The Will and Ability of Certain Countries to Support and Develop Their Armed Forces, from Their Own Resources and with US Aid.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 29, 1949
• Content Type: IM

~.2f~~G ~
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C~I~3'i~f~r-i, 1Te'TI:~LT~aT.C~1JGL` .~+.GiuiVG~'
INTEI.~,IGi~~GE T.~:~:C7~.ti.IvDL'I~aI N0, 16?
:aU~3~H G'~s The -ti~.1 and .~bil3ty of Ge;.?te,an Gountr~.es to ~uppox?~ and
Develop `heir hxmc~d F?rces, From ~'he~.r Gg.? 'aties~sux?ces anc~
~~.tb. U~ ~. ia.
Rk~'.I~ie~,IvG~~ 3I:G~e~..1C6, 2g i~~:rch ~9~.9; I~~~3.5ba i:T~~7.~ga :ifs-t~l~
~. ~ The a~r;~ to estic~te th.e rr~_? and ab3.li?~y a., ~'apan., ~ore~;,
1ir~entina, Lt~.~.i~ ~.a, Dxazil, Ghile, Colo3~ab:~.a, Gosh Baca; Gta:aa, Tho
Dom:s.saican Republio, ~c~d.ot?, E1. Sa2Yrador, Gt~?e~uala, Iiaiti; Hondurss!
Ia~exiec, I3:~.cara~ia, Pgraguay, I'eraz, 'Jz?u~~a~A, ~'~ans~ue:_e. to stir porgy: and
dev~~.c,~ t~1eiY? ar~:ed i'orces duria~~ the next, eight years, ~'rcm their Q~an
~?esources ar~d c~it;t`t US military- aad? In pur~;ic~,].ax-, t.o estiu~to, ~.?i?th
respect to eaoh o,# these countries;
~9 Its ~v3? to resist soviet ,nilitax?y aggr~ssian, s.f need ha,
(to be e~resaEd an hrc~ad cate~;orie ~;ear~s ;such as st?on~, rnoder~.e,
t111C:Br"fain, l?x" 4atiE3~~ a
~* 5ts ~~.~.linaness to ~tapport n~. t~.an,~:~. i ea:~?n:a~.~e;~t to tY~e
rnaa~imra~ pxac?ticat~le extent fA can its o~j~n z?esour cUa
~~~
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4 ~rl H
'Z r ~ ~n ~ n
~-a
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a
~, ?~ts natianaZ 3:ncame arzd manpo~,es? z~oten?~ia3.A
;~, ?'hG ~poa?t~.on of this ~taoral. incom~.~ and~'rr?anpocrex pa~ential
xr`rz~.ch it coed affaxd to deY ote to i t~~ mi? stnraT esta~lashnen?~,
havanJ re~axd to the avoidance of ~~nac:c;ept~rt2e ercncinae and o7.a~.
~ t?.c:as.. ca?~sequences,
.Za m
~ ~
^~ `t'he Lr~.tiasl. l~.mitir+g ~?actnrs t?ait?ra res~;ew;t to t?~e rt~in-
~;~rance ~!nd cic~trelor~r:~ent of its ~.r;rursd~, a:ir, a~~d r~a?~al #'orces,.
~,;~ -='~~e eFf`eGt a~" as axrned ps?c~res:;ive cconc~:~a.c r~?;overy on
the:;, a.~mitations,~
~:,, `the amo+~nt of ~JS ~:sil.itaz?y aid e~~.i~.~;~ it could effectavel~r.
s is a,~~~: ~v~.t~~,n cor~tinu'a.n~; critical 1ir_~3.ta?~ir~:a:~.:,
2, ~st;~~n~at~:s r~a,tl~ respect try eaoh c+f t.~1o cot~tltries ~-~mm~. are irz
a ser~.es of ~rclosure:; ~rhich fo1lc~ (in a1p;:~~aheticdl ordtir~
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~'~~-
Jr1P1~TsT
As a defeated and occupied paver, Japan cannot ha ~aadv to fit ttte
prefaced structure of this I~itslligence ~aora,r~dua~ sxesg3t upon consideration
of special conditions xesultinq from US occupation.
