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August 8, 1949
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Approved For Release 2000/05/2416101617A000V200001-9 'tore Project/MI.2?9 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE CF RUMS AND ESTIMATES Lesgsteavam la_m2E?Mjal To: B From: Staff Intelligence Group, Projects Planning Subject: Yulnerability of Communist Movement in Asia. atagertugiwg,21 =law MSC Staff Date:8 August I 9 &gun: List and discuss vulnerable points of the Communist movement in Asia. Agagmatgeg: sectp4: Maybe handled along lines of CRS 72-49 but without detailed analysis. Fairly brief paper desired. .11Aftialrei49nAl.kjISLUglialalaw Estrap lu, but may later take form of an CRE. ;Meg: To 0/SI by 20 August. DrApALEgargagaultigas Draft and coordinated i hat1gatazega3111: $9.2412.20W-210.22thalgag: Approved For Release 2000/ DP78-01617A000600200001-9 (Use verso of this sheet for other matter) Approved For RelNat 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A0004119200001-9 ""artaltitiff , CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 4.137 62 20 September 1949 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 209 SUBJECT: Vulnerabilities of Communist Movements in the Far East 1 Executive Registry O ? 4:1" Communist movements throughout Asia are variously vulnerable to military, economic, and political attack. Certain of these vulnerabilities are common, in some degree, to all the nations of Asia, while others are present only in one or two countries. Effective opposition to Communism in Asia might be based on a. single strategic pian, but ff it were to be success- fully carried out, it would have to be oxite differently applied In each given situation. For the purposes of this discussion, it is believed ad- vantageous to divide the Far East into three geographical areas: (a) that in which the Communist movement Is or soon will be in effective control of the, country (Soviet Far East, China, and northern Korea.); (h) that in which the US exercises effective control (Japan and the Ryukyus); and (e) that in which the Communist movement threatens the security of the local government (southern Korea, the countries of Southeast Asia, and the Indian Subcontinent). --NtArE: This memorandum has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force.o/ Document No. NO CHANGE in Class. 0 RETURN TO ARCHIVES & RECORDS CENT[ IMMEMATELY AFTER USE .0:(11)71(olOBOX pproved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA: itre,rifiT ? E] DECLASSIFIED Class. CHANGED TO: TS DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77 Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763 Date: /Min ; By: -Til617A000600200001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600 00001-9 Lt 11411e ???1911911461116mm 1. Qpmmunist Control. In the first area, the Communist regimes cannot be deposed by anything short of a major Western military effort. The Soviet Far East is, of course, the most firmly under Com- munist control, and the least susceptible to Western influence. In China, however, the Communist, movement exhibits a variety of internal weaknesses which, if they can be effectively exploited, might eventually lead to the downfall of the regime, or to a modification in its hostility to the West. If the Chinese economy should continue to deteriorate, and should the Communists lose popular support, anti-Communist forces may develop in suffi- cient strength to employ Western support effectively. Other vulnerabilities related to the Communist military effort include the risk of inflation if the army is maintained atits present strength, and the risk of rebellion if it is rapidly demobilized. The Chinese Communists are harassed by manifold economic problems, including food shortages, unavailability of industrial materials, the presently effective Nationalist blockade, the trade controls which can subsequently be imposed by the West, the lack of shipping, the vulnerability of communications to Nationalist air attacks, various inflationary pressures, and a shortage of technicians. Politically, the Communists must overcome the hostility of the Chinese tradition, their loss of popular support, their default on promises, the weakening of Party discipline, the threat of Party schisms, and territorial and economic encroachment by the USSR. Nevertheless, it is estimated that the Communist regime in China is not immediately vulnerable in the sense of being deposed or altered, and that, for the next few years, the CC P's Stalinist leadership will con- tinue to control the Party, while Moscow will continue to control the Party leadership. The same eatimate is believed to be valid, in most respects, for northern Korea: the Communist regime is vul- nerable to the force of nationalism, to mass opposition to - 2 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Relike 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A00b4140200001-9 coercion, to resentment over it inability to fulfill its promises, and to the mere existence of the Republic in southern Korea as a symbol of nationalist aspirations. There is no prospect, however, that. the northern regime, can be deposed by the forces of .the Repubne, whle the Republic itself l highly vulnerable to hostile action frt :m the north,. 2. Up.copp:01. The special siteation of japan and the.Ryukyu.s is, of course, a product of the Occupation, which is carried out almost entirely by "US military authorities. The Occupation has encouraged and supported the more Moderate elements in Japan and has brought about the establishment of a conservative Japanese Government determined to employ every permissible means to oppose the Communist movement in japan. In addition, there exists in japan a strong anti-Russian tradition, stemming from diplomatic and military clashes which began when Tsarist Russia pashea its eastern frontier to the Pacific. More recently, Soviet tactics in regard to the repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war have aroused widespread resentment in japan. 3. C:01311Talat Tiwpat. In most of the countries cited as belonging to the third area--southern Korea, the countries of Southeast Asia, and the Indian Subcontinent?the Communist movement is vul- nerable to some degree militarny, i.e., through military action by government forces. Only in Indochina and Burma, of the countries in the third area, does the Communist movement ap- pear to be militarily too strong for decisive counteraction by forces at present committed. In certain of the countries, however:, the native or colonial government would require US - or UK assistance in order successfully to prosecute its mili- tau operations against Communist forces. In any event, the military Is only one part of the problem. 3 nrcret'ir Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Reictose 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-01617A0a1K00200001-9 wigtoeftaithiim. Communist movements throughout this third area are vulnerable principally to the force of nationalism. The Communist movements in most of these countries, recognizing that nationalism is the major issue and force throughout the area, have attempted to identify themselves with the national movement, posing ae the champion cf "independence." In several cases, however, the Communists are recognized by nationalist leaiers as the instruments of another kind of foreign aggression. Throughout the area this intense nationalist feeling Is reinforced by steong antipathy to the Chinese, historically and in the present day; Communist movements are vulnerable in these countries, aneeng the non-Chinese population, to the degree that those movemente are associated with the prospect of in- creased Chinere lenience or control. Additional political vulnerabilities of the Communist movement are derived, in certain areas, from the incompati- bility of Communism and the prevailing religion (Catholicism In the Philippines and Indochina; Islam in Malaya, Indonesia, and Pakistan; and Hinduism in India), and from the relative satisfaction with life of the native peoples (e.g., in the Philip- pines, Thailand, and Malaya). Economically, Communist move- ments throughout the area are highly vulnerable in the sense that no economic program has been applied or proposed by the Communists which has any reasonable prospect of bringing greater material benefits to the bulk of the population than programs sponsored by the local governments. Here again,:.. the the Communist movements are vulnerable through the wide- spread antipathy to the Chinese, since the non-Chinese people associate the Chinese invariably with economic exploitation. 4. Conclusion. The vulnerability of Communist movements through- out the Far East will be increased as colonial areas realize their ambition for indeoendence, as independent nations realize further stability and development, and as bc,th colonial and isimererr" Approved For Release 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Relelote 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO*00200001-9 independent nations are induced and assisted to eliminate the economic and social conditions which are most susceptible to exploitation by the Communists, and to employ their developed strength against the spread of Communism, in concert with the West. A political and economic program which recognizes the desires of national movements, and which is designed to assist the birth and development of a democratic revolution, can effec- tively challenge a Communist program which is committed to the ultimate supprossion or perversion of national movements, and which employs a revolution only in order to establish a dic- tatorship. The general lack of understanding, by the great mass of Asians, of the ireplications and dangers inherent in Commu- nism, is a distinct advantage to the Communists, and will remain so, in the absence of a Western informational program emphasiz- ing the subordination of personal and national interests to Com- munist objectives. The vulnerability of Communist movements will be increased to the degree that peoples of the Far East become con- vinced of the ultimate success of their endeavors to gain and maintain national independence. At the same time it appears essential to develop in the non-Communist peoples of the Far East the will and ability to join effectively with the peoples of other nations in a coordinated opposition to the spread and con- solidation of Communist control. It should be noted that an effort by the West to exploit these vulnerabilities would provoke Communist counter- action, which would decrease Communist vulnerabilities. Western success would depend on early seinure of the initiative, accurate reappraisals of Communist vulnerabilities, and a persistent application of a coordinated and diversified program. More detailed discussion of the vuhierabilities of Corn- In specific Far Eastern countries is given in the attached appendices. soireeeer. Approved For Release 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 144001 %No, AP?ENDDC A CMNA A Political Consultative Conference will soon meet in Peiping to form a Communist-controlled "coalition" govern- ment. of China. That government will proba.bly be proclaimed before the end of 1949, and will Invite recognition as the Nation- al Government of China. It will assert its authority over all of China% ? and will feetually !minder at the time of its proclama- tion, more than two-thirds of the territory and people of China Proper. 