WEEKLY SUMMARY NUMBER 36

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002100150001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 4, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Number 3 ~?
~~ 4 FED ?~4~
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Document No.
NO CHt~NGE in Class.
DECJASSI~'?ED
Class. C:3A~VG.cD T0: TS g C
DDA R2emo, a Apr 77
Auth: D"A zG. 77 1763
Date: ~"~ BY: Of/
CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance with applicable security regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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C O N T E N T S
Page
HIGHLIGHTS ............. ~ .......... 1
WESTERN EUROPE ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,o, 2
EASTERN EUROPE ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 4
NEAR EAST -AFRICA .............. 8
FAR EAST ..........................10
'WESTERAT $EMI3PHERE............14
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H I G H L I G H T S
The Soviet propa~. "peace offensive" was
sharply intensified during the past week by Premier Stalin's
oblique proposal in press interviews that President Truman
meet him in eastern Europe for peace talks to end the cold
war. The timing od the Stalin interviews appareatly es-
- presses the Kremlin's grave and increasing anxiety over
the progress made by the westera powers in defensive
planning and ecoanomic recovery for western Europe; the
intent of the interviews was to create confusion and dis -
unity among the western powers (see page ~4). Although
it is clear that the Kremlin would welcoffie a Truman-
Stalin meeting oa Soviet terms, there is mmo evidence that
Soviet policy torevard the West has changed or that Soviet
efforts to e~.nd world Commu~aism have relaxed.
The current deadlock to the Israeli-Egyptian
negotiations at Rhodes provides fresh evidence of the
serious and fundamental difficulties which still obstruct
a settlemeat in Palestine (see na.ge 8). Unless the pres-
ent trend toward stalemate at the Rhodes Conference is
reversed, a renewal of Arab-Israeli hostilities seems
likely. Failure at Rhodes will also have an inhibiting
effect upon further Israeli negotiations wath Traasiordan
and Lebanon, which have been suspended during the
Rhodes talks.
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'tip' E S ~' ~~ l~. I~` ~ l7 l~ ~} ~ E
I~
Trade ~ol~cy The ~'cYiii~g eC~E7CI0Il'l~i~'S Of ~~'F"~3.3FL~ 3P1a:3 ~~.~d.Il.
~~.*~d i.h~.~ resu3t~g increa,seci e;oraz~? riic~~ ~cyr
woad ~xx~or#: inarl~e~:s are caus~~g serious ca&YCern to i~~e $rS?-
ish Go?~era:xre:at, ~a~?adoxically, the British progr~s~ ftrr U~-
te~nal reerover~y at~d sta.~lity, ~x~t!icii teas been Keyed. fe3 ~~:~pand-
i?~g ex~soi~f:s, i:: threatened by tt~e re-er~~erf;a~nce as poteaziial
export,~rs of 1~}iese tiro countries whose industrial restoration
thr ~E has cor~~mitted itself to suppori:. ~Ivr:~y*s oaf pos~w~.r
c;onC~Xn ~C ~ri~:i5a~ iu:~~ustrial olio?les, '~.h~s ris~g ~carnpetit~ion
m~.y ce;m~~l ~~ie ~:; itish. Goverrarie~af: t o formu.lai:e an offacial
policy desig,~ed to safeguard ~~ifiish ~,r~dustry~ `the GoE~erta-
ment riay wds:i~ tQ l~a.ve lf~gftiiz~nate eco~aorr.ic restract%ons
ir~posc~d ova Gf?rrnan.y and japan, inc.ludi~-a su~tz measure^s as
reran-subsicli~a.~:~nn of exports, a tan on du~rp#.ng, fair labor
standards, anal :Cau~d f~s,ne;ial practipes. Taa additioia, ttae
l~~?itish wi"1 1:e~3d ~o ~~~.erpret n~.A?ro~rly- the ~restern poarprs'
agreement on g~rotluetion lixnita~txnr-s in cer~..at~. strai:egiL
