THE PROBABILITY OF LOCAL INTERFERENCE WITH THE PRODUCTION AND MOVEMENT OF CERTAIN STRATEGIC MATERIALS IN THE EVENT OF WAR BEFORE 1954

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000900030001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 28, 1950
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTXLLIGENCE AGENT-
INTELLICENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 272
'
28 Maroh 1950
$DBJECT: The Probability of Local Interference with the Production
and Movement of Certain Strategic Materials in the Event
of Dar before 1134
1. Tho attached ostimates (Enclosures ulin through nIu) relate only
to the probability of local interference: by Comartrasts or others (such
as disaffected nationalists in colonial areas): with the production and
movement or the strategic *materiels indicated in each case: in the event
of war between the US and the TDSR before 1954.
2, Significant interference is defined az at least 15 percent re-
duction in availability over a period of at least one month.
3. The order of the Enclosures is as follows:
A. General Considerations (p.
B. Canada (p. 3).
CO Mexico (po 4).
B. The Caribbean (p. 5).
E. South America: Dost Coast (p. 7).
F. South Amorioa: Bast Coast (p. 8).
O. Southern Africa (p. 10).
H. The Mediterraman and Near East (p. 11).
1. India and the Far East (p. 13).
A nignificant possibility of local interferon= with the produm-
tion or movement of listed commodities (not necessarily resulting in
long-term denial) is considered to exist in the following cases:
CANADA: iron ore: lead: lumber:PULIVOal: zinc.
DEXMOt antimony, cadmium, copper, fluorspar, graphito?
LEAD, manganoso? LERCURY? mica, pstroleum: rirc.i,_
^ ODBAt MOLASSES and sugar, chromite, niokol oxidoq
This memorandum has not been coordinated with the intontgeme
organizations of the Depertmonto of State: Army: N aua the
Air Force. Document No.
DO CHANGE in Class. Ej
DECLASSIFIED
001=1;68s. CHANGED TO: TS S
.DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA RE . 7711763
Date: BY:
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44ttlIZZ'
Els
VENEZTEIA: ..JIEULL
?a, wawa: BALSA, cocoa beans.
gp PERU: leads vansaum.
? BOLIVIA: ANTINORT: lead, TIN, tungsten.
it. CHILE: COPPER CRUDE MINE, sodium nitrates!, iron ewe.
lp BRAZIL: BERYL, cast= beanss coffees maims iron ores
UINGANESEs QUARTZ, O1YSTAL0 sisal.
jp ARGENTINA; beefs hide, skins.
URUGUAY: grease wool.
2, SARDINIA: talc.
Be IRK: petroleum.
.?pp MIA and FAST PAKISTAN: =MESE: =As Jute, tea.
.20 BUttati, THAM11100 Wan: zvlber, teaks tin.
INDONESIA: palm oils peppers quinine and quinidines
? petroleums rubbers and tin,
slc. CHINA: antimows.duck feathers hog brist/ess tins and
tungsten. _
5. With respect to other listed commoditiess no significant inter-
ference is likely, although sporadic strikes and sabotage are probable.
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ENCLOSURE "A"
GESDBAL CONSIDERATIONS
10 The USSR, through the apparatus of international Comnunism?
has made and is making extensive preparations to interfere with the
production and movement of strategic materials required by the US.
In the event of maa.? the USSR must be expected to exert to the full
- its capabilities in this regard.
2. Absolute denial of newly produced strategic materials re?
quires Communist seizure of control over the means of production or
export, as has occurred in China. Temporary or partial interference,
of greater or less duration and magnitude, can be accomplished if
public disorder, work stoppages, slowdowns, or sabotage are instigated?