1. 4. intUlLemye_elnerebilities. Chinese. Communist forces currently are eapable of launch- ing simultaneous operatiens againet the?remaining non-Commu- niet military force s idely diseersed in the south, southwest, northweet, and southeast cce.stal areas (including Tateren) of China -and..eliminating effective military resistance by such :ores. by the end of '190. The provision of extensive US poli- tical, economic and logistic support, as well as U$ advisers, to any or all of these non-Communist resis.nce forces, would not prevent their eventual elimination. Even with extensive US. support, short of major armed intervention involving the enteioyment of US combat forces, none of the non-Cernmunist regirees Fe mainland China can rairVilte beyond 1952. Taiwan is the only non-Communist area of China where positie US action could effectually prevent Communist control, but, without US military occupation and control, Taiwan will also fail to the Communists. The Chinese CommuniBts, however, are increasingly troubled by armed dissidents and guerrillas as they extend their control over China. The Communists have already lost much of their emill'i?ftioNeeem Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Relea*/ 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000S08200001-9 4?4011.. popalar support, a.rZ1 will net increasIng resistance ? if the ?- ? ? t3cono147 continues' to deteriorate. ? Thera is some, possibility that reLlsta,nce forces -will strengthen themselves. to the point they coold effectiVely employ Western as.sistAnce. In- t3Olar a5. the eq.:)minvaists are coMpelleci to divert their .energies and -resource's to the suppreSsion of anti-CommuniSt . "bandit:4," the CCP 's rrap.Vold and economic prob. .: Reins will be Increased. ? The :CCP plans to maintain a military establishment of ;- at least .2,000?000 man. The maintenance of 'such an army, will drain a stibEtttial-portion of the zational in- ..civo. into unproducave 'Zie`$.ds, with a. cmksequant inflationary 7.1,ri;soure 6n the ecoyaomy. T;t4;;' CCP play ezparience inter,Aal order,. ..Wiether. 3 chooses to risk a OL O1E inflatIon in order to support the army, or to mlitirnize the risks of- inglatice by reducing the army. - With tlie railittrvals1;..)ects aZ e revolution.dimbishing . in impoilance, the .civilian leadership of the CCP Will be in- dined to and strength- of the Military leaders, whethef.. tb,f41, milltarV le.:aderzi-resipt this .develop-;- Ment, or?cho.ese instead to Compete with oz.c.h othe:r. for poll- icr new order, 'Me pres-ent 0:ZfectivoneSs of .the Com.munist mUity 1krship May D:e ;reduced, L. omIcVuhabi1itt. Feod. ; Cfna's food position is rorerrailslly, and the 19,1.0 huvests were, the worsib -army yank's. Import pros- pects are, taoor' tir e in "11.7,ttle. lik;aLiht.?oti Of foreign relief. ro:i!eign C7C11:arlge RISI;Ci170E aVe Ic ane. the NationaWnt bloctmde will proaalily contirAue. Itlititary and 111,rtvii con;wmptiou will be hig-,:h ,Irid will require heavy do- mestiOt evisitiolts. There will ''')e increased *4 nditry and lin3ifienco among the peasantry -In YespirAro to the preslures :amine and military. C2,14.; eTtiOi?- , Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For ReIvoe 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-01617A0Otet0200001-9 otroleurci product; ?'? nd awcoton are the iNVO items icozt n..;,-.1('...ed by Ch4..2a's present ?:nduAries and transportation. Mo 1,1xied chg)micals, dye,.;1 machine tools, re ir parts, copper wire, amer m Lel iaL Ao, the CCP consolidates its contra at aah ve iuk1ticii sta.bility, capital require - mt r imports ili Le. enoritgious, with railroad, power, and mtg enterprkses Witing priority; these primv..ry indus- trial iitaities, as it ila9pen3, are also badly needed by 'ie USSR. 3. Need to Eeort. exL-..mive 3oviet aid to theP is unlikely, he import neadsoi he Chinese Communis, I can be met only insofar o..s they fi. t possible to export; unlike the National- China uavJer the CCP will not be able to import far more thtin its c-.!.,..-ports by :eelying? on UE credits and ECA. aid to cover the anatvorable tr ii 4.,..lance. This vulnerability is accentiotted ttie fact Chtn.'s prilacipal et cutlets have been the Tit3 an other pczers. it action by the non- Coliumuniit powergito ralse liark;RrE4 agalost Chinese exportu /iicdd;,?,ezloaEty *cats Chine.s al,..lhity to ?lay for its essential 131port needs. 1 i',Is possiI3ke to E,aiu the cooperation of ? Plc. UK 171.nd ot.aer grovezeillase?:4t6iiisuch a measure, the US uri7ht be able to re:.:42...ict Chiaz's foreign commerce by sup - dag the Nationa1t2f 13. ItcansportaLoy.i. foreJ.E,n cozliTierc 111013'0S very largely -'oreigit ships, 1i.).1.3 vnera-c,1L,Ity .is eccatuated by the fact most the Z'htn;:-:-:".%) 141.1tioy.e_L'ist me-in-going vvssels have ctire t 'slappo:,,=td. t1 7,.e Nationalist blockade lnt asrAst in deivi.veti; i)rcigrt .,:hippinc,, to the if the Y?rger shipping i iinK ni k. be otif.erwise dir2:3nseed from. z.r.1311ng .f Chines. ports. , ???Illerr Approved For Release 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-016:17A000600200001-9 Approved For RitzeZ)00/05/44442P78-01617Attna0001-9 The CCP is vulnerable to attacks on domestic trans- portation principally because so few routes are available. This weakness can be and is being exploited by Nationalist air attacks on rail lines and shipping. In addition, the ma- terial needs of the rail transport system limit substantially its carrying capacity; there is, at present, an urgent need for rails, ties, repair parts, signalling equipment, and lubri- cants for existing equipment. Such Communist requirements can be denied through extending to China the system of export licenses now applied to the Soviet bloc. e. nlationary Pressure: ? If the CCP shows itself helpless to arrest price Inflation, it will become as vulnerable as were the National- ists in the field of currency management. At present, the CC P's difficulties in controlling inflation derive largely from their military expenses. Recognizing the dangers of over-issue of currency, the CCP has increased taxation?leading to scattered peasant rebellions?and has reduced expenditures through widespread discharge ot government employees, as well as preparing for wage reductions. However, the over- taxed peasantry cannot be counted upon for much additional revenue, and the benefits of layoffs and wage reductions do not cut deeply into a budget swollen by military expenditures. f. Shortage of Technicians. To prosecute successful7y the CC P's plans for ex- nding agricultural and industrial output, the unskilled laboring population of China must have the direction of skilled technicians, administrators, and engineers. Shortage of skilled personnel has already handicapped the CCP in gov- erning newly occupied cities, area important positions are still filled by ex-Nationalist offinials. The CCP is endeavor- ing to train its own skilled personnel, but the Party's (and China's) facilities for such education are sharply limited. For many years, the CCP will depend upon the services of Chinese trained in foreign schools, as well as the services of foreigners themselves. - 9 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 ? CIA-RDP78-01617AtOZZ90001-9 wig iv 41'1.4 440Mitiril. 3. Political Vulnerebilities. The CCP intends to eliminate all significant organized political opposition, unify the nation under the dictatorship of the CCP, gain the support of all productive elements of Chinese society, and restrict (prior to eliminat ) Western influences in China. As it acquires firm control of the nation, the CCP will apply a progressively rigorous Communist pro- gram, aiming at the total domination of the individual, and of all elements of Chinese society, by the Slate, as represented by the leadership of the CCP. a. Communism andTencjikoka The CCP has slated frankly that it "aims to destroy" the present political, economic, and cultural forms of the Chinese society. Although Communism is not altogether alien to China's bureaucratic authoritarian tradition, Communism will encounter great difficulty in attempting to transfer the loyalty of the ordinary Chinese from the family to the State. China's bestilations and belaavica patterns are among the oldest and most persistent in the modern world. If the CCP proceeds rapidly in its attack on the Chinese culture, it is certain to encounter c isiderable active resistance. If the CCP moves slowly, it will risk bogging down. b. 1).2port, CCP Chairman Mao asserts that the "revolution in China is a revolution by tho masses of people of the entire nation," and that, "except for imperialists, feudalists, bureau- cratic bourgeoisie, Kuomintang reactionaries and their henchmen, all persons are our (the CCP's) friends." The first claim has much truth; the second does not. The Chinese people have been less supporters of the CCP than antagonistic to the previous regime. The CCP must enlist the support of peasantry, urban labor, and the middle class, and must provide the social and economic incentives which will ensure their cooperation. If - 10 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 1.0.-.10evre the CCP adopts a flexible and moderate program, it can con- solidate its political power more rapidly, but at a cost of postponing indefinitely its ideological and economic objectives. If the CCP presses rapidly toward these objectives, it risks destroying the bases of its political power. c. Deault on Promises. The Chinese Communists are coming to power in the role of social revolutionaries rather than merely as military conquerors. Their promises of .a better life have played a major part in their military successes, by sustaining troop morale, weakening the resistance of Nationalist forces, enlist- ing popular support, and diminishing popular opposition. However, the CCP cannot hope to undertake a program of significant economic reconstruction, or of subsequent in- dustrial expansion, without limiting or decreasing the con- sumption of certain social groups. The promises of lower taxes and rents in the countryside, and of higher wages in the cities, almost certainly will not be implemented. The probability is high that popular discontent Will increase, and the CC P's prestige diminish. d. Party ,Unity. During the process of Stalinization of the Party?con- solidation of power, crystallization of dogma, despotism of leadership, incessant intrigue and periodic purges?certain elements of the CCP will necessarily be alienated and cut off. Party unity is probably not threatened seriously, by any domestic issue, for Party .doctrine sanctions great flexibility in domestic policy. This flexibility does not extend to foreign affairs, how- ever, and Party unity may encounter its most severe test through the CC P's subservience to the USSR. Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Rettez,490/05/21aa78-01617AOQZVZ001-9 e. Sino-Soviet Relations. The record of agreement between the CCP and the USSR is very Impressive, and the public pronouncements of the two parties reveal no differences of opinion. Disagree- ments may exist, however or may come to exist, through the settings in which the parties operate, their positions in the world Communist movement, the border regions which sep- arate them, and their economic relations. (1) Domestic Issues. Chinese Communist tactics have repeatedly been approved by Soviet spokesmen. It is possible, however, that the USSR will attempt to force the CCP toward orthodoxy more rapidly than the CCP desires, with speedy suppression of the bourgeoisie, nationalization Of enterprise, collectiviza- tion of the peasantry, and seclusion from the West. A Corn- =mist program of such severity would complicate the CC P's problems both in consolidating control and developing produc- tion. (2) Leadership East. In its public pronouncements, the CCP has em- phasized the "leadership of the USSR" in the revolution in Asia, rather than stressing its own capacities for leader- ship. However, such capacityexists. The CCP will control the large and influential Chinese communities throughout the Far East. The CCP is likely to provide direct assistance to Asian Communist movements. Should Sino-Soviet relations be exacerbated on other grounds; the CCP might choose to compete with the USSR for leadership of the Communist movement in Asia. (3)ezTeeiji_lseeeek. The 2500-mile frontier betWe.en China and the USSR provides potential groamds for conflict. The CCP has stated that its armies will "liberate" Sinkiang, but the USSR; - 12 - O'CiritteAvir Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9. Approved For Release 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-01617A0k245V001-9 PT presently negotiating with the Nationalists for concessions in Sinkiang, may not desire the exclusion of the Nationalists at this time, and may prefer that the Ili government extend its control over all of Sinkiang. In Tinier Mongolia, a satis- factory working relation must be achieved between the CCP- Influence Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government and the northern Manchurian group oriented toward Outer Mongolia; here again, a Soviet attempt to impose a unilateral decision may meet with CCP displeasure if not resistance. Manchuria is much the most important border region to both parties, military, economically and politically. Unilateral Soviet con- trol, outside the Port Arthur-Dairen area, would mean the frustration of the Chinese desire for sovereignty over Man- churia and the CC P's plans for financing China's economic recovery. Unilateral CCP control is most improbable. The most likely arrangement is that of joint Sino-Soviet control, but there may be frequent dissension over the exercise of authority and the allocation of Manchurian produce. (4) Economic Relations. Serious trouble may develop from the control exercised by the USSR over the direction of China's foreign trade. If the experience of Eastern European countries is a valid guide, China will be placed at an extreme disadvantage In trade relations with the USSR. To the extent that the USSR cannot or will not supply China's requirements for materials and equipment, China may feel impelled to turn to non-Soviet sources; and, if China does not have control aver the disposi- tion of exports, the CCP may seek credits from the West as well. Moreover, the CCP has stated that only the "anti- imperialist front, headed by the USSR," can be relied upon for "genuine friendly aid." There is a possibilityof severe disillusion over the results of Soviet "cooperation" and "assistance." - 13 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A?OZW001-9 annallejlairm f. The CCP desires and needs international recognition of the Communist-controlled "coalition" regime as the National Government of China, for reasons of prestige, in order to ob- tain goods not available from the Soviet bloc, and to inherit the Nationalists' position in international bodies and in the diplomatic field. If a common front can be maintained among the Western powers on the question of recognition, those powers will perhaps be able to influence to their advantage the foreign polities of the CCP. - 14 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617AQQ6,90290001-9 imeememm-m APPENDIX B NOREA The greatest weakness of the Soviet-dominated Com- munist movement in Korea is its inherent incompatibility with the strong, ingrained native feeling of Korean nationalism. Apart from general resentment of foreign interference and domination implicit in Communism, coercive Communist eco- nomic and political policies in northern Korea have generated mass antipathy to Communism. The possibility of exploiting Communist weaknesses in northern Korea is limited, however, by the strength of available Communist armed forces. Even should the Pikeples Army prove disloyal to the Communist regime during anti-Communist revolts or attacks, sufficient military forces from Communist China or the Soviet Union would probably be available to restore or maintain Commu- nist control. As a minimum objective, however, exploitation of Communist vulnerabilities in northern Korea might disrupt Communist economic, political, and military progress and thereby deter decisive action against the anti-Communist Republic of Korea in the southern zone. 1. Political Vulnerabilities. Independence, unification, land, and food are the principal desires of the Korean peoples. The Communist movement has generated mass opposition because most Koreans now believe the Communists cannot satisfy these desires. Although Koreans attribute some of the responsibility for the partition of Korea to the US, they place most of the onus for the con- tinued separation on policies of the Soviet Union, and generally realize that a Comreunist-sponsored "unification" would result in a complete extinction of Korean nationalist aspirations. ? Policies of the Communist government designed to develop socialism, and the normal police state methods used to enforce these policies, have further alienated farmers, former landowners, - 15 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-0161.7A000600200001-9 Approved For Relew 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-01617A00W0200001-9 maafiiiViPPD youth and labor elements, Christians and intellectuals in northern Korea. Communist agricultural policy and regimenta- tion of labor are major sources of dissatisfaction. Soviet exploitation of Korean raw materials, the export of rice to the USSR, the shortage of consumer goods, fawning adulation of Soviet culture, perversion of academic work to fit Commu- nist concepts, are other characteristics of conditions in northern Korea that offer specific fields for anti-Communist propaganda in Korea. The Republic of Korea offers the only alternative to Com- munism. Although it has not yet developed a particularly strong position among the people, its appeal to Korean national- ism has been adequate to make it generally acceptable in south- ern Korea and probably to a large extent in northern Korea, as a preferable alternative to Communism. The capability of the Republic to exploit the weaknesses of Communism depends omits ability to surpass visibly the Com- munist regime in satisfying the basic economic and political requirements of the people, and on its ability to develop suffi- cient military strength to deter a Communist invasion. 2. Communist control of northern Korea depends entirely on the control exercised over the population by the internal security forces and the Peoples Army, under the direction of Soviet advisors. Although large numbers of the Peoples Army might prove disloyal or ineffective in action against armed forces of the Republic, sufficient loyal Communist troops would probably be made available from Communist China or the Soviet Union to insure continued Communist domination of northern Korea. So long as the Soviet Union and Communist China continue to have the capability and desire of supporting - 16 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Rele,4650 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A00(00200001-9 4.4161101111= the armed forces in northern Korea, the Communist regime will remain invulnerable to Republican military action and will be able to maintain its control in the area by police - methods. Communist guerrilla activity in southern Korea is dependent on supplies and personnel infiltrated from the north. The guerrillas receive little willing support from the local population and create resentment by their terror- istic methods. The Republic's' security forces, almost com- pletely dependent on US support for equipment, are capable of preventing large-scale and effective guerrilla activity. 3. ggagal VulnerabWat. All political movements in Korea have suffered from factionalism and the desire of every member to be a leader. The strict discipline of the Communist movement has minimized the usual Korean tendency to factionalism, but personal rivalries and nationalist deviations continue to weaken the Party. In northern Korea, persistent reports hint at an internal contest for power among Kim 11 Sung, Pak Ilun Yong, and Kim Mu song. The presence of Soviet advisors in all government departments and the large number of Soviet Koreans in positions of power within the government probably is resented by native Korean Communists who have not received equal power and privilege. Discipline and morale probably are fairly high within the Party in northern Korea because of the secure Communist position in northeast Asia. Discipline and morale are probably much lower in the southern Korean Communist underground. The Underground has suffered severe reprisals from Republic police action and many of its members may resent the failure of the northern regime to fulfill promises of large.scale assist- ance or invasion to overthrow the Republic. Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Rely, 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-01617A00W200001-9 Of the minority of Koreans who actively support Commu- nism in both north and south Korea, it is believed that relatively few are familiar with and believers in Marxist doctrine. Com- munism has received considerable support from Korean youth because it offers a revolutionary solution to the problems of a predominantly feudal society. The support of some farmers and laborers in northern Korea is maintained by granting favored treatment. Police brutality and government ineffi- ciency have contributed to Communist support in local areas In the south. A fairly large percentage of Communist support, especially among intellectuals, businessmen, and professionals, comes from opportunists who believe Communist domination of all Korea to be inevitable. 4. Special Considerations. In the final analysis, the strength of the Korean Communist movement depends on the support of the Soviet Union and Com- munist China. Weaknesses in the movement can be expected to Increase only to the degree that external support is diminished and to the extent that the Republic of Korea is able to develop as an acceptable alternative to Communism. The basic weak- nesses of Communism in Korea may remain constant over a period of years but the possibility of effective exploitation of the weaknesses depends on the survival of the Republic as a symbol of Korean nationalist aspirations. Possible measures of exploitation of Communist weaknesses Include psychological warfare, propaganda, increasing the appeal of the epublic of Korea as an alternative to Communism, and . underground activity in northern Korea. All of these measures are subject to Communist counter-measures, the most effective of which would be an all-out effort to overthrow the Republic of Korea. ? - 18 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Releara,2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000W00001-9 APPENDIX C JAPAN ? The future of the japan Communist Party (pp) is con- fronted by several barriers. Although favored by an inflated economy, the Party is limited by the presence of the Occupa- tion, is increasingly obstructed by a conservative Government, fights an anti-Soviet tradition, and is very much embarrassed by Soviet tactics in repatriating Japanese PWa. The ICP's hold on Japan's largest labor federation has been weakened recently by withdrawal of the anti-Communist Democratization League faction which formed one-quarter to a third of the original federation's strength. Much of the surprisingly large vote received at the last general elections was a protest vote at the Occupation or at the inadequacies of the middle-of-the- road Government rather than a genuine Communist ballot. 1. Political Vulnerabilities. The japan Communist Party is opposed by conservative Premier YOSHIDA's government, which is adopting an in- creasingly anti-Communist stand. The government's Diet majority is sufficient to permit the "steam-roller" passage of Cabinet measures which limits the opposition within the Diet, Communists included, to vocal recriminations. The government has cut Communist paper allocation very drastically, forcing the Party either to reduce its propaganda output or to resort to the more expensive blackmarket. YOSHIDA's party, the Democratic Liberals, is in the process of organizing an anti- Communist Youth Group organization. The YOSHIDA government has been more than willing to meet Communist-instigated force with police action. The government is proceeding on its anti- Communist campaign cautiously, for fear the Occupation will censure "undemocratic" action. Should the government feel free - 1 9 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For ReIv, 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-01617A00V200001-9 melieRANT.E. in the future to outlaw Communism (and the recent dissolu- tion of the leftist Korean organizations may point in this direction), popular respect for force and authority is such that the Party, going undergound, would find itself severely limited in its activities. The Socialists, the only left-of-center party giving promise of being able to oppose the JCP, have so far cate- gorically rejected all Communist invitations to a united front. The Socialists have, in fact, adopted a program call- ing for "two front" action, both anti-YOSHIDA and anti- Communist. The Socialist attitude is making itself felt in the field of organized labor at Communist expense. The association, in the mind of the general public, between the JCP and the USSR, is a point of vulnerability. The historical Japanese antipathy for the Russians dates back to the initial Japanese fears of aggression aroused by the Russian Empire's arrival on the western shores of the Pacific. The Party'rE; re- peated avowal of its independence from Kremlin direction is indicative of the necessity for the Party to assume the defensive on this particular point. While the JCP has thoroughly exploited for propaganda purposes Japan's inflation, high taxes, food ration- ing, the presence of the Occupation and a score of other issues, large segments of the same groups to whom the Party's sales talk appeals have been offended by the JC P's instigation of labor unrest and reputation for recourse to violence. The Party over the past two years has minimized its opposition to the Emperor. With the large body of Japanese, however, the ic P would be very vulnerable to periodic propaganda emphasizing the Party's stand on the Emperor issue. Perhaps the most serious "vulnerability" is the Soviet handling of repatriation. Again the popular concept that the JCP is sub- servient to a USSR which has employed thousands of Japanese PWs on forced labor projects and has delayed inexcusably their repatria- tion, has proved extremely embarrassing to the Party. Should the - 20' - N4INEMBE/b Approved For Release 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For ReIv, 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-01617A0005)200001-9 ."91911,111WII. Japanese public be convinced that the USSR is retaining thousands of Japanese after the announced completion of repatriation in the course of a few months, the JCP will find the issue a serious barrier to its advance. Since japan has no land tenant problem, the JCP has received considerable opposition from the peasants, a traditionally conservative group. Civil functionaries and a bcorgeosie are largely opposed to the Communists ex- cept those businessmen who see the JCP as a means of reviving trade with China. 2. Military Vulnerabilities, Japan's 194'7 Constitution, with its Renunciation of War clause leaves the country with no military strength other than that of the Occupation. The knowledge that the Occupa- tion Forces are available to make up for Japanese police Inadequacies, however, acts as a deterrent to outright resort to force. Thillt presence of the Occupation has a strong psychological reaction on anti-Communist sentiment, en- couraging those who fear either external or internal Com- munist aggression. 3. ceneral.Vulnerabilities. The JCP has several weaknesses which may prove susceptible to exploitation. Party finances come In part from extra-legal sources, such as the profits from smuggl- ing or blackma,rket activities. Widescale publicity of all cases on which adequate evidence is available could help put the Party in a bad light, if one may take the ASH1DA cabinet scandals as an example. There probably would be an adverse public reaction to all cases of violence either directly attti- butable to the Communists or to their instigation. - 21 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 The unexpectedly large vote for Communist candidates In the January 1949 general elections, in which they received nearly 10 percent of the ballots, is not necessarly any criterion for judging the Communist Party's hard core. Many individuals voted for the Party as a protest against the ineffectiveness of the middle-of-the-road coalition gov- ernment, or against the Occupation. In fact, in the event that Japanese economic conditions were to improve measur- ably in the near future, the Party's support could easily be halved. 4. Special Considerations. The Communists are capable of taking either direct counter-measures against attack on their vulnerabilities, or of mounting such distractive maneuvers as attacks on Japanese government scandal and inefficiencies. The Occupa- tion can easily be attacked, as no people long enjoys a for- eign garrison. Relative to the repatriation problem, it seems unlikely that the USSR can succeed in either convincing the Japanese that thousands of PWs are not being held or else that the US and the Japanese government are solely responsible for the delay in repatriation. - 22 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A00w200001-9 SRO%Nam, APPENDIX D INDOCHINA ? The vulnerability of the Communist movement in Vietnam (there are no significant Communist movements in Laos and Cambodia) is somewhat diminished by the fact that there is officially no Communist Party. The Indochinese Communist Party, which had displayed a high degree of or- ganizing ability before World War II and which had led the anti-Japanese resistance movement during the war, voluntarily dissolved itself in November 1945, presumably in order to avoid conflict with the French Communist Party (which at that time was not stressing anti-imperialism) and in an attempt to allay the suspicions of non-Communist forces both Within and without Vietnam. The Vietnamese Communists have in this manner been able to disguise Stalinist objectives by subscribing exclusively to nationalist and mildly reformist objectives in the name of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and in alliance with non-Communist nationalists. So long as the war against the French forces continues, neither the Communist nor the non-Communist group within the resistance is In a position to carry on an extensive and persistent propaganda against the other without splitting the ranks of the resistance. Both groups are agreed that elimina- tion of all French control is the primary objective. However, yeah their long experience in the techniques of persuasion and coercion and with their control of many of the important governmental positions, the Communists are playing a winning game. Since the decline of Communist strength in France, earlier Soviet hopes that the French Empire might be delivered into the Communist camp intact have diminished. - 23 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Rely 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78701617A00(0200001-9 afeelegirm 1. Political Vulnerabilities. a. OppositionGroups Allied with the CommuniSts. The Communist movement is vulnerable in terms Of conservative and reformist nationalists who have avoided col- laborating with the French rather than in terms of the ex- ? isting anti-Communist (Bao Dal) regime, which has failed to win a popular following. However, since party propaganda is believed to be carried on only to a limited extent within the resistance areas of Vietnam at the