Capabilities of the USSR for Operational Employment of Airborne Radar for Night Fighter Aircraft

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000700270001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 12, 1949
• Content Type: IM

\pproved For Release : CIA-RDP78-O1617AOOQ70027000 1 Q J 3
CENT L INTE:t.LIGE* AGFPICY
12 October 1949
IN LLIGZNOE MEMORAX UJM NO. 2 6
SUB3EGTt Capabilities of the USSR for Operational Employment of
,Airborne Rader for Right Fighter Aircraft
Di gauesic~~ e
It ehT:!L& be borne in mind that there is little or no positive in-
te.ligence ,n Exssian developments or capabilities in Al radar as such.
What the foilowing estimate is based upon is extrapolation from that
slender shunt of available information sum.ari.zed in. Appendix Ao
Part T. i v 1910
On the given date the USSR will probably have sufficient mm7bers of
active Al equipment to provide 100.200 equipped night fighters. These
equipments :'31 largely be former lem%.leased sets of British or American
make as d eta-'led elsewhere. It mfr be assumed that snare tubes, magnetrons,
T&-tubes, etc.. have either been stockpiled from World war 11 or have been
purchased by secondary agents from sales of US surplus stores. The opera--
Lion-of these sets at high altitudes and. low temperatures may involve
special techniques in pressurization, but these are believed to be within
the Soviet Capabilities.
The Soviets WE have an undetermined number of naggirg Al?iequir e&
airorft. There is no positive intelligence on this at all but, should
passive LI nets prove to exist, the ' roblems involved in tactical radar/radio
silence si.1 make them a most important intelligence target.
Approved For. Rele FS~.QQc~aiQ~t act
 Approved For Releaser' 1,'f 8-01617A000700270001-1
The Soviets nrobebly willl have available a native IFF similar to
the U. S. Mk III and ;possibly one similar to. the U. S. M. V. If passive
Al detection is used, no 117 'rnroblem exists.
There Is no positive ind .cation that night fighters will be equipped
with tail-warning equipment.
It is unlikely that F.,t t will be emvloV ed by night fighters because
of limitation of space, extreme speeds and consequently short time of
contact and intercept, and other demand' on pilot's or radar operator's
attention. It mast be presumed, however, that the USSR -possesses adequate
ECM knowledge to activate such a phase as necessary.
Part II. 1 Dieu 1953
The USSR will probably have available active Al equipment at band
in u*mwn numbers, but w2.th the n mbers probably restricted by the num-
ber of aircraft and adequately trained -personnel rather than by the
electronic gear. lffective research on Xband magnetrons and hard-ftbe
modulators in the Soviet Zone of German suggest that vigorous efforts
are being made. on airborne 7w-band radar.
The USSR may have passive Al equipment in unknown but large ==bore.
The t SSR will probably have IFS' equipment in operational use at
least equivalent to the U.8. Mk V 137 set.
The USSR may -nrovide night fighters with tail-warning e(pa,irment.
Part III. a 1956
The situation will be substantially the same as on 1 May lW.
2.
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-01617A000700270001
 Approved For Relea Wki P78-01617A000700270001-1
APPBFIDIX A
w.~.iltannne ol xnig'111gpe 2D AM= n
foox N ht ZISM2XIL
I. Prese=t 5 ,et ?Qa gn in Al Radar.
It is ka= that the USSR received a number (about 120) of U.S. and
British AI radar sets on lend,-lease, and in,ad4ition captured or liberated
an undetermined saber of German and Japanese sets. The former are listed
elsewhere. The latter consist of the Uehtennstin,, MM=g and the
Palm and Aja reports have identified the majority of the Soviet radar
signals as coming from sets of both categories. Although this situation
UP 11103 largely to Zarly Warning and 001, it is not unreasonable to em.
Pact the Soviets to make just as vigorous use of foreign AI radar sets
available to them. It is also probable that initially the Soviets will
rely on U. S. and British airborne gear even more than on foreign ground,
based and ship-based equipment (almost all of latter so far identified tarn
out to be U.S. or British) because of the limitations in space, weight, and
power is the engineering of which the u. S. sate are probably (although
not certainly) more advanced than are the Russian sets at the -present time,
This leadership cannot be nrestuned to continue indefinitely, however, as
In- hinted by the description of the Soviet in set below.
Among the EW and GOI signals are a number which dl not oorreei,ond to
any U.S., British, German, or Japanese sets known to be in Russian hands.
These signals are spotted between 113 and. 93'7$ lNofeec. This sun,orts the
position that the Soviets do erode some of their own radar gear, indeed
including X..band. These higher frequencies, (one at S..band and one at ]G-band
-IP.
Approved .For Releas~ 1 P78-01617A000700270001-1
 Approved For Relea G P78-O1617A000700270001-1
actually detected) and the fact that some Groan ter= blind,-bombing
radexw on band have been Produced for the Soviets in Oc fed GermaW
also support the prediction of active airborne radar and the '0oe$ibility
of *native Russian Al radar under develo sment.
