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November 11, 2016
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August 4, 1998
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February 1, 1963
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Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01400380004-1 Scope The third biennial conference of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization took place in Moshi, Tanganyika, from 4-11 February 1963. Attached is a working paper which describe the events and results of the conference emphasizing the position of the AAPSO in the international Communist movement and particularly the effect of the Sino-Soviet conflict on its policies and organization. It should be noted that the scope of c AAPSO interests and activities now extends to Latin America as well as Africa, the Near East and the Far East. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01400380004-1 Sanitized - Approved For ReIeaseL.,Q~-RDP78-00915 R001400380004-1 The Third Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference I. Introduction Delegations representing 54 anti-imperialist nationalist movements and revolutionary parties from the countries of Asia and Africa,along with 72 observers including European and Latin American members of international Communist fronts, met at Moshi, Tanganyika, from 4-11 February 1963. This was the third biennial conference of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO). The Organization's first conference,held in Cairo (December 1957-January 1958),legitimized the E'cZ Y' Sino-Soviet presence in the Jdiftft. East and Africa. The second conference which met in Conakr in April 1960/ assured Communist control of the organization. This third conference at Moshi brought a confrontation between the Chinese Communists and the Soviets in their respective efforts to dominate the AAPSO. This confrontation, however, was effected within the framework of a common mutual determination to hold the organization together and to a shared desire to maintain solidarity - at least in the short run - on the basis of a least common denominator - the struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism, and Western imperialism led by the United '~sz f~ ci~~, loo v States. But,ultimate determination of each to controlAwas equally evident. ,t CL-i emcee-a of Sino-Soviet conflict were most obvious in those issues which bore on the relative importance of peaceful coexistence and militant liberation, anti-colonial struggle in the war against the imperialists, particularly regarding the World Peace Council's relation to the AAPSO. Th conflict a Iso was - if much less obvious - in proposals for organizational changes by which both the Chinese and Soviets attempted to add to their supporters on the two major policy-making bodies of the organizationai. e. the Executive Committee and the Permanent Secretariat. On these issues both the Chinese flee and Soviet delegations initially took strong positions from which they retreated 80004-1 Sanitized - Approved For Releesea RDP78-00915R001400380004-1 to isr. compromise stand&'whenever it became apparent that an open breach and. organizational might develop. In general the final resolutions and organizational changes reflected a substantial net gain for the Chinese inAAAPSO leadership and program lines. "reoAk that were being dzawxtfor a Sino-Soviet ca 'en were apparent from the earliest preparat Sor the jfrtoming conference. Not only was it important to find a suitable locale but also to convene the conference at a time acceptable to both of the major Communist participants. During the 13 months taken up in preparing for the conference both the Chinese and the Soviets were actively working to bring about conditions which would prove advantageous to their respective positions and add strength to their respective support among the. delegations. I.I. Preparations for the Conference Preparations for the conference had been under way since the Gaza meeting of the AAPSO Executive Committee in December 1961. First, difficulties were encountered in finding a suitable locale for the meeting. Casablanca was initially suggested because of the importance of the Algerian situation. However, this posal was_atthe request of Mehdi Ben Barka who felt that the presence of the King, "an ally of imperialism" would be embarrassing not only to the UNFP and the UMT but to the conference. Ben Barka was undoubtedly aware at this time (June 1962) that a confrontation between the UNFP and the King was inevitable. Moreover, increasing Communist interest in the liberation movements of East Africa made desirable ikowwtd the third AAPSO conference in that area. Serious consideration was given to Addis Ababa, Mogadiscio, and Dar es-Salaam as possible locations, and missions from the AAPSO Secretariat were dispatched in early 1962 to all three cities. In Addis Ababa the AAPSO emissaries were at first given encouragement by Mekasha Getachew, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Ethiopian government, who had Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001400380004-1 - been aSa t tiz pttOVIed(forrfe ele es:tffilAsIR ZB-06945R1Q1ADA38GQ@4el-, higher authorities of the Ethiopian government turned down the proposition to hold the conference in Ethiopia, and Addis was eliminated. The governments of Somalia and Tanganyika both approved the holding of the conference in their countries. The