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February 13, 1998
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February 27, 1961
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Approved For Relessers78-00915R001300170001-8 .2 7 FEB 1961 THE ti/NO-SOVLET RUT AN INTZIMPRETATWN OF YRS MOSCOW MEETINGS OCTODER-NOVZhinlait ISO Th. Uoote of the Chinone r. caftion I. Mum Xhrushclaev rose to power on a program promising do- Stalinizstion and liberalisation of the regime, centrifugal forces in Eastern Europe began to endanger the cohesion *file bloc. National Communism of the Yugoslav variety asserted itself in ihavarar and Polead, only to be bloodily repriansed or neutralised through arms or pressure by the Soviet Union. Today the Chinae. Communist resistance to the Soviet Union a resistance amounting at time* to open defiance is essentially akin to the fermentation of national Communism* in Laster* Europe. The differerace in the cats of the Chinese Communists is that their outlook is fundamentalist) whereas the Eastern Xuropean movements were revisionist. The common denominator of both forms of opposition. however is the ctbjection to Soviet hegemony within the bloc sad the Intonational Conammist movement and to the practices of Soviet hegemony in the fields of ideology, policy making. and policy coordination. Althotgh Soviet hogomerdetic practices Cr. no Unger as ends as they IVOINIS'under DLI .:61A-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 Approved F IA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 Stalin, natieeal and racial pride may rends Chinese national Communism particularly eeneitivs to encroachments. The Chinese Communists themselves claim that the conflict began when ilhrushchev rose to power and attempted to impose his views and international racism on world COM321#411131.0 Their clue against the CPSU and illarushcher is 'based on the charge that their objections to the Khrushcher program have net hoes heard, that they have no voice in the policy.making preemie although they are the second largest Communist power. At the Octoller-Vorember 1960 meetings in Moscow. iihru.shcher anti the CP= in control a the majority of the Communist parties in the bloc and irt the free world attempted' - to overcome the Objections of the Chinese by imposing majority rule **them. This maneuver did not succeed. U. The Sycantiost a the Chinese Position Chime* lave insisted Unit, contrary to Soviet accusations, thity have (awl* sew& tO resolve their differences with the CSU through bilateral cotioultation. We know that they did maks their views known en ausksber of amidst questions (Poland, Uungary tint Sues crisis) to the Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 TUTIATEM,ISTIHR.,-,M7.4,4 .111,1 0.1.? Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 CPSU during 1954. and that the CPSU. at least norninally. sought Chinni* concurrence on such matters as the anti-Stalin ,campaign. But it is equally clear that the Chinese were ever more critical of Soviet unilateral actions until November 1957. At that time they achieved What they considered a real bilateral consultation through Mao's visit to Moscow sad the joint Sbto-Soviet drafting of the 1957 Moscow Declaration. Since then they assert. the Soviets have unilaterally abandoned the common positions of this declaration. ? 3. In 1958 the CPC telt free to demonetrate publicly its autonomy tat least on domestic policy) when it launched the communes and the "great leap forward" program* Both in 1958 and 1959 consultations between Mao mind Xbrushehev were considered unsatisfactory by the Chines.. Chinese moves to re-open the border question with India1 which began in mid-1958. were also proof that in the Chinese opinion this autonomy applied in the foreign policy field as well. By mid-1959 Chinese representatives in the decision-making bodies of the inter- national Communist front organisations were opposing Soviet initiatives. challenging Soviet control of both personnel and policy, and refusing to cooperate in reaching urgently required policy decisions Approved For Release : CIA-R9P78-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Rele 0P78-00915R001300170001-8 4. At the beginning of 1960 the Chinese made pii&b1Ic declaration of their autoaoray in foreign policy, both in a statement by the party'e Central Committee and in a speech (4 February) by Wang Slang to the Political Consultative Committee of the Wareaw Pact States. in April 1960 the Chinese gave clear public statement a their ideological dissent by publishing and circulating to Communist parties.throughout the world summation of their ideological views in the book ".Long Liver Leninism.' In June 1960, at the meeting of the Executive Council of the World Federation at Trade Unions in Peking. the Chines. went from public dissent to public criticism of the CP3U. S. At the special meeting of Communist parties convened in, Bucharest later in jun*. the Chinese made explicit their fundamental opposition to the CPSU domination of the intorestional Communist movement, and theretvon launched their attack upon librushcbev as the head of the CPU. 