The Will and Ability of Certain Countries to Support and Develop Their Armed Forces, from Their Own Resources and with US Aid.

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Document Creation Date: 
November 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 20, 2000
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Publication Date: 
April 29, 1949
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~.2f~~G ~ Appd~~or Release 2000/05/ 78-01617A000500090001-3 `~ .~ ~~ C~I~3'i~f~r-i, 1Te'TI:~LT~aT.C~1JGL` .~+.GiuiVG~' INTEI.~,IGi~~GE T.~:~:C7~.ti.IvDL'I~aI N0, 16? :aU~3~H G'~s The -ti~.1 and .~bil3ty of Ge;.?te,an to ~uppox?~ and Develop `heir hxmc~d F?rces, From ~'he~.r Gg.? 'aties~sux?ces anc~ ~~.tb. U~ ~. ia. Rk~'.I~ie~,IvG~~ 3I:G~e~..1C6, 2g i~~:rch ~9~.9; I~~~3.5ba i:T~~7.~ga :ifs-t~l~ ~. ~ The a~r;~ to estic~te th.e rr~_? and a., ~'apan., ~ore~;, 1ir~entina, Lt~.~.i~ ~.a, Dxazil, Ghile, Colo3~ab:~.a, Gosh Baca; Gta:aa, Tho Dom:s.saican Republio, ~c~d.ot?, E1. Sa2Yrador, Gt~?e~uala, Iiaiti; Hondurss! Ia~exiec, I3:~.cara~ia, Pgraguay, I'eraz, 'Jz?u~~a~A, ~'~ans~ue:_e. to stir porgy: and dev~~.c,~ t~1eiY? ar~:ed i'orces duria~~ the next, eight years, ~'rcm their Q~an ~?esources ar~d c~it;t`t US military- aad? In pur~;ic~,].ax-, t.o estiu~to, ~.?i?th respect to eaoh o,# these countries; ~9 Its ~v3? to resist soviet ,nilitax?y aggr~ssian, s.f need ha, (to be e~resaEd an hrc~ad cate~;orie ~;ear~s ;such as st?on~, rnoder~.e, t111C:Br"fain, l?x" 4atiE3~~ a ~* 5ts ~~.~.linaness to ~tapport n~.,~:~. i ea:~?n:a~.~e;~t to tY~e rnaa~imra~ pxac?ticat~le extent fA can its o~j~n z?esour cUa ~~~ ..~ ~~ ~i w H n ? G ~ ~:; ~ ~ 4 ~rl H 'Z r ~ ~n ~ n ~-a ~z~ N a ~, ?~ts natianaZ 3:ncame arzd manpo~,es? z~oten?~ia3.A ;~, ?'hG ~poa?t~.on of this ~taoral. incom~.~ and~'rr?anpocrex pa~ential xr` it coed affaxd to deY ote to i t~~ mi? stnraT esta~lashnen?~, havanJ re~axd to the avoidance of ~~nac:c;ept~rt2e ercncinae and o7.a~. ~ t?.c:as.. ca?~sequences, .Za m ~ ~ ^~ `t'he Lr~.tiasl. l~.mitir+g ~?actnrs t?ait?ra res~;ew;t to t?~e rt~in- ~;~rance ~!nd cic~trelor~r:~ent of its ~.r;rursd~, a:ir, a~~d r~a?~al #'orces,. ~,;~ -='~~e eFf`eGt a~" as axrned ps?c~res:;ive cconc~:~a.c r~?;overy on the:;, a.~mitations,~ ~:,, `the amo+~nt of ~JS ~:sil.itaz?y aid e~~.i~.~;~ it could effectavel~r. s is a,~~~: ~v~.t~~,n cor~tinu'a.n~; critical 1ir_~3.ta?~ir~:a:~.:, 2, ~st;~~n~at~:s r~a,tl~ respect try eaoh c+f t.~1o cot~tltries ~-~mm~. are irz a of ~rclosure:; ~rhich fo1lc~ (in a1p;:~~aheticdl ordtir~ Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 App'Ira'ved 'F'or Release 2000/05/2 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 ~'~~- Jr1P1~TsT As a defeated and occupied paver, Japan cannot ha ~aadv to fit ttte prefaced structure of this I~itslligence ~aora,r~dua~ sxesg3t upon consideration of special conditions xesultinq from US occupation. At prec~ent, th+s country io conp3etely disarmed, entirety under the control of US oecupat3an, industrially stripped, and operating under ~!eneraZ7ir _ depressed economic conditioaa creating continued dep?ndc~nce upon US subs3.dieso Furthermore, the Japanese constitution specificallyv re~aounoes , tnakir~g rearr~ar.~ent constitut3 ona1.I~~r impossible ~-ithaut rsadificat ~ one or interpretat'3ons to }3ermit 1?g$~. rearman~nt ~sYthout negating the entire ~alu~e and prest~.g? of the cons~ti tutian? BS efforts to stren.then Japan throe rh recoaastitu+_iz~.g and rearming Sts antsy, navy arid. air Toree, and rebuilding zts nar industr~r ~+'uId elicit 7agansse enthusiasm, because the Japanese are anti-Russian and as~t3~Gomt~n3at and toecause such rearmament ~rould be seen as Jarsan?s opportunity min to becaaZe a rra~or m313.tar~r powaa~ Keith the paten+ial. to resume a career of canc~u?st, Re~axdless of the t~roprxety, froffi a US paint of view, off' ~.ieartaing Japetxt, e~rez~ a staggastion thaf the US intended to