present time, Communist vulnerability under this head is probably more potential than actual. (1) The Democratic Party. The two most important sub-groups within the conservative nationalist camp are the Tan Dan Chu Dang (Democratic Party) and the Roman Catholics., To some ex- ? tent these two sub-groups may overlap. There are evidences that since its foundation the Democratic Party has tended to become a real entity, in its own right. In general, its members are wealthy and well-educated persons who are pro-IIS and opposed to both French and Communist domination. Reports are that it has some degree of coherent organization and the 'nucleus of a private police force, and that it controls the Ministry of Justice of the Ho Chi Minh Government down to the local level. The Democratic Party is the natural rallying ? point of the French-educated Vietnamese intellectuals. (2) The Catholics. There are at least one million native Roman Catholics in Vietnam, both communicants and clergy, of whom a considerable number, probably a majority, have given their support to the Ho Chi Minh Government. The stronghold ci nationalist Catholicism in Vietnam is the vicariate d Phat Diem in South Tonkin under the guidance of Bishop Le Huu Tu, who, although anti-Communist,. has supported Ho Chi Minh and has maintained a firmly anti-colonial position., Communism is potentially vulnerable to the influence of the Church, which - 24 - gewelerrom Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 ' Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Sowd 1.404 aMeltIVIP commands extensive material, as well as popular support, but this vulnerability will remain virtually untested so long as the struggle for national independence continues. (3) Other Opposition Groups. Some of the cabinet members in the Ho Government who are non-Communists?ex-mandarins "independents," Socialists?may have popular followings. The Ministry of Education has escaped Communist control. The administhathe chief of the Ho Government in Cochinchina is a Socialist. The powerful Cao Dal religious sect, which now has factions fight- ing on both sides, would presumably be united in opposing undisguised Communism. The same is true of the Buddhists and Protestants, although the latter do not have coherent organizations. In addition, the Trotskyists are reported to be still active with a secret membership of perhaps 2000. b. Ability of the Communists to Recruit Supporters. Experience has shown that the vast majority of the Vietnamese people are willing to support a revolt against foreign rule, whether that revolt is led by the Conununists.or by any other group. Only when Communist propaganda and action have become 'obviously Communist and urges policies patently ccntrary to the national interests of Vietnam will it become vulnerable to counter-propaganda capable of eliciting a strong anti-Communist movement. This will occur only when freedom from French control has been achieved. 2. Militari..q.9nsideratipn. The Communist movement in Vietnam has thoroughly identified itself with a national liberation movement which will probably maintain its solidarity despite French efforts to bring about its disintegration. The forces of this liberation movement are - 25 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : C1A-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 'two,OIJtrnflT capable of continuing to resist the French indefinitely, and are steadily improving their military prowess and egaipinent. The Communist movement, as such, is therefore not vulnerable to military counter-measures undertaken by, or at the in- stance of, French forces which can be committed. 3. Qepsigl Vulnerabilities. a.Pa_AV. j_dt The whole question of the extent to which the Vietnamese Communists are united in pursuit of ultimately Stalinist objectives is a matter for conjecture. The dissolution of the Indochinese Communist Party in 1945 may have been designed largely to mislead the Kuomintang and the US, but it is partly attributable, as well, to the first head-on clash with the "Russia First" outlook of World Communism. This took the form of a memorandum delivered by the French Communists of Indochina to the Vietnamese Communists urging the latter to delay the national liberation movement, penaIng Soviet approval. At the time of the formation of the Republic of Vietnam in 1945, the Indochinese Communist Party probably did not contain more than 2,000 members. Some of this support may have been opportunistic, in the sense that the expression of antipathy to French rule was scarcely possible except through clandestine action. Ho Chi liffinh state& that he was a member of the Com- munist Party before World War II because in no other way could he fight for Vietnamese independence and at the same time pro- tect himself from the Ftench authorities. Nationalism has always been an incomparably more dynamic force lit Vietnam than has Communism. The stress imposed on the Communist movement ?under cceelttons rA politica), independence, whtch v.vo224! further tend tCi brikg to the surface the fundamental incompatibility of Commumb n, and nationalism, could preelece a further dis- integration cr.' the "hard core" of the Communist movement. _ - 26 - Approved For Release,2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Relee, 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-01617A000Qp200001-9 asiiimelopm The prospect of Chinese Communist domination of the Vietnamese can be expected to provide a vulnerability in attempts to 'communize Vietnam. The historical dislike for the Chinese may prove even stronger than ideological affinity with the Chinese Communist Party. There is already some evidence that the Indochinese Communists have failed to cooperate with CCP attempts to provide directives regarding party regulations and procedures. Because of the antipathy to the Chinese, it can be expected, at least for the present, that a formal acknow- ledgment of CCP support would split the resistance movement Instead of adding strength. In the long run, however, raced by a continuing war with the French for control of the country, the Ho Government might choose as its only alternative full coopera- tion with the Chinese Communists in its efforts to win complete control of Vietnam. Should French troops withdraw from Indochina, the chances of Sino-Vietnamese cooperation would become much less probable. b. Counter-measures b the US and Western Governments. There is almost no effective manner in which Western governments unilaterally through the French can oppose the trend favoring theConununists so long as the indigenous, pot- entially anti-Communist forces accept predominantly Communist leadership in order to eliminate French control. Within the setting of the jr esent military stalemate, Western policies which are not readily susceptible to Communist counter-measures are of a very limited sort. Voice of America broadcasts point- ing up the distinction made by US poliey.makers between Red Imperialism and Titoism, and pointed references to Soviet encroachment in Manchuria might be of value in weakening the solidarity of the Communist movement in Vietnam. Discreet encouragement of the formation of a Southeast Asian confederation would harmonize with the prevailing fears et Chinese imperialism, now linked with the Communist advance in China and infiltration of Chinese overseas communities. Encouragement of the Catholic-nationalist aspirations of the Le Huu Tu group would - 27 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Relee, 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-01617A00030200001-9 `'1191116bEirm reinforce the contention that the US is not opposed to genuine nationalist movements. A program designed to help Vietnamese students enroll in US universities would be avidly seized upon by young Vietnamese and would strengthen US prestige. - 28 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A001V200001-9 11.1 APPENDIX E THAILAND Thailand, politically and economically, is relatively less susceptible to the ideological appeals advanced by inter- national Communism than are other countries of Southeast Asia. The majority of the population is satisfied with its economic lot, which represents a relatively high Asiatic standard of living, and is proud of the country's history of political independence. The monarchical concept in Thailand has a strong hold on the loyalties and imagination of the people. Thailand's leadership has been trained in Western Europe and American democratic traditions, and the peasantry was less aroused politically by the events of World War II than that of adjacent countries. For these basic reasons Communism fails to find any sizable following in its appeal for liberation of the masses from economic or political bondage. The only signi- ficant number of Communists are Chinese, who are unpopular and are discriminated against in Thailand. That identification of the Chinese with Communism at present prohibits open collaboration between the presumably distinct Thai and Chinese Communist organizations. At present, Communists are relatively vulnerable to That police controls, do not conduct a militant program, and attempt to reach their objectives through propaganda media rather than relying upon military force. Chinese leadership of Asian Communism and Chinese Communist successes in China enhance the position of Communists within the Chinese community in Thailand, Thai economic and racial nationalism is the major limitation to the spread of Communism, but, in the presence of an expand- ing Communist China, That nationalism nevertheless may play a subordinate role to the traditional tendency of Thai leaders to accommodate themselves toward the dominant Asiatic power. - 29 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Relee.?2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000649,200001-9 Political and Economic Whimbilities. The present government and all-important Thai political factions are pro-Western and anti-Communist. Although the paternalistic Thai Government has not been able to eradicate certain inequities Inherent in the That way of life, it is attempt- ing to mitigate, within limits, the existing economic and poli- tical problems which could be exploited to the advantage of the Communist movement. The Thai Government is believed to be making a more effective appeal to a majority of the Thai population than are the Communists, whose approach is one of continued criticism of governmental policies and practices without offering constructive alternatives. A distinct weakness in the Communist effort is the very limited range of its propaganda outlets. Outside of the Thai capital, Bangkok, there have been few known Communist attempts to propagandize the Thai population. Intelligent use of the US Information Service in rural areas should provide an excellent opportunity for inculcation of