'Surprised in Bucharest by the hastily .orgaoleed Soviet counterattacki and provoked try punitive Xrdilkeilltall taken against them by the CP3U in July sod Augusts She Chinese in their letter to the CP313 of 10 September (codified their challenge to Soviet hegemony Approved For Release : Clei-RDRi8-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 and to the methods used to enforce it. This document was clearly the first move in the Chinese campaign to exploit the coming October and November meetings, agreed upon at Bucharest, for an all-out challenge to the position of the CPSU within the international Communist 2110VOMOriti M. The Chinese Case A. airtst the He *mon of the CPSU and the USSR 6. The essence of the'Chinese case as presented at Moscow is embodied in two charges* first, the USSR had sought to infringe upon Chinese national or state sovereignty; second, the CPSU had infringed upon the political and ideological sovereignty of the CPC. T. Under the first title the Chinese stated that the USSR had demanded the formation of a joint fleet under Soviet command in the Pacific, had sought to establish naval bases in China, had insisted on the establishment of radar stations in China under Soviet command; and had proposed the creation of a joint Sino-Soviet stock company to construct and manage s long-wave radio transmitter in China, The Chiniese, furthermore, rejected as pressure the Soviet criticisms of the Chinese domestic policy on the great leap forward and the COMMtUalla Approved For Release : CIA-RE1F'78-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 saying that, while they did not ask for approval of such programs. they denied that any outsider had the right to criticize them. Such criticism, they said, was unwarranted intervention in Chinese internal affairs. The Chinese also rejected Khrushchev's insistence that Sovist scientific planning methods were necessary for China, saying that they were determined to go ahead through their own efforts and that inter, national cooperation on a voluntary basis would be feasible only when their own efforts had achieved their *ad..' The Chinese spokesman specified that the CPSU considered this Chinese position a "nationalist deviation." 8. Under this first title the Chinese, with valuable Albanian support, also charged infringement of their sovereignty by Soviet effort* to use relationships for coercive purposes. In these terms they condemned the Soviets for violating treaties and agreements, using their economic power coercively, and fabricating issues to gain political advantage. The Chinese also charged that the CPSU had used the same " methods against the Albanians. and the presentation by the Albanians of 6 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 their own case showed that the Chines* bad informed them of statements made by Soviet officials on the matter. kioxha charged that the CPSU had sought to subvert and mobilise specific Albanian party leaders againat the Chinese. that the Soviet ambassador had interfered in Albanian foreign affairs, and that the Soviets bad tried to provoke Albanian military leaders to act against their government. Haulm said the USSR had reduced grain deliveries drastically in September and October 1960 during & time of famine and. further, that the Soviet marshals Matinevslty and Grechko had refused to give "certain arms" to the Albanian forces and had been threatening. while the November conferences were in session, to exclude Albania from the Warsaw Pact. Haub& dramatized his charges by saying that Khrushchev himself had told the Chinese on 6 November that the Soviets would employ the same methods against Albania that they had used. against Yugoslavia and had contemptuously said that the USSR bad lost an Albanian ally while the Chinese had gained one. 14 Detailing infringements of the political and ideological sovereignty Of the CPC the Chinese first pointed to the specific efforts of the CPSU to impose its views And on China and the international Communist 7 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 en-7.