, the
exclusive right to be the interpreters of Marxism-Leninism and
the authority to excommunicate those who disagreed with them. The
CPSU asserted that the defamation of Khruahchev was a Chinese efrort
to split the CPSU from the Soviet peoples and from the rest of the
Communist world. The Soviets accused the Chinese of attacking
the CPU merely to cover up their own violations of discipline.
They accused the Chinese of being pTeterstioue and narrowly nationalist,
saying, contemptuously, that such Chinese slogans as "the east wind
prevails over the west wind" and 'imperialism is a paper tiger" were
incomprehensible and a ,mere juggling of geographical and meteorological
language, used in plACIP of the scientific terminology of Marxism-Leninism.
They charged the Chinese with claiming false credit within the inter-
national Communist movement, and with attempts to set minorities
in other Communist parties against existing leadershipe. They che,rged
them with stirring up national feeling against the Soviet Union by miming
the old issues of Hungary. Poland, and the anti-Stalin campaign. And
they characterized most of the Chinese charges as slander. rnisrepre.
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s,lutation. and placing weapons in the bands of the imperialist
erten-I.*" This last charge. for 02=rip1e. was levelled aaainat the
Chinese because of the misrepresentation of the purposes for which
the CSoviet "Union gave aid to the other bloc countries.
19. The truth of these Cloviet charues obviously cannot be
determined. it, on the ba$is of available evideuce? it seems
possible to prove that the 6oviat charge that the CPC was eeeki a the
leading role in the movement was highly exaggerated. The Chinese
party and its okexneiz at It4oscow never made such a claim. ln fact,
at the height of the recriudsiatione lvloscow the Chinese insisted
that the CPUit assume th cibi1tty of leadership within the
iaternatimal Co=munist rcoves.nent but not abuse this position to obtat'Ai
primacy. the Chinese. moreover, have regularly eu-L:ressed their
vain:lances to consult with the C.P4A3 and worls out policies jointly.
Lt1y, there is Vac fact that all the available vidance shows that the
Chinese have neither the material strengtb or the organisational bass
for exerting systematic and effective leadership within the international
Communist movement.
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20. The leaders of the CFU, on the other head. hownd by
their action during October and November 1960 that they had no
intention of giving up anythin3 that they considered essential to their
continued domination of the world Communist moverneet. They
stubbornly persisted in their tactics of impo zg their will on the
Chinese throwth the device of the rule of the majority; and their
manipulation of free world party delegations hes been well documentad.
.At the ed of the drafting commission's deliberations on 22 October'
1960,
the CP U3 was stilt insistiog on the following three points which were
the 'basis of ite whole case, and the Chinese still had not given itu
the condemnation of factional activity, the negating of Chinese assertions
of sovereignty through critictam of national Communism, and the
acknowledgment ot the CPEU's hegemony through endoreement of the
binding nature of the decision of the 20th and 2Ist CPSU Congresses.
21. The Chinese were also clearly aware of the nature and
purpose of the Soviet tactic of the rule of the majority. They pointed
out that Ithrush.chev's disclaimer of the leading role of the CPSU and
la
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his endoreornent of the 141 of the eInallty of parties eras an attempt
to 'ify only the methods of Soviet control. S ifically. the Chit 85
charged that Ithrushchev had adopted these positions in order to make
it possible for the C12.513 to 11.e..eich. come other parties." Confronted by
this eituation. the CSV circulated, on the eve a the November met:Inge,
a scathing attack on the CPC in the forra of a letter to all delegates.
We believe this procedure had the objective of crushing Chinese real t nee
and forcin then%to acct n ajority rule. The CPU held to this course
through the conference **salon a 24 November.