final choice of Tanganyika, however, was apparently based primarily on the active support given to the AAPSO planners by Oscar Kambona, Secretary General of TANU and Home Minister of, the Tanganyika government. Other factors which probably influenced the decision were the strategic location of Tanganyika adjacent to the most important colonial territories left in East Africa and recognition of the difficulties that might easily arise if the conference were forced to take a stand on the controversial "greater Somalia issue", a virtually inescapable problem if the conference were held in Mogadiscio. Formal approval from the Tanganyikan Republic for the holding of the, conference was received in Cairo in July. Although the conference was originally scheduled for the summer of 1962 in order to comply with stipulations of the AAPSO by-laws directing a conference to be held "every two years," further delays occurred. Long-drawn-out negotiations ensued between the host party, TANU, and AAPSO officials over technical arrangements. These delays were welcomed if not encouraged by the Soviet contingent within the AAPSO, who had been vigorously attempting to forestall Chinese and Japanese demands for an early June-July conference date. In retrospect it seems likely that the Soviet reluctance for an immediate confrontation with the Chinese in the framework of the AAPSO was inspired in part by their hopes of outflanking the Chinese by enhancing the influence of the WPC in the national liberation groups of Africa and Asia through the Moscow Disarmament Conference in July. A number of new peace committees in Africa were in fact formed; the WPC claimed nine in October. Furthermore, Soviet preparations for the Cuban venture were certainly under way at this time. It is therefore likely, particularly in view of their previous experience with the Chinese and Albanians on the Berlin issue, that the Soviets were concerned that the Chinese might exploit the projected Russian maneuvers over Cuba in the infighting within the Communist movement and its fronts. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001400380004-1 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001400380004-1 Although a mid-November date for the AAPSO conference had tentatively TAT been set, the Russian withdrawal from Cuba and the Sino-Indian border war fwd further p stponements, and it was not until 4 February 1963 that the conference actually convened. During the summer months the invitation list for the Tanganyika conference was the source of repeated dissension within the AAPSO Secretariat. The bone of contention was the question whether or not to include observers from the World Peace Council and Eastern European groups. The Tanganyikan government had stipulated that observers not be invited from European countries. This policy was in complete agreement with the Chinese positio Aof eliminating observers from both the Soviet-backed World Peace Council and European bloc countries. The issue was hotly argued in the Secretariat,where sides were taken,with the Chinese supported by Japan and Indonesia lined up against the USSR, UAR,and India. The latter group was given some support by the secretaries from Cameroun, Uganda, Algeria, and Iraq. The aas=aant re.ce44n an uneasy compromise whereby 12 WPC observers were invited but all Eastern European representatives were banned. (An East German group eventually turned up at Moshi where they had no official status but occupied themselves busily making contacts with African leaders), In contrast to the dissension over the question of Eastern European representation at the conference, propos^L,atin American observer representation caused little trouble. Invitations were dispatched to Cheddi Jagan's Peoples Progressive Party of British Guiana, and to Cuba via the Cuban Ambassador in Cairo. Other Latin American observers from Argentina, Chile, and Brazil were included in the WPC delegation. There was little disagreement concerning invitations to delegates who had attended previous AAPSO conferences. In fact,the only major problemnconcerned Osende Afana, Cameroun Secretary at the AAPSO Secretariat, who had recently Sanitized - Approved For Release CIA-RDP78-00915R001400380004-1 Sanitized -Approved 1. 1 -RDP78-00915R001400380004-1 been denied a re-entry visa by the UARI seat in Cairo was being filled on a temporary basis by Aloys-Marie Ndjog. Inasmuch as Ndjog represented the Accr apro-Soviet wing of the UPC and Osende Afana the Conakry..based pro-Chinese UPC faction, the Chinese supported Osende's accreditation to the Tanganyika conference while the Soviets sponsored Ndjog. A compromise- t au suggested by the UARwas finally reached 3decision to invite both. Invitations to new applicants for AAPSO membership were separated into two categories; those who represented countries not heretofore represented at AAPSO meetings and those who applied from countries already represented at AAPSO meetings by other organizations. &The first group roused little friction; concerning the second group Wp deferred for -afr the credentials committee at the conference. III. Conference Management With the conference actually under way the Chinese and Soviet leadership immediately started jockeying for position. It was apparent to each group that the mechanics of the conference, i.e. the make-up and responsibilities of committees, the methods of reaching decisions, and the accreditation of delegations and