do so v~nu~.d result in violet protest Pram raa?xq powers in the F'ar ~asfierffi Commission and frata Pacific countries that have felt or feared Japanese s,ggressiono " It is only in realisatia~ of such factors as the above that a~ states menu can he made v?ithin the frsme~ror~o In tht`s i3ght of these cohsiderationsb Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 App1FoYed ~'or Release 2000/05/23 : - DP78-01617A000500090001-3 anal an assu5nption of c?ntixtued US occupation of Japan and a~railabilit~* ~f IIS aid for developing Japan's armed forces: ' (s,) Japan's wiL7. to resist Soviet military aggraa~ion ~rou].d be moderate to stronge {b} Ja?aanesa williaguees to support national rearent would be strong. It would he reinf`oraed_ fvtherr~~.r~_ b~v ~ T~iis~:eri~a't nnr3 c~at~i~nl~nniE?~1 lvonlr.~ ground of support for national military grogz~ams and by a strong antipathy for Camm~isma, (c) Japenese willingness to devote considerable of its national income and manpower potential to development of its ~eilitar~lr establishment would ba sprang, as long ss it received IIS moral. and rant?r3e~l s~,~ppo~^'to {d) Ja~paxa, at present, however could not devo~..e ..*:riy large share of its national. income to its war establishment without a more severe austerit3r prr~gra?a P~ithin the next eight years, Japan's totaal male ~sapulation between the ages of I5~ ~~'td 49 is expected to increase 3'rc~at l'~,500,00t3 to 22,000,U{10., .Assuming that JananOS 5,500,000 serving the armed forces in 1945 represented appraxiraate total availabilitp at any one time under stiaximum mabilisaation, Jam's manpower potential exclusive3y for ~Llitary service in the acanomia and political conditions would be approximately 6,200,0000 {e) The critical Iimit~.n~; f$atars with x?espsct ~a the raaintensnce and development cf its ground, air, and naval forces a:?e: 1. Japan?a paucity of strategic natural rasoura~ss, including food, and the fact-that Japan's warama2cin:; industries, including the mereshaait marine, have teen largely destro~d or aan~~c~ a Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 Approved for Release 2000/d'~''DP78-01617A000500090001-3 2, Internationt^~. hosti? its s~a~ ns~ Js.p~e~s~ eCOnomia re~ri.4al for :tear of cc~~petition in ~orid ~ax?kets ~s sxa i~diats cozscern aaad of ita econond.a de~elcip~nt for ~i;3tas~ rc~sttr~?snta as an ~ait~_~ate~ eor~cern~ 3. Constitutoi~al Z3.~3.tat3on, disregard of ~rhich ~~.~h~ k~a~re $d~srss~ 3.ntsrru~tfonal aa~d domestic consequeaaoes (fa8~ ~) In ~ievr of the abz~exs~ of armed Forces in 3annn and the depressed etmte of Ja~n~ s esconc>r~, there ie prec:ticall~r aA irttern~.3 iim4.tctian to the e.mount of ASS ra:~.~.ta,~Y e3.d ~-hach Japaaa ~rf`fQetivel~ couid uses Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 Approved for Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 (Sou?hern Karen) (a;) The will of the Re blic and ~~`~ pu people of'Kcrrc~a to resist Soviet aggression wou3.d depend on the means of aggression used by th? OSSR. If aggression were carried out through the use of actual. Sa~iet forces, the gill c~ou3d be meek; ii' it took the form of en attack bg unessistsd northern Korean forcers, the will would para~bably be strong. The Koreans might even resist aggression and harass occupation by the USSR itse:tf i.t US aid ha+d been given, and a national resistance movement had groan up whose ],seders had been so trained that they could organise the rovement f~^~ ~;aexil"tea vr~..