WEEKLY SUMMARY NUMBER 46

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002100250001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 15, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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COPY N ?
LI
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WEEKLY SUMMARY
Number 4 6
15 APR 1949
Document No. 4SISS
NO CHANGE in Class. 0
DECLASSIFIED
Class, CHANGED TO: TS
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: D. 77/1763
Date: L. By: 0 fr
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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oft.
1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance with applicable security regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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1 CONTENTS
II
Page
HIGHLIGHTS
1
WESTERN EUROPE
2
EASTERN EUROPE
4
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
7
FAR EAST
8
ARTICLES
Agrarian Reform in Italy
11
Banditry in China
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HIGHLIGHTS
The possibility that the UN General Assembly will
postpone a final decision on the disposition of Libya has
been increased by continued disunity on the question among
the western powers and by strong Soviet and Arab opposition
to most of the proposed solutions for the Italian colonies
problem. UK representatives, confronted by French and
Latin American opposition to British plans for trusteeship
of Cyrenaica and for denial of TripoMania to Italy, are will-
ing now to accept postponement of the Tripolitanian issue
until 1952 (see page 2). Meanwhile, present British plans
envisage an advisory panel for Tripolitania made up of US,
Italian, and Egyptian representatives during the interim
period.
Communist troops are expected to cross the Yangtze
River and resume military operations sometime in the near
future regardless of the outcome of the current peace nego-
tiations in Peiping (see page 8). If Acting President Li were
to accept a Communist demand that Nationalist political
and military authority be turned over to a Communist-
controlled coalition government, Chiang Kai-shek might
still reclaim his position as president of the Republic and
make another attempt to oppose the Communists. The sign-
ing of the agreement would, however, greatly reduce Chiang's
ability to rally effective resistance and the Communists
could then brand remaining Nationalist armies as "outlaw."
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WESTERN EUROPE
Italian Colonies Continued strong opposition to most of the
proposed solutions to the Italian colonies
question has increased the likelihood that the UN General
Assembly will postpone its final decision on the disposition
of Libya. The UK, which is extremely desirous of retaining
Cyranaica and reluctant to return 'rripolitania to Italy, would
now accept postponement of the Tripolitanian issue until 1953,
in view of: (1) apparent French, as well as Latin American,
efforts to bargain for Italian trusteeship of TripoMania by
withholding approval of British trusteeship over Cyrenaica;
and (2) the anticipated Slav opposition and Arab resistance
to any dismemberment of Libya. The British postponement
plans call for selecting representatives from the US, Italy,
and Egypt to serve as an advisory panel during the interim
period. Such a scheme would be more palatable to the Arabs
than Italian trusteeship. Moreover, by allowing Italy some
participation in Libyan affairs, Italian bitterness over the
set-back to its claims might be somewhat alleviated.
World Peace Congress Communist leaders are preparing
to launch a concentrated attack on
the Atlantic Pact and the security program of the western
powers at the World Congress of Partisans of Peace to be
held in Paris on 20 April. Financial contributions from Soviet
and Satellite areas may reach figures approaching the total
aid given by the Communists to the striking French coal miners
in 1948; so-called "initiative committees" have been established
in some thirty countries to organize the widest possible parti-
cipation in the Congress; and a preliminary meeting of Eastern
European delegates has been held in Bucharest. Boasting the
sponsorship of the World Federation of Trade Unions and such
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non-Communist figures as the ex-President of Mexico and
the Dowager Queen of Belgium, Communist propagandists
In Paris are emphasizing the international character of the
Congress, and invitations have been issued to some 2,000
delegates of fifty-two countries. Substantially the same
Soviet delegation which attended the recent Cultural and
Scientific Conference in Ne* York will attack western plans
for increased armament outlays and will stress the impor-
tance of setting up peace organizations on a world-wide basis
to hold conferences such as those already scheduled for Italy;
Canada, the UK, and Mexico.
