ALBANIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A001400050001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 15, 1947
• Content Type: REPORT

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S E C R E T;
INTELLIGENCE GROU P
S E G R E "1' / t--"
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This (SR) series of CIG Situation Reports is designed to furnish to
authorized recipients, for their continuing use as a reference, analyses and
interpretations of the strategic or national policy aspects of foreign situations
which affect the national security of the United States.
In the preparation of this report, the Central Intelligence Group has
made full use of material furnished by the intelligence agencies of the State,
War and Navy Departments and of the Army Air Forces. These agencies have
also concurred in this report unless otherwise noted.
It is suggested that the recipients retain this report, since it will be
reviewed and, if necessary, revised in whole or in part each month hereafter.
WARNING
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NA-
TIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF
THE ESPIONAGE ACT, 50 U.S.C., 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANS-
MISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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15 August 1947
SR-4
ALBANIA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY
SECTION I - POLITICAL SITUATION
1. Historical Background .............................................I-1
2. Origins of the Present Regime .....................................I-2
3. The Present Regime ................................................I-3
4. Opposition Groups .................................................I-4
5. Stability of the Present Administration ...........................I-5
1. Genesis of the Present Economic Situation .........................II-1
2. Description of the Present Economy ................................II-1
a, Over-all Government Policy ....................................II-1
b. Yugoslav Economic Pact ........................................II-2
c. Agriculture........... .........................................II-2
d. Natural Resources ............................................ II-3
(1) Oil ......................................................II-4
(2) Minerals ..............,...................................II-4
(3) Other Resources............. .............................II-5
e. Industry ......................................................II-6
f. Transportation ................................................II-6
g. Finance .......................................................II-6
h. International Trade ...........................................II-7
3. Stability of the Economy ..........................................II-7
1. The Bases of Albanian Foreign policy ..............................III-1
2. Significant Relations with Other Countries ........................III-2
a. Balkan Federation .............................................III-2
b. Yugos].avia ....................................................III-3
c. Greece ........................................................III-3
(1) Epirus ...................................................III-3
(2) Guerrilla Support ....................... ...............III-4
(3 ) Corfu ................ ..,., ....,. . III-4
A.ll'~?;l
Bate:
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d. Western powers ................................................III-4
(1) United States ............................................III-4
(2) United Kingdom ...........................................II1-5
(3) Italy ....................................................III-5
SECTION V - STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY............V-1
SECTION VI - PROBABLE FUTURE, DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY.......VI-1
APPENDIX A - Topography ...............................................A-1
APPENDIX B - Characteristics of the People ............................B-1
APPENDIX C - Chronology ...............................................C-1
APPENDIX D - Biographical Data ........................................D-1
APPENDIX E - Map - Terrain and Transportation
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SUN~IARY
Albania's political influence, economic resources, and military
strength are negligible from the point of view of United States security.
Its strategic significance resides solely in its location, as a potential
base of operations, at the entrance to the Adriatic and on the northwest
frontier of Greece. US interest in Albania is therefore a conseouence of
US interest in Italy, the Adriatic, and Greece.
The 1,000,000 inhabitants of Albania are traditionally hostile
toward the Yugoslavs as well as toward the Greeks. Currently the great
majority of them are also anti-Communist in sentiment. They are neverthe-
less firmly controlled by a Communist-dominated government which came into
power through leadership of the wartime resistance mcvement and maintains
itself by the usual techniques of the Communist police state. This regime
is controlled from Yugoslavia, rather than by the USSR directly, and the
country has been annexed by Yugoslavia in all but name.
Albania is, however, no great addition to Yugoslav or Soviet
strength. Its natural resources (principally petroleum, iron and chrome
ores, and lumber) are limited and largely undeveloped; their development
would require a diversion of manpower and machinery which Yugoslavia and
the USSR could ill afford in view of the slight prospective gain. Its
Army of 65,000 is primarily an internal security force without heavy
weapons and without air and naval support. At best it could serve in
major operations as only a local auxiliary. Although Albania provides
some sites for advanced air and submarine bases, these are limited in
number and capacity, their logistical and military support overland would
be precarious, and they would prove untenable in the face of superior air
and naval power.
The USSR nevertheless derives considerable local and immediate
advantage from its indirect control over Albania, primarily through the
use of that country as a base of guerrilla operations into northwestern
Greece.
No significant change in the status of Albania is to be ex-
pected in the foreseeable future. The regime is securely established.
Economic and military development under Yugoslav direction will occur,
but gradually and without appreciable increase in the Albanian economic
and military potential.
In short, Soviet control of Albania is of considerable local and
incidental advantage to the USSR, but is not an important factor in the
international balance of power.
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SECTION I
POLITICAL SITUATION
1. Historical Background
The strategic location of Albania on the Strait of Otranto, commanding
both the entrance to the Adriatic and the shortest overland route between
the Adriatic and the Aegean,* has made that country from the earliest times
a theater in which greater neighboring powers have contended against each
other for mastery. Since the days of Alexander the land ha.s been subjected
to the domination of first one and then another of these powers. Foreign
domination, however, has rarely been effective beyond the coastal area and
the main roads. While tides of empire ebbed and flowed around them, the
native folk of the alpine heights from which the country Lakes its name
have remained apart, preserving into the 20th Century the speech, the clan
system, and many of the folkways of ancient Illyria.
Modern Albanian nationalism derives its inspiration from the epic resis-
tance of Skanderbeg to Turkish domination, 1444-1466, one of the few
occasicns in history when the Albanian clans were united in a common cause.
Previously, however, Skanderbeg ha.d fought for the Turks against the
Italians and the Slavs, Albania's traditional enemies, and subsequently the
Albanians accepted a nominal Turkish suzerainty as a guarantee of protection
from these same neighbors. Brief participation in a common European resis-
tance to a non-European invader is thus far less characteristic of the
Alban~.a.n people than is the tenacity with which the mountain folk have re-
tained their riostility toward all their more immediate neighbors, Italian,
Slav, and Greek.
The revival of Albanian nationalism in mcdern times was less in resis-
tance to weak Ottoman rule than in opposition to Slavic, Greek, and Italian
designs on Albanian territory. The Albanians wanted only autonomy within
the Ottoman Empire with continued protection from their neighbors. Their
apprehensions were well founded. The Balkan League, formed under Russian
inspiration, had agreed upon a complete partition of Albania between
Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece, and during the First Balkan War (1912) the
country was occupied by Slavic and Greek forces. Thereupon Austria-Hungary
and Italy, both unwilling to see Russian satellites established on the
Strait of Otranto, intervened. Those Powers were equally determined Lo
prevent each other from controlling so strategic a location. The result,
then, was the establishment of an independent Albania, a decision imposed
by the concert of the Great Powers upon an angry Russia and her Balkan
* The Roman road over this route ran from Dyrrachium (Durazzo) to
Thessalonica (Salonika) by way of the Shkumbin River valley.
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satellites. Thus Albania, as a national state, was an artificial creation
of .Great Power politics rather than an expression of the national will and
power of the Albanian people.
The new state was engulfed in World War I before it had well begun to
function. With impartial xenophobia, the Albanians expelled the German
prince who had been imposed on them and decimated the hated and helpless
Serbs driven into their country by the Austro-Bulgarian advance. There-
after Albania was occupied by Austrian forces in the north and Italian
forces in the south. On the collapse of Austria, Italy was left in com-
plete control of the situation. The restored Albanian state depended upon
Italy for protection from the continued aggressive designs of its Balkan
neighbors, Yugoslavia and Greece.
Albeit under vague Italian protection, Albania enjoyed, between 1920
and 1924, a brief period of striving toward democratic self-government.
In 1924, however, Ahmed Bey Zogu (later King Zog I), supported by the
landowners and other reactionary elements, seized power and established an
authoritarian regime. Zog effectively subdued the clans, established un-
precedented order, developed the apparatus of modern administration, im-
proved communications, and promoted the exploitation of Albania's petroleum
resources. His neglect of true social and economic reform, however, his
denial of civil liberties, and his increasing subservience to Fascist Italy
created conditions favorable to subsequent Communist agitation.
On Good Friday, 1939, Mussolini found occasion to discard his Albanian
puppet and to install Victor Emmanuel as King of Albania. Although nominally
a separate kingdom still, the country was for all practical purposes annexed
by Italy. There was no appreciable resistance to this coup, which in fact
represented no more than nominal change in the real status of Albania. More-
over, the Albanians took no advantage of the Italian defeat by the Greeks in
1940, since liberation by Greece would certainly have entailed the loss of
Albanian territory. Conversely, on the collapse of Yugoslavia and Greece
before the German onslaught in 1941, Albania gained certain accessions of
territory long claimed, but never before within her grasp.