~- tare after th? outbreak of open aggression. (b) 5a long as the Republic of Korea survives, and particularly sv long as it is dominated by anti-Communist military leadership such as that of the present Premier, the Republfcrs wili.ingness to support national armament to th? tna~cimum prsctieable extent from its own meagre resources will be strong, ,particularly if Ua mi.Iitary aid is devoted largely to stren~thaning the Korean potential tar eMploying diversionary tactics against a Soviet ocaupyinry force. (cad) The RPpnblic's willingness to devote large port3_ons of limited national income and extensive manpower resources to i.ts military eatabliahmeat would be atronne Korea, with a population of 20,000,OOC~ is presently d?voting epproxima~elg 50 pert?zrt o? its budget to the security ~'ora~ss. The Republic, however, cannot devote appreciable amounts of its national income to developing its military establishment without jeopar3i~in~- the stability of Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 Appr~'ved F'or Release 2000/05/23 : C - 78-01617A000500090001-3 co?~siderable manpor-er to the militar~,* eatabliahment without serious consequences to normal activities (eF:f) The critical limitins factors with respect to the eaa3ntenance of security forces in Korea are the almost total Ice?-_ of f'aeilities for manufsature of arms axtd equirnaent, beck of skilled,r~npox?r, lack of foreign exchange with which to purchase arms and equipment abroad, artd the need to detrote a substantial portion of air foreig~s economic aid to industrial and social~~tevelop~nto The most critical factor however, is, the poasibAl3ty that the Republic of Korea will disintegrate'under internal and external Gommuniat attack before it has had the apnortunity to attain mr~ad mum develap~ent of its security forces. (g} ~'~ithin these critical limitations, the R~:public of Korea could effectively absorb sufficient military aid (a) to equip an Army of at least 100,000 men, a National Folice of 50,000, a Coast Gus~xd of 10,000, and a small number cif observation aircraft; and (b) to organize and train for guerrilla operatianso. Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 App~o`ved `For Release 200 / IA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 (a) It is esti+^ated that Argentina n?uld be able and erillin~ to render active military support if the U5 v~ere willixtg to trade important concessions far active military support in the event of ,var between the US and the U55R dotting the neact eight years. Arrgentina would probably insist, as the price of continued support, an providing troops for duty ahroa~d ian strength eguivaleirt to those provided bq Brasil but not greatlyr in excess of ;~ such strength --- possibly~nne or two divisions and one or t~o air groups. (b) Areentix~ erillingness to support national rearmament to the maximum practicable extent from its.~i;;4 rasaurcea is anct will remain high ,during the foreseeable future. ~c) N~~;~?~~~ - Tho latest available eatit~ate of national income (1945) ~ ~.3 billion pesos. Uain~ that year's figure as a base, a rough estimate for 1449 of 15.3 bi? liana pesos or X3,060 n-412~ on has b~sen c'.erived. ~~~ pst~ntia~ - Of a total male population of approximately ~ million, there iffi a total theoretical mobiliaatian capacity of 2,680,000, of which 2,20,000 are untrai.rmed. Supplied by the US, Ar~entins emuld pla~se a .~.? Zion mszx i$ the fireld 4~n a ~ar? s ~;ime o ~gentina is ~ not capabl9 et' itmlep4rxntly dispateh5.lag or maintaininE; an exp?ditiarias?y farce oversea~a o (d) B?cause some Yunotaavailable to the armed forces care not disc lased it is inpossible to know precisely the portion of the national budget devotsd to military purposes. In the rev?aled budget of 19.9, Argentina appropriated $.4 percent of its estimated national income for ths~ armed farces and Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 App~i3ved for Release 2000/05/23~~78-01617A000500090001-3 national defenses It its be~.isved that arty substantial increase in thza parcents;ge durin the period contemplated would be wade at the coat of the productive deselopment of the Argentine eaonan~b (2~ It is estimated that the peacetime atren~;th of the Argentine military estab].iahnQent and quaeipn3.litary arganit~atioris will substantially