3* Communist capabilities in these respects vary with local
circumstances not necessarily related to local Communist strength
or to the vulnerability of the industry concerned. It must be
recognized that disorders, strikes, and even sabotage affecting the
availability of strategic materials can occur for strictly local reasons
without Communist instigaticn? and that a wartime demand for strategic
materials presents an inviting opportunity for exacting the redress
of local grievances. It is to be expected, however, that the USSR
and local Communists will take every-advantage of such local dissatis?
factions to accomplish their own ulterior purpoee. Because any
systematic and sustained interference with US access to strategic
materials normally presupposes at least covert Cceounist direction
or influence, Communist party strength and labor influence have been
taken as the point of departure of country estimates in most cases?
h. Control of or dominant influence in organized labor is
Communiemes principal weapon for the accomplishment of this mission*
Communist penetration of organized labor has been significantly
selective, with concentration on mining, fuel and power, electrical
communications, overland transport, materfront? and maritime vorkers0
unions. In many cases it will be found that the Communists. lacking
control of basic production nevertheless control availability through
their control of essential Lel and power, transportation, or port
facilities.
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tall ?
?5. In addition to Communist capabilities for the local instiga?
tion of disorder, work stoppa ? or sabotage, account must betaken
of the possibility of planned sabotage by trained Soviet agents
introduced from the outside on specific mission. This factor, although
relatively difficult to estimate, is especially important with respect
to highly remunerative targets such as Venezuelan oil. Whatever the
security precautions in each case, the possibility, of a successful and
severely dAvaging attack can never be entirely excluded.
6. The following estimates do not take into account the possibility
of Soviet resort to clandestine biological warfare as a form of eabatoget
on the supposition that Soviet capabilities in this regard will be
covered elsewhere. This form of attack, if feasible, could obviously
have a severe effect on the production and export of strategic materials,
directly in the case of animal and vegetable products, and indirectly
in terms of its effect on human resources.
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121CLOSVRE "s"
CANADA
1. Products des 6.4ated. The Canadian products listed are
ALUMBUIE? 4 . CO 3 corundum; hides, ilmenite, iron ore, lead;
lumber:, mida, =dew, AICKEL? petroleuml PUTINUM METALS: PULMOOD,
URANIUM: WOODPULP? and zinc.
2.' Communist stren h and influence. The Communist Partys, out-
lawed 5.liT15)? nm operates as? he Labor Progressive Farty? with an
estimated 23,000 members( Its influence is extended through labor unions,
foreign language groups, And front organizations. It has had little
political success, however, and was weakened by the espionage trials. A
of 1946. In the June 1949 general elections, for example, it received
only 32,633 votes in contrast to 111,892 in 1945, a trend further sub--
stantiated in municipal elections. Although Communist influence in
organized labor has diminished, it is still important, particularly
in miners and lumbermenos unions.
3. Iron ore? Plant protection is believed to be normal, but the
producinr26.0771inion is Cormunist.dominated, and there is a corresponding
danger of serious work stoppage, if not of sabotage. Moreover, the ore
is ehipped via the Great Lakes, and its movement might be cubject to SOTO
interruption by the remnants of the Communist Canadian Seamen?s Union
if the emergency arose during the summer shipping season. (This danger
mould be lessened if wartime controls have been put into effect before
the reopening of traffic in the spring.)
4, Lead and Zinc. The producing union is Comunist-dominated, and
plant parec'erearlia?armittedly inadequate. In these circumstances, serious
work stoppage and/Or sabotage may be expected.
5. Lumber and Pulpwood. The dispersed and primitive charaeter of
the indungriefraerai-T'----7757Ntively immune to sabotage, but interference
through work stoppages is a possibility. Tho chief producing :Union TT
is no longer Commanist controlled, but is Communist infiltrated. (The
effect of such stoppages would depend on the season: normally cut wood
is accumulated during the winter to be floated deenstream in the spribg.)
6e Other Products. No significant interference is indicated, except
insofar .jairM=Tluipwood might interfere with the production of
newsprint and vroc,,dpulpo
taLWOWNImme.
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ENCLOSURE "C".
MEXICO ?
?
1. i._IctsProddcAl.g_t_.edna. The Mexican products listed are antimony,
cadmium, copper, fluorspar, graphite, LEAD: mahogany, manganese,
MERCURY, mica, petroleum: and zinc.
2. Work Stoppages. Communist influence is extensive-among
Mexican mining and petroleum, electrical, railroad, and port uorkers. ?