V. 17he Ca Cace Ait the CPOS L i?-tc1 bnctt1cne
, 22.
the Moscow mitotiags the CU a.tten,td, to deal vith
Chinese ideolazical arguments Ly im,pugning thane as violations of
discipline or as attache tlp a the CPC-1.1, but the Chinese stubbornly
insisted that the uteetiszethou4 consider whether the particular
argum t as richt or ronz. Given the occasions when the Chinesie
took up ideological pointe and the concentration a their lira upon
Khrushchev it seems poseible tho.t the Soviet accucation-contained
an element or truth and that much of the Chinese hair-splitting argument
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viaa their way of couaterinz the intcitty of the Soviet attack. 'rho
epokeenlen allowed consid rable sensitivity to CIL, Chinese
gambit, and responded to the =est vt.oroue Chinese attact..s by
prcteeting that Ehrusbehev had the full suriport of the CPSU Central
Committee and that all hle epeeches 'were approved beforehand by the
Pres idiurs.
23. Loth the Chincoe end Soviet descriptions of their opponent:'s
ideolosical views must be treated as biassed. Charges of misrepresentation
- and slander were freely (=chained. Nevertheless1 the *rain features of
the ideological positione taken at Moscow can be defined
24. 'The core of the Ch aese ideolozical argument was that. In the
absence of adequate guare,nteee. the ar.iplication of the CPSIJ's Weelozical
line would promote false hellos and illusions and commit the international
Ciemmunitit movement to no revolutionary positions which it rnigtt
Iter find untenable. The Chinese idea of what such Zaaranteea rni.ght
be were all related to their pessirniatic and cautious attitude on the
question of war and peace. Some of their specific views emerged in
their dernandi for the maintenance of bloc military strength. in their
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supation with the nr...rcezsity of the takecvr of state power in
countries, and in their crivieism of r-hruslichov's ter.dency
to detlne peaceful policies c svicry rather than merely desirable.
Tait, led them, on virtually ovary point that tb.try discussed, to critkixe
Vge aad ie-hrushchev for placing emphasis on the wrong things.
ZB. On the cuestion of the charactor of the current epoch. the CPC
rqjected as nonsense Soviet charges that the CPC consilerod it one of
re azd rovolutions. that it denied the possibility of preventing world
war, and that it failed to recognize the siznificance of the existence
and power of the Corntr.,uniet bloc1 and accused kIhrushehetv of using
these charges to create the inlp assion that the danzor of war cameo
from C1'34s
26. Oa war and pe co the Chineoe challenged the key V.hrushchlsv
thesis that world war is not inevitable by asking. '41low can one be tone?
Then they explained that their criticism of the overecaphseis given by
the C propaganda to the horrors of %tucker war wae provoked by
their concern that, if war were to break out in spite of Communist wishes,
surrender sentiments mizlit well arise 'within the Coriarnst camp.
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that local war fi L.orea and Vietaarn had not led to general
war they co o4 dwellinog the relationship between local. and
Er, crte..-ra war. They said that this was an overemphasis on the
possibility of p.rovoking general war and that it would weaken the
Communist -will and ability to resist both local imperiaist aggressiot
ziad counter.revolutionary wars.
Z7. On disarmament the Cbne criticised as overernpbasis
the C-PLI; formula on the ofeachisving a "world without
van before the victory of socialism, sayinz that this would
only be possible in a world without states and that drastic disarmament
the Communist bloc was rnaracstly tArriVilie's The Sovietsreplied
Vkat their main interest was in disarnAng the ens y and that, even if
aver merit were actilevod, the defense of the bloc would be assured
by the znainteriance of :militias. After assertinz that they considered
diplomatic negotit.tion with the onerny both desirable and useful
shinese insisted that the C11.3 overemphasized the necessity of
negotiations and thus obscured the in-iportance of mass strugsles ar4
mass pressure. They specifically accused Kitruskich.ev ira this contest
the
' ZZ
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-ozloting "false illusione about euzennit rreetim." The Cr-TA;
taco relying ez:ecseively I:: so, peacervi coexist;Dnee. Granting
thAi it mht be achieved in the future with some states. the Chineae
that the campaign for peaceful coexistence could not be allowed
:to itter:ere with all.out se:I-Tort by the Communist states of revolutionary
truggies.