At prec~ent, th+s country io conp3etely disarmed, entirety under the
control of US oecupat3an, industrially stripped, and operating under ~!eneraZ7ir
_ depressed economic conditioaa creating continued dep?ndc~nce upon US
subs3.dieso Furthermore, the Japanese constitution specificallyv re~aounoes ,
tnakir~g rearr~ar.~ent constitut3 ona1.I~~r impossible ~-ithaut rsadificat ~ one or
interpretat'3ons to }3ermit 1?g$~. rearman~nt ~sYthout negating the entire ~alu~e
and prest~.g? of the cons~ti tutian?
BS efforts to stren.then Japan throe rh recoaastitu+_iz~.g and rearming Sts
antsy, navy arid. air Toree, and rebuilding zts nar industr~r ~+'uId elicit
7agansse enthusiasm, because the Japanese are anti-Russian and as~t3~Gomt~n3at
and toecause such rearmament ~rould be seen as Jarsan?s opportunity min to
becaaZe a rra~or m313.tar~r powaa~ Keith the paten+ial. to resume a career of canc~u?st,
Re~axdless of the t~roprxety, froffi a US paint of view, off' ~.ieartaing Japetxt,
e~rez~ a staggastion thaf the US intended to do so v~nu~.d result in violet
protest Pram raa?xq powers in the F'ar ~asfierffi Commission and frata Pacific
countries that have felt or feared Japanese s,ggressiono
" It is only in realisatia~ of such factors as the above that a~ states
menu can he made v?ithin the frsme~ror~o In tht`s i3ght of these cohsiderationsb
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anal an assu5nption of c?ntixtued US occupation of Japan and a~railabilit~* ~f IIS
aid for developing Japan's armed forces: '
(s,) Japan's wiL7. to resist Soviet military aggraa~ion ~rou].d be moderate
to stronge
{b} Ja?aanesa williaguees to support national rearent would be strong.
It would he reinf`oraed_ fvtherr~~.r~_ b~v ~ T~iis~:eri~a't nnr3 c~at~i~nl~nniE?~1 lvonlr.~
ground of support for national military grogz~ams and by a strong antipathy
for Camm~isma,
(c) Japenese willingness to devote considerable of its national income
and manpower potential to development of its ~eilitar~lr establishment would ba
sprang, as long ss it received IIS moral. and rant?r3e~l s~,~ppo~^'to
{d) Ja~paxa, at present, however could not devo~..e ..*:riy large share of its
national. income to its war establishment without a more severe austerit3r
prr~gra?a P~ithin the next eight years, Japan's totaal male ~sapulation between
the ages of I5~ ~~'td 49 is expected to increase 3'rc~at l'~,500,00t3 to 22,000,U{10.,
.Assuming that JananOS 5,500,000 serving the armed forces in 1945 represented
appraxiraate total availabilitp at any one time under stiaximum mabilisaation,
Jam's manpower potential exclusive3y for ~Llitary service in the li.tht.af
acanomia and political conditions would be approximately 6,200,0000
{e) The critical Iimit~.n~; f$atars with x?espsct ~a the raaintensnce and
development cf its ground, air, and naval forces a:?e:
1. Japan?a paucity of strategic natural rasoura~ss, including
food, and the fact-that Japan's warama2cin:; industries, including the
mereshaait marine, have teen largely destro~d or aan~~c~ a
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2, Internationt^~. hosti? its s~a~ ns~ Js.p~e~s~ eCOnomia re~ri.4al
for :tear of cc~~petition in ~orid ~ax?kets ~s sxa i~diats
cozscern aaad of ita econond.a de~elcip~nt for ~i;3tas~
rc~sttr~?snta as an ~ait~_~ate~ eor~cern~
3. Constitutoi~al Z3.~3.tat3on, disregard of ~rhich ~~.~h~
k~a~re $d~srss~ 3.ntsrru~tfonal aa~d domestic consequeaaoes
(fa8~ ~) In ~ievr of the abz~exs~ of armed Forces in 3annn and the depressed
etmte of Ja~n~ s esconc>r~, there ie prec:ticall~r aA irttern~.3 iim4.tctian to the
e.mount of ASS ra:~.~.ta,~Y e3.d ~-hach Japaaa ~rf`fQetivel~ couid uses
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(Sou?hern Karen)
(a;) The will of the Re blic and ~~`~
pu people of'Kcrrc~a to resist Soviet
aggression wou3.d depend on the means of aggression used by th? OSSR. If
aggression were carried out through the use of actual. Sa~iet forces, the gill
c~ou3d be meek; ii' it took the form of en attack bg unessistsd northern
Korean forcers, the will would para~bably be strong. The Koreans might even
resist aggression and harass occupation by the USSR itse:tf i.t US aid ha+d
been given, and a national resistance movement had groan up whose ],seders
had been so trained that they could organise the rovement f~^~ ~;aexil"tea vr~..~-
tare after th? outbreak of open aggression.
