KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A001400030001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 2, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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INTELLIGENCE `,-.GROUP
S E C R E T
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This (SR) series of CIG Situation Reports is designed to furnish to
authorized recipients, for their continuing use as a reference, analyses and
interpretations of the strategic or national policy aspects of foreign situations
which affect the national security of the United States. The complete series
will give world-wide coverage, including reports on all significant foreign coun-
tries, geographical areas, or functional subjects.
In the preparation of this report, the Central Intelligence Group has
made full use of material furnished by the intelligence agencies of the State,
War and Navy Departments and of the Army Air Forces. These agencies have
also concurred in this report unless otherwise noted.
It is suggested that the recipients retain this report, since it will be
reviewed and, if necessary, revised in whole or in part each month hereafter.
WARNING
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NA-
TIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF
THE ESPIONAGE ACT, 50 U.S.C., 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANS-
MISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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0
1.
Genesis of the Present Political Situation ..................
I-1
a.
b.
c.
External Influences Affecting Korean Political Develo rent.
The Korean Independence Movement ........................
Effects of Allied Policy a`nd Its Implementation.........
I-1
I-1
1-2
2.
Current Political Situation .................................
1-4
a._ Contrasting US and Soviet Occupation Programs ...........
b. Current Situation in the Soviet Zone ....................
c. Current Situation in the US Zone ........................
1-4
1-6
1-7
1.
Genesis of the Present Economic System ......................
II-1
2.
Description of Present Economic System ......................
II-1
a. Agriculture and Fisheries ................................
11-2
b. Natural Resources .......................................
11-3
C. Industry ................................................
11-5
d. Transportation ..........................................
11-6
e. Finance .................................................
11-6
f. International Trade .....................................
11-8
3.
Current Situation in the Soviet Zone...... ...................
11-9
4.
Current Situation in the US Zone ............................
II-10
SECTION III - MILITARY SITUATION
SECTION IV - STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY
SECTION V - PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A -
Topography
APPENDIX B -
Population Characteristics and Statistics
APPENDIX C -
Chronology
APPENDIX D -
Biographical Data Document No. 0
APPENDIX E - Map - Transportation Routego CHANGE in Class. ^
? APPENDIX F - Map - Topographic D7?:~ C ASSI . IED
ss. c:QNC ?D TO: TS S C
D):A T: ^mo, 11 Apr 77 SECRET
Auth: DA 77/3.763
Date; By:
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SUMMARY
Korea's immediate significance to the security of the US lies in
the fact that it is the critical point of contact between the US and the USSR
in the Far East. Korea can be of little military value to the US, but the
failure of the US to meet its commitments regarding Korean independence would
result in serious loss of prestige. From a long-range view, however, Korea
is important to US security because Soviet control of this strategically
situated peninsula would jeopardize US political aims in China and Japan, and
would thus threaten all US security plans throughout the Pacific.
Koreans have always resisted outside penetration, and for centuries
successfully maintained their isolation despite Chinese suzerainty. Forty
years of Japanese domination only intensified the desire of Koreans for free-
dom from foreign interference. Korean nationalism was manifested in the
formation of groups, at home and abroad, which fought for independence from
1919 until the liberation of Korea from Japan in August 1945. Nationalism is
therefore a deeply imbedded characteristic of the large majority of the Korean
people.
Korean aspirations for sovereignty and independence were recognized
and their realization was guaranteed by the US, USSR, UK, and China through
international agreements reached at Cairo, Yalta, Potsdam, and Moscow. The
US and the USSR, as powers in occupation of zones South and North of the 38th
parallel, respectively, have failed to agree, however, on the means of carry-
ing out the terms of the Moscow Decision. This disagreement reflects a
difference in basic aims. The USSR seeks to establish a united Korea under a
government subservient to the USSR, to re-orient Korean economy toward the
USSR while developing Korean industrial and agricultural potential, and to
integrate the Korean peninsula into the Soviet system of Far Eastern defenses.
The US seeks to establish a self-governing Korean state independent of foreign
control with a representative national government, to establish a sound econ-
omy with multilateral, non-discriminatory trade opportunities, and to ensure
permanent military neutralization.
The-absence of agreement between the US and the USSR has converted
supposedly temporary partition into the governing factor in Korean political
and economic life. Both the USSR and the US have initiated programs in their
respective zones to implement their contradictory basic aims. Freedom from
foreign interference has remained the dominant aspiration of the Korean
people; the inability of the occupying powers to unite the country has
brought Korea nothing but political discord and economic stagnation. The
contradiction between the US and Soviet programs has added significance be-
cause Japanese domination left the Koreans politically inexperienced and with
an economy which had been designed solely to serve Japanese purposes.
The Sovietization of Korea-north of the 38th parallel began immedi-
ately after the occupation and has proceeded since that time without inter-
ruption. The Zone is organized as a police state in which opposition to the
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regime is rigorously suppressed and political activity is controlled by
? Communist-dominated People's Committees. The economy of North Korea, based
on nationalization of the extensive former Japanese holdings and the redis-
tribution of large land holdings, has also been reconstructed on the prin-
ciple of state control. Despite greater industrial resources, a better
balanced economy, and the fact that a large majority of all Koreans favor
a socialistic program, the economic problems in the Soviet Zone are now
more acute than in the US Zone, and the Soviet program does not appear to
have won the support of the Korean people. Nevertheless, in its zone the
Soviet regime has spurious evidence of popular support in the form of
general elections held in November 1946, which followed the well-known
totalitarian pattern and gave overwhelming support to the government's
slate. There is little likelihood of a future departure from the established
pattern in the Northern Zone, because the Soviet-controlled police, backed
by a native Korean Army totalling 200,000 allows no opportunity for public
expression of general discontent or the overthrow of established Communist
rule.
In South Korea, the US Military Government established an ad-
ministration aimed at relieving the wants of the people while educating them
for self-government. Reluctance to settle issues for fear of prejudicing
the,work of a future Korean government and an endeavor to maintain a balance
among Korean political parties have handicapped the reconstruction of
political and economic life in South Korea; US hopes for the resumption of
negotiations leading to the implementation of the Moscow Decision led to a
postponement of unilateral political and social reorganization there. When
delay in the resumption of joint Commission meetings was prolonged, however,
the US undertook the establishment of an advisory legislature for the US Zone
and the gradual transfer of administrative authority from US to Korean per-
sonnel. While the policy of retiring US personnel to advisory positions has
had Korean support, the issue of an interim legislature has been a source of
dispute since its inception. Elections held in October 1946 for the Interim
Legislative Assembly gave an overwhelming majority to the Right. Prior and
subsequent US efforts to unify moderates of the Right and Left were not
successful. Rightists hold the lion's share of positions in administration
of the US Zone while the Leftists are attempting, primarily by covert means,
to obstruct the US program and to discredit the US Military Government. The
US alienated influential Rightist elements when it agreed with the USSR, in
principle, that groups continuing to oppose the Moscow Decision would be
excluded from consultation with the Joint Commission in the formation of an
all-Korean provisional government.
Meanwhile, the acute food shortage which provoked rice riots in
the fall of 1946 has been relieved. The imposition of marketing controls
and improvements in the collection and distribution of grain make possible
the best ration in South Korea since the end of the war. Lack of fertilizer
hampers the restoration of agriculture to prewar levels of production, how-
ever, and necessitates continued large-scale food imports. Continued re-
vival of other segments of the economy is substantially dependent on imports
which must be supplied principally through foreign loans or grants and
through managerial and technical assistance.
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While Korea's vulnerability to attack from the north limits US
? military capabilities in this area, the emergence of a unified Korea under
Soviet domination would constitute a major political defeat for the US.
Well aware of this, the USSR intentionally created and prolonged political
stalemate while consolidating its control of North Korea and attempting by
all possible means to disrupt US efforts toward stability in South Korea.
In pursuing these delaying tactics, the USSR has been counting upon the
possibility that the US public would be unwilling to continue to bear the
cost of military occupation and economic assistance, particularly since
the USSR is relying on the possibility that the US faces economic depression
which will force a drastic reduction in the role of the US in international
affairs.
The progress made in the US Zone toward the establishment of a
basis of a democratic Korean government and the implication of the Truman
Doctrine that the US intends to continue its support of Korean aspirations
for independence, may have caused the USSR to agree to reconvene the Joint
Commission on terms acceptable to the US. The USSR may well be willing to
make concessions in the Joint Commission or on the governmental level in
order to reach agreement if it estimates that Korean Communists are capable
of bringing Korea eventually within the Soviet orbit. This is a more likely
development than a proposal of US-USSR withdrawal. In the event of an
impasse in the Joint Commission a dangerous possibility is the unilateral
withdrawal of Soviet troops in order to try to force a withdrawal of US
troops and leave South Korea open to penetration by the Communists backed
by the North Korean Army. The USSR is not likely to adopt this course unless
? it believes that the concessions required to achieve agreement would nullify
the possibility of ultimate Communist control of Korea. In any case, the
USSR will continue to seek to place on other signatories the onus for any
failure to implement the Moscow Decision. The USSR, however, probably hopes
to resolve the Korean issue in.its favor without reference to the UN, where
world opinion would be focused upon Soviet activities in North Korea.
Eventually either the US or the Soviet concept of democracy must
prevail in Korea. If the choice lies with the Koreans themselves, it will
be determined by the relative political strength of the Sovietized North
Korean regime and the democratically inclined political parties of South
Korea. A national provisional assembly in which representation was accorded
on the basis of population theoretically would be controlled by the South,
but the multiple parties of the South could not retain this control except
by coalition, held together by leaders who now engage in bitter personal
rivalry. Such a coalition would be in constant jeopardy in the face of
impact from the cohesive, communist-controlled bloc from the North sup-
ported by the North Korean Army. Unless the formation of a national govern-
ment can be accomplished with accompanying safeguards against Communist
tactics, it will be impossible to establish Korea as a sovereign and indepen-
dent state.
40
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?
SECTION I
POLITICAL SITUATION
1. Genesis of the Present Political Situation
a. External Influences Affecting Korean Political Development
Long known as the Hermit Kingdom, Korea, by reason of its geo-
graphic location, succeeded during many centuries in maintaining virtual
isolation from more powerful neighbors. Having adopted Chinese civiliza-
tion at the beginning of its history, Korea was ruled under the loose
suzerainty of the Chinese until the end of the 19th century. This alle-
giance of Korea to China resembled the relationship of younger brother
to elder brother in the Confucian morality. The relationship implied a
certain degree of subordination but not by any means subjection. In this
semi-autonomous position Korea had sufficient freedom to develop a national
culture without ever achieving national sovereignty in the modern sense.
Korea was opened to the outside world at a time when national-
ism and imperialism were at their height. Although the Japanese were
well acquainted with the application of Confucian ethics to interna-
tional relations, they chose to regard Korea as a sovereign nation ac-
cording to the Western definition. Japan therefore recognized the in-
dependence of Korea in the treaty of 1876 and proceeded to undermine
the Chinese position of preference in the peninsula. In this maneuver,
Japan could count on the support of the Western powers who could not
conceive of independence apart from sovereignty.
Once the barrier of isolation was forced, Korea became the
crossroads of international conflict in northeast Asia. Japan and
China undertook the first joint occupation of Korea in 1885. Since they
were rivals for hegemony in the peninsula, the occupying powers soon fell
at odds. Chinese influence tended to predominate until the outbreak of
the Sino-Japanese War in 1893. This conflict which arose over a, Japanese
demand for the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Korea ended in a striking
victory for the Japanese. The expulsion of China from Korea, however,
redounded chiefly to the benefit of the Russians, who held the Maritime
Province of Siberia. For a time Russian influence replaced the Chinese
at the court in Seoul and Japan did not secure uncontested control of
Korea until the decisive defeat of Russia in 1905. Korea preserved a
semblance of self-government under the Japanese protectorate until 1910,
when the Korean king finally abdicated in favor of the Emperor of Japan.
From then on, until her liberation by the Allies in August 1945, Korea
was governed as a Japanese colony.
b. The Korean Independence Movement
40
Intense nationalism developed in Korea primarily as a result of
long isolation and subsequent relations with foreign powers which
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consistently worked to the detriment of the Korean people. Koreans at
home and in exile have consistently given evidence of a strong desire for
immediate and complete independence. Although the Japanese were partially
successful in winning over the Korean royalty and aristocracy through
titles, gifts and preferences, national consciousness grew steadily among
all classes under Japanese rule. The higher level of education, the more
efficient administration, and the industrial development which the Japanese
brought to Korea only, served to stimulate the desire for independence.
This desire for independence led to the organization of Korean underground
nationalist groups during the period of Japanese rule, while other groups
chose to leave Korea and to work for Korean independence in exile.
