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PAB from GSJ

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP78-01617A000200180005-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
November 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 21, 1998
Sequence Number: 
5
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
NOTES
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP78-01617A000200180005-2.pdf66.02 KB
Body: 
Sanitized - App red For Release : Cl PAB from GSJ Fortunately I sm not the NNSC-4 working group because if I were, this would be of no use whatsoever to me. The NJSC-4 working group, however, being more perspicacious than I, will understand what it means. 25X1A9a I wonder by what slip the authors failed to get a copy of memorandum of 26 October, 11=+48. Not only has the question about the UNGA been ignored, but they don't pay any attention that I can see to the "probable consequences." Of course it's a little ambiguous as to what consequences are to are referred to and whom they/affect, but I should think some sort of consequences ikexmmeaz2zIe xatzthtsxexZ:k As to assumptions, it would seem that they built up their own rather than take the one they were given. The memorandum specifies Russian dis- satisfaction and attempt to improve. I can't see where either of these things is mentioned or even implied. Also, the specific questions aren't really dealt with. The first one wants to know about advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of a unilateral wit drawal. That is less discussed that quadripartitte ditto. The second one is on UPTGA, which, as said, the authors moc?alifi Ll39vApr Release : CIA-RDP78-01617A000200180005-2 Sanitized - Appppved For Release : CIA-RDP78 17A000200180005-2 I don't happen to know what the NSC-4 (which I belkive was the designation of a pre-PBY airplahe) wants to use this IM for, but I should suppose it would be as a basis for preparing counter-arguments against the Soviet propaganda. I wouldn't know whether or not it would help them with this problem. About all this says tmztkat relative to the point is that the Soviets could use any withdrawal for propaganda reasons, which is pretty easy for anyone to see. If the group merely wants to know what sort of proposal the Soviets will make and when, they wouldn't have a very clearout answer either. Maybe they'll do something after the summer of 1949 is about all In get out of it. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-01617A000200180005-2 .