(b) 5a long as the Republic of Korea survives, and particularly sv long
as it is dominated by anti-Communist military leadership such as that of the
present Premier, the Republfcrs wili.ingness to support national armament to
th? tna~cimum prsctieable extent from its own meagre resources will be strong,
,particularly if Ua mi.Iitary aid is devoted largely to stren~thaning the Korean
potential tar eMploying diversionary tactics against a Soviet ocaupyinry force.
(cad) The RPpnblic's willingness to devote large port3_ons of limited
national income and extensive manpower resources to i.ts military eatabliahmeat
would be atronne Korea, with a population of 20,000,OOC~ is presently
d?voting epproxima~elg 50 pert?zrt o? its budget to the security ~'ora~ss. The
Republic, however, cannot devote appreciable amounts of its national income
to developing its military establishment without jeopar3i~in~- the stability of
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co?~siderable manpor-er to the militar~,* eatabliahment without serious consequences
to normal activities
(eF:f) The critical limitins factors with respect to the eaa3ntenance of
security forces in Korea are the almost total Ice?-_ of f'aeilities for
manufsature of arms axtd equirnaent, beck of skilled,r~npox?r, lack of foreign
exchange with which to purchase arms and equipment abroad, artd the need to
detrote a substantial portion of air foreig~s economic aid to industrial and
social~~tevelop~nto The most critical factor however, is, the poasibAl3ty
that the Republic of Korea will disintegrate'under internal and external
Gommuniat attack before it has had the apnortunity to attain mr~ad mum
develap~ent of its security forces.
(g} ~'~ithin these critical limitations, the R~:public of Korea could
effectively absorb sufficient military aid (a) to equip an Army of at least
100,000 men, a National Folice of 50,000, a Coast Gus~xd of 10,000, and a
small number cif observation aircraft; and (b) to organize and train for
guerrilla operatianso.
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(a) It is esti+^ated that Argentina n?uld be able and erillin~ to
render active military support if the U5 v~ere willixtg to trade important
concessions far active military support in the event of ,var between the US
and the U55R dotting the neact eight years. Arrgentina would probably insist,
as the price of continued support, an providing troops for duty ahroa~d ian
strength eguivaleirt to those provided bq Brasil but not greatlyr in excess of
;~
such strength --- possibly~nne or two divisions and one or t~o air groups.
(b) Areentix~ erillingness to support national rearmament to the
maximum practicable extent from its.~i;;4 rasaurcea is anct will remain high
,during the foreseeable future.
~c) N~~;~?~~~ - Tho latest available eatit~ate of national income
(1945) ~ ~.3 billion pesos. Uain~ that year's figure as a base, a rough
estimate for 1449 of 15.3 bi? liana pesos or X3,060 n-412~ on has b~sen c'.erived.
