IM-85

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000200260002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 18, 1948
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2090/05/23: CIA-RDEN-01617A000200 02-6
ISO- WTI.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
18 November 19 48
,85
CIA COML;FNTS ON SANACC SUB=CU:~SMITTEE NEAIVMIDDLE EAST
"APPRAISAL OF U.S, ;FILITAEIY, POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN SOUTH ASIA"
General Comments
This is an excellent presentation of vjhat has been up to now a
much neglected subject, The basic recomendation, for a thoroughgoing
study of US objectives in the South Asia region and of the specific
means which can be used for their accomplishment,, is a sound one,
though it should be pointed out that the close political) econoi:iic$
and geographic relationshigewhich exist between components of the South
Asia region and the countries to the east make it important that such
a study be integrated with a similar consideration of the Southeast
Asia region, Burma, in particular, is so closely related to the other
countries of Southeast Asia (especially Siam, Indochina, and Indonesia)
as to make a South Asia regional concept including Burma a sometimes
rather artificial one.
In addition to its comments on various individual passages of the
paper (listed below under "Specific Comients' s CIA feels that the
25X6Afollawing general comments are pertinenti
Qd ~
10
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Fli~
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2. overemphasis of military aspects.
While it is recognized that the military aspects of aid to
southern Asia are important, it is believed that the report over-
emphasizes the role of military aid as distinguished from economic
and educational assistance. The basic requirement of the countries of
southern Asia, once law and order have been established, is the develop-
ment of economic stability. This stability cannot be achieved primari: y
through the development of the armed forces (which, moreover, are not
expected, except in the case of India, to play a large part in defense
against a major power), on the other hand, it is possible that economic
stability can be brought closer through ITS-supported efforts to increase
industrial production, introduce more efficient methods of agriculture,,
and increase the standard of living; such US help and cooperation would
do much to strengthen South Asian friendship for the US and its people.
Consequently, it is considered that an intelligent, integrated program
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for economic aid and technical information slaoa>.ld take precede,'":ce uver-?--
Or at least be Instituted concurr nLLl ;r wi't; a--a.ny r's.z n :" "or military
assistance,
: Intra. r e p aonal- conillcts,
`,raiile th3 raper rec 1,1ze that; 1o :a.1 c s :l a t au d to the
problem of i3OW to extend. 15 aids, and aid,
`.So i.tit Asian countries I t. do ti t7 _L T:i J 173 "r:X E hf? t?T '1". o of the #i L
:J ono 1iu A3: sh~iat .a.nn.s to t'ie s w or`?.' i over'nmcrt s t* 1t } t'1. 1,7.f''[' 70.3,';,/
only create mo;v nphenv :..., I't? tiw 1 rno:p,-J:?ad ~':~' _St,'tY2 aY; an...a 'N.
?sae xJ..%_it+c . ` 4 ..:: 7lL Jr en
Would undoubtedly b use:". in t E- t- to s t~rUirgIs Y.ls,'
hmir., Likewise arms s ut r:.. shed to Af's;h. ia:i.s tali
border disnutes with Pakistan-. B % sasv)pl y aid Y^.5 L ,ti:t-" 7 o e en
miLLit%iry equipmu?nt to any of these 'couritr.#ts at.. j: es . nt Vuf,p-
US might easily Lain the en,t:'.t,v or one or none of other ;+. r.:i tits
con+ erncc n QnIy after some sen;bl.ance of accord hi.'. i
such e ttl?eTi?onts mi.4ht he a...l T1liTh Pi coo ;?( b;1 ttLC U") 3_ the
,:ecn r".P.'''~t forcee, of ti. e sO'''
- hey. o rt L'r i' a r
:ror South Asia and in dJ ~.=:4::tT?2 ~: }34:'.'_t" .kt.ti;.~l .-~'TtiE'C'?~`..ii .,"~ r,,. t".~y..M1?.-.:,C1' e'~;`?.
fl"ip in nner in 't7~.ch &,j YJa"f
tbe ix
addition to guard- i p i t.3.r s cha rc r> c
_Crfj
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the US must take into account the fact that the cress of tha region
Irequently voices fear of US G"doilar7aggression.11
the US seeks domination through economic infi.lt.ra- a on:, This sear
unchecked, may encourage the governments of South Asia a to adopt polio,
of political neutrality and independent industrial de?~relonment vithout
foreign assistance, or even to accept Soviet ass1& tanoe? It ii" there-
fore recommended that the problem of presenting en, uid prof rammboth
through diplomacy and through accompanying education c nd propaganda
directed at the population at large,, be seriously and carefully considered
There is a strong possibility that a US aid program would dafeat its
own purposes if accompanied by requests for c:xteri; ? ve concessions or
the injudicious assumption that the countries r?eceivIrtg US aid would
automatically follow all the dictates of US foreign policy,
Industrial War Potential,,
The potential contributions which the South f,.sian countries
can make to an fast-West conflict are of tremendous significance and
are recognized as such by the paper,, However, it might be appropriate
to inject a note of caution when considering India us industrial potentia:
for war,, particularly now that the British have withdrawn, "'hale India
has established a few modern industries (notably : teel) and has developed
competent technicians and skilled laborers in those industries$ India
a?>annot, without considerable material and technjeel aid from the out:r dec
set up and operate new and complicated precision eiuip;rnerAt to turn 01
it
the instruments needed for modern war0 The speed with which and the
extent to which India could aid the West would depend auuon Indians
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willingness to enter such a war and to accept I ester guidance.
ability of Ind-Laos population to contribute will rest in part on the
extent to which social and economic improvements have been achieved
over and above the current status, Other South Asian count.ries JAck
sufficient acquaintance with industry and basis, induct - ai installation
to be able to contribute significantly on this level,.,
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I. Page 4, lines 7-9t These lines are misleading. Soviet influence
has been and continues to be negligible in Afgha.stano
2. Page 6, lines 3.4.-15: The phrase "which may well invite Soviet
claims to Afghan territory" should be deleted. This assumption does
not follow from the previously presented facto nor is it in accord
with the fact that in October 1948, after two ye. ,rs of work on the
part of the !fghan-Soviet Border Commission, both governments accepted
its recommendations 0 .
