WEEKLY SUMMARY #2

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002000020001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 28, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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WEEKLY SUMMARY
Number 2
Document No. 0
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Date: ji
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance with applicable security regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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C 0 ENTS
WESTERN EUROPL
F ASTERN EUROPE
FEAR EAST-ARICA
AR EAST
7
14
WBSTERN ENTISPBERE
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28 May /948
HIGHLIGHTS
The efforts of the western powers to resolve their
developing differences this week assumed greater prominence
than the continuing struggle between the East and the West.
French concern over the strategic and domestic implications
that will inevitably ac'company a decision to carry out the US -
UK proposals for a provisional government in western Germany
continued to complicate negotiations between US, UK, and French
representatives in London. Divergent views regarding a resolu-
tion of the Palestine issue have put a strain on US-UK solidarity.
Soviet propaganda has been making considerable capital of these
differences.
Worried over possible Soviet military counteraction
following the establishment of a German provisional government
for the Western Zones and deeply concerned that the French
people would search any agreement on Germany for a possible
compromise of French long-range security aims, the French
Government has maintained its pressure for concrete US mili-
tary guarantees. It appears inevitable, however, that France
must eventually modify its stand, even at the risk of parlia-
mentary criticism, lest the advantages of close working re-
lationships with the US and UK should be sacrificed. Elsewhere
In western Europe, the British Labor Party has given overwhelm-
ing approval to BevinIs foreign policy; in Italy, the outlook for
political stability was considerably improved by the successful
reorganization of the De Gasperi Cabinet (see page 3).
The USSR, which appears to be intensifying its efforts
to persuade the Germans to demand the withdrawal of all occupa-
tion forces, has been challenged in Berlin by anti-Communist
German trade union leaders (see page 6).
Meanwhile the Kremlin has been pursuing its propaganda
"peace offensive' by playing up the differences between the west-
ern powers. Simultaneously, Soviet propagandists have been
minimizing any implied threats of political or military aggression
in an apparent effort to conciliate the western people and win sup-
port for economic concessions to the USSR (see page 7). The non-
Communists in Finland are offering strong opposition to Communist
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SPAIN
plans to renevthis policy of using the Falange as a "front".
for a controlled social reform program designed to make his
regime "popular." 7..e apparently intends also to correlate
Falange social-economic policy with-church doctrine, in an
effort to head of an opposition movement under Catholic .
Action leaders., These Catholic leaders, whb desire social
reform along the lines of\Papal- doctrine and who oppose the
.radical and totalitarian theories of the Faiange; at one time
appeared to be gaining considerable influence with Franco but
lacked the strength to force a showdown with the E'alange.
France's new program, therefore, may cause a realignment
of the conservatives and produce a new conservatiVe effort -
against the regime.
UNITED KINGDOM
.Theesejidarifer of the British Labor Party in backing
its moderate and right-wing, leaders was clearly indicated at
the rem t annual Party conference. This solidarity springs
from recognition?on the part of the Labor .membership of such
considerations as the following: (1) British GeOfflOrilie .dependence
on the US, p 'rticularly emphasized by continued Soviet intransi-
gence; (2) the continuing threat of national economic disaster;
and, (3) the increasingly 'unfavorable electoral prospects.- for
1950. -These diminished prospects are largely responsible for
Herbert Morrison's declaration that, following its return to
'power in 1950, the Party will place the greatest emphasis upon
increasing the efficiency of 'industries already nationalized.
The .over helming approval of Bellies forei- policy by a
record v te at the receot Labor Party conference provides the
clearest .evidence of the left-wing "rebe' grads disintegration.
, British Commonwealth ego of the
southwest Pacific will be Made more effective by a. plan to ex-
change representatives from the defel se ministries and national
defense councils Of the UK, New Zealand, and Australia. :The:new
plan does not compromise the autonomy of the three Common-
we Ith countries. because ultimate decisions o defense matters
must still be made by the governments co cern
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WORWA Y
1311.21L214211101101111.S210211.221a1l,Sallatt In
their attitude toward a western European defense system. Novvay
Ma se4pted waiting tactics, hoping that Denmark will eventually
join in persuading Sweden to abandon its pion for Scandinavian
seutrality and thus continue a coordinated Scandinavian attitude.
The Danes, meanwhile, are reluctant to break with Sweden, hoping
that alter the election in September Sweden may relax its rigid
neutrality policy. The Norwegians have made it clear, however,
that if a crisis arises they will join the western European union
withott regard for the attitude of Sweden or Denmark. Except
in such a crisis, however, neither Norway nor Denmark would
join until they are offered tangible security benefits.