2. Origins of the Present Regime
It was only after the German invasion of the USSR that significant resis-
tance began to develop in Albania. Although the appeal of this movement was
to Albanian patriotism in opposition to Italian occupation, its belated _
appearance and convenient timing were significant of its Communist leader-
ship. Not all Albanian nationalists were prepared to accept such leadership,
however; for a time there was a rival movement supported by landowners, Catholic
clergy, and similar conservative elements, and a full-scale civil war between
them, parallel, to that between the adherents of Tito and Mihailovich in
Yugoslavia. As in Yugoslavia, the Communists disguised their ulterior pur-
poses, appealed to the ideal of national unity, promised free elections after
liberation, and so won a more general following than did their competitors.
By October 1944 their "People's Army" had liberated three-fourths of the
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country. their "National Liberation Councils" were in effective local
political control of the liberated areas. and their "National Liberation
Front" had been constituted as a national political machine under effective
Communist control. In November 1944 their "Democratic Government" moved
into Tirana and assumed control of the entire ccuntry.
The popular themes of the resistance movement continued to be emphasized
through the election of December 1945, in which the National Liberation
Front, the only party permitted to participate, succeeded in turning out an
impressive vote in favor of its nominees. Only after this vote had been
recorded did the regime reveal its specific program, which it proceeded to
put into effect as in response to a popular mandate.
3. The Present Regime
The Constituent Assembly elected in December 1945 adopted, in March
1946, a constitution for the "Albanian People's Republic" which ostensibly
provides for full civil liberties and a thoroughly democratic government.
Actually. however, the Communist inner circle is able to exercise absolute
control of the National Liberation Front as a political machine and its
control of the Albanian Array as an ultimate sanction.
Colonel General Enver Hoxha is the most powerful man in Albania. Al-
though he takes his orders from the Kremlin via the Yugoslav Communist
Party, he exercises extensive power in Albania through his various offices,
which include Premier, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of National
? Defense, Commander-in-Chief of the Army. President of the Democratic Front.
and member of the Presidium of the People's Assembly. Along with Hoxha,
the small group which formulates high policy and really rules the country
includes: Lieutenant General Koci Xoxe, Major General Mehmet Shehu, Kocho
Tashko, and Nako Spiru. Several other former influential leaders who were
active in organizing the present regime have recently been relegated to po-
sitions of insignificance, possibly because of their pro-Western sympathies.
Principal Government agencies used by Hoxha and his associates to con-
trol the country include: the Army. the Security Police (DMP), the Minis-
tries of Economy, Finance, and Education, the Directorate of the Press,
and the Communist Party. The Army, fairly well armed both with captured
German and Italian and with Soviet eouipment. has successfully eliminated
or driven from the country nearly all organized resistance to the Hoxha
regime. The Army's loyalty is unouestioned and it is believed to be
capable of~suppressing any potential rebellion. In addition, the Govern-
ment dispenses .justice through its military courts. The civil .judiciary
system has thus far been allowed to handle only such minor cases as petty
thefts, cattle rustling, and divorce proceedings. The military courts
are staffed by former Partisan officers. usually reliable Communist Party
members without legal training. Judicial procedure bears little resemblance
to Western practice; one ma.,jor difference being that the court presupposes
the guilt of the accused until proven otherwise.
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The activities of the Security Police (DMP) are but an extension of the
role played by the Army. With a complete disregard for all civil liberties,
the DMP uses its unlimited powers of search and arrest to silence any dis-
sidents who dare to raise their voices against the Government -- many who
opposed the Front candidates in the November elections have since been con-
victed as "traitors to the people". A former Minister of Education declared
that civil liberties can exist in Albania only within the framework of the
"new democracy", which is directed by a single political group and which
allows the practice of but a single political ideology.
The Government, through the Ministries of Finance and National Economy,
further regulates the life of the people by its controls over all domestic
and foreign trade, prices, agricultural production, and distribution and
taxation. In addition, ccntrol of government activity is extended through
Control Commissions, each headed by a trusted Communist. These Commissions
have sweeping powers of investigation over almost every governmental depart-
ment and serve effectively to check upon those whose sympathies may not be
sufficiently pro-Communist. The Government also owns or controls all media
of expression, even to the extent of expropriating privately owned radio
receiving sets. Finally, through the Communist Party, the present regime
maintains effective control of the People's Councils, the trade unions, all
"mass" organizations (youth, women, etc.), and of the National Assembly,
itself.
4. Opposition Groups
As a result of its terrorist and repressive policy, the Hoxha regime
has lost much of the popular support it en,ioyed at the time of the 1945
elections. It is estimated that 8G% of the people now oppose the Govern-
ment, the strongest opposition ccming from Catholic elements in the popu-
lation. The Roman Catholic Church, however, has been so persecuted by the
Government that it no longer can be considered as an effective resistance
factor. The few hundred bandits still operating in the northern mountains
would probably resist any Central Government and are not motivated by any
ideological opposition to Communism. Although no organized resistance
movements remain in the country, two organized opposition groups operate abroad:
(1) Exiled in Egypt, King Zog. with his entourage, is seeking
recognition from the great powers as de .jure Government-in-Exile
(Turkey maintains and Egypt has reaffirmed recognition). It is
not believed that Zog has important connections within Albania or
that he constitutes a threat to the Noxha regime, although support
for his Legality Party has recently increased.
(2) The Balli Kombetar group. made up of remnants of those who
opposed the merger of Nationalist and Partisan resistance groups
during the War, is believed to maintain a skeleton organization
among refugees in Italy and Greece. Its membership early in 1947
probably did not exceed 300; however, it has recently been gaining
strength.
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5. Stability of the Present Administration
The Hoxha regime, despite its unpopularity, is in no danger of collaps-
ing. Its control of the Army and Security Police is absolute and it has
effectively crushed all open political opposition. The little subversive
armed resistance which still exists in the North is powerless without out-
side aid. Hoxha is young, ambitious, and sufficiently astute to realize
that his position is impregnable as long as he adheres to the Moscow-
Belgrade line. Even his fall from favor would have little effect on the
present administration, which could carry on with only minor personnel
changes. Furthermore, the USSR and Yugoslavia would probably offer
assistance should economic deterioration threaten the political stability
of the present regime.
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SECTION II
ECONOMIC SITUATION
1. Genesis of the Present Economic Situation
Albania is a backward country with a predominantly agricultural economy.
The standard of living is low even by southern European comparisons. It
was not until the 1920's that, under the influence of the Italians, an
attempt was made to develop Albania's natural resources and to raise the
level of economic activity of the country through"foreign trade. Italian
efforts had produced only a slight improvement in the economic situation by
1939, when the outbreak of war brought these efforts to an end. For six
years economic activity was badly dislocated by occupation and guerrilla
warfare.
The Hoxha regime is currently attempting to impose on this primitive
economy controls similar to those which regulate the economies of the USSR
and Yugoslavia, To this end, Albania has signed an economic accord which
makes its economy completely dependent upon Yugoslavia, and hence upon the
USSR. The rate and course of economic development in Albania, therefore,
now depend primarily upon the extent to which Yugoslavia and the USSR will
find it profitable to develop Albania's natural resources.
2. Description of the Present Economy
a. Over-all Government Policy
The Hoxha regime's economic philosophy was aptly summarized by an
Albanian official: "State economy is the firm foundation of our national
economy.....the interest of the people is superior to personal interests.....
Only when construction material, machinery, clothing, food and everything
else necessary for existence is placed completely under State control will
the economic development of the country have a greater impetus and the life
of the masses and impoverished workers be lifted to a new standard."
The Government has accordingly imposed strict controls over all eco-
nomic activities. All former Italian properties have been seized; national-
ization of almost all production facilities (including the country's mineral
wealth but excluding agricultural land) has been completed; stringent price
and wage laws have been passed; independent merchants and middlemen have
been virtually eliminated; and extensive land reforms accompanied by rigid
controls on agricultural production and marketing have been imposed. In
February 1945 the General Council of Workers' Syndicates was established
and the majority of workers now belong to its affiliated Communist-dominated
local unions. Albania's first comprehensive labor legislation regulates
working hours, wages, and management-employee relationships, and provides
for social security benefits, vacations with pay, and arbitration of disputes.
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b. Yugoslav Economic Pact
On 27 November 1946 Albania forfeited its economic independence by
signing an all-inclusive pact with Yugoslavia. Unable to stand alone eco-
ncmically and prevented by the Kremlin from turning to the West, Albania by
this act became an economic satellite of Yugoslavia. The agreement* pro-
vides for:
(1) Joint Albanian-Yugoslav monopolies (patterned after the joint
companies set up by the USSR in its other Eastern European satellites)
to operate Albania's railroad, mining, metallurgical, electric, shipping,
and import-export activities. Each country has equal shares in these
companies and Albania has an option to purchase the Yugoslav shares in
30 years. Yugoslavia is to provide the working capital and equipment
in exchange for a half interest in Albanian enterprises and exploitation
rights;
(2) Joint Albanian-Yugoslav bank to be located in Tirana;
(3) Technical training for Albanians in Yugoslavia and provision
by Yugoslavia for technical assistance to Albanian agriculture and
industry;
l4)
dinar;
Stabilization of the Albanian franc in terms of the Yugoslav
(5)
Yugoslav credits for the purchase of machines and tools;
(6)
Early establishment of an Albanian-Yugoslav customs union to
be jointly administered.
c. Agriculture
Approximately 80% of the Albanian people earn their living from
agriculture. Only 12% of the country's area is cultivated, another 32% is
pasture and meadow land suitable for grazing, and approximately 20% is at
present non-productive. The remaining 36% is forest land (see Natural
Resources). Agricultural methods are primitive and marketing facilities
limited. For the most part, farming is on a family or village subsistence
basis with each farm producing a fairly diversified crop.
