WEEKLY SUMMARY #80

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002300340001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 9, 1942
• Content Type: REPORT

RETURN TO CIA LIBRARY
WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Number 80
9 .DEC 194?
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,,DECLASSIFIED
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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 1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance, with applicable security regulations. or
returned to the Central Intelligence. Agency.
8'
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act. 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32. as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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Page
HIGHLIGHTS .....................
1
WESTERN
EUROPE
2
EASTERN
EUROPE .............
6
NEAR. EAST e AFRICA ...... ..... 10
FAR EAST
ARTICLES:
.............12
West German Cartels ... , ....
16
Sweden's Export Policy .......
18
Inter-American Relationships ...
20
A
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o
H I G H L I G H T S
Developments during the week in the East-West struggle
for control of Europe revolved primarily about Yugoslavia.
Soviet propaganda treatment of both the recent Cominform
resolution. on. Yugoslavia and the Kostov trial in Bulgaria
suggests that the Kremlin. is not planning immediate concerted
or overt Satellite action against Yugoslavia. The Kremlin
appears more concerned at this time with the need to eradi-
cate "nationalist" elements from the Satellite Communist-
Parties (see page 8). Meanwhile, recent Yugoslav overtures
toward achieving a bilateral settlement of the Trieste issue
~. with Italy, though indicative of Tito's growing desire to
cement relations with the West, are unlikely to lead to an
.early solution of this problem (see page 6),
has finally moved to its last bastion on Taiwan, and announced
plans for continued anti-Communist resistance on. the main.
land have little chance of success (see page 12). Prospects
o for increased stability in Burma have improved as a result
of the Government's reported plan to negotiate a settlement
with the insurgent Karens (see page 12).
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Western Labor Western labor's efforts to build a unified
non-Communist world labor movement
at the recent London. Trade Union Conference will remain
inconclusive until the European Catholic unions respond to
the AFLmCIO bid to quit the Catholic Trade Union Interna-
tional within two years and enter the new international.
Although the Belgian. and Italian Catholic unions have pro-
visionally accepted, their final position, like that of the other
21 to 3 million workers in the Catholic unions, awaits a policy
decision. by the Catholic International, The US labor bid,
agreed to by the Conference over Socialist opposition, poses
a difficult choice for the Catholic trade unions: whether to
join the new international on US assurances that it will not
be Socialist-dominated or to cling to the half-century old
Catholic International, Currently, they are seeking some
basis of cooperation. with the new world organization which
will permit the two internationals to co=exist while ensuring
close collaboration between them. Although. this solution
would postpone Indefinitely the unification desired by the
US labor leaders, It would probably be accepted by them. as
the best obtainable. Meanwhile, Soviet recognition of the
dilemma facing the Catholic unions was reflected in a re-
solution of the recent Cominform meeting calling for in-
tensified efforts to win the support of Catholic workers and
their organizations,
Political Trends The traditional German proclivity for
dominance by the executive branch in the
governmental processes, and to a lesser extent Chancellor
e
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Adenauer's autocratic tendencies, will probably prevent
full implementation of Adenauer's pledge in the 22 November
Petersburg agreement with the Allied High Commission to
exclude authoritarianism from German political life and to
"liberalize" the governmental structure, In order to do so,
the Adenauer government would be forced to make drastic
changes in its present legislative program, as well as to
alter the prevailing attitude of many government officials.
Illustrative of this attitude are: (1) the hostil.ity*of,.federai-and
state officials to unrestricted freedom of the press; and (2)
the strong support for the proposed-eivil service law, which
provides in effect for the reconstitution of the old entrenched
German bureaucracy, Many Germans also view Adenauer's
recent actions in making unilateral decisions on foreign
policy, as well.as the expulsion of Social Democratic leader
Schumacher from the Bundestag, as damaging the prestige of
representative government in west Germany and as a step in
the direction of the authoritarianism wii eli We Chancellor
so recently promised to prevent.