~~~ pst~ntia~ - Of a total male population of approximately
~ million, there iffi a total theoretical mobiliaatian capacity of 2,680,000,
of which 2,20,000 are untrai.rmed. Supplied by the US, Ar~entins emuld pla~se
a .~.? Zion mszx i$ the fireld 4~n a ~ar? s ~;ime o ~gentina is ~ not capabl9 et'
itmlep4rxntly dispateh5.lag or maintaininE; an exp?ditiarias?y farce oversea~a o
(d) B?cause some Yunotaavailable to the armed forces care not disc lased
it is inpossible to know precisely the portion of the national budget devotsd
to military purposes. In the rev?aled budget of 19.9, Argentina appropriated
$.4 percent of its estimated national income for ths~ armed farces and
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national defenses It its be~.isved that arty substantial increase in thza
parcents;ge durin the period contemplated would be wade at the coat of the
productive deselopment of the Argentine eaonan~b
(2~ It is estimated that the peacetime atren~;th of the Argentine
military estab].iahnQent and quaeipn3.litary arganit~atioris will reme.in
substantially unchanged, parhmns expanding ove~? the eight?year pa~riad,
from 170,000 to 20Q,OOOe The effective ~?obilization potential, in the
absence of ~'arc~ign aasistanca, will probably increase during the same period
at a re3.ati~?1y constant rate from the present 35Q,000 to X00,000 ,
(3 ~' 4 ~A~ vai ble .for mi 3 tar sa~s~
Eatireated Actual ~ Avable 'R nvc~e,,
13 tarn s3ud~e
1949 ~25~,4oa,0~o 32a,oov
2950 X255,000,000 330 000
2951 ~255,OO0,oo0 3409000
1952 $255p000,000 350,000
I953 ~#2 5 5,000, 000 3F, 0, 000
* Estimates of taild.tsry expenditures in ~'~rggntina are nc~ceasar~ Iy ap-
pa?az3mationa. Und~ar the ~?ive417Cear Plan, the Executive ~a a:uthori~ed
w~d~cloaed expenditup?ea t'or military purposes. ~ A. al.inht decrease from
the 1949 estimate of military expenditures has been allowed For 1950 to
accoeant for a possible proportionate decline in national inoarae as a result
of econaa~ic dif4"icultiea, Howetrer, it is possible ,that the iaepe,ct of such
difficulties will be greater, The IeWe1 of national incoffie during the
period 19501953 will be largely influpx~ced by the adminiatrationo? success
or failure is resolving the present crisis in its interrtatfonal. trade and
financial relationao This in turn will be influenced by US and to a Iesaer
;. extant U~ policy, ?The eati~nates presented for the military budget for 1950
1953 are based on the asstus~ition that trade and financial relations,
particularly those with the US, will be ad~uated to a considerable extent
and a +~harp decline in natia i come thrau~h 3.ss?ge~scals uner~ployt~e+sxt there-'
by averted, The consistent,~~ted far military appropriations 1950-53 a1s?
reflect the followin,; considaratior~: (l) the great d.nf'Iuence of the e~ilitary
in Argentine policy- and i.ts abilit~r to resist curtailment of a~ilitar~r
appropriations; (2 the probabi~ty that the administration will bey confront+~d
with problems of economic ad~uatment during t}ie period and thereby forced to
aonso].idate rather than exp~xnd the Military p~?ograa~,
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e) C~A~t t~ cal '! i miti na factorac ~ri.th res . - cwt t~o
~~A?~r of rr o ~ x~ vr~,~~,.,.,~rd_~x fog~cee ir~dlz dam,
(l) Inadequacy and nbsolescsnce of materiel and equipment on
hand and the non?-sta~lard character of equipment procured since the writ,
pat?ticularly in aircraf`~ .
~ 2) Px~asent absence of head industry for production of other
-than bight arms and ar~munition o P ] anes~ are uruler gray, howa~a~r 4'or a factoa~
which wi3.1 contstruct field piQCes to include 155 ~n gums. Stith the exception
of ta.raks, motor vehicles and other heevSr equipment, Argentina will probablq
baecotae ru~arly self euff icie~rt by about 1~3#r0 so far as m~.nimvn supply of ite~
actin armed forces is caneer~ed.~ Argentina lacks the natural resaurees
and financial capacity for the creatioa- of heavy industry.
(3) Teasporar~r do~testic economic iasta~ail3ty and adverse
conditions of foreign trade fnrcing curtailn~nt of procurement abxoad for
rearmament. It is estimated that thus eaanomic instabi7.itg i$ *e~apararr and
w3.11 be largely overcome within two y?ars as Argentine trade end the
industrial devela~tsnt progra~a ere readjusted to existing and prospeatirre world
conditions,
~# For purposes of th3.s esti.Lnate, the expression "wi+hout prejudice to the
ecoac~r" is interpreted to mean "wi.thout bringing about an economic collags~,"
*"Available manpower" represents the number of r4en under arms that
Argentina is able to suprx5r~t out of its c?~,~n ecoro~ny ~+ithoiit, rare judice
the~rdto, assumin~? initia]. US ai.d in equ~ pment~ but no continuing U5
aid other than US military missfons. Physical fitn?ss is not taken
into a,ccoutat because 3.t :is assumed that any country (according t+~
its own standards} can find at least as Iart;e a number of able-
bodied men as 3t can support."