In the past, Albania has been able to attain about 75% self-suffi-
ciency in food products, but only because of a standard of living as iow
* For complete text of Economic Agreement, as well as other joint Albanian-
Yugoslav pacts, refer to Department of State OIR Report No. 4358, dated
2 July 1947. Evaluation of the effect of the agreement on economic
development in Albania will be discussed under the appropriate headings
below.
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as any in the Balkans. The principal cereal crop is corn, with lesser
amounts of wheat, oats, barley, and rye being raised. Olives, tobacco, and
grapes are the chief commercial crops. Small quantities of rice, vetch,
alfalfa, potatoes, beans, onions, citrus fruit, cotton, and flax are also
grown. Although corn is the largest cereal crop, pre-war imports were sub-
stantial. The country is dependent upon imports for sugar and coffee and
also must import cotton and wheat. Principal exports include olives and
olive oil, tobacco, and beans. Cattle and dairy products, wool, hides, and
furs also are important export items.
The Hoxha regime has undertaken an ambitious program to increase
agricultural production. One of the regime's first acts was to implement
sweeping land reforms which parcelled out the large land-holdings to peasant
farmers and set as the national standard a farm of 12~ acres for a family of
five persons, with an additional acre for each person above five in a family.
Although this redistribution earned initial peasant good-will for the Hoxha
regime, its effect will more likely be to reduce total production than to
increase it. Restricting farms to this size tends to emphasize subsistence
crops, to increase the cost of marketing, and to make more difficult the
introduction of farm machinery and modern agricultural practices. In view
of the Albanian Government's twin desires to increase production and to
spread collectivization of agriculture, the Communists may be hoping that
the peasants will be unable to make a living on their small holdings and
will be less intransigent in their opposition to later collectivization.
The Communists, however, will probably not attempt widespread collectiviza-
tion until farm equipment is available to make collective farms profitable.
An early substantial increase in Albanian agricultural production is
unlikely. In addition to factors already mentioned, Albania will be unable
to afford the import of agricultural machinery or fertilizers in Quantities
that will have any appreciable effect. Despite their desire to see Albania
agriculturally self-sufficient, the USSR and Yugoslavia will be able to do
little about it as they are themselves short of the products needed by Al-
bania to achieve this goal. Moreover, it will be many years before the
backward Albanian peasant is trained to make effective use of modern agri-
cultural techniques. Although the Albanian Government is currently engaged
in extensive reclamation, irrigation, and drainage projects, the labor for
cultivation of new farm lands will be in short supply as long as Albania
maintains an army of 65 000 persons and attempts to develop its natural
resources.
d. Natural Resources
Albania is relatively rich in certain natural resources, particularly
oil, forests, and some metallic minerals. The extent of these mineral re-
sources has never been accurately determined and their exploitation has been
retarded by the lack of communications facilities, capital, skilled labor,
and industrial machinery.
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Albania's pre-war petroleum production (1935) of about 158,660
tons ranked, just after Hungary, third in Eastern Europe and fifth in
all of Europe (Rumania, Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Albania), ex-
clusive of the USSR. Reserves are estimated at 12,000,000 tons, al-
though further exploration may reveal new deposits. In 1942, the
Italians reported having produced slightly under 300,600 tons.
Although Albanian oil is, therefore, of potential strategic
and economic value to the USSR and its Eastern European satellites,
numerous factors combine to reduce its immediate importance. Crude
oil produced in Albania ha.s a high sulphur content and its conversion
into gasoline requires a relatively complicated refining process.
Prior to World War II, nearly all of Albania's oil was exported to
Italy where it was refined at Bari. Albania's refining capacity is
extremely limited, and refineries known to exist in Yugoslavia are
not equipped to handle Albania's high-sulphur crude. Moreover, both
rail and water facilities for the transport of oil from Albania to
Yugoslavia are wholly inadequate. Full exploitation of Albanian oil
is further limited by antiquated operating techniques and by the lack
of drilling and well equipment and storage facilities. It is unlikely,
therefore, that there will be an early substantial increase over
current crude production (about 25'h of pre-war, or 40,600 tons annu-
ally), most of which is locally used in semi-crude form for fuel
purposes.
(2) Minerals
Albania has abundant mineral deposits, particularly iron,
chrome, copper, coal, and asphalt (bitumen). As in the case of oil,
there are no accurate estimates as to the extent of these deposits.
The following table represents the best information available:
Production (Annual)
Reserves
Quality
Location
Pre-War Present
Iron
20,000,000
Excellent
North &
Unknown
Believed
tons
East
Small
Chrome
506,000
Excellent
East & NE
12,000
Unknown
tons
tons
Copper
5-15,000,000
Fair
North
6,000 tons
6,000 tons
tons (ore)
(refined)
Coal
Extensive
Brown
Central
2,OC~0 tons
8,000 tons
Deposits
Asphalt
Unknown
Excellent
Southwest
2,000 tons
Unknown
(Bitumen)
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In addition to these minerals, smaller quantities of gold and
manganese are known to exist, although it is not believed that they
are being currently extracted in any appreciable quantities.
Exploitation of these resources to a point where they will
become of practical strategic or economic value to Yugoslavia or the
USSR is still a goal attainable only in the long-range future. With
the exception of asphalt, and coal to a lesser degree, Albania itself
cannot use these materials until domestic refining and industrial
facilities are developed.
Under present circumstances most of Albania's mineral resources
are being used only as items for export. The extent of even such ex-
ports, however, is limited by a lack of railroads,. machinery, skilled
labor, and capital.
i
Prevented from turning to the West, Albania must rely upon
Yugoslavia and the USSR for assistance in extracting these minerals.
Since Yugoslavia also has substantial undeveloped deposits of iron,
chrome, copper, and coal, it is unlikely to divert its short supply
of capital, machinery and technicians to Albania. Yugoslav partici-
pation in joint companies established by the Yugoslav-Albanian eco-
ncmic agreement will, therefore, provide little material assistance
to Albania, which is in the frustrated position of being unable to
tap its major source of wealth-- and without tapping it is in turn
unable to afford those facilities (transportation, skilled labor,
machinery, etc.) without which these resources cannot in turn be
developed. Meanwhile, it is unlikely that Yugoslavia or the USSR
will allow Albania to open the door to Western capital. Although not
immediately available to them, these countries do not intend that
Albania's resources become available to their potential enemies.
(3) Other Resources
An abundance of water power and rather extensive forests con-
stitute Albania's only remaining major resources. The Hoxha regime is
making every effort to speed electrification of the country as part of
its program to raise the standard of living. At present only one hydro-
electric plant (at Korce) is in operation, and the country's limited
supply of electricity is generated by steam plants which are a drain
upon limited coal and oil supplies.
Development of Albania's timber production from some 2,000,000
acres of good quality coniferous and hard types again has been retarded
by the lack of communications facilities, machinery and capital. In
fact, these factors forced Albania prior to the war to import wood and
wood products. As in the case of other Albanian resources, little help
can be expected from Yugoslavia since development of that country's
ample timber resources also is retarded by the same factors which obtain
in Albania.
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e. Industry
Albania has no heavy industries, no metallurgical, engineering, or
chemical plants, or concerns engaged in the production of armaments, ships,
or aircraft. Albanian industry, such as it is, owes its development to the
Italians, who provided the capital and technical knowledge for the construc-
tion of: flour mills adequate for domestic needs; olive oil refineries at
Valona and Elbasan which produce enough table oil for small exports; soap
factories at Valona, Durazzo, Tirana and Scutari; alcohol distillation plants
at Tirana, Durazzo, Korce, Pogradec and Scutari; and cigarette factories at
Korce, Tirana, Scutari, Elbasan and Durazzo which supply local needs. A few
cheese factories manufacture for export; cement is commercially produced in
limited quantities, and file is manufactured on a small scale by primitive
methods.
Although the present Government's grandiose plans for industrializa-
tion may achieve some results, particularly in such fields as consumer goods,
textiles, paper, and wood products, the country lacks the capital, the tech-
nical know-how and the manpower to achieve any significant industrialization.