GERMANY
The long expected defection of the anti-Communist element
in the Communist-controlled Free German 'Mgistriioirr----"--"".eague
(FDGB) of the city of Berlin transpired on 22 May. Led by the
Berlin Social Democrats, the independent Trade Union Opposition
(UGO) challenged Communist control at a city-wide meeting con-
vened to elect members of the Executive Board and prevented
Communist acquisition of 100 disputed convention seats. UGO
leaders declared their intention to form an independent union repre-
senting a majority of the city's organised workers. They offered
to avoid splitting the Berlin trade union movement in return for
? terms allowing UGO to participate on an equal basis with the
FDGB. The singular unwillingnens of the Communist-FDGB fac-
tion to offer an acceptable compromise may have resulted from
? an underestimation of the intention of the anti-Communist UGO
to exploit its power or may reflect unoffieial Soviet assurances
that the western powers would soon leave Berlin. In any case an
anti-Communist labor movement will be of Take to the western
powers in the east-west struggle for Berlin.
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EJ STERN EUROPE
SOVIET UNION
The current Kremlin eace offensive" may be. moti-
vated nOt only by the political objective of reducing western
solidarity and determination but also by the economic necessity
confronting the USSR for increasing east-west trade. Initially,
the Kremlin, in seeking to wreck the European recovery program,
forbade Soviet and Satellite participation in the program. Now,
faced Nvith the prospect of western European recovery and the
pressing economic needs of the Soviet sphere, the Kremlin
must seek an economic rapprochement of some form with the '
west. The realization that further political aggression at this
time woul; only increase resistance on all fronts probably
contributed to the decision to make this shift in Soviet tactics.
This change in tactics explains in part the wide exploitation by
the USSR of the Smith-Molotov exchange since only through an
easing of the present political tension can economic cooperation
be achieved. This may also help explain the occasional concilia-
tory gestures of certain Soviet officials in recent dealings with
ester representatives.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
the.,Sasanslayalt Communists appear to be preparing
to oust President Benes if he should refuse to sign the new
constitution. Although useful to the Communists during the ,
initial period of consolidation following the coup, the ailing
enes could now be? carded without endangering the posi:tion
a the Communist Government, Continued refusal by enes
to sign the new constitution, therefore, will probably prompt
the Communists to announce BenesP resignation for reasons of _
health. Under such circu stances, or in event of his death,
the executive power would revert to the Communist-controlled
Cabinet until the new National, Assembly could elect a successor
following the 30 May elections.
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YUCOCLAVIA
'atnd US measures whist 'ivaosits_v
son-diplomatic establishments in the US have quieted Yugoslav
protests about tkie size of the US Consulate staff in Zugrev.
in its rept,/ to the US, the Yugoslav Government ineiclted thrt
it casidered the matter clvseti and that measures would h.,
takes to ease the dilEcitities nwzxperienced by US consulate
per sonnei.
WJt)jinsh to obtain their
demands during the recent crisis resulting from the dismissal
of Communist Minister of Interior Leino reflects the growing
strength of the Finnish non-Conummists. This failure has
also seriously weakened the Conummistss ability to penetrate
the Government. The appointment of a leading Finnish Com-
munist as Minister-rithout-portfolio in no way compensated
the Communists for the loss of the vital Interior post, and did
not change the relative strength of Communists and non-Cave-
rns:Mats in the Cabinet. ? Failure of the Communist strike cam-
paign during the recent crisis also indicates that the Iirudsh
Corrununist party is not yet strong enough to make use of
typical Communist pressure tnctics in the July national elec-
tions. Increased opposition to the Communists may have
resulted from the non-Communists belief that the current
Kremlin "peace offensives' rouki deter the USSR from the
drastic overt intervention necessary for a Communist victory
In the national elections.
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MILI I AKY I UA I ION - 25 MAY 1948
CONFIDENTIAL
PALESTINE
Border of Jewish held area
as+ Jewish attack
/ Arab troop concentration
Arab troop movement
British evacuation area
Partition Boundary las accepted by the United
Nations General Assembly, Nov, 19471
International Boundary
---??????? District Boundary
Standard Gauge Railroad RINI
Narrow Gauge Railroad (35141
First Class Road
Second Class Road
Oil Pipe Line
Intermittent Stream
Jewish Communal Area
10 20
30 Mlles
30 Kilometer
35.
En Nagura
Res en Name.
aseary
Ii
0
-1"??;
iLEI71 NESE
N, TROOPS
(2,000) 1'Na
flint Jubeir',/-- 4:
1 i
Rama
.13inva
GAL IL
HAIFA
LAKE
TINGRIAS
d)
Nazar
.SYRIAN
FORCES
3,4 go
ORCES
Natan
Tuft(
Nur as
-\.5hams
Lc
JE4SH
A ?
