THE UNIFICATION BY THE US, THE UK, AND FRANCE OF THEIR ZONES OF GERMANY UNDER A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE RUHR UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE WESTERN POWERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000100330001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 9, 1948
• Content Type: MEMO

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1611101.10 Qt[ Cl!
XIMOXASIDUS lei TXX IMILSVIT
The uslassiles 4, the UN the VL, sad "roses of their ,
of Seamy ender a provisiesel movernmen* mmt the
of the Survader the emmtrel of the wester. powere sb7 31
interpreted br the Xreells as potential barriers to the belie Soviit
objestive of preventing the esememis reaseverr of Birepent ormartee
outside the Soviet 'Owe.
As yet me emelmeive mitoses has gems to light Abet the
Kremlin believes the reergomiaaties ormairleatiem of thermostats arm*
aka be seesessfally armemplished or will materially armlet the lImse,Sat
rosemary program. Im view of the emplesities labereet in tin estehildh
mint of a provisional governmeat saw the Lest* ogreirmate. the IMNIR
is likely to dolor say =eater moves until the irmilia is amalmesi thee
the wester& Osman ergemisatint is besseing a three* to Soviet terengs
palm'. Is ototerminisgi its esserse. ttA MS viii lekit ismAd sett Os
(1) the difficulties to be eve:ram lir the 112. the tg. esmi Yarn
terniihing the new regime with proper venting omidemas sod adespete
and timely armada snideness and (2) the Intent of Osman ermperatiem
or nen-ssooperatios, partieularly in the Bahr.
The Krwillass Immediate reaction be the trimmed sager. Warder%
Will peehably le an intermitleatiem at present Soviet activities is
Gamow rather thee as sobrorpt Ohmage is either &Minas or smarm of
maim.. The USSX NW be =pasted to eemtinme its hindramse of MIMItela
pavers is Devlin sad elesubere Is oemmir w mere dart of mdlitiny femse.
It will further oomeslidate C- 'it eastrol of the motels arm im atter
be obtain a "lora" and Nianseratie" area. whiskers oris he
a 'Tree Owens" state erased to Sovietise a emdfled Semmear. She
mer be espopeted also to step ap it. prepayment stfarte to diesredit the
waiters povers in Germma eyes es the dierepters smd despoilers of gemmed,
mad te depict the Soviet Union an the ehemplea at emedfiedAvommeer.
If the Wilma merger appears emenseatal am* grunises' to vs-pip
habilitate western Germs:sr es, well as oemArthete to the littlySits
promo. the ITOM111 will probably be impelled to sitar SU
Mamlastve of a resort to military, fame, the tsvedlitsrmilL
ems of We 'gessoes (1) ostensibly shooks its amilditilmik
make an attractive offer be fere availed ilesimmaistoodal
partitite eastrel (in order to Slew the progress of 441mame
(2) retaliate 741, establishiag ea seaters Oommen state.
kitautd - e6k):: *14, 1,;,44:1
IQ.
t4f (iAcj?,..4.4/4
ECRET
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4-0?-+
Document No. COI
NO CHANGE in Class. 0
)(DECLASSIFIED
Class. CHANGED TO: TS S C
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA RE r. 77 1763
Date:
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Me Knells% i411imobnbly resort to the score* *Mina la (1)
ad we n vizoraas effort to Fargana* the 'astern power* that the WM
15 sincere in its !rainless of coveretion. Ths &mist/Mica lb 11114r
to mks a sorters* endeavor to San it* ZOOS to The western soma UMW
a ulnae covtrament, unlace weatern terns for Covidi poriSetvetion In
a new cueri7=rtits structure cre rrobaltive. If the ligretaincemateles
that it =not cats the concessions denardeiltr the western powers. the
mu will likely adovt worse (2) one ammo* ths sstallihnent of
new etste in eastern aerma7 vIth proyagmoda rreterstons of being the
ant" lecallp-canstItnted Dergra Bavnbllo ana the mrssentative memo.
rant of all aer12.13311.
B. B. it=
Ben: AantrA-1.US
Director of Oentml Intelligence
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1PA-'3)
.41?'