It is estimated that maintenance of even a low standard of agricultural self-
sufficiency, partial exploitation of the country's natural resources, and
development of the country's transportation and communications facilities,
coupled with the preservation of a large army, will leave little manpower or
capital for industrial development.
f. Transportation
Albania's transportation system is inadequate to support more than a
most primitive economy. Highways for the most part are poor, particularly
the east-west routes, and land communication with Yugoslavia and Greece is
barely sufficient for current limited needs. Motor transport is estimated
to be limited to 1,200 trucks (mostly from UNRRA); 50 buses, 90C private
cars and 120 jeeps fall from UNRRA). A shortage of tires and spare parts
reduces the effectiveness of these vehicles. There are no railroads in
Albania, although construction has begun on a line from Durazzo to Elbasan
which is intended eventually to join with the Yugoslav rail system.
g. Finance
After World War II, Albania managed by dint of rigorous controls to
avoid inflation, stabilize the franc on a gold basis at 2.77 to the dollar,
and to rehabilitate the chaotic post-war condition of state finances. It is
improbable, however, that the Government could have weathered the post-war
period without the revenues obtained from the sale of UNRRA imports, the
confiscation of property (mostly Italian) and the acquisition of Italian and
German war supply depots. Without these sources of revenue and with inade-
quate income from taxes the Government can be expected to incur substantial
deficits if it continues its existing activities--particularly the support
of a large army. Under the terms of the Yugoslav-Albanian economic pact,
the Albanian lek, now the official Albanian unit of currency, will be pegged
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to the Yugoslav dinar, at the rate of one lek to one dinar. Furthermore,
the basic inflationary effects of consumer goods shortages coupled with
high wages (in comparison to pre-war) still prevail.
h. International Trade
Albania's pre-war imports consistently exceeded its exports to the
extent of nearly four million dollars yearly. The difference was made up
chiefly by Italian capital investment, tourist trade, and remittances from
emigrants (mostly in the US ). '
Albania's pre-war international trade--the smallest per capita of
any nation in Europe--was primarily with Italy, Germany, Yugoslavia and
Greece, with some imports from the US. Nearly all Albanian oil exports
went to Italy, which received 68% of all exports. Other important exports
were wool (14%), hides and furs !13%), dairy products, livestock, asphalt,
chromium and iron ores, and agricultural produce. Albania was completely
dependent on imports for its textiles (21% of all imports), coffee, sugar,
iron and steel, and partially dependent for corn, wheat, woolen goods and
luxury items.
Little is known of Albania's post-war international trade. The
country has signed no trade agreements other than with Yugoslavia and it is
believed that trade even with Yugoslavia has been negligible. Small quantities
of grain were received from Yugoslavia in 1946 and in return Albania is be-
lieved to have delivered some petroleum, wool, hides, dairy products, and
? olive oil. Both the Yugoslavs and the Soviets are also believed to have re-
ceived many of the Italian war-time stocks, including such products as luxury
textiles. Unconfirmed reports also indicate that the Soviets may be receiving
some copper and chrome ore, possibly in return for arms and equipment supplies
to the Albanian Army. Although Albania is not expected to receive desperately
needed industrial equipment from Yugoslavia or the USSR in the near future,
it is improbable that the Hoxha regime will make overtures to the West. More-
over, under existing conditions, investment of Western capital in Albania
would probably not be profitable and any profits would likely find their way
into the Government's treasury or to the USSR.
3. Stability of the Economy
The Albanian economy is relatively stable. It has a predominantly agri-
cultural base and the population, largely self-sufficient, is inured to
hardship and privation. Moreover, there is no complex financial or industrial
structure subject to dislocations adversely affecting the rest of the economy.
The Hoxha regime's hold over the country is so strong that, regardless of how
slowly economic improvement is achieved and how long the present low standard
of living is maintained, there is little danger of critical economic deteriora-
tion.
As long as the Hoxha regime is under Communist control, however, and per-
sists in attempting to impose a Soviet pattern of controls on a backward,
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agricultural economy, the rate of economic recovery will be slow. The USSR
and/or Yugoslavia will not only continue to take from Albania more than is
given in return, but will prevent Albania from obtaining Western capital
and equipment, requisites for substantial economic improvement.
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SECRET
SECTION III
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. The Bases of Albanian Foreign Polic
Itself a pawn in the game of power politics since time immemorial,*
Albania has never enjoyed a real independence and sovereignty in the ccnduct
of its foreign relations. Only at brief intervals since its creation by the
Great Powers in 1913 has the country been actually free of foreign military
occupation: in 1913-1914, 1920-1939, and since 1944. During the first
period the state had hardly begun to function and its only policy was that
of its foreign creators. During the second, for 19 years, it enjoyed mem-
bership in the League of Nations and engaged in the normal procedures of
diplomatic intercourse, but it was dependent on Italy for protection from
Yugoslavia and Greece, the special and privileged position of Italy in re-
lation to it was recognized by other powers and embodied in treaty form, and
it could pursue no foreign policy independent of that of Italy. Since 1944
it has been controlled by a puppet regime manipulated by the USSR through
Yugoslavia.
Albania's present pro-Soviet foreign policy stems from the emergence
of the Albanian Communist Party as the leader of the wartime partisan move-
ment. As a minority group with only two Moscow-trained members, the Albanian
Communist Party owes its present dominant position to the substantial assist-
ance received from the Yugoslav Communists. In fact, the Albanian Communist
Party was subordinated directly to the Yugoslav Communist Politburo. This
dependence upon Yugoslavia has continued since the war and Yugoslavia has in
effect become the instrument by which the USSR directs Albanian foreign
policy.
The extent to which Albania, nominally an independent state, follows the
Soviet foreign policy line was revealed in March 1946 by Premier Hoxha sub-
stantially as follows:
Albania can no longer be treated as "a chattel of the diplo-
macy that was responsible for World War II", but must pre-
serve its independence at all costs. The Albanian people
view with bitterness and indignation the postponement of
their legitimate request for membership in the UN and hold
the US and UK responsible for this. The true friends of
Albania are the USSR, "the real defender of the small
peoples", and Yugoslavia, which respects the independence
and sovereignty of the Albanian state. The Albanian Govern-
ment will further strengthen the friendship between Albania
* See Section I, pp. I-2,
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and Yugoslavia through stronger economic, political and
cultural ties. Friendly relations.will continue to be
cultivated with Poland, Czechoslovakia, France and, in
particular, with Bulgaria. Improved relations will be
sought with "the other Allies", but Albania will resist
any territorial encroachments by Greece.
In practical terms this means that: (a) politically, Albania seeks to
strengthen its relations with nations having Communist governments (or large
Communist representation in the government), and to participate in inter-
national conferences on an equal footing with other nations, thereby making
its maximum contribution to the Soviet-dominated Balkan bloc; and (b) eco-
nomically, Albania seeks the integration of the national economy with that
of Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe as an alternative to former dependence on
Italy.
2. Significant Relations with Other Countries
Albania's emergence as a pawn of Yugoslavia and the USSR has wrought pro-
found changes in the temper of its foreign policy. Aware of the strength of
its backing and anxious to pose before the people as a vigorous supporter of
Albania's interests in the world, the Hoxha regime has pursued a policy far
more bellicose and defiant than the size of the country would justify. Hoxha,
in his zeal to please, may even have exceeded his instructions by arousing
Western opposition to Albania's bid for membership in the UN. Thus, the
Hoxha regime, prompted by the urge to compensate for the relative insignifi-
cance of the country, can be expected to play with vigor and determination its
role in the USSR's master plan in the Balkans.
Albania's relations with other countries must be viewed in the light of
how it can best serve the USSR, both internationally and in Eastern Europe.
Paramount short-range Soviet objectives for Albania include (1) cooperation
with Yugoslavia, primarily as the most effective and least expensive means of
controlling the country; (2) denial to the West of a toe-hold on the Balkans;
(3) assistance to the Greek Communists; and (4) membership in the UN in order
to increase the voting strength of the Soviet bloc. Albania's ultimate posi-
tion in the Soviet hegemony depends primarily upon whether and how the USSR
implements its plans for a South Slav or Balkan Federation, but the effect
will be the same.
a. Balkan Federation
In the event of such a federation, Albania will either be included as
a Federated Republic of Yugoslavia or as a separate member on a par with
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and possibly Macedonia. A decisive factor will be the
USSR's attitude toward the UN when such a federation is brought into being--
Albania's chances of maintaining nominal independence being in direct ratio to
Soviet intentions and capabilities to increase the voting strength of the USSR
in the UN. In any case, formation of a Balkan Federation will only create a
substitute instrument for continuing Soviet domination of Albania.
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b. Yugoslavia
Before the Communist-directed rapprochement between the two coun-
tries, Albania and Yugoslavia were not on friendly terms, the chief bone
of contention being the Kosovo plain area of Yugoslavia, north and north-
east of Albania. The Turks settled this district with Albanians following
the Turkish defeat of Serbian forces there at the end of the fourteenth
century, and an estimated half million Albanians still remain. Albania,
however, has now abandoned its claim to the area in return for Tito's
friendship and aid.
Albania and Yugoslavia have signed the following agreements:*
(1) an all-inclusive economic pact (see Section II); (2) a protocol on the
resumption of border traffic between Yugoslavia and Albania; (3) a treaty
of friendship and mutual assistance; (4) a civil aviation agreement; and
(5) a maritime agreement. Secret military agreements also appear to have
been concluded between the two countries.