2:1. On the question, of the revolutionary seLsaire a power. the
1:hineee said that tho C rtY was mistak= in icsistinz that the chances
peace:414 ta:loover a :rower wore incr.' sin-, and that this mistake
Ze:f. the CPZ,Ii to overemphaaisethi hoLe kinestion .tcerva takeolietr.
Ty also cautioned aaitun.1Le reliance upo tho national bourgeois
c a41. of underdeveloped cowl:zits pointin out that their dual nature
could not earely he ignored ana that ouch men as Naeeer. Nehru, and
f;u1;arno-
we =tying away fro a .1 pIrL1t3rn, ern
7 -
dernaginy
trAd the mani,p'4io felectoral d parliamentary pro see and usill3
riti-Cornmunist car to coLeolidate their positions. The Chinese
also called a.ttention to the militarization a such regimes as proof of the
need for reatraint and caution in dealing with the and for ;avoiding hopes
Approved For Release : CIA-R9178-00915R001300170001-8
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8
int.t3itAns sa4.1cht1t the.7eat of
cf erLici:lat extd we'ponsitloa. or spre,Jaratioas
to xteizz.: power. ogvl re;:d.L.-?J,,,.3-- to re-v4,1 earl:Tice cowItor.rovolutiortary
-attao:c. 11.4e beezt alov,11.oro tho Chine-ze eleo oit1tictre4 tb+)
Covi4zt Zonuttotaion of tb.ei cUt a ,p4trao-maity bum oars zied.
too tor.
27. these oriazistrvo a24 cowrzinze of the GLIzzeoe weze
arr4raatica21y toze1!:;t:,,,Y. in the etz..rcetitoprtocheo
zrzi had the t f:t....c-t of eaibt-:111r1;143 wrzttiryiniI
ere eneray, acid 17--,r,orneting tolzft.ttioz
? la ca:z-1174,11:1,7,Q C74 at;titn:;21, bour;4ots leadere the ChiAece aleo
na,-at .nothirAf.: Ls?. dorm c2i..-.12;a14 prettlfy
30. t corzte:4; 1,1:1 ii.:LLweit came Ooze to 1li
cvic; -;;A:4 v.hczt they thtt. the gctv1miza
rcvtz,icallarvr, be ba2ta f.tot tbAt it. was alner in
yrettirvilv, a both L.,-;.1,0 apitltra. They vi:torotzely
reSected $eviet etiort3 t th-. to..1....r.-art.nt.inzt to 1.7.e the ba.zis for
strue3le az-ainet uit'a it* aottrl ants that tho oIns of
2,1
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Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8
b.yrnai:Ily Lt the rt
cf: 011:: catcrial cor4.z.ali. Ot., bad intro:II:zed an aztwadrrit-,...1t
t* its t:I?4311 Craft coveri?.o,'th.b,?tr,v4til3 It was probably
i. t%L.4 areazidmeat that thr,cr rscc tko coaezt!oa of the relation, of
revialoala-ra aatl matiottAtictn.) he CLIacee obviotvaly iw It this
szaaztrior a Boviot atte=t to pave tas -way for sttacn1 0.1f1r natives'
. =??;s- t -
31. The Covi,v,ts vier clearly prcoctrrizti r/iat Ezzt nv.:-;:ot of the
? oa tlieir egttre tstrate:y of ,:catza. rtray t14:e. Cctot;er
Oat accc:.;:to,.,,,ce of C;e taLitztoAce c:132Cerontiati,45
? Ge tral c.a-1 Iota ?";;C.;.t,`,7,144-12t Crw t movemeat
of Cur barizt-r of ts i;,:ceolble t Uoi,s the
;Tveriallate oartno% Tit) trizs a mill re.clatcmert a the lona-
startd1?,..L, Cov cbarga aittity.tio tot" war rroal,
tdoptz:41 by the interastiom5=1Cti3t. CatrAVALIr
pz.rties ;Many ccttr1 2dtreat their offorts for tlaity ca. action
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Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8
withLg.0.1.4 tar a p-eact.