The foremost Korean independence group in exile was the Korean
Provisional Government (Kopogo). This group, founded in Shanghai following
the failure of the Korean uprising of 1919, received the nominal allegiance
of nearly all other exile groups including the Korean Communist Party. The
Kopogo drew up a Provisional Constitution, established a Provisional Legis-
lative Assembly and controlled the Korean Independence Army which operated
as a part of the Chinese National Army. Despite the inclusion of more
liberal elements, including Kim Kiu Sik, the political viewpoint of Kopogo
under the leadership of Kim Koo and Rhee Syngman was largely conservative.
(It was under the chairmanship of Rhee Syngman that the Korean Commission
was established to represent Kopogo in the US.)
Koreans both at home and abroad were generally united in opposition
to Japan until shortly before the outbreak of war in the Pacific. As tension
mounted between Japan and the Pacific colonial powers, however, the pre-
viously distant prospect of Korean independence at last seemed to be moving
nearer. Various factions emerged in preparation for the coming struggle for
power. The Korean Provisional Government, which had had a virtual monopoly
of Korean representation abroad since 1919, was suddenly challenged by rival
organizations. In January, 1941, the Korean Independence League was founded
under Communist sponsorship at Yenan, China. Shortly afterwards the opponents
of Rhee Syngman among the Koreans in the US banded themselves together in the
United Korean Committee. These two groups, one in China and the other in the
US, were not officially associated, but personal contact was maintained on an
informal basis. The KIL and the UKC constituted the beginnings of Leftist
opposition to the leadership of Rhee Syngman and Kim Koo, and between them
they presented a fair cross-section of Korean Leftist opinion, ranging from
the extreme pro-Communism of the Yenan organization to the "liberalism" of
the US group.
c. Effects of Allied Policy and Its Implementation
In the course of the Second World War the Allies repeatedly promised
independence to Korea. These promises are embodied in the Cairo Declaration
which was issued by the US, UK, and China in December 1943 and confirmed by
the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945. Since Soviet adherence to the Far
Eastern policy of the Allies had in the meanwhile been obtained at Yalta in
February 1945, the USSR adhered to the Potsdam Declaration, upon going to war
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with Japan in August 1945. When Japan surrendered, the US and USSR, as an
expedient to facilitate the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea, pro-
ceeded with the previously agreed upon joint occupation of Korea and in-
formally agreed on the 38th parallel as the line of demarcation between
their respective forces.
Shortly after the Japanese surrender, the Allies attempted to
unite Korea before the artificial partition had had time to work its bane-
ful effects. At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December
1945, the representatives of the US, UK, and USSR, with the consent of
China, made specific arrangements for the implementation of the Cairo and
Potsdam Declarations. The Moscow Decision provided that a Joint Commission
of the US and USSR should consult with "Korean democratic parties and
social organizations" in framing a provisional government for the whole
country. This provisional government would then assist in drawing up a
program of political and economic reforms to serve as the basis of a four-
power trusteeship of the US, UK, USSR, and China for a period up to five
years prior to granting Korea complete independence.
At the time of its announcement, the trusteeship clause of the
Moscow Decision aroused a storm of protest in Korea which has not subsided
to this day. This protest came from the natural objection of the Koreans
to interference, however temporary, by foreign powers which gave Korea
something less than immediate and complete independence. Resentment was
intensified by political leaders who played upon traditional Korean
nationalism by declaring that Allied trusteeship in effect meant a quad-
ripartite displacement of Japan as "trustee" of Korea and that this con-
cealed an attempt to stifle the aspirations of the people* for freedom
from outside interference.
All Korean parties originally joined in protesting against trustee-
ship, but the Communists and their fellow-travelers executed a remarkable
about-face once the USSR had manifested its support of the Moscow Decision
in toto. Since then opposition to trusteeship has been the distinctive
badge of all parties except those dominated by the Communists, without
losing its general appeal among Koreans. When the Joint Commission met in
* Although all Koreans want freedom, on specific subordinate issues, when
speaking of what Korea as a whole may aspire to or fear, it is necessary
to bear in mind the Qualifications that by "Korea" is meant only the 5
or 10% of the adult population which maintains an active interest in
national or international developments. Since a small group may not
have the mass solidarity of a large electorate, the tide of fickle public
opinion at present characterizing Korea may shift radically. By the same
token, if some of the national apathy can be wiped away, then public
opinion may eventually take on more authority.
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Seoul in March 1946 to carry out the terms of the Moscow Decision, the
? USSR had apparently decided to explort opposition to trusteeship as a
means of disqualifying from participation in the provisional government
all political elements except those under Communist domination. For six
weeks the Soviet delegation argued for an application of the Moscow
Decision which would have precluded consultation with groups other than
Communists. Since adherence to the Soviet view would in effect negate
the right of free speech, the US was equally insistent on the right of all
representative groups to be heard. This led to the adjournment of the
Joint Commission without result in May 1946. For the ensuing year all
efforts to implement the Moscow Decision foundered on the contradiction
between the US and Soviet positions on the right of Korean groups to par-
ticipate in the forming of a provisional government. In the meanwhile, the
growing divergences between the US and Soviet Zones of occupation daily
increased the obstacles to the eventual unification of Korea.
2. CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION
a. Contrasting US and Soviet Occupation Programs
The contradiction between the US and Soviet political ideologies
has again been illustrated in Korea where the application of opposing
policies to similar situations at the beginning of the occupation had
added significance because forty years of Japanese rule had done nothing
to prepare the Korean people for self-government. On their arrival in
Korea, the US and Soviet forces both found that local politically con-
scious Koreans, with some assistance from the Japanese, had formed People's
Committees during the interim between the surrender of Japan and the be-
ginning of the occupation. The Soviet forces, which arrived first, at once
recognized the People's Committees north of the 38th parallel as the
legitimate "interim" representatives of the Korean people. The US forces
on the other hand refused to commit themselves to support in advance the
claims of any one group to rule Korea. General Hodge accordingly refused
to recognize the so-called People's Republic, which had been elected by
the People's Committees on 6 September 1945, except as another political
party.* When Rhee Syngman and the members of the Korean Provisional
Government arrived in South Korea, they were accorded the same treatment.
The result was that the supporters of both the People's Committees and
the Korean Provisional Government considered themselves slighted by the
* In post-occupation Korean affairs there has been a continual reshuffling
of numerous political groups. The parties, as such, are not the only
political groups. Labor unions, cultural and religious groups have impor-
tant political significance, for these have either been founded upon a
political ideal or subseauently infiltrated by political party members.
Because of the resultant melange and multiple party affiliation (in the
South), the importance of individual political groups is secondary to the
personal stand and influence of group leaders. The multiplicity of political
groups has made necessary the use of coalitions to obtain effective strength.
As an arbitrary measure coalitions favoring trusteeship have been classified
as the Left Wing; all opposing trusteeship as the Right Wing.
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US authorities. Since the US Military Government furthermore made temporary
use of the Japanese officials at the beginning of the occupation, the vari-
ous Korean factions convinced themselves that they had a legitimate griev-
ance against the US.
The USSR had taken advantage of its position of control to impose
on the Koreans north of the 38th parallel a regime of full-fledged totali-
tarianism. Soviet policy of achieving control through regimentation is
based on a determination to place responsibility for the political and
economic welfare of the area on Soviet-recognized representatives of the
Korean people. Having accepted the People's Committees in North Korea, the
USSR promptly proceeded to pack them with native communists and organize
them along lines similar to the Soviets of the Russian Revolution. By
organizing a police state, these People's Committees have ruled North Korea
at the bidding of the Soviets for nearly two years not only without economic
assistance, but in spite of the economic demands which the Soviet forces
have made on the area. Unencumbered by the remnants of parliamentary de-
mocracy or by the traditions of Liberalism, North Korea has in fact offered
less resistance to the extension of Soviet influence than any of the Euro-
pean countries.
In South Korea, on the other hand, the US Military Government had
established an administration aimed at relieving the wants of the people
while educating them for eventual independence and self-government. In this
approach the US labors under a handicap because it endeavors to maintain a
balance among Korean parties. The Military Government has been reluctant to
settle many issues for fear of favoring one group above another and of
prejudicing the work of a future Korean government. But pending the imple-
mentation of the Moscow Decision, the US has guaranteed the Koreans certain
fundamental liberties the maintenance of which required resistance to the
constant pressure of the USSR and its adherents. The unwillingness of the
USSR to grant similar liberties to all Koreans in effect was responsible
for the deadlock of the joint Commission holding the Moscow Decision in
suspension for more than a year. The fact that the US hoped for the re-
sumption of negotiations led to a postponement of unilateral political and
social reorganization in South Korea. Since the USSR did not delay the
implementation of Soviet policy in its zone, North Korea appears to have
moved farther toward self-government and egalitarian reform than the US
zone. However, US policy has prepared southern Korea for the acceptance
of a democratic form of government, a condition which is not even approxi-
mated in the North.
Thus subjected to the forces of joint US-Soviet occupation, the
Korean Independence movement, originally split into groups operating under-
ground in Korea and groups in exile, now is shattered into numerous Right
Wing groups which call for immediate independence, and Communist-dominated
Left Wing groups which have agreed to accept independence via trusteeship.
The Leftists are the only articulate groups in the North; in South Korea
political life is still dominated by a rivalry between Rightists and the
remnants of the Left Wing People's Committees.
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b. Current Situation in the Soviet Zone
In its zone the Soviet regime has spurious evidence of the whole-
hearted support of every element in the population. But despite their
constant reiteration of the word "democratic" the Soviet authorities in no
wise rely upon the consent of the governed. Nothing in North Korean politics
is left to chance or to the vagaries of public opinion. The ruling hier-
archy of "people's committees') is buttressed at every stage by a duplicate
member of the Communist party structure which controls every phase of public
life in the Soviet Zone. The government party not only enjoys a monopoly
of political leadership in North Korea, it also supervises, inspires and
infiltrates every association and grouping which may claim to represent the
citizens in any of their social, economic or cultural activities. The gov-
ernment can thus obtain on a given signal the seemingly spontaneous ex-
pression of popular opinion from any segment of the population. Under these
circumstances, it becomes impossible for the individual to make himself heard
on any subject unless he conforms to the "party line."
Throughout Korea, the parties of the Left were early subject to
infiltration. In North Korea, under strong Soviet pressure, the moderate
elements of the People's Front soon succumbed to the Communist assault.
The announcement of the Moscow Decision at the end of December 1945 pre-
sented to the USSR an opportunity for the total suppression of opposition.
All individuals and groups which refused to endorse trusteeship at that
time were branded as reactionaries and barred from political activity.
Since the vast majority of Koreans on both sides of the border are hostile
to foreign control under any guise, the trusteeship issue has provided a
convenient pretext for imposing minority rule on North Korea.
The single party system has thus prevailed in North Korea since
early in the Soviet occupation, but the Communist Party has consistently
exercised its domination through "front" organizations. In fact since
July 1946, the Communist Party no longer exists under its own name, for
it has been merged with other Leftist groups into the North Korean Labor
Party. In order to complete the democratic facade, the Soviet authorities
last fall decided to give their system in North Korea the supreme sanction
of a plebiscite. On 3 November general elections were held in the Soviet
Zone for the local and provincial People's Committees. These elections
followed the well-known totalitarian pattern in which the voter is given
no choice but to support or reject an official slate of candidates. Ap-
parently no attempt was made to keep the balloting secret or the registra-
tion free, and the elections resulted in an overwhelming victory for the
regime. The Moscow radio was able to brag that over 96% of the electorate
had gone to the polls, while the government candidates had polled approxi-
mately 99% of the vote. In this carnival of compliance, the only notable
opposition seems to have come from the native Catholic community, which,
in several instances observed by the US Liaison Officer in Pyong-yang,
refused to have any part in the electoral proceedings.
The general election of 3 November marks the end rather than the
beginning of revolution in North Korea. In contrast to usual democratic
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procedure, the elections in the Soviet Zone constitute not so much a point
of departure for new developments as the confirmation of the old. Thus
the general elections in the North have merely consecrated the status quo.
As a result of the plebiscite the People's Committees have dropped the
qualification "interim" from their title. The democratic facade was
recently completed by the addition of a "Council of Representatives" and
a "Peoples Council" as legislature, which masks but does not alter the
totalitarian regime. Otherwise no significant change can be found.
The transformation of the political and social institutions of
North Korea occurred in the opening stages of the occupation when the
USSR was liquidating the remnants of Japanese rule. In the course of
this liquidation, the Soviets took over from the Japanese almost all, the
big industrial and financial establishments of North_KoreafThe control
of North Korean banking, transportation and heavy industry has thus been
vested in the People's Committees, so that private enterpriseis now con-
fined largely to. agriculture and the handicrafts. The question of land!
reform, which is pending in the South, has been settled in the North.
The USSR claims to have distributed 2,471,000 acres free of charge to the
tenants.
The USSR has undeniably taken the lead in economic and social
changes. A labor law was promulgated in the Soviet Zone before it was
enacted in the US Zone, and judging from appearances, the first two years
of occupation have brought great changes north of the 38th parallel.
