AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 71
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 21, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
-tatRi
COPY NO.294
FOR rHE CHIEF,CIA LIETARY
AFGHANISTAN
SR-32
Published 21 October 1948
Do2um,,,
t Jr "..
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Declassified in in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
?
SECRET
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient
designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient's
office who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Further
dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the informa-
tion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, for
the Department of State
b. Director of Intelligence, GS, USA, for the Department of the Army
c. Chief, Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Director of Security and Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Com-
mission
f. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
g. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other
Department or Agency
2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with
applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by
arrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
DISTRIBUTION:
Office of the President
National Security Council
National Security Resources Board
Department of State
Office of Secretary of Defense
Department of the Army
Department of the Navy
Department of the Air Force
Document No. 0
19. CHANGE in Class. 0
YI DECLASSIFIED
V?ss. C'I.ANGED TO: TS S
DDA gam, 4 Apr 77
Auth: 77/1763
Date:
State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Atomic Energy Commission
Research and Development Board
By: Div,
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
Published October 1948 SECRET
SR-32
AFGHANISTAN
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY
SECTION I ? POLITICAL SITUATION
1. GENESIS OF PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION 1
a. Introductory . ? ? 1
b. Establishment of the Constitutional Monarchy 1
c. Afghanistan during World War II ? 2
2. PRESENT GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE 2
3. CURRENT ISSUES 4
4. STABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT 5
SECTION II? ECONOMIC SITUATION
1. INTRODUCTORY ? ? 7
2. GENESIS OF THE PRESENT ECONOMIC SYSTEM 8
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE PRESENT ECONOMIC SYSTEM 8
a. Natural Resources . 8
(1) Agricultural Products and Livestock 8
(2) Forest Products 10
(3) Minerals 10
b. Industry . 13
c. Transportation 14
d. Finance . 14
e. International Trade 15
4. ECONOMIC STABILITY 18
SECTION III ? FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. GENESIS OF THE PRESENT FOREIGN POLICY 21
2. PRESENT RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN NATIONS 21
a. The UK . 21
b. The USSR 22
c. The US . 23
d. Iran, Turkey, and other, Moslem Countries of the Middle East 24
e. India and Pakistan . 25
f. Other Countries 26
g. International Organizations 26
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
SECTION IV?MILITARY SITUATION
1. GENESIS OF THE PRESENT MILITARY POLICIES .
2. STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF THE ARMED FORCES
29
29
a. Army
29
b. Navy
30
c. Air Force .
30
d. Gendarmerie
31
e. Quasi-Military Forces
31
3. WAR POTENTIAL
31
a. Manpower
31
b. Natural Resources
32
c. Industry .
32
4. MILITARY INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES
32
a. Army Plans .
32
b. Military Capabilities
33
SECTION V ? STRATEGIC FACTORS AFFECTING US SECURITY
1. THE IMPORTANCE OF AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE .
35
2. FACTORS PROMOTING CONTINUED INDEPENDENCE
35
3. FACTORS WORKING AGAINST CONTINUED INDEPENDENCE
35
SECTION VI? PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SE-
CURITY .
37
APPENDIX A ? Topography and Climate
39
APPENDIX B ? Significant Communications Facilities .
43
APPENDIX C ? Population Statistics and Characteristics
49
APPENDIX D ? Significant Biographical Data .
53
APPENDIX E ? Chronology of Significant Events
61
APPENDIX F ? Important Afghan Officials
65
SECRET
MAPS
. ?
Figure I. Terrain, Transportation
Figure II. Ethnic, Linguistic and Religious Groups
Figure III. Density of Population
Figure IV. Mineral Resources
Figure V. Agricultural Products and Climatic Zones
Figure VI. Industrial Facilities
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
SECRET
SUMMARY
Afghanistan, which for many years served as a buffer state between Russia and the
British in India, is strategically important because it is traversed by the shortest feasible
route from the Soviet Union to Pakistan and India. It has a common frontier of more
than 1,000 miles with the USSR and makes up the eastern end of the arc formed by
Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan.
Continuity of government in Afghanistan is assured by the close political and
military control exercised by a competent oligarchical regime composed of members of
the royal family and a few other select individuals. The government shrewdly main-
tains internal stability in the country, with its diverse ethnic and tribal groups, by plac-
ing trusted Afghans in positions of control and administration and by settling groups of
true Afghan tribesmen in regions adjacent to the USSR. The army is adequate for
suppressing tribal uprisings and for maintaining internal order.
The large majority of Afghans are dependent on agriculture or animal husbandry,
and the standard of living is low. The government, however, is trying to improve living
conditions through irrigation projects and the development of small industrial enter-
prises. The export of karakul skins provides foreign exchange for the importation of
essential goods and for the development of automotive transportation although the
current Pakistan-Indian disturbances are preventing or delaying the delivery of essen-
tial imports (especially oil products) to land-locked Afghanistan and are impeding the
normal flow of Afghan agricultural products to those countries. If prolonged, this
situation may impair the political stability of the government.
Afghanistan's relations with other nations are generally cordial, although there
are recurrent difficulties with Pakistan and Iran. Friction with Pakistan has devel-
oped over the status of some three million Pathan tribesmen who live in Pakistan's
North West Frontier Province but who have close ethnic and linguistic affinities with
the true Afghan tribesmen in Afghanistan. The dispute with Iran has to do with the
distribution of the waters of the Helmand River, which flows for most of its course
through Afghanistan but empties into a marshy area in Sistan Province, Iran.
The USSR appears to have no objectives in Afghanistan itself, and Soviet action
against the country will depend on the Kremlin's policy and intent toward the Indian
subcontinent (and, to a less extent, toward Iran) . The USSR has shown little interest
in the internal affairs of Afghanistan although it has expressed concern over US activity
in or "penetration" of the country. A few Soviet agents have been active among the
peoples in the northern part of Afghanistan, and the USSR may ultimately seek to
exploit the ethnic and linguistic relations between these people and groups living
across the border inside the Soviet Union. Should over-all Soviet policy in southeast
? Note: The information contained in this report is as of August 1948.
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force
have concurred in this report.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
Asia demand occupation of Afghanistan, the Afghan armed forces could offer no effec-
tive resistance.
Afghan-US relations are steadily growing stronger. The US has in recent years
assumed an increasingly important role in Afghanistan's foreign trade by importing
most of its karakul and by supplying nearly all of Afghanistan's automotive and indus-
trial equipment. Afghanistan employs a number of American teachers, technicians,
and also an American engineering firm for construction work. The Afghan Govern-
ment has sought the good offices of the US in resolving the dispute with Iran and is
hoping for a US loan to implement its economic development program. Afghan offi-
cials, although cautious of making commitments and unwilling to provoke the USSR,
have shown some interest in emulating such other Moslem nations as Iran and Turkey
in obtaining material and moral support from the US in the maintenance of
independence.
'SECRET fi
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
SECRET
SECTION I
POLITICAL SITUATION
1. GENESIS OF PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION.
a. Introductory.
The history of the region goes back to remote antiquity, although the earliest
written references to people called Afghans are circa A.D. 1000, and the country did
not receive its present name, which means the "Land of the Afghans," until the eight-
eenth century. During the centuries, present-day Afghanistan has been variously a
province of empires ruled by foreigners, a dismembered country distributed among its
neighbors, a group of mutually hostile petty states, and a powerful kingdom under
local rulers.
About the middle of the eighteenth century a local sovereign, Ahmad Shah,
established the country as a political and geographical entity. During the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, Great Britain was determined to maintain Afghanistan
as a buffer state between Russia and India. British efforts to eliminate any manifesta-
tions of Russian activity or influence within the country led to two Afghan-British
wars in the years between 1838 and 1880. At the end of the second war the Afghans
agreed that their foreign relations should be conducted through the Government of
India and in return received annual subsidies and military supplies. The Anglo-Rus-
sian convention of 1907 stated that Afghanistan was outside the Russian sphere of
influence.
Since 1834, when Dost Mohammad became Amir, the rulers of Afghanistan
have sprung from a single family of the Mohammedzai clan, which belongs to the
Barakzai branch of the Durani tribe.
b. Establishment of the Constitutional Monarchy.
While Afghanistan maintained its neutrality in World War I, resisting pressure
from its Turkish co-religionists and from German agents, the end of the war brought
armed conflict with Great Britain. In 1919 Amanullah, a great-great-grandson of
Dost Mohammad, became Amir and in his zeal to secure complete independence dis-
patched his troops across the frontier into India. British forces had the best of a
brief campaign along the eastern border of the country, but Great Britain, preoccupied
with postwar problems at home and in India, was willing to negotiate peace which
put an end to the established system of subsidies and recognized Afghanistan's inde-
pendence in the conduct of domestic and foreign affairs. However, the conviction
among Afghans that their general, Nadir Shah, won a brilliant victory over their long-
time enemy remains an important factor in the continued loyalty of the people to the
ruling family.
1 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05 : CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
Amanullah, after his return from a tour of Europe where he was greatly im-
pressed by Western social and economic institutions, undertook a disjointed program
of internal reforms. He discarded the title of Amir for that of King and established a
cabinet and an assembly while retaining autocratic control of the government. He
incurred the hostility of religious and tribal leaders by his attempts to free women
from the veil and to foster feminine education and by his willingness to admit for-
eigners in numbers to Afghanistan. He neglected the proper maintenance of the army,
and when revolt broke out in 1928 he was unable to rally strong support. Tribal ele-
ments led by a peasant leader, Bacha-i-Saqao, occupied Kabul and the central govern-
ment disintegrated. In 1929 Amanullah abdicated the throne and fled to exile in Italy,
where he served as a tool of the Axis during the recent war and where he still remains.
After several months of disorder, central authority was re-established by Gen-
eral Mohammad Nadir Shah. A descendant of a brother of Dost Mohammad, Nadir
Shah became king in 1929 and reigned until his assassination in 1933. He instituted
his own program of reforms, which was much less drastic than that of his predecessor.
A constitution was adopted and through his efforts the treasury was replenished, a
banking system created, and a system of government monopolies established which
provided revenue funds for road building and for irrigation and power projects.
His son and successor, Mohammad Zahir Shah, continues the policies and pro-
gram of his father and is advised and guided by the same relatives who were the asso-
ciates of Nadir Shah. A brother of Nadir Shah, Mohammad Hashim Khan, was prime
minister from 1929 until May 1946, when he was succeeded by another brother, Shah
Mahmud Khan, formerly minister of war. A third brother, Shah Wali Khan, who has
held various important positions in the government, has recently been appointed
ambassador to Pakistan.
c. Afghanistan during World War II.
Afghanistan announced and followed a policy of neutrality during the war in
spite of traditional enmity toward (and fear of) the British and in spite of the pro-Axis
propaganda disseminated by the Kabul German colony, many of whom were specialists
employed by the Afghan Government. The German nationals were expelled in 1941;
the legation remained until August 1945. In 1942, however, at the high point of the
German advance into the Caucasus, the government indicated informally to the Ger-
man and Italian diplomatic missions at Kabul that Afghanistan would place troops at
the disposal of the Germans and would cooperate in obtaining intelligence from India
and the USSR if German forces reached the frontier of Afghanistan.
2. PRESENT GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE.
? The constitution of Afghanistan, adopted in 1931, appears to have been based upon
that of the 1906 Iranian constitution, which followed Western European models. It
provides for a division of governmental authority between legislative, executive, and
judicial branches. In actual practice, however, the cabinet, directed by the royal
family, dominates the legislative branch.
SECRET 2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
The seat of the government is Kabul. The legislative branch consists of the
Majlis-i-Alli-Ayan or Senate and the Majlis-i-Shura-i-Milli or National Assembly. The
Senate has a present membership of some 45 distinguished Afghans who have been
appointed for life by the king. The National Assembly has a membership of 120 depu-
ties elected for three-year terms on the basis of one deputy for each voting unit of
100,000 people. All males 'above the age of 20 may vote, but the percentage of the
population actually participating in elections is very small. Decisions taken by either
body must be approved by the other except that acts passed by the National Assembly
during adjournment of the Senate do not require the latter's approval.
The constitution states that the sovereignty of the country is hereditary in the
family of Nadir Shah. The king has constitutional authority to name the prime
minister, to sanction laws passed by the National Assembly and Senate, to command the
military forces of the country, to proclaim war, to conclude peace, and to make treaties.
The cabinet is composed of the prime minister, thirteen ministers, and two heads of
departments.* Theoretically the cabinet is responsible to the legislative branch, but
in actual fact it conducts the affairs of government free from parliamentary controls.
An important provision of the Iranian constitution which prohibits members of the
reigning family from holding cabinet posts was not followed in the Afghan constitution.
Since 1931 relatives of Nadir Shah and of the present king have held a majority of the
cabinet posts, usually remaining in office for a period of years. In this manner the
king and the experienced members of his family, especially the three surviving brothers
of Nadir Shah, exert an oligarchic control over the government and country.
The Afghans are zealous Moslems, and the constitution names the Hanafi rite, one
of the four orthodox systems of Moslem jurisprudence of the Sunni sect, as the official
doctrine. The judicial organization of the country, based upon this system rather
than upon a civil code of the Western type, consists of a supreme court, nineteen courts
of appeal in the provinces, many lower courts, and a number of police courts.
While the constitution guarantees civil rights and liberties, the press is controlled
by the government, which retains the sole right over publication of news. Freedom of
speech and of assembly is permitted but not specifically guaranteed; use of this privi-
lege for subversive purposes would provoke repressive measures by the government.
No formal political parties exist in Afghanistan, and it is doubtful whether the forma-
tion of even a pro-government party would be permitted. Organized Communism has
not appeared in Afghanistan, and any signs of such activity would be immediately
suppressed as constituting a danger to the state and as being contrary to the constitu-
tion, which forbids activity against the religious faith of the people.
Auxiliary to the regular machinery of the government is the Loe Jirga. This grand
assembly of the tribal leaders may be summoned at Kabul to deal with tribal disputes
or to receive any communication of vital interest which the government wishes dissemi-
nated to the entire country. The last Loe Jirga was called in 1941 to discuss the ques-
tion of whether Axis nationals should be expelled from the country.
* See Appendix F.
3 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
The government makes use of members of the true Afghan tribes * to maintain
order throughout the country. The provincial governors and most of the high officials,
both at Kabul and in the provinces, come from this group. The government has also
settled communities of Afghan tribes in the northern area of the country in an effort to
establish effective control over this region.
3. CURRENT ISSUES.
The Government of Afghanistan's chief internal problem is the maintenance of
order and the settlement of the legitimate grievances of the population elements.
While there have been no serious tribal disorders since 1946, the Government is con-
stantly faced with the task of controlling, without alienating, the unruly tribal groups
along the eastern border. Certain high officials have given support to a new policy of
overawing the tribes by keeping among them units of the strong, loyal army. This
policy is in part replacing the older practice of containing the tribes by appeasement,
intrigue, and subsidies. The government has also acted to transfer insubordinate or
potentially disloyal groups from their hereditary areas to regions where they may be
easily supervised. In 1947 and 1948 it moved Tajiks and Uzbeks from the north and
Safi tribesmen from the east to southwestern Afghanistan in the Helmand valley below
Girishk.
Population elements in various parts of the country harbor grievances against the
central authority. They disapprove of forced labor (with or without pay) ; military
conscription; compulsory planting of such crops as cotton and sugar beets; the forced
sale of lambskins and other products at low prices to large government-controlled
companies; the lack of transport for moving local goods to higher-price areas; the pre-
dominance in the government of officials from the true Afghan tribes; and attempts to
establish Pushtu as the official language of the country. A considerable number of
the younger and better educated Afghans are dissatisfied with the static state of the
social structure of the country but express their views only in private.
The government is aware of these complaints, and one of the reasons why the
present prime minister (Shah Mahmud Khan) took office was to pursue a more pro-
gressive policy and to satisfy the general demand for modern reforms. The govern-
ment has employed an American engineering and construction firm, Morrison-Knudsen-
Afghanistan, to execute specific agricultural and industrial projects.
The government has also expressed a desire to develop the rich areas in the north-
ern part of the country adjacent to the Soviet frontier. Such a project would increase
the national wealth and would tend to placate the Uzbek and Tajik population elements
who are aware of Soviet interest in fostering the culturing unity and development of
the same ethnic groups within the USSR. The development of the northern area, how-
ever, would have serious political implications. If nationals of the Western Powers
were sent into the region to supervise the program, Afghanistan probably would incur
the hostility of the USSR. Moreover, if the program proved successful, the USSR
* These true Afghan tribes include the Durani, Ghilzai, and smaller groups. They are used in
controlling and governing other ethnic groups of the country. See Appendix C.
SECRET 4
1_ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
SECRET
might well view the area with increased cupidity. Hence the government has done
little to develop this region.
In the field of foreign relations, the Afghan Government is faced with several
problems vis-?is Pakistan, India, Iran, the USSR, and the US.* The most urgent
matters involve Pakistan, across whose territory lies Afghanistan's normal and most
practical route to a deep-sea port. The movement of oil products through Pakistan to
Afghanistan has been sharply curtailed, and quantities of other imports destined for
Kabul are in warehouses at Karachi awaiting transportation. The former North West
Frontier Province (now a part of Pakistan) with its predominantly Afghan Pathan
population is the cause of considerable controversy. Moreover, current friction be-
tween Pakistan and India and problems incidental to the establishment of these new
states have had repercussions in Afghanistan.