FRANCE
Inflationary Trend With the inflationary trend in France
expected to be reflected in prices
and wages during the winter, political considerations will
probably prevent the present Government from taking the
necessary remedial measures. Aware of the strong op-
.position from business,'farm, and labor groups to the
Government's budget, scheduled for discussion on 15
December, the Cabinet will be reluctant to tighten credit
or clamp down on wage raises, Moreover, the Bank of
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France is reluctant to adopt tighter credit controls on
the grounds that such action would jeopardize the Govern-
ment's commitments regarding full employment and a
"high level" of economic activity. Meanwhile, wages
are expected to rise following a return to collective
bargaining, a step which is virtually certain in view of
universal labor demand anti of the Socialist obligation
to push this demand possibly by threatening to withdraw
from the coalition. Despite these inflationary pressures,
ECA is considering--in view of the :Government's present
political difficulties--release in December of the 37-billion
franc balance of the counterpart fund,
Bilater.i Trade The end.of the postwar shortage of
goods in Western Euiope and the
uncertainties as to price trends followigg devaluation
have brought. fresh problems to the working of the British
system of bilateral trade pacts as a means of effecting
and controlling the exchange of goods. Throughout 1948,
when the need for essential imports was grea.t,_government
permitted the importation of non-essential products in
order to obtain the more essential goods, and non-essentials
were sufficiently short to assure individual importers of
satisfactoty home markets. Production has now increased
so that markets are becoming more competitive, in-
dividual importers have been presented with additional
sources of supply, and diverse price movements since
devaluation have further unsettled markets. As a result,
the bilateral trade pact no longer ensures the entry into
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foreign markets of a given quota of non essential products.
In current trade negotiations, therefore,the granting of
licenses for "non+essential" goods and the promise of
definite amounts of "essential" products are no longer
decisive, and increased weight is given to the criteria of
price and qualify. Although some British exporters are
perturbed at the collapse of agreements upon which they
had planned production and sales policies, the change
adds a fresh challenge to British productivity and sales-
manship, and the development signifies an important
postwar step toward a more genuinely free market.
New Regime The minority government formed by
Iceland's Conservative Party will
not be capable of sufficiently decisive action to solve
Iceland's economic difficulties and legislation will
result only in compromises. Moreover, the highly
controversial nature of Iceland's domestic issues at
this time will be a continuing threat to the minority
government;4here is already speculation concerning
the likelihood of new elections in the spring. In the
foreign field, the new Government will be anti-Com-
munist and will not oppose US interests-in Iceland.
There are, however, anti-i7S elements in both the
opposition Progressive and Social Democratic Parties,
and these elements will tend to obstruct the implernenta.
tion of a pro~US policy.
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 Yugoslav Plans A recent Yugoslav request for US
intercession with Italy to agree to
a compromise settlement of the Trieste issue, coupled'
with the presence in Rome of a Yugoslav mission auth-
orized to discuss other Italo-Yugoslav differences, in-
dicates Tito's growing desire to cement his relations
with the West but is unlikely to lead to an early solution
of the Trieste issue,
Yugoslavia's eagerness to reach agreement with
Italy on Trieste, which has already been manifested
by past efforts to placate bitter Italian. feelings on
the area and to smooth relations with the Allied
Military Goverfunent in Trieste, has probably been
Increased by the belief that: (1)-a -rapprochement with
Italy would strengthen Tito for the expected eventual
showdown with the Cominform;- and (2) an -amicable Italo-
Yugoslav settlement of the Trieste question would
strengthen US support for Tito, The Yugoslavs may
also fear that the Kremlin, in its efforts to undermine
the Tito regime, might now be Inclined to adhere to the
US declaration calling for the return. of the entire Free
Territory of Trieste to Italy. It would thus appear that
Tito has overlooked, temporarily at least, the fact that
the continued presence of Western forces In Trieste
under the status quo serves as a symbolic deterrent to
Soviet aggression against Yugoslavia and provides a
direct channel for western military aid to Yugoslavia,
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 Despite these considerations, a bilateral solution of
the Trieste issue is still unlikely at this time. Yugoslavia
will seek to retain most of the Yugoslav zone, which has
now been virtually made a part of Yugoslavia. The Italian
Government, on the other hand, is .presently unable, without
strong internal. reaction, to agree to anything short of
the return 'of the entire Territory to Italy, a position which
the US is publicly committed to support. Thus, any formal
bilateral discussion of the issue at this time would only
serve to arouse the deep-rooted nationalistic feelings of
both the Yugoslavs and Italians.
Communist Plans The Greek Communist Party is apparently
taking steps to implement its announced
shift from military to economic and political activity. Following
close upon recent reports of armed commissar-led squads
engaged in sporadic sabotage and terrorism while spreading
"enlightenment," seeking recruits, and raiding villages for
food and supplies, a new directive has laid down. the lines
Communist followers are to pursue in trying to transform
the purely economic strike campaign recently undertaken by
the anti?Communist Confederation of Greek Workers into
an organized political weapon.