thzt vaz., c hirteze,,, v11,--,Vi 4 o.a the pros.,er tactical
to the stiutat of i-eoi,-74kr, rejcztzdttze ik:aa tLat suctessful
socW1.1rtrel coad ,,zttr4.31,26e,4-1,,-; to C,1:1:4xLe1arn.
34. ie,:hrti2hchov V,-.3 sante .ioiate Ills latt srica.nt
szeeic".1. tt;a1 of Z3 3Zovo-o,-.1:cr. attite.e on, at pz:ace was.
he v1', t ror,:asurt of- t:143 t.-riol;r:-.1-..1.7,0 a a C party; peazo
was citi,c%;!.lantuci,?:-.)4:14. wad te empht4size4
Cvni,?45- Itioe Ay aztl scilt.,tion, to the -rololora
CA* bc$t Iray to
1:or the Latezz3tizza C itLicverntot. Zejt tkat Chine sa
tosir4ti,oc-da that c;tuttwa tioatina -4.;113 o'attoaaZiat
lea4er-a
4. I* 4$
14:40 Arttia?Lr':*1:4i24.44,,ke-i. rt.44,4,k.Li,,... aLta
Lhat Conormz.low, cv.1.1fi itstiS aarai:tIvo Cie poo:ae.a
o tr44.,:r4evotovcd COU.T.trit.:0 G.zti Clitats*
the attrActiventss th* ,p...ez.x.:e to man Me nelz-o. Attractizea
o tha p6o.pit uto s* be also was Vv.:
purpoeo of the 'bloc pro,Sz.%-sta such its a ttam.
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Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8
vzo.4.1 earriva the 7,..v,,tcz,- iAti'Avidtsala 111'4 1?14:4' av-2a Nettr4.
rejectio3v rebuttaid of Chirmaz viewa 2L ctercd
t trt LC.L-Arscse which %Ns.* Olt
the CLineso vtir.vz 03 tactical vs:we bav:s4 on pzesi istLe,
caLittous, a el emaentk.?Ily v,...z-,%tr4tre ASvezorriunt of the world af.tuation
arta ors
rtrealf,atic fait;s in the persuasive w,g.I of rtvoluto ary
propar;amfa. rs*c t*
Lettsc we ?t ti z tactical
proaraa:as r by
IZA a- wtro- tt,rattr- vito,41.3 itaIate
Cornmo,lritztpti ricetroy VA* of extezt;'...ing Co..
th.Cit:Itr)Ce 10, 4h4 tInst,te prora:rts would
r..Lztitc it 2rk for t LiJt3 ve;10r Com th= i:aterunal
Coccus4...t.tiOz ratwz.:7?Artt to c:4s,>7.1.?,.liz.' s u,:x>a atz.: emtltuslavcrt in, the
con-47.*:,tti:d co4Intrii,1. for evo:::-4 av peace, and ecor*Inic
both th
tetEn.'7.$
el
'hivsitt tha Covita fs-rt.g;,-;:abed
tactical rs, et??svc.riz?-; t::'str e4u.etit2.4.3ttwt.dockt.f.L Ata
arzti tolts CZtnnzg. itti any coniidatca tccurate stzternimIA
of no ertati fit?.1.r T4,11 pDVilit)rs .W bliievt, for tscartTA-)14. that
?L1 to2 Las osmiblo t+) conclkaL$ ror_A OAT avai.14141e., 4.3
41:,1 -4.aloatgo st is, ti[4.0.: t- ;:iovict 1.;:r4oct wou'A,:1;,
Approved For Release tIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8
cirt.,..trnataric.zs tr," c".az 1:;:zatt V:za Onu,'1"` t40 Cliin;.14te
vvouldr iz1y to ore& ry c& tkpi2citic . 6ut
cc rta':.rt corAi.,...lasiamo of practical vbit: can, v ev e
safcly irotr, Cho ,...tvz3lable eatto. Ars. iuzportiAt contluoiott concerrsar
tLat facttht vIrtually all thte z.ltineol th4 1963 vtatv:rtent reflects
rooitionc. 1::tiv fact corziot coaatmed, 4s evidence
of dtfolit, forrr.a I '1%T...wax:Aber, ittt dyl of the Txtoot
biLtta. attacA clon tLt t7-.13 C.4inZAitt said ircallidy
1124 ref.a;:::q; clear its s.2::rt.--emerit wit:4 virtlly all
attptets. of GT.I 'It V,e ovasixiona anti rle!etiot kw-a? tXe?