Significant interference with the production and transportation of the
mineral products listed above, through work stoppages, is probable in
the event of war. It is unlikely, however, that such interference
could be prolonged. The Government has shorn itself capable of dealing
effectively with Communist labor leaders. Its security forces are
considered reliable and generally adequate to support a strong policy',
An eventual nationalistic, anti-Communist reaction among rank-and-file
workers is to be expected.
3. Sabotage. Few restraints are put upon the movement of foreigners
into or within Mexico. Planned sabotage of remunerative targets by
militant Communists or trained Soviet agents is probable. The Poza Rica
oil field, producing 60 percent of Mexican petroleum, is particularly
vulnerable in this respect.
4. Mahogim. Mexico presently forbids commercial cutting of
mahogany. Were production to be resumed, no significant interference
' would be likely.
priterlr'
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ENCL6S: "Er
THE CARIBBEAN
10 Products siolsnated. /The products listed with respect to this
area are:.
?a. CUBA: =ASSES and sugar, chromite, nickel Oxide.
b. JAMAICA: bauxite,
c.? HAITI: sisal.
d. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: cocoa beans.
e. CENTRAL AMERICA AND PANAMA: ABACA, bals mahogany.
f, COLOMBIA: petroleum, platinum.
?g. VENEZUELA: PETROLEUM, diamonds.
2. Cuba. The Communist Party, vith a nucleus of 20,000 militants,
has approximately 127,000 registered voters and exerts influence over about
100,000 rorkers, including many port and transport personnel and some sugar
rorkers, Significant interference through strikes and el ?dons can be
expected as =11 as some sabotage probably by alien saboteurs. Sugar and
melasses production is relatively easy to sabotage through the firing of
cane fields.
3. Jamaica. There has been social unrest in Jamaica, but no tlell?,
defined Communist movement. Inasmuch as the _production of bauxite is as
yet undeveloped, no specific assessment can be made rith respect to that
industry. Probably there uould be no significant interference.
40 Haiti. No significant intereforenco is to be expected.
5. al21212se_Eme1120 No significant intereference is to be
expected.
6, Cenixal America and Panama. No significant interference is to
be expected.
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t,
7. Colombia. Communist influence has been important in the
? Colombian oll.uorkers unions, uhich in the past have conducted pro
longed strikes affecting petroleum production, processing, and trans?
portation. The capabilities of those unions hav9 decreased in the
past feu months, chile the governments ability to cope uith:them
has increased marked/y. Consequently, although sporadic interference
is likely, no significant intereference vith petroleum production and
movement is indicated. The same is true of platinum.
8. Venezuela. Communist influence is important in the labor
unions concerned mith petroleum production and transportation. There
? is serious danger Of significant interference through strikes and
sabotage.. The target, moreover, is one to attract trained Soviet
saboteurs on specific mission. In the past, homever? the Venezuelan
Government has dealt firmly and effectively 'with labor disturbances in
the industry. With its cooperation in carrying out projected security'
measures, the danger of serious sabotage caused only b. local eiementa
can probably be controlled. No significant interference is indicated
vith respect to diamonds.
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EmasuRE "E"
SOUTHANERICA: MT COAST
1."o.__aujaLL.,?Is:gni.A2$1, The produoto listed with respect to this
area are:
h.
d.
ECUADOR: Rnm, cocoa beans.
PERU: Chinchona bark: lead mahogany, vanadium.
BOLIVIA: ANTIMNY, lead, TIE, tungsten,
CHILE: COPPER, CRUDE IODINE, sodium nitrates,
iron ore.
20 Damlar. Communists control the inportant port workere unions,
Security forces are neither effective nor reliable. Significant inter-
ference through strikes and sabotage is to be expected.