The Communists can expect few substantial early gains
from their new tactics in view of the generally anti-Communist
sentiment of Greek labor, the ability of the Greek armed
forces to keep guerrilla remhants off balance, and the
currently good morale of the Greek peoples There are certain
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GREECE
weaknesses in the Greek situation, however, which will
contribute to the Communist potential during the coming
winter. Government ineptitude in dealing with labor's
wage demands has already increased the possibility of
a general strike, which would undermine the stability
of both the Government and the economy: add create
opportunities for Communist exploitation. Winter
weather is beginning to hamper army operations and will
thus aid the efforts of the commissarbled guerrilla
squads. In addition, the Government's program of re-
leasing former Communists and fellow travellers from
confinement after a period of rehabilitation will add to
the reservMr of potential, Communist recruits. Com-
munist exploitation of these various factors may begin
to show results by spring, possibly in time to disturb
Greek election plans and will generally increase the
instability on which Greek Communism thrives.
Cominform Plans Propaganda treatment by Moscow
of the Cominform resolution on
Yugoslavia and of the Kostov trial in Bulgaria indicates
that the Kremlin does not yet consider the time ripe for
an all-out propaganda campaign calling for Communist
aid in'a struggle to overthrow Tito and has no immediate
plans for concerted Satellite action against Yugoslavia.
That part of the communique which calls for "the utmost
assistance" by world communism in the fight to over-
throw the "fascist Belgrade clique" has been beamed
only at Yugoslavia., while the Satellites and the outside
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 world have merely been exhorted to increasing vigilance
against the dangers of Titoism. It would thus appear
that the Kremlin does not contemplate an immediate
drastic intensification of overt Satellite pressure against
Yugoslavia. This does not preclude, however, an increase
in subversive anti -Tito activity within Yugoslavia, which
would not require an extensive propaganda buildup. Sim-
ilarly, the Kostov trial is not being used as a propaganda
springboard for all-out demands for aid in the overthrow
of Tito, Instead, Soviet propaganda to the Satellites on the
trial is also stressing the need for vigilance and for the
ousting-of "nationalist" elements from the Communist
parties,
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 Soviet Policy In openly supporting the internationaliza-
tion of Jerusalem, the USSR has once again
demonstrated its desire to gain a voice in Near Eastern
affairs and to foster dissension and unrest in the area and
has highlighted the deterioration of Soviet-Israeli relations.
The USSR probably supports internationalization, not _
only for the opportunity it affords for a direct Soviet voice-
in the administration of Jerusalem but in the hope that the
plan will prove unworkable and thus give rise to irridentist
agitation and political instability. Although the USSR has
abandoned its support for Israel on this Issue, basic Soviet
objectives remain unchanged: namely, to reduce Anglo-
American influence, promote disunity in the Near East, and
foster political and economic instability. Thus, in pursuance
of these alms, the USSR at first supported Israel. With the
gradual strengthening of. US-Israeli ties, the USSR has re-
duced Its support and is again laying emphasis on its basic
anti-Zionist. policy. Similarly, Soviet support for a separate
Arab state in Palestine is designed primarily to weaken
UK-supported Jordan and to increase fragmentation. In the
Arab world.
'Economic Distress The current deterioration of living
conditions in various sections of
Iran, notably Azerbaijan, can be charged largely to govern=
mental inertia. Although the Government has imported
00
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considerable quantities of wheat and initiated a number of
work relief projects in. order to cope with the widespread
crop failure and the increased unemployment, the effort
to relieve the distressed areas has bogged down in detail
because of official lassitude, corruption, and incompetence,
both in Tehran and in the provinces. With some 4,000 refugees
from Azerbaijan now in Tehran and others arriving at a
reported rate of 400 daily, top Iranian officials are expressing
considerable concern over the situation, which will become
more critical as the coming of winter forces suspension of
the relief constru ction program and slows up the distribution
of wheat.. Until the Shah returns later this month, however,
no one is likely to take the drastic action which is required.
.The USSR, in the meantime, has made unexpectedly little
propaganda use of its wheat shipments to Iran, and may be
waiting for just such a deterioration of the situation, which
would add additional force to its blasts against the Irabtan
Government.
Border Incidents Meanwhile,a recent resurgence of border
incidents along the Soviet-Iranian frontier,
after some weeks of relative quiet, has finally provoked a
demarche on the part of the Iranian Government. According
to Prime Minister Saed, he has proposed to the USSR that
either: (1) a mixed frontier commission be set up to settle
disputes; or (2) the questions involved be settled by arbitration.
Saed has indicated that if the Kremlin fails to reply within a
month, his offer will be repeated and that a subsequent failure
to answer will cause Iran to submit its entire file of documents
on the border issue to the UN Security Council.
