General Notes on Soviet Armed Forces

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000500200004-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 27, 1949
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500200004-7
^t~ T~
c~sx~+ral Xatas an Soviet .~rF I~'c~rezee
1. A~3,`~~ .; x~ .~ t~enere.2
27 1~4~
As ~urirx~~;' ~?arlti ~s~ ZIr tl~ Ground Fr~ra~es aunt inu~s tra ix3 the
R+rnic~r anc~ ;nast 3,r~I,a~~ut s.r:g of tha Sr~v~.at .~rr~er~t ~ac~roes. ~e
Gxtiae~rtd Fames hex's the br~t~ of bYua ~r~r a-nd tr~+ir Qer~e~bili.tie~c e.ra
,f tat],I;~ te~z'~t~oc~d by the Sr~iv~.ets ae is nca~ #~her esaee t4~.th, fi~~.~rel e,t'
~ttx~te~ic~ Af x? ~`ar+p~+sa.
In the springy; +af 1~4P, tkze ~avie~s ~ar~wnia+sd the atruoture
aP their Awed fax~ars? i!'}wa ~'t 1:r~ludiz~ its sir erxa, rxrs-s iia'~e-
~rx-ted ink a si.x~le i4ixYistx~- of Axed Fix tress t+~~ether' x3th tt~
~xe4yf ~hsk f,~r air, a~-d nevxel .~c~sexes eci ttxe~ e~x~r~ly~ a~x~stt3sst9~mn
alb bear rye ~" equt~ oosz~ozxerats cat" tD n~ unified Areued Rbx?oss.
The nor a:a ~is~ a~~z preee~s ems. i~t~:ese~d isipc~x~~.nv+r ~c~r the Atx~
Foraea e~speoialxy. an8 +R2sQ f"or the iie~', but i:t i.s si~xai,~tiaaxit
Chet the gr~rsexxt l~r~ed F~st?oee t~enere~2 Staff aoatsi.sts ?~rst ertatixyrl~
a!` ~x~ux~ !exile oi'fi.oers<
Fir eenturies, incsludin tt~e ~orict f~tr II period, .Russir~t
stre#e~ urea cn+e of stlxaiti+axa ?* s ~3eferxsive rotrete~y xle~eerx$ix axi
rart iazi.tie,~. e~tl~ib of ~-lalded s~aoe, 1'ell.eeed~ by eventcxe.I deasisive
arxuu~ts~,~..eak. x~s.~.isnticr c.* t4xe hi~,h oo;~~d. end L':~s tr~utiaa~
tats wt` the :~aviet ~rrr~ ~'o7.icrein~ txa mar indi~tet~s tit ?the~ a~.ff+s~-
sine is r+saelvi inoreesir~; emphasis ire Sovi+a~ strste~ia tktcxu~73~~
~ new ~ruuraci ~.rsa~* or,au~:i~,~ot~ ~lc-n` a~`,~"+~ns:~v~ lines, s~.c~:~:~+srty~ ~~
inax~~si1~ p~rer~'u3 Aix? Fa~rees s.?id a iie'~;,~ etz?et~}+~~ ~t ie~s~
in s-ofa~,iz+dd ~ixxes, ~ril~. ot~n~`a~ ~~ t~~ ~.a~titit~rx o~ he~ia~,hsrfa
la'.r,~ pxcr:+~a~e ixtr~ ~hr~i~ the a~c~~sriet '3n,3.aa~ ~o-vad. as ?~ result
r~' ?==~rlei Fir ZIP
A erxlier~~~ ~reekness izt wht~ ;.x~~ecl ~'~~ts~s or};sn..is~i;i~n, ~s rt?r~+
r~~~~t~tut~ad* is the leak r.!' ~,rxltxnae bo~~+~ the t sretr r:arvi?~es.
~ ffi~i~a of ~:::.e o~er1 ..~: i:??+rrur sire*?w~;ic uiw.:~~ic.,~, : A,~y -:;x:i'a`i d,
see ~~tixad t?,~ s:a;~s ~~~ie~ ssil.i~rar;~- ~c's.iG,i f:u ~ rx`~.?. z:.er ex~~x~?~
'LFt~'L"Y is ~L'Lil~~$-.~~"r~~? c"1 ~d'~'"~"~'a~~i. ~ik~i3 i, ~'SI''~,a~ v :~,~.~ t~~';t' i~l~',.~`~s ~ t ~.'~'.r
g~rie~riex~ ~,1~ars ~,s~er I3~:{.:Ie h~ek~xro+~r~ i~t si~g`t''~:~r;it3 ~.r w,~r ~~ci 5.::
lar~,e-sasle aa~txl o~ersxtiaaas. Iii sttc;:kti~pxx ~.o ti~irs .: u?xtt?~.;~ea~ts.3
~or~rtess, tic, bthore coo tc~ ~3c~ t '~hsa :.Haz~e2e a~` ~'~e :'s:;'~i~st sa1~3t3.~`s
is not entirely ss.tista~:tory i.rr~, sad fs a lame Pa~st~r c:i' ~SCStesatirx~
~ree:?~-a.?~ss. 'f?`z~ other amass, cif o~:.a~?se, is t.:a~ le.a~: M~_ ~::ise sL~~+a
~n~^~.
~.
~~:e `~a4ie~ Grca~nc3 ~'nrcas wr,zer~ed fx`Cr~i ,.,ar9c1 'd>~!t` TI e?~ ~ ragas
ix:f'a~--try - rArtillery arch, ritl~ ~+raportie-nat~el;~ srnali f,ila ele~,ents.
Approved For Release :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500200004-7
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Approved For Release : CIADP78-01617A000500200004-7
in the Soviet Union. Its importance stenos from the f&aat that in
time of war its units would provide the air-lift required for
airborne attack and the normal air transport of man and material
incident to military operations. An extensive modernization program
is under way within the Civil Air fleet.
4. NAVY
The two principal weaknesses of the Soviet Navy are traditional
subordination to the around to roes and inherent look of technical
skill. Durin 'Norld War II, the Soviet Navy experienced little com-
bat except in the Artie Ocean, the Barents Sea and the Tate Sala.
'T`herefore, shortaG. of oe bat-oxperteneed personnel is acute.
While the morale of the Soviet Navy is good and it has f ,dt-
sorters than either the Ground or Air Forces, the officer-enlisted
m^n relationship still has not been fully ironed out. The division
of naval personnel into officers and ratings only to* place in l%3.
In both categories promotion continues to be based more on political
than on profeseionsl reliability. The officer corps lam homogeneity
and does not possess the technical der which exists in other major
navies.
The interiority complex which the Soviet Navy suffers is evident
even in the flag rank. The admirals in the Soviet Navy are not ac-
aorded the saw privileges or deference an t tivir opposite numbers in
the Ground or Air Forces,
Tactically ships and small units are well handled at sea but
op rations corn trainin are ;onora lly United nd do not include
large fleet or force maneuvers* The submarine service is consider od
the "elite" bran( Ox of the Soviet Navy and comprises the highest type
avLilabls persona 1, but, lid surfaoc and land ueaits, cutters de-
ficiency of personnl in propor eaployacnt of der' weapons and
eq"d : nnt.
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-01617A000500200004-7