36 ha. The Communist Party, never strong, is outlawed and dis-
organized, Comaniet influence exiats? however, among mine, railroad,
and port workers. Peruvian poodle:A/on and transportation of lead and
vanadium are notably vulnerable to strikes and sabotage, Significant
interference must therefore be expected, although it is unlikely to be
prolonged. No such interference is indicated with respect to chinchona
bark and mahogany*
Aggykto Gommynict influence is insignificant, but labor unrest
exists, The nine and railroad workers1 unions are well organized and
have conducted prolonged strikes, The governments handling of those
difficulties has been weak and ineffective, Bolivian mining and rail-
road oporat ions are extremely vulnerable to sabotage, Significant inter-
ference through strikes and sabotage is therefore possible,
5. Chile. The Communist Party, though outlawed, is estimated to have
45,000 membere. It retains control of the Federation of Hiners and has
infiltrated railroad, port, and electrical workers' vmions0 ibreover?
wasting conditions are conducive to labor unrest0 The security forces:
however, are vigilant and effective. No prolonged work stoppage is deemed
likely. Significant: though limited, interference through sabotage is
probable, however*
oefeiftr`
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ENCLOSURE oF"
SOUTH AMERICA: EAST COAST
1. asqlquadmatel. The products listed uith respect to this
area are:
a. ITEGUIANAS:
b. BRAZIL:
URUGUAY:
BAUXITE.
BERYL, castor oil, cocoa beans, coffee, diamonds,
emetine, iron ore,. MANGANESE, PICA, monazite, ?
platinum, QUARTZ?CRYSTAle sipal, tantalUM.,
grease uook, hides, and zkins.
ARGENTINA: beef, corundum, hides and skins, quebracho
extract, tungsten, grease eool? tung.oil.
2. The Guianas. NO significant interference is indicated. ?
3. Brazil, The Communist Party, though outlauod, retains effective
organization and leadership and has an estimated 90,000 members. Its
strength is concentrated in the capital and the states of Sao Paulo and
Pernambuco. Its influence is'particularly strong among port workers and
is also felt among railroad uorkers and manganese miners. Social and
econoMic problems afford it opportunities for fomenting local strikes,
disorders, and sabotage. Security forces, however, are actively engaged
In its suppression and are considered able to check any widespread and
concerted interference uith production and transportation. Nevertheless,
significant interference with the production of maneanese and eith the
shipment of beryl, castor beans, coffee, emetine, iron ore, manganese,
quartz crystal, and sisal must be considered nossible? though Such inter:---
ference is likely to be sporadic and brief in each case.
40 Uruouav. Communistedominate the Montevideo wool eorkersg union,
?uhich has recently interfered eith the export of uool through a slowedoen
strike of the highly skilled workers who grade wool for export. Although
the government can be expected to prevent violent sabotage, a strike based
ostensibly on labor demands is not likely to be stopped imeediately? even in
uar time. Therefore, significant interference in the export of eool is to
be expected, but no significant interference is indicated in the production
and export of hider and skins.
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5. ijmeatj.241,..a.. The Communist Party, although not large numerically,
has exnerienced, leaders and a fairly large number of ?Sympathiz6re, .
including the 85,000 Slays Ilho belong to.. the Soviet-..spcinsored Union
Eslava (now legally dissolved). The ?artya strength?la concentrated
in the city and province of Ihmnos Aires.', While its st.r.!Ppgth in the laix)r
movement generally is not great, the Party has significant inflUence areong
railvdayi port, and :r.eat7packing ,zorkero. The government can ? txpected ,
to take forceful action to halt or prevent extensive interferexi6e? lath
produation and export through strikes and sabotage. Nevertheless,
.significant interference with the production and shipment of beefs,. hides,
and Skins must be considered likely.
9 -
Ermigififier^
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VAL1.11T
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ENCLOSURE
. SOUTHERN AFRICA
(South of the Sahara)
l. Products desio2t2g. The products listed uith respect to this
area are:
a. LIBERIA: LATEX.
b. BRITISH WEST AFRICA: cocoa beans, COLUMBIUM, diamonds,.
mahogany, MANGANESE, palm 0110
tantalum, and TIN.
L . BELGIAN CONGO:
d. SOUTH AFRICA:
e. RHODESIA:
COBALT, columbium, copper, DIAMONDS,
palm oil, pyrethrum floUers? tantalum?
tin, URANIUM.