-nr7 movement. In particular they charged that the CPSU had attempted to impose the decisions of the 20th and Zlet CPSU Congresses upon the international Communist moviment without any prior consultaticns. But the Chinese also devoted much time to stating the positive side of their cm, which centered in the thesis that "consultation between equals" was the only proper method of achieving aolt insuring unity within, the International Communist movement. They pointed to the Moscow Declaration .1 1957 as the good and proper precedent since it was arrived at through real consultation and a joint drafting effort and since it covered only those points upon which there was agreement. Cent:citing these good and bad precedents. the Chinese charged that the CPSU had in fact 4f...emphasised and virtually iiinored Oa policies agreed upon and embodied in the 1957 declaration. ,and had instead pressured the mova.. meat into conforming to the decisions of its own congresses. 3/3. Developing their argument. the Chine.e emphasised that they had been milling to consult with the GPM. after the November 1957 meeting in an attempt to iron out the remaining differences. They also said they were willing to do the same thing after the November. 1940 recertizig. They STE718 .4. Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 stated that they sought no special privileges and that sincere consultation was the true expression of the equality between parties. They made it clear that for them there were two conditions for unity. First, rejecting the Soviet insistence that they approve majority decisions., they asked for an acknowledgment by the movement of their right of assent. This they spelled out by insisting upon the need for unanimous decisions. Second, they affirmed that they also had the right of dissent. This they embodied in their demand that at conferences unresolved questions be carried over for future consideration rather than be made the subject of pressure and "crusade." organized by one party against another. Ca the basis of sovereignty the Chinese rebuffed the Soviet attempts to attack the "Sinification" of Marxism-Leninism by Mao as an expression of nationalism. Not only did they declare. at Moscow that it was their sovereign right to determine how Marxism-Leninism was. to be applied within China; their late 1960 campaign.demanding that all Chines* accept Mao's "world outlook showed their determination to assert their autonomy in foreign affairs as well. U. In attacking the CPSU for imposing- its views on the international Communist movement. the Chinese first sought to pro** the fallibility of Approved For Release : cIA-RDR78-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 the CPSU, to show that it had no right to impose its views. Further. by proving that the CPSU used improper methods and pressures. the Chinese sought to invalidate the CMU claim to moral superiority. objectivity, or adherence to high principles in its dealings with other parties. The case against the infallibility of the CPSU was presented mainly in the form of a three-pronged attack against Ithrushchev's personal infallibility as an interpreter of Marxism-.Leninism. as a maker of international policy, and as a Communist activist at the diplomatic level. ? ? 12. The Chinese desire to discredit IChrushchev in the ideological field is one of the main reasons why their case against the CPSU depanded heavily upon ideological argumentation. Their use of this approach tends to overshadow their positions on other matters, which are more easily recognizable as manifestations of national Communism. The attack on Khrushchev as a policy maker justified the Chinese attention to what the Soviets called the "old issues "Stalin, Hungary. and Poland. The .Albanian case, of obvious, topical interest, reinforced this Chinese approach drarnatkally. The very fact that Hosha was able to present his accusations with impunity was itself a proof that the CPSU under l?hrushchev's Approved For Release : CIA-Rd178-00915R001300170001-8 ft, Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 leadership had clearly failed to achieve its objectives in Albania. The detailed critical treatment the Chinese gave to Khreshchevls performance as a diplomat was intended to round out the case againet him by showing his incompetence as an activist. A particularly shrewd device employed by the Chinese in this presentation was the description of the way the French Communist Party had been obliged to scold