Daring the last few mcnths of World War II, Soviet soldiers captured
by the Germans started to make numerous references to night fighters
equipped with AI radar. This early equipment was of Soviet design, very
crude, and operated at onl' 200 Mc/sec. It em c'ed an antenna consisting
of b quarter-wave dipoles, two vertical and two horizontal. Lobe-swltchieg
was used. There is further scattered evidence all to the effect that the
Soviets intend operation) use of Al radar: thera are reports that, fighter
aircraft recently are fitted with airborne radar (no details given); more
Intensive night flying at fields occupied by Soviet fighters has been ob-
served. On the other hand, neither radomee nor radar antennas have yet
been Identified on the new Soviet fighters which have been seen so far by
our observers.
No details of any new Russian AI radar sets are known, alt-ough there
Is some information concerning, the crude and obsolete 200 Me/sec Russian
airborne set already mentioned.
11. P"IMU Soviet dog tion in 1
A new Soviet In get, the SM3-(m), which is eomparativb1y sinrnle,
small and compact. has been observed. It uses a built-in dynamotor fur-
nishing the dra voltage and also to drive the, frequency-weeping mechanism,
much the came as in the U.0. Mark III 117 set The Soviet equipment, however,
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-01617A000700270001-1
 Approved For Releas8-01617A000700270001-1
are d veloping several low-power and mediv-power (30-60 kw) msgnetroas.
One high power 8-band tube (l Megawatt) is being developed, as well as
one 2 Omvatt S-band tube (the letter probadbly for countermeasures). The
only .L.band magnetrons under derelopsent are low-power tubes. Imav-power
metal-ceramic tubes and klystrons from IL- to lam. bands are also being
developed. A further significant fact is that much effort ie being put
into developing the 5021. (hard-tube pulse modulator) in spite of main
diffiemlties.' This last tube suggests strongly efforts on airborne radar.
for, if space and weight were no object, other means of modulating ground
or shipborne sets could readily be employed.
The indication of this slender evidence supported by other known
research on PPI, test gear, eta., in that the Soviets are making serious
efforts to develop airborne radar in the Lband region. Such ra&r would
probably include Al.
The Soviets are known to have YursUsed surplus V.S. electronic gear,
either directly, or indirectly through principals of other nations. It
Is entirely reasonable to suppose that the USSR has no lack of magnetrons,
either S-band or X-band, modulators, TD-tubes, hardware, *to., all of
which could have been readily -mrobased at low prices.
IT. resen Soviet Z9M ttoai?vith rresarrd~to t.
It is known that German experts are working in the USSR and that
the German had adequate, well-developed l gear from ly No/sec up to
?S-band by the end of World War II. It uw7 be sunned that this potential
is at the disposal of the Soviets.
Approved For Release FMIMMIft-01
 Approved For Release'-T 78-01617A000700270001-1
U. S. airborne radarst
SOB 720
AI
$0 7172
AST
SCB 520
Al
Al
AN/
-13
311&bombing and Bs
attonsl
A9/AWS.?1$
n e a #
AR f dP&l
At and tab
A/AI't 9
Al
AV/AM13
Navigation
air' Control
i'iohnicat publications, military releases, and press have dnvsled
the details condo 'nit g tbulotion, size, weight, wavelength, p+ per.
pnlset repetition frequency, antenna size ana gain, type of soon, beam
widfi t, scan rate, rewiva, r sensitivity and bandt4dEtb. saximom range.
'a 101Man acasctragr. reage cnraciy, and angular accs.-*' of almost all
equipment developed in World War II. The Soviets are thus armed. with
considerable data, including the daafinite indication that we pit the
weight of emphasis on L.b2.u& (note Soviet emphasis on &-bead tubes above).
No intelligence currently exists on possible Soviet Al.
3ifineW The imnortanee of t possibility, the tactics Of radar silence that would
be imposed if the possibility bG0&MQi a reality, emphasises the need to
study farther this wab ect. Prom kAM19dge of the capabilities of Germans
aonicing for the Bmseieans, from the known oapabilities of the Eusciaus
themselves. Main AI want be considered a, distinct poseibilitr.
TI.
The Soviets have tail-warnipg equipment of their own design, TOW- 2,
operating probably at 200 Ko/sen; the observation was probably of an ez-
perimental unit fitted to a T3.2 aircraft. The obaraeteristias of this
Approved For Releas 01617A000700270001-1
 Approved For Relea mnP7
early set ares
xa~~.ari~th
Pest power
Pulse width
Palle repetition
tsegaeAW
Ztfootivee range
*Dead Seim
weight
Anteraa
6o watts
1.5reee
250 per use
1500 motors
200 asters (at this range.
varauw note ceases to be
interrupted and becomes a
etea4 bass)
4k
Ya4
Approved For Relea -01617A000700270001-1
Mif