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(f) ~ In th? absenvs of ho$tilities ~1r~c~mtia9a avuld effectively t~.sv,
within critical Imitations, tiS aid to re-ac~uip its arm~- (10~, 000 preae~
sta?ength, ptrobablq increa,~f.x~ et a relativelg Constant rate tv approxlnately
190,000 wring the newt eight years)"o
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}30LIVIA
(s) Although there is strong sentiment against Communism in
Bolivia, general wi2lingnesa to resist Saviet mi2itargr a~;~?reaaic3n against
uuraps or the US vrould ba slinhte Boliviats army of 11,500 men could
hardly provide an expeditionary combat foree. It could, ho~rev?r, be
very elf?cti~re against domestic distus~bances in the Ait3p3.ano region and
slightly lase so in other area.
(b) If Bolivia should be asked, as its share of a coordinated
defense plan for Latin Amdrica~, to ineregs? its armaments to the "
imum extent pract~.cab2e from its own resources, 9t would probably do sa.
(c) Groaa national income is estimated 8t ~85,0OO,OQO (na~t ~
including non-monetary income). Total males (l5 1.9) are estimated at
991,0?0, but not more than 300,000 n~ou2d probably be fit for military
aerv~ce.
(d) Bolivia. at present spends about X7,960,000 or araproximately
$ pere~snt of its gross national incom? (Zb~percent of its budget on
its armed forces, and presumably could devote a small additional amount
to thin purpose.
Aa of June 194 the Bold vian Armed Forces, including the
Carabineroa, totalled 26,976. Of the population of 3,790,000 (I946),
1,1.~O,OOf~ or 32 percent are gainFully amploy+ed. Ag there is na Wrest
induatr~el or agz?icultural ne1d to drain off manpmvar, a considerable
additional member could probably be incarporated :into the rai'titary .
establishment. Thin xould not endanger the economy or the 7overnm~nt'a
politica3. stability provided original e~~uipmsnt a.nd continued auoport
far tF~em were obtained from the bS, ~ .
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providdd original equipment and continued support for theut~rer~ abtsined
fdrom the US,
(3)
Estimated Actual
1~3.,litar~- Budget
Available ~tanoQw?~,,r*
20,000 (actual farces 2H, 976)
20,000
20,000
20,000
20, 000
2949 ?x,962,000 (1Gi total budget)
1'950 7, 500,000
1951. .7,250,000.
.x952 7p~~o,ooo
Y953 79?00,000
?~"Availablc ma~tpoeser" represents the number of men under arms that
Bolivia is ab1? +~o support out of its o~rn economy without pre3udice
thereto, assuming; initial US aid in equipment but no continuing! US
aid other than U5 military missions, Physical Fitness is not taken
into ae~count because it is assuttted +shst any country (accordi.ng to
its own standards) can find at least as large a nu~~ber a? able?~
bodied men as it can supparte"
(e) The critica~.?imitin factors with respect to the maintensnce
and development of_graund, naval., and a3.r forces eras
(l) Except For textiZea and smg1l quantities of sulphuric acid,
Bolivia is depend?nt on i~-ports to support its armed forces and lacks
sufficient farei.gn exchange for the purposee
? (2) No scientific or technical devolo?~ents which will.
materially i-ncrease Sts ability to maintain and develop its grround, naval,
and air forces are un~?er v-ay,
(3) The Bolivian Arty is poorly e~.~uipped, ineffectively organized,
and inade:~titately trained, Its equipment is obsolete anc~ poarly maintained.
(~.) t~ith the exception of the Altiplano region, two-thirds at' the
country is deficient in almost ar.~y kind of communieatiot~ facilities,
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(5~ `~n? quality caf the arrt~tsd forces ~'s ltswr bgr 'JS standards .