ita members for their display of undue enthusiasm at the time of Eisenhower's visit to Paris. it made clear to free world parties how Soviet maneuvers and mistakes could force them into difficult positions and create internal disciplinary problems for them. 13. in attacking the infallibility of ichrushchav as a maker of ? international policy, the Chinese first returned to the denigration of Stalin. The Chinese charged that ic.hrushchevis denunciation of Stalin at the 10th Congress of the GPM, in 1956 had been improperly carritsd out and was devoid of a proper Marxist analysis of Stalin's actions; they declared also that it had provided ammunition to the enemy. The Chinese spokesman in November 1960 declared that, although the CPC had endorsed the criticism of Stalin, it had never agreed with the way Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release : CIA-R9P78-00915R001300170001-8 the attack was carried out. ECAtha went even further and blanied the Polieh and Hungarian crises of 1956 on the Theneer in which Stalin was exposed. Klaruehchev protested that the Chinese leaders and other bloc leaders including Hoxha had approved the anti-Stalin campaign in advance. The Chinese denied this. They aseerted further that the attack on the cult of personality had been carried too far by the CPSU, for, they said. Communist parties needed pereonal leaders and it was improper to toreleten the rightful honoring of influential persoas. The bead of at least ens European Communist party. De Groot of the Netherlande CP, echoed this Chinese sentiment. - .14. The Chinese next charged that the Soviet Unica bad intended at the end of October 1956 to withdraw their forces from Hungary and that they had protested thle move. Since their audience was fully aware of the impact of the military Lite *talon decided upon on 4 November 1956, the import of this Chinese charge waa clear. Again, lioxha carried this charge of Soviet failure even farther when be *aid that the causes of the Hungarian debacle lay fa the fact that Khruebehav and Sualov had allowed themselves to be deceived by Imre Nagy. The U Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 Chinese took just the opposite position on Poland, charging that the CPSU. had prepared for military intervention in Poland and for a conference of Communist parties to condemn the Poles, and asserting that they had successfully opposed these policies. The inference was that they had prevented the CPSU from blundering. 15. The specific Chinese accusations of CPSU use of unfair methods were linked together in their most brutal accusation when they characterized the Soviet misdeeds as manifestations of "great nation chauvinism". They charged the CPSU with anti-Chinese attitudes and with expressing these in slander and smear attacks on the CPC general line. on Mao, and on the CPC leadership in their crusade against China at and after the Eucharest conference. Vih.en the Chinese were accused of acting in collusion with the Albanians, they asked pointedly what interpretation could be placed on the fact - that other delegations expressed identical views. They accused Khrushcb,ev of making common cause with former CPC leaders who had been expelled as anti-party elements. They charged that the Soviets wished to split the Chinese people away from the CPC and that , Approved For Release : A-IkDF178L00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 they had tried to undermine the whole leadership of the Chinese party. The Soviet press release of late 1959 on the Sino-India border dispute was also treated as a manifestation of Ws anti-Chinese attitude. The Chinese said that this release was a horrible scolding publicly administered to the Chinese, and that the Soviets had taken this anti Chinese position to ingratiate themselves with imperialism at Chinese expense. 16. The Chinese also charged that the Soviet use of state-to-state relationships to exert pressure on the Chinese was chauvinistic. The Soviet withdrawal of techaicians from China, they described as a viola- tion of treaties.. They also exposed the fact that the Soviets had demanded the recall of an information officer.from the Chinese embassy in Moscow. had threatened China in a Pravda article with economic blockade, had violated agreement. by stopping the circulation of Chinese publications in the 'USSR, and had/artificially created a diplomatic issue by protostin as a Chinese border encroachment the accidental presence of Chinese shepherds on Soviet territory. The Chinese also labelled as manifestations of chauvinism the Soviet charge of Chinese lack of gratitude for the 14 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 economic and technical aid that China had received from the Soviet Union, and the contemptuoue attitude the 5oviets adopted in the 5 November letter to the. Chinese contributions to the corornon cause. The Albanians again drove home the charge. 