10 0*
JON
?
Jerich
TY OF JERU
-14
GION
?Sr
,
Masmiya,
?F?:.--/ Solomon'sP
? Cs iERU
yeit
.?RCES
EGYPTIAN F
(8,000)
A SA 2tg
(3,000
em \
Hebron
E"'4<
\
11_4"
A
Sources: i
fes1emes, 11500.000. Geo. Philip and Son. 1942
So.,' a Pd... /........A 1:500,000, 1939
Os ? , 150.000. M.O.R. 1509/12375, 1946
40 \
Beersh
34.37
JEWISH
35.
SO,
10984 MAP Branch, CIA,4.48. 5-48
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NEAR EAST s AFRICA
P ALESTINE
. There,lit,2111z2L111qt.cii jams. in -the militarzamtiant in ?
Palestine since last week. In the crucial battle, for Jerusalem,
the Arab Legion has 'captured most 'of the Old City and is currently
exerting great pressure on the remaining Jewish forces. In the
New City, where the main igagana forces are strooly entrenched,
the Arab Legion is pressing the attack from all sides and has suc-
ceeded in cutting the supply road to Tel Aviv, which is blocked at
Bab el Wad and at .Latrum ley another Arab force. Egyptian troops
?
have, advanced northward slightly beyond Majdal on the coast;
another Egyptian force has p2,ssed north through Ilebron and has
reportedly linked up with the Arab Legion beyond Bethlehem. ?
Other than these advances by Transjordan and Egypt, Arab forces
have accomplished little. Iraqi and Syrian troops appear unable
to advance beyond the southern tip of Lake Tiberias. Lebanese
trpops are on the frontier and seem in no hurry to take the of-
fensive. Saudi Arabia :has sent only token troops to join the
Egyptian forces,
Jerusalem remains thsiekey to the situation for both skies.
Unless lia.gana can hold the Jewish sections of the city and siMul- ?
'taneasSiy, reopen the supply route from Tel Aviv, ?Israel will suffer
the loss of a large Zionist population and considerable prestige.
Moreover, if the Arab Legion can win a decisive victory in
.Verusalern, It will be free to reinforce the Syrians and Iraqi in
eastern Galilee. The combined Arab fortes 'conseqiently might
be able to achieve significant ,successes before gaga= could be
with. arms and men from abroad.
Arab selection of, the 'UN `ctease-fire", order is further
Indication that the Arabs cannot be brought to accept a Jewist
state in Palestine. .The war is popular i the Arab states and
has diverted public attention from other threatening problems.
It has also been a strong unifying force among the Arab leaders,
whose own convictions on Palestine have been fortified by the
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P ALESTilT3
scalimasa tint V th':.2.y re= to alma up th 1Jht, eczn at Co
b:Lest a? Cle UN, the Arab Llsofies wculd turn czainnt thom and
mand that the war be cziz ca. Ccmseqaently, tkeir d:-.tor-
otratisn to eoatinue the IZ1--in defiance of %to UN, the U-3,
M.71 th3 1311--1s not 11hly to werlmn. V the TriWEI aro atsoz,..ay
cueTyported x.Tath arms ohipmen from the US and Inrcsrmel
mtnforeoments from Euro, tLe Arab campatnW almazt
eor2ainly be unsuccessful, tad ta"'n stability e2 tae Aral: go7z.rn-
mats will be endangered. CIL-11We CILIC3 and the diazolutten
a US azd MT influence in the area will leave the Arab world
vulnerable to Soviet exploitatiaa.
71111.fitkiiiiste_pt,tbeYPLIts,...
is charactorized by increased concern combined with a firm
Intention not to intervene. Up till nor, the Turks have remained
as aloof as possible without &lending their Arab neighbors and
co-religionists. They voted against Palestine partition in the
UN, but they also tried to persuade Arab leaders to strive for
an understanding with the jecs. At present, the Tints are
greatly concerned by the possibility that the chaotic situation
In Palestine will help Soviet-Communist Influence to spread.
They are already convinced that Soviet agents are active in
Palestine, and they foresee the dreaded possibility that Soviet
troops will eventually eater. Such thoughts as thece prolably
wore in the mind of the Turkish Foreign Minister last weet
when he renewed his plea for peace in the Middle East. Sig-
nificantly, he expressed the hoya that a lasting solution far
Palestine would leave the Arabs "masters of their rights."