UNITED KINGDOM
UK Elections The outcome of the UK general elections in
1950 is still in doubt despite substantial
gains by the Conservative Party in the recent nation-wide
local elections. With the local contests nearly completed,
the Conservatives claim a net gain of 325 seats and the
Laborites admit the loss of 253 seats on various County
Councils. Despite these local results, in a general election
the two parties at this time would probably be very evenly
matched. Local elections do not necessarily provide an
Infallible indication of public opinion on national issues be-
cause of their emphasis on local issues and the opportunity
afforded for casting a purely protest vote. The Conserva-
tive Party has greatly increased its organizing activities and
efficiency in the past few years and has apparently profited
also from: (1) the Labor Government's recently-announced
national budget which provided no relief from high taxes or
high living costs; (2) the continuation of austerity controls;
(3) excessive economic pressure on the middle classes; and
(4) general dissatisfaction over the reduced meat ration.
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EASTERN EUROPE
SOVIET UNION
Party Members Recently-announced figures on Communist
Party membership in USSR indicate that
since 1940 the Communist Party has lost its base of tried and
well-indoctrinated party members and is growing more and
more remote from the laboring classes it claims to represent.
For example, two-thirds of the Leningrad Party members have
joined since 1940; membership in the Byelorussian Party has
Increased 84% since 1940; and about half the Kirghiz Party
have taken up membership during the same period. Moreover,
members of the Soviet bureaucracy constitute the overwhelm-
ing majority of the Communist Party, with workers and peasants
poorly represented.
FINLAND
STAT
Cabinet Threat Dr. Urho Kekkonen. Finnish Agrarian Party
leader, may
overthrow the Social pe mocratic government by de- STAT
a non-confidence vote in the Diet. The composition
of the Diet has not changed since a similar move was defeated
In February by a slim two-vote margin. Consequently, a re-
newed effort on the part of the Agraritns would again constitute
a serious threat to the Fagerholm government. Meanwhile,
Prime Minister Fagerholm's efforts to form a non-Communist
coalition Cabinet have been blocked by Kekkonen who: (1) opposes
Agrarian Party participation in a broadened cabinet under Pager-
holm; and (2) favors a coalition based upon the numerical strength
of the parties in parliament. Because Kekkonen's latter proposal
would automatically assure their re-entry into Finland's govern-
ment, the Communists may be expected to support a future effort
of Kekkonen to overthrow the present cabinet.
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Espionage Case Perhaps emboldened by the lack of strong
reaction to the imprisonment of two US
soldiers convicted on charges of espionage, the Czechoslovak
Government is apparently intensifying its repressive measures
against US nationals. The arrest of a US citizen directing the
activities of American Relief for Czechoslovakia is the latest
action of this kind by the Communist regime. Meanwhile,
Communist propaganda is apparently having considerable
success in persuading the Czechoslovak people of the truth
of the trumped-up espionage charges against the two US
soldiers currently in jail. Unless effective retaliatory meas-
ures can be taken by the US, the Czechoslovak Government
can be expected to continue its attacks on US nationals in
further attempts to restrict US activity within the country
and undermine US prestige and influence.
GREECE
Guerrilla Government The recently announced changes in
the guerrilla government reflect not
only Cominform intentions to use the Macedonian issue as an
instrument to undermine Tito but also Cominform and Greek
Communist efforts to prevent that issue from reducing too
much the effectiveness of Greek guerrilla action, at least in
the northern Greek frontier areas. The reshuffling of the
guerrilla government probably also completes official Greek
Communist acceptance of Cominform control, a process which
apparently began with the dismissal of Markos in January. As
a result of the inclusion in the new guerrilla government of
two Slavo-lViacedonian leaders who are members of the
National Liberation Front, Macedonian aspirations have
again received Communist recognition. The Cominform
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GREECE
apparently hopes thus not only to weaken Tito's influence,
but also to counteract the probable loss of Yugoslav support
for the Greek Communists by securing the full cooperation
of Slavo-Macedonians along the Yugoslav frontier. If
successful, such a move would facilitate the maintenance
of some guerrilla land communications between Bulgaria
and Albania. No change is expected, however, in over-all
Communist policy towards Greece, which will probably re-
main militant. The current offensive in the Grammos area
indicates that the guerrillas will continue their aggressive
military tactics.