ASBESTOS, CHROMITE, CORUNDUM, diamonds,
MANGANESE, uranium, vanadium, grease
mool, skins and uattle barko
ASBESTOS, CHROMITE, copper, platinum,
and zinc.
f. BRITISH EAST AFRICA: KYANITE, pyrethrum flouers SISAL.
MADAGASCAR: beryl?.GRAPHITE, MICA.
Loir.n......lalsm_._inubilities. No significant Communist capability to
interfere uith the production or shipment of these commodities exists in
any of the countries indicated.
3. Nationalistic disturbances, There is BOMB possibility that
nationalistic disturbances might interfere mith production and shipment
in BRITISH WEST AFRICA and MADAGASCAR. Given reasonable precautions,
hoover, such disturbances could be limited in duration and effect,
4, Planned sabotage, The possibility of planned sabotage by agents
dispatched on specific missions cannot be excluded in the case of expecially
remunerative targets, Although the BELGIAN CONGO is notably vulnerable in
this respect, since no effective border control exists beteeen it and French
Equatorial Africa, significant interference uith production and transport
of listed commodities is not indicated,
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ENCLOSURE "H"
THE MEDITERRANEAN AND NEAR EAST
1. Products designated. The products listed ilith respect to this
area are:
a. PORTUGAL, SPAIN, FRENCH NORTH AFRICA: cork.
b. SARDINIA: talc.
TURKEY: chromite? guulopium.
EGYPT: extra long staple cotton.
e. SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT? .BAHREIN, QATAR: petroleum.
fe IRAQ: petroleum.
IRAN: petroleum.
.2. P..c2Ltu'altFrench North Africa. Corkproduction-is r?
tively'immune to interference. Sporadic sabotage import areas is
possible.
3.* Sardinia. Communist strength in Sardinia is .considerable.
Moreover., Sardinia has knoun sustained strikes accompanied by sabotage.
Significant interference vith talc production and shipment by these means
is possible.
? 4. Turkez, Communism is not a significant force in Turkey. The
security services are in effective control of such minor subversive
elements as do exist. No significant interference is indicated, although
sporadic sabotage is possible.
5. gmmt. There is social unrest in Egypt, but no significant
Communist movement. Sporadic strikes and sabotage are possible, but
no significant interference is likely.
6. alla_katiAL_EaTiat_akreinjSAIE. No significant inter
ference is indicated.
7. Iran. Considerable disaffection and Communist influence exist
in the raiaeum producing area. Security forces are probably adequate
to protect the main installations, but not field installations and pipe-
lines, thich are vulnerable to sabotage. Significant interference is
therefore indicated.
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$0 Iran. If the USSR were to invade Iran, it would presumably
uish to capture the oil facilities intact. Its local fifth column,
therefore, rould be 'employed, not to sabotage those facilities; but
to prevent both production and sabotagep.
If 'Iran were not to be invaded, there would be Communist=
instigated strikes and Sabotage. Security forces, hcrever? could
probably prevent significant local interference.
s_
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IN-CLOSURE "I" ?
BMA AND THE FAR EAST
Products?tad The product's listed with respect to thie
area are: .
do ?liZIA. & EAST PAR/STAN:
MANGANESE, MICA, monazite, crade lac,
shellac, tea, and skins?
bo CEYLON: rubber.
beryl, burlap, kyanites jute,
co RUM, TIRILANDs, MAYA:, rubbers teaks, and tin?
INDONIMIA: pains oil, peppers petroleum, quinine and
quinidine, rubber, and tin?
eo CHINA: antimony, duck feathers, hog bristles, tin and
tungsten e
ko PHILIPPINES: chromite, cocoanut oil, mahogany, manila
fibers and sisal?
AUSTRKLTA: beef, beryl, copper; hides and skins, lead,
? mmazites GREASE WOOL, and zinc?
he NEU CALEDONIA: chrome, nickel..
ioNJ1 ZEMAND: GREASE WOOL, skins
2. India and East Pakistan. At present the Cormunists have no
signifioThriTr'aar =serfere with the production of the commodities
listed, but they may be ab/3 to hinder their. shipment. Before March
19119 the Comaronists ware able to disrupt railway and port operations
over a periOd of =eke by means of unannounced strikes and sabotage?
since then, strong government act-1m has rendered them relatively
ineffective, and their influence in organized labor has declined.