unchanged, parhmns expanding ove~? the eight?year pa~riad, from 170,000 to 20Q,OOOe The effective ~?obilization potential, in the absence of ~'arc~ign aasistanca, will probably increase during the same period at a re3.ati~?1y constant rate from the present 35Q,000 to X00,000 , (3 ~' 4 ~A~ vai ble .for mi 3 tar sa~s~ Eatireated Actual ~ Avable 'R nvc~e,, 13 tarn s3ud~e 1949 ~25~,4oa,0~o 32a,oov 2950 X255,000,000 330 000 2951 ~255,OO0,oo0 3409000 1952 $255p000,000 350,000 I953 ~#2 5 5,000, 000 3F, 0, 000 * Estimates of taild.tsry expenditures in ~'~rggntina are nc~ceasar~ Iy ap- pa?az3mationa. Und~ar the ~?ive417Cear Plan, the Executive ~a a:uthori~ed w~d~cloaed expenditup?ea t'or military purposes. ~ A. al.inht decrease from the 1949 estimate of military expenditures has been allowed For 1950 to accoeant for a possible proportionate decline in national inoarae as a result of econaa~ic dif4"icultiea, Howetrer, it is possible ,that the iaepe,ct of such difficulties will be greater, The IeWe1 of national incoffie during the period 19501953 will be largely influpx~ced by the adminiatrationo? success or failure is resolving the present crisis in its interrtatfonal. trade and financial relationao This in turn will be influenced by US and to a Iesaer ;. extant U~ policy, ?The eati~nates presented for the military budget for 1950 1953 are based on the asstus~ition that trade and financial relations, particularly those with the US, will be ad~uated to a considerable extent and a +~harp decline in natia i come thrau~h uner~ployt~e+sxt there-' by averted, The consistent,~~ted far military appropriations 1950-53 a1s? reflect the followin,; considaratior~: (l) the great'Iuence of the e~ilitary in Argentine policy- and i.ts abilit~r to resist curtailment of a~ilitar~r appropriations; (2 the probabi~ty that the administration will bey confront+~d with problems of economic ad~uatment during t}ie period and thereby forced to aonso].idate rather than exp~xnd the Military p~?ograa~, Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 Approved ~`or Release 2000/05/23 ? 78-01617A000500090001-3 e) C~A~t t~ cal '! i miti na factorac res . - cwt t~o ~~A?~r of rr o ~ x~ vr~,~~,.,.,~rd_~x fog~cee ir~dlz dam, (l) Inadequacy and nbsolescsnce of materiel and equipment on hand and the non?-sta~lard character of equipment procured since the writ, pat?ticularly in aircraf`~ . ~ 2) Px~asent absence of head industry for production of other -than bight arms and ar~munition o P ] anes~ are uruler gray, howa~a~r 4'or a factoa~ which wi3.1 contstruct field piQCes to include 155 ~n gums. Stith the exception of ta.raks, motor vehicles and other heevSr equipment, Argentina will probablq baecotae ru~arly self euff icie~rt by about 1~3#r0 so far as m~.nimvn supply of ite~ actin armed forces is caneer~ed.~ Argentina lacks the natural resaurees and financial capacity for the creatioa- of heavy industry. (3) Teasporar~r do~testic economic iasta~ail3ty and adverse conditions of foreign trade fnrcing curtailn~nt of procurement abxoad for rearmament. It is estimated that thus eaanomic instabi7.itg i$ *e~apararr and w3.11 be largely overcome within two y?ars as Argentine trade end the industrial devela~tsnt progra~a ere readjusted to existing and prospeatirre world conditions, ~# For purposes of th3.s esti.Lnate, the expression "wi+hout prejudice to the ecoac~r" is interpreted to mean "wi.thout bringing about an economic collags~," *"Available manpower" represents the number of r4en under arms that Argentina is able to suprx5r~t out of its c?~,~n ecoro~ny ~+ithoiit, rare judice the~rdto, assumin~? initia]. US ai.d in equ~ pment~ but no continuing U5 aid other than US military missfons. Physical fitn?ss is not taken into a,ccoutat because 3.t :is assumed that any country (according t+~ its own standards} can find at least as Iart;e a number of able- bodied men as 3t can support." Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2000/05/~~P78-01617A000500090001-3 (f) ~ In th? absenvs of ho$tilities ~1r~c~mtia9a avuld effectively, within critical Imitations, tiS aid to re-ac~uip its arm~- (10~, 000 preae~ sta?ength, ptrobablq increa,~f.x~ et a relativelg Constant rate tv approxlnately 190,000 wring the newt eight years)"o Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 Apprc~ued For Release 2000/05/~ii~DP78-01617A000500d90001-3 }30LIVIA (s) Although there is strong sentiment against Communism in Bolivia, general wi2lingnesa to resist Saviet mi2itargr a~;~?reaaic3n against uuraps or the US vrould ba slinhte Boliviats army of 11,500 men could hardly provide an expeditionary combat foree. It could, ho~rev?r, be very elf?cti~re against domestic distus~bances in the Ait3p3.ano region and slightly lase so in other area. (b) If Bolivia should be asked, as its share of a coordinated defense plan for Latin Amdrica~, to ineregs? its armaments to the " imum extent pract~.cab2e from its own resources, 9t would probably do sa. (c) Groaa national income is estimated 8t ~85,0OO,OQO (na~t ~ including non-monetary income). Total males (l5 1.9) are estimated at 991,0?0, but not more than 300,000 n~ou2d probably be fit for military aerv~ce. (d) Bolivia. at present spends about X7,960,000 or araproximately $ pere~snt of its gross national incom? (Zb~percent of its budget on its armed forces, and presumably could devote a small additional amount to thin purpose. Aa of June 194 the Bold vian Armed Forces, including the Carabineroa, totalled 26,976. Of the population of 3,790,000 (I946), 1,1.~O,OOf~ or 32 percent are gainFully amploy+ed. Ag there is na Wrest induatr~el or agz?icultural ne1d to drain off manpmvar, a considerable additional member could probably be incarporated :into the rai'titary . establishment. Thin xould not endanger the economy or the 7overnm~nt'a politica3. stability provided original e~~uipmsnt a.nd continued auoport far tF~em were obtained from the bS, ~ . Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 +? ~ n Appro'v~d 'For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A00050,0090001-3 providdd original equipment and continued support for theut~rer~ abtsined fdrom the US, (3) Estimated Actual 1~3.,litar~- Budget Available ~tanoQw?~,,r* 20,000 (actual farces 2H, 976) 20,000 20,000 20,000 20, 000 2949 ?x,962,000 (1Gi total budget) 1'950 7, 500,000 1951. .7,250,000. .x952 7p~~o,ooo Y953 79?00,000 ?~"Availablc ma~tpoeser" represents the number of men under arms that Bolivia is ab1? +~o support out of its o~rn economy without pre3udice thereto, assuming; initial US aid in equipment but no continuing! US aid other than U5 military missions, Physical Fitness is not taken into ae~count because it is assuttted +shst any country ( to its own standards) can find at least as large a nu~~ber a? able?~ bodied men as it can supparte" (e) The critica~.?imitin factors with respect to the maintensnce and development of_graund, naval., and a3.r forces eras (l) Except For textiZea and smg1l quantities of sulphuric acid, Bolivia is depend?nt on i~-ports to support its armed forces and lacks sufficient exchange for the purposee ? (2) No scientific or technical devolo?~ents which will. materially i-ncrease Sts ability to maintain and develop its grround, naval, and air forces are un~?er v-ay, (3) The Bolivian Arty is poorly e~.~uipped, ineffectively organized, and inade:~titately trained, Its equipment is obsolete anc~ poarly maintained. (~.) t~ith the exception of the Altiplano region, two-thirds at' the country is deficient in almost ar.~y kind of communieatiot~ facilities, Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 Approved for Release 2000~~-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 (5~ `~n? quality caf the arrt~tsd forces ~'s ltswr bgr 'JS standards . Tndivic~uA1 soldiers ax?? un3nte'tligent and il2~.texate, and most of ~.,~.ea speak a~ly Indian languages. (6} l`hs w~,akne~sass of the eCOnosQy, which requires ~.mports of most i'oodstuf~'a mnd all fi~ypes oP r.