Despite the Hoxha regime's insistent protestations of Albanian in-
dependence, these agreements (particularly the economic accord) would make
the incorporation of Albania as a Federated Republic of Yugoslavia little
more than a formality. The exact nature of future Yugoslav-Albanian rela-
tions will depend upon the formation of a Balkan Federation. Until that
time, however, Albania will be allowed to preserve an appearance and even
a measure of independence in the hope that it can obtain membership in the
UN.
c. Greece
Factors in Greek-Albanian relations are: Greek claims to northern
Epirus (southern Albania); alleged Greek treatment of Chams; alleged Al-
banian help to Italians in Greek war; Greece's harboring of Albanian dis-
sidents; and Albanian aid to Greek Communist guerrillas. An additional
irritant is Albanian resentment over Greek ownership of the island of Corfu.
Greece is still "at war" with Albania.
(1) Epirus
The disputed territory of northern Epirus lies south of a
line drawn from Valona on the Adriatic to Pogradec on Lake Ohrid. Its
total population is about 290,000. The Greeks, citing ethnic, histori-
cal and strategic factors, have asked for this area as "a matter of
simple justice" based on Greece's role in World War II. Ethnically,
their claim does not appear justified, as it is based on the erroneous
assumption that all Orthodox Christians in the area (variously esti-
mated to number from 120 000 to 130 000) are Greeks. The League of
Nations inquiry commission, which visited the area in 1921-23, produced
* See footnote, p. II- 2.
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? what are probably the most impartial data available, giving the Greek
minority figure as 16,000. The 1945 Albanian census raises this to
35,000, or 12% of the area's total population (or 3% of the total popu-
lation of the country).
The historical claims of both Albania and Greece to the area
are obscure. They are based on opposite interpretations of events in
the Middle Ages when the area was part of the Byzantine Empire. Impartial
authorities agree that it would be impossible to untangle the origin of
the majority of the area's inhabitants, whose race, culture, religion and
language have through the centuries become so intermingled. Moreover, no
evidence supports Greece's charge that its minority in southern Albania
is persecuted by the Hoxha regime; in fact, the Greek minority has more
than its proportion of representation in the Cabinet and other responsible
civil and military positions.
(2) Guerrilla Support
Albania's part in training, supplying and giving refuge to Greek
guerrillas has paralleled the Yugoslav and Bulgarian practice. Border
incidents resulting from this activity are frequent and usually explained
in the Albanian press as Greek provocations designed to regain control
of northern Epirus, but a UN Inquiry Commission found Greek charges sub-
stantiated.
f3) Corfu
Alba.~ia has recently evinced a greater interest in the Greek-
held Island of Corfu, which is strategically located opposite the southern
tip of Albania and commands the entrance to the Straits of Otranto. Be-
cause of Corfu's potential military value, the Hoxha regime may pursue a
steady propaganda campaign in an attempt to lay the groundwork for eventual
separation of Corfu from Greek control. The damage to two British warships
by mines in the Corfu channel indicates the importance Albania attaches to
the area. Although the Channel has for some years been recognized. as an
international waterwav. Albania risked world censure in an attempt to ex-
ercise sole sovereignty over it.
d. Western Powers
Albania's hostility toward the West has largely been caused by normal
Communist antipathy toward the capitalist West, and by fear that the presence
of US and UK representatives in Albania would strengthen opposition to the
Hoxha regime. It has been aggravated by Western opposition to Albania's mem-
bership in the UN.
(1) United States
The US has had an interest in and supported the cause of Albanian
independence since World War I. US-Albanian relations, however, have
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deteriorated steadily since the end of World War II, eventually cul-
minating in the withdrawal of the US Mission from Tirana in November
1946. Chief irritant bet~reen the two countries was Albania's refusal
to confirm the validity of all pre-war treaties and agreements to
which both countries were signatories. Although Hoxha finally agreed
to accept the continued validity of all multilateral treaties, he
steadfastly refused to accept the US condition that bilateral treaties
also be accepted prior to recognition, despite US agreement to re-
examine the treaties once diplomatic relations had been resumed.
Since the US Mission's withdrawal, the Albanian Government has
intensified its propaganda attacks against the US. Former staff members
of the Mission have been falsely accused of sabotage against Government
economic projects and of organizing the people against the Government.
Albanians accused of receiving directives and money from the US have
been tried and executed. Meanwhile, claimants to US citizenship are
encountering increased obstacles in their efforts to leave the country.
Generally speaking, Albanians residing in the US support the
Hoxha regime.
(2) United Kingdom
After World War I, the UK actively supported Albania's efforts
to regain her independence and join the League of Nations. The UK
participated in the training of the pre-war gendarmerie and actively
supported Albanian Partisans during World War II. Relations between
the two countries remained cordial until the advent of the present
regime, which has consistently treated the UK with reserve and even out-
right hostility. The UK withdrew its Military Mission in April 1946 and
subsequently informed the Albanian Government that, in view of Albania's
increasingly hostile attitude, diplomatic relations would not be renewed.
UK-Albanian relations reached their nadir in October 1946 when two British
warships struck mines in Corfu Channel. The British submitted their claim
arising from this incident to the UN, which passed the case on to the
World Court. Should Hoxha fail to comply with the World Court decision--
which is expected to support the British claim--the matter would again
be referred to the Security Council. It is unlikely that the USSR would
use this issue as a test of the UN's power to enforce its decisions, and
would therefore force Hoxha to comply with the World Court decision.
(3) Italy
The Hoxha regime has made no attempt to resume relations with
Italy. Despite the country's pre-war dependence, both economic and
political, upon Italy, the Hoxha regime by its post-war actions has
definitely renounced the possibility of reestablishing the traditional
ties between the two countries. All former Italian property has been
expropriated by the Government and many Italian nationals in Albania
have been forcibly repatriated.
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SECTION IV
MILITARY SITUATION
1. Genesis of Present Military Policies
Throughout its short history, the Albanian Army has been considered pri-
marily as an instrument for maintaining internal order and only secondarily
as a defense against foreign aggression. King Zog laid the groundwork for
Albania's first national army and, under the terms of the Tirana Pact (1926),
the Italians undertook to assist in its organization. Compulsory military
training was adopted and Italian influence in the Army`s development was
paramount. The Italian General Staff hoped that the Albanian Army could hold
off a possible Yugoslav invasion until the arrival of Italian reenforcements.
During the Italian occupation, however, the personnel of the Albanian Army
was absorbed into the Italian Army. Although Albanian units fought on the
Italian side in the war against Greece. widespread desertions reduced their
effectiveness.
Albania's present armed forces evolved from the guerrilla bands of the
war-time resistance movement. Originally organized with Allied assistance,
the Albanian Army is now being reorganized on the Soviet pattern and under-
going training under Soviet and Yugoslav supervision. Albania has no navy.
and only the nucleus of an air force, consisting of 40 Yak-3 fighter planes.
2. Characteristics of the Army
a. Strength and Disposition
The Albanian Army has maintained its war-time strength and, as of
May 1947, numbered an estimated 65,000 men, including security troops. (In
order to attain the same ratio of armed forces to total population, the US
would have to maintain a peace-time Army of approximately 9,OOq,000.) The
Army consists of three or four infantry divisions, one DMP division (Divi-
sion for the Protection of the People), and a coastal defense group. The
infantry divisions each number from 10,000 to 15,000, divided into three
infantry regiments, one artillery regiment, and supporting troops. The
majority of the troops are stationed in the southern half of the country,
particularly along the Greek border, and along the Adriatic Coast.
The DMP Division is an elite formation corresponding, to KNOJ in Yugo-
slavia or to the former SS troops in Germany. The DMP's organizational
status is confused. Although nominally under the Ministry of Interior, in
practice it operates as a branch of the Army. This is facilitated by the
overlapping functions of its Chief, Lt. General Koci Xoxe, who, in addition
to being Minister of Interior, is Deputy Premier, Secretary-General of the
Communist Party, Military Commander of Tirana, and also wields considerable
influence in the Army. Thus the DMP is called upon to perform the duties of
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frontier military police, secret police, espionage and normal civil police.
An estimated 60% of the DMP personnel are Communists of known loyalty to
the Government. Special DMP units wearing civilian clothes handle espionage
and counterespionage matters; regular DMP troops patrol the towns, control
movement within the country, and arrest and execute criminals and political
enemies of the regime.
b. Organization and Training
Colonel General Enver Hoxha, as Minister of National Defense and
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, is the supreme military authority. Below
him, command officers share authority with political commissars whose chain
of responsibility is believed to be through the Communist Party. Chief of
Staff is Moscow-trained General Mehmet Shehu.