1Ioxha, speaking emotion- ally about the suspension of grain deliveries, said that Soviet rats were eating at a time when Albanian people were ftarving. 17. The charges and specifications set out in the preceding para- graphs were the core of the Chinese case ag Last the CPSU. While the evident polemic overstatements and distortions employed in the debate make it difficult to say that all the Chinese charges were true, precedent clearly supports them. The CPSU has used such reethode in the past, as the cane of Yugoslavia clearly demonstrates. W. The 'Zovint Reaction 18. Characteriatically. the Soviet resonse to the Chinese case was to impugn the Chineee motives and to turn around every one of the charges and airn each of them back at the Chinese. Rejecting the accusation of great-nation chauviniem as vile and worthy only of the imperialist enemy. the CPU charged that the Chinese sought a special Approved For Release : C11-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 role within the international Communist movement. namely, the exclusive right to be the interpreters of Marxism-Leninism and the authority to excommunicate those who disagreed with them. The CPSU asserted that the defamation of Khruahchev was a Chinese efrort to split the CPSU from the Soviet peoples and from the rest of the Communist world. The Soviets accused the Chinese of attacking the CPU merely to cover up their own violations of discipline. They accused the Chinese of being pTeterstioue and narrowly nationalist, saying, contemptuously, that such Chinese slogans as "the east wind prevails over the west wind" and 'imperialism is a paper tiger" were incomprehensible and a ,mere juggling of geographical and meteorological language, used in plACIP of the scientific terminology of Marxism-Leninism. They charged the Chinese with claiming false credit within the inter- national Communist movement, and with attempts to set minorities in other Communist parties against existing leadershipe. They che,rged them with stirring up national feeling against the Soviet Union by miming the old issues of Hungary. Poland, and the anti-Stalin campaign. And they characterized most of the Chinese charges as slander. rnisrepre. Approved For Release : CIA-RDI08-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For RelearrMrATRUP78-00915R001300170001-8 s,lutation. and placing weapons in the bands of the imperialist erten-I.*" This last charge. for 02=rip1e. was levelled aaainat the Chinese because of the misrepresentation of the purposes for which the CSoviet "Union gave aid to the other bloc countries. 19. The truth of these Cloviet charues obviously cannot be determined. it, on the ba$is of available evideuce? it seems possible to prove that the 6oviat charge that the CPC was eeeki a the leading role in the movement was highly exaggerated. The Chinese party and its okexneiz at It4oscow never made such a claim. ln fact, at the height of the recriudsiatione lvloscow the Chinese insisted that the CPUit assume th cibi1tty of leadership within the iaternatimal Co=munist rcoves.nent but not abuse this position to obtat'Ai primacy. the Chinese. moreover, have regularly eu-L:ressed their vain:lances to consult with the C.P4A3 and worls out policies jointly. Lt1y, there is Vac fact that all the available vidance shows that the Chinese have neither the material strengtb or the organisational bass for exerting systematic and effective leadership within the international Communist movement. Approved For Relentw-rAN4P78-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release TMIBIM0915R001300170001-8 20. The leaders of the CFU, on the other head. hownd by their action during October and November 1960 that they had no intention of giving up anythin3 that they considered essential to their continued domination of the world Communist moverneet. They stubbornly persisted in their tactics of impo zg their will on the Chinese throwth the device of the rule of the majority; and their manipulation of free world party delegations hes been well documentad. .At the ed of the drafting commission's deliberations on 22 October' 1960, the CP U3 was stilt insistiog on the following three points which were the 'basis of ite whole case, and the Chinese still had not given itu the condemnation of factional activity, the negating of Chinese assertions of sovereignty through critictam of national Communism, and the acknowledgment ot the CPEU's hegemony through endoreement of the binding nature of the decision of the 20th and 2Ist CPSU Congresses. 