~ac~.inery and processed faateria?a, Zir~i is Bgliv3.e. ? s abi 1i.ty to maintain its ar: ?~d forces . (f~ Bolivia could cff?ctire4y use ~atb~aut eeriaua r~ca~nami.c dislocation on],~r enough equipme~ for a ~cal.itary estab7~.she~en~t of approx3.mai;eI,y I~,oOd men. Continued ~trainina by US missions mould ba Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 Approved for Release 2000/05/2,78-01617A000500090001-3 {a~ In the event oP hostilities between the US and the USSR, Brazil would be an active ally to th? extent of its total capabilities, Nhich would include coiYtributing combat troops, (b) It is himhly doubtt"ul whether Brasil would be willing! or able to inc~?ease appreciably its military establishment with ~+s oan resowrces. Its economy noes supports national armament to the maximum practicable extent. (c) Brazi.I?s nat~.anal income is Pstirnated to be US ~~ bil~.~.onp It may be expectesd to increase every year. Brasil has c~ manpower potential exceeding x,00?,000, but #x,000,000 must be cons9dered as a hi:~h estimate or the number of males t~etween l5 and 49 fit far military serv9ce, (d) Brazil?s military budget in 19,5 was 5 ~rcent of its estimated nat~anal ineame~. It is doubt4'4il that prasent military +sxpenditures could be igcreased ryreatly wi~:hout producing a national economic dissatez?. ~~; It is believed i,hat of ~3raail?s manpower potantial it would not be practicable to keep more than 26,000 under arms. 13 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2000/05/~ ? P78-01617AOQ0500090001-3 `' estimated Actual tai 1 { tary Budaet ~ Avg 1 ab~ t A nt~o~re+~ 1949 us ~ 31~,z6l,aoo zz6 ~aa 195a 36S,lba,a00 223'600" 1951 434,zao,ooo z23;$~ 1952 5I2,32a,000 223 gp0 1953 604,160, 000 ' 22.3,840 #"Avaa.lah].e m1-npower" represents the number of r~ea unda~r arms 'chat Brasil is able to support out of its own economy without prejudice thereto, assucnin7 i n3 tigl US a~ d i n equinmen~, but no continuing US aid other than US military misbions. ?hysical Fitness is not taken into account because it is assumed that any country (according to its own standards} can find at least as Iarge a number of ab~.e~ bodied men as it can support." (e) Critical limitin? factors Frith respect to maintenance and develo~sment of Bra~il~s armed forces are< (l) The very law levels oi' national education and health (2) Insufficient maintenance Facili~`.ies ar~d training; (3) Xnadequate land. transportation; and (4) Inadequate domestic sources of 1"bels.. (g) Brasil Could use eifec'c{vel;,r U5 aid in ^~aintaining a force of 260,OOa men, It must be recalled, howesver, that US standards had to be relaxed in organising the Braai lien Txpenditi.anary Force in '~orld far II, even though the entire army vas combed for personnel. BEF performance in Ita],y was about that of thg poorest o~?tJS combat divisions. 14 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2000/05/2~C~~P78-01617A000500090001-3 (a) Chile's will.i.nryness to render active miZitsry gupoort to the US can ~e Pssu~~d, but the extent of a~:sastanee wauld dep~;nd dry US aid. ~v?n Frith US aId, its abi~.ity to reader active tni'?itary suax~ort to the US in the event of war l~t~c~srs US and USa~ would probaf~ly be limited to ma3ntainins; irzterno,l sscurity and, depending on US aid, assisting i.n naval and a3.r off~shor~ patrols, anti-submarine activitiPS, and a3??~ses rescue operations. At present, Chile's military ,establis}ant is capable on~.y of mai.ntai.nin~ inter~ia~. or3er, rspellin7 a?.tack fro~rl Peru and,lor Bolivia, and Frnvidi~z~; a delsyinT action to attack by a laxg?r paver, fib) Chile has a?s~eady s'.y~own arillin~;r~ss to su;~port a relativels~ large mi.3_itary establishmemf;, Little increase could bs expected fron Ch le's (c) rstintat?d national income for 1945 (~ 37,40 million pesos) eras ~ 1,163, 000, 000. ~'lie~?e about I, 000, 000 me~~ o ~ mi litary a~ (15 through 49) fit for r~i.litary service. or th=s tote?, annroxzraately 7'35,000 are of 1.3the military valu~+ o~+nia to t?