These changes, however, have been chiefly in the direction of further
? regimentation and closer state control. In the Soviet Zone, the indi-
vidual has given up his liberty for a rather dubious assurance of "social
security", so that after an initial period of enthusiasm for Communism,
the Korean people seem finally to have reacted against the USSR. Evi-
dence of discontent and apathy in the Soviet Zone is provided by the
official propaganda put out to combat the symptoms of disaffection. Such
observers' reports as are available likewise tend to confirm the impres-
sion that the USSR has become unpopular with the Koreans who live under
them. The Soviet-controlled police system, however, allows no opportuni-
ty for this general discontent to be expressed publicly or to overthrow
established Communist rule.
c. Current Situation in the US Zone
The rivalry between the Leftist People's Committees and Rightist
elements of the former Provisional Government in exile still dominates the
political life of the US Zone with the US attempting impartially to es-
tablish democratic procedures. Almost two years after the liberation the
Leftists are still demanding that the US recognize the People's Committees,
while the Rightists continue to work for the early establishment of an in-
dependent provisional government. Both the Right and the Left join in de-
manding the unification and independence of Korea. All South Korean
parties seem, moreover, agreed that the future Korean government must
nationalize the industries and redistribute the land. This Socialistic
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program is the common property of both Right and Left, for there are ap-
parently no articulate proponents of capitalism among the Koreans. With
regard to method and personnel, however, bitter differences have arisen.
The Leftists wish to proceed as expeditiously and ruthlessly as possible
with the proposed reforms. They favor revolutionary procedures such as
outright expropriation where the Rightists prefer indemnification. Per-
sonal conflicts embitter the discussion, since the Leftists make no secret
of their intention to punish prominent Rightists for their past collabora-
tion with the Japanese. Since most parties of the Left are dominated by
the Communists and their fellow-travelers, the Soviet Union and its poli-
cies have become an important issue between the Left and Right in South
Korean politics.
When it became apparent last summer that there was no prospect
of the prompt renewal of Joint Commission negotiations, the US undertook
to promote the democratization of South Korea in order to match the in-
creasing sovietization of the North. The cardinal points of the program
were the establishment of an advisory legislature for the US Zone and the
gradual transfer of administrative authority from American to Korean per-
sonnel. In this way the Koreans would be brought to share in the execu-
tive and legislative functions of the Military Government, and receive
training for eventual independence and democracy.
Leftists denounced the US plan from the start as a sham and a
subterfuge devised to split Korea irrevocably into two parts by setting
up a separate government south of the 38th parallel. These accusations
had some color of truth, for every advance made in South Korea toward
parliamentary democracy would necessarily widen the gulf between the US
and Soviet Zones. ' The Military Government, however, refused to be swayed
from its goal by the attacks of Soviet and'Communist propaganda, and
steadfastly maintained that the achievement of self-government in one
zone was a step toward the establishment of democracy in the whole of
Korea. Two important steps have now been taken to comply with the in-
terim US policy for South Korea: the replacement of American by Korean
officials in the chief posts-of the administration and the convocation
of a South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly. While the policy of
retiring US personnel to purely advisory positions in the Military Gov-
ernment has had Korean support from the time of its announcement in
September 1946, the device of an interim legislature has given rise to
bitter disputes since it was first proposed publicly in June of last
year.
In order to get popular support for its legislative project,
the US Military Government in South Korea had to organize a unification
movement of the Right and the Left. The parties of the Right, grouped
in the Representative Democratic Council, were nominally led by Kim Kiu
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Sik but actually came under the influence of Rhee Syngman* and Kim Koo,
former heads of the Korean government in exile. General Hodge obtained
the cooperation of Kim Kiu Sik early in the proceedings. Since Rhee
Syngman and Kim Koo were also favorable to the institution of an advisory
legislature, the coalition movement met with little resistance from the
Right. The Left, however, was sharply divided between moderates and ex-
tremists. Lyuh Woon Hyung, president of the People's Party, largest of
the Leftists groups, set out to marshal the moderates for a great struggle
against the domination of the Communist Party led by Pak Heun Yung. The
ensuing contest between independent and captive Leftists disrupted every
party of the Left, including even the Communists, and cracked the pre-
viously solid People's Front. The independent Leftists won a temporary
advantage at the beginning of September when General Hodge attempted to
check illegal activities by suspending three extremist newspapers, by
issuing warrants for the arrest of several Communist leaders including the
Secretary General of the Communist Party Pak Heun Yung, and by vigorously
prosecuting the trial of party members charged with counterfeiting. On
4 October the Leftist members of the coalition committee were finally
persuaded to sign a declaration of the Right and the Left in favor of an
advisory legislature for South Korea. This act marked the high tide of
moderate influence among South Korea parties.
The elections to the Interim Legislative Assembly for South
Korea, which were held at the end of October, gave an overwhelming ma-
jority to the Right, and thereby checked the progress of the moderate
Left. Of the 45 elective seats, 43 were won by Rightists. Although
General Hodge undertook to compensate the Left for its defeat at the
polls by nominating a fair number of Leftists to the 45 appointive seats,
the policy of cooperation with the Military Government which had brought
them to defeat at the polls was nonetheless discredited with the Leftists.
Lyuh Woon Hyung retired from politics after a valedictory speech on 5
December in which he took the blame for the failure of the unification
movement and for the continued partition of Korea. Thereafter the Com-
munists rapidly regained their ascendancy over all remaining sectors of
the Left. The Socialist Labor Party, which Lyuh founded last November
* Rhee Syngman, the most ardent exponent of the anti-Soviet and anti-
Communist feeling of the Right, had been consistently ignored by the
Military Government since his removal from the chairmanship of the
Representative Democratic Council in March 1946, because of his per-
sonal recalcitrance and intense hatred of Soviet Communism. The Demo-
cratic Council then replaced Rhee with the moderate Rightist, Kim Kiu
Sik, at the instance of US officials who were trying to clear the air
for the Joint Commission meeting. After the deposition of Rhee the
extreme Right continued to campaign for immediate independence and
against trusteeship, but it was not until recently that this campaign
turned against the US Military Government.
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in opposition to the South Korea Labor Party* previously organized by the
Communists, has steadily lost members to its rival, and has now been
dissolved. After the Communists the chief beneficiary of the decline of
the moderate Left has been the extreme Right. Kim Kiu Sik, leader of the
moderate Right who was associated with Lyuh Woon Hyung on the coalition
committee, was elected Chairman of the Interim Legislative Assembly, but
has lost standing because of his deference to the Military Government.
Control of the Rightist majority of the Assembly now lies with the fol-
lowers of Rhee Syngman.
Within little more than a month after its inauguration on 12
December 1946, the Interim Legislative Assembly of South Korea, proceeded
to act as the parliament of the Korean nation, in open defiance of both the
US and Soviet occupation. According to ordinance #118 which contains the
terms of reference for the Assembly, the interim legislature is charged
with drafting ordinances on matters concerning the general welfare, and
with reviewing and confirming all civil service appointments under the
Military Government above the lowest grades. The assent of the Military
Governor is required before any enactment of the Assembly can become law.
Ordinance #118 provides that the Assembly assist the Military-Governor in
working out a program of political, economic, and social reforms, but
does not therefore make the legislature a constituent assembly. The US
authorities have held that the enactment of a universal suffrage law
which would serve as the basis for elections to a second and more repre-
sentative legislature was the first task of the Assembly. The Assembly,
however, has given priority in its deliberations to the enactment of a
constitution and to the Koreanization of the administration. In its
proceedings to date the Interim Legislative Assembly has tended to dis-
regard the existence of the US Military Government in South Korea as well
as the Soviet regime in North Korea, and has claimed to represent the
entire Korean people. By thus generally following the line laid down
by Rhee Syngman the Assembly has repeatedly come into open conflict with
the US authorities in South Korea.
* Last July, shortly after the Leftist parties in North Korea were
united in the North Korean Labor Party, a similar organization was
launched in the South. The Communist Party since that time has oper-
ated under the cover of the South Korean Labor Party, a disguise which
may have been adopted because of the discredit reflected on the Com-
munist Party by the counterfeit trial. A change of tactics seems to
have followed the change of names. The severe reprisals of-the Mili-
tary Government agitators and the overwhelming defeat of the Leftists
in the elections to the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly
appear to have persuaded the Communists that the time for overt opposi-
tion had passed. At present the Communists seem to be working under-
ground and trying to consolidate their position within the Korean Labor
movement. They are active in the All Korean Council of Labor Unions,
which represents the Leftist elements in South Korean labor, and have
,also established contact with international labor through the World
Federation of Trade Unions.
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Far from giving the US Military Government the popular support it
was seeking, the legislature has fomented hostility between General Hodge
and the parties of the Right. This growing disaffection of the Rightists
is the most portentous development in South Korean politics since the
beginning of the occupation. Heretofore the US authorities could rely on
the Right, whatever their troubles with the Left. Throughout the agitation
over the US-sponsored Left-Right unification movement last fall and summer
the Right was quiet. At the height of the strikes and riots which con-
stituted the "October offensive" of the Communists against the Military
Government, the US authorities had the assistance of Rightists in preserving
order. The Rightists seemed committed to support the US primarily because
of their antipathy to the USSR.
The publication on 11 January 1947, of General Hodge's letter of
24 December to the Soviet Commander in North Korea was the signal for the
rebellion of the Right. In this letter General Hodge agreed in principle
that continued opposition to the Moscow Decision would constitute a basis
for the exclusion, by mutual agreement between the US and the USSR, of
groups from consultation with the Joint Commission in forming a provisional
government. Anti-trusteeship sentiment immediately flared up in South
Korea. A call to arms had just previously been issued by Rhee Syngman and
Kim Koo proclaiming that the time had come for Koreans to face martyrdom
in their struggle for independence. An outbreak of violence from the Right
was expected in the US Zone toward the middle of January 1947. Although a
Rightist insurrection has not materialized, a revolt against the US occupa-
tion has nonetheless occurred in the Interim Legislative Assembly. In spite
? of the opposition of Kim Kiu Sik, a resolution condemning General Hodge for
his recent concessions to the USSR was introduced in the Assembly on
14 January 1947. The Chairman, Kim Kiu Sik, delayed a decision by adjourning
the Assembly for five days. General Hodge took advantage of the respite in
order to argue personally with the members of the Assembly against the
resolution, but the motion was carried as soon as the session resumed on
20 January. The vote taken in the name of the Korean Nation was 44 to 1 in
favor of the resolution, with complete abstention by the Left. The coali-
tion committee which originally sponsored the Assembly is now under fire from
both Right and Left, while Kim Kiu Sik's position at the head of an Assembly
which he cannot control has become almost untenable. The centrist group
(moderates of Left and Right) which was organized to support US policy in
South Korea has apparently disintegrated, leaving the US Military Government
more isolated than at any time since the beginning of the occupation. The
extreme Rightists control the overt political structure in the US Zone, while
the Leftists are attempting primarily by covert means to obstruct democratic
progress and to discredit the US Military Government.
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?
SECTION II
ECONOMIC SITUATION
1. Genesis of the Present Economic System
Historically possessing a localized agricultural economy, Korea,
was originally exploited by the Japanese in a forty-year period of domi-
nation as the "granary" of the Japanese Empire. Agricultural exploitation
continued throughout most of this period, but with the development of Japan's
plans for Asiatic expansion during the 1930's, Japanese capital and tech-
nology were assigned to Korea to build an industrial superstructure for war-
time use. The basis for Korean industrial development was the peninsula's
abundant supply of water power, its resources of iron ore and anthracite
coal, and its proximity to the bituminous coal resources of North China and
Manchuria.
The policies followed by Japan in exploitation of the Korean
economy have a direct bearing upon Korea's present economic plight. The
peninsula was developed not as a self-sustaining economic unit, but as an
integral part of the Japanese Empire. Development and expansion of industry
was carried out in terms of its wartime potential, and many Korean factories
and mines were heavily subsidised by the Japanese and therefore could not
be expected to be operated as peace-time ventures. Agriculturally and
industrially, Korea was operated as a business for Japan's financial and
material gain, with little regard for the welfare of the Korean people.
Native Koreans were not trained in technology to any significant extent,
and Korean industry was almost completely dependent upon Japan for managerial
talent, capital equipment and technical experience. Moreover, in the later
stages of World War II, Japanese exploitation was attended by wholesale
waste and despoliation of Korea's agricultural and industrial assets.
Korea thus emerged from the War with a nearly prostrate economy;
its soil and forests seriously impoverished; its industry, transportation
and communications in an acute state of deterioration and obsolescence; its
financial structure nearly destroyed by the unrestrained flood of currency
issued by the Japanese prior to the surrender. The bulk of Korea's foreign
trade, which had been carried on with Japan, disappeared practically over-
night.