The Albanian soldier's background and experience in tribal and guer-
rilla warfare, while developing the basic qualities of individual bravery,
endurance and resourcefulness, have not fitted him for modern warfare in
large, mechanized units. Illiteracy is high and there is little knowledge
of modern weapons. Consequently, since the country's liberation, the Army
has turned to the USSR and Yugoslavia for assistance in conducting an ex-
tensive training program. By the fall of 194F, from 100-150 Soviet instruc-
tors had been assigned to the Soviet Military Mission in order to train as
rapidly as possible a corps of officers familiar with Soviet equipment and
tactics. Since then, the Yugoslavs are gradually replacing the Soviets.
Meanwhile, selected officers and non-commissioned officers have been sent
? for training to the USSR and Yugoslavia. Although it may be possible to
develop an efficient officer corps within the next year or two. it will take
many years to develop an enlisted reserve capable of mastering the com-
plexities of modern warfare.
c. Equipment
The Army's equipment is inadequate and heterogeneous. Albania re-
lies on Yugoslavia and the USSR for all its weapons and ammunition. Yugo-
slavia--itself in desperate need of modern equipment--will probably in the
near future pass on to Albania only enough equipment to man defense posi-
tions on the coast and the Greek border and to provide for an adequate
training program. Thus far, probably owing to the country's rugged terrain
and the inadequacy of roads and railroads, the primary emphasis in the re-
equipment of the Albanian Army has been on artillery and small arms to the
exclusion of mobile armored equipment. The current status of the Army's
equipment is:
(1) Fair quantities of new and standard Soviet models of light
artillery and mortars, light and heavy machine guns, and rifles,
although reserve supplies of these weapons or of ammunition are
probably insufficient for a protracted engagement;
(2) Miscellaneous equipment from Yugoslavia, including a few
light anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns and consisting mostly of
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? Axis or US stocks obtained during the war; ammunition for this eouipment
is believed to be in short supply;
(3) Practically no motorized or mechanized equipment;
(4) Inadequate defense against chemical warfare or aerial attack.
Although there is little concre*.,e information concerning the loca-
tion or extent of Albanian defensive fortifications, it is known that during
1946 there was intensive activity on defense constructions along the coast
and the Greek frontier. Coastal guns reportedly cover the harbors at Valona
and Sarande (near the Greek frontier) and possibly Durazzo. Construction
activity has also been reported on Saseno Island under the supervision of
Soviet and Yugoslav advisers. Moreover, Albanian coastal waters are fairly
extensively mined. Many of these mines were probably laid during the war.
but evidence resulting from the mining of two British warships in Corfu
Channel indicates that some of them have been la9d more recently, possibly
by Yugoslavia.
3. War Potential
In the event of war, Albania could mobilize an estimated 100,000 men
from its pool of 312,000 males between the ages of 15 and 50. but, for at
least another five and probably ten years, such an Army would be inade-
quately trained and equipped. Albania is entirely dependent on outside
assistance for all its military requirements with the possible exception of
food. Under normal conditions, it is highly improbable that the Albanian
economy could afford imports of munitions and equipment in sufficient
quantities to equip effectively a fighting force, even considerably smaller
than that now being half-heartedly supplied by Yugoslavia and the USSR.
In its natural resources, Albania does have potential value as a war-
time ally to the other Soviet satellites. Exploitation of its supplies of
oil, chrome, copper, iron, and wood, however, will require extensive invest-
ments of machinery and capital equipment, at present unavailable except
from the West. The backwardness of the country's communications system
also detracts from its war potential. Roads are inadequate for the move-
ment of heavy military supplies and construction has only recently begun on
the country's only standard gauge railroad from Durazzo to Elbasan. Linking
this line with the Yugoslav network, in view of the rugged terrain and the
lack of capital, is still only a plan on paper.
Albanian ports of naval significance are limited to Durazzo, the only
harbor which can accommodate ocean-going vessels, and Vlone (Valona), a good
natural harbor with potential significance as a submarine base.
Airfield sites are few in number and limited to the southwestern part of
the ccuntry. However, when completed, the Lake Maliq drainage project will
create additional sites in southeastern Albania.
i
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SECTION V
Albania's political influence, economic resources, and military
strength are negligible from the point of view of US security. Its stra-
tegic significance resides solely in its location, as a potential base of
operations, at the entrance to the Adriatic and on the northwest frontier
of Greece. US interest in Albania is therefore a consequence of US interest
in Italy, the Adriatic and Greece.
Soviet denial of US access to Albania deprives the US of no impor-
tant advantage. Access to the economic resources of the country would be of
only limited, incidental, and local benefit. Access to its terrain, as a
strategic beachhead in the Balkans in the event of a major conflict, would
also be of little conseouence, in view of the inadequacy of port facilities,
airfield sites, and overland communications to support a major advance into
Yugoslavia.
Similarly, Soviet control of Albania confers only slight advantages
to the USSR in terms of a major conflict. The economic resources of the
country are relatively inaccessible by land. Their development would require
an investment of manpower and machinery which would be disproportionate to
the prospective gain and wl-iich the USSR and Yugoslavia could ill afford.
Although access to advanced air and submarine bases in Albania would be of
some initial advantage in time of war, the potential sites are limited in
number and capacity, their logistical and military support overland would be
extremely precarious, and they would prove unusable in the face of superior
air and naval power.
The USSR nevertheless derives considerable local and immediate ad-
vantage from its control over Albania, primarily through the use of that
ccuntry as a base for guerrilla operations into Greece. Just as such opera-
tions from Yugoslavia are facilitated by the existence of a genuine Mace-
donian problem, so operations from Albania are facilitated by the similar
problem of Epirus.
Moreover, the nominal independence of Albania is exploitable in
terms of a potential vote in the United Nations and in terms of incidents
such as that in the Corfu Channel by means of which the USSR can harass
other powers without itself incurring responsibility.
In short, the Soviet ccntrol over Albania is of considerable local
and incidental advantage to the USSR, but is not an important factor in the
international balance of power.
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Thus, Albania's immediate war potential is limited to a manpower pool of
? approximately 100.000 inadequately trained men, limited natural resources as
yet largely undeveloped, airfield sites, two harbors of secondary importance,
and extremely limited communications facilities.
4. Military Intentions and Capabilities
Albania at this time has no independent military intentions and will
centime to follow orders from Yugoslavia or the USSR. It is improbable
that the latter contemplate using the Albanian Army at this time other than
as a vehicle for waging the war of nerves against Greece and for giving
clandestine support to the Greek Communists. Although the Army is incapable
of defending the country against either land or sea attack by a modern,
mechanized force with air support, the Albanian Army, by virtue of its guer-
rilla experience and the natural fighting ability of its soldiers. could
probably offer strong resistance to an attack by Greece. The major military
effort during the next decade will probably be devoted to improving the
nation's defenses, particularly along the coast, and to training the Army
for modern warfare. Albanian Army personnel may be used increasingly as
labor battalions in ar. attempt to improve the country's communications and
to exploit its natural resources, but this will depend on a reduction of
Albanian forces now assigned to the Greek frontier.
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SECTION VI
PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY
No significant change in the status of Albania is in prospect. In
the long run the traditional antagonism of the Albanians toward the Yugo-
slavs will tend to undermine existing arrangements, but for the foreseeable
future the Hoxha regime, with Yugoslav and Soviet support, is secure against
internal overthrow.
Since all the practical benefits of an annexation of Albania by
Yugoslavia have already been obtained, no motive exists for the formal con-
sumation of such a union, while the use which can be made of Albania's nomi-
nal independence is a reason for deferring it. The USSR and Yugoslavia will
continue to press for the admittance of Albania to the United Nations in
order to obtain international recognition for the puppet regime and an
additional vote in international councils.
Yugoslavia and the USSR will continue to guide and support the
economic and military development of Albania, but probably will invest no
more in this undertaking than is necessary to insure the stability of the
regime. ~'hus a gradual increase in the productivity of Albanian extractive
industries may occur, but not on a scale to render them strategically im-
portant. The organization, eouipment, and training of the Army will like-
wise be improved along Soviet lines, but not in such degree as to render it
effective as other than an internal security and local auxiliary force.
Until the political situation in Greece is stabilized in one way or
another, Albania will continue to be used as a base of guerrilla operations
across the frontier. The Epirus dispute will be kept alive as long as
mutually hostile governments exist in Athens and Tirana.
The principal danger to peace inherent in the Albanian situation is
that the Hoxha government, by miscalculation, may inadvertently precipitate
a situation from which there is no retreat (as Serbia dragged Russia into
war in 1914).
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APPENDIX A
TOPOGRAPHY
Albania, with an area of 10,629 square miles, is one of the
smallest countries in Europe. Situated on the west coast of the Balkan
peninsula, it is bounded on the west by the Adriatic Sea and the Strait of
Otranto, on the south and east by Greece and on the north and east.by
Yugoslavia.
Albania's location and the rugged nature of its terrain explain
in part how the Albanian people have maintained their national character-
istics and their ethnic unity despite nearly continuous occupation by
foreign powers. These same factors have also contributed to the backward-
ness of the Albanian people and to the country's slow rate of economic _
development.
Albania is essentially a region of rugged hills and mountains and
as a consequence agricultural development has been slow and never rewarding.