British policy in. the Middle East is so threaded with
contradictory aims that it is almost impassible for the UK to
take any clean-cut action on the Palestine problem. Its tactics ?
therefore remain negative and obstructive. The UK Government
desires to work with the US in estblishing political and economic
stability in the Middle East, but it must also meet certain British ?
strategic and economic considerations in the area. The Govern-
ment is pushed in one direction by the traditional sympathy of
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FAR EAS-T
CHINA
A serious stru le has developed within the Kuomintang
inner circle. The difficulties which Chiang Kai-shek has me
in trying to form a new Cabinet indicate that he no longer has
complete control over the Party and cannot rely on the unwaver-
ing support of certain key Party leaders from whom he has de-
rived his strength for years., This situation represents a more
dangerous threat to Chiang's position than the developing liberal
opposition. The nature of the rift within the Kuomintang was
recently revealed by the problems which arose over the selec-
tion of a new premier, or President of China's Executive Yuan.
Prominent political figures, mindful of new constitutional pro-
visions for parliamentary responsibility, turned down the ap-
pointment because they doubted their ability to command a
majority in the Legislative Yuan, which is now controlled by
the Party's conservative CC Clique. As a compromise, Wong
Wen-hao, an able administrator and loyal to Chiang, was' ap-
pointed to the position. Wong has been chairman of China's
National Resources Commission and because of his economic
experience appears well-qualified to oversee the implementa-
tion of the US aid program. Although identified with the Poli-
tical Science Group, he has remained outside intra-party rival-
ries and has no political following. His effectiveness may be
limited inasmuch as he will now be caught in the crossfire
between Chiang and the Legislative Yuan.
The wides read Communist offensives ey.pected during
May have so far failed to materialize. In Manchuria as well
as in North China, the main strength of the Communist regulars
has not yet been committed. Current activity in this area, in-
volving comparatively small numbers of these troops, appears
to represent a Communist endeavor to couple destruction of
communications with an attempt to spread defending forces as
thinly as possible before bringing the weight of the main body
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KOREA
. The teeest4 elections in South Korea failed to give either
of the two leading rightist groups a majority; as a result, the
balance of power is held at least temporarily by the smaller
independent parties who gained a plurality of seats.. Kim Koo's
Korean independence Party, the largest of the lesser groups,
thus may enjoy an important strategic position, if. Kim's prestige
has not been impaired y his presence at the recent Soviet-
sponsored conYerence in North Korea. .Rhee Syngma "s large
political machine proved incapable of winning Ms National ?
Society a plurality, and he emerged no stronger than his rival
rightist group, the Hankook Democratic Party. For the present,
Rhee and the Ha.nitooks will maintain an uneasy coalition-and,
the Isfankooks will support Rhee for?presidenteof the new govern-
ment. The Ilankooks? however, will seek to control Rhee and
the government lry capturing key sections of his following and
by pressing for a strong premier selected from their party.
Their wealth, flexibility, and political astuteness may give the
liankooks an advantage over the egocentric and stubborn ghee.
INDONESIA
Basic unresolved differences ad mutual distrust be-
tween. the lutch and the Republic of Indonesia, .especially con-
cerning the Republic's status in an interim government, are
making political agreement increasingly remote. The Dutch
are giving further signs of their intention to disregard the
Republic if it fails to eet Dutch terms, and consequently
sharp unrest and a new Dutch recourse to "police action
have become more likely. This prospect is increased by the
latest Dutch moves to by-pass the Re blic in an attempt to
strengthen the existing Dutch-sponsored Provisional Federal
Government. The Dutch have convened at Ba.ndoeng an elabo-
rate "Federal Conference" to which the Republic reportedly
was not invited. A Republican request to hold an "All Indo-
nesia National Congress" at Batavia has been refused. As
a result, the conviction ts growing among Republican leaders
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INDONESIA
that the Dutch will permit the Republic to enter an interim
government as well as the projected United States of Indoneata
on17 on Dutch terms, that is as a minoritv. or be by-passed
entirely. The Republicans, who believe themselves capable
of winning a majority in any fair elections, would presumably
resist such a move by force.
IA PhN
? A plan to bar Japanese Communists from public office
Is under discussion by the Japanese Cabinet. The exclusion
would affect appointed officials and the civil service but pre-
sumably could not be extended to elected officials without a
constitutional amendment Actually, the Government is not
likely to impose any such restrictions until the repatriation
of some 700,000 Japanese in Soviet-dominated areas has been
completed. Any Japanese Government which offered the USSR
grounds for cancelling repatriation would be unable to survive
the resulting popular resentment. Therefore, until reparations
are completed, the USSR will be in a position to give indirect
protection to the Japanese Communists and Japanese authorities
will be obliged to move with caution. Premier etabide a
public disclosure of the plan was apparently designed to test
US and Soviet reactions to such action and to warn Japanese
Communists that the Government might retaliate if they failed
to curb the increasing tempo of their activities.