2. Description of Present Economic System
The immediate post-war problem of preventing disease and unrest,
and the longer-range problem of rehabilitating the Korean economy, have
been compounded by arbitrary division of the peninsula into Soviet and US
Zones. As indicated by the following description of Korea's economic
structure, the hydro-electric power facilities, chemical (particularly
fertilizer), metal and mining industries of the North form a much-needed
complement of the agriculture and textile industry that dominate the eco-
nomic pattern of southern Korea.
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a. Agriculture and Fisheries
Agriculture, on which over 70% of Korea's working population de-
pends for a livelihood, is built around the production of food and con-
stitutes a dominant political and economic force in the life of Korea's
masses.
sive irrigation projects, fully 25% of all cultivated area in Korea had
been irrigated by the outbreak of war.
ing methods, similar to those prevailing in other Far Eastern countries,
place emphasis upon human labor employing relatively crude farming imple-
ments. The amount of cultivated land did not increase significantly during
the period of Japanese control, but with the partial completion of exten-
and poor quality soil requiring liberal applications of fertilizers. Farm- '~
(averaging less than 4 acres per family in 1938), widespread farm tenancy,
Korea's agricultural economy is characterized by a relatively
small area under cultivation (about 20% of total area), small farm units
important food product, but Korea also produces sizable quantities of
vegetables and grains (the latter comprising the main staple of North
Korea's food consumption).
Rice, grown principally in southern Korea, is by far the most \!
cultural food production, supplemented by an active fisheries industry,
compared roughly in areal distribution with Korea's population: approximate-
ly one-third in the North and two-thirds in the South. The substantial pre-
war exports of food from Korea to Japan are not a reliable index of Korea's
future export capabilities since such exports were effected largely at the
expense of an adequate food diet for the Korean people. In addition, the
marked population increase in recent years has greatly expanded Korea's
local food requirements.
Under conditions more favorable than those now prevailing, by Far
Eastern standards both zones probably could attain self-sufficiency in food
output, and possibly export certain foods in small quantity. Pre-war agri-
Korea's fishing industry, which ranked sixth in pre-war world fish
production, provided a small but essential part of native food requirements,
fertilizers and fish oils for local use, and a substantial volume of exports
to Japan before and during the war. Fully 10% (by value) of Korea's total
exports to Japan in 1939 consisted of fish and other marine products. Main-
tenance and repair of Korean fishing craft and gear was almost wholly neg-
lected by the Japanese during the war years, and production since V-J Day
has been far below earlier levels. With a relatively small expenditure,
however, the existing shortages of equipment could be alleviated and fishing
could be restored to its position as one of Korea's major export industries.
Non-food crops, chiefly cotton and tobacco, utilize only a small
percentage of Korea's cultivated area, but, in the past, supplied a large
part of the raw materials for the country's light industry, particularly in
the southern zone. As in all Far Eastern countries suffering from food and
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commodity shortages and inflation, non-food production in Korea has been
? cut sharply by the diversion of farming effort to food crops.
Favorable conditions that could lead to a substantial revival of
agricultural production would include, in the first instance, an adequate
supply of fertilizers to southern Korea (such supplies must be imported as
long as the Soviets continue to withhold fertilizer surpluses manufactured
in the North) and rehabilitation of Korea's badly run-down transportation
system. Longer-range measures are also needed: reforestation, flood con-
trol, extension of acreage under cultivation, and completion of irrigation
projects that were started by the Japanese. Any agricultural revival of
permanence, finally, depends in part upon a reform of the feudalistic land- I
holding system, in order to promote farmer incentive. To date Soviet land
reform efforts in the northern zone have been largely nullified in effect
by the levy of excessive farm taxes, and.land reform in the South is-still
in the planning stage.
b. Natural Resources
With the exception of water power--the country's most important
natural asset--Korea,is not richly endowed with natural resources. Most
of its mineral wealth and water power, moreover, is located in the northern
zone.
Between 80% and 90% of Korea's hydro-electric power is generated
by plants in North Korea. These plants, constituting the major source of
? power supply to the entire peninsula, distribute power over an integrated
grid system developed by the Japanese. The whole electric power complex in
Korea, including the comparatively small hydro- and thermal-electric power
capacity in South Korea, suffers from a lack of maintenance, replacement
parts and technicians. In their present condition, the power plants are
incapable of supporting any substantial increase in consumer demand. The
situation in the South is the more precarious since there is no guarantee
that the Soviet-controlled zone will be willing or able to continue supply-
ing the southern area with power, even in the limited quantities now being
delivered.
Korea possesses coal reserves estimated at nearly two billion
tons, largely in the northern zone, but three-quarters of these reserves
consist of low-quality anthracite, and the balance of lignite and brown
coal. Good quality bituminous coal had to be brought in from Japan, North
China and Manchuria to supply Korea's rail system and much of its heavy and
light industry. Likewise coking coal for the production of iron and steel
and coal for gas manufacture had to be largely imported. As an integral
part of the Japanese Empire, Korea obtained a large part of its bituminous
imports from North China, Manchuria and Sakhalin, but shipments from these
areas are now largely cut off. Even if Korea returned to its war-time
coal production level of 7,600,000 tons per year (1944), and received
larger imports of bituminous coal from Japan than are currently arriving,
a coal supply problem of serious proportions would still exist.
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Iron ore resources, also largely concentrated in North Korea, com-
prise an estimated 20 million tons of medium-grade and practically unlimited
reserves of low-grade ores. The war-time production rate of 3,400,000 tons
(1944) substantially exceeded iron ore requirements of Korea's own iron and
steel industry. During the war, Korea was a major supplier of tungsten for
Japan and of molybdenum for the entire Far East, drawing on its sizable re-
serves of ferro-alloy metals both in the North and South. For Korea to re-
gain its position as an important exporter of ores and ferro-alloy metals,
much of the mining equipment and machinery, now badly run-down, must be
restored or replaced.
Other metallic and mineral reserves, located mainly in North Korea,
include relatively large quantities of aluminous shales, and one of the
world's largest concentrations of magnesite ores. The aluminous shale, how-
ever, appears to be of inferior quality; it is notewcrthy that the two large
alumina-aluminum plants which the Japanese erected in North Korea before the
war were designed to use aluminous shale imported from Manchuria. /Production
from Korea's magnesite deposits, which jumped from 35,000 tons in 1937 to
nearly 400,000 tons in 1944, contributed materially to Japan's output of
furnace brick (vital to the iron and steel industry) and of metallic mag-
nesium. The country's magnesite reserves, which complement the much larger
reserves in Manchuria, could be further developed into one of the major com-
ponents of the area's peace-time or military economic potential.
Korea's gold resources, widely distributed throughout both North
and South Korea, were increasingly exploited by the Japanese before the
war, with rapidly rising subsidies by the Government-General for this pur-
pose. Gold production for the entire country rose from 5 metric tons in
1925 to 28 metric tons in 1938, the latter figure having a value of 106
million won (yen) or about US $30 million. More than 70% of the production
in pre-war years originated in North Korea. Part of Korea's gold output
was exported to Japan in the form of ores; the greater part, it is believed,
was utilized in Korea as currency reserves or transferred to Japan in the
form of specie and bullion. During the war, the Japanese concentrated
their mining effort on more strategic materials, and stripped most Korean
gold mines of their machinery. Under US occupation, rehabilitation of
South Korea's gold installations is already in progress, and gold produc-
tion in the US zone is expected to reach about 50% of the pre-war level by
1950. For the country as a whole, gold resources will eventually regain
their position as an important component in Korea's balance of payments.
Both North and South Korea formerly had extensive forest lands.
While North Korea is still substantially stocked with timber, much of South
Korea's forest land has been laid waste, largely due to heavy overcutting
to provide fuel. Rapid deforestation resulting in serious soil erosion
contributed materially to the heavy floods in South Korea during 1946, the
worst in twenty years. The resultant shortage of wooden railroad ties and
building materials, in the absence of replenishment from the Soviet Zone,
has greatly retarded restoration of South Korean transportation and con-
struction operations.
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c. Industry
The bulk of Korea's heavier industry, led by the manufacture of
iron, steel, chemical fertilizers and cement, is concentrated in North Korea,
close to the sources of iron ore, hydro-electric power, locally-mined coal
(mainly anthracite), and the bituminous coal formerly imported from North
China and Manchuria.
As developed by the Japanese, the Korean iron and steel industry
was not completely integrated: Korea's war-time output of iron ore was
greater than the in-put of its pig iron furnaces; pig iron output substan-
tially exceeded the requirements of its steel plant, which in turn manu-
factured ingots in a volume considerably larger than Korea's rolling mills
could handle. The remaining surpluses of ore, iron, and steel represented an
important series of exports, feeding Japan's own war industry. Such products
might figure significantly in Korea's future trade pattern, but not until
such time as bituminous coal of good coking quality becomes readily available
from abroad.
Practically all of Korea's chemical manufacturing plant, its
largest pre-war industry, is north of the 38th parallel. The large nitro-
genous fertilizer installations, readily convertible to the manufacture of
explosives, took the lead in Japan's war-time development of Korea's in-
dustrial potential. Since the end of the war, almost no commercial ferti-
lizers have been made available to South Korea from the northern zone,
partly due to the presently poor condition of the fertilizer industry itself,
and partly due to Soviet unwillingness to make fertilizer accessible on any-
thing but a barter basis in exchange for food products that South Korea could
not afford to supply.
The remainder of Korea's industrial structure is more evenly di-
vided between the US and Soviet Zones, with the larger plants generally
located in the vicinity of leading urban industrial centers and ports. Pro-
duction of machinery and rolling stock is concentrated around Seoul and Pusan
in South Korea. In the consumers goods category, the manufacture of textiles
predominates, with the larger cotton spinning and weaving plants centered
about these same two cities. The synthetic (primarily rayon) fiber plants,
on the other hand, are located mainly in northern cities. The two zonal
capitals, Seoul and P'yong-yang, contain the major portions of Korea's food
processing plant.
In general, Korea has never been highly industrialized, except in
heavy industry, and even in the late stages of Japanese development, its
machinery and consumers goods industries fell considerably short of supply-
ing the domestic requirements. Moreover, many of its plants, as well as some
of its mines, were uneconomical ventures, heavily subsidized by the Japanese
as war-time expedients.
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d. Transportation
Serious war-time neglect, acute shortages of replacement rails, ,
ties, construction materials, and of bituminous coal, have severely impaired
the operability of Korea's 4000-mile rail system, upon which most of the
country's economy is dependent. By early 1947, rail transportation was in a
state of near paralysis in North Korea, where the lack of operable locomotives
and rolling stock has multiplied the effects of other shortages. Rail condi-
tions in South Korea, though far from adequate, are believed to be better
than in the North.
The country's 14,000 miles of highways, serving as essential feeders
to the cities and railroads, must also be rehabilitated, having been left to
deteriorate during the war years. In South Korea, such essential construction
items as asphalt and cement must be imported in Quantity, owing to the con-
centration of Korea's own asphalt and cement plants north of the 38th
parallel. In the Soviet zone, according to reports dated May 1947,-"high-
ways are being well maintained and an extensive road repair program, using
compulsory labor, has been instituted.
e. Finance
During the period of Japanese control, the entire financial struc-
ture of Korea was dominated by Japanese public and private interests. Most
of the paid-up capital of the Government-controlled Bank of Chosen, Korea's
bank of issue, was Japanese-owned, as were the ordinary commercial banks.
? In the corporate structure of Korea, investment and managerial participa-
tion by Koreans was likewise relatively small, nearly 90% of the corpora-
tions being Japanese-owned.
The Japanese provided part of the capital for development and ex-
ploitation of Korean industry and agriculture through the Bank of Chosen,
and the large Chosen Industrial Bank. Much of the financial and technical
assistance, however, was furnished through a "national policy" organization
known as the Oriental Development Company, which developed into owner and
operator of hundreds of Korean enterprises in the fields of agriculture,
mining, industry and transportation.
In addition to extensive control over private and semi-public
components of Korea's economy, the Japanese Government exercised monopo-
listic control, within the framework of the Korean Government-General,
over such profitable commodities as salt, ginseng (a medical herb),
tobacco and narcotics, and over two important services: communications
and transportation. Revenues from and expenditures by these monopolies,
in fact, were far the most prominent items in the Korean national budget.
Their predominance in Korea's fiscal structure emphasizes the degree to
which the country's economy was managed as a Japanese business. For ex-
ample, in 1936--a typical pre-war year--fully 53% of all budgetary revenues
were scheduled to be derived from the "revenue-producing agencies" that
operated the monopolies, and expenditures of these same agencies were
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budgeted at 41% of total outlays. In that year, taxes were expected to
yield no more than 25% of total revenues, Korea's people being too poor
to support a complicated tax structure or heavier tax burden.
With the termination of the War, all public and private Japanese
title to property in South Korea, including physical installations, finan-
cial investments and controls, was vested in the US Military Government.