21. The Chinese were also clearly aware of the nature and purpose of the Soviet tactic of the rule of the majority. They pointed out that Ithrush.chev's disclaimer of the leading role of the CPSU and la Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 his endoreornent of the 141 of the eInallty of parties eras an attempt to 'ify only the methods of Soviet control. S ifically. the Chit 85 charged that Ithrushchev had adopted these positions in order to make it possible for the C12.513 to 11.e..eich. come other parties." Confronted by this eituation. the CSV circulated, on the eve a the November met:Inge, a scathing attack on the CPC in the forra of a letter to all delegates. We believe this procedure had the objective of crushing Chinese real t nee and forcin then%to acct n ajority rule. The CPU held to this course through the conference **salon a 24 November. V. 17he Ca Cace Ait the CPOS L i?-tc1 bnctt1cne , 22. the Moscow mitotiags the CU a.tten,td, to deal vith Chinese ideolazical arguments Ly im,pugning thane as violations of discipline or as attache tlp a the CPC-1.1, but the Chinese stubbornly insisted that the uteetiszethou4 consider whether the particular argum t as richt or ronz. Given the occasions when the Chinesie took up ideological pointe and the concentration a their lira upon Khrushchev it seems poseible tho.t the Soviet accucation-contained an element or truth and that much of the Chinese hair-splitting argument Approved For Release : CIA-RD19P78-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 viaa their way of couaterinz the intcitty of the Soviet attack. 'rho epokeenlen allowed consid rable sensitivity to CIL, Chinese gambit, and responded to the =est vt.oroue Chinese attact..s by prcteeting that Ehrusbehev had the full suriport of the CPSU Central Committee and that all hle epeeches 'were approved beforehand by the Pres idiurs. 23. Loth the Chincoe end Soviet descriptions of their opponent:'s ideolosical views must be treated as biassed. Charges of misrepresentation - and slander were freely (=chained. Nevertheless1 the *rain features of the ideological positione taken at Moscow can be defined 24. 'The core of the Ch aese ideolozical argument was that. In the absence of adequate guare,nteee. the ar.iplication of the CPSIJ's Weelozical line would promote false hellos and illusions and commit the international Ciemmunitit movement to no revolutionary positions which it rnigtt Iter find untenable. The Chinese idea of what such Zaaranteea rni.ght be were all related to their pessirniatic and cautious attitude on the question of war and peace. Some of their specific views emerged in their dernandi for the maintenance of bloc military strength. in their Approved For Release : CIA-IkDP78-00915R001300170001-8 20 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 supation with the nr...rcezsity of the takecvr of state power in countries, and in their crivieism of r-hruslichov's ter.dency to detlne peaceful policies c svicry rather than merely desirable. Tait, led them, on virtually ovary point that tb.try discussed, to critkixe Vge aad ie-hrushchev for placing emphasis on the wrong things. ZB. On the cuestion of the charactor of the current epoch. the CPC rqjected as nonsense Soviet charges that the CPC consilerod it one of re azd rovolutions. that it denied the possibility of preventing world war, and that it failed to recognize the siznificance of the existence and power of the Corntr.,uniet bloc1 and accused kIhrushehetv of using these charges to create the inlp assion that the danzor of war cameo from C1'34s 26. Oa war and pe co the Chineoe challenged the key V.hrushchlsv thesis that world war is not inevitable by asking. '41low can one be tone? Then they explained that their criticism of the overecaphseis given by the C propaganda to the horrors of %tucker war wae provoked by their concern that, if war were to break out in spite of Communist wishes, surrender sentiments mizlit well arise 'within the Coriarnst camp. Approved For Release : CIA-R13078-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-009.15R001300170001-8 that local war fi L.orea and Vietaarn had not led to general war they co o4 dwellinog the relationship between local. and Er, crte..