The Afghan Government places increasing emphasis on its friendly relations with
the US. Realizing that it may thus draw unfavorable attention from the USSR, the
government may join the group of Middle Eastern countries whose resistance to Soviet
penetration and aggression is based upon faith in US support.
4. STABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT.
The stability of the present regime in Afghanistan appears assured. No political
parties exist to challenge the actions or policies of the government; the press refrains
from criticism; and the independence of Afghanistan is not threatened by any foreign
power. In the event of the death of the present king, the members of the royal family
who now rule the country would continue in power, and one of them would be desig-
nated regent or elevated to the throne.
The country is always faced with the possibility of tribal unrest, but at present the
tribes are calm, and the Afghan Army has demonstrated its ability to deal with regional
disorders. As a close and aggressive neighbor, the USSR remains a potential source of
trouble to Afghanistan, but it does not constitute an immediate threat.
* See Section III.
5 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
SECTION II
ECONOMIC SITUATION
I. INTRODUCTORY.
SECRET
The economy of Afghanistan is agricultural and pastoral. Some 70 percent of its
people are engaged in tilling the soil or raising stock, and most of the remainder are
nomads who follow their flocks across the land. Only a few thousand persons could
be considered full-time workers in industry.
In normal years the limited water supply of the country is sufficient for the pro-
duction of foodstuffs in amounts adequate to maintain the meager diet to which
its people have been accustomed for centuries. There is a considerable surplus of fruit,
vegetables, and nuts available for export to neighboring India.
Afghanistan possesses important natural resources which could be exploited on an
extensive scale both through the extraction of subsurface materials and through the
development of major irrigation projects. However, most of the real wealth of the
country?coal and oil reserves, conditions favorable for the growth of cotton and sugar
beets, and the grazing areas most suitable for raising karakul sheep?is in the northern
section. If deprived of this region, immediately adjacent to the USSR, Afghanistan
would lose a large proportion of its resources and would have difficulty in raising ade-
quate agricultural products to meet the needs of the remaining population.
In its trade relations with the rest of the world Afghanistan is fortunate in having
one natural resource, karakul lambskins, which finds a steady market abroad and which
is the important source of foreign exchange. This exchange, until recently under
strict control by the government, is used in large part for the modernization of the
country.
Afghanistan's program of modernization and industrialization is impressive only
if it is considered in comparison to the period before 1930 when there was a total lack of
motor roads, motor vehicles, factories, mills, and power plants. The extension of trans-
portation facilities and the industrial development have as yet had very limited direct
effect upon the life of the mass of people. Food and crop surpluses may be more readily
marketed and imported goods can be more uniformly distributed, but in actual practice
the prices of agricultural products are set low while those of foreign and locally manu-
factured items are set high in order to insure substantial profits for the government-
controlled banks and licensed companies.
While the deep-rooted suspicion of foreigners and foreign intentions which long
retarded industrial development in Afghanistan is disappearing, the lack of convertible
capital prevents rapid industrial expansion. The government, which is expected to
continue the practice of engaging foreign specialists, may even permit the participation
of foreign capital in industrial enterprises to alleviate this condition.
The general standard of living in Afghanistan is roughly comparable to that pre-
vailing in rural areas of the Near and Middle East; it is close to that of Iran and some-
what lower than that of the countries fringing the western Mediterranean.
7 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
2. GENESIS OF THE PRESENT ECONOMIC SYSTEM.
For centuries in the area of modern Afghanistan a feudal system was in force under
which local chieftains known as khans and maliks controlled segments of the sedentary
and nomadic population regardless of the shifting political divisions and changing
allegiances of the region.
Within more recent times the splendor of Afghanistan's ancient towns has van-
ished, and the public works erected to extend and stabilize agricultural production have
fallen into decay. Concurrently with this economic decline, the true Afghan tribes
worked for political solidarity and successfully established their hold over the other
population elements. Added impetus to solidarity was provided by the wars of the
19th century against Great Britain, and the movement finally culminated in the estab-
lishment of a completely independent state in the twentieth century.
Since 1921 the ruling group, drawn largely from these same tribes, has worked in a
paternalistic fashion toward a gradual improvement of the economic situation. Until
very recently all contacts with the outside world were made through the government.
Financial operations and statements were, and still are, kept from general view. A
monopoly system was established to control foreign trade, internal transport, construc-
tion, and industrial development. Companies holding monopolies over stated products
received capital from both private investors and the government, while the government
retained control over their operations. The operations of some 130 such companies
brought important annual revenues to the government and also built up reserves of gold
and foreign exchange. In the current period two important trends are the lifting of
monopolistic control from certain items, and the merging of numerous companies to
form a few larger companies which are dominated by the Afghan National Bank (Bank-
i-Millie) and the Bank of Afghanistan (Da Afghanistan Bank) .
The impact of World War II upon the economic system of Afghanistan was serious.
The industrialization program was interrupted, and foreign trade declined sharply.
However, with a view to bolstering the country's wartime economy, the US facilitated
the shipment of karakul skins, a luxury item, to New York. As a result Afghanistan
accumulated a sizable amount of foreign exchange.
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE PRESENT ECONOMIC SYSTEM.
a. Natural Resources.
(1) Agricultural Products and Livestock.
The part of Afghanistan regularly cultivated is not over 3 percent of the
entire area of the country. Three-quarters of this cultivated land lies to the north of
the Hindu Kush range.
In normal years food production, except tea and sugar, is ample for local
needs. Periods of drought upset this balance, as in 1946 when the US sent 16,500 tons
of wheat and flour to Afghanistan. Lack of manufacturing facilities results in a sur-
plus of raw cotton and wool, which are for the most part sent to the USSR or India.
SECRET 8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
Quantities of fresh and dried fruits, vegetables, and nuts are shipped to India and
Pakistan.
? In 1945 official government figures gave the cereal production of the
?
?
country as follows:
Cereals
Metric Tons
Wheat
2,916,666
Barley
1,388,880
Millet
3,467,222
Rice
25,000
Other grains
189,583
Afghan's statistics must be viewed with some reserve and it may be noted that reliable
foreign estimates place wheat production as low as 800,000 tons and the rice crop as
high as 192,000 tons. In certain regions barley instead of wheat is used in bread mak-
ing. Millet is eaten by the people and also used as a cattle food.
Good quality long-staple cotton is grown in the north and northwest of
the country. The crop totalled 26,721 tons in 1940, when some 9,929 tons of raw cotton
were exported, but in recent years the quantity exported has been much smaller. The
highest production of sugar beets in a single year has been 37,000 tons. Recently, cot-
ton and sugar beet production has fallen off, partly because expanded wheat production
was required to meet current deficiencies. Raw silk is produced in limited quantities.
Fruit and vegetable production is heaviest south of the Hindu Kush
range. The orchards yield heavy crops of apricots,. apples, plums, peaches, and pears
as well as citrus fruits. Grapes, melons, and pomegranates are extensively cultivated,
and large quantities of pistachios and almonds are gathered. Some tobacco is raised,
and the sesame and castor oil plants are grown for their oils. In 1944 cultivation of
the opium poppy, formerly widespread, was forbidden by government decree.
Agricultural production is conditioned by the fact that the annual pre-
cipitation over most of the cultivated areas is less than ten inches. Heavy snowfalls in
the high mountains result in a spring run-off which represents the major water supply
of the country. Dry farming is carried on in the high mountain valleys of the north
and northeast, but more than half of the total cultivated acreage is irrigated. Gen-
erally small channels which are led off from the rivers and streams water the terraced
fields. In some localities wells are the source of water supply, while the "qanat" system,
common to Iran, in which underground channels tap permanent water tables well
below the surface, is employed in a crescent-shaped area stretching from Farah to
Ghazni. Irrigated land may produce two crops a year.
More than half of the cultivated land is owned by large landowners; the
state also holds large tracts. Independent farmers, who seldom own more than a few
acres are far outnumbered by sharecroppers who labor on the large holdings. These
peasants, aided by domestic animals, plow, sow, reap, and thresh by the primitive
methods common to the entire Middle East for many centuries.
The future prosperity of Afghanistan is dependent largely upon the
extension and improvement of agricultural production and methods. An agricultural
school is in operation at Kabul, and Morrison-Knudsen-Afghanistan and International
9 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
Harvester Company are conducting certain experimental work in agriculture. It is
probable that the amount of arable land could be doubled through a comprehensive pro-
gram of irrigation. Plans of the government in this field include both the re-use of
ancient dams and barrages and the construction of new systems. Several old barrages
in the region to the north of Ghazni have been partially or completely reconstructed (in-
cluding works at Sira; on the Ghazni River and at Kharwar on the Logar River) . Some
of the new projects are in operation. In the vicinity of Kabul and Boutkhak Barrage to
the southwest of the city irrigates 1,500 acres, and a dam at Kargha on the upper Kabul
River irrigates 5,000 acres. The Gohaigan Canal, above the Pul-i-Khumri Dam, irri-
gates 10,000 acres. More extensive works are planned for the Helmand River. A diver-
sion dam at Girishk on the Helmand will provide water for the Boghra Canal. This
canal, begun by Japanese engineers and now being dug along a new course by Morrison-
Knudsen-Afghanistan, is to irrigate 100,000 acres southwest of Girishk. Seasonal con-
trol and distribution would be effected by a storage dam at Kajkai, farther up the
Helmand.
At the present time the country has no facilities for storing large stocks
of grain. Mechanized farming methods will probably be introduced very slowly.
Domestic animals number about 35 million, of which over 85 percent are
sheep and goats with the balance horses, cattle, donkeys, and camels. Fat-tailed sheep
are the common breed found throughout the country, but special attention is devoted
to the type which produces karakul lambskins. Flocks of this type are concentrated
north of the Hindu Kush range in the regions of Andkhui, Maimana, and Mazar-i-
Sharif, where their number may reach 4 million, and the annual production for export
approximates 2,400,000 skins. In general the quality of the raw wool produced for
export is rather poor. In recent years exports of wool have varied from 1,270 to 9,200
tons. In the summer months extensive movements of flocks take place across the
country from south to north and from west to east.
(2) Forest Products.
The forest growth of Afghanistan is limited to a few areas which are
relatively inaccessible. Most of the Hindu Kush range is barren of wooded growth.
The region of Nuristan, the most heavily forested area, has stands of pine, cypress,
plane, and walnut. Timber from this region is floated by river to Jalalabad and to
Pakistan. More scattered woods to the south of Kabul and Jalalabad in the Safid Kuh
River valley furnish timber for Kabul. Throughout the rest of the country poplars
grown in irrigated groves provide building material for houses and other construction.
(3) Minerals.
(a) Petroleum.
Automotive transport, which plays an increasingly important role
in Afghanistan's economy, and a considerable part of the nascent industry of the coun-
try must rely on imported petroleum products until the still unproved local petroleum
resources have been developed. The current consumption of gasoline exceeds 250,000
gallons a month and would be much increased if additional supplies were_ available.
SECRET 10
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
SECRET
Current supply must come either through Pakistan or from the USSR. In recent
months the flow through Pakistan has been seriously curtailed.
Oil deposits are known to exist in north and northwest Afghanistan.
In 1935-36 both French and Japanese oil geologists were active in the country. Early
in 1937 the Afghan Government granted a 60-year petroleum concession to the Inland
Exploration Company, a subsidiary of the Seaboard Oil Company of Delaware.* The
company was also authorized to explore Afghanistan for mineral deposits with the
possibility that a mineral concession might be granted at a later date. Geologists of
the company began field work in the fall of 1937, searching for both oil and mineral
reserves. In June 1938 the company abruptly notified the Afghan Government that
it was surrendering the concession. The reasons for this decision included the immi-
nence of war, the failure of the prospectors to locate deposits in the southern desert
basin within closer distance of the sea, and the discovery of rich fields at Bahrein.
However, the field work had established the location of a number of
anticlines in formations similar to those which prevail in the oil-producing region of the
USSR to the north of Termez. These anticlines (shown as possible fields on Figure IV)
stretch in a crescent from Herat to Khanabad, north of Mazar-i-Sharif, and it was esti-
mated that they would yield an annual production of up to 10 million barrels with oil
occurring at depths of about 5,000 feet.
In ,September 1947 an American engineer in the employ of the
Afghan Government recommended that test drilling be undertaken in the Shibarghan
area. In the summer of 1948 a French engineer inspected the oil areas and made sub-
stantially the same recommendations. The government hopes to bring in a producing
field and to construct a refinery which will produce 10 million gallons of gasoline annu-
ally for local use only. The government has expressed willingness to employ foreign
capital in this undertaking, either in the form of a joint stock company backed by both
Afghan and foreign funds or by the employment of a foreign firm to carry out a specific
contract.
(b) Other Minerals.
No comprehensive survey of the mineral resources of Afghanistan
has been made. In 1936 an official statement listed 571 mineral deposits, only a few of
which are under exploitation at the present time. In 1937 the Afghanistan Mining
Company was registered under joint German-Afghan ownership with Germany repre-
sented by Krupp and four other firms, but the concession was later relinquished. The
Inland Exploration Company did some field work in search of mineral deposits. (Fig-
ure IV shows the location of those mineral deposits and mines for which reliable infor-
mation is available.)
Currently the Afghan Government is most interested in the exploita-
tion of workable deposits of gold, coal, and salt. Residents of localities where such
deposits may exist have been reluctant to volunteer information since the government
* At the same time the Amiranian Oil Company, another subsidiary of the Seaboard Oil Com-
pany, received from the Iranian Government a petroleum concession covering northeastern Iran.
11 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
not only has exclusive proprietary rights over subsurface deposits, but also drafts and
underpays local labor in mining operations.
Gold is reported at an old mine in the vicinity of Kandahar and from
several placer sites or caves in gravel deposits in northeastern Afghanistan, quite close
to the Soviet frontier. In January 1947 the Ministry of Mines suspended its monopoly
rights on gold mining. With such mining free and in view of the current bazaar price
of $80 an ounce, it is probable that the current annual production of 45,600 grams or
1,600 ounces will be considerably increased.
Afghanistan hopes to exploit its coal reserves at the rate of 25,000 tons
a year. At the request of the Afghan Government the Government of India sent spe-
cialists who made fairly extensive surveys in 1936, 1938, and 1940-41. Five areas were
defined. Two are south of the Hindu Kush: one of these is the Ghorband valley and
the other includes sites north and east of Kabul where some coal is now mined. The
three areas north of the Hindu Kush have a better quality coal. One such area, beyond
Doab on the main road leading north from Kabul, includes the promising sites of Ish-
pushta and Barfak. The second area is to the south of Khanabad in Badakhshan
province, and the third is south of Mazar-i-Sharif. The last two areas are rather inac-
cessible, and an American engineer in the employ of the Afghan Government rec-
ommends that more extensive mining operations replace the primitive methods now
being used at Ishpushta.
Salt is found at several places in the northern foothills of the Hindu
Kush, specifically in the vicinity of Talikan and near Khanabad in the same region.
Two extensive deposits of iron ore have been reported by foreign spe-
cialists: one at Aranj Khwa, south of Faizabad in northeastern Afghanistan, and the
other south of Bulola on the main road from Kabul to the north of the country. This
second deposit may stretch for a distance of 100 kilometers to the vicinity of Charikar.
Deposits of copper ore with veins up to one meter in thickness exist in the Maidan dis-
trict to the west of Kabul and have been mined by primitive methods.
Important ancient lapis lazuli mines are found at Sar-i-Sang in the
northeastern part of the country. Deposits of lead ore occur near the lapis lazuli
mines and in the Ghorband valley, and promising samples of lead ore have been found
in the vicinity of Herat.
Asbestos has been mined in small amounts in the region south and
east of Kabul. Samples of mica have been obtained from the Maidan district west of
Kabul, and refractory grade chromite exists north of Jalalabad in the Logar valley.
Fine marble is quarried and deposits of antimony, sulfur, and gypsum have been located.
Local Afghan sources mention mines or deposits of silver, aluminum, nickel, tin, zinc,
manganese, graphite, talc, and earth pigments, but precise information regarding these
minerals is not available.
While exact figures on current mineral production are lacking, the
total production is certainly very slight. It is limited almost entirely to a considerable
quantity of rock salt, a few thousand tons of coal, less than 2,000 ounces of gold, and
some lapis lazuli.
SECRET 12
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
4,
?
SECRET
b. Industry.*
By 1948 Afghanistan had some 25 enterprises equipped with modern power-
driven machinery, chiefly hydroelectric. These installations include factories, mills,
repair shops, and cotton gins. The plants, erected since 1930, are owned by companies
open to private stockholders but are actually directed by the government since the gov-
ernment-managed banks own a controlling interest in the various companies. The
plants endeavor to fill certain staple requirements of the people?matches, canned
fruit, soaps, furniture, automotive repair, and publications?and to contribute to other
essential needs such as textiles and sugar.