Custody of Japanese assets in North Korea was likewise placed in official
hands, presumably in the Soviet-backed People's Committees. Thus, the
governing bodies in both North and South Korea are in at least temporary
possession of a major portion of Korea's economic wealth, which is being
employed as the main support for the fiscal structure of those zones. Dis-
position of this wealth, a problem that may be reserved for the future
Korean Government, presents numerous difficulties. Relatively few Koreans
possess the managerial qualifications or the ready capital to take over
ex-Japanese properties, and there is a real danger that such wealth, if
offered to the public, may become concentrated in the hands of a powerful
native economic minority, or of private foreign interests.
While the occupation authorities in both North and South Korea
have had at their command, since V-J Day, a substantial proportion of the
country's means and instruments of production and service, the financial
yield of such assets has fallen far short of bridging the gap between
other available revenues and the total expenditures in those zones. The
former Japanese assets and Japanese-controlled monopolies in Korea repre-
sent investments in economic enterprises that are in a serious state of
disrepair; moreover, they are critically short of technical help, stocks
of raw materials, and replacement parts. In both zones, the short-fall in
revenues has required heavy issues of new currency, thereby greatly acceler-
ating the inflationary trend already in evidence during the war years. As
a partial indication of this trend: in contrast to a Bank of Chosen note
issue for all of Korea amounting to 580 million won (yen) at the end of
1940 and 8,680 million shortly after V-J Day*, the volume of notes issued
by the Bank of Chosen in South Korea alone had jumped to 18,200 million
won by late January 1947.
In the forefront of expenditures in South Korea that have com-
pelled the US Military Government to resort to heavy deficit financing
are such major items as (a) heavy administrative costs, (b) allocations
to lower levels of government, and (c) grants and subsidies to industry
and agriculture. Comparable expenditures in the Soviet zone have prob-
ably been much smaller, but the post-war inflation in North Korea thus
far has been no less drastic. The Soviet troops' practice of "living
off the land" has produced much the same inflationary results as deficit
financing, since this practice constitutes a direct drain upon the al-
ready marginal supply of foods and other necessities.
* More than 4,000 million of this was issued by the Japanese in the
last 24 months of war.
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In an environment of rapidly expanding note issues and growing
commodity shortage, widespread profiteering and reported counterfeiting
have added significantly to the inflationary upswing by undermining
public confidence in Korea's currency.
The Korean monetary unit, in the absence of free and active
interchange of foods and services with other countries, has the nature
of a controlled currency with only nominal foreign exchange value. In
contrast to the pre-war open market exchange rate of about 3.5 yen to
one US dollar (same as the Japanese yen), the military conversion rate
for South Korea was set at 50 to 1 by SCAP in March 1947. Even the
latter rate fails to reflect the full post-war depreciation of the Korean
unit; in terms of relative purchasing power, its real value probably lies
between 100 and 200 to one US dollar. Within Korea, moreover, the unit
has little or no metallic backing, since most of the Bank of Chosen's
reserves of cash, gold and silver were taken by Japan during the war,
and replaced by Japanese bonds and notes.
f. International Trade
Korea's current foreign trade pattern bears little resemblance
to that of the pre-war and war-time period. Nevertheless, an examination
of Korean trade during the latter years of Japanese control discloses the
serious problems that the country is due to face even if unification and
some degree of rehabilitation are achieved.
0
Korea's foreign trade for 1939, a year that can be regarded as
a median between pre-war and war years, shows two characteristics typical
of the broad period of Japanese domination: (a) an exceptionally heavy
reliance upon trade with Japan, which in 1939 took 73% of Korea's total
exports by value and supplied 89% of Korea's imports; and (b) a large
unfavorable balance of trade--imports were 39% larger than exports in
1939. Although shipments of manufacturers such as chemicals, cement,
iron and steel products, increased during the 1930's and early war years,
Korea's exports were preponderantly "natural" commodities: agricultural,
mineral, forest and marine products. The country's imports were largely
Japanese-manufactured consumers good (textiles, clothing, beverages) and
machinery, as well as bituminous coal and other minerals.
In addition to a substantial unfavorable trade balance, Korea
also was a net debtor for interest, insurance, dividend payments and
freight (Korea has never had a merchant marine of significance). The
resulting debit balance in Korea's balance of payments position was
characteristically offset by Japanese capital investments in Korea, and
by the shipment of Korean-mined gold to Japan.
For the next few years at least, a period when Korea's economy
will be sustained and to some degree rehabilitated by commodity imports
and capitalization provided almost entirely by the US, Korea's balance
of payments position hardly merits discussion in terms of a "normal"
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pattern of foreign trade and capital flow. In the absence of unification,
? North Korea is not expected to produce any substantial surpluses of com-
modities for export. South Korean exports, led by minerals and marine
products, probably will not exceed US $46 million in the three years
1948-1950; in the same three years, it is estimated that a grant-in-aid
of US $540 million will be required for the rehabilitation of South
Korea's agriculture, industry and transportation.
Even after unification and substantial rehabilitation are a-
chieved, Korea still faces an adjustment period characterized by an un-
favorable balance of trade and net outpayments on the non-trade items,
both only partially offset by gold exports. Sizable shipments of food,
formerly one of the key Korean exports, will not be forthcoming for many
years unless attained (as formerly) at the expense of native food con-
sumption. Nevertheless the long-range outlook is not necessarily bleak,
particularly if Korea follows an interim program of "austerity" in its
purchases abroad. Korea's natural resources provide many opportunities
for continuing capital investment. From a balance of payments standpoint,
a revival of transportation in the North Pacific (e.g., between Japan and
nQrthern Asia) would benefit Korea.
3. Current Situation in the Soviet Zone
Soviet policy in Korea is directed toward the establishment of a
state politically subordinate to the USSR at a minimum cost to the USSR's
own scanty Far Eastern resources. Soviet economic policy is, therefore,
? the reorientation of Korea toward the USSR while developing Korean indus-
trial and agricultural self-suffiency. In realizing this aim, the USSR
thus far appears to have failed; despite greater industrial resources and
a better balanced economy, the economic situation is now more acute in the
Soviet Zone than in the US Zone. According to early 1947 reports, infla-
tion is greater and the food shortage more pressing in the North than in
the South. This reverses the relative situation of the two zones pre-
vailing in 1946. Current food prices are reported to be 50% higher in the
North. Unlike the US, the USSR has not imported food into Korea but rather
shipped it out, while the Soviet forces of occupation have pursued their
customary practice of living off the land.
Industry in North Korea is operating at less than 25% of war-
time levels. Although the industrial equipment of the Soviet Zone has
not been dismantled like that of Manchuria (excepting possibly the north-
eastern provinces), the rehabilitation of industry has been retarded by
the disruption of pre-war trade relations. The general breakdown of the
railroad transportation system has put an additional obstacle in the way
of industrial recovery. The USSR has been unable to improve these con-
ditions even to furnishing coal from Sakhalin. Fuel supply on which North
Koreans were counting has not materialized, and consequently the Soviet
Zone is as destitute of industrial products as it is of foodstuffs. Kim
Il Sung, chairman of the north Korean People's Committee, has described
the adverse factors affecting the economic reconstruction of the Soviet
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Zone as follows: "(a) Division of Korea and difficulties of readjusting
S an economy which was developed to serve Japanese rather than Korean
interests; (b) Shortages of raw materials, especially bituminous coal,
which forces Korea to solicit assistance from Russia; (c) Shortages of
technicians and backward state of technological development; (d) Lack of
capital and (e) Greatest of all, lack of spirit of reconstruction, which
obstructs elimination of selfish profiteers."
Thus, notwithstanding Communist emphasis on material prosperity,
by its own admission the Soviet regime in North Korea has had greater
success politically than economically. Although the USSR is unable to
increase the output of the Korean economy, it has nonetheless secured
complete control of the means of production. Conquest has facilitated the
task of revolution in Korea, for the bulk of the capital of the country
was in the hands of Japanese at the time of the surrender. By confis-
cating this property and turning it over to the People's Committees, the
Soviets have accomplished a quick conversion of Korean industry to state
ownership. Private property has been completely eradicated from a large
section of the economy. Credit, communications, transportation and heavy
industry are controlled by the People's Committees. Only agriculture and
the handicrafts have escaped the process of socialization.
Soviet policy of land reform provides additional evidence of
political motivation. The USSR gained much good will among Korean farmers
a few months after the beginning of the occupation by distributing the
holdings of the big Japanese and Korean landlords among their tenants.
? The benefit of this agrarian reform, which affected the ownership of
2,471,000 acres, was, however, diminished by the exactions of the regime.
The People's Committees are now demanding as much from the farmers as did
the former landlords, though by a different claim. After the successful
levy of a 25% tax on the fall harvest of 1946, the Soviets announced the
imposition of an additional contribution of 25% on the same crop. This
second phase of the collection program appears to have aroused the re-
sentment of the rural population, and as a consequence, the government has
been encountering considerable passive resistance in its crop collection
program. (The tenants of the US Zone generally pay an over-all rent of
25% of their produce.)
4. Current Situation in the US Zone
Economic stagnation has aggravated political discontent in both
zones of Korea, and food has become the primary economic concern of all
Koreans. In the US Zone, the food shortage provoked severe rice riots in
the fall of 1946 during the wave of Leftist agitation against the Mili-
tary Government. Acute want has now been relieved and owing to the timely
imposition of marketing controls, the collection and distribution of grain
is proceeding more smoothly this year than last, with the result that the
people of South Korea are at present receiving their best rations'since the
end of the war. In spite of this improvement, the lack of fertilizer in
the US Zone hampers the restoration of agriculture to pre-war levels of
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production, necessitating a continuation of large-scale imports of food
from abroad for an estimated three years. The Military Government has
calculated that South Korea will require monthly shipments of at least
40,000 metric tons of grains and leguminous products until the summer
harvest in July 1947. Since this quantity represents half the ration
requirements of the non-self-supplying population, the restoration of
agricultural self-sufficiency is one of the principal factors in the
economic stabilization of South Korea. In the course of the next three
years, the Military Government expects the increase of domestic produc-
tion to reduce the total value of yearly food shipments from US $49 million
in 1948 to US $6 million in 1950.
The financial situation of South Korea has been improving since
early 1947. The Bank of Chosen note issue for the US Zone, which was at
a peak of 18,200 million won in January 1947, had dropped back to 17,300
million by the end of May. Prices have also shown a trend toward stabili-
zation, accompanying some increase in the supply of food and consumers
goods, particularly textiles. It is anticipated that the budgetary deficit
of the Military Government, which amounted to about 5,000 million won for
the 1946-47-fiscal year (ending 31 March 1947), will not be greatly in ex-
cess of 3,000 million for 1947-48. Moreover, extra-budgetary expenditures,
such as outlays for food collection and distribution, will probably be
substantially less in the current year. All of these conditions are re-
flections of a more stabilized economic situation in South Korea. However,
any real economic revival in the US Zone depends in large part on increased
imports, which must be supplied principally by foreign loans or grants.
The only credit which South Korea has so far received for recon-
struction is an FLC loan of $25,000,000, which the Military Government ob-
tained in August 1945. This loan was promptly attacked by the Leftists as
an attempt to reduce Korea to colonial status by making the country a
dumping ground for surplus US equipment. However, there has been no such
outcry at the current grant-in-aid proposal. The Korean public may have
come to a realization of the country's dependence on imports, since a
shortage of raw materials threatened to close nearly all factories in the
US Zone during the first half of 1947. The cotton industry has recently
afforded a good illustration of the precarious condition of the Korean
economy in this respect. The food shortage of the past year has caused
farmers to plant half of the former cotton acreage in grain crops, there-
by sharply reducing the cotton supply to the South Korean mills. Since
the textile industry is the most important of the light industries which
characterize the economy of the US Zone, a shut-down in the manufacture
of cotton goods would gravely retard recovery of the whole area. The
Military Government has now succeeded in obtaining 8,400 bales of cotton
from USCC stocks in Japan, and the cotton shortage in South Korea has
accordingly been alleviated, but the textile crisis has nonetheless
demonstrated the urgency of a long-range import program.
Agricultural production needs the incentive of consumer goods,
while a rise of the industrial output depends in turn on a better diet
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for the workers. The Korean economy seems therefore to be caught in a
vicious circle which only a strong infusion of imported raw materials
and capital equipment can break. Raw materials such as cotton for
clothing and fertilizer for the farms have first priority because of
the extreme indigence of the country. Failing unification, capital
equipment is also needed to build in South Korea some of those essential
industries which already exist in the North. Although South Korea ob-
viously cannot compete industrially with the North, the US Zone can, with
initial outside assistance, expect to develop a sound economy. Eventually
it may have a food surplus which would serve as the basis for revived
trade either with Japan or with North Korea. A limited amount of barter
is currently going on between the US Zone and China, but it seems doubt-
ful that China will in the foreseeable future be able to supply South
Korea with the industrial goods it needs. Korea's economic future would
therefore seem still to be bound up with that of Japan.