democratic ideas. In Bangkok, however, a heavy Communist propaganda campaign in the Chinese press is believed serious enough to warrant a strong counter-effort to present adequate factual news coverage to the Chinese comnumity there. The large majority of Thai and Chinese are politically in- articulate, and, so long as the Thai Government continues to exhibit an interest in the welfare of That people, it probably will be able to offer a continuing alternative to Communism adequate in appeal to the majority of the people. Not only does the mass of the That peasantry remain immune to Communism, but also the very nature of the Thai social structure, and its governmental tradition and economic well being discourage the acceptance of Communism. Vigorous Western encouragement of the That Government's progressive measures, through eco- nomic and technical assistance designed to enhance and enlarge Thai capabilities, very possibly would limit further Communist opportunity to exploit potentially dangerous situations. - 30 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 :21agga91617A000600200001-9 red IrY Confe:Alerations, The That Government at present is able to maintain a reasoirible degree o control over Thai and Chinese Commu- nists by means ot pelice mearsures. The extent of police effectiveness, however, has .iot really been tested, since the Communist groups only rarely have resorted to violence. Should a Communist military effort develop, however, the serious antagonisms between elements o the Thai armed ffn.ces_ may vent effective use of a canister force. lin the absence of direct aggression from Communist China, the Thai Government should be able to internal security, because the existence of the Thailand Communist movements depend upon tight paaty discipline ,and covert organbation, - rather than upoi the possession and utilization of military force. To the extent that governmental elorts toward control ase not diluted by cceruptien and fear of antagonizing Commu- nist China, tie internal Communist movement does net provide a military threat to Thailand. 3. General vulneraLilitles. The internal problems? et the Commmist organizations in 'Mailand an unknown faetor. Apparently, however, Corn- raantst Party unity, discipline, and mora.le are good, parti- eniariy following the rapid e.outward sweep of the Chinese Communist regime in Chi. The absence of widespread sup- Port, however, is indicated by the mere handful of Thai Com- rilliniSt numbers. This groml is bolieved to be composed of tao rilore than sonie OO and. dissatisfied *Yorkers. Suppert from the Chinese cemmunity for the Communist move- ment is. far larger and appears to arise primarily from intense diesatisfaction, disappointment, and bitterness at the Chinese National Government, together with a monnting tendency toward identification with the Chinese Communist movement for opportunistic and paivalotic reasons. - flolloPPWOINEm Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 *ar0i eliMileagamm There is no doubt that identification of Communism in Asia with Chinese leadership is a major deterrent among the That to the effectiveness of the Communist effort in Thailand. Within the Chinese community, however, this factor enhances the prestige of the Chinese Communists and appeals to the patriotism of the overseas Chinese minority. The That are less concerned with USSR leadership of World Communism than they are afraid of the extension of Chinese infoluence and domination in the form of an expanding Chinese hegemony in Southeast Asia. Exploita- tion of this natural Thai antipathy for the Chinese should prove to be an effective instrument for the containment of Communism. 4. ftcial Considerations. Communist vulnerability to That police controls appears to be lessening somewhat as the Communist regime in Chbta ex- pands into southeast China, the area from 4htCh most Chinese have emigrated to Thailand. The threat of deportation to Nationalist areas in China may be losing its effect as a con- trol measure over the activities of Chinese communities. A more insidious factor is the increasing ability of Communists to protect themselves against Thai security measures through bribery of That officials. Although nationalism will continue as a major limiting factor, the tendency of Thai leaders to accommodate themselves to the dominant power in Asia indicates that Thatnationalism will diminish as a force operating to minimise the growth of Communist Influence in Thailand. This trend probably will progress in proportion to the extension of Chinese Communist interests and prestige in Southeast Asia. Opportunities for Western exploitation of Communist vul- nerabilities in Thailand will continue to exist. Every Western effort to assist Thailand economically or politically, however, has been attacked in the Communist press as an "imperialist" attempt to control Thailand's resources and people. Additional Western assistance, whether military, financial or technical, would be sub- jected to increasingly vitriolic condemnations. The Thai Govern- ment would be further labeled as a vessel of the "imperialist" powers. To a limited extent, this propaganda line is effective among the most avid That nationalists; the majority of Thai leaders, however; are sufficiently pro-Western in sympathy and training not to be deceived. - 32 - J1JORIiT Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 %re 410iiaridirm. APPENDIX F BURMA The Communist movement in Burma exhibits certain vulnerabilities which the Burmese Government has not been able to exploit fully, and it is unlikely that full advantage can be taken of these weaknesses unless the Government is offered and accepts external assistance. Chaotic conditions within the countey, military ineffectiveness, and an intense national- ism which fosters distrust of outside aid or advice have increased the ineffectiveness of government efforts to combat the Commu- nists. But Communist vulnerabilities?which include a split within the movement, a program strikingly similar to the gov- ernment's, and an ignorance of the inherent danger to their sovereignty in international Communism?may be exploited by competent leadership in the government and through external assistance. I. Political Vulnerabilities. The government of newly independent Burma maintains a strong anti-imperialist attitude, and its program for recon- struction and development of the country is based on state socialism. The armed rebellion of the two Communist parties-- the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) and the Communist Party (Burma) (CPB)--represents a fundamental difference as to the means of achieving the same ultimate objectives as proclaimed by the government. In most respects basic government policies-- political freedom economic security, a socialized welfare state through the redistribution of land, industrialization, state control of the means of production, and equitable distribution of surplus wealth?parallel those advocated by the Communists. The gov- ernment theoretically also offers' but through evolution, this utopia without bloodshed, while the Burmese Communists advocate these changes through resort to violence. - 33 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Rele402000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000W00001-9 This similarity in aims, but with a difference in implementa- tion, makes the government's position potentially the more attractive. The government must intensify considerably its efforts to establish itself in the minds of the Burmese as the true advocate of nationalism and of improved conditions in Burma, while identifying the Communists as the proponents of violence, acting under foreign instructions. Its ability to do this without the judicious application of outside assistance, however, is doubtful. 2. Military Considerations. The Burmese Government cannot, in the foreseeable future, destroy the armed Communist opposition without external assist- ance. Prolonged guerrilla warfare is likely. The government's armed forces are superior to those of the Communists in terms of manpower and material but are, nevertheless, severely handi- capped in a number of respects. The most important is the wide dispersion of government forces throughout the country to fight a variety of other insurgents, in addition to the Communists. Other problems are: (I) inefficient transportation and commu- nication systems, (2) the necessity of importing most military supplies, which are limited by depleted Treasury resources, (3) defections, and (4) a shortage of technically trained leadership. Thus, while the Burmese Communists possess some degree of military vulnerability, the government, even with superior forces, has been able at best only to protect selected centers of population, and without external assistance will not be able to suppress the Communists in the near future, especially if they are aided by Chinese Communist Forces. Another facet of Communist military vulnerability is the mutual animosity of the two Communist groups and other rebellious elements; clashes between them have been frequent. This is at best a negative benefit, however, for the government has not been able to take full military advantage of this schism. - 34 - 481BOIMPm Approved For Release 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Releau,2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000V200001-9 3. General Vulnerabilities. There are indications that BCP unity, discipline, and morale have declined recently but this trend does not appear to have reached disruptive proportions. Nevertheless, most BCP leaders seem to work with reasonable consonance, have kept the Communist machine functioning, and have given no indication of digressing from their present course for the foreseeable future. The demarcation between Communists, actual and intimidated sympathizers and bandits operating under the cloak of Commu- nism, is not clear. It is thought that rank and file party members are mostly opportunistic followers of local leaders, who bear a grievance against the government, or those who have succumbed to plausible Communist propaganda promising improvement of their standard of living. While actual BCP members probably number only a few thousand, 'the Party commands a considerable popular following of perhaps several hundred thousand. The extent to foreign control over the BCP is still an unre- solved question. Strong foreign influence is discernible in its propaganda and in its growing compliance with the orthodox Communist doctrine and use of violence. The BCP had demon- strated its amenability to foreign "advice," at least on a policy level, and it would probably accept material assistance with alacrity. However, it Is entirely possible that the Communist movement in Burma would be seriously retarded in the event of large-scale and overt foreign intervention, either Chinese or Indian, in the implementation of policy. Finally, the various ethnic minorities, who populate Burma's border areas, are strongly anti-Communist. As such, they con- stitute a possible buffer between the main centers of the Burmese Communist movement and those of surrrounding areas. - 35 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Relic, 2000/05/24a601a4-01617A00W0200001-9 4. ?,pecial Considerations. Because of the intensity of Burmese nationalism and the Inherent distrust of any kind of foreign intervention, the utiliza- tion of Western assistance by the Burmese Government, which might give it the necessary strength to establish itself as the genuine advocate of nationalism, is a complex and delicate prob- lem. Recently the government, probably realizing finally its extremely tenuous position, has manifested a greater degree of amenability toward proffered external (Western) assistance, In matter of finances and technical assistance. Only acceptance and effective use of assistance from nations respecting Burma's sovereignty appear to be Burma's most promising means of undermining Communist influence. - 36 - s4ihrialii6U.N. Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Rele.6si 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000*10200001-9 "VIMISENT., A PPE NDDE G MALAYA The major weakness of Malaya's militant Communist movement at present is a military one. British forces have demonstrated their ability to diminish the effectiveness of Communist-led guerrilla units. In addition, the Communist effort--predominantly Chinese--has failed, because of a basic racial antagonism toward the Chinese among the Malays and a "wait-and-see" attitude on the part of most Malayan Chinese, to secure voluntary mass support for its cause. The Communist movement in Malaya suffers from a lack of co- ordinated, competent leadership and has not yet received any significant external assistance. These facts have led to another, and reportedly increasing, weakness: a lowering of morale. Continued Communist successes in China, to- gether with a possible UK rapprochement with the Chinese Communists for commercial reasons, may, however, enable the Malayan Communist movement to regain the initiative and thereby minimize its present vulnerabilities. 1. Political Vulnerabilities. The British Government in Malaya currently offers an alternative to Communism adequate in appeal to a majority of the people. This appeal is particularly strong among the Malaya, who are one of the two major and numerically almost equal racial groups in Malaya. ? The Malays, whose political supremacy (as the indigenous people) over the Chinese is guaranteed under the present British policy, are quite sensitive to any suggestion of a change in government which might threaten their favored position. They particularly fear political control by the more - 37 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For ReIwo 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000400200001-9 modiaGIBEE... aggressive Chinese who already dominate the economic life of the peninsula; they would also be solidly against any sug- gestion such as the subordination of their national interests to USSR interests. Since the Malayan Communist movement has from its inception been almost wholly Chinese, they are antagonistic to it on racial as well as political grounds. The average Malay, too, is not susceptible to Communist promises of economic improvement; his major interest is maintenance of his status as a small landowner responsible only to himself. His Moslem religion is a further deterrent. On the other hand, the Malayan Chinese, with their close political, social, and economic ties to China, their proclivity toward opportunism, and their real or imagined grievances under British rule, are considerably more susceptible to Communist blandishments. 031111111111113111Ps major vulnerability here lies with the bourgeois Chinese's involvement with Malaya's economy; the extent to which he will align himself with the British Government against Communism will probably be decided by his personal business interests. The most effective exploitation of these vulnerabilities Is, among Malays and Chinese alike, education in the mean- ings and implications of Communism, plus a concerted effort to increase Chinese loyalty to Malaya and to raise the general standard of living. 2. MIlitary ilitiesrab British Security Forces are now engaged in suppressing militant Communist terrorists. Their efforts have been in- creasingly successful and, barring hostile foreign intervention or the necessity for drastic retrenchment, they will be able to put down this insurrection, at least temporarily, without external assistance. - 38 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Releabs4000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000644200001-9 The Malayan Peoples' Anti-British Army (MPABA), the Communists' fighting organization, has not had the popular support It anticipated, and has had to resort to intimidation and extortion to supplement voluntary contributions. It has exercised terroristic control over certain squatter areas (land illegally occupied by displaced or immigrant Chinese) whose population is easily susceptible to such intimidation. In addition, there is some evidence of forced recruiting into the MPABA. Increased military measures against the MPABA can be expected to show proportionately increasing success. Full deployment of existing troops has already had a good effect, not only militarily, but also in the important tank of increas- ing the population's faith in the ability of the British to main- tain control of the area. For the opportunistically inclined, this latter consideration is most important and is one strong reason why Malaya's Communists have so far lacked real popular support and are now confronted with mounting desertions. 3. General Vulnerabilities. Communist morale in low, largely as a result of two causes: (1) continual political and military harassment by the British, and (2) lack of support from the populace. Central direction of the Party seems slow and insubstantial. It is thought that very few, perhaps only an estimated several hundred "hard-core" Communists, have anything but a very limited conception of international Communism. and its dangers. Many of the 3-5000 militants are probably opportunistic Chinese who have found an outlet for their grievances and who are spurred on by the Communist successes in China. The problem, then, in exploiting these weaknesses is one of education, accompanied by attempts to eliminate inequities under the present government which increase dissension and explode into misguided militancy. - 39 - ETBUflDT Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Releacw2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A0006O200001-9 ""11918410%. APPENDIX H PHILIPPINES The principal vulnerability of Communism in the Philip- pines is the weakness of the local Party itself. In addition, Communism as a theory of government, although vaguely understood, is widely feared and disapproved by the Filipino people, 80 percent of whom are of the Catholic faith. The Communist-led Huks depend upon the local peasantry of central Luzon for supplies and recruitment and are incapable of overthrowing the present government without external assistance. Although social and economic inequalities suscep- tible to Communist exploitation do exist in the Philippines, the comparatively higher standard of living presently being maintained will probably prevent any rsPid growth of Commu- nism in the near future. Furthermore a 'widespread antagonism towards any extension of Chinese influence stands as a deterrent to the extension of Communism by means of the Chinese. I. Political Vulnerabilities. Although the existing non-Communist regime in the Philip- pines is corrupt and inefficient, it is still acceptable to poli- tically conscious Filipinos in preference to Communism. A more efficient and honest government, however, which can command greater respect from the ople, will probably be required in order to check the gradual growth of Communism. within the next few years. The Philippine Communist Party (PKP) is so small that the political danger it represents is not that Communists will suddenly seize control or win popular approval but that they will infiltrate into the government through a coalition. The fact that approximately 80 Percent of the Filipino people are Roman Catholics may have tended to prevent the spread of Communism, although Philippine Communists reportedly have never preached atheism. - 40 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A0006940300001-9 Neve 461.0616111. 2. MM.. J.L.z..r Vulnerabilities. The chief weaknesses of the Communist-led armed peasant movement (liukbalahap) are its inability to overthrow the government without external assistance and the generally localized area of its operations (central Luzon). The govern- ment could take advantage of these weaknesses by strengthen- ing its immigration controls and security facilities. Other weaknesses include lack of facilities for arms manufacture and some dependence upon forced recruitment. The government could exploit these vulnerabilities by providing stricter control of firearms and more adequate protection of peasants who re- fuse to join the Huks. 3. General Vulnerabilities. Although social and economic inequalities susceptible to Communist exploitation do exist in the Philippines, the standard of living presently being maintained will probably prevent any rapid growth of Communism in the near future. In order to prevent the possible future extension of the Communist move- ment, however, the Philippine Government must take immediate steps to develop a viable economy and to improve the standard of living. The Philippine Communist Party (PICP) is young and in- experienced. It is believed to have approximately 3,000 active members, of whom fewer than 100 are believed to be trained and indoctrinated Communists. The most Important Communist front organizations are the Hukbalahap and the Congress of Labor Organizations. Many peasants of central Luzon who join and support the Huk army and who give moral and material aid to the Huk cause do so largely as the result of depressed socio- economic conditions in central Luzon. The Congress of Labor - 41 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 NIS Neod ameneRlialr Organizations (CLO) recruits and,holds its follvwers by posing as the center of the progressive labor movement. Members of most affiliated unions apparently go along purely out of self interest and probably in ignorance of the motives of their leaders. By encouraging anti-Communist progressive labor unions and acquainting workers with Communist methods, the government could help to prevent the expansion of Com- munist influence in the labor movement. Some liaison is reported to exist between Chinese and Philippine Communists within the Philippines but there is no evidence of instructions either from the mainland or from Chinese in the Philippines. 