Matters of possible interest with reference to the visit of President Prio of Cuba

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000200350002-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 8, 1948
• Content Type: IM

ApproVpd For ReleaseWCIIA, -RDP78-01-61 A000200350002-6
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
8 Decelx ber 1948
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 94
SUBJECT, ivAatters of possible interest with reference to the visit of
President Prio of Cuba.
President Prio has placed first. on his list of topics to be discussed
with US officials the Cuban desire for a larger fixed share of the US
sugar market. Despite certain scarcities, black markets, and read-
justments, the increased production and sales of sugar since 1942 have
financed a prosperity that has enabled the Cuban standard of living to
rise above prewar levels. Large sales of sugar to the US having been
the principal source of this increased income, however, many Cubans
feared that the reinstatement of the US quota system in 1948 would
force reduced sugar production with a consequent, and radical, down-
ward readjustment of national wage-price structure. Actually it has
been possible for Cuba to dispose of practically all of its bumper 1948
crop, but fears still persist concerning the sale of the 1949 crop which
will be harvested within the next few months. Meanwhile, Prio's recently
announced decree concerning the price-wage-production cycle to the
effect that the salary of sugar workers is to be mairtained on the same
level as last year,. has made Cuba's future economic equilibrium depen-
dent on the maintenance of production and income close to present
levels in relation to prices the workers will have to pay.
Since Cuba buys most of its food from the US, there is a definite
limit to what it can do independently to reduce food prices if the feared
readjustment of wages resulting from a collapse of the sugar market,
becomes necessary. For this reason, Prio has indicated that the US
can help by alloting Cuba larger amounts of staples -- thus tending to
lower prices. The same fear of radical readjustment motivates the
Cuban desire for US economic and technical aid in the diversification
of industry and in the construction of public works -- both of which,Cuba
believes, tend to cushion the shock that might be occasioned by reduced
production and marketing of sugar. Document No. 00/
NO CHANGE in Class.
DECLASSIFIED
Class. CHANGED TO: TS S C
DD'A Memo, 4 . Apr 77
Auth: Mil ':o. 77/1703
Date: By; CII fi
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As a. quid pro quo for expected aid from the US, the Cubans offer
their willingness to cooperate in US plans for Hemisphere defense.
In this they are sincere not only as to military cooperation but in
suppression of Communism. Prio personally led the campaign
against the Communists in Cuba during' the last year of the Grau
regime.
Any attempt to make the granting of advantages such as Cuba
enjoys in the US sugar market contingent on more immediately prac-
tical concessions, such as Cuban respect for the rights of US nationals,
would be opposed by the present Cuban government.
which termed can be expected
to continue the policies of its predecessor
""economic aggression" and induced the Bogota Conference to adopt a
resolution that `ono state may use or encourage he use of character in order to force went
measures of an economic or political
sovereign will of another state."
The explanation for the seeming contradictions within this so-called
?Grau Doctrine" (persistently advocated by Guillermo Belt, Ambassador
to the US) lies in a Cuban desire to enjoy the benefits that would accrue
if Cuba were a quasi-dependency, while simultaneously exercising pre-
rogatives that go with extreme nationalism. The Cuban propensity to
believe that the US---for a combination of historical reasons---has a
special obligation to aid Cuba nourishes the first illusion, while popular
pressure on Cuban statesmen compels them to strive for international
prestige by striking independent attitudes, or leads them to favor laws
that hamper the operations of foreign nationals within Cuba.
The present Cuban Government like its predecessor, is the product
of the supremacy in Cuba of democratic, liberal forces born during the
1933 revolution against the dictator Machado. With regard to the sta-
bility of the existing regime, the Prio government probably has suffi-
cient political and economic support to maintain its position for at
least two more years. Unfavorable conditions could conceivably cause
the loss of present majorities in both houses of Congress in the 1950
congressional elections. Until that time the government's 1948 victory
at the polls will, it is estimated, discourage illegal and revolutionary
opposition and tend to assure the durability of the regime.
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