~h lack oY' basic sducationa~. and technics,l 1949 ~13,2`?7,000 (25 ~ total budgQt) b2,OC~o 1950 13,aoo,o0o bl,ooo 1951 13,000,?00 6I, 000 3952 ?.2,500,000 60,000 1953 i2,50o,0~0 60,000 ,~aliable manpower" rapresent,$ tP~e nu~cser or- man onset arms Gnat ' ' Pena is able to support out of its oRn economy without prejudice thereto, assuming initial US aid in egaxi,~ment, but no cont~,nuing US aid other than US military m;anions. Physical fitness is not taken into account because it is aASUmad that cry country (according to :i.ts o~sn standards) can find at 7.east; as large a number of able-~ .bo3ied men as it can supportr (e) The critical~lia~itin~ factors with reenact to the maintenance end developtaent of ga~ound, Naval, and air forces erg the followings (1) Peru has no rm~nitiana in~~?ustry and is desperxient uparz imported materials of war and ~sanufactured pror3uats to supple its ground, ..,naval, and air farces.,, It ],acks suf~'iciaxst foreign exchan~!e for such imports. (2) Pdo scientific or technical developments, which wi11 materially increase its abi]3.ty to mainta3.n and develop these forces, are under say. (3) present military equipment is a hsterogeneaus assortment, generally old and in d~.srepaira (Q) Tha health spa educational levels of this armed forces are lotr by US standards o (5) The government9a lack of funds precludes the holding of well~or~;anis~sd periodic tactical maneuver~o .~1~6~ Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 Approved Foy' Release 2000/05/ - DP78-01617A000500090001-3 (6} Fero?s economy requires imports or food, machinery, motor vehicles, metal r~anufs.cturea, and eleGfar~ cal goods and its li~nitat~ one ,reduce Peru?s ability to maintain its ax?mad forces. (fa In general, Peru could effectively use anly enau~h equipment to supp]~y~ 1a4, 0?~ man. Coat irnued t~?ai ping by iJS miasians would be neaessat~y. As of 1 Dece~aber 194, it +vas estimated that T'eru needed ~500'OOU ~aoaeth o~? spare parts for its i~S tactical. aircraft in order to operate them for training; ptarpaose~a c~iaring 39490 47 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 L Approved ~ For Release 2000/Q~1~l~RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 UfiUOUAY {a}- Uru~uay$a wi?lingneas to sur~port the t~S in the event of hostilities l~tween the US and the USST~ can be relied on, but eapabi~ities for active military eunport are extremely limited. (b} Uruguay a int,tsrest in obtaining, and wi lli.ngnesa to support, at maximum of war machinex?p is certain, but it can be ex~scted to ba reluctant to increase manpower to the maximum practicable e~ctent. {c} Pational income figure is not available. There are 550,000 males {1549}, of which 1;20,000 are eat~ated to be fit for military service. {d) Uru~~:ruay has s.l.located about I4 percent of tho proposeN 1949 budget for national defense; in view of the rnroapect of approximately . 15 percent deficit-financing for 1949, enly a increas+ed a?location to national, defense woulri seem practical in the foreseeable future; Armed forces could be increased from a ppraximataly 11,000 to r~ raaxiam~ of 50,000, but the rca~ar coats of equippia~; and maintaining these men would .have to be borne by the U:~. Estimated Actual. Btidvet ?~liLtarv Avai 7Lable ~danbowar~ 1949 _ os X15,332,000 {~ total budget} z5,0oo 1950 1,5,000,000 25,000 19571 z5,ooo,oao 25,000 ].952 1,500,000 z5,oao 1953 u,5oo,oao z5,ooa #"?vailable manpower" represents the number of men under arms that Uruguay is ah~.e to sup~rt out of its o>n economy without pre3udice thereto, assuming i.nitiel US aid in equi?yment but no continuing U5 aid oth+~r than US atilitarp mi.asiona. Iical fitness is not taken into account because it is assumcad that any country {according to its own standards} can find at least as Large a number of able- bod~ed mien sa it can supporto .. 