The cotton textile mill at Jebal-es-Siraj was constructed and equipped with
German machinery in 1936-37, that at Pul-i-Khumri with British machinery in 1943-44.
In 1946 these mills produced nearly 6,700,000 meters of cloth, or about 6 percent of the
country's needs, and about 1 million pounds of cotton yarn. In 1945 the new woolen
mill at Kandahar and the old mill at Kabul produced a total of 260,000 meters of woolen
cloth and 600 tons of yarn.
The beet sugar refinery erected at Baghlan in 1941 is equipped with Skoda
machinery. Maximum rated production is 6,000 tons of sugar, but the actual annual
output has not surpassed some 4,400 tons. Periodically the refinery is idle because of
lack of beets. A second refinery is projected. With two plants in operation the coun-
try's annual needs of approximately 9,000 tons of sugar might be met if an adequate
quantity of beets were grown.
An important segment of the infant industry of Afghanistan is centered at
Kabul, which is also the site of the government arsenal. Installations at Kabul include
a knitting mill, match factory, oxygen plant, slaughter house with cold storage facili-
ties, furniture factory, a plant for working semi-precious and building stones, automo-
tive repair shop, government printing plant, tannery, and an old woolen mill. Kanda-
har has a cannery, Kunduz and Imam Sahib have small soap factories, and the sugar
factory at Baghlan makes soap in the slack season. Some ten towns have power-driven
cotton gins.
Afghanistan has three hydroelectric plants, each capable of producing some
4,000 horsepower, which serve the cotton textile mills and the city of Kabul. There
are small hydroelectric or Diesel-driven plants at about ten other sites.
The industrial and power enterprises were designed and installed by foreign
technicians. Germans led in this work and resided at Kabul to the number of some
150 until their expulsion during the recent war. American and Czech engineers are
still employed by the government, and it is highly questionable whether the Afghans
alone would be capable of running and maintaining the existing installations. The
number of skilled or semi-skilled workmen in the entire country is very small, certainly
not more than a few thousand, including truck drivers. Labor unions do not exist in
Afghanistan.
* See Map, Figure IV.
13 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
c. Transportation.*
The motor roads of Afghanistan, constructed since 1930, are poor by US
standards. The primary internal road system is the "great circle route." The north-
ern half of the circle runs from Kabul through Mazar-i-Sharif to Herat, and the south-
ern half from Kabul through Kandahar to Herat. Roads which lead into the neighbor-
ing countries take off from the periphery of this circle. The main roads are, for the
most part, surfaced with gravel but may become impassable when spring floods result
in washouts and ruined bridges. In the winter snow may block passes in the northern
section of the country. Caravan routes supplement the motor roads and still carry a
considerable volume of traffic.
In early 1948 Afghanistan had some 700 passenger cars, mostly Chevrolets, and
some 3,450 trucks, mostly 3-ton Chevrolets or Internationals. Approximately 200 buses
are also in operation. Most of the trucks and cars are postwar models.
Both government-sponsored and private transport companies operate within
the country. The operation of buses and trucks is hampered by uncertain road con-
ditions, lack of repair facilities, and a shortage of gasoline and oil. The present road
system is inadequate for the country's needs. Morrison-Knudsen-Afghanistan is cur-
rently repairing a few important links.
There are no railroads or air lines in Afghanistan. No significant traffic is car-
ried by the rivers within the country.
d. Finance.
On the basis of the limited information released by the Afghan Government the
financial position of the country seems to be sound, although facilities and resources for
expanding operations are limited. Factors of strength include ample currency cov-
erage, important reserves, and the fact that the government has no internal or
external debts. Potential factors of weakness include the possibility that an abnormal
condition abroad might shut off the sources of vitally needed foreign exchange and the
fact that the international financial markets and institutions may view with skepticism
the currency of a country which does not print a full financial statement.
Internal expenditures are stated to be based upon a balanced budget, but the
Afghan Government publishes no detailed figures regarding its financial operations.
In early 1947 an official source stated that the annual revenue was $30,664,000. In the
previous year about $41/2 million had been budgeted for the army and air force. Cus-
toms receipts are believed to represent the largest single source of government revenue.
In 1948 the government stated that its gold and dollar reserves, mostly on deposit in the
US, amounted to $50 million.
Afghanistan has three banks. The Bank of Afghanistan (Da Afghanistan
Bank) , founded in 1938 at Kabul, is a government institution which performs the func-
tions of a central bank and bank of issue, and handles transactions in foreign exchange.
Its capital is $9 million and its accounts and deposits total over $16 million. Branches
of the Bank of Afghanistan are located at Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Andkhui,
and Maimana.
* See Appendix B.
SECRET 14
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
?
SECRET
The Bank of Afghanistan, with the sole right of note issue, prints notes of 500,
100, 50, 20, 10, 5, and 2 afghanis. Statutes require a note coverage of 50 percent in gold,
silver, and foreign currency, but the Bank of Afghanistan states that the current cover-
age is 100 percent. In March 1948 the official buying rate for Afghan currency was
14.0000 afghanis for $1.00 and the official selling rate 14.1773 for $1.00. The afghanis
may also be sold and bought in the bazaars at a free rate which in early 1948 was 17
afghanis for $1.00.
The Afghan National Bank (Bank-i-Millie) , founded in 1932, is considered a
private commercial institution. However, its directorate includes high government
officials, and its policies are controlled by the government through the Bank of Afghan-
istan, which holds a portion of the bank shares. The president of this bank, who serves
also as governor of the Bank of Afghanistan, is the Minister of National Economy. The
Afghan National Bank has a capital of $23 million, and its accounts and deposits total
over $86 million. In 1947 the government stated that the capital of this bank should
be expanded by an additional $30 million in order to provide adequate funds for the
development of agriculture and industry. A major part of the shares in the Afghan
National Bank is held by the various joint stock companies (shirkats) for which the
bank functions as a purchasing and selling agent, in New York through the Afghan
American Trading Company and in Pakistan and India through the Afghan National
Bank Ltd.
In the spring of 1948 the Building and Loan Bank, with a capital of about $2
million, was established. This institution is not yet active, but its operations will be
under state control; aside from making loans, it is also authorized to go into the actual
construction business to build houses.
e. International Trade.
While Afghanistan's trade is unimportant to world markets, it is essential to
the current economy of the country and to the furtherance of projects aimed at raising
the country's economic level. Afghan trade has been disrupted and hampered by the
shortages resulting from World War II, the grave dislocation of the economies of
Pakistan and India, the confusion over attempts by India and Pakistan to collect cus-
toms duties on their exports to Afghanistan, Afghanistan's reluctance to orient its
economy toward the USSR, lower prices on the karakul market, and poor crops.
It is impossible to obtain reliable figures on Afghanistan's 'trade during and
after World War II. The following figures, submitted in March 1947 by the Afghan
Government, seem to reflect 1945 statistics and disagree in part with other available
information. They do, however, present a picture of the relative importance of the
major items of Afghanistan's foreign trade.
15 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
Commodity
Karakul skins
Other skins
Wool
Dried fruit
Fresh fruit
Cotton
Textiles
Tea
Sugar
Gasoline and motor oil
Motor vehicles
EXPORTS
Amount
2,400,000
6,140,621
7,000 tons
14,711 tons
16,362 tons
8,000 tons
IMPORTS
142,000,000
1,664
21,623
2,193,908
804
yards
tons
tons
imperial gallons
Value in Dollars
$28,800,000
763,764
3,520,935
7,300,825
4,481,382
6,134,970
7,078,220
1,637,235
846,244
490,108
569,176
The very favorable balance of trade reflected by these figures is misleading
and is achieved, in part at least, by the device of grossly underpricing staple imports
such as textiles and sugar (listed at not more than 20 percent of actual value). Af-
ghanistan has had a favorable balance of trade in recent years chiefly because war and
postwar shortages limited the monetary value of imports while the continued export of
karakul skins brought in considerable sums. A decline in the karakul market, and
Afghanistan's need for larger quantities of machine equipment probably indicate that
Afghanistan no longer has a favorable balance of trade. This conclusion is reinforced
by the fact that in 1947 US imports from Afghanistan amounted to $37 million while
the US exported to Afghanistan goods to the value of $47 million. Moreover, during
the first months of the same year the value of items passing across the frontier between
Afghanistan and India showed a monthly balance of nearly $2 million unfavorable to
Afghanistan.
As the above tables show, Afghanistan's chief exports are karakul skins, agri-
cultural products, and wool. Some years ago the market for karakul skins was at
Leipzig; later it shifted to London. After 1939 the market moved to New York with
the US taking nearly all the karakul from Afghanistan and hence representing the
country's principal source of foreign exchange. Between 1932 and 1944 Afghanistan's
export of karakul fluctuated widely but seems to have been somewhat under 2 million
skins per year. In 1945 karakul skins were sold abroad to the amount of over $28
million. In early 1946 karakul skins were selling for $13.50 apiece, but declined to $9,
and nearly 2 million skins already shipped abroad remained unsold. During 1947 the
market began to recover. By the end of the year London was again buying about 25
percent of the skins. The $37 million worth of exports to the US in 1947 consisted
almost exclusively of karakul skins.
Agricultural products, particularly fresh and dried fruits (grapes, pomegran-
ates, melons, apples, raisins, and apricots) and nuts, have always found a ready market
in India. Although the abnormal conditions currently prevailing in India and Pakistan
SECRET 16
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
SECRET
have sharply curtailed Afghanistan's exports to these countries, they still remain the
chief market of these products.
Raw wool, not of top quality, produced chiefly in the northern parts of
Afghanistan, has been and is a chief export to the USSR. During World War II when
almost no trade existed between the USSR and Afghanistan thousands of tons of wool
were inadequately stored in the northern area, since it was not profitable to ship it over
a long and difficult route to India and thence to world markets. In November 1947
Afghanistan and the USSR signed an agreement for the purchase-exchange of specific
amounts of certain items. Afghanistan was to export between 6,000 and 7,000 metric
tons of wool and in return the USSR agreed to export to Afghanistan about 7,500 tons
of gasoline and kerosene, 4,000 tons of sugar and specific manufactured items. The
transfer of goods was carried out in a satisfactory manner, and in August 1948 a second
purchase-exchange agreement was announced in Kabul. Between 15 August 1948 and
30 September 1949 the USSR is to receive 6,600 tons of wool (valued at $3,259,000) ; in
exchange Afghanistan is to receive 3,000 tons of gasoline, 2,000 tons of kerosene, 3,000
tons of sugar, 6,500,000 meters of cloth, 10,000 square meters of glass, and 300 tons of
galvanized iron.
Afghanistan's cotton is not an export of major importance because current
cotton production has dropped to a point where it is little more than sufficient to supply
the local cotton cloth industry. The drop in production occurred in 1946 when the
government removed the regulations governing cotton planting and many farmers
turned at once to wheat growing. Any cotton available for export finds a ready market
in India.
The chief imports of Afghanistan are textiles, tea, sugar, automotive and ma-
chine equipment, and oil products. Figures compiled in early 1947 show 36 percent of
Afghanistan's imports by value originating in the US, 35 percent in India and Pakistan,
and the remainder in other countries. A relatively small amount of manufactured
goods comes from the UK.
While Japan occupied first place in supplying Afghanistan with goods before
World War II, during the war India attained that position through its ability to supply
goods normally obtained from other sources. Nearly all of Afghanistan's textiles,
sugar, and tea were imported from India during and immediately after the war. In
1947 the chaotic conditions attendant to the creation of an independent India and
Pakistan brought grave dislocation not only to their own economy but also to that of
Afghanistan.
Since less than 10 percent of Afghan's textiles are locally produced, textiles are
probably the single most important import item. India continues to furnish a large
percentage of this essential item with the US and the USSR furnishing smaller
amounts.
India and Pakistan supply Afghanistan's tea needs.
In accordance with the 1947 trade agreement the USSR delivered 4,000 tons of
sugar to Afghanistan. Local production and imports through Pakistan and India sup-
plement the Soviet supply.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
Automotive and machine equipment and other manufactured items are im-
ported chiefly from the US. Since 1945 the Afghan Government has purchased a new
fleet of trucks and buses (about 3,000 vehicles) from the US. Replacements, spare
parts, and tires continue to come from the US.
Oil products are vital to Afghanistan's transportation system. Pakistan's
current inability to deliver an adequate supply of these products has created serious
economic problems. The oil shortages in the northern part of the country are cur-
rently alleviated by delivery of the gasoline and kerosene arranged for in the Soviet-
Afghan purchase-exchange. Afghanistan, realizing that oil shortage will probably
continue, is interested in developing its own oil resources to a point where they will
cover domestic needs.
The conduct of foreign trade has been in the hands of companies (shirkats)
financed jointly by private capital and by the government, with the government exercis-
ing control over their operations. These companies were created in order to expand
industry and foreign trade with Afghan resources instead of foreign capital. The first
company was formed in 1932; in 1941 some 50 companies were licensed to conduct
business or industrial enterprises; a recent 1948 study reports 138 such companies.
Some of these companies have or have had monopolies, such as the Afghan
Sugar Manufacturing Company which produces sugar but also controls imports and
sales of sugar. Another company handles the import and sale of motor vehicles. By
contrast a dozen or more companies engage in the export of karakul. While companies
operate in all fields of domestic and foreign commerce, private individuals do engage
in trade. For example, The Afghan Commercial Company in New York acts as an
agent for private capital interested in foreign trade.
Tariff on its foreign trade is an important source of revenue for the Afghan
Government. Imports pay ad valorem duties ranging from 5 percent to 35 percent,
and export taxes levied on most items run from 10 percent to 30 percent. However, free
entry has recently been granted for machinery and other materials related to the indus-
trial development and for trucks, tires, spare parts, and gasoline.
Purchases abroad involving foreign exchange must be approved by the Bank
of Afghanistan, and luxury goods may not be imported. For a brief period in' 1947
exchange controls were lifted. They have recently been re-imposed with the provision
that merchants and companies may hold 20 percent of the foreign exchange receiyed
from karakul sales and 100 percent a exchange received from other exports. However,
companies holding foreign exchange must still obtain government permission to spend
it on imports. The practice of granting monopolistic importing and exporting rights
tends to, restrict the number of individuals or firms engaged in trade in a given com-
modity. Since this is not one of the essential purposes in the creation of companies,
the government has announced its desire gradually to abolish monopolies as far as
possible.
4. ECONOMIC STABILITY.
Several factors favor the economic stability of the country. Normal harvests yield
adequate food supplies for the population, except for sugar and-tea; surplus agricultural
SECRET 18
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
?
SECRET
and livestock products are available in quantity and normally find a relatively stable
foreign market; karakul sales provide a continuing source of foreign exchange; and the
financial position of the country is good.
There are also less favorable aspects. Afghanistan has no deep-water access of its
own so that its entire foreign trade is dependent upon the situation prevailing in adja-
cent countries, particularly Pakistan, as well as on the good will of these countries. The
country also lacks adequate capital for developing its natural resources and expanding
its industry. Moreover, the mass of people may become increasingly unwilling to pro-
duce under a closely controlled economic system which does not provide for an even
distribution of benefits.
The government is faced with the necessity of halting and, if possible, of turning
back the inflationary trend in the cost of living. With the year 1938 representing an
index figure of 100, by 1946 the cost of living had risen to 600 for cereals, 300 for mutton,
butter, milk, fruit, and vegetables, and 450 for consumer goods.
The Ministry of National Economy has proposed a 12-year comprehensive economic
development program under which major attention will be concentrated on increasing
agricultural production by the construction of irrigation projects, and on the improve-
ment of transportation facilities. In early 1948 Afghanistan hoped to implement this
program by obtaining a loan of $100 million from the US.
19 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
SECRET
SECTION III
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. GENESIS OF THE PRESENT FOREIGN POLICY.
The year 1919 marked the beginning of Afghanistan's complete independence in
foreign relations. Between 1919 and 1921 travelling emissaries negotiated a number
of agreements with other nations, apparently in the belief that widespread recognition
of the country's independence might be a factor in preserving that same independence.
Since that time Afghanistan's foreign policy has been to maintain correct relations
with a number of nations while allowing special privileges to none of them. The
Afghans have continued to fear the USSR and to dislike and mistrust the UK and have
avoided entanglement with either country. Afghanistan maintained a neutral policy
during both World Wars in spite of the fact that popular feeling favored the opponents
of Great Britain and Russia in both instances. During this same period nearly all
relations with other countries have been carried on through governmental channels
and agencies; direct foreign contacts by private individuals have been avoided. How-
ever, the ruling class of the country now appears ready to open up the country to a
much greater extent and to solicit the aid of those nations which are believed to harbor
no designs against Afghanistan.
2. PRESENT RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN NATIONS.
a. The UK.
