POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS AFFECTING THE STABILITY OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000900180001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 24, 1950
• Content Type: MEMO

9
' Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A000900180001-O
Ser. Ter
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
24
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 287 24 April 1950
SUBJECT: Political and Economic Factors Affecting the Stability
of the Philippine Government
SUMMARY
NOTE: This political and economic estimate has not taken
full account of the many variable elements in the
Philippine military situation. It is therefore emphasized
that nothing in this paper should rule out the possibility of
a forceful overthrow of the Philippine Government, if the
conclusion regarding such a possibility is derived from a
detailed study of military factors necessarily beyond the
scope of this estimate.
Although worsening political and economic conditions in the
Republic of the Philippines do not presage the immediate overthrow
of the government, elements in the situation are seriously threaten-
ing the stability of the WSW? administration. Loss of popular con-
fidence in President Quirino is becoming widespread, largely as a
result of administrative incompetency, abuses of power, and evident
liability to maintain essential conditions of law and order throughout
the archipelago. The weaknesses and irresponsibility of the Philip-
pine political system have also contributed to this loss of popular
confidence.
Under President Quirino, the Philippine Government will
probably increase its use of arbitrary power in the immediate future,
in attempts both to auWue legitimate opposition and to quell Commu-
nist-inspired violence. Increasing loss of confidence in Quirino, as
a result of a continuation of his incompetent leadership, may bring
about the President's removal, unless his death or retirement for
physical reasons occurs first, in favor of Vice President Lopez.
Note. This memorandum has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organisations of the Departments of State, Army, 0 V \
Navy, and the Air Force,
Document No.
NO CHANGE in Class. E]
WISPS 11; DECLASSIFIED
lass. CqAFIGED TO: TS S
DA Yemo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: r_r__/a__n63___,v , rite
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29 : aIA-RDP78-01617A000900180001-2
t
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A000900180001-23
Although Lopez may be able to restore a measure of the popular con-
fidence which Quirbao has lost, he will be equally unable to eliminate
the basic factors in the Philippine situation responsible for the long-
term trend toward greater insta.bility. In any event, current attempts
to reorganize the armed forces are not egpected to Increase their
?
efficiency nor to bring about closer cboperation on the part of the
general public.
Economic factors, while not directly responsible for the pre-
sent decline in the stability of the Quirt() administration, nevertheless
aggravate the uneasy political climate. Of immediate concern is the
Republic's rapidly deteriorating firancial position. In turn, the solu-
tion of fundamental economic problems?principally inequities in the
Philippine agrarian system?would play an essential part in ending
the long-term threat to a stable government in the Philippines.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A000900180001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A000900180001-23
Strisfraiatia'
1. Political Conditions,
The Filipino people, largely because of political immaturity and
inadequate education, have generally been apathetic toward their gov-
ernment. This apathy is presently turning into active popular resent-
ment against governmental inefficiency and abuses. Loss of confi-
dence in the government, and particularly in President Elpidio
Quirino, has become widespread and has extended even to the inner
circle of officials upon whom the Presided has heretofore depended
for loyal support. These developments handicap the government it
Its Grier% to maintain law and order throughout the archipelago and
contribute to the strength of the Communist-led link movement in
Luzon.
a. Executive Leadership.
Wan leadership has been traditional in the Philippines and
continues to be expected by the Filipino people. The Philippine
Constitution delegates broad powers to the President, and the great
popularity of the late President, Manuel Quezon, resulted from pop-
ular reaction to his vigorous leadership. The general dissatisfaction
with President Quirino's leadership derives primarily from his in-
ability to exercise effective control, as demonstrated both by his
toleration of excessive graft, corruption, and inefficiency in the gov-
ernment and, perhaps more importantly, by his demonstrated liability
to maintain law and order and his disregard for civil rights. Quirino's
position is further weakened by the increasing popular conviction--
fontered by opposition Metered's% Party charges--that the Quirino
administration returned to power in the 1949 elections solely as a
result of fraud and coercion.
The possibility that Watt)/ who is in ill health, may die in
the near future, or he forced to resign before his term of -office ex-
pires in 1953, has stimulated a general maneuvering for position
among Filipino politicians, a development which has also tended to
lessen confidence in the Quirino administration and weaken the au-
thority of the executive. Vice President Fernando Lopez, who would
succeed Quirino, is a member of the wealthy /and-owning class that
dominates Filipino political life, and has always identified himself
- 1 -9traulecra.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A000900180001-2
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000900180001-23
P.Sniilarfax`s??
with vested economic and political interests. Lopez is becoming
Increasingly popular in comparison with Quirino and, if he assumes
office, might be able to increase administrative efficiency and re-
store a measure of popular confidence in the government. Lopez'
background, however suggests that he would not institute the broad
administrative, political, and economic reforms necessary to obtain
the continuing support of the increasingly articulate common people.