New Government The fourth successive Sophoulis Cabinet,
sworn in on 14 April, represents a slightly
narrower, and perhaps less effective, coalition than its prede-
cessor, which had resigned 12 April over a minor domestic
political issue. The crisis had resulted from insistent parti-
san pressure and public suspicion over allegations that a key
figure in the old Cabinet, Minister-without-Portfolio Markezinis,
had been involved in illegal financial transactions. Although
Markezinis and two of his colleagues in the New Party were
omitted from the new Cabinet, their duties have been assigned
to Liberals already in the Cabinet. Thus the change appears
not to have worked to the benefit of the Popurst foes of Marke-
zinis. Meanwhile, the Crown Prosecutor is making an urgent
investigation of the allegations against the ex-Minister; if the
findings are clearly favorable to Markezinis, he may ultimately
be included in the government, perhaps at the insistence of the
King, General Papagos, and possibly Sophoulis. Another Cabi-
net crisis or a prolongation of partisan difficulties undermining
the government might tempt the military command and the King
to take strong measures, thus increasing the danger that an
authoritarian regime might evolve.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
PALESTINE
Armistice Talks No beginning has yet been made on Syrian-
Israeli armistice talks. Discussions were
Initially thrown off by the Israeli incursion across the Syrian
frontier just north of Lake Hula last week. This move was
apparently designed to gain bargaining leverage for Israel in
its attempts to obtain Syrian withdrawal from the Jewish settle-
ment at Mishmar hay Yarden. Following UN, US, and Syrian
representations, Israeli troops were withdrawn, but resumption
of negotiations was again blocked when the Israeli representa-
tives refused to recognize Zaim's representatives as speaking
for a validly constituted Syrian government. Despite these
setbacks, however, the prospect for an armistice remains fair
In view of the apparent desire of both nations to conclude a mili-
tary settlement.
EGYPT
Coup Doubted .Despite current rumors, the possibility of an
Egyptian coup, similar to that which took
place in Syria, seems remote at present. Although the Wafd
Party, representing a parliamentary majority, is in opposition
to Prime Minister Abdel Hades Cabinet, no party--the Wafdists,
themselves, the outlawed Moslem Brotherhood, or the illegal
Communist Party?is in a position to overthrow the government.
Only the strong-willed Minister of Defense, Haidar Pasha, offers
any substantial threat either to the King or to the Cabinet. How-
ever, Haidar's chances of initiating a palace revolution are dim
as long as the army is hampered by disaffected elements within
and the army and the police are at odds with each other.
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50
45
00
MONGOLIA
10
40
115
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Manchouli
120
125
130
13
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SOUTH CHINA
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CHINA
, NATIONALIST CONCENTRATION
NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
MT
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12 APRIL 1949
COMMUNIST CONCENTRATION
SCALE 1:16,400,000
COMMUNIST. CONTROLLED AREA
COMMUNIST DRIVE
COMMUNIST MOVEMENT
200 300 400
COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED AREAS
MILES
100 200 300 400
KILOMETERS
125
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45
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35
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20Li
STAT
1238 MaO 0,annh. CIA. 4-49
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FAR EAST
CHINA
Peace Negotiations Regardless of the outcome of the current
peace negotiations, Communist troops
will probably cross the Yangtze and resume military operations
In the near future. Because the majority of the Nationalist
leaders will repudiate any agreement reached at Peiping and
will continue resistance in the South, the current negotiations
probably will only delay the resumption of the Communist mili-
tary offensive. The negotiations will also determine whether
this offensive will be conducted in the name of a Communist-
Nationalist "coalition" as a "bandit suppression" campaign,
or whether it will be a continuation of the Communist campaign
against the National Government. Meanwhile, the Communists
are probably demanding that the Nationalist negotiators sign
an agreement transferring military and political authority to
a Communist-controlled coalition government. These demands
might permit Acting President Li to sign an agreement, despite
his inability actually to deliver control of the majority of the
Nationalist forces to the "coalition." In the event that a Nation-
alist-Communist coalition does emerge from the present nego-
tiations, it could not prevent Chiang Kai-shek from reclaiming
his position as president of the Republic; nor could it deliver
to the Communists the remaining anti-Communist forces in
China. Such an agreement would, however, greatly reduce
Chiang's ability to rally effective resistance and would enable
the Communists to brand the remaining Nationalist armies as
"outlaws."