Tndivic~uA1 soldiers ax?? un3nte'tligent and il2~.texate, and most of ~.,~.ea
speak a~ly Indian languages.
(6} l`hs w~,akne~sass of the eCOnosQy, which requires ~.mports of
most i'oodstuf~'a mnd all fi~ypes oP r.~ac~.inery and processed faateria?a,
Zir~i is Bgliv3.e. ? s abi 1i.ty to maintain its ar: ?~d forces .
(f~ Bolivia could cff?ctire4y use ~atb~aut eeriaua r~ca~nami.c
dislocation on],~r enough equipme~ for a ~cal.itary estab7~.she~en~t of
approx3.mai;eI,y I~,oOd men. Continued ~trainina by US missions mould ba
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{a~ In the event oP hostilities between the US and the USSR,
Brazil would be an active ally to th? extent of its total capabilities, Nhich
would include coiYtributing combat troops,
(b) It is himhly doubtt"ul whether Brasil would be willing! or able
to inc~?ease appreciably its military establishment with ~+s oan resowrces.
Its economy noes supports national armament to the maximum practicable
extent.
(c) Brazi.I?s nat~.anal income is Pstirnated to be US ~~ bil~.~.onp It
may be expectesd to increase every year.
Brasil has c~ manpower potential exceeding x,00?,000, but #x,000,000
must be cons9dered as a hi:~h estimate or the number of males t~etween l5
and 49 fit far military serv9ce,
(d) Brazil?s military budget in 19,5 was aAprax3.ma?ely 5 ~rcent
of its estimated nat~anal ineame~. It is doubt4'4il that prasent military
+sxpenditures could be igcreased ryreatly wi~:hout producing a national
economic dissatez?.
~~; It is believed i,hat of ~3raail?s manpower potantial it would
not be practicable to keep more than 26,000 under arms.
13
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`'
estimated Actual
tai 1 { tary Budaet
~ Avg 1 ab~ t A nt~o~re+~
1949
us
~ 31~,z6l,aoo
zz6 ~aa
195a
36S,lba,a00
223'600"
1951
434,zao,ooo
z23;$~
1952
5I2,32a,000
223 gp0
1953
604,160, 000
'
22.3,840
#"Avaa.lah].e m1-npower" represents the number of r~ea unda~r arms 'chat
Brasil is able to support out of its own economy without prejudice
thereto, assucnin7 i n3 tigl US a~ d i n equinmen~, but no continuing US
aid other than US military misbions. ?hysical Fitness is not taken
into account because it is assumed that any country (according to
its own standards} can find at least as Iarge a number of ab~.e~
bodied men as it can support."
(e) Critical limitin? factors Frith respect to maintenance and
develo~sment of Bra~il~s armed forces are<
(l) The very law levels oi' national education and health
(2) Insufficient maintenance Facili~`.ies ar~d training;
(3) Xnadequate land. transportation; and
(4) Inadequate domestic sources of 1"bels..
(g) Brasil Could use eifec'c{vel;,r U5 aid in ^~aintaining a force of
260,OOa men, It must be recalled, howesver, that US standards had to be
relaxed in organising the Braai lien Txpenditi.anary Force in '~orld far II,
even though the entire army vas combed for personnel. BEF performance in
Ita],y was about that of thg poorest o~?tJS combat divisions.
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(a) Chile's will.i.nryness to render active miZitsry gupoort to the US
can ~e Pssu~~d, but the extent of a~:sastanee wauld dep~;nd dry US aid. ~v?n
Frith US aId, its abi~.ity to reader active tni'?itary suax~ort to the US in
the event of war l~t~c~srs US and USa~ would probaf~ly be limited to
ma3ntainins; irzterno,l sscurity and, depending on US aid, assisting i.n naval
and a3.r off~shor~ patrols, anti-submarine activitiPS, and a3??~ses rescue
operations. At present, Chile's military ,establis}ant is capable on~.y of
mai.ntai.nin~ inter~ia~. or3er, rspellin7 a?.tack fro~rl Peru and,lor Bolivia,
and Frnvidi~z~; a delsyinT action to attack by a laxg?r paver,
fib) Chile has a?s~eady s'.y~own arillin~;r~ss to su;~port a relativels~ large
mi.3_itary establishmemf;, Little increase could bs expected fron Ch le's
(c) rstintat?d national income for 1945 (~ 37,40 million pesos) eras
~ 1,163, 000, 000. ~'lie~?e e.re about I, 000, 000 me~~ o ~ mi litary a~ (15
through 49) fit for r~i.litary service. or th=s tote?, annroxzraately
7'35,000 are of 1.3the military valu~+ o~+nia to t?~h lack oY' basic sducationa~.