The Quirino administration will probebly increase its clumsy
use of arbitrary power in the immediate fuhtre in an attempt both
to subdue legal opposition and to quell Communist-inspired violence.
This development would accelerate the growing loss of confidence in
the administration, would increase popular opposition, and would
add to Communist strength. As conditions deteriorate, Vice Presi-
dent Lopez, together with other political leaders, may assume effec -
five control of the government, leaving Quirino only the vestiges of
his office.
b. LAW Enforcement.
Operational control of the Philippine Constabulary, the agency
primarily responsible for maintaining law and order, was recently
transferred by emergency decree from the Department of Interior
to the Commanding General of the Armed Forces. This reorganiza-
tion, however, is not..espected to enable the Quirino administration
to suppress lawlessness. Neither the Constabulary nor the Philip-
pine Armed Forces has yet demonstrated noteworthy capability for
maintaining law and order or even for preventing destructive raids
by the dissident Communist-led auk bands concentrated in central
Luzon.
In addition to the pressing problem posed by this Communist-
led "liberation" movement in Luzon, the government's security forces
are handicapped by the prevalence of privately-owned firearms through-
out the islands and by rivalry with special police units, which are
responsible solely to local officials. Widespread abuses of police
authority by all law-enforcing groups, moreover, have resulted in
a non-cooperative attitude on the part of the general public.
- 2 -
-smear
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A000900180001-2
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A000900180001-23.
c. Government Administration.
Governmental Instability is also aggravated by administrative
corraption and inefficiency at virbsally all levels. This situation
has resulted, in lower echelons, primarily from inadequate salaries
and inexperience, and, among the small elite group of wealthy land-
owners and entrepreneurs who constitute the Filipino ruling clique,
from a lack of civic spirit, as well as that clique's full knowledge
of its awn economic power and its past confidence that the apathy of
the disorganized and uneducated mass of the people would continue.
Among the elite, personal enrichment and the protection of vested
Interests continue to be overriding motives for holding public office.
d. The Party System,
The undeveloped Philippine political party system also con-
tributes to governmental instability, Political allegiance in the
Philippines is granted to leaders rather than to issues. The two
major political parties--Liberal and Nacionalistanhave a common
origin and few differences in their platforms. Party members, and
? even party leaders, shift their loyalties frequently and rapidly, de-
pending upon their personal assessment of relative party strengths.
Currently, for example many of the Senators elected on President
Quirino's Liberal Parts; ticket have turned against the President
The local Communists, who have been quick to sense the significance
of these weaknesses in the political parties and who hope to discredit
the whole party system, are continually propagandizing the Filipino
people regarding the self-interest and venality of the nation's poli-
ticians.
2. Economic Conditions.
Although economic conditions are partially responsible for the
present instability of the Philippine Government, they pose less of
an immediate threat than political factors. Although the Republic
of the Philippines is almost self -saficient in food, .a factor favoring
long-range stability, long-standing inequalities in the nation's agrarian
system have been exploited by the Communists and have not only facil-
itated the development of the Communist-led Utak move=nt. in Luzon
3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A000900180001-2.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A000900180001-0
but are producing unrest eisevhere in the archipelago. Continued
failure of the Philippine governing class--the beneficiaries of this
agrarian system--to deal with this problem effectively has pro-
vided local Communists with =silent opportunities tb organise
the otherwise leaderless peasantry. ?
The nation's raPidly deteriorating financial position is a less
deep-seated but immediately critical problem. Hem budgetary
deficits and a serious depletion of foreign reserves have obliged
the government to tighten import controls drastically and to pro-
pose tas increases. Under a reasonably stable and efficient Smartt-
straticm, these measures might have been considered necessary to
a solution of the problem. However, the resultant sharp price in-
creases of imported consumer goods and the creation of some un-
employment in the import trades, when viewed in connection with
the general lack of confidence in the Qatzino pthninigtration, have
increased pop-alar doubt as to the csrantry'-s economic future and
thus have aggravated the present political instability.
4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A000900180001-2
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A000900180001-2
le#
40 Next 6 Page(s) In Document Denied
e
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A000900180001-2