fie=lds, a,s ~-lney have a.I: early do;~e ire sl~ipbuilc~ing. faespite
such r~stric;~.i~~e devices, however, the l:3ritash desire to
expand t.lie tot~.l ~rorld ma.rkef sufficiently tea provice reasc~ta-
ably a~~~sured wrutle4;s f?r all ex1--orters wall. preclude tike
adoptic>n of a lzoliry which wou1~1 seriously retard the develop-
ment c:f peacet iaxbn industry .ln Gerrnang a~td japan ,
GE~il~S~]~Y
Inflaticmary P4~es~~ure Inflatioaaary pressures in west Ger-
many t~Jil.i gain anew impetus if inc~.reased
prices raecessary to elirninate the ope::ratine; losses of a anal, steel,
ar~d triuisport~~tio~7 industries arse passed along to consumer
products.. Sue h a developznez~t zs likely becawse the hard-pressed
Laende~r g~over. nments cannot afford ?ror~ gresemt revenue to
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~GrER1UtANY
continue subsidies to cover industrial operating losses. The
coal industry is in #inancial difficulty because 3??Jo of the
mines are sub-marginal and machinery and equipment are
obsolete. As a result, the Ruhr coal industry is operating
at a loss of about 1 a million dollars a azonth and must be
sustained by subsidies from the German government. In an
effort to relieve the Bizone of this burden, AMG officials are
urging_an increase in the export price of Ruhr coke and coal.
France and the ]~enelux nations have already registered
strenr!ous objections to any increase in prices. 13izonal
authorities are ciao considering increases in the price of
gas and electric power produced at the mines. The steel
industry refuses to pay the increase in the price o? cope
that went into effect in August 1948 unless it is permitted
to increase its own prices accordingly. The railroads,
operating at a loss of 10 million dollar s a month, have
recently received a subsidy of 35 miuioa~ dollars in lieu of
increased freight and passenger rates. This subsidy is in-
sufficient, however, to pay for the heavy reconstruction
program which will be necessary during 1949 to keep pace
with. the expansion of industrial production projected under
the European recovery program.
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EASTERN EUROPE
Stalin's IntervieWS ~ The dramatic and unprecedented in-
tensification of the current Soviet
propaganda "peace offensive," as revealed by Stalin's
action in proposing a meeting with President Truman,
reflects the. grave and increasing anxiety ~ the Sremlin
over the progress of western defensive planning and
economic recovery in western Europe. 3fialin's inter -
views also reveal the continued determi~tian of the Krem-
lin to prevent the containment of the USSR by an increas -
ingly strong western bloc.
Atlantic Poet In its timing, Stalin's interview appears
to have been motivated primarily by the
rapid development of the Atlantic Pact and r~.~flects
Soviet determination to pretreat, delay, or at least mini-
mize the entire western defense effort. Soviet concern
aver the Pact had already been ezpressea fn the Krem-
lin's blunt note to Norway and in the recent Soviet "White
Paper" on the Pact. Owing to the proxioQity of Norway,
the USSR is unquestionably disturbed over possible Nor -
wegian adherence to the Pact and, despite the peaceful
tone of Stalin's pronouncements, can be ea>;pected to ia-
tenaify its efforts to prevent Scandinavian participation
in western defense plans. Although Soviet aggression is
unlikely, the U35R will probably increase ifs pressure
on the Scandinavian countries through propaganda, Com-
munist Party activity, and possibly economic pressure.