Hammers production and shipment from this area are constantly
in danger of interruption by economic warfare between laclisl and Pakistan
and by cotammal 'disturbances in both countries ? Moreover, the probable
growth of Communist power and influence in Southeast Asia may be ex-
pected to produce an increase fin Comm:acts activity and influence in
easternIncb.'a and East Pakistan venich would jeopardize the production
and shipment of jute products, manganese, rdca.sand tea?
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3. Ceylon. The Communists, capabilities for interference are limited
to the Colombo port area, where they control approximately 35 percent of
organized labor. It is eelieved? however, that this danger could be
contiolled except for the possibility of sporadic sabotage.
4. Bursa. Production and shipment are now effectively disrupted by
the armed insureection of Communists and other elements. Present
conditions, approaching anarchy, are likely to continue indefinitely.
5. Malaya. Althoueh Communist terrorists have been active in Melaya
since July 190, the output of rubber and tin have not thus far been
affected. Production of both these Laterials, hoeevers has been main.
tamed only rat considerably cost. Prospecting for new sources of tin in
Malaya has virtually been halted as a result of terrorist activities.
Terrorism in Malaya, although presently under control, may tell increase ,
as a result ofdevelopmentsin China and Indochina. In the event of mar,
Communist terrorists mould intensify their activities against such
primary objectives as rubber estates and tin mines, significantly inter-
ferine with production and shipment.
6. Tkalend. If the Communists should gain the ascendancy in Indo-
china and Burma, which now seems a definite possibility, the shipment of
strategic materials from Theiland might be prevented by external and in-
ternal Communist pressure on the Thai Government. If such pressure
failed to produce that result, the Communists would nevertheless be cap-
able of significant interference with production and shipment through a
campaign of terrorism similar to that in Malaya.
7. Indonesia. A rateer precarious situation exists in which a new
government is attempting to establish its authority after a long period
of conflict eitb the Dutch. The situation is susceptible to Communist
exploitation, although present threats to production and movement of
commodities arise principally from other elements and over local issues.
Numerous strikes occurred during early 1950, notably of petro-
leum workers and dockeorkers. There has been some evidence of Communist
activity in connection with these strikes, particularly those occerrine in '
Sumatra. Indonesian labor, however, is not well organized or disciplined,
and the fluidity of the present situation permits no valid assessment of
the likelihood of future sabotage. The output of those products requiring
a sizable, disciplined labor force (e.g., petroleum products, tin, and
estate agricultural products) is, of course, mora vulnerable to work
stoppages than is the output from native agriculture. Export of any
Indonesian products, moreover, could be effectively hindered by strikes
at the ports. Therefore, significant interference, for at least limited
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periods, is to be anticipated in the production arid/or shipment'of'all
Indonesian products listed.
8. China. The production and marketinp of strategic commodities
Is a monopoly of the Chinese Communist government, and the capability
of denial to the US is absolute. In the event of war, it must be
presumed that Chinese policy would conform to Soviet requirements and
therefore that the US would be unable to acquire Chinese strategic
commodities.
9. The Philiulus. No significant interference is indicated,
although there is a possibility of sporadic sabotage.
10. Australia. Communist capabilities are limited prieearily to
interference with the operation of raileays and ports through domination
of coal mining, transportation, and dockuorkers? labor unions. No sig-
nificant interference with production is indicated except in the case
of the principal lead-zinc properties, at Broken Hill, where the union
is also Communist-dominated. Rank-and-file membership of these unions
is overwhelmingly non-Communist, however, so that any tork stoppages
or slowdowns would have to be justified in terms of legitimate grievances
in order to be sustained.
11. 11614 Cal donla. Local interference is not indicated. The
production of nickel matte, however, is dependent on coal supplies nor-
mally received from Australia, which might be interfered with.
120 RELlealanlo The only eignificant Communist capability is for
interference uith shipment through domination of the Waterside Workers?
Union. It is doubtful, however, that extended interference would be
supported by the non-Communist rank-and-file membership of the union.
15-
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