Although Afghanistan did not win the Third Afghan-British War and by the
terms of the Treaty of Rawalpindi of 8 August 1919 lost an annual subsidy, the country
did obtain from Great Britain complete liberty in external affairs. On 22 November
1921 the two nations signed a treaty at Kabul. Its several articles re-affirmed the
complete independence of Afghanistan; provided for the establishment of a British
Legation at Kabul and British consulates at Jalalabad and Kandahar; and stated that
Great Britain would sell material needed for the modernization of the country. It also
affirmed that no customs duty would be levied upon goods landed in India and des-
tined for immediate transport to Afghanistan; and declared that so long as the inten-
tions of the Afghan Government were friendly and no immediate danger from such
traffic threatened India, permission would be given by Great Britain for the import of
arms and ammunition through India. In a letter pertinent to the treaty, Afghanistan
stated that the USSR would not be permitted to establish consulates in sections of the
country adjacent to the Indian frontier.
During the following years both parties maintained normal and friendly rela-
tions. However, Great Britain made no effort to aid Afghanistan in developing its
industry, and the Afghans turned to Germany for machinery and technicians. Pos-
sibly Great Britain preferred to see Afghanistan remain as an amalgamation of war-like
21 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
tribes. The British continued to sell military supplies to the Afghan Government, and
British nationals are still attached to the Afghan Air Force.
At present the UK maintains an Embassy at Kabul and consulates at Kanda-
har and Jalalabad. Trade between the two countries is not on a large scale. The UK
is currently concerned over the possibility that its withdrawal from India may deliver
Afghanistan into the Soviet sphere and therefore welcomes increasing US activity in
the country. In the future the British consulates at Kandahar and Jalalabad may be
operated by Pakistan.
b. The USSR.
Afghanistan was the first country to recognize the revolutionary government
of Russia, recognition being embodied in a letter of 7 April 1919 from King Amanullah
to Lenin just before Amanullah began the Third Afghan-British War. On 27 May 1919
the Soviets, in turn, became the first country to recognize the new Afghan Government.
Afghanistan's recognition of the USSR was inspired less by sentiments of
friendship than by a desire to obtain support against Great Britain. Although the
two countries observe formally cordial relations, as indicated by various treaties and
agreements in recent years, Afghanistan has become increasingly suspicious of the
USSR. The Afghans, shocked by Soviet excesses during a period of political purges in
the late thirties, gave asylum to certain tribal refugees. The USSR closed all Afghan
consulates within its borders; the Afghans retaliated by closing the Soviet consulates
in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Afghans, like the Turks and the Iranians, feel that the
USSR constitutes a potential threat to their independence. The belief is current that
long-range Soviet plans for India involve military operations across Afghanistan and
that, since the Afghan Army could not offer effective resistance to such a move, the
USSR would not trouble to make warning demands in advance of the invasion.
The USSR also disapproves of US activity in Afghanistan. Soviet broadcasts
declare that US agents infiltrate the country under the guise of "specialists" and that
roads and other public works under construction are actually war preparations directed
against the USSR. In 1947 the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul expressed to Afghan offi-
cials his objections to any plan leading to foreign technicians' working on airfields in
northern Afghanistan, and in early 1948 Radio Moscow charged the Afghan Govern-
ment with direct responsibility for US construction works planned for military use
against the USSR.
The USSR has not undertaken an organized propaganda campaign against the
Afghan Government or people, and there is no available evidence of efforts to spread
Communistic doctrine through the country. The Soviet press, on at least one occasion,
has alluded to the close affinities existing between the Turkomen, Uzbeks, and Tajiks of
northern Afghanistan with the same population groups within the USSR, and in May
1948 Afghan delegates attended a celebration in Soviet Tashkent commemorating a
mediaeval Uzbek poet. Also, some clandestine activity is certainly carried on by Soviet
agents among the Uzbeks and Tajiks. In 1946 and again in 1948 the Afghan authorities
arrested several Soviet agents, reportedly provided with radio receiver-transmitters, in
the northeastern part of the country.
SECRET 22
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
?
SECRET
The first pact between the USSR and Afghanistan was a Treaty of Friendship
signed on 28 February 1921. It provided for the opening of seven Afghan consulates
in the USSR and five Soviet consulates in Afghanistan (at Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kan-
dahar, Kaznein, and Maimana). Under the terms of the treaty the USSR would also
undertake to give material and financial assistance to Afghanistan, but in practice this
assistance was limited to subsidies granted during the first few years following ratifica-
tion of the treaty. The original agreement was expanded by a Treaty of Neutrality and
Non-Aggression on 31 August 1926 and one of similar title on 24 June 1931. On 29
March 1936 a protocol prolonging the 1931 treaty was signed. A trade agreement was
concluded between the two countries on 23 July 1940.
On 13 June 1946 Afghanistan and the USSR signed a Frontier Agreement, and
since that date special commissions have been carrying out the actual demarcation of
the boundary between the two countries. The conclusion of commercial agreements
in November 1947 and August 1948 covering exchange of certain specific items marked
a revival of trade relations which had declined sharply during the war.
The USSR is represented in Afghanistan by an embassy at Kabul with a staff
of about eighty Soviet nationals. No other Soviet citizens are legally resident in the
country. The USSR has made no serious effort to expand its political or cultural rela-
tions with Afghanistan, although it has indicated a willingness to help in the develop-
ment of northern resources.
c. The US.
In 1921 an Afghan mission visited the US and expressed a desire to initiate
diplomatic relations. However, relations were not inaugurated until 1935 when the
US Minister to Iran was concurrently accredited to Afghanistan, and it was not until
June 1942 that the US opened a legation at Kabul. In 1948 both countries raised their
respective missions to embassy rank.
Before 1942, only a few Americans, including the mineral and petroleum geolo-
gists of the Inland Exploration Company, had visited Afghanistan. As soon as the US
Legation was opened, however, Afghanistan began to display an active friendship for
the US. The country harbored pro-Axis sentiments but was hemmed in by the Allies
during World War II and was forced to cooperate with them. Of these Allies only the
Americans were welcome to the Afghans. The period following the end of World War
II has seen a steady development of US-Afghan relations. The withdrawal of the UK
from India has destroyed the balance of power in the general area, and the Afghans look
to the US to fill this void. The Afghan Government is also anxious to employ compe-
tent technicians and experts to help modernize the country; such personnel may be
found in the US.
In 1946 the Morrison-Knudsen International Company was engaged to survey
and execute engineering projects within Afghanistan. A special subsidiary company,
Morrison-Knudsen-Afghanistan, is currently constructing roads and irrigation projects
and the Afghan Government has set aside sufficient dollars for the payment of the
$17,400,000 contract. In the summer of 1948 MKA and the Afghan Government were
negotiating a new contract reportedly for $30 million for a five-year program.
23 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
Some 30 American teachers have been engaged to staff the Habibiya College
and the Teacher's Training College at Kabul and two secondary schools at Kandahar.
The Government of Afghanistan employs an American mining engineer and a city plan-
ning engineer; the Ministry of Finance is anxious to obtain the services of US experts
in finance, accounting, and statistics. In 1946 the US shipped much needed wheat and
flour to Afghanistan. The Afghan Army has acquired two US Army hospitals with
complete equipment for 500 beds and wishes to employ three American technicians to
supervise the installation of the equipment. The Afghan Government has also dis-
played interest in obtaining US arms and in having officers trained in the US and is
exchanging air attaches with the US. A number of Afghan students are currently
enrolled in educational institutions in the US.
Afghanistan has shown an interest in obtaining a loan of $100 million (but
would probably be willing to accept $50 million) from the US for the execution of an
economic development program. The subject was raised informally during the visit
of the Prime Minister to the US in August 1947, and pursued more directly by the Minis-
ter of National Economy during his visit to the US in late summer 1948. The Minis-
ter of Public Works, visiting the US in the spring of 1948, likewise discussed the proposed
loan and also asked for the good offices of the US Government in resolving the dispute
between Afghanistan and Iran over the distribution of the water of the Helmand River.
-
There is also the possibility that an American firm may be invited to participate in the
exploitation of Afghanistan's oil reserves.
d. Iran, Turkey, and other Moslem Countries of the Middle East.
Among the Moslem countries of the Near East only Iran and Turkey have rela-
tions of any importance with Afghanistan. The three countries and Iraq joined in the
Saadabad Pact of 8 July 1937, still in force, which was designed to insure peace and secu-
rity in the area through mutual pledges of non-aggression. The pact also contains a
provision for consultation in case of international conflicts affecting the mutual inter-
ests of the signatories, but this clause was not invoked by any of the signatory powers
during World War II.
Relations between Afghanistan and Iran are rather static, and- trade between
the two countries amounts to little. A source of past and present dispute is the Hel-
mand River, which is used for irrigation purposes by both countries. Most of the course
of the stream is within Afghanistan, and in years of sub-normal precipitation little or
no water reaches the province of Sistan in Iran. This situation prevailed in 1947 and
1948 and has given rise to an acrimonious dispute between the two states. The US has
shown a willingness to help in the establishment of permanent regulations covering
the distribution of the water of the Helmand.
Relations with modern Turkey began with the Treaty of Alliance of 1 March
1921. Its articles recognized the spiritual leadership of Turkey as the seat of the
Islamic Caliphate; included a defensive alliance; and provided for a Turkish military
mission to the Afghans. In more recent years, and following the abolition of the Caliph-
ate by Turkey and the severing of religious bonds, relations between the two countries
have become less important. However, a small Turkish mission is still attached to the
SECRET 24
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
SECRET
Afghan Army. A Turkish medical mission was at Kabul until 1946, and a Turkish
economic mission is still active there.
Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq have diplomatic
representatives at Kabul. Indonesia, another Moslem country, recently indicated its
intention of opening a legation at Kabul. In the summer of 1948, as a result of the
Palestine situation, pro-Arab feeling increased in Afghanistan and funds to aid the
Arabs were collected publicly.
e. India and Pakistan.
Afghanistan's relations with these two dominions began on 15 August 1947.
Afghanistan has since exchanged ambassadors with India and Pakistan. These coun-
tries conduct important trade relations, and in the case of each country some of the
items imported from the other are not readily obtainable from other sources.
Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan are affected by the former's inter-
est in the tribesmen of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) , known as Pathans.
The Government of Afghanistan considers these people to be Afghans. They are in
fact ethnically a part of the so-called true Afghan tribes, and successful opposition by
the Afghans to former British encroachment is credited largely to the resistance of these
tribes. Many Afghans believe that the area inhabited by them should be merged with
Afghanistan, but the elder statesmen appreciate the danger of attempting to absorb
within their country an additional 3 million people, many of them armed and unruly
tribal groups, and hence tend to restrain expansionist sentiment. They insist, how-
ever, that the tribesmen's future is a matter of rightful interest to Afghanistan.
Under the administrative procedure followed by the British while in control of
India, the continued existence of the NWF tribesmen as a distinct group was assured.
With the British gone and a Moslem Government of Pakistan established, the Afghans
fear that tribal interests may eventually be sufficiently merged with those of Pakistan
to destroy the prevailing feeling of kinship between the tribesmen and the Afghans
generally, with a corresponding weakening of Afghanistan's military potential.
As long ago as 1944, the Afghan Government suggested to the British that if
India were to be granted independence, the people of the NWFP and adjacent areas of
Baluchistan should be allowed to determine their constitutional future. Afghanistan
received the very definite impression that a plebiscite would be held, but it was subse-
quently made known to the Afghans that neither the British Government nor the Gov-
ernment of India as then constituted could entertain proposals from a foreign power
regarding territory which had been established as an integral part of India. Neverthe-
less, upon the UK's announcement of the decision in 1947 to partition India into the
dominions of Pakistan and India, the Afghan Government permitted a violent press and
radio campaign for the creation of an independent "Pathanistan." After the estab-
lishment of Pakistan and the inclusion of the areas concerned in that dominion, Afghan-
istan demanded of the Government of Pakistan that complete autonomy be conceded
to the areas by treaty between the Governments. of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
At the end of August, King Mohammed Zahir Shah, in a speech from the
throne, stated: "We only desire that the Afghans on the other side of the Durand Line
25 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
(the frontier between Afghanistan and the North West Frontier area) be recognized as
a separate entity. The decision as to their future should be entrusted to them uncon-
ditionally." On 30 September 1947 the Afghan delegate cast the only vote against the
admission of Pakistan to the UN, offering the objection that a fair plebiscite had not
been held in the North West Frontier Province. However, shortly thereafter the
Afghan Government sent a message to the Secretary General of the UN reversing this
vote.
That relations between the two countries now appear relatively amicable, de-
spite Pakistan's rejection of the Afghan demands, is due to two factors. The first of
these is Pakistan's current policy toward the tribesmen: the withdrawal of all troops
from the tribal areas and the entrustment of some local administration to the tribesmen
themselves?a policy which has informally established general conditions very similar
to those which Afghanistan had previously attempted to set up by treaty. The second
factor is Afghanistan's realization of the importance of maintaining friendly relations
with Pakistan, which is a gateway for the Afghan's vital foreign commerce. The uncer-
tain allegiance of the tribesmen themselves, however, and the conflicting interests of
the two countries remain potential sources of trouble.
f. Other Countries.
France has maintained a Legation at Kabul since 1923, although official rela-
tions began on 28 April 1922, while later a convention gave the French Republic the
exclusive privilege of conducting archaeological excavations in Afghanistan for a period
of thirty years. A limited amount of archaeological work has been carried on up to
the present time. Since 1924 French teachers have been ori the staff of the Esteglal
College, a Franco-Afghan institution at Kabul. In 1947 a complete French staff took
over the management of the hospital at the University of Kabul.
According to statements made by French officials, the interest of their country
in Afghanistan is entirely on the cultural level. France has long been the interpreter
of Western culture to the Middle East, and the French still struggle to hold their leader-
ship in this field.
Afghanistan and China maintain diplomatic relations and have a common,
roughly defined frontier some 30 miles in length where the Wakhan corridor of Afghan-
istan adjoins Chinese Sinkiang. Although this border has been closed since 1933 a few
former residents of Sinkiang were given permission to leave Afghanistan and return to
China via this frontier in 1947.
g. International Organizations.
In 1934 Afghanistan, despite its relative isolation and paucity of foreign rela-
tions, joined and actively supported the League of Nations. On 19 November 1946
Afghanistan became a member of the United Nations; in the deliberations of the UN,
Afghanistan has generally supported the other Moslem states, voting against the parti-
tion of Palestine and for the admission of Transjordan to the UN. It has avoided voting
on numerous controversial issues between the USSR and the US, apparently to keep
from offending the USSR.
SECRET 26
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
SECRET
Afghanistan also maintains membership in the International Labor Organiza-
tion, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Telecommunications
Union, International Postal Union, International Trade Organization, and the World
Health Organization.
27 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
?
SECRET
SECTION IV
MILITARY SITUATION
1. GENESIS OF PRESENT MILITARY POLICIES.
Afghanistan has maintained a regular standing army since early in the nineteenth
century. However, in all major operations, such as the Afghan-British wars, the best
fighting has been done by irregular tribal forces.
The most recent action by the Afghan Army against foreign opposition was that
of the Third Afghan-British war of 1919. After 1919 King Amanullah neglected the
training, equipment, and morale of the army, and when civil revolt broke out in 1928
the force disintegrated. In 1929 King Nadir Shah began the task of building up an
efficient, loyal regular army and his brothers have carried out this policy. The size
of the army has been steadily increased, special schools have been opened, and volun-
tary enlistment has been encouraged. Moreover, the government has foreign training
missions engaged, and has introduced some standardization of weapons. Since 1930
the army has conducted several successful campaigns against tribal groups.
Present military policy is concerned primarily with the maintenance of internal
security. For this purpose the bulk of the army is stationed south of the Hindu Kush
range and faces the border of the former North West Frontier Province. The most
unruly of the Afghan tribes inhabit both sides of the border, and the possibility of
disorder is ever present.
Military policy is also concerned with defense against foreign invasion. In case
of invasion Afghanistan will place strong reliance upon irregular tribal forces, skilled
in guerrilla warfare, and find its greatest reservoir of strength among those same tribes
which are a dormant threat to internal security in time of peace. The fact that these
tribes would certainly rise against an invasion is one reason why the government does
not attempt to disarm them.
The estimated annual defense budget for the year 1946-47 was $4,600,000, of which
$770,000 was assigned to the air force.
2. STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF THE ARMED FORCES.
a. Army.
The current strength of the Afghan Army is probably above 70,000 including
3,500 officers. The army is organized into eleven divisions, five of them being grouped
into two corps; the other six being independent provincial divisions. There are also
two independent mixed brigades and a Royal Bodyguard. About 80 percent of the
force is stationed in the Kabul area and in the southern and eastern part of the coun-
try adjacent to the Pakistan frontier. The Kabul Army Corps is the best trained,
organized, and equipped unit. The Southern Province Army Corps has its headquar-
ters at Gardez. The bulk of the independent divisions generally have their head-
quarters at provincial capitals with units scattered about the provinces.
29 SECRET
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
Army strength is maintained by compulsory military service, all males between
22 and 28 being liable for two years' service (though many choose to serve for a longer
period) . The army inducts annually an average of 28,500 men. The government calls
up conscripts by a system of drawings, or by issuing definite quotas of conscripts to the
tribal leaders. Certain of the tribes are opposed to conscription, and the issue has
been the cause of numerous tribal incidents and uprisings. Morale of the troops in
provincial divisions is fair; morale in the Kabul area is good.