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STF,LIi1T'S 1?RIr~S II"~TER`?I1E~~'S
Insincerity By presenting his prop~isal ft~r a Truman-Stalin
meeting tiiraugh tine press rather than through
official channels, Stalin has not coann~itted the liSSR to any
specific action and has been able to exploit the hope ~ the
w?rld for peace. The insincerity c~ Stalin's propasal is re-
vealed ~y his refusal. to n3eet I?resident Trunnan outside the
Soviet orbit, which is actually an attempt t? create the im-
pression that the +3'est must go t~; Staliaa. Although Stalinps
health might i:eep hint from ma:~ing t:~e loam jcug?ney to ~.'ash-
ington, it presumably would not prevent hian fg?orn going tc a,
nearby country outside the Soviet or&~it. i~xoreover, if the
Kremlin were sincere in its desire t?~ t~ieet the ~~~Test halfway,
8ta.lin would not have nnade his prcpi~sa; t?- ~e ljS alone.
This approac~a was undoubtedly desigrneCl to crc~~.~te disunity
among the western powers nand to aroaase the susg~icions cf
the non-Cor~amunist world concernin the good faith and re-
liability of tEie i1~`.
No l:'c;licy Cina~,nge Although the Kremlin would welcon3e
a Truman-Stalin aneeting cn Soviet
terms, Stalin's recent stateanea~ts offer no evidence cf any .
change in basic Soviet policy tc~ard the i~'est or of any re-
laxation c? Soviet effUrts toward the eXpansic~n of world
C ornanuanism. For example, Sta.lin's rerniarks concerning
Germany, cc}upled with his failure to refer to the currency
issue, reveal continued Soviet deterynination tc, prevent the
estaJOlishment of a west German sta~~e. Stalin reiterated
the Soviet deanand made during ttie neg~~tiations ~ last .
August and ofFered no immediate prospect for the lifting
of the Berlin 1~lockade.
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S~O~7' U13It.~N
Foreign Trade The Soviet decision to participate in the
current lnternationa.l Wheat Con#erence
was probably prompted by the desire to perpetuate existing
Soviet trade agreements with the nations of westera Europe.
Grain-producing rations -- especially the US, Canada, and
Argentina -- have large exportable surpluses of wheat. Thus,
a.n international agreement undert~.ken vvit}:out Soviet pa.rtieipa-
tion might havE led cei?tain western European zaations tc- shiFt
their wheat pux~cba.ses from the USSRR to the western wheat Export-
ing countries, ~erebq making more difficult the fulfillment of
Soviet import requirements. The USull is undoubtedly
eager to Peep its frade agreements with such countries as
Belgium, A1orw~,y, Switzerland, and the rtetherlands, which
are supplying the USSR with ships, diesel genetors, power
equipment, tin, rubber, chemicals, drilling installations,
industrial diamonds, tungsten, and other items in short
supply in the Soviet orbit. The loss of these essential
strategic imports would be a considerable blow to Soviet
plans for expanding heavy industry and also would retard
the development of the Soviet-Satellite war potential.
East German Economy Soviet pIaa~s for orienting the east
Gerxma.n economy toward the Soviet
orbit economies were indicated a# the recent Socialist Unity
Congress in Berlin which was attended by delegates from
all countries in the Soviet bloc, excepting Finland and Yugo-
slavia. Yn the ~seynote address for the Satellite cleiegations,
Czechoslova.I~ I3eguty Premier Fierliuger exhorted the east
Germans to co~~perate in establishing increased economic
ties with the Soviet empire. Fierlinger added his convic-
tion that political and economic developments in east Ger-
many would inevitably lead to greater economic exchange
with Czechosiava.kia. This emphasis upon the coordination
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SOVIET UNION
of the east German economy with the economfes ~ Poland
and Czechoslovakia reflects the Kremlin's concern with
both the deterioration ~ the east Germaa economy and the
unsatisfactory rate of improvement in the Satellite econo-
mies, especially that og Caechoslovakia.