10..rmaict t7.1At 41rol z-t.-q-Aat
?
35, The &.7.-.ate;f7.1.1alt tlaza rwt cc:nt.t.in uct
trit:a val. is
1,4.-15.1 to vc4,1.,,ert..-i?tvar, th.-..t arrnies czn zi.e.atved
Ve.e final.victory of Co;:r..-.1.--..urtienI, at rai;.v.o:,11t-orr, the
COLIrce1 rtaritA.04.1arrs. rz.-q-kza inozg toant smiesicqlz
thakt
t i tIlwartAtz .1.:"';',73it
parpas.00. The cer.trzll fict is fs:3VC707:1;dtty C%I.trAt
a Coz.lzr.lair)t `Party ofwe rt torr..p trAsodr, tbe,
w.:.-ze tot. oZ)11.z44 to acctpt evez. 0114 1,4 tht thr
2-4
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8
t14. poistt. *St:: ,1r t: tcHe
tr;etz'sz V./
is r?txt c?if vg-,11...ttor.11
dcfcizir.ma for gxot
21.
t tho imd aV,L,',"1,..tolicIvsv t43 cd'elt to tbe
ftro- r'?-,)eit:Atz ttht5 cixzztztrictr
toi!;:s arres t iltLsS Janu,: y1161
circuLlt.,:f4.1-ivt aflCr.irnrilz_z,L): vartlos e...0
Z11.7.14:1 4 qt"...* ? 1 . 7-7:t ?
C;17713; f..; 14 13 'fir et :?Sr; W7tal Itt::?te?kr:r.,tnt to Lo
,t
. .1% ." 4 `? F ir,4;r3 tctz,,,,, Oak 031.
111.........m..?KV~?AR94...ee.hf.,.-t..mtp.A1veAe.fRVeatlu,Mikilteaxac-
tl:Aric%,:t 2: 2-4114,1:3Z.)
!pr.
37. ArtItAzedfa atelt-t:vJat id b tbit Mcr Cvai'e-, re. ace v'ae
urtati74o,J/17) Soviet :,:zte:Ci?iwords) sad, iaaConv oince t!..e
cluiteronce st,zzezt tit Vacir irttitatc-n-,mni
Approved For Release : CIA-Rli178-00915R001300170001-8
Approved For Release C1A-RDP7
-00915R001300170001-8
Ana their ttcr a01ve4 di..a'.1,:,=.eca a, iiiLely to c atia....lo to
:generate temelon mut an ev?,
?luterrAtional Cot,==x0,,
by eltaitrz the impooltion
their beak tib,:ective of 0144,
-
.40 ....M.,.
of debate .7.31,thio the
rtatIly the Cbiztece.
r4s, -harp to loser to
ao&cce4zc* oomit! vit. 3
by the 4ia il-4row.14h rrizt.ta,-.:at/F
it the rzczatirem. the C11.1a.c4t, grot4b1y cezitioue proeolytize
g
foc1 Coait; oriBer to collator=soviet
ral. atillitaaelas with, them..
the
?
30
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