ISMATA OF 41071111 A/AMOS IN GSRKANT 30 O31,100201
OS.123 IOU 01,1311 SOWS
ATOMICS, A ," 3
A a' ilimasalinulmsdatiariaLiamtsaJdU
AR, suggestion by the OSSA that it Jet& the wester&
powers in the quadripartite control of a =Med aesmolO 41,0100
oent would be made with the IOU realisation on both sides that
past Soviet obduracy, chle$17 in eba aebeee of eameete
cation, bed exhausted the patience of the OS, the te., out frames,
and hal led directly to the mere% tripartite action. fhe USSR
rill realise, too, that the vesteen powers would be =trembly
reluctant to abandos their program Ser the wester* sew either
to please the Soviet Onion or to take part again in bulges'
discussions in an lepotent Allied Control Council or eliewhers.
It is prObable, therefore, the, ow Soviet molar* woad be
carefully worded to gAve the impression that the USIA bet sheep
dosed ite previous intranligent attitude, end sineerely believed
its own propagaoda for Oempenunity. The overture would seviousIr
urge the western powers tip consider an overall politioal mid so,-
nowt? unification of Oerminy under a Sermon government with a
minimum of overt occupaWn power control.
Seems, the prips,,ry Soviet purPoos Ia aolelaS seab a
suegestion would be to de*, German end helm wester', larepenn
rocovery by discussions *Ad other typical Soviet delaying tee?
ties, the OffsS would be pelporet to otter impostem* tactical
coneeseiene in the fere .1W the Norma& mtateletration to be
eetabliehed. Under alme0 amps oirenuotonees? the USSR seat be
sure that the mew of Cps Soviet lane is any fore of a imitissi
Oermany would assure the freletemes of slioamosiaiseostivials41
bloc which could be reli0 on to Maw end block eemmemie
mover, through,Iut the country, Valet those conditions. the
USSR bight also offer, largely for German domestic consuictionit
to reduce or drop some s0riet reparations claims, Sr even pos..
'Ably to consider subetaphial reductions in the oac4Poeles
forces atter a *dsmoorat140 State had been tirmlr established.
If the western festers cheat permit the um to Jab
in a quadripartite zonal es.gur without first hewing absolute
and therefore practicallyimposeible elasifioation of Soviet
intentions, the true4 eiOer directly or through its Sermon
repreeentativee, would woA aotively to defeat western plane
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w such actions ast (1) deasadisg a Soviet ogles is the osatiel OS
the Ithrt (2) proposing that all political ergsaisatioas set sow
maitted in various areas ae recognised on a eaeliripartitO boast
() urging similar recognition of the Commenistdomiaated hee
German Trade Delon lasagne in order to facilitate faqir. Serie%
control of a unified Itaxr moveeent partioulefir in the Rahn
and (4) supporting rightist as well as leftist political elsaanto
in the rest in order to Add strength to the deviat*oeatrellei
bloc,
Iliesuwalmult-audaltliadaLaguaLia
The present high degree of Soviet control ever the *esters
suss of Oereany woad greatly facilitate the conversion of that
area into a Satellite state* if the Kremlin ileades to retaliate
by getting; up a provisioual governmeet is easter* Germany* le
serious opposition could arise within the sone to the appOintueete
under the pretense of popular elections* of Soviet emendates to
the leading nositione In the new state. The creation of such *
state, however* woad glee the mu no immediate benefits Woad
those now received free the same area. toltercsd* benefits wool
be dependent on the acceptance by opportunistic 00.1MMA of time..
parent Soviet propaganda designed to depict the Soviet-sponsored,
state as a restoration of the Reich. The mu vould attempt tit
underame the tripartite Sermon state w urging the wester* Softens
to rejoin the Reich. Except for the questionable value of each
prepegmada, the mu wad have at its disponi-al oar strike* ONi
sabotage with which to interfere with the econoulo end political
recovery of western Germany.
A Satellite stet., in short. would promise the tiSSIA
neither additional economic nor politica benefits of or sman10
rode. and woUld fall short of the immediate objective of blocking
the western power progran. Such a state would guarantee continued
tonal sutenomy mad allow the western powers to continua their
independent course without *orlon* Soviet interference.
a. 2
ROP-SECRE1-?
0330001-3
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