YUGQSLAVIA
Dialectical Battle In the continuing dialectical battle be-
tween Tito and $ialin, Tito now appears
to have won the first round. In drawicg upon the works ad
Mara to prove that Stalin, not Tito, is guilty of nationalism,
Tito has uncovered the one notable disparity between Marxist
theory and Soviet practice. Tito and his lieutenants have
accused Stalin of abandoning the "Marxist principle of
equality between small and great" and his leading theoreti-
cian has asserted that Soviet Communism "unilateara.lly takes
into consideration the duties... of other countries toward the
Soviet Union and not the duties of the first country a? Social-
ism (USSR) toward the proletariat off other countries and toward
the new Socialist countries." These charges, which preceded
the announcement that Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Poland
had become "dictatorships of the proletariat," were shrewdly
calculated to upset the Politburo and to strike at the right oaf
the USSR to exploit its eastern European empire. In addition,
the assertion of the Tito Communists that Yugoslavia alone
of all the Socialist countries upholds Marxist-Leninist prin-
ciples is obviously aimed at arousing discontent among sub-
servient Satellite leaders.
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l+i I' A Ft E ~ ~ T - ~,. ~' .~. I C .F~
~ALE~TII~TE
::Modes Impasse The current deadlocl~ at the Fhc~des ~ 4n-
ference is iA tine familiar pattern ~ pre-
vious efforts to bring peace to Palestine. ~~n th~?ee occasions
during tie past year there has been a brief flareLp of hovti-
lities, followed &~y a CN-decreed cease-?ir~e and Mien a
fruitless e~Cfort by tt~e ~I~ to persuade the belligerents to
compose their differences. The imsx~inent completion of
this cycle for a fuurti: tune is indicative ~ the seriousness
of the difficulties which still c3bstruct a seltlex~leaat cif the
Palestine prc~i~lem. although the Rhodes fial~~s between Israel
and Egypt have aut yet brol~en up, tiie prc;babfle failure tc+
achieve an arx~stice is lil~eiy to inhibit gs~.?ael's negotiations
with Transjr~rdan and Lebanon, which have been held up pend-
ing the outcome of tine talus. Tra.nsjurdan a~td lLebanon,
which are snore interested in a final settlement tian the
Egyptians, will probably engage in new tall~s with the $sraelis
at Jerusalem if not at Iitzodes. Nevertheless, Guc~~ talus will
be hampered by considerations similar ti- tic,se v~hich have
thus far blc~ct~ed an Israeli-Egyptian deal. ~lthcuxg~a the de-
cision of the Y3x~ and fine major t~iestern uropean countries
to recognize ~israel map impress the 1~rabs, it will nut ne-
cessarily dissuade them from believing that ccnt~xaued stale-
anate, even at the risi~ cif further Jewish aggression, is pref -
erable tc open abandunaneat cf their claims. ~~ing ~,bdullah
t~? Transjordan, who has stressed his desu-e tc~ bsxgain, may
gG further fiiian the others. tu~~ard cornpron~ising with the
Israelis, partic~~larly nc3w that lie has received tine moral
support of ~S rQCOgniticn. Even if ~bdullah ignores the
mare extreme claims ~ tye ot?ier ~.rab states, however, his
desire to obtain the best possible terms may eArell impede a
prompt settlement even fur his limited sphere of ~~alesfiine.
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I~1A-PA~T.AI~T
C$echoslovak ReZatio~n$ Caechoslo~vakis6t is replacing ibs
representative an the i3i~T C om -
mission for India and Pakistaa 3>In a meaner which leaves
no doubt that the new appoffitee will be a trrusbed Gommu-
niat. Because the present Czechoslovak representative is
an old-line democrat who cooperated freely With his Sour
western colleagues, the shift will providc3 the Soviet bloc
width ite first real opportunity four i~luencing the hand].hl~
ad the delicate I~shmir problem. ~ Cr~echoslovakia. had
mer~~Iy been making a routine change in diplomatic appoint-
3nenffi, it world scarcely ha~+e informed India that: (1) the
C$echoslovak representative was being replaced 'because
~ was "pro-Pakistan and pro-13ritfsh ' (Yndia, would have
been the first to oppose him on those grounds); and (~)
India. would strain Indo-Czecho?lovat~ia.~e relations if it
V~@n'~t3red t0 Object t0 the neW representativE.