Meanwhile, the prolonged partition of Korea has made an interim
economic "prevention of disease and unrest" program totally inadequate
for the purpose of establishing a balanced and stable economy in South
Korea. An adequate program is now dependent on substantial long-term
foreign assistance (such as the grant-in-aid program recently proposed
by the US Administration to the Congress). Such assistance could be
used to help (1) Transform Southern Korea from a food deficit to a food
surplus area, thus improving the low nutritional standard of the Koreans
and providing some exports to pay for necessary imports; (2) Increase the
supply of consumer goods by restarting local industries; (3) Decrease the
dependence of the southern zone upon the northern for electrical power;
(4) Contribute to the financial stability of Southern Korea by increasing
production; (5) Facilitate the training of Korean technicians and the
eradication of illiteracy, two serious deficiencies resulting from the
Japanese policy of monopolizing with their own nationals nearly all
positions requiring technical skill and of keeping the Koreans a servile
people.
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?
SECTION III
MILITARY SITUATION
The numerous contrasts between the US and Soviet occupations
in Korea can finally be reduced to a difference in their use of force.
In the last analysis both governments rely on coercion to maintain their
authority, but coercion in the US Zone is a sanction for law, while in
the Soviet Zone it is an ever-ready means of persuasion. Whereas the US
Military Government attempts to win the consent of the governed by argu-
ment and reason, the Soviets require compliance by the threat of violence.
These differences are real and not merely nominal as shown by the fact
that the US maintains a relatively small number of troops and a relatively
high degree of freedom of expression, in comparison with the USSR.
The US Zone in Korea contains about two-thirds of the population
and is occupied by a force of less than 50,000 US troops, assisted by a
native constabulary of approximately 5,000 and a coast guard of slightly
more than 1,000. With only about one-third of the Korean population in
its zone, the USSR is reported to have at its disposal 68,000 Soviet
troops, augmented by a native force, potentially 500,000 strong, whose
effective strength is undetermined but which has been estimated at
200,000 (People's Army: 125,000; Security Forces: 75,000). This Korean
army under Soviet control is based on a technically voluntary system to
? recruit all males between 17 and 25 years of age and built around a core
of approximately 75,000 well-trained members of the special police and
the Korean Volunteer Army which served prior to the Japanese surrender
under the orders of the Yenan Independence Alliance (the former Com-
munist-sponsored government in exile). Chinese Communist troops are
also known to have crossed the border from Manchuria and are reported
to be taking part in the training of the new Korean army of the Soviets.
The majority of these Chinese Communists are probably Koreans of the
Volunteer Army who campaigned together with the Chinese 8th Route Army
in Manchuria. The rest of the Chinese Communist troops whose presence
has been reported from North Korea are presumably in transit from one
area of the Manchurian front to the other.
The military preponderance of the Soviets is a standing threat
to the US occupation in South Korea, and General Hodge has felt obliged
on occasion to issue warnings of a possible attack across the 38th
parallel. Although no attack has yet occurred, the Soviets could pre-
sumably overrun the whole peninsula, so that the US position in South
Korea is in a military sense distinctly precarious. General Hodge's
effectives of approximately 50,000 troops are divided roughly as follows:
1,300 air, 27,000 ground, 13,000 service personnel and 7,000 miscellaneous.
A Soviet invasion of South Korea, however, would mean war, and there is
consequently little prospect that it will be tried in the near future.
The only present danger to the US occupation in South Korea would seem
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to lie in a widespread revolt which would draw US troops away from the
border permitting mass infiltration from the Soviet Zone or an invasion
by the native Army.
The US occupation has so far enjoyed the cooperation of the
majority of the population in the maintenance of order in the South.
The Military Government has nonetheless been the target of unrelenting
propaganda and occasional uprisings on the part of the extreme Left.
Recently the extreme Right has also shown a disposition towards violence.
Rightist violence seems, however, to be rather the product of temporary
exasperation than part of a concerted plan of disruption. In spite of
all Rhee Syngman's manifestoes and proclamations the Rightists have yet
to produce any disorders such as characterized the October offensive
of the Communists last year. Fear of Communist control and a conserva-
tive preference for order appear to moderate the Rightists even in their
wildest outbursts against the US Military Government. The US authorities
have consequently depended on the Rightists for support even while com-
batting the leadership of such extremists as Rhee Syngman.
The Korean government in exile at Chungking organized an army
known as the Kwang Bok Army which the US could eventually remobilize if
ever Soviet pressure against South Korea became excessive. So far the US
authorities have given no recognition to this Rightist Army, which is not
needed for defense and which could only serve to intimidate the Left.
Instead of mustering a partisan army, the Military Government has en-
couraged a youth movement. The Korean National Youth Movement which was
launched with official approval in January of this year now numbers approx-
imately 30,000 members. Although the movement is not affiliated with any
party, it is led by Rightists and has undertaken, as part of its program
of public service, to "dispel the falsehoods planted by Russian Communists."
The Moscow radio has already denounced the organization as Fascist, but in
this connection it is interesting to note that the USSR also boasts of
having at its command in North Korea a Democratic Union of Youth with a
membership of 1,300,000.
Korea's military potential is limited to the contributions it
can make as an ally, willingly or unwillingly. These contributions consist
of manpower; strategic location; two major warm-water ports; abundant hydro-
electric power; limited surpluses of iron, tungsten, wood, low-grade coal,
and possibly food; chemicals; and a transportation system which connects the
complementary industrial establishments of Korea, Manchuria, the Soviet Far
East, and Japan. The extent to which Korean manpower, resources and facil-
ities can be exploited was well illustrated by the considerable war aid Japan
was able to obtain from Korea at the expense of the Koreans themselves. How-
ever, owing to the present state of the economy as a result of exploitation,
first by the Japanese and subsequently by joint occupation forces, the im-
mediate war potential of Korea is negligible.
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SECTION IV
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY
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Korea's current significance to the security of the United States
lies in the fact that it is the critical point of contact between the US and
the Soviet Union in the Far East. Basically, however, Korea is important
to the US because Soviet control of this strategically situated peninsula
would jeopardize US political aims for China and Japan, thus threatening
US security measures throughout the Pacific.
Under joint US-Soviet occupation Korea is one of the most un-
stable political compounds in the Far East. The prevailing uncertainty
of its political future is attributable mainly to the prolonged delay
in the execution of the Moscow Decision, which has kept Korea divided
and subject to dual foreign control. Instead of the former occasional
and superficial contacts with the West, the peninsula has now been opened
to the influence of the two chief world powers. Unlike the Japanese rule
which isolated the peninsula and bound the people together in common
resistance to a single regime, thereby fortifying Korean national unity,
the US and Soviet occupations have divided the Koreans and opposed them
to each other. Thus, subsequent to joint US-Soviet withdrawal, the Korean
political vacuum will be filled by a polity which has a foreign orientation
toward either US democracy or Soviet Communism.
The emergence of a unified Korea under Soviet domination would
constitute a serious political defeat for the US. In China, where US
prestige has declined since V-J Day, the attendant moral lift to the Communists
and the demoralizing effect on moderates would make very difficult the
unification of China under a government favorably disposed toward the Western
Powers. In Japan, any democratic government nurtured by the US during its
period of occupation would, in the post-occupation period, face an external
situation posing an additional threat to its stability at a time when internal
problems taxed its powers most heavily. The effect in China and Japan of a
communistic Korea would in turn have repercussions in the whole of southeast
Asia, the Philippines, and Indonesia.
The political confusion which has retarded Korea's unification
and independence has also hindered its economic recovery. Partition has
been the chief cause of economic disruption because of the interdependence
of the two zones of occupation. Economic stability is ultimately de-
pendent on unification. Meanwhile, grants-in-aid from foreign sources
are required. Hence the extent to which the US is willing and able to
meet Korean economic requirements will figure importantly in US ability
to attain its political objectives.
While both the US and the USSR are directly concerned with the
political future of Korea, the long-term military considerations are of
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40
lesser importance to US security than to that of the USSR. The USSR has
indicated that the security of the Siberian frontier is a principal ob-
jective of Soviet policy in its relations with Korea, and that for this
reason Korea must be established as a "friendly" (i.e., subservient)
state. A hostile power in Korea would be in a position to cut off
Vladivostok from Port Arthur and intercept communications generally
throughout Manchuria, whereas a friendly power in the peninsula would
protect the Soviet flank and contribute to Soviet capabilities for of-
fensive operations in northeast Asia. While US troops occupy Japan the
US has a vital interest in maintaining a position in Korea which will
protect its position in Japan and North China. In the post-occupation
period, even though the US might still desire to deny the peninsula to
a potential enemy of Japan or China, Korea's indefensible position
against attack from the north makes it of less interest to the US,
since the US first line of defense near Korea is the US Pacific Islands
Defense Base System.
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SECTION V
PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY
The joint US-Soviet occupation of Korea potentially could
become a signal instance of Russo-American post-war cooperation or the
failure of the most clear-cut of all joint US-Soviet undertakings.
While the USSR, for reasons of international prestige, will not permit
a failure to implement the Moscow Decision to be directly attributable
to Soviet actions, the former alternative will remain unattainable so
long as the Soviets insist upon a "friendly" (i.e., subservient) govern-
ment in Korea.
In these circumstances the USSR has intentionally created and
prolonged a political stalemate, while consolidating its control of North
Korea and disrupting by all possible means US efforts toward democracy
and stability in South Korea. In pursuing these delaying tactics, the
Soviets have been relying upon the possibility that the US public would
lose interest in Korea and eventually be unwilling to continue to bear
the cost of military occupation and economic assistance, particularly
since the USSR is convinced that the US faces economic depression which
will force a drastic reduction in the role of the US in international
affairs. Future Soviet actions, therefore, depend upon their estimate
of (a) the stability of the Communist regime in North Korea and its
ability to control the entire country in the event of US-Soviet withdrawal,
and (b) the sincerity and practicability of the US desire to maintain its
program of democratization, economic aid, and eventual independence for
Korea.
The USSR probably estimates that the Communist regime in
North Korea is now sufficiently stable, particularly since it is backed
by an effective Korean army. On the other hand, the progress made in
the US Zone toward the establishment of a basis for the formation of
a democratic provisional Korean government and the implication of the
Truman doctrine that the US intends, at least for the immediate future,
to continue its support of Korean aspirations for independence, may have
caused the USSR to decide that prolongation of the present stalemate
might work to its disadvantage.
Under these conditions and in view of renewed US pressure, the
USSR has agreed to reconvene the Joint Commission on.terms acceptable to
the US. This ostensibly could lead to one of three major developments:
a. Agreement on means of implementing the Moscow Decision.
9
b. A new stalemate and a public proposal by the USSR that the
occupying powers withdraw completely from Korea and grant immediate Korean
independence.
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c. Unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops, in event of a dead-
lock in the Joint Commission, or after the establishment of the Provisional
Government. The primary Soviet purpose in accepting any of these alterna-
tives would be to obtain US withdrawal from Korea in the belief that the
Communists could either immediately or ultimately gain control of any
provisional Korean Government.
The USSR may well be willing to make concessions in the Joint
Commission or subsequently on a governmental level in order to reach
agreement on implementing the Moscow Decision, if it estimated that the
Korean Communists were capable of quickly gaining control of a national
Korean Provisional Government, or of eventually bringing Korea within
the Soviet orbit during or after'the termination of the trusteeship. This
is a more likely development than a proposal that the US and USSR withdraw
completely and grant immediate Korean independence, since the latter would
require agreement on revision of the Moscow Decision by the US, USSR,
United Kingdom, and China. A four-power meeting for this purpose would
inevitably involve a complete airing of Soviet repressive actions in North
Korea. Also, the other powers would not accept such a revision without
accompanying safeguards for the maintenance of Korea as a sovereign and
independent state, which would be unacceptable to the USSR.
The third alternative of a unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops
in the event of an impasse in the Joint Commission is a dangerous possi-
bility, since the USSR might count upon the propaganda value of this move
to embarrass the US or to force a withdrawal of US troops which would leave
? South Korea open to penetration by the Communists backed by the North
Korean army. This, however, would not offer the USSR full propaganda
value, since it would still be participating in the Joint Commission or
in trusteeship over Korea. The USSR therefore is not likely to adopt this
course unless it believes that the concessions required under the first
alternative would nullify the possibility of ultimate Communist control of
Korea. This third alternative, however, is potentially the most dangerous
to US security, since it would present the US with a dilemma of maintaining
its forces unilaterally in South Korea, or the withdrawal of these forces
before proper safeguards for democracy are established.
In any case, the USSR will continue its efforts to place on other
signatories the onus for any failure to implement the Moscow Decision. The
Soviets, however, probably hope to resolve the Korean issue in their favor
without reference to the United Nations, where world opinion would be fo-
cused upon Soviet activities in North Korea.