-ra war. They said that this was an overemphasis on the possibility of p.rovoking general war and that it would weaken the Communist -will and ability to resist both local imperiaist aggressiot ziad counter.revolutionary wars. Z7. On disarmament the Cbne criticised as overernpbasis the C-PLI; formula on the ofeachisving a "world without van before the victory of socialism, sayinz that this would only be possible in a world without states and that drastic disarmament the Communist bloc was rnaracstly tArriVilie's The Sovietsreplied Vkat their main interest was in disarnAng the ens y and that, even if aver merit were actilevod, the defense of the bloc would be assured by the znainteriance of :militias. After assertinz that they considered diplomatic negotit.tion with the onerny both desirable and useful shinese insisted that the C11.3 overemphasized the necessity of negotiations and thus obscured the in-iportance of mass strugsles ar4 mass pressure. They specifically accused Kitruskich.ev ira this contest the ' ZZ Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 -ozloting "false illusione about euzennit rreetim." The Cr-TA; taco relying ez:ecseively I:: so, peacervi coexist;Dnee. Granting thAi it mht be achieved in the future with some states. the Chineae that the campaign for peaceful coexistence could not be allowed :to itter:ere with all.out se:I-Tort by the Communist states of revolutionary truggies. 2:1. On the question, of the revolutionary seLsaire a power. the 1:hineee said that tho C rtY was mistak= in icsistinz that the chances peace:414 ta:loover a :rower wore incr.' sin-, and that this mistake Ze:f. the CPZ,Ii to overemphaaisethi hoLe kinestion .tcerva takeolietr. Ty also cautioned aaitun.1Le reliance upo tho national bourgeois c a41. of underdeveloped cowl:zits pointin out that their dual nature could not earely he ignored ana that ouch men as Naeeer. Nehru, and f;u1;arno- we =tying away fro a .1 pIrL1t3rn, ern 7 - dernaginy trAd the mani,p'4io felectoral d parliamentary pro see and usill3 riti-Cornmunist car to coLeolidate their positions. The Chinese also called a.ttention to the militarization a such regimes as proof of the need for reatraint and caution in dealing with the and for ;avoiding hopes Approved For Release : CIA-R9178-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 int.t3itAns sa4.1cht1t the.7eat of cf erLici:lat extd we'ponsitloa. or spre,Jaratioas to xteizz.: power. ogvl re;:d.L.-?J,,,.3-- to re-v4,1 earl:Tice cowItor.rovolutiortary -attao:c. 11.4e beezt alov,11.oro tho Chine-ze eleo oit1tictre4 tb+) Covi4zt Zonuttotaion of tb.ei cUt a ,p4trao-maity bum oars zied. too tor. 27. these oriazistrvo a24 cowrzinze of the GLIzzeoe weze arr4raatica21y toze1!:;t:,,,Y. in the etz..rcetitoprtocheo zrzi had the t f:t....c-t of eaibt-:111r1;143 wrzttiryiniI ere eneray, acid 17--,r,orneting tolzft.ttioz ? la ca:z-1174,11:1,7,Q C74 at;titn:;21, bour;4ots leadere the ChiAece aleo na,-at .nothirAf.: Ls?. dorm c2i..-.12;a14 prettlfy 30. t corzte:4; 1,1:1 ii.:LLweit came Ooze to 1li cvic; -;;A:4 v.hczt they thtt. the gctv1miza rcvtz,icallarvr, be ba2ta f.tot tbAt it. was alner in yrettirvilv, a both L.,-;.1,0 apitltra. They vi:torotzely reSected $eviet etiort3 t th-. to..1....r.-art.nt.inzt to 1.7.e the ba.zis for strue3le az-ainet uit'a it* aottrl ants that tho oIns of 2,1 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 b.yrnai:Ily Lt the rt cf: 011:: catcrial cor4.z.ali. Ot., bad intro:II:zed an aztwadrrit-,...1t t* its t:I?4311 Craft coveri?.o,'th.b,?tr,v4til3 It was probably i. t%L.4 areazidmeat that thr,cr rscc tko coaezt!oa of the relation, of revialoala-ra aatl matiottAtictn.) he CLIacee obviotvaly iw It this szaaztrior a Boviot atte=t to pave tas -way for sttacn1 0.1f1r natives' . =??;s- t - 31. The Covi,v,ts vier clearly prcoctrrizti r/iat Ezzt nv.:-;:ot of the ? oa tlieir egttre tstrate:y of ,:catza. rtray t14:e. Cctot;er Oat accc:.;:to,.,,,ce of C;e taLitztoAce c:132Cerontiati,45 ? Ge tral c.a-1 Iota ?";;C.;.t,`,7,144-12t Crw t movemeat of Cur barizt-r of ts i;,:ceolble t Uoi,s the ;Tveriallate oartno% Tit) trizs a mill re.clatcmert a the lona- startd1?,..L, Cov cbarga aittity.tio tot" war rroal, tdoptz:41 by the interastiom5=1Cti3t. CatrAVALIr pz.rties ;Many ccttr1 2dtreat their offorts for tlaity ca. action Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 withLg.0.1.4 tar a p-eact. thzt vaz., c hirteze,,, v11,--,Vi 4 o.a the pros.,er tactical to the stiutat of i-eoi,-74kr, rejcztzdttze ik:aa tLat suctessful socW1.1rtrel coad ,,zttr4.31,26e,4-1,,-; to C,1:1:4xLe1arn. 34. ie,:hrti2hchov V,-.3 sante .ioiate Ills latt srica.nt szeeic".1. tt;a1 of Z3 3Zovo-o,-.1:cr. attite.e on, at pz:ace was. he v1', t ror,:asurt of- t:143 t.