and technics,l trai~i.no~res
1949
~13,2`?7,000 (25 ~ total
budgQt)
b2,OC~o
1950
13,aoo,o0o
bl,ooo
1951
13,000,?00
6I, 000
3952
?.2,500,000
60,000
1953
i2,50o,0~0
60,000
,~aliable manpower" rapresent,$ tP~e nu~cser or- man onset arms Gnat ' '
Pena is able to support out of its oRn economy without prejudice
thereto, assuming initial US aid in egaxi,~ment, but no cont~,nuing US
aid other than US military m;anions. Physical fitness is not
taken into account because it is aASUmad that cry country (according
to :i.ts o~sn standards) can find at 7.east; as large a number of able-~
.bo3ied men as it can supportr
(e) The critical~lia~itin~ factors with reenact to the maintenance
end developtaent of ga~ound, Naval, and air forces erg the followings
(1) Peru has no rm~nitiana in~~?ustry and is desperxient uparz
imported materials of war and ~sanufactured pror3uats to supple its ground,
..,naval, and air farces.,, It ],acks suf~'iciaxst foreign exchan~!e for such
imports.
(2) Pdo scientific or technical developments, which wi11
materially increase its abi]3.ty to mainta3.n and develop these forces, are
under say.
(3)
present military equipment is a hsterogeneaus assortment,
generally old and in d~.srepaira
(Q) Tha health spa educational levels of this armed forces are
lotr by US standards o
(5) The government9a lack of funds precludes the holding of
well~or~;anis~sd periodic tactical maneuver~o
.~1~6~
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(6} Fero?s economy requires imports or food, machinery, motor
vehicles, metal r~anufs.cturea, and eleGfar~ cal goods and its li~nitat~ one
,reduce Peru?s ability to maintain its ax?mad forces.
(fa In general, Peru could effectively use anly enau~h equipment
to supp]~y~ 1a4, 0?~ man. Coat irnued t~?ai ping by iJS miasians would be
neaessat~y.
As of 1 Dece~aber 194, it +vas estimated that T'eru needed
~500'OOU ~aoaeth o~? spare parts for its i~S tactical. aircraft in order to
operate them for training; ptarpaose~a c~iaring 39490
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UfiUOUAY
{a}- Uru~uay$a wi?lingneas to sur~port the t~S in the event of
hostilities l~tween the US and the USST~ can be relied on, but eapabi~ities
for active military eunport are extremely limited.
(b} Uruguay a int,tsrest in obtaining, and wi lli.ngnesa to support, at
maximum of war machinex?p is certain, but it can be ex~scted to ba
reluctant to increase manpower to the maximum practicable e~ctent.
{c}
Pational income figure is not available.
There are 550,000 males {1549}, of which 1;20,000 are eat~ated
to be fit for military service.
{d) Uru~~:ruay has s.l.located about I4 percent of tho proposeN 1949
budget for national defense; in view of the rnroapect of approximately
.
15 percent deficit-financing for 1949, enly a aligh+.ly increas+ed
a?location to national, defense woulri seem practical in the foreseeable
future;
Armed forces could be increased from a ppraximataly 11,000 to r~
raaxiam~ of 50,000, but the rca~ar coats of equippia~; and maintaining these
men would .have to be borne by the U:~.
Estimated Actual.