Military Developments As superior Communist forces con-
tinue their southward push along the
Pinghan railroad toward Hankow, Pai Chung-hsi, Nationalist
Commander for central China and one of the few remaining
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CHINA
Nationalist commanders with an army capable of organized
resistance, is readying his forces for a speedy evacuation
of that important central Yangtze port area. The American
Mission school in Wuchang, Just across the river from Han-
kow, has been asked by Pat's headquarters to make its prem-
ises available by 15 April as advance headquarters for the
Central China Command. Pal's main headquarters will
Probably be moved south to Changsha as the first phase of
his withdrawal to his home province of Kwangsi. Almost all
of his heavy equipment has already been moved south and
the timing for the withdrawal of his troops from Hankow
depends upon how rapidly the Communist forces advance.
Pal will probably offer only token resistance in the Hankow
area, thereby conserving his troops for possible inclusion
either in a southern bloc or to support an autonomous Kwangsi
regime.
BURMA
Strife Continues The breakdown in negotiations between the
Government and the insurgent Karens and
the resumption of military action against the surrounded
Karens at Insien sharply reduce the possibility of a negotiated
settlement in the near future. The breakdown followed the
realization by both the Karens and the Government that agree-
ment to negotiate had actually been based on mistaken expecta-
tions of concessions by each side. The Government widely
publicized the "surrender" of the Karens, apparently expecting
the Karens to submit to unconditional surrender. The Karens,
however, expected substantial concessions from the Government
because it had made the initial offer to negotiate a settlement
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BURMA
of the various issues involved. The Karens, confronted with
a Government demand that they surrender their arms,
countered with their own proposals, including a Burma-wide
truce. When the Goveriunent flatly rejected the Karen counter-
proposals, the Karens apparently decided that there was still
no means of obtaining better terms except py force of arms.
The failure of these negotiations and the uncompromising
position of the Burma Government have probably increased
the determination of the Karens to continue their armed in-
surgence until they either establish an autonomous state,
receive substantial concessions from the Governmentlor suffer
severe military reverses.
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AGRARIAN REFORM DT ITALY
Prospects continue poor for the early passage of
effective agrarian reform legislation, despite the 1948
electoral campaign pledges of the Christian Democratic
Party. Delayed implementation of such a program pro-
vides a continuing threat to the stability of the Italian gov-
ernment. Failure to produce an adequate reform program:
(1) could cause serious dissension within the Christian
Democratic Party; (2) might cause the moderate Socialists
to withdraw from the Cabinet; and, most important, (3) might
strengthen the appeal of Communist propaganda, particularly
In southern Daly. Millions of discontented peasants await
parliamentary action on the proposed agrarian legislation
In the hope of obtaining better living conditions as a result
of improved distribution of property and land revenue.
Government efforts to achieve agrarian reform are
currently being hampered both by dissension among pro-
ponents of reform over the type of program to be adopted
and by opposition from vested interests and various con-
servative groups. The Christian Democratic Party's pro-
gram of agrarian reform is being directed by Minister of
Agriculture Segni. Segni's insistence on the creation of
small landholdings?approximately one acre for each
proprietor--is incurring the opposition of large landowners
as well as independent technicians and economists who be-
lieve that larger holdings are necessary in order to maintain
production levels.