observers, would have a substantial bearing on the relative success of their respective positions on major issues. It is not surprising therefore that conflicts arose from the first day. When the conference opened at Moshi on 4 February, problems of accreditation caused the first on-the-spot confrontation between the Chinese and Soviet delegations. In all cases, even when Soviet supporters outnumbered ti 4AAc -Another latent ,ource of trou l.e remains in the unresolved conflict between IN. hinese and the So''ets.M TAlthough the Chinese won co .siderable ground at these gains were esse " -a-ally tactic diffexces on the- ortance of_p_eaceful_c_oeistenceand violent struggle aretill unresolved. -In fact, as pr`bparations for the-three-ca inentcorifer cL--go--forw&rcl- we isagreements betty n_China and Russia seerlnevitable., V+ffWH_Y`, ' though Julius Nyerere's opening address was given little play at the conference, his warnings against Communist imperialism, now on record in the AAPSO, could, if brought up and debated at a later date, embarrass either or both of the ma'o C mmuni t ar . SanitiY~ec - Approve d for fb18 : C1%'R~Wcb0915R001400380004-1 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01400380004-1 A basic source of trouble, however, remains in the conflict between the Chinese and the Soviets. Although the Chinese won considerable ground at Moshi, these gains were on the tactical level. Sino-Soviet differences on the role of the African and Asian peoples in the peace and xtimal liberation struggles are still unresolved. In factsoon after the close of the conference the polemics were resumed. Characteristically, press comments on the results of the Moshi conference poured out of Peiping hailing the meeting as an unqualified success for the solidarity of militant liberation movements throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America. On the other hand, Soviet sources gave the conference very little coverage and this was limited almost entirely to the speeches of Soviet delegates and to publicity for some excerpts from the final documents that indicated endorsement of Soviet peace and total-di sarmament formulas. At the Malmo Peace Conference on 2-3 March, the Soviet-dominated peace council, evidently ignoring the Chinese opposition at Moshi, approved a resolution that hailed the "success" of the Moshi conference; but, in accord with Soviet desires, it declared that "the unanimous approval won by the General Declaration and other resolutions;, testifies to the hopes and fervent desire of millions of people of those two continents for national liberation, universal disarmament,and peace." The Chinese, who had protested at Malmo but to no avail, returned to open conflict with renewed vigor on 7 March when Liu Ning-i addressed a Peiping rally celebrating the Third Afro-Asian Conference. "A small minority of delegates at the conference, " he said, "did not face the reality of the Afro-Asian peoples' struggle.... In their speeches, they once again distorted the current major tasks of the Afro-Asian peoples, departed from the anti-imperialist struggle, made empty talk of peace, and resorted to the terror of nuclear war to threaten the Afro- Asian peoples." Furthermore, he added to the Chinese bill of particulars another and serious open charge against the Soviet faction in the international fronts when he said, "Those who are unwilling or who do not dare to oppose imperialism but who are manipulating and giving orders to international democratic organizations and international conferences are not very happy about this resolution. They are now conspiring to distort the spirit of this resolution in an attempt to manipulate or undermine the conference. " The Malmo resolutions tend to bear this out. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01400380004-1 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01400380004-1 With-the increasing bitterness of both the Chinese and the Soviet," followed in the underdeveloped ver the 1!+APSO rnd the genera : world, the best opportunity for the Chinese to win a victory over the CPSU in the mass-organization field seems to be the projected Three- Continent Conference. While in Latin America the old-line CP leadership and the pro-Soviet peace struggle cadre appear strong enough to resist pro-Chinese tendencies) ,Yie Chinese supporters from Asia and Africa may be strong enough to tip the scale in China's favor. In any event, Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01400380004-1 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01400380004-1 The Soviets retorted forcefully to this accusation in the 30 March letter sent by the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The letter statedt'the militant call (Proletarians of the world, unite advanced by Marx and Engels, means that at the basis of such a union lies class anti -imperialist solidarity, not nationality, color, or geo- graphical principles.. Cohesion of the masses for the struggle against imperialism only on the principle of belonging to this or that continent, whether it is Africa, Asia, Latin America., or Europe might do harm to the struggling people. It would not be a unioh but a dispersal of the strength of a single anti- imperialist front. " Apparently the three -continent project is no longer an appropriate tactic. With the incur, a s ii gy bitterne s s of both the hire s e and the viets over th gy.S kA^{" ;'D Out. TI_.(c N-t- ?f J1 Ctw ,.k4. t