Btidvet
?~liLtarv
Avai 7Lable ~danbowar~
1949
_
os X15,332,000 {~ total budget}
z5,0oo
1950
1,5,000,000
25,000
19571
z5,ooo,oao
25,000
].952
1,500,000
z5,oao
1953
u,5oo,oao
z5,ooa
#"?vailable manpower" represents the number of men under arms that
Uruguay is ah~.e to sup~rt out of its o>n economy without pre3udice
thereto, assuming i.nitiel US aid in equi?yment but no continuing U5
aid oth+~r than US atilitarp mi.asiona. Iical fitness is not
taken into account because it is assumcad that any country {according
to its own standards} can find at least as Large a number of able-
bod~ed mien sa it can supporto
.. 4g
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(e) (~.~
T~c'st of ~a3.J.itslr~r inr3ustriea woui.c~ n~?cessitate
prar:ur3na mi.litr~ry equip!~nt abroad ar~~ p~-ying in hard currency, which
is not a~r~ai].rab:~e ~'or the- purg>ose.
(2) Strong popular and coi~~esaionel ~^esistence to
coa;~cription arzd btxild~.ng up a ].arge~ mil.itarl- machine ~rauld de#.er the
dovelopment o`' ground, air, and naval force~a
(3) Uraleas stirred by an avert, a?~re~sive sct of g fos?e;gn
nations Uru~;uaya,na wauZd be very reluctant to ps~^ticivate in a
conflict.
(4~ X11 factors cc>nsi.dered, ~~he arr,~ would prove effective ae
a delaying force ~.ati.n~ n~3.thin the cova~trlra
e 13.m3 tad scale would were to be out ai` the
s ver~r weak op~nsnt .
Of#'enatve action can eves
question aga~t sqy but
(f) TTru~uay wauld effecti.v$Iy use only
~enaugh equipa~exat to supply
s ~`orce~ not exceeding ~0,0(3J men. IIrug+.~an n~npo~rer would be effect~.ve
in arra~r, rratral~ or air f arciea .
o4q~
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V~rizv,~4
(a} In the event of ha~stilitiea between the fIS srad the USSR,
Venezuela would be willing to render active military support, but its
assistance mould be li.mzted to the maintenance off' domestic order and
the rrote~ction of vial US petrol?ut~ 3nstallat3_ena a-ithi.n V~nezu~.ean
territory.
(b} Venezuela ~s at present increasinn, its military ?stablishment~?
and ~autd probably bra willing an,~ ~'innncia~ly able to increase it
still furt'~!er in the event oi' an emiergencyo However, for reasons o~'
:aanpctioer and inadequate military organs zatian, sttoh a rearn~nt prap~sm
probably would pat be extensive enough to permit the sending of an
exr~ditionary farce,
(e} There is na information regarding the national income of
Venezuela. The 1948?199 budget a~' the Ministry of National Aafe~se
i s U:l 34,0,000, repz?eaentin~; 7 pexcent of the national b~cuigeto
The man;x>vrer potential in .terms of all tna'Les fit for- serriae
as of December 1947 was ea+imated at 81,5,0(X-, Thfs fi~urey however, has
little praetioal significance, since it includes agriculturalists and
ineff active manpoc~er un3ta Q
(d} ~:ithj.~a the critical lim3.ting factors noted below, Ve~znAla
could effectively devote to its miiitarg establishment 23,00 0? its
manpavaer potential, al?hough fi,nanaial~,y it, could afrord further sxpansfon~
g0 0
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Estimated actual
~l~~x $~d ~at
~~in
1449
US
~34,860,2I0
24,900
.1950
35,557,4I4
26,800
1951
36,268,562
28,700
1952
36,493,433
30,700
3953
37,733,81.2
32,500
*"Rvailable m~anpower? repres3ents the number of men under arms that
Veneauela is able to euppari; out ?P its oven econam~r without pre3ud3ce
thereto, sasumi ~ initial ITS aid in equipment but no cantinuin~ US
aid other than US ?ilitary m~saioaao Physical fitnes8 is not
takext into account because it is assumed t:+.at ar{~r country (according
to its own standards) can find at feast as lar~e~ a nu~aber of able
bathed men as it can suppott~
(e) Illiteracy, disease and rsalnutrition, Lack of adequate
msintenanee sad training facilities, and Zack of adequate, transportation
facilitiee~ sure among the critical t'sctors which limit the rasintenance
and development of the grovnd9 ai.r and naval forces of Veneausla?
{i') ~ ~'eneau?Z~t could ei'fectively use the account of basic arms
necessary to equip and maintain a force of 23,000 man
m 5Z
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