CIA COMMENTS FOR JIG ON(Sanitized)MIDDLE EAST COMMUNIST SURVEY FOR PERIOD 15TH JULY-30TH SEPTEMBER 1948.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000300030001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 20, 1948
• Content Type: IM

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I T .aaIGENCE I ORANDUM NO. 102
SUBJECT s CIA Cements for JIG on "Mddle East Communist
Survey for Period 15th July-30th September 1948.0
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1. .
It appears that subject report would not be a sound basis for a
current study of Communism in the Middle East. M my trends which were
developing du ing the period 15 July-30 September have not matured and
in some instances have been reversed by events during the past two months.
2. Ckreer&2*
While it is true that the Tito-Cominform split put both EKE and
Tito (with respect to continuing aid to the guerrillas) in difficult
positions,. Yugoslavia has not out off supplies from Mar3oas. On the con-
trary, the determination of Yugoslavia to go along with Albania and
Bulgaria in the Greek matter has been clearly indicated by the Yugoslav
stand in the recent Evatt reconciliation talks in Paris. Furthermore, it
is not likely that the split had any direct bearing on the outcome of the
Grammos battle. The guerrilla escape route was entirely through Albania,
and the guerrilla defeat was not caused by lack of supplies.
Subject study appears to put too much weight on the one report that
the Cominform has notified EKE to find a peaceful solution to the Greek
problem. The Cominform may. have been concerned that Uarkoa' manpo?_mr
reserve is running low, but guerrilla current recruiting efforts show a
determination to continue the struggle and are obtaining a significant
degree of success. So far, guerrilla attempts at "conciliation" are prob.
ably no more than propaganda designed to weaken the Greek will to resist.
In spite of numerous reports of the existence of independent Slavo-
Macedonian units, no such units have been identified in operation since
1946. These units are probably only paper organisations or else training
or reserve cadres in Yugoslavia. Further, it is not believed that one of
ME's reasons for seeking peace is the growth of nationalist sentiment
amongst Co?nunist leaders as a result of the Macedonian question, Just
(slut sort of deal EKE has made with the satellites concerning the disposition
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party has little or no influence .on the GSEM except poaeibly in some
local units. There have been numerous strikes, but these were 1egit3merte,
as it were, and few if any were protracted beyond their armed
duration of a feew hours or a day.
3. Cvi u .
Apart from one highly improbable report concerning arms traffic
between Cyprus and Rhodes, we have received no definite information on
an Increase in arms held by the AKUL, although an inoresee is entirely
possible.
The penalty for the possession of explosives has been inoreseed to
6 months, which under the airoumatances can scarcely be oe#lled "heavy.*
The additional threat to the security of Cyprus represented by the
11,000 Jews in internment camps should certainly be mentioned.
4a Arab Stat?e?8.
Had we been aakcd to comment on this report two months ago we would
have had little criticism to make of its general correiueions. Pbnpr
trends which were developing during the period 15 Jul -30 September, howi -
ever, have not matured and in some instanoee they have been reversed
by events during the past two montles.
There does not appear to have been arty basic reorganization of
Communist strategy in the Arab states' area. Sa1od, Soviet Minister
to Lebanon and alleged leader of Communist forces in all, the Arab states,
has recently returned to Beirut. He may have brought back with him plans
for a decisive change in Con nurzist strategy, but there has as yet been
no evidence of such a changea
of Macedonia is an important question which has not, yet been answered.
However, those Greek Communists who were most tmtlonelistie (Zevgoe, Sjantoe,
Serkird3is, *to.) have long been deed; the surviving leadeare are inter-
nationally minded and can probably keep the rank and file from erystal..
lining any ideas on this particular problem.
While it is true that party orgaairratione in the towns Were especl&uy
reproved for inactivity (see Zao1ariadees "All to Arms, All for Victory")
and have been reorganised, the reorganisation has not yet borne fruit.
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The increase in Ccmmutint pressure in IM during the summer months
has not continued. Aside from continued unrest in the Kurdish areas, the
Iraqi Commamists appear to have lost grow2d. C~o~~itinuing instability,
occasioned by the Palestine issue and economic and financial difficulties,
has resulted in a gradual shift to the political right. The "tltd Guard"
politicians, such as Nuri Said, are slowly returning to power, and iaoreas-
ingly stringent measures against the Coemunists and other left-wing groups
are being instituted. The recent voluntary dissolution of the National
Democratic Party is a measure of the declining influence of left-wing
groups in Iraq,
in , in spite of the success achieved by Soviet representatives
in penetrating the Russian Orthodox Chinch, the indigenous Casts
have had a -amber of setbacks. Mapem (left-wing socialist party) turned
down the Palestine Communist Partyss bid to present a combined slate of
candidates in the coming 25 Jan =7 elections. Through the active inter-
ference of the Provisional Government of Israel, the labor monopoly held
by the Arab Communist labor union in Nazareth is in the process of being
broken.
During the UNESCO Conference in ~r , Communist activities were
severely curtailed, and after the demonstration before the UNESCO Con-
ference building, 1fustapha el Aria, Lebanon's leading Commamiet, war
placed under arrest. In general, Communists in both Simla and Lebanon
appear to have been unable to take arq particular advantage of the
increasing political and economic difficulties facing these two countries.
We have no evidence that Communists have infiltrated Mj&U or any
other of the.PgZMj&U gulf,_ .
As 3: Syria and Lebanon, Comrnmists in AMMI appear to have been unable
to take advantage of increasing internal instability. They were not
significantly involved In any of the rooent distuurLances in Cairo.
I i i 1 4t the "Italian Pblitioal Association for the Progress
of Libya" is now believed to be Commist,
5. ,p?
There is no evidence to warrant the supposition that the Soviets
are curtailing the operations of their own agencies in Iran in the belief
that the Tudeh Party is now in a position to supplant Soviet officials
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in the matter of spreading pro-u^oviet propsgsnda, and Soviet inflnenoe?
The meeuorandvm presented by the Liuleh to the Prime Ng,niater shortly after
the departure of the Soviet Ambassador merely repeats de?snde previousay
nude on Iranian goveranents by Iranian leftists and r the Soviets and
was undoubtedly inspired by the latter. The Soviets will, however, make
full use of the resurgent Tudeh, which is considered their chief inatru-
meat in Iran, and will support it by every practicable means, inelu8ing
financial.
We have never considered the return of ntmueroi Soviet diplomatic
and consular officials to the USSR last molest as s permanent withdrawal
or reduction of staff. Several of these officials have rerned to
Yes and in soma Instances consular etaffe lave been expanded. Mareover,
the Rw uian Embassy recently opened in Tehran has a comber of Moeleme
on its staff and is suspected of being charged d th oatz*ying out the work
of the Cominform in the area.
Although s me of the Soviet oa?aiearcial agenoiee have curtailed their
official operations and nar>lr members of their staffs have returned to the
USSR, these measures are pa'obshlp temporary, and it is believed that the
clandestine activities of mess agencies are being continued. According
to recent reports, Soviet agents are increasingly active among the Kurdish,
tribes in Northwestern Iran.
The considerable movement of Soviet diplomatic, ooneular, and ooameroial
representatives to the USSR during the steer can probably be attsibated
to: (a) grants of leave; (b) acmanonaea for consultations in the Kremlin,
possibly ooncerniM a new Soviet policy in the 1-e East; (a) the recall
of incompetent or unreliable personnel;. and (d) diminished trade between
the USSR and Iran.
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