3. Page 6, par,, 2: In the case of Bwaa this situation (ioe. Political
upheaval) is also due to ineptitude, the trend toward nationalization,
and the desire to eliminate foreign influence,,
4* Page S, lines 8-9s Despite reports of a possible "shift in' i a jor
Kremlin efforts toward the East" CIA on the basis of its current
analysis of Soviet activity does not believe such a shift has occurred.
5. Page 8, per. 2: CIA has one report from a "generally reliable"
source that Burma has requested arms from Czechoslovakia after being
turned down by the US. This may be added to the list of Soviet and
Satellite agreements noted
6e Page C, par. 2: CIA has no reports which confirm the existence of a
Cominform branch for Southeast Asia. It is preeimaeci, however, that the
USSR 3s exerting its influence in Southeast Asia throuc?h its Legation
in Bangkok and its E nbasny in Lxliao
7 Page 10: Im , n e of South Asia to US flationa1 t,; The
contribution of this area to the European recovery program might be
stressed as adverse conditions in this area could directly retard.Westem
Europe recovery.
8. Page 12, line 2t CIA considers "upwards of 20,,000 ,,000 recruits" as
too optimistic. Met of the inhabitants of South Asia are unsuited for active service in a modern army,
9. Page 14, Table: The following corrections and additions shoed be
made. Cadmium is not available in Burma. Tungsten is available in Bum a
Rubber is available in Csylon. India is the world's largest producer
of nhellaa.
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10. Page 15, par0 2, line 1s This section is .mport:xnt and could be
emphasized mores For a .mple, Burma's rice is absolutely neceseary
to Ceylon, India, and x3 ,
110 Page 16, par. 2, line 7t UK investments in Btu - a have little
value at the moment o
12. Page 17, par. 3, lines 3-9z Sentence;. r ght be changed to reads
primitive methods of production, population pre,-aeu ve, waste and. un-
economical use of laand, however, have prevented the area from becoming
self-sufficient in :food. Production may be I e&ie'- to the polnt. of
self-sufficiency by the application. of modern technology pari4onlax lyy
with respect to the use of chemical ferti.1izere, iiaectlcides and
improved varieties of seed, by the completion of pi.,oposedd ' rIgati on
projects, and more effeetly d3.stribut.on etc.
.13. Page 18, line 5t Legmaes should be added to the lit of foods.
14. Page 18, line 13 t It might be noted that nar r of the items listed
are on the US list of strategic materials.
15. Page 19, Minerals and) ..~ a It should be noted that the known
coking coal reserves are very limited - not more than a nifty yua
supply at the present rate of consumption.
16. Page 20, line 8t Suggest the phrase "milt Lary purposes" rather
than "munitions purposes" to represent the wide variety of uses for
mica in warfare.
17. Page 20, line 16t in connection with kyanite it might be stated
M the world's principal source of strategist grades
that India hU be
of kyanite. An important new source of kyanite is being developed and
exploited in Kenyan
18. Page 20, lines 18--21: "Deposits" would be mo.-:e accurate than
"important sources." "Tantalite col umhite" should be added.. to _ 1,he li
and "phosphorus" changed to "phosphates."
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19. Page 20, lines 28-x30 A.k 4Laa loot ? he largest producer of
wolfram; it was second only to China. Burma stood e j g j thn (rot
fifth) in world tin production. It might also be noted that much
of Burma remains to be explored for minerals
20, Page 21, 1etrleuttss Burma's petroleum was of p-a. ticular value
to India. However, it is expected that it will be a number of. years
before Burma's oil fields are rehabilitated and axtaanded.
21. Page 21. par, 21 Petroleum, line 13: Suggest "(330,082 bar-role
in 1937)" be changed to "(300,000 barrels in 19/)". Line 16, suggest
"85,000,000 gallons (over 3,000,000 barrels)" br, changed to "aboard
2,430,000 barrels", Linea 2.1-22, suggest "276,000,000 gallons (about
10,650,,000 barrels)" be changed to "about 8,000.,000 barrels",
22. Page 23, lines 11.12: Present steel production is approximately
one million tons per year; obsolescence of squ "_pmeent, labor troubles,
and transport difficulties are limiting factors,
23r Page 25, mar. 5t The rlp+.D given on the Bangalore airplane "aotory
is misleading. Currently t! c factory produces s :either engines nor air-
craft; it does a limited anount of assembly arc` repair v ork,
24. Page 26, par. 4 : Appreciable economic k 'o .,Tess in J3unma YeL11
delayed until law and order care' ntored.,
25. Page 31, P .l tad for s. II sa's ground forces are closer to
40,000, not 23,000. India's ground forces are currently given as
294,000 not 241,000.
26. Page 38, Burma had an opportunity to secure supplies from
the UK but delayed requesting them until after r deadline specified in
their military agreement had passed. Mny of Burma's requests have been
casual and have not been coordinated with their military authorities,
This section should be br lw ht up to date. The Burmese government has
been turned down but eta add sc; 3, to seek commercial sources of supply.
The US has also indicated that it desires that arms procured in the t
be used against Communists - not to build up private armories.
27. Page 1+0, lines 3-6t t1; aid extended at this time or in the near.,
predictable future must be given simultaneously to both India and. Pakistan
lest the one or the other be seriously alienates`..
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