Only one-fourth of the country is arable, the remainder being forest land,
marshland or high pasture. With the exception of the narrow marshy coastal
plain, the average altitude is 3000 feet above sea level, with the Albanian
Alps rising to heights of 6500-8000 feet. This complex mountainous hinter-
. land--which contains Albania's wealth of lumber, iron, chrome, copper, etc.--
is difficult of access, and its small fertile basins and occasional valleys
are effectively separated from one another by intervening mountains.
There are no navigable rivers in Albania, although the Bojana (the
outlet of Lake Scutari) and the Drin are open to small coastal and fishing
vessels for a few miles. Of the four ports in Albania, only Durres (Durazzo)
can accommodate ocean-going vessels. Vlone (Valona) is a good natural harbor
with potential significance as a submarine base. Shengin (San Giovanni di
Medua) and Sarande (Porto Edda) are of minor significance.
Wide variations occur in temperature and climate within short
distances, ranging from the Mediterranean climate of the southern coast to
the winds and frost of winter in the mountainous interior. The annual
rainfall is about 60 inches, and mean monthly temperatures in Tirana are
41.5 F, in January and 75.6 F, in July. In general, weather conditions
permit regularly scheduled air operations throughout the year, although
sites for large airfields are few in number.
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? APPENDIX B
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PEOPLE
The population of Albania is 1,138,000 (1 January 1947 estimate),
giving a density of about 107 per square mile. (US density: 47.1 The
population is increasing, with a birthrate of 28 per thousand and a death
rate of 17 (relatively rapid for Europe).
More Albanians live outside their country than in it: about 440,000
in Yugoslavia, mostly in the Kossovo district; a large number, variously esti-
mated at from 218,000 to 380,000 in Greek Epirus and the Macedonian areas of
Greece and Yugoslavia; about 400,000 in southern Italy and Sicily, their fore-
bears having fled from Turkish rule in the 15th and 16th centuries fthe
majority of these, like Albanian settlers in Greece and Greek islands, have
now been assimilated); and 50,000 in the US who emigrated from the poverty-
stricken region of Northern Epirus.
Although recent population increases and the Communist emphasis on
industrialization have made Albania's urban centers more influential, the.
rural areas are still of paramount importance. The country's three largest
cities--Tirana, 8G,000 (capital); Scutari, 35,000 (northern trading center);
and Korce, 30,000 (farming center)--contain less than 15% of the total popu-
lation.
Albania has no outstanding minority problem, most of its inhabitants
being of Albanian stock. An estimated 3?k (35,000) are Greeks; there are some
Vlachs, especially in the Epirus region, and a very few Serbs and Bulgars.
Albanians within the country proper divide into two important groups: the
Ghegs, who live north of the Shkumbi River, and the more advanced Tosks, to
the south of it.
By type there are three natural divisions:
a. Mountaineers of North and Center: Primitive mountain
folk where the customs of tribal days still linger. They are
of good appearance and physioue, can move quickly and do long
marches, but undernourishment has in some cases sapped their
endurance. Although deprived of education, they show no lack
of intelligence.
b. Plainsmen: Dwelling along the coast, they are much like
those of other Balkan countries. As an effect of their environ-
ment, they are of a more indolent disposition than the high-
landers. Physically, they are a poor people, mainly because the
low-lying plains are infested with malaria. For centuries they
have been successful traders and merchants along the Adriatic
coast.
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c. Hillmen of Southern Albania: An industrious people,
more advanced than the mountaineers of the north.
As a result of Turkish rule, some 70% of the population is Moslem.
However, they are non-polygamous, and the status of women is higher than in
most Moslem countries. The remaining 30?k is Christian; 20% Greek Orthodox--
mainly among the Tosks; and 10% Roman Catholic--mainly among the Ghegs.
Traditionally the Albanians are extremely tolerant in religious
matters, though the present government is conducting a ruthless campaign to
suppress the Catholic Church. The government has refrained from direct
attacks on the Moslem faith, but it is probable that the traditional antip-
athy of Mohammedans to Communism contributes to public opposition to the
present regime.
The Albanians have retained their original language, the only
surviving remnant of the Thraco-Illyrian group of languages once spoken in
the Balkan peninsula. (It does not belong to any major European group:
Slavonic, Latin, Germanic, Greek.) The language was only recently reduced
to writing in the Latin alphabet. (Previously the Greek alphabet was used.)
Dialects occur, but the differences are not so marked as to make mutual com-
prehension impossible.
Under Turkish rule the Turkish language was made the official
tongue and the population kept in ignorance. Subsequent governments in-
creasingly have taken more progressive measures to improve the level of
literacy. Although the present law provides for compulsory education, its
application is more strictly enforced in the cities and the richer rural
areas than in the mountain districts where schools are still scarce. The
Hoxha regime has launched an intensive campaign to increase the number of
schools as well as to make schooling available in the more remote districts.
A drive has also been initiated to reduce adult illiteracy by means of
night schools and day classes. As a result of these measures, early in-
creases in school attendance and a reduction of illiteracy can be expected;
present estimates indicate that 25% of those eligible are attending school
and that 45% of the adult population is illiterate. Concurrently, the .
publication and circulation of newspapers and periodicals has increased.
There is, however, no opposition or independent press; radio, theater,
cinema, and all other media of expression are either government-owned or
government-controlled.
Nearly 80% of the population is dependent on the land, carrying
on a combination of agriculture, animal husbandry and dairying. Valley
tribes are almost self-supporting, with each household attempting to pro-
duce its needs: cornbread, sour milk, and mutton for the common diet; flax,
wool, and leather for clothing; and materials for the characteristic small
farm houses of grey stone.
Because the country has always been undeveloped and poor, the in-
cidence of illness, particularly malaria, is high. Medical care has improved
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? in the cities, but generally speaking, adequate facilities are still lacking
and the majority can ill afford what few facilities are available.
The Albanians have psychological traits common to those of most
isolated mountain folk. Strongly bound by tribal law, they are ready to
avenge in blood the honor of their family. Their supreme law is the bessa
or pledge; such a bessa united the various guerrilla bands in the patriotic
resistance movement against the Italians and Germans. A breach of the bessa
or a violation of the duties of hospitality cuts a man off from his family
group. In the population centers where modern influence is gaining, these
traits have largely disappeared.
People are courageous, resourceful, and extremely hardy, particu-
larly in the mountain areas. The picturesque Albanian history is marked by
exploits of courage. Skanderbeg, Albania's "Lion of Christendom", was the
hero of Christian resistance against the Turks., The so-called "Sons of the
Eagle", led in the 18th century by the celebrated Ali Pasha, successfully
resisted the Ottoman Empire for a short period. More recently, Albanians
waged determined guerrilla warfare against the Italians and Germans. Al-
though many individual Albanians have shown considerable ability in public
affairs in the service of the Turks, as citizens of neighboring countries,
and~even in Albania, they are comparatively inexperienced in the technique
of modern government.
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APPENDIX C
CHRONOLOGY
1913 The Great Powers, over the protests of Russia, compel
Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece to evacuate the Albanian
territory which they had intended to annex, and establish
Albania as an independent national state under a selected
German prince.
1914 The Powers, at war with each other, are unable to prevent
the Albanians from expelling their Prince.
1915 The secret Treaty of London provides for the partition of
Albania among Italy, Serbia, and Greece after the war.
Serbians driven into Albania are decimated by the natives.
Pursuing Austrian forces occupy northern Albania, Italian
forces the south.
1917 Italy, repudiating the partition of Albania, proclaims the
independence of the country as a whole under Italian pro-
tection.
1918 A provisional Albanian government established under Italian
protection.
1920 Italian troops withdrawn; Albania admitted to the League
of Nations.
1921 The Council of Ambassadors rejects Yugoslav and Greek claims
to Albanian territory, charges Italy with responsibility for
protecting the independence and territorial integrity of the
country.
1924 Ahmed Bey Zogu seizes power in Albania.
1926 In return for concessions, Italy guarantees the Zogu regime
against internal as well as external enemies.
1927 Italy and Albania conclude a military alliance.
1928 Zogu becomes King Zog I.
1939 Italy occupies Albania, expelling Zog and making Victor
Emmanuel king.
1940 Italy invades Greece from Albania, suffers defeat and
counterinvasion.
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1941
Greek front in Albania collapses as Germans overrun Greece.
?
1942
Partisan activity develops in Albania. .
1943
Germans occupy Albania on surrender of Italy.
1944
Communist-led National Liberation Front in complete
control of Albania.
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APPENDIX D
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
1. Colonel General ENVER HOXHA
As Premier, Commander of the Armed Forces, Minister of War and Foreign
Affairs, Enver Hoxha is the undisputed dictator of Albania.. Although his
youth and personal charm would make him an ideal figurehead for the Com-
munist dictatorship, Hoxha also possesses qualities of leadership which
make it unlikely that any of his subordinates will soon replace him.