Officer candidates are trained at Kabul in the Military School and in the
Military College. Between the two World Wars a few officers were trained in Turkey,
Italy, France, and the USSR. In 1946 and again in 1947 a group of selected officers
and NCO's was sent to India for training, but the second group returned after a few
months because of the unsettled conditions in India.
Turkey has supplied five military missions to the Afghan Army, from 1920
until the present. Members of these missions have been instructors in the military
schools and advisers to the Ministry of War. Following World War II re-organization
of the army was undertaken on the British-India Army model, and British small arms
were adopted as standard equipment.
During 1945-46 considerable military equipment was ordered from the Gov-
ernment of India; by midsummer of 1948 only a portion of the order had been delivered.
Major items in this order are 52,000 .303 caliber British Lee-Enfield rifles with bayonets,
and 52,000,000 rounds of ammunition; 2,726 light and medium machine guns with
ammunition; 228 mortars with ammunition; bulk explosives and a few howitzers and
field guns. Also included are a few light tanks, armored carriers and cars, signal equip-
ment, clothing and miscellaneous items. The firm of Skoda maintains an office at
Kabul, and it has been reported that contracts with the Czechs provide for delivery
of 3,000 tons of ammunition in the next three years. Munitions ordered from India
are to be supplied during the next four or five years as needed.
The new equipment will supplement and supplant in part an assortment of
older Soviet, Italian, German, British, French, and Czech arms, which include small
arms, machine guns, anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and artillery pieces (chiefly 75-mm).
Nearly all this equipment is obsolete for modern warfare but can be used in the mainte-
nance of internal order by the government. In the summer of 1948 Afghanistan
informally indicated an interest in securing US military equipment including artillery,
mortars, tanks, and motor equipment.
b. Navy.
Afghanistan has no navy.
c. Air Force.
The Afghan Air Force numbers approximately 500, including 150 officers. It
is organized into three attack squadrons with a total of 22 planes and one transport
squadron of eight planes. The aircraft are all obsolete type (Hawker Hind, Romeo,
and Tiger Moth).
SECRET 30
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
?
SECRET
The pilot strength is less than 50 men. Some of the pilots and ground per-
sonnel were sent abroad for instruction while the rest were trained locally by foreign
instructors. Currently a small British training mission is stationed at Kabul. The
Afghans have displayed little flying ability, and their knowledge of maintenance is
inadequate. There are no trained navigators or bombardiers. The home station of
the air force is at Kabul, but in the winter detachments are sent to Jalalabad. In
early 1948 a contract was concluded with the UK for the purchase of 12 Avro Anson
XIX aircraft, some of which were delivered during the summer of 1948.
The present air force is probably effective for tribal operations but would be
useless against a modern air force or if opposed by anti-aircraft guns.
d. Gendarmerie.
The gendarmerie which numbers approximately 15,000 men, is designed
mainly to maintain public order. Average annual induction for the gendarmerie is
8,500. At the same time, the stationing of some 30 percent of the total strength in
the north for garrisoning frontier posts and maintaining border patrols makes it pos-
sible to reduce the number of regular troops in the area and thus to allay Soviet sus-
picions. The gendarmerie is armed with rifles and light automatic weapons.
The gendarmerie was established in 1945 to replace the older kotwali, or
provincial police force under the Ministry of the Interior. The local governors largely
control the units assigned to their provinces. In the event of war, it is understood
that the army commander in a given theatre of operations will assume command of
all forces (army, gendarmerie, and levies) in that theatre.
e. Quasi-Military Forces.
Gendarmerie units are not stationed in certain tribal areas in the Kabul,
Kandahar, Southern and Eastern Provinces, where the government permits local tribal
chiefs to employ armed tribesmen called Khassadars to niaintain order and to pro-
tect traffic moving through these regions. The Khassadars are paid by the government
and are subject to call with their chiefs as levies en masse in case of need. The total
number of Khassadars is roughly 1,000. A similar irregular tribal levy, the Urgun
Militia, consisting of 1,000 men, one-third of whom are on active duty at a time, main-
tain order in the Urgun area. Municipal police, numbering about 2,000 and mostly
unarmed, are maintained only in the cities.
3. WAR POTENTIAL.
a. Manpower.
Afghanistan has, by conservative estimate, 1,800,000 males between the ages
of 15 and 49.* The total number of Afghans who have received regular training with
modern weapons is about 260,000. This figure is made up of the 70,000 men in the reg-
ular army, the 15,000 in the gendarmerie, and between 150,000 and 200,000 former
* This US Army estimate is based on a total population of 8,000,000. If a figure of 12,000,000 is
accepted as the total population, the estimate must be revised upward to approximately 3,000,000.
31 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
army and gendarmerie conscripts. Some 240,000 tribesmen, armed with their own
rifles, could be mobilized in part in case of national emergency. Thus, the maximum
armed manpower of the country totals roughly 500,000. The government in case of a
national emergency could probably not mobilize more than 200,000 to 300,000 men
at one time.
The Afghans, especially the members of the true Afghan tribes and the Tajiks,
make hardy, brave soldiers. There is a scarcity of officer personnel, and the Afghan
officers are generally not capable of directing complicated military operations.
In case of a general mobilization, former conscripts would serve as "fillers" in
existing units and in newly created units, while tribal forces would remain under
their own tribal leaders. The tribal forces would be most effective in guerrilla war-
fare on home terrain. Their miscellaneous equipment, their independence, and their
lack of training would greatly limit their general military usefulness.
b. Natural Resources.
Afghanistan produces ample food supplies for the maintenance of its armed
forces. However, it is not probable that the army possesses large stocks of grain and
other foods. Data concerning stocks of petroleum products are not available, but
such stocks would probably be exhausted by a few weeks of unusual demands.
c. Industry.
Local industries produce only a part of the boots, cotton, and woolen cloth
used by the army. The only arms production of the country is at the Kabul arsenal
which is largely equipped with obsolete machinery purchased in 1907. In the past
this arsenal has turned out artillery pieces, machine guns, rifles, and ammunition; at
present it is making only small quantities of ammunition. Arms and ammunition are
currently purchased from the UK, India, and Czechoslovakia in amounts not large
enough to build up impressive reserves. All modern military equipment must be
imported.
4. MILITARY INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES.
a. Army Plans.
The army has two active functions. Troops stationed in the Kabul area insure
the stability of the government. Troops stationed in the east and south control the
unruly tribes. Officials of the government hold divergent views with regard to tribal
policy. Some favor a policy of conciliation while the army leaders favor a show of
strength and, if necessary, the use of force. The latter policy which has been in the
ascendancy might have a damaging long-term effect in alienating the tribes from sup-
porting the government in time of national emergency.
Military planning is limited to the defense of the frontiers of the country,
specifically against invasion by the USSR, although it is questionable whether the
Afghan Army has a thoroughly coordinated plan of defense. Since the Afghan Army
is based on the opposite side of the lofty Hindu Kush range from the Soviet frontier,
SECRET 32
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
?
SECRET
it would be almost impossible to oppose invasion in the region of the actual frontier.
Resistance would probably be concentrated in the few high passes of the Hindu Kush.
b. Military Capabilities.
Inadequate modern equipment, lack of properly trained officer personnel, indif-
ferent morale, lack of mobility, and dependence upon imported military supplies would
make it very difficult for the Afghan Army command to execute specific plans. The
army could not withstand attack by a larger power. It would probably split up into
small units which together with the tribesmen, would wage guerrilla warfare over
familiar terrain.
On several occasions since 1930 the army has shown an ability to deal with
serious tribal threats to internal security; the armed forces should be able to maintain
such control unless the situation is drastically disturbed by other acts of the govern-
ment or by foreign interference. The present and planned purchases of arms and
ammunition should strengthen its ability to maintain order but will not measurably
increase its ability to meet substantial foreign aggression.
33 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
?
SECRET
SECTION V
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY
1. THE IMPORTANCE OF AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE.
Afghanistan is important to US security because it lies across the direct path of
Soviet expansion to Pakistan and India. If the country fell under Soviet domination,
the USSR would (1) have extended its control to the borders of Pakistan and India;
(2) come within easy striking distance of the Indian Ocean; (3) threaten the eastern
flank of neighboring Iran; (4) gain possible additional oil reserves which could be
exploited and transported into the Soviet Union; and (5) undermine the will of other
Near and Middle East countries to resist Soviet aggression. It is unlikely that the
USSR would occupy Afghanistan except as an operation to facilitate a thrust into
Pakistan and India.
2. FACTORS PROMOTING CONTINUED INDEPENDENCE.
Currently, the greatest factor favoring the maintenance of Afghan independence
is the USSR's apparent lack of interest in the country. In contrast to its activities
vis-A-vis its other Near and Middle East neighbors, the USSR has made no formal
demands upon Afghanistan, has issued no threats, and has not carried on an organized
propaganda campaign against the people or the government, although it has been
critical of current US activity in Afghanistan. This lack of interest probably arises
from the fact that Afghanistan itself contains little of immediate value to the USSR
and could be readily occupied by the Soviet Army should the occasion arise.
A second factor is the strong anti-Soviet sentiment of the Afghan Government
and of most of the people, who are devout Moslems. Under current conditions Soviet
and Communist propaganda would reach only a very limited audience; any manifes-
tations of interest in it would be promptly suppressed by the government. Afghan
independence is also bolstered by US and UK policy. Moreover, the Afghan Govern-
ment is desirous of strengthening its ties with the US and of aligning itself with Turkey
and Iran, which count on US support against Soviet aggression.
3. FACTORS WORKING AGAINST CONTINUED INDEPENDENCE.
Factors militating against continued Afghan independence are the recent with-
drawal of the UK from India, where the British have strongly opposed Russian expan-
sion southward toward the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean for a period of over a
hundred years, and the general decline of British influence and power.
The lack of real cohesion among the various population elements of the country
also serves to weaken Afghanistan's ability to resist threats to its independence. The
least loyal groups are those in areas adjacent to the Afghan-Soviet frontier; also, the
warlike eastern and southern tribes resent any central control.
Afghanistan is so remotely situated that help sent to aid the country against
Soviet aggression would arrive too late. Afghanistan itself has no military estab-
lishment capable of waging effective modern warfare.
35 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
? SECTION VI
?
?
PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY
In view of the Afghanistan's strategic location adjacent to Iran and between the So-
viet Union and the Indian subcontinent, it is hardly probable that the USSR will remain
indifferent indefinitely. Although military occupation of Afghanistan may be expected
only in connection with a Soviet operation involving India and Pakistan, the USSR may
launch intensified radio and press attacks on Afghanistan (and also on the US) as a
result of continuing US assistance to and interest in the country. In this connection,
the USSR may apply direct diplomatic pressure on Afghanistan. Moreover, subversive
activities may be increased among those tribal groups which have racial and linguistic
affinities with peoples inside the Soviet Union.
Moslem Afghanistan, however, will continue to resist Communist influence, and
so long as the USSR does not resort to force, or a strong threat of force, Afghanistan
will strengthen its ties with the Western Powers, especially the US.
Under a strong, closely knit, paternalistic oligarchy, Afghanistan should remain
politically and economically stable, despite the irritant of Pathan tribesmen of the
Pakistan frontier, and the existence in the north of tribal groups ethnically con-
nected with Soviet peoples. Continuing and increased violence in the India-Pakistan
situation would result in serious economic difficulties for Afghanistan which might
ultimately have adverse effects on the political stability of the government.
37 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
SECRET
APPENDIX A
TOPOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE
Afghanistan is a completely landlocked country, bounded on the north by the
USSR, on the extreme northeast by a narrow strip of Chinese territory, on the east
and south by Pakistan, and on the west by Iran.
Afghanistan covers some 260,000 square miles or approximately the area of Texas.
Its greatest length from east to west is 770 miles, and its greatest breadth is about
525 miles. From north to south it covers a range of latitude equal to that from the
northern border of Maryland to the southern boundary of Georgia. Kabul is situated
in approximately the same latitude as Atlanta.
From the extreme northeastern corner of Afghanistan a line of mountains strikes
towards the heart of the country. The principal range, the Hindu Kush, stretches some
375 miles from the region of the Pamirs to Bamian Pass and is featured by peaks over
21,000 feet in height. The Hindu Kush throws off giant spurs to the north, west, and
south which create an extended massif of somewhat lower elevations. The western
extension beyond Bamian Pass includes the Kuh-i-Baba, Firuzkuh, and Parapamisus
(Band-i-Baba) ranges, with the latter mountains extending to the Iranian frontier
in the area north of Herat. North of these westerly extensions and roughly parallel
to them is the Band-i-Turkistan range, while the Safid Kuh range to the south of
the Hindu Kush extends from the Kabul River to the southwest.
The Hindu Kush and its spurs constitute an extensive barrier to direct communica-
tions between the USSR and Pakistan and India. Passes leading across the range from
northern Afghanistan to the vicinity of Kabul are at elevations of from 8,000 to about
14,000 feet.
The mountainous central and northeastern sections of the country are strewn with
valleys, having an average elevation of over 6,000 feet, which are the sites of numerous
small farming communities. Most of these settlements are far from the few motor
roads and are connected only by rough trails. The area northward from the Hindu
Kush and the Tir Band-i-Turkistan ranging to the Oxus is well-watered pasture land,
at an altitude averaging about 1,500 feet, except for a belt of sand dunes immediately
bordering the river. A very large section of western, southwestern, and southern
Afghanistan is characterized by an arid climate and barren wastes at an altitude be-
tween 2,000 and 3,000 feet. The southeastern and eastern parts of the country have
some fertile valleys and small plains. Heaviest population density is along the valleys
of the Kabul and the Kunar, with the town of Jalalabad, at the junction of these two
rivers, enjoying a semi-tropical climate; in the vicinity of Herat along the Hari Rud
valley; and in the vicinity of Kandahar.
The drainage system of Afghanistan falls into three major categories: some 7
percent of the total land area has no streams at all; some 11 percent of the country
has drainage to the sea through the streams which flow to the Indus River; and the
39 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
rest of the area has interior drainage, either to lakes or marshes or by the gradual
evaporation and absorption of the water into the ground. Most of the streams are
intermittent, and flash floods may impose serious barriers to cross-country movement.
On the north some 14 percent of the land area drains into the Oxus (Amu Darya)
basin. Of the remaining 68 percent of the country, the principal rivers are the
Murghab and the Hari Rud, which flow to the Karakum desert within the USSR,
and the Helmand which flows into the Hamun lake or marsh. The .Helmand and its
several tributaries drain some 41 percent of the country. Today there are about
40,000 square miles of desert north and south of the lower course of the Helmand.
Current projects envisage the irrigation of thousand of acres of this land, which cen-
turies ago was irrigated and fertile.
The average annual precipitation of the country is between 10 and 15 inches, ex-
cept in the southwest where it is not over 5 inches. Rain and snow fall between
October and April; rainfall is very rare during the summer months. Snow is rare
in the Kandahar region and south of this area. In the mountainous regions heavy
snows occur which may block the highway passes for long periods during the winter
and spring.
Afghanistan has a temperate climate with wide seasonal variations and a con-
siderable range between day and night temperatures.* During the summer, tempera-
tures on the lower Helmand reach 120 degrees and in the winter sink to below freezing.
At Kabul the summer temperature rises to 100 degrees and ranges well below the
freezing point in winter. In general, temperatures are lower to the north of the
Hindu Kush. Clear skies are the rule during the summer months, and even in the
winter completely overcast days are comparatively few in number. The strong sun-
shine of the winter tends to ease the rigors of that season.
The following tables give the best available temperature and precipitation data
for Afghanistan.
TABLE I
MONTHLY TEMPERATURE RANGE AT KABUL*
(Centigrade Scale)
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Year
Mean Temp. -3.0
-1.4
7.0
13.2
17.3
21.7
24.4
23.3
18.0
11.6
5.8
0.5
11.5
Mean Max. 3.4
5.0
13.9
20.5
25.1
30.0
32.3
31.8
27.4
22.1
15.7
7.5
19.6
Mean MM. -7.1
-6.6
1.0
5.7
8.5
10.5
14.0
13.6
7.7
3.3
-1.3
-3.8
3.8
Abs. Max. 13.7
17.7
24.5
29.9
34.8
36.6
37.7
36.4
36.1
30.0
23.1
17.5
37.7
Abs. Min. -24.5
-25.8
-11.0
-3.3
0.2
2.6
6.2
4.1
-2.3
-7.4
-10.4
-15.0
-25.8
* See Map, Figure V. ?
SECRET 40
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
SECRET
TABLE II
MEAN TEMPERATURES
(Centigrade Scale)
Station
Altitude
Meters
Mean temp.
of warmest
month
Mean temp.
of coldest
month
Kabul
1,799
24.40 C
?3.0? C
Ghazni
2,218
23.4
?6.7
Kandahar
1,044
31.5
5.6
Chaman
1,314
31.1
6.8
Girishk
945
33.5
8.4
Herat
922
30.7
2.1
Kushk Post
635
28.0
1.2
Termez
302
31.5
1.7
* Data based on a period of 13 years, 1923-32 and 1940-44.