-riol;r:-.1-..1.7,0 a a C party; peazo was citi,c%;!.lantuci,?:-.)4:14. wad te empht4size4 Cvni,?45- Itioe Ay aztl scilt.,tion, to the -rololora CA* bc$t Iray to 1:or the Latezz3tizza C itLicverntot. Zejt tkat Chine sa tosir4ti,oc-da that c;tuttwa tioatina -4.;113 o'attoaaZiat lea4er-a 4. I* 4$ 14:40 Arttia?Lr':*1:4i24.44,,ke-i. rt.44,4,k.Li,,... aLta Lhat Conormz.low, cv.1.1fi itstiS aarai:tIvo Cie poo:ae.a o tr44.,:r4evotovcd COU.T.trit.:0 G.zti Clitats* the attrActiventss th* ,p...ez.x.:e to man Me nelz-o. Attractizea o tha p6o.pit uto s* be also was Vv.: purpoeo of the 'bloc pro,Sz.%-sta such its a ttam. Approved For Release : CIA-RDIU8-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 vzo.4.1 earriva the 7,..v,,tcz,- iAti'Avidtsala 111'4 1?14:4' av-2a Nettr4. rejectio3v rebuttaid of Chirmaz viewa 2L ctercd t trt LC.L-Arscse which %Ns.* Olt the CLineso vtir.vz 03 tactical vs:we bav:s4 on pzesi istLe, caLittous, a el emaentk.?Ily v,...z-,%tr4tre ASvezorriunt of the world af.tuation arta ors rtrealf,atic fait;s in the persuasive w,g.I of rtvoluto ary propar;amfa. rs*c t* Lettsc we ?t ti z tactical proaraa:as r by IZA a- wtro- tt,rattr- vito,41.3 itaIate Cornmo,lritztpti ricetroy VA* of extezt;' Co.. th.Cit:Itr)Ce 10, 4h4 tInst,te prora:rts would r..Lztitc it 2rk for t LiJt3 ve;10r Com th= i:aterunal Coccus4...t.tiOz ratwz.:7?Artt to c:4s,>7.1.?,.liz.' s u,:x>a atz.: emtltuslavcrt in, the con-47.*:,tti:d co4Intrii,1. for evo:::-4 av peace, and ecor*Inic both th tetEn.'7.$ el 'hivsitt tha Covita fs-rt.g;,-;:abed tactical rs, et??svc.riz?-; t::'str e4u.etit2.4.3ttwt.dockt.f.L Ata arzti tolts CZtnnzg. itti any coniidatca tccurate stzternimIA of no ertati fit?.1.r T4,11 pDVilit)rs .W bliievt, for tscartTA-)14. that ?L1 to2 Las osmiblo t+) conclkaL$ ror_A OAT avai.14141e., 4.3 41:,1 -4.aloatgo st is, ti[4.0.: t- ;:iovict 1.;:r4oct wou'A,:1;, Approved For Release tIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 cirt.,..trnataric.zs tr," c".az 1:;:zatt V:za Onu,'1"` t40 Cliin;.14te vvouldr iz1y to ore& ry c& tkpi2citic . 6ut cc rta':.rt corAi.,...lasiamo of practical vbit: can, v ev e safcly irotr, Cho ,...tvz3lable eatto. Ars. iuzportiAt contluoiott concerrsar tLat facttht vIrtually all thte z.ltineol th4 1963 vtatv:rtent reflects rooitionc. 1::tiv fact corziot coaatmed, 4s evidence of dtfolit, forrr.a I '1%T...wax:Aber, ittt dyl of the Txtoot biLtta. attacA clon tLt t7-.13 C.4inZAitt said ircallidy 1124 ref.a;:::q; clear its s.2::rt.--emerit wit:4 virtlly all attptets. of GT.I 'It V,e ovasixiona anti rle!etiot kw-a? tXe? 10..rmaict t7.1At 41rol z-t.-q-Aat ? 35, The &.7.-.ate;f7.1.1alt tlaza rwt uct trit:a val. is 1,4.-15.1 to vc4,1.,,ert..-i?tvar, th.-..t arrnies czn zi.e.atved Ve.e final.victory of Co;:r..-.1.--..urtienI, at rai;.v.o:,11t-orr, the COLIrce1 rtaritA.04.1arrs. rz.-q-kza inozg toant smiesicqlz thakt t i tIlwartAtz .1.:"';',73it parpas.00. The cer.trzll fict is fs:3VC707:1;dtty C%I.trAt a Coz.lzr.lair)t `Party ofwe rt torr..p trAsodr, tbe, w.:.-ze tot. oZ)11.z44 to acctpt evez. 0114 1,4 tht thr 2-4 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8 t14. poistt. *St:: ,1r t: tcHe tr;etz'sz V./ is r?txt c?if vg-,11...ttor.11 for gxot 21. t tho imd aV,L,',"1,..tolicIvsv t43 cd'elt to tbe ftro- r'?-,)eit:Atz ttht5 cixzztztrictr toi!;:s arres t iltLsS Janu,: y1161 circuLlt.,:f4.1-ivt aflCr.irnrilz_z,L): vartlos e...0 Z11.7.14:1 4 qt"...* ? 1 . 7-7:t ? C;17713; f..; 14 13 'fir et :?Sr; W7tal Itt::?te?kr:r.,tnt to Lo ,t . .1% ." 4 `? F ir,4;r3 tctz,,,,, Oak 031. 111.........m..?KV~?,.-t..mtp.A1veAe.fRVeatlu,Mikilteaxac- tl:Aric%,:t 2: 2-4114,1:3Z.) !pr. 37. ArtItAzedfa atelt-t:vJat id b tbit Mcr Cvai'e-, re. ace v'ae urtati74o,J/17) Soviet :,:zte:Ci?iwords) sad, iaaConv oince t!..e cluiteronce st,zzezt tit Vacir irttitatc-n-,mni Approved For Release : CIA-Rli178-00915R001300170001-8 Approved For Release C1A-RDP7 -00915R001300170001-8 Ana their ttcr a01ve4 di..a'.1,:,=.eca a, iiiLely to c atia....lo to :generate temelon mut an ev?, ?luterrAtional Cot,==x0,, by eltaitrz the impooltion their beak tib,:ective of 0144, - .40 ....M.,. of debate .7.31,thio the rtatIly the Cbiztece. r4s, -harp to loser to ao&cce4zc* oomit! vit. 3 by the 4ia il-4row.14h rrizt.ta,-.:at/F it the rzczatirem. the C11.1a.c4t, grot4b1y cezitioue proeolytize g foc1 Coait; oriBer to collator=soviet ral. atillitaaelas with, them.. the ? 30 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001300170001-8