Meanwhile, various groups are insisting that regional
governments rather than the national Parliament have the
constitutional authority to pass detailed agricultural legisla-
tion. Implementation of a large-scale reform program by
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regional legislatures, however, would hamper nationwide
reform and play into the hands of the Communists. Peasants,
particularly in the South, might turn to the Communists in
the 1949 fall regional elections as their best hope of procur-
ing needed agrarian reforms.
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BANDITRY IN CHINA
Since the collapse of the Nationalist military effort
north of the Yangtze, the twin problems of banditry and
tribal brigandage, which have traditionally plagued both local
and National officials in the outlying regions of China, have
grown more acute, particularly in the south and the south-
west. The ominous presence of Communist regulars north
of the Yangtze and the numerous small bands of Communist
irregulars south of the river emphasize the necessity for
liquidating all anti-Government activities in the rear areas
if further resistance to the Communists is to be attempted.
Dissident operations in Hunan, Yunnan, Kwangtung,
and along the Indochinese border have already become serious.
A rebellion by Miao tribesmen in western Hunan has already
threatened the rear areas of Pat Chung-hsi, Nationalist Com-
mander there. Bandits are estimated to control one-third of
the province of Yunnan. In Kwangtung and on Hainan, the
forces of "organized lawlessness for profit'? (non-ideological
bandits, pirates, and smugglers of long standing) and the Com-
munists may actually outnumber the forces of the provincial
government. As a result, the government exercises practically
no control over large sections of rural Kwangtung and interior
Hainan. On both the Kwangtung and Yunnan frontiers with
Indochina, the French have charged that Chinese insurgents
are joining with Viet Minh forces in attacks on French garri-
sons.
South China dissidents fall into three general categories:
(1) groups either made up of or being led by Communists;
(2) local bandits and dissidents having no particular political
coloring (the largest group); and (3) opportunist bands of local
bullies, fugitives, army deserters, etc. Each group operates,
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for the most part, in bands of 3-500,and liaison between
them is probably maintained by a network of loyal Commu-
nists. Because of the nature of their operations and be-
cause of the fine shading between the forces of law and the
lawless, it is difficult to determine the total number of these
brigands. Although the total may run as high as 150,000 to
175,000, their true strength is more accurately indicated
by the number of rifles the bands possess; this is often as
low as 1 rifle per 10 men. Even though these forces are
not all Communist-oriented, they serve the Communist
cause by denying the countryside to the Nationalist tax-
collectors and conscription officials and by keeping the
areas in constant turmoil.
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DISTRIBUTION
1 The President
2,64 Secretary of State
3,4 Secretary of Defense
5 Secretary of the Army
6 Secretary of the Navy
7 Secretary of the Air Force
8,70 Chairman, National Security Resources Board
9 Executive Secretary, National Security Council
10 Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
11,69 Chief of Staff, U.S.Army
12,13,14 Chief of Naval Operations
15,16,17 Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
18 Director of Plans and Operations,General Staff,U.S.Army
19 Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) U.S.Air Force
20 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
21. . . Director of Plans and Operations, U.S. Air Force
22,23,24 Special Assistant to Secretary of State for Research
and Intelligence
25,26,27,28,29, Director of Intelligence, General Staff, U.S. Army
30,31,32,33,34.
35,36,37138,39, Chief of Naval Intelligence
40,41,42,43,44.
45,46,47,48,49
50
51
52,53,54,55,56
57
58
59
60
61
62,63
65
66,67
68
Director of Intelligence, U.S. Air Force
Director of Security and Intelligence,Atomic Energy Comm.
Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
Atomic Energy Commission
Chief ,Acquisition & Distribution Division,OCD,Dept.State
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Secretary of State (Attention: Chief, Policy Reports Staff)
Deputy Director, joint Intelligence Group, joint Staff
Secretary, joint Intelligence Group, joint Staff
US Air Force Representative on Joint Strategic
Survey Committee
Secretary, State-Army-Navy-Air Coordinating Committee
Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration
SECRET
I.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/17: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100250001-0
, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/17: CIA-RDP78-0161A002100250001-0 I
ET
13. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE it
2631-8-1948
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/17: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100250001-0 I