CIA IM-169

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000500100006-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 1998
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 29, 1949
• Content Type: MEMO

ADDRAp ,oMed,For. Release_2001 /03/02 : LTK .S"WA 0500100006-6
E
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EN
OF
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STAT
June 29, 1949
4biOCO
MEMORANDUM
To: Assistant Director
Office of Reports and Estimates
Central Intelligence Agency
Subject: CIA IM-169
The intelligence organization of the Department
of State concurs in subject report. Attached comments
are submitted for possible consideration.
For the Special Assistant for
Research and Intelligence:
Att.
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COIV1 ENTS ON CIA IM 169
Malaya
Communist and bandit insurgents are now attacking estates,
mines, and transportation. These disorders may also have local
effect on some labor forces.
However, production level is being
maintained by strenuous and costly efforts.
6. Siam
To the extent that Chinese labor would support Communist
activities, there could be some denial of Siamese rubber, tin and
teak by labor troubles and sabotage at shipping centers. Complete
control by the police is not expected.
7, Indonesia
In Java and Sumatra nationalist rather than Communist dis-
orders predominate. Widespread disorganization and destruction
exist and it will be some time before production can be restored
after political stability is achieved. Until then the petroleum,
palm oil, pepper, quinine and rubber will be available only in
quantities well below prewar production. In Bangka and Billiton
pepper and tin can be denied to the extent that Chinese labor develops
Communist sympathies. In Borneo, petroleum and rubber production is
likely to be only minimally reduced. In Celebes there is no reason
to believe that copra production would fall off if collection facilities
were available.
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June 23, 1949
Comments on CIA IM-169
Latin America
DRA has reviewed the subject memorandum and has no
positive disagreement with the estimates made by CIA,
with the possible exception of the one on Uruguay. A
number of comments have been made by the analysts, how-
ever, which tend to clarify or slightly modify some of
the points in the explanation given by CIA. No comment
may be assumed to mean we concur with the CIA estimate
and explanation.
The Latin American republics and mentioned dependent
territories are listed below in the order given in the
CIA memorandum:
Mexico. It is suggested that in the first sentence
of paragraph 2 the words "is extensive" be deleted and
the phrase "through aggressive leadership exists" be
substituted. This suggestion is made because it is be-
lieved the sentence as it now stands is susceptible to
the erroneous interpretation that there are many Com-
munists in the groups mentioned.
Cuba. In the second sentence in the paragraph on
Cuba the word "members" seems more appropriate than the
word "militants." The number of hard-core militants
is probably considerably less than 55,000. It might be
well, too, to mention that as a result of a series of
reverses communist influence in Cuba has recently
declined.
Jamaica., No comment.
Haiti. No comment.
Dominican Republic. No comment.,
Central America and Panama. Although we agree with
the es ate given here it might be pointed out that in
our estimation the possibilities of interference with pro-
-duction are somewhat greater in Guatemala, Costa Rica, and
Panama than they are in El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
Guatemala is an uncertain factor particularly becau a of
the leftist tendencies demonstrated recently in that coun-
try. Costa Rica has a fairly large number of Communists,
at least compared with the number in other Central American
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2.
countries, who conceivably might use their influence to
the detriment of production in that country even though
they appear to be under control at the present time.
Panama is in such a strategic position that the action
of Communists there is rather difficult to predict. Al-
though at present the Communists in Panama and in the Zone
are discredited and communism is reported on the decline
the situation may be different two or three years from
now. Unemployment is assuming large proportions in Panama,
a condition which would be somewhat aggravated if the Com-
munis~ Party were placed on the Attorney General's list of
subversive organizations, as recommended by the Embassy,
and Communists discharged from their positions in the
Canal Zone. In other words, it seems possible that con-
ditions may change in such a manner to encourage the
growth of communism possibly to the extent of making
significant interference a probability.
Colombia. Although we do not differ with the esti-
mate given e would like to suggest that the interference
with the production may be somewhat less than it appears
because the nationalist_Gaitanista faction of the Liberal
party would. in all probability side with the US in the
event of war against the USSR even though its labor
policies have thus far paralleled those of the Communists.
Venezuela. No comment.
Ecuador. No comment.
Peru. No comment.
Bolivia. It is suggested that the third sentence
be altered o read in substance "The Government's handling
of these difficulties was previously weak and ineffective,
but more forceful measures have lately been employed by
Acting President Urriolagoitia as exemplified during the
recent mine disorder. 11
Chile. No comment.
The Guianas. No comment.
Brazil. it is recommended that the word ttprinci-
pallyncluded in the sentence following the word
"concentrated." it is noted that the term "castor oil"
is used in paragraph 1 as contrasted with "castor beano
in paragraph 3.
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3.
Uruguay. Uruguayan exports of meat normally stand
in the same proportion to Argentine exports as do Uruguayan
exports of hides and skins. It is suggested that the Uru-
guayan list include meat as well as hides and skins or
that hides and skins be dropped from the Uruguayan list.
Although we are not particularly anxious to argue
that there would be significant interference in Uruguay
we are a bit puzzled by the fact that Uruguay is the only
one of the republics of South America in which significant
interference is not expected. We have compared the sec-
tion on Uruguay particularly with that on Argentina. From
these two sections one is forced to conclude either (1)
that the Uruguayan Government is better equipped to handle
communist sabotage or has less communist activity to deal
with than the Argentine Government, or (2) that the Com-
munists are not interested in sabotaging Uruguayan pro-
duction. The first conclusion is questionable on the
basis of information available to us regarding the rela-
tive ability of the Communists in either country to per-
form acts of sabotage. The alternative conclusion is
arguable but also seems open to question.
_A~__r_ge__n____t__i__na. In connection with the statement in the
first sen-tence about the Slavs it is believed that some
mention should be made of the fact that the Argentine
Government has dissolved the Uxii6n Eslava. Although not
prepared to argue against the statement in the second
part of the third sentence we note that information avail-
able to us is not sufficient to support fully the state-
ment that the Communist Party has "particular influence"
among railway, port, and packing house workers.
OIR/DRA:WSLester:mo
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