SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000200180004-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: PAPER

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W : CIA-' P78-01617A000200180004-3
SOVIET 9~l rA
A Soviet r the withdrawal of all troops from Germany has already
been mnd6ficially advanced. This may be officially proposed in the near future,
in spite of Russian awareness that such a proposal would be rejected by the
Western powers. There would be these advantages, however, in making such a
proposal:
(a) Propaganda value in Western Germany and in pro-communist circles
throughout the world;
(b) Creation of a favorable impression among some of the smaller na-
tions, as being a step toward easing East-West tension.
The USSR might make the proposal through a future East German Government, which
with Soviet compliance, would have the further advantage of increasing the
prestige of that government. On the other hand, *rh noMo sal for-quadripartite
withdrawai would have the disadvantage that, subject to its evaluation as ar
simple propaganda, the proposal would arouse in Western Europe and among the
Satellites fears of German resurgence. Because of the Soviet position on the
competence of the UN on the German question, it is unlikely that any such
proppsal would be made in UNGA.
It is possible, but unlikely, that the USSR will announce a un_ lateral
withdrawal in the immediate future, intending a,o carry it out at a much later
date. While this would have some value as a peace offensive designed to dis-
courage western preparedness and while it would have some propaganda value
in the western occupation zones, it would arouse an unfavorable reaction
among the Satellites, and might tend to u}dermine solidarity within the Communist
parties of Western Europe.
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It is highly unlikely that the USSR would actually carry out a unilateral
withdrawal prior to the summer of 19,49. Only after a communist-control mechrnism
had been established and tested through gradual withdrawals, could Russian
military occupation be terminated. It may be assumed that withdrawal would
come only after a western evacuation of Berlin, and only after an East German
Government had been established. In any event, nationals would be left behind
to insure continued communist control, and the withdrawal would be in name only.
After the circumstances assuring Russian control h^d been satisfied, Soviet
withdrawal would have these advantages:
(a) Enhancement of the prestige of the East German Government;
(b) Regularization of long-term indirect control over Germany;
(e) Dissociation of USSR from direct responsibility for repressive
measures and unsatisfactory conditions in Germany;
(d) Weakenintngf the position of the Western powers through the con-
sequent impetus toward a unified Germany.
On the other hand, these disadv4ntages would result:
(a) Loss of an advanced military base;
(b) weakening of the Soviet eKonomic position through a drop in goods
delivered to the USSR and a rise in East German trade with the west;
(c) Weakening of political control in Germany;
(d) Weakening of the Soviet bargainin position in negotiations with
the West;
(e) Facilitation of western penetration of Eastern Germany.
The proposal of a simile withdrawal of troops from Berlin, either unilater-
ally or on a quadripartite basis, would have considerable propaganda advantage
for the USSR, and might undermine the solidarity of the western powers. Neither
this proposal nor its implementation would have a%-y appreciable disadvantage
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for the USSR -
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-01617A000200180004-3