Should the US and the USSR reconcile their differences and thus
remove the barrier to the unification of Korea, national unity under a
representative strong central government would still be threatened by the
potentialities for serious political internecine strife. A national pro-
visional assembly in which representation was accorded on the basis of
population theoretically would be controlled by the two-thirds of Korea's
population residing in the US Zone. Under present conditions, however,
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this control could be established and maintained only if the numerous
? political parties of the Sou'uh were willing to form a Rightist dominated
coalition to oppose the solid Communist dominated Leftist bloc which the
Northern zone would presumably return. The North will return a solid Com-
munist bloc, except under the unlikely circumstances that the elections for
the provisional government could be freely conducted. While the urgency of
preventing Communist control of a national provisional government may well
lead initially to a coalition of the Southern political parties based on
mutually acceptable compromises among the party leaders, the long-range out-
look for control of the central government by majority representation is far
less encouraging. The basic factors militating against the maintenance of a
truly independent democratic regime are: (1) the cohesive bloc from the
North which can be expected to follow the well-known Communist tactics of
weakening the opposition and which is supported by the Soviet-trained North
Korean army; (2) the existence of a small Communist-dominated Leftist group
in the South which can be expected to work closely with the Northern Com-
munist bloc; (3) the personal feuds among party leaders of the South which
transcend any differences in party platforms: (4) the initial establishment
of a central government based on compromises worked out in Joint US-Soviet
negotiations; and (5) the characteristic apathy of the electorate.
Of these factors, the one which is likely to be most decisive is
the first. Unless the formation of a national government can be accom-
plished with safeguards against Communist tactics, it will be impossible
to establish Korea as a sovereign and independent state.
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?
APPENDIX "A"
TOPOGRAPHY
0
Korea has well-defined natural frontiers. The northern third
of the peninsula is occupied by a mass of rough mountains, separated from
Manchuria, by the deep valleys of the Yalu River in the west and the Tumen
in the east. Southward from these mountains a long range of lower mountains
extends to the tip of the peninsula, keeping close to the east coast. From
this range, spurs branch westward to the Yellow Sea, and the principal low-
lands of the country where most of the agriculture is concentrated lie be-
tween these spurs. The mountains on the northern border are rugged, steep,
and generally unfavorable for movement, but the eastern and western slopes
of the mass and the lower valleys of the Yalu and the Tumen provide possi-
bilities for entering the country from the north.
In the northwest the Yalu, Korea's longest river which forms
part of the Manchurian boundary, is navigable by small craft for about
350 miles up from its mouth on the Yellow Sea although its channel is
encumbered by many and sand banks in its lower course and by rapids
upstream. At Sinuiju, the major city on the northern border, located in
the northwest corner just across the Yalu from Antung, there is a double
railroad bridge across the river, linking Korea's major railway, which runs
along the west coast to Seoul and then across the peninsula to Pusan , with
the Asia Express, a branch line of the South Manchurian Railroad. There is
another rail bridge at Supong-dong across the great dam built by the Japa-
nese, and a third at Manpojin farther up the Yalu, designed to tap the
Tungpientao iron ore region in Manchuria. These points are tied to the
Korean railway system by branch lines,-, and are also connected by a road
extending from Sinuiju up the Yalu valley along the Manchurian border.
South from Sinuiju stretches one of Korea's main highways, which parallels
the railroad to Seoul and Pusan. This north-south orientation of major
transportation arteries reflects the country's recent role as a stepping
stone from Japan to the continent and would favor penetration from the
north.
In the northeast, Korea borders the Maritime Province of the
USSR for the last ten miles of the Tumen River, the upper course of which
forms part of the Manchurian boundary. The river is navigable by small
craft for about fifty miles from its mouth on the Sea of Japan, and its
valley is winding, steep-sided, and generally unfavorable for movement.
Since the Russian occupation of North Korea, an excellent overland road
from Chongjin to Vladivostok has been developed out of the 4th and 5th
class roads which previously served as the only avenue between Korea and
Siberia. This new road also provides a good link between the USSR and the
rail and highway network of Korea, which connects the major northeastern
ports with Pusan on the south coast, with Seoul in the southwest, and with
Sinuiju in the northwest. Two rail lines and two first class roads cross
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the backbone of the peninsula, connecting Wonsan and the northeast more
directly with P'yong-yang and Seoul, the country's major commercial centers.
The transportation facilities in the northeast, as in the northwest, were
developed primarily as a funnel whereby Japan could supply her war needs;
consequently branch lines connect this sector also with Manchuria.
The east coast of Korea, which borders the Sea of Japan, is
fairly regular with small beach-bordered pocket valleys separated from one
another and from the interior by steep mountains and swift streams. Six
of the ten principal ports of Korea are located along this coast -- Unggi,
Najin, Ch'ongjin, Hungnam, Wonsan, and Songjin -- all of them north of the
38th parallel. All are tied in with the peninsular rail and highway net-
work which is linked to the Manchurian system by two branch lines in the
northeast across the Tumen and to Vladivostok by the recently improved
road from Ch'ongjin. There are in addition numerous secondary ports and
landings on this coast, which has for the most part clear approaches and
fairly moderate tides.
In contrast, the south coast, which borders the Korea Strait,
is highly irregular with alternate beach-fringed lowlands and rocky head-
lands and numerous off-lying islands, rocks, reefs, and shoals. Broad
drying mud flats and sand bars and very high tides add to the difficulty
of approach. However, Korea's most vital port and third largest city,
Pusan, is located at the eastern corner of this coast. It was the key
trans-shipment point on the fastest water and land route from Japan to
Manchuria. At Pusan the freight and passenger ferry from Shimonoseki,
120 miles across the Korea Strait, met the main Korean railroad, a double-
track line which crosses the peninsula to Seoul, runs north through P'yong-
yang to Sinuiju in the northwest, and there connects with the line to
Mukden. A first-class highway parallels the railroad from Pusan to
Sinuiju. Other ports, developed by the Japanese as military and naval
bases, are located along the southern coast and are connected with the
Pusan-Seoul route by road or branch rail lines.
The west coast, which borders the Yellow Sea, is similar to
the south coast in its irregularity and perils to navigation. There
are, however, numerous good harbors and landing places. Seoul, by far
the largest and most important city in Korea, lies at the eastern edge
of a lowland which extends for about twenty miles from the coast, and
is connected by rail and highway with Inch'on which serves as its port.
Seoul is the principal railway and road hub of the peninsula and the
key to control of the peninsula. P'yong-yang, the second largest city
of Korea, now being used by the Soviets as their headquarters, is an-
other lowland city about 120 miles northwest of Seoul, connected by
rail and highway with the port of Chinnamp'o. The third important west
coast harbor is the estuary Kum-gang River which serves the ports of
Kunsan and Changhang-ni. These cities, like the other principal ports,
are tied in with the peninsular transportation system.
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0
?
0
Korea's only other boundary, the 38th parallel, is a purely
arbitrary dividing line with no physiographic delineation. It crosses
the peninsula at about its broadest point, a distance of approximately
190 miles, and isolates a sub-peninsula to the west which according to
present arrangements, can be reached only by weekly American convoys
passing through the Soviet Zone. It cuts across Haeju Bay on the west
coast, separating the city of Heaju in the Soviet Zone from some of its
port facilities at Yongdangp'o on the US side of the parallel. The top-
ography along the parallel varies from tidal flats, low hills, and
intensively cultivated valleys in the west to higher hills and ridges
descending to a narrow coastal strip in the east. It is crossed by 181
small cart roads, 104 country roads probably passable throughout the
year, 15 all-weather provincial roads, and 8 better class roads. The
two good highways running northeast and northwest from Seoul to Wonsan
and P'yong-yang respectively and six railroad lines furnish modern
transport across the boundary. It is in no sense a natural barrier and
the general north-south orientation of the country's transportation
facilities favors passage across it.
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APPENDIX. "B!I
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS AND STATISTICS
Population Characteristics
The Koreans are a Mongoloid people racially akin to the Chi-
nese and Japanese with whom they have also strong cultural affinities.
United by religion, language and tradition, the Korean people are ex-
tremely homogeneous, but a few differences may be noted between the in-
habitants of the northern and southern sections of the peninsula. Al-
though the Koreans as a people are considered to be sensitive and vio-
lent and xenophobes to an alarming degree, the southerners appear to be
slightly more docile and phlegmatic than the northerners. As a result
of Japanese domination, Koreans are likely to complain to authority
rather than to face problems squarely on their own.
Confucian morality has for centuries exercised a strong influ-
ence on the development of Korean manners and customs. The other great
cultural influence has been Buddhism, which has at present almost died
out in the peninsula. Christianity, on the other hand, has developed
into a great expansive force. The Christian churches have not only
brought Western civilization to the common people; they have also served
as centers of resistance to Japanese and, more recently, Soviet oppres-
sion. At present Korea is undergoing a cultural crisis as all other
countries of the Orient. The outcome of the current conflict between
Western and Eastern cultures is difficult to predict, but it seems likely
that Korea will eventually adopt either Communism or Christianity. It
is doubtful that Korea can long maintain its Confucian heritage in the
modern world.
The great mass of the people in villages and on farms appears
to be extremely apathetic on national issues. Barely 35% of the popu-
lation is literate, and the 71% of the people who are engaged in agri-
cultural pursuits lead a very narrow local existence.
Population Statistics
The population of Korea is usually referred to in round num-
bers as 30 million, of which roughly 20 million are considered to be in
the US Zone and 10 million in the Soviet Zone. The South Korean Interim
Legislative Assembly has claimed to speak for 30 million Koreans. Sta-
tistics issued in August 1946 by the National Economic Board of Korea and
by the Departments of Labor and Commerce in the headquarters of the US
Army Military Government in Korea, however, do not bear out the usual
estimates. The official figures which are the basis for the plans and
programs of the Military Government give Korea a total population of
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? roughly 25 million, to which nearly 2 million should be added for the
Koreans who have been repatriated since August 1946. This revised total
of 27 million is still considerably below the accepted figure of 30 mil-
lion. Throughout this paper the statistics furnished by various sources
are used in the context to which they apply. The following tables, based
on the official estimates of the US Army Military Government in Korea,
may serve, however, as a check on any other estimates hereinafter adduced:
1. POPULATION:
ALL KOREA
1940
1944
1950 (AMG Forecast)
Total
23,547,000
25,120,000*
28,948,000
Male
11,839,000
12,521,000
14,694,000
Female
11,708,000
12,599,000
14,254,000
2. POPULATION: NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA
(These figures are estimates derived by adding the population of the
provinces south of the 38th parallel and those north of the 38th par-
allel. In the case of the three provinces both north and south of
the parallel, the division of population was estimated by using the
percentage distribution shown in the 1944 emergency census undertaken
by the Government-General of Korea.)
1940
1944
1950
0
North
South
8,518,600
15,028,400
9,171,000
15,949,000
10,569,000
18,379,000
3. NUMBER OF PERSONS AGE 15-59
1940
1944
1950 (AMG Forecast)
Total
12,281,831
12,687,000
15,348,000
Male
Female
6,152,882
6,128,949
6,268,400
6,418,600
7,812,000
7,536,000
4. NUMBER OF PERSONS AGE 15-59:
NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA
(Estimates:
see Table 2.)
1940
1944
1950 (based on AMG
Forecast)
NORTH
Total
4,506,000
4,714,000
5,436,000
Male
2,313,000
2,410,000
2,783,000
Female
2,193,000
2,304,000
2,653,000
SOUTH
Total
7,776,000
7,973,000
9,912,000
Male
3,840,000
3,858,000
5,029,000
Female
3,936,000
4,115,000
4,883,000
40
* This figure does not include 1,890,000 Koreans who have been repatri-
ated since the surrender.
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5. INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION OF OCCUPIED PERSONS: NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA
The 1940 Census is the only one which gives distribution of "occupied"
persons by industrial classes. Adjustment of figures for 1940 were made
by AMG to obtain figures for 1944. Estimates of the total number of
persons in each occupation for South Korea were obtained by adding the
figures for provinces south of the 38th parallel. In the case of the 3
provinces split by the parallel it was arbitrarily assumed that the occu-
pational distribution south of 38? followed the population distribution as
shown in the 1944 census. The same procedure was used in obtaining totals
for North Korea.