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-FAIL EAST
CRIl+tA
Peace Talgs The probability of Chfnese Communist insist-
ence an unconditional surrender of the lYatian-
alist Governrae~tt became more certain this week as a result
of Communist demands for compliance with Nlao Tse-tuug's
eight-points ~s a prerequisite to the start of peace "nego-
tiatioa~s." The Communists also called upon Aeting President
Li Tsang=den to arrest and deliver to them President Chie.ng
Sai-shek and all o#hex "war crimu>~ls." Li could not possi-
bly comply with all t1~se demands, even if he wished. Yn ffict,
there is no single authority, including Chiang Kai-shek, who
can deliver intact to the Communists the remaining anti-
Communist forces in Ghina.. The Communists, therefore,
regard the Naa~g Government as a mere regional regime,
which coaatrols only ane or two of the principal centers od
resistance. Whey have announced that the pati~rn established
by the surrender of Peiping (gradual Communist occupations
of the city as Nationalist forces withdraw and lay dorovn their
arms will apply to the 2.6 other mayor centers of non-Commu-
nist China. ~'he Peipi~ formula gives the Conlnaunists the
double advantage of peaceful occupation of the areas of res~t-
ance and sufficient Time to organize and staff Communist
administrations for fihese areas. 7.'be profected Communist
"coalition" government for all China. will still seclude Chiang
Kai-shek and his associates, although the door remains open
for the inclusion of Nati~alist leaders who facilitate Commu-
nist occupation of the remaining centers of resistance. The
Communist "coalition" government Diu probably be pro-
claimed sometime after more than half the territory and
people of Ghina fall under Communist control. This "casA.li-
tion" government will then seek international recognition as
i:he legal government for all of China.
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~,llilitary Retreat As the Chinese C otr.munist armies con-
tinued moving into position along. the
north bang of the Xangt2e, the Nationalist Nigh Cona.nd
started withdrawing troops southward from its "is~pregaable"
Yangtze defense line and began preparing a new general east-
west line running from'~Juchang to l~anchang and thence along
the Chientang River. This defense plan, reportedly to be
irnplementea. if current peace negotiations fail, presumes
the complete abandonment of Shs,nghai, I~Tan'~.ing, and I~.nl~ow.
Therefore, these cities will probably come antler Communist
control within the next 3~ ds.y5. Thies latest defensive tactic
is apparentlg~ a Nationalist attempt to lrreserve their remain-
ing men and equipment while awaiting tine renewa:i of ~S aid.
The planned withdra,~ral probably sets the ~.ttern for future
Nationalist action in the face of superior Communist =~. -.
forces. :is ~, further preparation for such a program, fhe
Nationalist capital has been moved to Canton where the Gov-
ernment announced it Would be open for business on 5 1~`ebruary.
The abandonment of Nanking, however, is a heavy blow to 1~Iation-
alist prestige. In moving south, the Nationalist Government
gives up its political stronghold of the past tram generations
and enters an area where local political elements are either
unfriendly or ants,gonistic.
Econor~a.ic mistress ~opula.r resentment by the Taiwanese
against ernigrees from the Chinese
ma.inlancfl may result inn acts of violence and sabotage within
the next few weeks, but such outioreaks are unlil~ely to
threaten T~atioa~.list control of the island. The major prob-
lem facing the Idationa.list administa~.tion on Taiwan is the
economic distress caused boy the influ ; of at least several
hundred thousanol people from the mainland. This influx has
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CHINA
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TAIWAN
created inflationary conditions, a rice shortage, and an
almost complete diversion of shipping from normal
Taiwa,aese trade to evacuating refugees and supporting
the Chinese administration. Arsenal equipment shipped
from the mainland, if put in. operation, will lower Taiwan's
normal industrial production by stra.iniug the island's
limited power and other resources. Although Nationalist
gold supplies in Taiwan. could be used to stabilize the
currency, they will be more likely held in reserve for
future use by the National Government in combatting the
Chinese Communists,
Irmor~slA
Dutch Plans C ontiaued Indonesian resistance will probably
foil current Dutch plans to circumvent a con ;
siderable portion od the recent Security Council resolution
oa Indonesia. The Dutch apparently hope that they can effect
a quick settlement between non Republican Indonesians and
interned Republican leaders on the terms ~ Republican
participation in a [Inited States of Indonesia. The Dutch
could then argue that agreement by responsible Republican
leaders to take part in such consnltatioms makes unnecessary
both the re -creation of the Republic and negotiations under
the supervision of the new UN Committee for Indonesia..