4g Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 ~- .r Approved Fer Release 2000/0 ~~, i~QDP78-01617A000500090001-3 (e) (~.~ T~c'st of ~a3.J.itslr~r inr3ustriea woui.c~ n~?cessitate prar:ur3na mi.litr~ry equip!~nt abroad ar~~ p~-ying in hard currency, which is not a~r~ai].rab:~e ~'or the- purg>ose. (2) Strong popular and coi~~esaionel ~^esistence to coa;~cription arzd up a ].arge~ mil.itarl- machine ~rauld the dovelopment o`' ground, air, and naval force~a (3) Uraleas stirred by an avert, a?~re~sive sct of g fos?e;gn nations Uru~;uaya,na wauZd be very reluctant to ps~^ticivate in a conflict. (4~ X11 factors cc>nsi.dered, ~~he arr,~ would prove effective ae a delaying force ~.ati.n~ n~3.thin the cova~trlra e 13.m3 tad scale would were to be out ai` the s ver~r weak op~nsnt . Of#'enatve action can eves question aga~t sqy but (f) TTru~uay wauld effecti.v$Iy use only ~enaugh equipa~exat to supply s ~`orce~ not exceeding ~0,0(3J men. IIrug+.~an n~npo~rer would be in arra~r, rratral~ or air f arciea . o4q~ Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 Appr~ved~For Release 2000/ ,,? -RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 V~rizv,~4 (a} In the event of ha~stilitiea between the fIS srad the USSR, Venezuela would be willing to render active military support, but its assistance mould be li.mzted to the maintenance off' domestic order and the rrote~ction of vial US petrol?ut~ 3nstallat3_ena a-ithi.n V~nezu~.ean territory. (b} Venezuela ~s at present increasinn, its military ?stablishment~? and ~autd probably bra willing an,~ ~'innncia~ly able to increase it still furt'~!er in the event oi' an emiergencyo However, for reasons o~' :aanpctioer and inadequate military organs zatian, sttoh a rearn~nt prap~sm probably would pat be extensive enough to permit the sending of an exr~ditionary farce, (e} There is na information regarding the national income of Venezuela. The 1948?199 budget a~' the Ministry of National Aafe~se i s U:l 34,0,000, repz?eaentin~; 7 pexcent of the national b~cuigeto The man;x>vrer potential in .terms of all tna'Les fit for- serriae as of December 1947 was ea+imated at 81,5,0(X-, Thfs fi~urey however, has little praetioal significance, since it includes agriculturalists and ineff active manpoc~er un3ta Q (d} ~:ithj.~a the critical lim3.ting factors noted below, Ve~znAla could effectively devote to its miiitarg establishment 23,00 0? its manpavaer potential, al?hough fi,nanaial~,y it, could afrord further sxpansfon~ g0 0 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3 Apprav+~d For Release 2000/0 78-01617A000500090001-3 Estimated actual ~l~~x $~d ~at ~~in 1449 US ~34,860,2I0 24,900 .1950 35,557,4I4 26,800 1951 36,268,562 28,700 1952 36,493,433 30,700 3953 37,733,81.2 32,500 *"Rvailable m~anpower? repres3ents the number of men under arms that Veneauela is able to euppari; out ?P its oven econam~r without pre3ud3ce thereto, sasumi ~ initial ITS aid in equipment but no cantinuin~ US aid other than US ?ilitary m~saioaao Physical fitnes8 is not takext into account because it is assumed ar{~r country (according to its own standards) can find at feast as lar~e~ a nu~aber of able bathed men as it can suppott~ (e) Illiteracy, disease and rsalnutrition, Lack of adequate msintenanee sad training facilities, and Zack of adequate, transportation facilitiee~ sure among the critical t'sctors which limit the rasintenance and development of the grovnd9 ai.r and naval forces of Veneausla? {i') ~ ~'eneau?Z~t could ei'fectively use the account of basic arms necessary to equip and maintain a force of 23,000 man m 5Z Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500090001-3