BENELUX COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000100560004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 26, 1948
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP78-01617AO00100560004-5
cCQl1TRIN
Int~Tensions possibly affecting stability of tlenelux ee mtri.o
Belgiu-, Luxembourg and the Netherlands can be considered ta-~~~
a unit in estimating conditions in 1956 because of their projs.tbd
economic union. Although progress to date has been alow,
although the major obstacles are yet to be overcome, the tk*'Ss
countries have shown determination and can be expected to bi
sufficiently coordinated by 1956 to warrant consideration as a
unit.
The only source of tension in the Netherlands which night
affect internal stability will be .coda, highlighted by an
-adverse situation in Indonesia* Prolonged conflict in Indmssia,
continued unrest in the par Eastern area as a whole, and the
general trend of nationalism in oolonir .1 areas will prevent the
Netherlands from regaining its pre-war position In this area.
Indonesia's favorable trade balance oo stituted an important factor
in Holland+s pre-war economy. The lost of income from Indon.ria
combined with heavy military expenditu'es have aggravated the
Dutch financial position. Even taking'into acoamt- the favorable
effects of the revival of western Zuro;-san economy as a whole
and of closer European and Benelux ooo}~-eration, Holland will
have considerable difficulty evolving i viable econy for some
t im. to come.
In Belgium there are a number of controversial domestic
issues of which the Leopold question, the division of the eouatry
Into the Walloon and Flemish areas, out the Protestant-Cathelie
conflict as it affects politics are this most Important. It is
estimated, however, that those issues r. ill not cause aapr
fundamental, long range instability or !Interrupt the gsnerel
continuity of domestic and foreign pol! cy.
In the Benelux area as a whole, ptilitical power will
probably oontinu. in the hands of centtr ooalitiaas, with no
substantial change in the strength of the extreme right and left.
$ tabilt tr I d ` Ijs tU%a t*4e+4
The political stability of the a!M 4lux countries will remain
high. Although the Dutch eoanoaq will weakened by the lass: Of
most of its colonial sources of reveix*4 it is believed than the

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP78-01617A000100560004-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP78-01617A000100560004-5
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tinaacial position of the Netherlands within the Benelux prole
will not uonatitute an important block to the internal stability
of the area.
Probable AliManent MS-Van - 1956
The Benelux countries are s tronr,],j pro-western in their
orientation, and have abandoned pre-eat' policies of neutrality
in favor of active support of the US d West To USSR. This
trend cnn be expected to continue, ? ed by the probable
growth in western *',....-
can
FRME
ynternal Tensions possibly affectlivt stability of Prance _ 1956
political and social polarisation with marked traditional
,. oats
The expected assumption of political power in France during
1949 by the de Gaullist forces will Au-nish evidence that the
moderate center has been tenable to a mye the degree of stability
necessary to continued domestic suppor . with the failure of the
moderate center "Third Force' to ooavi,.oe the electorate of the
efficacy of middle of the road methods it is considered probable
that Oaullists can retain power for years. De Gaulle'.
constitutional changer will probably a hen the executive,
thus cresting stability, and his la
bor
of cy coupled with the
disorganized state of labor is likely 1o keep the large worlcers?
class politically and socially ineffeo ive for either Caemanist
or Socialist use.
One of the principal factors crontributing to the slow
recovery of the French economy and-the instability of the Government
has been the strong and well organised Communist Party which has
used many and sometimes valid economic ievance? of the workers
to cause work stoppages, resort to sabcftags, and generally to
disrupt the economy and create Govern shay crises. Done of the
post war Governments of Prance has attxtapted directly to attack the
Communist menace. A Gaullist Governmett however, would be
prepared to adopt strong measure. against the Party and woad it
necessary outlaw it. The advent of do Gaulle to power, the r;s
tide of anti-Caeuntat feeling anong t 1w people of wee, the
growth of non-o milat labor organisa1 ions and the slim imprvvverit
is French economy vill, by 1986, considerably reduce the power of the
Ca^snsniat Party in. French political and economic lift*
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP78-01617A000100560004-5
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As evidence of these consluaio`s, it is noted that the
political pendulum has swung to the ri t since the sl.stions of
1946. The French bourgeoisie voted ov whs]aingly for the eentrist
Popular Republican party after the labs ation o Francs, teary
have sought, subsequently, to preserve ':hair influence by ciC1ii
contact with groups further to the igh~f'; the Radicals, DOA-06n snt
Republicans and Democratic Union. sa(ptenb.r, the giilld
Government included 90% Popular ftspubli+ ana, 90 socialists d0d
47% members or groups to the right of Us Popular Aspublic6ui .