Lacking the Comintern training of Tito and Dimitrov, he has relied heavily
upon the former for advice and direction in establishing his regime, and
received his orders directly from the Secretary-General of the Yugoslav
Communist Party. In any projected Balkan Federation, Hoxha would be far
outranked by Tito and Dimitrov, but would probably have sufficient control
over his people to persuade them to give up a measure of their sovereignty.
Hoxha is bitterly anti-US, anti-British, and anti-Italian.
a.
Born 1908, in Argyrocastro, Albania, of Bektashi Moslem parents;
recently married.
b.
Education:
Excellent; studied in France.
?
c.
Positions:
1933
French teacher at Koritza High School.
?-1936
Secretary at Albanian Consulate, Brussels.
193?-42
Operated cigarette store in Tirana and active
1942
in anti-Zog and anti-Italian underground.
Chief of National Liberation guerrilla bands.
1944
President of Anti-Fascists National Liberation
1945
Committee (AAFNLC).
Premier of Provisional Government.
1946
Premier; Minister of War; Minister of Foreign
Affairs; Commander-in-Chief of Army.
d.
Party Affiliation:
Albanian Communist Party.
e.
Physical Appearance:
Tall; handsome, athletic.
f.
Personal Characteristics: Good public speaker, ostentatious, de-
termined and aggressive, ambitious, cunning, insincere, and lacking
in any fundamental ideals. Is a Communist for pragmatic rather than
ideclogical reasons.
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2. General KOCI XOXE
A strong runner-up to Hoxha, Xoxe is Secretary-General of the Communist
Party, holds the second spot in most of Hoxha's offices, and would be his
logical successor. He is not as picturesque as Hoxha, but his powerful
hold on the country reaches into every phase of its control agencies. He
is Director of the DMP (Security Police), Personnel Director of the Army
General Staff, Military Commander of Tirana, and President of the Economic
Control Commission. Morecver, he enjoys popularity with the workers and
organized the first trade union in Albania. He organized the Communist
Party in 1941 after years of clandestine work in its behalf.
a. Born 1 May 1911 in Negovan, near the Greek border, of Greek
Orthodox parents; married; two children.
b. Education: Five years of elementary school.
c. Positions: 1931 Worked as tinsmith and plumber; organized
"Puna", the first workers' society in Korce.
1935 Arrested for instigating strikes.
1936 Organized anti-Zog bread demonstration.
1937 Member of Korce General Council, head of
Cultural and Dramatic Section of "Youth of
Korce" (former "Puna").
1938 Interned at Peshkopia because of anti-Zog speech.
1939-42 Intermittently arrested for anti-Fascist activities.
1941 Organized the Albanian Communist Party.
1942 Joined the National Liberation Movement.
1943 Condemned to death after an escape from prison.
1944 Elected to Presidium of AAFNLC and as its Vice-
President at Permet Congress; member of the War
Crimes Commission.
1945 Personnel Director of General Staff; Director of
Public Security (DMP1; Tirana Military Commander;
Deputy in Constituent Assembly; visited Moscow
and Belgrade.
1946 Deputy Premier; Vice-President of the Presidium;
President of Economic Control Commission; Vice-
President of Democratic Front; member of committees
on Administration and Drafting Constitution.
d. Party Affiliation: Secretary General of the Albanian Communist Party.
e. Personal Characteristics: Smug, vindictive, sadistic, unscrupulous.
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? 3. Major General MEHMET SHEHU
Chief of Staff of the Army, Shehu as well as Xoxe has been mentioned as
Moscow's choice to succeed Hoxha. He is young (361, served the Communist
cause in Spain and is Moscow trained. Moreover, his brilliant war record
has made him popular with the people. Prior to his year in Moscow (1945-46),
he was staunchly nationalistic with no particular liking for Yugoslavia,
Russia, the US, or the UK, but since that time he adheres closely to the
regime's attitude.
a.
Born 1911, valley of the Vojussa River; married.
b.
Education;
Military Academy in Modena, Italy.
c.
Positions:
1936
Fought with International Brigade in Spain as a
Battalion Commander; interned in France after
Loyalist collapse.
1942
After returning to Albania he joined resistance;
was Communist Party representative at Peza Con-
ference.
1943
Guerrilla leader in Malokastro area; Chief of
Valona area in Liberation Movement.
1944
Commander of 1st Partisan Brigade; second in com-
mand of 1st Division of National Liberation Army.
Promoted to Major General
1945
Deputy Chief of General Staff in charge of train-
ing troops. Member of military delegation to
Yugoslavia.
1945-46
Attended Military Training School, Moscow.
1946
Chief of Staff of Albanian Army; Member of
General Council of Democratic Front.
d. Party Affiliation: Albanian Communist Party.
e. Personal Characteristics: Brave, vigorous and aggressive. Speaks
English, French, Italian and Spanish.
4. NAKO SPIRU
One of the most powerful men behind the present regime, he is President
of the Planning Commission and the Communist Party's Anti-Fascist Youth
Organization, BRASH, through whose members he steadily augments the party's
ranks. He takes groups of them on pilgrimages to Moscow. Strongly pro-
Russian, he believes US capitalism and British imperialism are deadly enemies
of all "people's movements".
a. Born 1916, in Durazzo, of Greek Orthodox parents; son of a former
Stamles Tobacco Company president who is said to give him money still,
"but not to respect him".
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b. Education: Good; attended Italian schools in Albania and Turin.
c. Positions: 1939 Went to France, where he worked with Italian
and Albanian anti-fascist emigres and wrote for
their newspapers.
1940 Returned to Albania to continue this work; was
arrested.
1942 Arrested in Durazzo for writing propaganda.
1943 Active in Communist propaganda work in Tirana.
1944 Became Commissar in 3rd Brigade of AAFNLC forces;
member of AAFNLC Presidium; President of BRASH.
1945 Member of Central War Crimes Commission.
1946 Secretary of the Constituent Assembly Presidium;
Minister of Economy; President of the Planning
Commission; member of ccmmittees to draft con-
stitution and for economic plans and finance in
Assembly. Negotiated economic agreement with
Yugoslavia.
d. Party Affiliation: Albanian Communist Party.
e. Personal Characteristics: Versatile, good organizer, intelligent,
hardworking; can be very unpleasant.
5. KOCO TASHKO
Although Tashko holds no top positions in the Albanian Government, he
wields much influence as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and as a member
of the Economic Control Commission. He was the intellectual leader in
planning the Liberation Movement and was responsible for indoctrinating
several of the present leaders with the Communist philosophy. Though he has
spent several years in the United States and graduated from Harvard, Tashko
also lived for six years in Moscow and is decidedly pro-Soviet. He is an
intelligent man and may share responsibility with Koci Xoxe for interpreting
the Kremlin and Yugoslav directives for Hoxha.
a. Born 1900 in Egypt of Albanian immigrants who had been active in
the Independence Movement.
b. Education: Preparatory school at the American University at Beirut,
after which he migrated to America. Entered Heidelberg University at
Tiffin, Ohio, and finally graduated with BS from Harvard in 1921.
c. Positions: 1921 Returned to Europe as Bishop Fan Noli's secretary
at the League of Nations and in Tirana.
1922 Appointed Vice Consul in New York.
1923 Assistant editor of DIELLI, Albanian paper of
Boston.
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1924 Made Consul General at New York. Resigned 6
months later when Zog returned to power.
1925 Returned to Europe to be active in Noli's
political exile groups in Austria, France,
Germany, and Switzerland.
1926 Returned to US, founded and edited IDEALISTI to
oppose DIELLI which had become pro-Zog.
1927 Sentenced to death in absentia by Zog Government.
1928 Returned to Europe, wrote for anti-Zog papers,
taught English in Berlin.
1930 Went to Moscow, taught English, studied in insti-
tution of foreign publications.
1936 Left Moscow during purge trials to settle in France
and organize radicals among Albanians studying in
French universities.
1937 Returned to Albania where he immediately contacted
clandestine Communist Party. Became the intellec-
tual leader of liberation movement which was trans-
planted from France. Opened dry goods store near
Hoxha's tobacco store which became an underground
headquarters.
1942 A key figure in creating the AAFNLC; traveled
organizing local councils.
1945 Member of the Committee to Draft Constitution.
1946 Appointed Minister to the USSR; member of
Economic Control Commission.
1947. Appointed Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs.
d. Party Affiliation: Albanian Comrr:unist Party.
e. Personal Characteristics: Mild-mannered, una.ssumiing, he is franker
than most Albanian Communists with foreigners. Intelligent and
scholarly, he speaks English, French, German, Italian, Russian and
Greek well, and knows Serbo-Croat. His brother holds posts such as
Minister of Agriculture and Director of the Tirana Lycee. One of
them, Arthur, a Boston artist, worked for OWI. His sister, Tefta,
is a talented opera soprano.
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u. a. uvvsnrvmr?;mr PRINTING OFFICE
]598-5-1947
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~U~'
,r~rx .-rc----
~,;~ i cG_ 77 1763 h9
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SECRET
II. 8. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1579-5-1947
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