TABLE III
MONTHLY MEAN PRECIPITATION
(Millimeters)
Number of years
Station
16
Kabul
3_ 5
Jalalabad Kandahar
4
Girishk
4
Herat
15
Kushk Post
15
Termez
January
44
34
88
79
66
31
22
February
51
46
40
44
35
57
8
March
45
21
21
21
37
80
25
April
62
47
12
5
7
18
16
May
28
12
2
2
13
26
June
3
3
July
4
3
5
August
9
9
September
2
2
October
13
2
. .
. .
November
5
1
2
1
16
18
8
December
34
5
22
16
40
42
8
TOTAL
300
185
192
168
201
259
115
41 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
SECRET
APPENDIX B
SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES
1. WATER TRANSPORT.
Because of deep gorges, rapids, or shallow channels, Afghanistan's rivers, with
few exceptions, are useless for navigation purposes. The few stretches of river which
are navigable in season for small boats, the lower Helmand, the Arghandab, and the
Kunduz, are not utilized by the Afghans for river traffic. The Oxus River which forms
nearly 400 miles of the Afghan-Soviet frontier is navigable by small steamers and
launches for commercial traffic up to Termez throughout the year, but shipping and
all ferry service across the Oxus are conducted by the USSR.
2. ROADS.
Transportation within Afghanistan is limited to motor, cart, and pack animal.
Soviet railroads and roads serve at least six border posts on the Afghan frontier
(Kushk Post [USSR] - Kara Tapa [Afghanistan], Tash Kerpi-Maruchak, Kerki-
Andkhui, Kilif-Dagla Arosa, Termez-Tash Guzar (Pata Kesar), Qizil Faleh-Hazrat
Iman). The limited commercial exchange between Afghanistan and the USSR is
concentrated at Kushk Post and at Termez.
The bulk of Afghanistan's foreign traffic moves through Torkham-Khyber Pass on
the Kabul-Peshawar road and via Kandahar through Spin Baldak-Chaman into Pakis-
tan. Pakistan roads and railroads serve both frontier points. Traffic with Iran is
conducted chiefly via Islam Kala-Kariz over the Herat-Meshed Road.
Although most of Afghanistan's roads have been constructed since 1930,
none is first class. Even those classified as improved are inadequate. Stretches of
narrow road, steep grades, sharp turns, weak bridges, and temporary blockage by
flood or snow present impediments to traffic. While most of the improved roads have
some drainage construction and a base with gravel or rock surfacing, they vary greatly
in accordance with the local terrain. They will not accommodate heavy trucks or heavy
traffic because of difficult hairpin turns, inadequate bridges, and poor road construc-
tion and maintenance.
The main highway system comprising about 2,200 miles * consists of: (a) the
"great circle route" which extends from Kabul through Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Kanda-
har, and back to Kabul a distance of about 1,600 miles; (b) internal connecting routes
to Khanabad, Kunduz and towards Gardez, totalling about 200 miles; and (c) con-
necting routes to the frontiers of Pakistan, Iran, and the Soviet Union totalling about
400 miles.-
All road mileage is approximate, since minor detours and improvements are an ever-present
factor. See Map, Figure I.
43 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
The first stage of the "great circle route," the North Road from Kabul to Mazar-i-
Sharif (390 miles), although a well-traveled road offers considerable difficulty at all
times because of the high and rugged terrain.of. the Hindu Kush which it crosses be-
tween Charikar (40 miles out of Kabul) and DOshi (215 miles out of Kabul). Between
Kabul and Charikar there are no problems. Beyond Charikar narrow gorges, deep
valleys, steep grades, sharp turns, repeated crossings of the Surkhab and Kunduz
Rivers on narrow bridges, and high passes (Shibar Pass: 9,800 feet) characterize the
route into Doshi. This road will accomodate only one-way traffic for long stretches
and only a limited amount at any given time; it could be blocked in innumerable-places
with little effort. Leaving Doshi the road follows the Kunduz River and gradually
descends through foothills to Pul-i-Khumri (245 miles) . At this point a connecting
road, following the Kunduz River valley, takes off to Kunduz, Khanabad, and Faizabad.
The main road, after crossing the Kunduz River at Pul-i-Khumri, reaches Haibak in
the Ghori plain and continues in open steppe and plateau country to Tashkurghan.
From here open plains extend westward to Mazar-i-Sharif, and the road is generally
good.
An important route to the USSR is the 35-mile stretch to the north of Mazar-i-
Sharif ending at Tash Guzar (Pata Kesar) where a ferry connects with Termez, USSR.
The last six to ten miles, over loose-drifting sand dunes, are not considered traversable
by motor. At Termez the Oxus River is 600 yards wide in summer, 400 yards in winter.
The second stage of the "great circle route," Mazar-i-Sharif westward to Herat
(approximately 500 miles) , offers considerable difficulties to motor traffic. However,
it is the only important route into northwest Afghanistan and will increase in import-
ance if Afghanistan's petroleum resources are developed. The road between Mazar-i-
Sharif and Andkhui (130 miles) proceeds over gently rolling plains where the chief
obstacles to traffic are the many canals and irrigation ditches. As Andkhui is ap-
proached, soft, shifting sands are a considerable handicap to traffic. The entire dis,-
tance becomes difficult in wet weather owing to poor drainage and inadequate surfac-
ing. On leaving Andkhui, the road turns southward, traverses sand dunes, and follows
the fertile Maimana River valley to Maimana (85 miles from Andkhui), located in a
plain surrounded by hills.
The route from Maimana to Herat, a distance of nearly 300 miles, is actually a
pack-trail improved to accommodate motor traffic. Like the North Road out of Kabul,
this route crosses the central mountain range. It follows long narrow valleys, traverses
many minor and major passes (Sazak Pass; 7,950 feet, 70 miles northeast of Herat),
and steep defiles. The road has sharp turns, widths of less than nine feet, grades of
nearly 20 percent, and bridges which will take only light traffic. Snow may block the
road for days at a time during winter.
From Herat, the largest city of western Afghanistan, an important 80-mile improved
road, which handles most of the commercial exchange between the USSR and Afghanis-
tan, runs to the Soviet border at Kushk Post. The first fifty miles of the road are
through rugged terrain with a maximum elevation of 5,000 feet; as the frontier-4s ap-
Proached, the route traverses stretches of sand along the Kushk River.
SECRET 44
_Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
SECRET
The road linking Herat, via the border points of Islam Kala-Korez, with Meshed,
Iran, is the most important route connecting Afghanistan with Iran. The road (80
miles to the border), which follows an easy grade, can be traveled throughout the year
but is in poor condition due to lack of maintenance and to stretches of sand and soft
earth. The road follows the north bank of the Hari Rud as far as Tirpul, 18 miles from
the border, where it crosses the river bed over a brick and stone bridge.
The third stage of the "great circle route" known as the West Road crosses barren
country and links Herat with Kandahar (400 miles). This road is easy and good by
comparison with other Afghan roads. The highest road elevations are approximately
4,000 feet, and there are but few steep grades. Aside from eight river crossings where
bridges may not be in repair, there are no serious obstacles to traffic. Of the eight
crossings the six between Herat and Farah can be forded most of the year. The other
two rivers (the Helmand at Girishk and the Arghandab near Kandahar) are rarely
fordable. When bridges over these streams are not in repair, a makeshift ferry may
be employed. Strategically this is the most important route in Afghanistan because it
is the easiest approach from Iran and the USSR to southern Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
India. When the irrigation and dam projects on the Helmand River near Girishk
(75 miles west of Kandahar) are completed, the road east of Girishk will increase in
commercial importance.
Kandahar, the chief city in southern Afghanistan, is linked to Pakistan by road
via Spin Balak-Chaman (65 miles). This road, currently being rebuilt by Morrison-
Knudsen-Afghanistan, is one of the two important foreign trade routes of Afghanistan,
and could be developed into the most important.
The last stage of the "great circle route" linking Kandahar to Kabul (320 miles)
follows the Tarnak River valley for its first hundred miles past Qalat-i-Ghilzai and then
continues into Ghazni via the Ghazni River valley. This stretch of approximately 200
miles over steadily rising terrain offers few road problems except surface maintenance
in areas where the surface is soft clay. The last hundred miles, particularly the dis-
tance between Ghazni and Kabul, are typical high mountain terrain with all attendant
problems: three major river crossings on bridges (Ghazni, Logar, Kabul rivers) , nu-
merous smaller stream crossings, high altitude (8,246 feet 12 miles north of Ghazni) ,
and narrow defiles. Rain and snow can make this route impassable. A somewhat
easier alternate route leaves the Ghazni-Kabul highway south of Shaikhabad, joins the
Gardez-Kabul road near Kulangar, and continues to Kabul.
The most importnt foreign trade route of Afghanistan leads from Kabul via Jalala-
bad to Torkham on the frontier (155 miles) and through the Khyber Pass (3370 feet)
to Peshawar in Pakistan. Efforts to develop a river grade route following the Kabul
River and the Tangi Gharu gorge between Kabul and Sarobi have not been abandoned;
work on the route proposed by M-K-A has been suspended at least temporarily, be-
cause of the high cost, in favor of the route via Butkhak. The Butkhak road, which is
improved but subject to snow blockage and washout, traverses rugged mountainous
country (Lataband Pass 6,850 feet). From Sarobi the road follows the river into Jalala-
bad and then leaves the river as it heads eastward to Torkham. Although Morrison-
Knudsen-Afghanistan is currently improving this road (a road on which the Afghan
45 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
Government has expended considerable effort in the past), travel over this vital link
with the outside world continues to be slow and difficult.
In addition to the main motor roads, approximately 1,500 miles of partially
improved roads or tracks motorable in good weather connect important villages and
agricultural areas with the main routes. This type of road connects Kabul with
Herat through central Afghanistan. It is approximately 175 miles shorter than the
southern route via Kandahar but is exceedingly difficult because of high passes (several
over 10,000 feet) and long stretches of unimproved road. It is motorable only during
favorable seasons and carries a limited amount of traffic.
Trails, a few motorable under favorable conditions, connect all villages and
smaller communities with more important routes. (Only important trails are shown
on Figure I, Terrain, Transportation Map.) Some of these century-old caravan routes
into Pakistan, the USSR, and China currently carry little traffic but are of potential
strategic importance. A caravan trail connects Afghanistan with Sinkiang, China.
The trail proceeds within Afghanistan from Zebak to Ishkashim at the western end of
the Wakhan Corridor and then along the Oxus River which forms the Soviet-Afghan
frontier. Near Langar Kisht (USSR) the trail leaves the border and follows the Oxus
River to its headwaters near the Chinese frontier where the border is crossed through
the Wakhir Pass (16,150 feet) into Sinkiang. The Afghan-Sino border, however, has.
been closed to regular traffic since 1933.
As indicated earlier, trails into the USSR are not of economic significance but may
be of strategic value. Trails into Pakistan, including the Gomal Pass route to Fort
Sandeman and the Paiwar Pass route to Parachinar, are losing their commercial im-
portance but continue to be important routes of tribal movements.
3. RAILROAD.
There are no railroads in Afghanistan.
4. AIR LINES.
There are no civil air lines operating within or into Afghanistan. Afghanistan's
expressed desire to be included on an international air route, as well as its interest in
establishing domestic service, may result in some type of civil air service in the near
future. Before 1940 the German Lufthansa operated a route to Kabul via Tehran
and Herat. During 1946 and 1947 Afghanistan unsuccessfully attempted to interest
PAA, TWA, and a Government of India civil air mission in cooperating in the establish-
ment of air service. In early 1948 Afghanistan contracted for 12 British Avro Anson
XIX planes (2-engine, 2-crew, 6-passenger aircraft), for the army. By mid-summer
1948 several of these planes had been delivered. It is possible that some of these planes
may be used in domestic air service.
While the number of landing areas within Afghanistan is estimated by British
sources to be as high as 33, not more than 14 can be considered currently useable, even
for light aircraft.* Only five of these fields, one each at Jalalabad, Kandahar, and
* See IViUp, Figure I.
SECRET 46
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
SECRET
Herat, and two at Kabul, have runways of 1,000 yards or more with limited installations
and facilities. No field has permanent all-weather runways, none has facilities for
night flying, and none has adequate communication facilities or landing aids. In line
with its interest in air transportation, the Afghan Government intends to expand the
facilities of the Khawaja Rawash field at Kabul. This field, used by the Afghan Air
Force, is also the only field used for occasional, international flights and by the Soviet
courier plane, a C-47.
5. TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH, AND RADIO COMMUNICATIONS.
The Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs controls and operates telecommunication
facilities within Afghanistan. Most of the traffic is government business. All cities,
important villages, administrative centers, and military posts are linked by telephone
with Kabul. In most cases the telephone wires follow the roads, but telephone con-
nections extend beyond motorable roads. Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif, Baghlan,
Maimana, Jalalabad and some smaller towns have limited local telephone systems in
operation. Between 3,000 and 5,000 telephone instruments are in service. The tele-
phone service does not connect with foreign countries. During 1947 the Afghan
Government displayed its interest in improving the telephone service by asking US,
UK, and Swedish firms for bids on specific equipment.
The telegraph system, with approximately 7,500 miles of lines, aside from giving
domestic service has four links with foreign countries: with Pakistan at Torkham-
Landi Kotal (Khyber) , Kila-i-Jadid-Chaman; with Iran at Islam Kala-Kariz, and
with USSR at Kara Tapa-Kushk Post. Most of the foreign telegraphic traffic is routed
via Pakistan.
The telephone and telegraph equipment is mostly antiquated; the systems are not
coordinated; and service is normally poor. In case of national emergency the telephone
and telegraph systems could not be relied upon, and they would be of little use to any
foreign military forces operating within the country.
The only radio station of international scope is located at Kabul. It is a Standard
British Marconi type Model SWB011, 5,000-8,000 watts, and has the call letters YAK.
It maintains limited radiotelegraph connections with the UK, Iran, Pakistan, India,
and the USSR. Connections with the US are via Tangier (WRG 4-5), where Mackay
Radio relays messages to New York City. Experimental radiotelephone service between
Kabul (YAK) and London (GAD) has been carried out. The only local Afghan
broadcasts of several hours per day originate with this same station. The number
of radio receiving sets in Afghanistan is variously estimated from 1,000 to 5,000. Short-
wave local sending stations operated by the government are known to exist at Kabul
(YAA) , Maimana (YAM) , Mazar-i-Sharif (YAQ), Herat (YAH), Khost (YAT) , and
Kaizangi (YAD).
Morrison-Knudsen-Afghanistan in connection with its engineering and construc-
tion work has set up its own radiotelephone system with main stations at Kabul,
Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Girishk, and six mobile units attached to local construction
projects. The equipment will be turned over to the Afghan Government after M-K-A
has finished its work.
47 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
SECRET
APPENDIX C
POPULATION STATISTICS AND CHARACTERISTICS
1. POPULATION ELEMENTS.
An Afghan Government figure of 1945 gives the population of the country as
12,000,000. The average density of population is about 15 persons per square kilo-
meter. However, large tracts have a very scanty population, while a relatively few
settled areas have up to 50 persons to the square kilometer.*
There are only fifteen towns with a population of over 15,000. The largest towns
are Kabul, the capitol, with 206,208; Kandahar 77,186; Herat 75,642; Mazar-i-Sharif
41,960; and Ghazni 27,084.
About 70 percent of the population is engaged in farming, the majority of this
group working as sharecroppers on extensive landholdings. Nearly 25 percent are
nomadic or semi-nomadic people who spend the fall and winter in the lower valleys
and plains, and in the spring move with their flocks to the high pasture lands. The
remaining 5 percent dwell in the larger towns where they are shopkeepers, traders, and
artisans. Dividing lines between these Principal groups are not hard and fast.
Settled farmers may also engage in herding, and nomads may have areas of settle-
ment where they sow crops. The present trend among the people is toward a more
sedentary life.
The population of Afghanistan is made up of a number of elements distinguish-
able from each other according to ethnic type, language spoken, Moslem sect, and
areas of settlement. These population elements may be grouped under the four major
classifications of Indo-Iranian, Turk, Mongol, and Indo-Aryan. Map, Figure II illus-
trates the areas of settlement of the four major groups and their important subdivisions,
their languages, and their sectarian affiliations. Certain minor classifications are
neither discussed in the text nor shown on the map which is intended to show at a
glance the probable ethnic group, language in current use, and sectarian belief of
any chosen point in the country. Some islands of settlement of ethnic groups within
the larger areas of other groups are not indicated nor can the communities of true
Afghans settled by the government in the northern part of the country be shown on
a map of this type. It should also be noted that boundary lines between ethnic groups
are not as sharp and precise as drawn on the map and that some areas may have a
mixture of as many as three ethnic groups.
The figures given in the following paragraphs are recent US estimates largely
based on earlier British sources and on a total population figure of 12,000,000. Some
US sources and certain foreign reports use lower figures. German figures for each
group are considerably lower and were based upon an estimated population of 8,000,000.
Soviet figures are also lower, being based upon an estimated population of 9,500,000.
* See Map, Figure III.
49 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
The four major classifications are as follows:
a. Inclo-Iranian.