Acquiescence to such a plan by interned Republicans, how-
ever, is unlikely. Republican Premier Rana. will probably
be quick to recognize the disadvantages of aDutch-sponsored
Federalist plan compared to the advantages offered by nego-
tiations under UN auspices. In addition, the effectiveness of
the Republican resistance, which could be continued for
several years, enhances the bargaining position of the
Republicans. Contrary to batch reports, guerrilla activity
is reportedly having a serious effect upon the Indonesian
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lNDOrlES~i
economy. Raiding Republican bands, operating from well-
established concentrations and areas where they have un-
disputed control, have been successful in disrupting the
essential transportation and communication facilities upon
which profitable operation ad the economy by the Dutch de-
pends. In some areas, where the Republican resistance is
especially well-organized, the guerrill~i bands have taken
the initiative in local harassing operations.
BURMA
Racial Strife The Karen-Burman conflict, which has spread
throughout lower. Burma and now appears to
have become full-scale warfare, is by far the most acute
problem facing the seriously-weakened Burmese Government.
The Karens are fighting for possession of several important
toR-ns, including the Port of Bassein; many Karen and Burman
villages have been destroyed; and Karen troops are reportedly
deserting the armed forces. Although ;,peace talks are in
progress between the Burmese Government and Karen leaders,
there seems little likelihood of a lasting settlement. A major
obstacle to such a settlement will be the probable refusal of
Prime Minister Thakin. Nu to agree to :wren demands for the
formation of an autonomous Karen state that would include
areas where Burmans outnumber Kare:~as by as much as three
to one.
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WESTERN TriE1VIiSPRERE.
ARGENTINA
Economic Changes Argentina is apparently endeavoring
to adjust its economy and trade policies
to the graving iaternationa.l b$.~yers' market in the hope of
improving its financial and tra.c~e relations with the US and
other countries, Miguel Miranda, postwar economic czar
and spon ,or of Argentina's "hard bar~,ining'y trade methods,
has been removed from the National Economic Council and
many of h-Is former powers will probably be assigned to the
more internn,tionally-minded secretaries of Economy and
Finance. There are indications that the exchange rate of
the peso ma.y be changed in an attempt to increase Argen-
tina's international trade, l~toreover, Argentine participa -
tion in the International Wheat C o~erence suggests a. relaxa -
tion of Argentina's former unilateral attempts to use its
wheat surpluses to gain economic advantages. At home,
strong emphasis is currently being placed upon increased
production. Peron probably hopes that these changes will
improve Argentine pr. aspects fog particip;ttion in E'.~rQpear_
dollar trade and will facilitate closer cooperation with the
US which might lead to some US assistance to alleviate Ar~e~2
tine`s present ffnancin.l difficulties. ~I`he adoption of these
reform, measures, however, may have tseen delayed too I?ng
to avert a major economic crisis and a reorganization of
the Argentine Go~rernment.
VENEZUELA
Regime Threatened Growing disaffection witfiin the Vene-
zuelan Army and increasing opposi#ion
from political parties and former government leaders are
threatening the military junln now governing Venezuela.