1944 (Adjusted from 1940 Census)
Occupation
South
North
Total
% of Total % of Total
Occupied Population
Agriculture
4,651,100
2,553,900
7,205,000
70.7
28.9
Fishing
117,100
73,900
191,000
1.9
0.8
Mining
78,400
144,600
223,000
2.2
0.9
Manufacturing
372,900
327,100
700,000
6.8
2.8
Commerce
303,700
132,300
436,000
4.3
1.8
Communications
87,100
79,900
167,000
1.7
0.7
Public Services
and Professions
183,600
101,400
285,000
2.8
1.2
Others
588,900
393,100
982,000
9.6
3.9
Occupied
6,382,800
3,806,200
10,189,000
100.0
41.0
Unoccupied
9,481,600
5,372,400
14,854,000
TOTAL
15,864,400
9,178,600
25,043,000
Zonal
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APPENDIX "C"
CHRONOLOGY
Is
1122 B.C. - Traditional date of founding of kingdom of Chosun,
with capital at Pyongyang by Kija, uncle of and counselor
to the last of the Shang Emperors, who welded all of
north Korea into a state ruled by his dynasty for 929
years.
57 B.C. - Beginning of Korean recorded history with formation of
kingdom of Silla out of three states in the south. At
about same time Chumong, from far north, established
kingdom of Kokuyo with Pyongyang as capital, and
another smaller kingdom, Pakche, was developed in
southwest.
4th Century A.D. - Introduction of Buddhism into Korea and consequent
influx of Chinese ideas and culture. With approval
and aid of China, Silla overcame Kokuyo and Pakche
and united whole country into single realm.
Formation of new Wang dynasty in state of Koryu by one
of Silla's generals. State wholly Buddhist, dominated
by priestcraft, easy prey for Mongols who invaded
peninsula in 1231, demanded a? fleet to assist in in-
vasion of Japan, and then left country to its own
devices. During much of Mongol period Korea was
governed directly by Mongol prefects.
Yi Taicho drove out Jap pirates from Korean coastal
towns, then inaugurated dynasty which endured until
modern times. Buddhism banned and renascence of
Korean culture ensued.
Japanese usurper, Hideyoshi, swept up the peninsula to
Pyongyang with an army of 300,000 with matchlocks. His
communications were cut and his supporting fleet deflated
by Admiral Yi Sun Sin, inventor of the tortoise boat
(iron-clad war vessel). Hideyoshi dies and with aid of
Chinese, Koreans drive Japanese out of Korea.
Manchu invasion. Manchus left country after its con-
quest, asking only annual tribute which was more like an
exchange of gifts than badge of servitude.
American flotilla under Rear Admiral Rogers sent to
repeat Commodore Perry's exploit of Japan. Fired on
by Koreans. American force landed, stormed fort from
which firing came, and then sailed away.
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Japanese treaty recognizing Korean independence.
0
American treaty with Korea, containing clause obli-
gating each signatory to aid each other diplomatically
in case of danger to either. All other major treaty
powers followed suit.
Abortive attempt of Jap-assisted Korean group to effect
coup d'etat. put down by existing government with aid
of Chinese who successfully reasserted suzerainty
of China until 1894.
1894 - Sino-Japanese War; elimination of Chinese influence in
Korea.
Murder of Korean Queen by Japanese in attempt to assure
economic and political cooperation. Retreat of King
and Crown Prince to Russian Legation; beginning of
Russian-Japanese rivalry in Korea.
Russo-Japanese War; Treaty of Portsmouth whereby
assumption of authority over Korea by Japan was
countenanced by US; establishment of Japanese
protectorate.
Abdication of Korean Emperor and annexation of Korea
to Jap Empire.
Declaration of Independence from Jap oppression and
establishment of provisional government by small group
of patriots in Shanghai.
1944 - Establishment of Korean Provisional Government at
Chungking for all parties.
Defeat of Japanese in World War II; beginning of joint
US-USSR occupation; Moscow Decision assuring Korea her
independence after formation of democratic government
to function under four-power trusteeship of not more
than a five-year duration.
Joint Commission meets in Seoul March 20 to consult
with representatives of democratic parties in forma-
tion of provisional government. Commission adjourns
May 6 without agreement.
1947 - Joint Commission reconvenes on May 21.
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0
APPENDIX D
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
0
KIM, Doo Bong
Place and date
of birth:
Residence:
Education:
Occupation:
Political
Affiliation:
Religion:
KIM, I1 Sawng
Place and date
of birth:
Occupation:
South Kyunsang Province in 1892.
Pyengyang, Pyengan Namdo
In 1915 attended Pai Chai High School
Politician
Member of the Independence Union, North Korea
Peoples Committee, Democratic Peoples Fighting
Line (Front), and North Korea Peoples Political
Committee.
Engaged in activities of Liberation Movement of
Peoples Party for about four years. In 1919 served
as part-time teacher at Seoul Posung and Himoon
Middle Schools. From 1923 to 1928 engaged in
activities as an executive member of Daihan Inde-
pendence Political Party. From 1928 to 1932 served
as a chief clerk of "Society for the Study of Revo-
lutionary Theory of Various Parties." From 1935 to
1937 organized "Chosun Peoples Revolutionary Party."
In 1942, appointed as a first Chairman of "Independence
Union." February, 1946, appointed Chief of "General
Affairs Bureau" of Democratic Peoples Fighting Line
(Front), Preparatory Commission, and is Vice Chair-
man of North Korea Peoples Committee.
Pyengyang, Pyengan Namdo
Attended Chinese School and graduated from Soviet
Military Academy.
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KIM, I1 Sawng (continued)
Political Member of Chosun Communist Party of North Korea, of
Affiliation: which he is General Secretary. Chairman of North
Korea Peoples Committee.
Religion: Not ascertained.
KIM, Kyu Sik
It is said that Kim, I1 Sawng is a son of Kim, Kwang
Sur, although his actual identity is still in doubt.
He is said to have rendered distinguished service
during the period of hostilities between Germany and
Soviet Russia. It is also said that the men who gave
much difficulty to the Japanese Army in Chintao Dis-
trict, was his father KIM, Kwang Sur. This has not
been definitely established. He is the leading Korean
Communist figure in North Korea and has been built up by
Soviet propaganda to be a national hero. Was recently
decorated by Stalin for his good work on_behalf of
Korean independence and his resistance against the
Japanese. Chairman, North Korea People's Committee
and Chairman, Central Committee, North Korean Labor
Party.
? Place and date of Location not ascertained. 1882.
Residence: Seoul
Education: Graduated with honors from Roanoke, Virginia, College
in 1903, and won a scholarship for M. A. work at
Princeton University, but returned to Korea in 1904.
Occupation: Politician and educator.
Political Is Vice Chairman of the Representative Democratic
Affiliation: Council of South Korea.
Religion: Not ascertained.
0
Went to China in 1913 and was naturalized as a
Chinese citizen in January, 1916. He was chief dele-
gate and presented Korea's case at the Paris Peace Con-
gerence in 1919. Was "Minister of Foreign Affairs" and
later "Minister of Education" of the Provisional Govern-
ment. About 1920 he returned to the United States and
organized, and became chairman of, the Korean Commission
to Europe and America, with Headauarters in Washington,
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S
KIM, Koo
KIM, Kyu Sik (continued)
Remarks: D. C. He represented Korea at the Far Eastern
(continued) Revolutionary Congress, Moscow, in 1922 and in
Siberia in 1923-24. Returned to China and engaged
in educational work, holding professorships at
Futuun University and Chungshan University,
Wuchang and at Paiyang University, Tientsin. Was
President of Williams College in Shanghai. Was
Foreign Secretary of the Provisional Government
and returned to Korea on November 23, 1945. Speaks
eight languages fluently. Is considered one of the
leading Korean statesmen, and has shown more dis-
position to assume a moderate political policy
towards the left-wing than other leading conserva-
tive Koreans. Chairman, South Korean Legislative
Assembly.
Place and date Not ascertained. 1877.
of birth:
0
Residence:
Occupation:
Political
Affiliation:
Religion:
Member of the Representative Democratic Council of.
South Korea and leader in the National Association
for the Rapid Realization of the Korean Independence.
Was a leader in the Provisional Government at Chung-
king; was police inspector general of the Provisional
Government in Shanghai. He replaced Dr. Rhee as
president of the Provisional Government in exile in
1943. Returned to Korea on November 23, 1945. Is
now one of the most influential and powerful conserva-
tive Korean leaders, although because of his intran-
sigent stand against the left-wing groups, he has
damaged his prestige as a leader to some degree.
Chairman, Independence Party; Chairman, Anti-trustee-
ship Committee organized in January 1947.
PAK, Heun Yung
0
Place and date
of birth:
Kyunggi Do in 1899.
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PAK, Heun Yung (continued)
? Residence:
Occupation:
Education:
Political
Affiliation:
Religion:
0
LYUH, Woon Hyung
Place and
date of birth:
Occupation:
Political
Affiliation:
Not ascertained.
Politician
Graduated from Lenin University, Moscow.
Leader and official spokesman of Korean Communist
Party. One of four chairmen, Executive Committee,
Democratic Peoples Front.
Went to Shanghai in 1920 and joined Chinese Young
Men's Communist Party. Became director of that
organization in 1925. Imprisoned in Shanghai by
Japanese police for Communist activities, 1925-27.
Was in Russia from 1927 to 1930. Returned to
Shanghai in 1930 and was again jailed by Japanese
police from 1931 until 1936. Came to Korea and
organized Communist underground movement, 1936.
Foreign press of 26 October, 1945 quoted him as
saying both Russia and United States should leave
Korea to Koreans. Leader of Korean Communist
Party. Met with sixty Communist sympathizers on
19 September 1945 to unify different groups in the
interest of Korean Communist Party. Played impor-
tant role in the organization of the Korean Labor
Party. In September 1946 US Military Government
issued warrant for his arrest on charge of foment-'
ing disorder and endangering the forces of occu-
pation. Still at large. One of six chairmen of
Democratic People's Front organized January 1947.
Yang Pyong, Kyonggi Do in 1886.
Attended Waseda University, Tokyo, and Yenching
University, Peking. Is a graduate of Presbyterian
Theological Seminary, Pyengyang.
Member of the Korean Peoples Republic and Peoples
Party.
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?
LYUH, Woon Hyung (continued)
Religion: Christian
0
Remarks: Was connected with the Korean Independence Movement
in 1919 and with the student movements in 1926 and
1929. Was an original member and Vice Minister of
"Foreign Affairs" of the Korean Provisional Govern-
ment, and in 1932 was kidnapped by the Japanese and
brought to Korea, where he was imprisoned for sev-
eral years. Was editor of the Central Daily News
published in Seoul and was imprisoned for a term be-
cause of his activities in this connection. After
August 15, 1945, was requested by the Japanese to
set up the National Founding Preparation Committee
which later became the Korean Peoples Republic, of
which he is now head. Was selected as one of the
four chairmen for the Central Committee of the
Democratic Peoples Front (left wing) in February,
1946. He is considered a moderate left-wing leader
of great influence and popularity, both because of
his personality and because of his consistent efforts
to attain Korean independence. He is now believed
to be, to some extent, under the influence of the
Communists and has opposed, in general, efforts at
uniting the left and right-wing groups. Although
undoubtedly a leader of significant power, he has
shown a tendency to vacillate and is regarded by
some as a political opportunist. He was invited to
represent his party on the Representative Demo-
cratic Council of South Korea, but refused to par-
ticipate. He is an excellent speaker, patriotic in
his views, and a scholar of considerable accomplish-
ment, but appears reluctant to take a firm public
stand on current leading issues. One of six chair-
men of Democratic People's Front organized January
1947.
RHEE, Syngman
Place and date Not ascertained. 1876.
of birth:
Education: M.A. from Harvard University; PH.D. from Princeton
University.
0
Occupation: Politician
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SECRET
RHEE, Syngman (continued)
s
Political Member of the National Association for the Rapid
Affiliation: Realization of Korean Independence.
Religion: Christian
0
0
Remarks: Published Korea's first daily newspaper from 1897 to
1904. Took a prominent part in the Independence
Movement in 1919. President of the Korean Provi-
sional Government from 1941 to 1942. Resided in the
United States from 1919 to 1945 and was a peace del-
egate at Philadelphia on April 5, 1919. Representa-
tive of the Korean Provisional Government, Washington,
D.C., 1942. Chairman of the Korean Commission in
Washington, 1944. Was appointed an advisor to the
San Francisco Conference, March 4, 1945. Returned to
Korea in October, 1945. Is a leader of the National
Association for the Rapid Realization of Korean In-
dependence and former Chairman of the Democratic
Council of South Korea. Rhee is probably the best-
known figure in Korean politics today; is considered
an arch conservative and implacably anti-communist;
is widely respected by most Koreans although, because
of his participation in partisan politics, is believed
to have damaged his original prestige to a significant
extent. He is strictly anti-Soviet. Because of his
opposition to left-wing elements, it is somewhat
doubtful whether he would be of sufficient stature
to be a successful candidate as head of the new Korean
state.
D-6 SECRET;
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A001400030001-2
 ?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/29: C
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/29: CIA-RDP78-01617AO01400030001-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/29: CIA-RDP78-01617AO01400030001-2
Document No. S./ O)
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/29: CIA-RDP78-01617AO01400030001-2
SECRET
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1442-S-1947
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/29: CIA-RDP78-01617AO01400030001-2