A de Gaulle regime, based on the rsturnq of a national .l.slm,
would demonstrate that the pendulum has swung scorn further to
the right, leaving the Cammmists and their syapathis.rs isolated
on the .xtrame left. The moderate torsos will gays norm or lose
disintegrated in this process of polarisation. The Popular
Republican Party, which since 1946 has represented the bridge
between left and right, is in the process of being aboorb.A into,
the right as represented by de Gaulle's group. The socialist
party may soon stand alone as the only r;nti-Ccasunist Party
representing the workers and be rendsrs;t. relatively Ineffectual
as a political force by the power of th,!, rightist alliaaoe..
An anticipated social polaris Lon will probably take
the shape of the division of the count: into two prinoipal
classest (1) an increasingly stronger or middle class (.small
industrialists, merchants, artisans grin farmers) .qualliflg an
estimated 38% of the population and trs~iiti cot~ssrirwtire,
favoring elimination of government oont}trola and door aa..=
and (9) the worker class (manual labor including industrial
workers farmhands and. domestic servants) squaliing 41% of the
population and traditionally favoring social reforms and a awe
equitable distribution of the national wealth through goverment
controls. This latter group, disorganised as a result of the
break-up of this national labor federation and deprived of the
aggressiveness lent to it by Canoimist leadership, will beams
neither vocal nor .ffsotiv.ly active until the X"4814 -to find
seam* new dynsuio leadership and objectives.
b. Continued but diminishing la!!~.r unrest
With the advent of a do Gaullf st Gove, ent, labor uor.sti
will diminish as a result of do Gaulle.,a efforts _ to ?llaifate
Ccsaaunist control of labor and his play - to div- lop pirofW~sharAina
associations. A d of labor unres will sentinu. as bong as
the wags-price problaa exists, but wilt disappear as .euooe i
stabilisation is gradually attained.
rap SEQU _ 3 an
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP78-01617A000100560004-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP78-01617A000100560004-5
atabilitg gaa ~~ :?
?robab] y stable ,n aru V AB eriod i a3p
The period 1020-1040, alto uuh named by excessive share"
in government, was one of relative t'olitioal stability. Mhile
under a de Gaulle regime the some cubinst instability will not
occur,. and Prance night appear on ti-pr surface to be more stable,
Currents of opinion will continue to` fluctuate in such the some
manner as the period 1090-1940. The;r=*rench will probably always
regard the axistonce of Zany shades of opinion and many politieal
parties as a prereWisite of deaocrd.ty, however, no revc4Lut
crises of profound Eovernuental 'es are foreseen for 19d:10=6a
giving this period a relative stabil...ty similar to that
oharaoterised Wrench political life 'area 19ID?1240?
obabl. All ent U5-U3 r ,ad
Prance is culturally and to a large extent cconcmioaUZ
orionted towards the Western hemiaphare+and, therefore, the
^oreover, it is estimated that the trend in Freaeh foreign
policy will be toward acquiring leadership in western *rope
Binos the principal mean to this end ,is a continuation of preoeh
participation in a trestern Union and western MZropean dsfeaee
system based an a Worth Atlantic All Vrence, this policy will entail
a strong us aligsaasnt as long as the e1opasnt of a western
bloc remains the keystone of us poll ,in 8irepe
?
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