4. Special Considerations. The Filipino people generally will remain anti-Communist and sympathetic toward government counter-measures. The Communist Party, however, is expected to remain a vowing factor in Philippine politics. Government success in relieving economic and social distress in central Luzon does not appear likely, although a successful extermination compaign against the Huks might eliminate lawlessness temporarily. The Con- gress of Labor Organizations grew in prestige and probably in membership during 1948; although it has suffered a recent split in leadership and consequent loss of union affiliations, long range plans and achievements will probably remain unaffected. Opportunities for exploitation of Communist vulnerabilities in the Philippines do not appear to be particularly susceptible to Communist counter-measures. Philippine Communists will not for a long time be capable of executing a successful coup against the national government and would probably be unable to take other effective counter-measures against exploitation of their weaknesses by techniques outlined above. - 42 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Rekwee 2000/05/2a004612a78-01617A00%,0200001-9 APPUNDEX I AND )NE SIA Unless there :is a Se1:4-,tment in the near future which enebodies the treedeeo sovere4ety from the Dutch to the indo sians CommemisTrt as a rpuitant rallying point for nationallsw In Indonesia may ne strengV:ened. At the momelt, the lack of open conflict between Indoneetan Communists and the Republican Government is due prima:141.e to reduced Communist strength as rest:tit of Republic eounteemeasures, to the presence of Dutch Inilitary forces fla Imeonetila, and to schisnis among Communist elements. If natienalisrn is :.'ecognizerl and implemented in the, settlement new being negetiveed in The liegue, the danger from Communist consoldation may, hoeever, he minimized and the Se?iij..SLIS within (:omenunist s rk,:Nrryr,*9 Pen.-Asian Communism and those prosecnting Communism, will be prosex ,ed. As long as the nationalist move- atent is led by a more moleennte group, the Commuedst elements will be highly vulnerable to lAo charges that they represent Chinese Communist influence. or Soviet interests. Furthermore, the Muslim religion a Inc:celesta represents another possible bulwark against Communist Influence. Political Vulnerabilities. A non.- Communist Indonesien regime offers a prospective Tirogeeen of limited nationalination, which, if t'le Indonesians achieee their objeatives dur'keg the present negotiations with the Dutch, should have more appeal than napkin which the elements can offre.US suppert of .hdonesian as- eleatiens at The Hague Rounl Table Conference, followed by US financial and technical ee:fi designed to raise the Indonesian ?e'fmndard e living, should aseist in consolidatiri., moderate leader- ship Indonesia. Commurest efforts will neecesarily be Approved For Release 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Re!we 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A009490200001-9 ""Meneliiihnon vulnerable to charges that they wish to destroy the progress which has been made, and that they advocate an importation of alien influences, almost certainly Chinese rather than Soviet- led, which have few possibilities of contributing to the economic and political stability of the area. 2. MlUtayiVuberabllit1cs. The Indonesian Republican Government has demonstrated a reasonable ability to suppress Communist armed uprisings in the past without outside help. It is expected, however, that Communist elements will continue to maintain military units as a means to achieve their ends and that the government will be unable to eliminate them completely. Under these circum- stances, Communist elements will be vulnerable to charges that they have no interest in achieving peaceful conditions in Indonesia and that they are instruments of disruptive alien influences. 3. geam_ti. Vulnerabilities. Countermeasures by the Indonesian Republican Govern- ment have disrupted Communist organizations, eliminating much of the leadership of Communist groups, and have been successful In playing one group against the other. The schisms which now exist, and those which could be brought about by further revela- tions d connections, particularly with Communists in China, remain the most important vulnerability of the Communist movement in Indonesia. Indonesian nationalism, which prompts these countermeasures, must, however, be given continuous and sympathetic support from the West. 4. al Considerations. The vulnerability of Communism to efforts by Islam is probably increasing, but not at the rate at which anti-Chinese sentiment will increase. Immediate exploitation of the latter development would be more fruitful. - 44 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Releata.12000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000649200001-9 While it is true that any assistance given to Indonesia by the United States will be subject to strong propaganda attacks from Communist sources, US aid and encouragement which conform with the requirements at Indonesian sovereignty would quite likely result in the development of an effective Indonesian government favorable to the US, and increasingly possessing the will and capability for opposing Communism in concert with the West. - 45 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For ReIttoe 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617AOW0200001-9 merifteridifinftb APPENDIX j INDIAN SUBCONTINENT The success of Communist movements in India, Pakistan, and Ceylon is dependent almost entirely at this time upon adverse economic conditions in those countries. The size of a Communist Party membership is no indication of the number of believers in Marxism. The population of the sub- continent is neither sufficiently educated nor sufficiently conscious politically to react favorably to purely ideological arguments. The measure of Communist progress in the sub- continent is therefore a direct function of the number of promises of economic advancement which the Communists can make and the speed with which these promises Can be put into effect. In many cases the economic aims of the Com- munists and of the existing governments are similar. The means of achieving popular support are the same. Thus, if the existing governments can bring about a steady improve- ment in the standard of living within the next few years, the Communist movement will have no hope of success. On the other hand, if they fail to do so in the near future, Communist supporters will increase in number until they may be able to wrest control from the present national governments. The latter wifi all require a measure of US financial and technical aid within the next few years in order to establish themselves securely. Whether or not they will receive sufficient assist- ance to enable them to do so remains to be seen. I. India, The Communist movement in India is presently dependent upon a small, trained leadership, most of whom are well known to the police and who can be arrested whenever necessary. - 46 - .61111110ffillmEm Approved For Release 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Relew, 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000W200001-9 i11n1vnl Simultaneous removal of these leaders from the field of action has in the past practically wiped out Communist leadership at one stroke, thereby leaving the party badly disorganized. Concomitantly, the Party seeks membership or - Sympathy among masses who are economically rather than ideologically dissatisfied. Professed party aims are not . sufficiently divergent from those of the Government of India to stimulate mass interests. The GOT, as well as the Com- munists,- is interested in socialization of industry, re-distri- bution of land, abolition of feudal land system, etc. Batts- factory ,change in these fields under the auspices of the GOT would leave the Communist Party little to promise and the number of Communist sympathizers would diminish rapidly. In the field of labor, as in the case of the peasantry, the Communists also lack mass support. The CongreSs-sponsOred Indian National Trade Union Congress,, In spite of its recent origin, is now stronger' than the Communist-dominated All- India Trade Union Congress. And, as the peasants are not yet fully organized by either group, it is possible that the Congress Party, which is aware of the necessity of gaining their support, may win the race to 'obtain. it. Limited Party membership in itself constitutes an element of weakness in the Communist move:meet in India. Except in cerin portions of the Deccan, its size renders it subject to effective police control and the lack of sufficient armed force. . to challange the. ex4:ting military might of the GOT accentuates this deficiency. Illustrative of the prcblems contingent upon small meniziership are certain violent actions, mainly around Calcutti,, which were not large enough to get beyond control and thus led only to severe r. epression. Further, faulty staff planning has, on occasion, prematurely tipped the Communist hand and led to the imposItion of severe suppressive measures as, for - 47 - Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9 Approved For Relwe 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-01617A0?90200001-9 example, in the case of the abortive nation-wide railway strike in March 1949. 2, Pakistan. The Communist movement in Pakistan is presently weakened by a lack of first-class leadership. Communist leadership in what is now Pakistan was completely disorganized upon the parti- tion of India and there have been no signs of real revival. While the tenets of Islam are usually used as the excuse for the diffi- culties attendant upon promoting Communism in Pakistan, the Party in fact is dependent for a following upon economically dissatisfied persons or political fortune-hunters rather than upon persons genuinely interested in Communism. There is a complete lack of sufficient armed forces to challenge the exist- ing government by violent menas. 3. ayis.t. In Ceylon the Communist movement is impeded not only by a lack of really competent leadership but also by disunity of thought and action among the three Communist political parties In the country. Stalinist, Trotskyite, and Leninist parties devote more effort to sparring among themselves than to opposition to the political party in power. Additionally, economic conditions, which are better in Ceylon than on the Indian mainland, do not constitute a powerful force favoring the growth of Communism. - 48 - 4,9194 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9