PHILIPPINES
The possibility of an amicable settlement of the law
and order problem by an arranged surrender of the major
dissident groups and a government amnesty proclamation now
appears increasingly unlikely. Hukhalahap Leader Luis Taruc
has publicly declared that he is still a member of the Commu-
nist Party. He insists on the right of his followers to bear
arms regardless of property or educational qualifications,
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PHILIPPINES
and he objects to "infringements" on Philippine sovereignty
by the US. The Philippine Government, which had sought to
win over, Tame, now appears to be considering a return to
the late President Roxas' stern pacification policy. President
Quirino has appointed two former members of the Japanese
puppet government as technical assistant on police matters
and technical adviser on provincial and municipal administra-
tion.
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7'Y ES'TE, 1.11?1 Ell' MIS P HT!: R E
ILLEGIB
LIZGEDITINA
Asvntina is coadUctirkc.g_,_Ligfaor carrz9...
Japing empkssfs on metal r=r Cf: 'ffllrEineirst-r?eWt
advantages di Argentine.rather than US leadership b Latta
Xmerica. The superior* d Poron's labor program, a middle-
al-the-read appeal based an his so-called "third acsition," tas
beon maladroitly advanced 'jai at home and abroad, and Argen-
tina's tendency to intervene in the economic and political aZairs
of other Central American countries has been protested recently
by Honduras and adversely commented on by other republics.
"Third-position" propaganda and the extension of Argentine
economic influence in Central America follow closely Perces
assertions concerning Argentine economic independence and
the administration's un.compromising attitude toward US policy
as demonstrated at the rro Conference at Havana and again at
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ARGENTINA
Bogota. Moreover, reports that Peron favors the formation of
a Central American union strongly suggest that his basic objec-
tive is to obtain a political precedent and a favorable situation
for a. union of Chile, Paraguay, and Bolivia under an Argentine
aegis.
VENEZUELA
Conservative o. osftion to the Venezuelan Government
seems to be reviving. These elements, apparently too wea y
organized to effect a coup, are reportedly trying to bring about
a split within the army. However, there is no evidence of great
dissatisfaction with the Government in the army's high command.
Some high-ranking officers are reported to be conspiring -with
ex-dictator Gomez sympathizers and with the newly formed
anti-Communist group. Any movement against the Government
by army elements has slight chance of success, however, with-,
out support from the Trujillo Government of the Dominican
Republic and from Venezuelan refugees living in the Dominican
Republic.
PERU
Apprehension over the touchy Peruvian political situ-
ation an eal-W1-77irffe politica consequences o clashes which
might arise between the Apristas and the Communists over
Indian issues have largely been responsible for the Peruvian
Government's recent postponement of the Inter-American
Indian Congress from June to October. Greater realization
of Communist potentialities for trouble, as shown in the Bogota
riots, may also have contributed to this decision.
- 20 -
SECRET
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A002000020001-6
,
DISTRIBUTION
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39,40,41,42,43.
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Secret:a:It of State
Chief of :c:ltrlf 7cs, CrQ.7.pander in. Chief
Fecretary of Defenszl
:.;ecretary of the Array
Secretary :its the Navy
'secretary of the Mr -7.:.);.-ce
Chairman, 19,4ticuaY rlesiy,Arnes
Executive Fern-!ay, ational
Assistaat ary ;',.1 Navy lor
Chief of Sta..6, U. Army
Chief of Naval Operations .
Chief of Staff, U. S, Air Force
Director of Plans and Operations; General Staff, U. S. Army
Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) U. S. Air 1--,'orce
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
Director of Plans and Operations, U. S. Air Force
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Research & Int.
Director of Intelligence, Cenral Staff, U. S. Army
Chief of Naval. Intelligence
Director of Intelligence, U. S.. Air Force
Director of Security and Intelligence, Atomic Energy Comm.
Executive Secretary, Military Liaisc,'n Committee,
Atomic Energy Commission
Chief, Acquisition&Distribution Div., OICD, Dept. State
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigatioa
Secretary, joint Chiefs of Staff
Secretary of State
Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, joint Staff
Secretary, joint Intelligence Group, :joint Staff
U S Air Force Representative on Joint Strategic Survey
Committee (Through joint Chiefs of Staff)
Secretary, State-Arny-Navy-Air Coordinating Committee
[111 '
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A002000020001-6
, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A002000020001-6 ,
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
2524-8-1948
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A002000020001-6