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vExEZUELA
Opposition groups are as yet uncoordinated but the regime
is becoming increasingly insecure in view of the possibility
that opportunists, particularly in the armed forces, can
capitalize on the growing unrest and rally support from
hitherto disunited groups.
PARAGUAY
New Government The sudden change on 30 January fn the
Government of Paraguay differs in two
respects from recent upsets in EI Salvador, Venezuela, and
Peru and may therefore raise new considerations in the
application ad the Bogota Coffierence resolution regarding
the continuity of diplomatic relations. Unlike the previous
coups, the use of military power in forcing President
Gonzalez to band over the Government to opposing members
of his awn Cabinet and political party was indirect rather
than open. Moreover, the new regime, in attempting to
establish its legality, carefully adhered to the Paraguayan
constitution a#ter President Gonzalez resignation, and has
promised a truly democratic election. Regardless of the
"legality" of the new regime, its continuance in power will
depend upon its ability to retain the support of the army
and police. 2Uieamvhile, there is no reason to believe that
the present Paraguayan Government will be less friendly
to the US than the Gonzalez Government.
STAT
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1
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SECRET
n~s~Rt~v~Iar~
x.. ....... The I~resid+sr~t
2......... Secretary of :ItaEe
3.. ....... Chief of Staff to Cornxrsanasr is Chie#
~, ........ Secre~a.z~y of C~ef?~~ase
5.. , ...... Sec~,etarir cf the army
6......... Secre>ra.ry of t~ Pinvg
?.. ...... Secreeax~y_of the Air Force
8,'IG....... Chalr?man, Netia~! Securifiy Resr~aarces l3oar~
9... , ..... Executive Secret~xy, hTatic~al .'~ecur9ty Council
1~... .. .. .. ~4.ssl~taxa~ SecreraYy of the ?d~av~ ffor .~lr
11,69.... ~ .. ~,'hief of Staff, U, S. P~rr~r~y
12,13,44. .... Chiei cd Nava.! gperaticxas
15,16,1?..... Chief crf Staff, U.S. Air :~'o~rce
18. ........ Director of Plans a.nd C>ger~tions,General Staff,~,~.S,Army
lg..... .... Deputy C;hieft ~ S~,if (operations) U.S. Air Force
20, ........ Deputy Chief of Naval Q~pe~.t2on~ ;Cy~erations}
2I........ , Director of Plans and C~perationsy U.S,Air Force
22,23,24..... Special A-~ss~lstant tQ Secretary of Smote for Research
and Intelligence
25,26,27,28,29, Director of Tntelli-gence, General Staff, T3.S.Azmy
30,31,32,33,34.
35,3~6,3'd,38,39, Chief og Naval Intelligence
40,41,42,!3,44.
45,48,47,48,49. Direc#or of fntelligencey U.S. A.ir Force
50......... Director of Securit~r and IntelligenGe,Atomic Energy Comm.
52......... Eg~~~tive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
Atomic Energy Commi.5slan
52,53,54,55,56. Chief,r'~cquisitic+t~. & Distritnation 17ivision,t7ICJD4Dept.State
57. , .... , . , Director, Federal Huraau of Investl~ation
58......... Secretary, Joint Chiefs of S
59......... Chief, Polfcy l~ianning S~.ff,Departn2ent of State
60......... Secretary of State (~1t:tention: Chief, Policy Reports Staff)
61......... Delrsty Iiireetor, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
62,63....... Secretary, joust Ye~telligence Group, Zoint Staff
84. , ....... Director, jQirst Planning Group, JaiaAt Chiefs of Staff
65......... U.S. Air Force Representative oz~ Joust Strategic
Survey Co~.nffiittee
QF,67. , . ,.... Secretary, Sfia.:.e--Array?Navp Air Coord:aaa:ting Committee
68. , ....... Adn~fnistrator, Economic C oopera~ti?~n Administration
SECRET
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--seeRer~
I
V. $. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
2831-8-1948
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