(1) Afghans.
The Afghan tribes referred to in the body of the text as the true Afghans
include the Durani, the Ghilzai, and a number of smaller tribal groups. They speak
Pushtu, an East Iranian language, and belong to the Sunni sect of Islam, which is the
official religion of the country.
The Durani, numbering some 2,250,000, have three principal tribal di-
visions: the Popalzai, the Barakzai, and the Alizai. Most of the high officials of the
government are Duranis, and the reigning dynasty comes from the Mohammedzai clan
of the Barakzai. About three-quarters of this number are now settled in villages of
Kandahar Province along the valleys of the lower Helmand and its several tributaries.
They are well supplied with small arms and are of a war-like disposition.
The Ghilzai number some 1,880,000. This group presumably containing
Turkish and Persian elements, lacks the ethnic purity of the Durani. The Sulaiman
Khel clan is the predominant element of this tribe which occupies the area to the east
of the habitat of the Duranis. Two-thirds of the group are still nomadic; in cold
weather one-third of their number generally moves across the Gomal Pass on the
frontier of Pakistan to winter in the plains of the Indus valley. Like the Duranis,
they are well supplied with small arms and are of a war-like disposition.
Other Afghan tribes, along the eastern frontier of the country, number
some 1,140,000. At least seven of these tribes either live on the Afghan side of the
frontier, move back and forth across the border, or live in the North West Frontier
area of Pakistan. Within Pakistan, where these Afghans are known as Pathans, the
tribes number some 2,400,000. The demarcation of the frontier between Afghanistan
and India (1893-1903)?the so-called Durand Line?ran an artificial barrier through
these closely related tribes. The tribes, including the Afridi, Waziri, Shinwari, Orakzai,
Mohmand, Yusufzai, and Mahsud, are semi-nomadic; they are well armed and con-
stitute a turbulent element on both sides of the frontier.
(2) Tajik.
The Tajiks, numbering some 2,800,000, speak Persian, are of the Sunni
sect, and are of Iranian (Persian) stock. It is probable that this group lived in the
general region at a very early date. They are the most settled group in the country.
The majority of them are farmers although traders and artisans also come from this
group. They are an orderly element and make hardy soldiers. Their area of settle-
ment is a wide corridor running north from the Kabul valley to the Oxus River, and
beyond into Soviet territory where they live in considerable number.
(3) Iranian.
The area from the Afghan-Iranian frontier extending to some distance
east of Herat is occupied by Iranians. Their number may reach 400,000. They speak
Persian and are of the Shia sect. This group is sometimes lumped with the Tajiks
and sometimes called Herati, but these farming people are closely, related to their
SECRET 50
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
SECRET
neighbors across the frontier to the west. The region which they inhabit was a part
of Iran until the middle of the last century.
(4) Baluchi.
The Baluchi, numbering some 50,000, speak Baluchi and are Sunnis.
Herders in the lower Helmand valley and in Afghan Sistan, they are of the same stock
as the Baluchi resident in Iran and in former Baluchistan, now a part of Pakistan.
b. Turk.
(1) Uzbek.
The Uzbeks, numbering some 1,320,000, speak Turki and are of the Sunni
sect. Occupying territory south of the Oxus River, they are closely related to the
Uzbeks north of the river and within the USSR. Some 50,000 entered Afghanistan
from Russia after 1919, including the Amir of Bokhara who recently died at Kabul.
His son is resident at Kabul. The Uzbeks are farmers and herders, raising karakul
flocks, and are the best horse breeders of Afghanistan. They have no tribal organiza-
tion and are no longer a martial group.
(2) Turkomen.
Although specific figures are not available, the Turkomen probably number
at least 250,000. They speak Turki and are Sunnis. Their area within Afghanistan,
a strip along the northwestern frontier, is the continuation of a belt of Turkomen oc-
cupation which stretches west to the Caspian along the frontiers of Afghanistan, Iran
and the USSR. The Turkomen are nomadic, have a tribal organization, and are
engaged in flock? raising.
(3) Kirghiz.
The Kirghiz are herders living in the Wakhan tip of Afghanistan. Infor-
mation regarding this group is very scanty. The bulk of this group lives within the
USSR, with probably not more than a few hundred in Afghanistan.
. Mongol.
(1) Kazara.
The Hazars, numbering about 1,044,000, are of almost pure Mongolian
stock. They are descendants of people who settled areas left desolate by the armies of
Ghengiz Khan in the thirteenth century. They speak Persian and belong to the Shia
sect. They occupy the remote and little-explored mountainous region of central
Afghanistan. Semi-nomadic in habit, they engage in farming and herding. They
were disarmed by the central government in 1891, but are believed to have largely
re-armed themselves since that date.
(2) Chahar Aimak.
The Chahar Aimak (or "Four Tribes") who occupy the region of west
central Afghanistan, number some 480,000. These tribes are the Jamshedi, Firuzkuhi,
Taimani, and Timuri. They speak Turki and are Shias. Their way of life ranges
from semi-settled to settled.
51 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
cl. Dravidian.
(1) Kafir.
The Kafirs, or Nuri, number 132,000. Originally pagan tribes, they came
under the direct control of the Afghan Government in 1896, after which they were for-
mally converted to Islam. Their language is of the Dardic group of the Indic language:
Their area of occupation in eastern Afghanistan, above Jalalabad, some 5,000 square
miles, was formerly known as Kafiristan, but now bears the official name of Nuristan.
2. POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS.
Probably at least 90 percent of the entire population is illiterate. The government
has taken steps to alter this situation by systematizing the material taught in the
village schools by the mullahs, the Moslem clerics; by opening primary and secondary
schools in the larger towns; and by founding the University of Kabul, which includes
faculties for the study of law and medicine.
The position of women remains essentially as it has been for centuries. Veiled
and secluded, except among the nomadic tribes, they have gained none of the advantages
now enjoyed by their sisters in Moslem lands to the west of Afghanistan.
The general health of the Afghans is much better than would be expected in view
of the total lack of such sanitary measures as water purification, sewage disposal, food
inspection, and insect control. Statistics relative to morbidity and mortality do not
exist, but it is known that the principal types of illness and disease are diarrhea,
dysentery, tuberculosis, malaria, small-pox, and venereal diseases.
The Afghans are generally characterized as one of the most War-like and freedom-
loving people of Asia, but such a statement is too sweeping even if applied only to the
Durani, the Ghilzai, and the Afghan tribes of the Indian border. The groups of the
rest of the country are subject to the Afghans; they are of more pacific disposition
and have no inherent attachment to the country as a political entity.
The population lacks homogeneity. At best it is bound together by the true
Afghan tribes, by membership in the Moslem faith and by the will to resist foreign
incursions.
The absence of homogeneity and unity results in a lack of national patriotism.
The population diversity also hampers the execution of programs designed to increase
the national wealth or to industrialize the country. Among the upper, educated groups
.,which are anxious to modernize the country, the belief may prevail that a copying of
the industries and techniques of the West will transform the country. However, the
pace and demands of the industrialized West require the development of certain abilities
which are foreign to the Afghans. These include the capacity for sustained labor;
obedience to orders; obedience to an authority not immediately backed by force; habits
of punctuality; and collective responsibility and group cooperation. The traditional
way of life in Afghanistan may only be altered at a slow rate and then only if the
benefits of a new system permeate each small locality,
SECRET 52
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
1. Name:
Place of Birth:
? Date of Birth:
Lineage:
Family Status:
Education:
Languages:
Religion:
Present Position:
Career:
Character:
.2. Name:
Place of Birth:
Date of Birth:
Lineage:
Family Status:
Education:
Languages:
Religion:
SECRET.
APPENDIX D
SIGNIFICANT BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
H. M. Mohammad Zahir Shah.
Kabul.
15 October 1914.
Son of late King Mohammad Nadir Shah.
Married to a cousin, Princess Umaira, in 1931. Four living
children. The Crown Prince, Ahmad Shah, is 13 years old.
Graduate of Habibiya High School, Kabul, 1920-23; attended
Estacilal College, Kabul, 1924; attended Lycee Janson de Sailly
Pasteur; College Montpellier, 1924-30; graduate of Infantry
Officer's School, Kabul, 1931.
Speaks and reads French, understands and reads English.
Sunni Moslem.
Since 8 November 1933, King of Afghanistan.
Served as Assistant Minister of War in 1932 and as Acting Min-
ister of Education in 1933. Since becoming King has con-
tinued policies of Nadir Shah, aided and directed by members
of the royal family, notably his mother and the brothers of
Nadir Shah. Displays serious and intelligent interest in the
problems of the country. In 1946 and 1948 toured northern
Afghanistan.
Has dignity, charm, and an easy, assured manner. Possesses
a sense of humor, is in good health and enjoys sports. Inter-
ested in the discussion of serious subjects and especially con-
cerned with administration, aviation, and the modernization of
Afghanistan. Private life led in frugal fashion without scan-
dal. Reputedly pro-American. Is reserved toward British and
said to be anti-Indian and anti-Soviet.
H. R. H. Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan.
Unknown.
1884.
Son of late Mohammad Yusuf Khan. Brother of late King
Nadir Shah, of late Mohammad Aziz Khan, of Sardar Shah
Mahmud Khan, and of Sadar Shah Wali Khan. Uncle of King
Zahir.
Not married.
In France.
Speaks English, Hindustani, some French.
Sunni Moslem.
53 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
Present Position:
Career:
Character:
3. Name:
Place of Birth:
Date of Birth:
Lineage:
Family Status:
Education:
Languages:
Religion:
Present Position:
Career:
Character:
4. Name:
Place of Birth:
SECRET
Retired from official life May 1946. Continues to
most powerful figures in Afghanistan.
Military Governor of Herat
Commander of Royal Guard
Lt. General and Army Commander
Governor of Jalalabad
Minister of War, Commander in Chief of Army
Minister to USSR
Exile in France
be one of the
1916
1917
1917-1919
1919-1921
1921-1923
1924-1926
1926-1929
Returned to help overthrow Amanullah and Bacha-i-Saqao.
Prime Minister and Minister of Interior 1929. Prime Minister
to May 1946.
Hard-working, efficient administrator. Has dignity, sense of
humor, and charming manners. Simple personal life. Neu-
tral attitude toward most foreign powers, but has distinct ad-
miration for the US.
H. R. H. Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan.
Dehra Dun, India.
1888.
Youngest son of Mohammad Yusuf Khan, brother of late King
Nadir Shah, brother of late Mohammad Aziz Khan, of Sardar
Mohammad Hashim Khan, and of Sardar Shah Wali Khan,
uncle of King Zahir.
Married in 1920: several children.
Habibiya College, Kabul.
Speaks English fairly well.
Sunni Moslem.
Since May 1946 Prime Minister, while retaining previous post
of Commander-in-Chief of the Afghan Army.
Began military career in 1908. Named General in 1917. Com-
manded troops in Third Afghan-British War in 1919. Between
1919 and 1928 held various high administrative and military
posts. In 1929 helped Nadir Shah restore order throughout
Afghanistan and was named Minister of War and Commander-
in-Chief of the Afghan Army. Was instrumental in installing
young Zahir on the throne in 1933.
Quiet, unassuming, unaffected, enjoys wide popularity among
all classes of people. More tolerant than preceding Prime Min-
ister. Expected to broaden reform and modernization pro-
gram. Considered pro-US. Son studying at Harvard Uni-
versity. Friendly to British.
R. HI Sardar Shah Wall Khan.
Kabul.
54
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
Date of Birth:
Lineage:
Family Status:
Education:
Languages:
Religion:
Present Position:
Career:
Character:
5. Name:
Place of Birth:
Date of Birth:
Lineage:
Family Status:
Education:-
Languages:
Religion:
Present Position:
Career:
SECRET
Date of birth variously given 1881, 1884, 1888, and 1892.
Son of Mohammad Yusuf, brother of late King Nadir Shah,
full brother of Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan, and half brother
of Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan.
Married in 1920, 4 or 5 children. Wife, a full sister of ex-King
Amanullah, has not been in Afghanistan since 1929.
Kabul and India. In 1926 travel and study in France.
Fluent French, speaks some English.
Sunni Moslem.
Ambassador to Pakistan since March 1948.
In 1929 commanded forces which recaptured Kabul from rebels.
Minister to Britain 1929-30. Minister to France and concur-
rently to Switzerland 1931 to 1947. Acting Prime Minister and
Acting Minister of War 1936-37. Acting Prime Minister and
Acting Minister of Public Works 1947-48. Has military title of
Marshal.
Cultured, intelligent diplomat of high integrity with adminis-
trative ability. One of the most able men in the "inner circle."
May not be interested in active career in Afghanistan because
of his wife's apparent unwillingness to return to Afghanistan.
Reported pro-British and pro-American. Highly esteemed per-
sonal friend of the late 'Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah.
H. R. H. Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan.
Kabul.
1909.
The eldest son of Sardar Mohammad Aziz Khan, a brother of
King Nadir Shah, and hence a cousin of King Zahir. A
brother, Sardar Mohammad Naim Khan, is currently Ambas-
sador designate to the US.
Married a sister of King Zahir in 1934.
Amaniya College, Kabul. Then spent nine years in France,
returning in 1930. Attended Infantry Officer's School, Kabul,
1930-32.
Speaks French well, and some English.
Sunni Moslem.
Since May 1948 Minister to Paris, Brussels, and Berne. Has
military rank of Lt. General.
In 1932 named Major-General. In 1932-33 Commanding Gen-
eral and Governor of Eastern Province. In 1935 Commanding
General and Governor of Kandahar and Commanding General
of Farah. In 1938 Governor of Eastern Provinces. In 1938
Commandant of the Kabul Military Schools. From 1936 until
55 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
Character:
6. Name:
Place of Birth:
Date of Birth:
Lineage:
Family Status:
Education:
Languages:
Religion:
Present Position:
Career:
Character:
7. Name:
Place of Birth:
SECRET
1946 Commanding General of Central Army Corps, Kabul. In
1945 commanded the campaign against the Safi tribe in the
Kunar valley area. From May 1946 to May 1948 Minister of
War with Military rank of Lt. General. Has been a favorite of
his uncle, and former Prime Minister Sardar Mohammad
Hashim Khan. A strong advocate of modernization of the
army and of the firm use of the army against unruly tribal
elements. His tribal policy has brought on friction with the
present Prime Minister, and may have resulted in his current
assignment.
Strong personality, very energetic, nationalistic, determined,
but tactless. Most interested in progressive program. In early
assignments proved to be headstrong and hasty, bringing on
mistrust of population groups. Under guidance of his uncles
may become a competent administrator. Admired German
war machine, and was considered pro-German.
H. R. H. Sardar Mohammad Naim Khan.
Unknown.
1910 or 1911.
Son of Sardar Mohammad Aziz Khan, a brother of King Nadir
Shah, and hence cousin of King Zahir. A brother, Sardar
Mohammad Daud Khan, is currently Minister to France.
Married sister of King Zahir Shah in 1934.
In France.
Speaks French fluently, and some English.
Sunni Moslem.
Since March 1948, Ambassador designate to US. 'Expected in
Washington in early fall of 1948.
In 1930 Secretary in the Afghan Foreign Office. In 1932 Min-
ister to Italy; 1934 First Assistant Foreign Office; 1935-1936
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs; 1937 Acting Minister of Edu-
cation; 1939 Deputy Prime Minister; 1941 Assistant Prime Min-
ister and Minister of Education; Minister to UK, July 1946 to
March 1948.
Intelligent, tactful, well mannered. Interested in promoting
modernization and progress in Afghanistan. Probably one of
the future leaders. Was impressed by German war successes,
but also considered variously pro-French and pro-British.
Currently
interested in the employment of US teachers; also considered
pro-US.
Mohammad Omar Khan.
Unknown.
56
?
?
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
Date of Birth:
Lineage:
Education:
Languages:
Religion:
Present Position:
Career:
Character:
8. Name:
Place of Birth:
Date of Birth:
Lineage:
Family Status:
? Education:
Languages:
Religion:
Present Position:
Career:
Character:
SECRET
1898.
Family with military tradition.
Habibiya and Military College, Kabul.
Speaks English, French, Russian, and German fluently, possibly
also Italian.
Moslem.
Since 28 July 1948, Minister of War.
Regular Army Officer. Military Attache to Rome and Berlin.
Chief of Military Mission to Moscow 1926. Attended Confer-
ences in Geneva 1932, 1934, and 1935. Chief of Staff 1934-1946.
In May 1946 Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Afghan Army
but resigned almost immediately because he did not wish to be
subordinated to Lt. General Mohammad Daud Khan. June
1946 to July 1948 Private Secretary to the King with military
rank of Lt. General.
Keen, intelligent officer without much experience with troops
but with considerable experience in international relations and
in domestic politics. His present assignment places him in a
strategic position where he can help strengthen the authority
of the central government in its relations with the tribes.
Seems friendly to the US.
Sardar Asadullah Khan.
Unknown.
1911.
Son of late Amir Habibullah and Ulya Janab, sister of the late
King Nadir Shah. He is thus half brother of the exiled Aman-
ullah and cousin of the present King.
Married, several children.
Infantry Officer's School, Kabul, 1931.
Speaks French fluently, English poorly.
Sunni Moslem.
Since 31 July 1948, Assistant Prime Minister and Minister of
Interior.
Imprisoned by Bacha-i-Saqao in 1929. Regular army officer
career since 1930. Represented King Zahir Shah at coronation
of British King in London in 1937. Appointed Chief of General
Staff with rank of Lt. General, November 1946. Acting Minis-
ter of War, May to July 1948.
Intelligent, good-looking, friendly. Interested in history and
archaeology of Afghanistan; is also an amateur photographer
and likes sports. Has social and political importance because
of his lineage and is trusted by the present regime.
57 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
9. Name:
Place of Birth:
Date of Birth:
Lineage:
Family Status:
Education:
Languages:
Religion:
Present Position:
Career:
Character:
10. Name:
Place of Birth:
Date of Birth:
Lineage:
Family Status:
Education:
Languages:
Religion:
Present Position:
Career: '
EQ._13,E117
Abdul Majid Khan.
Herat.
1901.
Tajik.
Wife of German-Russian stock; four children. Two sons cur-
rently in the US.
Probably no formal education.
Speaks fluent German and Russian.
Unknown.
Since September 1938 Minister of National Economy. Cur-
rently also President of the National Bank of Afghanistan and
Governor of the Bank of Afghanistan.
Originally a small-scale merchant at Herat. Worked in Herat
customs office. About 1920 went to Moscow and remained ten
years; was engaged in trade. About 1930 in Berlin. In 1933
called back to Kabul, directed by Afghan Government to organ-
ize Ashami Company, first effort to foster economic and indus-
trial development in country. Broke the virtual monopoly
which Indian merchants had in Afghanistan. In 1936 in Mos-
cow and concluded commercial agreement with USSR. Went
on to Germany and arranged agreement for arms and for tech-
nical assistance. Was personally responsible for pre-World
War II influx of German technicians into Afghanistan. In
1945 and again in the summer of 1948 visited the US.
Clever, astute businessman and administrator. Locally con-
sidered to be a financial wizard. Questionable whether per-
sonal ambition or desire to aid country strongest motives for his
activity. Has been considered a Germanophile and pro-Soviet,
but currently seems to be anti-Soviet and strongly nationalistic.
Has been anti-Indian on basis of economic policies. Currently
cordial to the US.
Najibullah Khan (Torwayana).
Afghanistan.
About 1914.
A cousin of ex-King Amanullah.
Unknown.
Estaglal College, Kabul.
Speaks and reads French, speaks English.
Sunni Moslem.
Since May 1946, Acting Minister of Education.
In 1933 entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1938 named
Director of Political Affairs in the Ministry. In 1939 Acting
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Has enjoyed the confidence of
58
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
Character:
11. Name:
Place of Birth:
Date of Birth:
Lineage:
Family Status:
Education:
Lineage:
Religion:
Present Position:
Career:
Character:
12. Name:
Place of Birth:
Date of Birth:
Lineage:
Family Status:
Education:
Languages:
Religion:
SECRET
King Zahir, of former Prime Minister Sardar Mohammad
Hashim Khan, and of the present Prime Minister. Repre-
sented Afghanistan in the USSR in a geographical conference
and at Cairo, in a regional civil air conference.
Very intelligent, excellent administrator. Despi'S TAT
his relationship to Amanullah, he appears loyal to the present
regime, is trusted by them, and is often consulted by high
Afghan officials and foreign diplomats. During World War II
displayed pro-Axis tendencies. Considered anti-British. Pro-
fesses to be pro-American and has expressed determination to
modernize Afghan educational system along US lines.
Mohammad Kabir Khan (Ludin) .
Unknown.
About 1898.
Afghan tribe.
Married, three children.
Habibiya College, Kabul. In 1931 matriculated at Cornell Uni-
versity and was graduated in civil engineering.
Reads and speaks English fluently.
Sunni Moslem.
Since 1946, Minister of Public Works.
After graduation from Cornell worked with the US Bureau of
Reclamation. In 1940 returned to Kabul and took post as engi-
neer in Ministry of Public Works. Advanced rapidly, becoming
head of Department of Irrigation, later Acting Minister. Has
headed special Afghan missions and is one of principal figures
in the planning of the economic development program.
Greatly interested in pushing the work of Morrison-
Knudsen-Afghanistan. Has been in US from late 1947 to April
1948, consulting on Helmand River problem, on loan to Afghan-
istan, and Morrison-Knudsen-Afghanistan business.
Able, careful career man, not a politician. Strongly pro-US and
anti-Soviet.
Sardar Abdul Hosayn Aziz.
Iran.
2 May 1896.
Unknown.
Married; children.
Habibiya College, Kabul, and at Tehran.
Speaks English and a little French.
Sunni Moslem.
Present Position: Ambassador designate to India.
59 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
Career:
Character:
13. Name:
Place of Birth:
Date of Birth:
Lineage:
Family Status:
Education:
Languages:
Religion:
Present Position:
Career:
Character:
SECRET
1919, First Secretary, later Consul, at Afghan Legation in Iran.
1922, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kabul. 1923, Consul General,
India. 1929, Minister to Italy. 1931-32, Afghan delegate to
Geneva Disarmament Conference. Observer at Narcotic Drug
Conference. 1933-38, Ambassador to the USSR. 1938-40, Min-
ister of Public Works. 1941-43, Minister of Posts, Telegraphs,
and Telephones. 1943?April 1948, Minister to the US. Also
Delegate to the UN.
Bluff, meticulous, careful, well-informed diplomat. Individ-
ualistic and extremely nationalistic. Reported at one time as
pro-Amanullah, anti-Pakistan, anti-British, strongly anti-
USSR.
Ali Mohammad Khan.
Unknown.
About 1895.
Uzbek or Tajik from Badakhshan.
No report.
Not known, but apparently good.
Speaks English fluently.
Moslem. is
Since October 1938 has been Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Assistant in Ministry of Education 1923. Undersecretary of
Education 1925. Minister to Italy 1927. Minister of Com-
merce 1928. Accompanied Amanullah to London 1928. Min-
ister of Education 1929. Minister to the UK 1933. Delegate
to League of Nations 1935-1936.
Intelligent, cultured, charming personality. Calm-tempered.
Considered pro-American and pro-British.
00
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
1907
31 August
1919
20 February
May ? August
8 August
1921
28 February
22 November
1922
22 April
1926
31 August
1928
Fall
1929
14 January
16 November
1931
24 June
1932
1933
8 November
1935
4 May
1936
29 March
SECRET
APPENDIX E
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
The Anglo-Russian Convention places Afghanistan outside the
sphere of Rusian influence.
Amir Habibullah is assassinated. Succeeded by Amanullah
Khan.
The Third Afghan-British war.
The Treaty of Rawalpindi closes the brief term of hostilities.
Treaty of Friendship between Afghanistan and the USSR followed
by the establishment of a Soviet Legation at Kabul.
Treaty of Friendship between Afghanistan and Great Britain.
Official relations established between Afghanistan and France.
Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression between Afghanistan
and the USSR.
Revolt against the regime of King Amanullah.
Abdication of King Amanullah.
Nadir Shah becomes King of Afghanistan. Mohammad Hashim
Khan is named Prime Minister.
Expanded version of the 1926 Treaty of Neutrality and Non-
Aggression between Afghanistan and the USSR.
Creation of the University of Kabul.
Nadir Shah is assassinated. Succeeded by Mohammad Zahir
Shah.
First licensed monopoly companies established by the Afghan Na-
tional Bank.
Diplomatic relations established between Afghanistan and the US.
Afghanistan and the USSR sign a protocol providing for auto-
matic annual extension of the 1931 Treaty.
61 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
1937
Spring
8 July
1938
June
1940
23 July
1941
October
1942
6 June
1943
4 June
1946
21 April
June
13 June
19 November
1947
13 April
26 April
13 June
4 July
10 July
August - September
30 September
5 November
December
? 1948
Winter - Spring
March
SECRET.
Afghanistan grants a 60-year petroleum concession to the Inland
Exploration Company.
Afghanistan joins Iran, Iraq, and Turkey in signing the Saadabad
Pact.
The Inland Exploration Company surrenders its concession.
Trade Agreement between Afghanistan and the USSR.
Axis nationals expelled from Afghanistan.
US Legation opened at Kabul.
First Afghan Minister assumes post in US.
Mohammad Hashim Khan resigns as Prime Minister after 19 years
in the post. Succeeded by Shah Mahmud Khan.
Morrison-Knudsen-Afghanistan personnel arrives in Afghanistan
to begin work on $17,400,000 contract.
Afghanistan and USSR agree to carry out demarcation of frontier.
Afghanistan becomes a member of the UN.
Agreement on wireless communications signed by Afghanistan
and the USSR.
An Afghan group meets Soviet officials at Tashkent to discuss the
demarcation of the frontier.
An Afghan note to the UK urges that the referendum announced
for July in the North West Frontier Province not only give the
people of the area the choice of joining India or Pakistan but also
of joining Afghanistan Or becoming independent.
The UK refuses the request of the Afghan note.
A second Afghan note to the UK on this subject.
Prime Minister Shah Mahmud -Khan-visits England and the US.
Afghanistan casts the sole vote against the admission of Pakistan
to the UN. Later it reverses this vote.
Afghanistan and the USSR sign a one-year Commercial Agree-
ment.
Afghanistan and India agree to exchange ambassadors.
Minister of National Economy Ludin visits the US.
Afghanistan and Pakistan agree to exchange ambassadors.
62
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
?
?
March
August
SECRET
Afghanistan and US announce that their legations at Washington
and Kabul will be raised to embassies. Afghanistan and the UK
likewise agree to raise legations to embassies.
Afghanistan and the USSR sign a second one-year Commercial
Agreement.
63 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
SECRET
?
APPENDIX F
IMPORTANT AFGHAN OFFICIALS
Chief of State
Prime Minister
Minister of War
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of the Interior and
Assistant Prime Minister
Minister of Justice
Minister of Finance
Minister of Education (Acting)
Minister of National Economy
Minister of Public Health
Minister of Public Works
Minister of Posts and Telegraph
Minister of Mines (Acting)
Minister of State without Portfolio
Minister of Court
Director General of Agriculture
Director General of Publicity
President of the National Assembly
President of the Senate
H. M. Mohammad Zahir Shah
H. R. H. Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan
H. E. Mohammad Omar Khan
H. E. Ali Mohammad Khan
H. R. H. Sardar Asadullah Khan
H. E. Mir Atta Mohammad Khan Hoseyni
H. E. Mohammad Nowruz Khan
H. E. Najibullah Khan (Torwayana)
H. E. Abdul Majid Khan
Dr. Abdul Majid
H. E. Mohammad Kabir Khan (Ludin)
H. E. Abdullah Khan
H. E. Sardar Gholam Mohammad Khan
H. E. Mirza Mohammad Khan
Sardar Ahmad Shah Khan
H. E. Mohammad Atiq Khan Rafiq
H. E. Salaheddin Khan
Sultan Ahmad Khan
H. E. Fazal Ahmad Khan Mojaddidi
65 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
PROVISIONAL
RESTRICTED
Figure 11
10945
63
66
69
72
NOTE:. Spelling of place names for all areas except the U.S.S.R.
was taken from Survey of India ,i,000,000) sheets.
2. The international boundaries shown on this map do not
necessarily correspond in all cases to the boundaries recognized
birth U. S. Government.
BASE: AAF AERONAUTICAL CHARTS 11,000,000 _
(sheets covering area of map), Army Map Service, 1945-48.
Bukhara
39
Chardzhou
Tedzhen
Serakhs
P'r
UNDEMARCA TED
ach Post
AFGHANISTAN
ETHNIC, LINGUISTIC
AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS
Fort Sandeman
SETTLED
Quetta
ETHNIC
INDO-IRANIAN
Afghan
Iranian
I
GROUPS
TURKIC
Uzbek
Turkomen
Tajik WWI Kirghiz
Baluchi MONGOL
INDO-ARYAN j Hazara
Kafir 'Mil Chahar Aimak
LINGUISTIC GROUPS RELIGIOUS GROUPS
Pushtu
Persian
Turki
Li Other 2
'Sunni Moslem
Shia Moslem
Selected Route
Connecting Route
Railroad
Scale 1:3,500,00,0
50 100 150
Miles
V 100 150
=N
Kilometers
RESTRICTED
10945 Map Branch, CIA, 7-48
.111111110111?11M011111?11111?1
U.S. GPO-S
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
PROVISIONAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
RESTRICTED
Figure III
.......-
66 69 72
Ei t Spielling'ofpLc'e n 'eines' fc, all :4rsea's exce th 'U.S.S.R.s BukharaW
olntein frcirii... utveraf,,Idia'fiti,o'c?0,600), shets. ,- -
,,The'iiiiejnIioiial brijndarieisho'wn5,6
'ases, tO- the ounaries reco n d
eX'sarily cditespahd in all c bd
V the U S Goveiiiir)ent" .: ,i,,--i,'-1,... ? ', - ' -
'
. 1
Kag ,
tnirkand - .....
- - .

39
, , ? ,-- - ,- .,:. ,;,- - ,,, .1.. .',..,1',A,--.= -,=, ,,,,',.
tSE?A,;,,IF'til.ERO.h/AUTI'CAL CHARTS i'tt,000,00,0 _, .,-,
(sheets_o9Vorin aiea`isT thaja), ATV, yap Servige,,T9457
, . - ,
Chardzhdu
. .
,' Pendzhikertt - . ?
i '
Kit ab
. arm ii
0 zero , , ,..?
0111,K 1
39
.,
Ka 1
., . - ..
liriabaCI afirnigan, .
Gu a
? ?
.1 ,
-,/
k'
?
---..
s
,',KalaiI-1..thullY
-- ' ?
i.?t,,V
63 ? 66 69 72
10946 Map Branch, CIA, 7-48
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
U.S. GPO-S
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Figure" IV
PROVISIONAL
SECRET
10947
NOTE: i.Spehiog 1pIace nam'eS for all a'reisi !jeeps' the
ah. taken from Survey-o( India (1 tr,000:000), sheets.
2. The internatiOnal bo'undaries Shown on this rhip-do not ..
, , ,
ecessarily reSpOlIU In all CaSeS ie. the boundaries reo4nized
Chaidihou
Langer
ab Cha kar
AFGHANISTAN
MINERAL RESOURCES
Selected Route
Connecting Route
Railroad
10947 Map Branch, CIA, 7-48
U.S. GPO-S
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600100001-2
PROVISIONAL
Figure V
,
66 69 72
E Spellin Of Olade rn?ine for' 011'a*re.is exc t ti?: (J,...S.R.
taken' Iron; Survey It ?.' '
khara
'
of India :i,006,620) sneretsf . . .
ii:tanyt. t erna t i ponozdd b o r I _ 6. al, 0
t
'Les n inunfiYaressessO w 't'll: L d 'i.idr:ries recZn1;eci '
::bey 'the P, Sc.?COoyernrnent.
'AER&IAU.TICAI:.0-1A-kT
K ga
Sahiarkahd
_
? -.''
.
39
BASE: AAF 000 000 ',.
??,- :..Isheets Coverin4 area' of niap), Army Map Seryice, 0.4574
rdzho
Nu 1.....
-:-,
Pendzhik.ent .,
k1tab 44
arm
Kers,Kul,

Kar
h
S ?riabad
-Qui
.,.
Kaknigan
..?.???-?
?
Kala47Kt.lti.
%
-
/ rki
.?
-----7?, :At,
,,,,,,,,,,
?
---' ;---4?1;:,-rs.- ? .7; r,,,?4i ..: ? ;' 2 - I
'V -;!? ?''''' ..- '
? Tedzhen
ozhtlikur
- ,
, : -.
.'Ss:s
.
\
Khan .-..-;??? \ .e7s,
\s N
, \ '.,.
'
?-..?.?..:
? Se kh
.
?
,
Shibaigh
(,
:,...:,,...,..,i,:v.,?
- ,.
y'laidzh
.
lkh -1-T4Ihkurgh
. ?
azar.1Shai, f
. r. ,. .,
., 13
I,
413.4.::,
\ ' \ \\,, \ .ps..S C ':.6.' \\,/ 4
, h ?s wry N'
? i'l
\\\\\ l?.' \
\-.\? A, ,- il. ' '
s \ \ , ,....: _
I. ' \ Do'nili,P,ass
'
1 ra
--? . ' -------r-
,-- .
7??????,......./., 'sr,
s.?
,
36
? _ - ,-,,:_,,,?::?;?,'?t'?,-,7.-':A,,,47-,1:-: -k'',,,. ': .7.:: -rr :?:?4 ": ": tin ?
u
\ \
, , :
, .. . ..
Za1' \ ??`, 7\,,,,,,, ,,,,, 1/4\
N ? 'q k ')
:.\\
"
*
\ \ \ \ ,.' fi:`?.--c-k.k .... i'':-..,, .',Ar'y
`4'4.0-`?;,
777?77'7.7??:.k.
c''7Cli?I'.
1
B,ala Murgh b
\ \. ,