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Recent assertions by the Kwangsi
military clique that it will continue
resistance to Communist penetration. of southwest China,
although probably designed to preserve a claim to any US
aid which may be forthcoming after the anticipated fall of
Chiang Kai-shek and his Taiwan regime, are unlikely to
be implemented with any degree of success. The group,
headed by Acting President Li Tsung-jen, includes the
governors of Yunnan and Kwangtung Provinces and the
local administrator of Hainan Island, Its military strength
is largely based on the remnants of Pai Chung-thsi's troops
now trying to retreat toward Hainan. However, the mili-
tary vulnerability of remote Hainan, long infiltrated by
local Communist guerrillas, prevents its use as a perma-
nent military bastion. Moreover, Li's presence in the US
considerably lessens the coalition's prospects for success,
while current Communist advances in that area may well,
within the near future, eliminate any chances for survival.
In an effort to unite the country against
,,the growing threat of Communist China,
the Burmese Government plans to seek a negotiated settle-
ment with the insurgent Karen, The Governmeht is
apparently prepared to offer the Karen an autonomous
state, full amnesty,and an invitation to rejoin the Burmese
Army. Although the Karen would probably be willing to
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 enter negotiations on. this basis, questions of boundary
delineation and delegation of powers to the proposed
state will pose serious obstacles to agreement. Despite
continued animosity between the Burmese and Karens,
however, consummation of even a limited agreement
would permit greater concentration of Government
efforts against Burmese Communists and would con-
stitute an important step toward restoration of stability
in Burma.
Possible Coup Mounting opposition to Premier Phibul's
regime on the part of military and
civilian groups in. Thailand makes an attempt at a coup
d'etat within the next three months a distinct possibility.
Navy and Air Force circles, as well as Aamy careerists
who wish to see the Thai. military divorced from politics
apparently have banded together with civilians to make
common cause against the corrupt Phibul Government.
Although a successful coup could. result in a more
democratic regime, it is not likely to bring increased
stability to Thailand. Instead, the overthrow of Phibul,
by intensifying the basic cleavages in Thailand's political
structure, could be expected to make that country even
more vulnerable to Chinese Communist pressures than
it is at present.
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 ,INDOCHINA
1.
Republic of Indonesia
10.
Autonomous area of Bandjar
2.
State of East Sumatra
11.
Autonomous area of S. E. Borneo
3.
Padeng, under Provisional Fed. Govt.
12.
Federal district of Batavia
4.
State of South Sumatra
13.
State of Pasundan (West lava)
5.
Federation of Bangka-Billiton-Riouw
14.
Area of Middle Java under Provisional Fed. Govt
6.
Autonomous area of West Borneo
15.
State of East Java
7.
Autonomous area of East Borneo
16,
State of Madura
8.
Autonomous area of Kota Waringin
17.
State of East Indonesia
9.
Autonomous area of Great Dayak
THE tt.
PHIUPPINES
Foos
UNITED STATES
OF INDONESIA
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Sovereignty Transfer Pending almost certain ratification
of The Hague agreements by the
Dutch Parliament and by representatives of the 16 states and
"autonomous constitutional units" in Indonesia, the Nether-
lands' Provisional Federal Government will be replaced by
the United States of Indonesia (USI) on 27 December, The
new state will be confronted by many pressing and complex
problems during the first year of existence. Barring drastic
changes in international trade patterns and a sharp reduction
in US and western influence as the result of further advances of
Communist control in other parts of Asia, however, prospects
for the establishment of a politically stable and economically
prosperous nation are reasonably good.
The most immediate problems to be faced by the new
regime include the silencing of rebellious dissidents of
left and right, persuading the population. that the settlement
with the Dutch was the best obtainable, and taking effective
steps to commence economic rehabilitation. It is expected
that much military and some financial aid will be granted
by the Netherlands, and this assistance, together with
the dynamic leadership of. Sukarno who is scheduled to
be the first President, should prove to be the new nation's
most valuable asset in. Its attempts to create and maintain
a stable regime.
Although the provisional constitution provides for a
strong central government during the difficult period of
transition, the new regime will face complex problems of
administration. and organization in unifying the numerous
political divisions (see map) which vary widely in political
and economic importances Many of these areas have
artifical boundaries established under the pressure of.
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 INDONESIA
military action rather than by ethnic or geographic
considerations. Consequently, some areas will have
influence out of all proportion to their importance.
These inequalities should be overcome, however, following
the plebiscites scheduled for 1950 and as a result of the
union of weak nearby units with the Republic of Indonesia,
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WEST GERMAN CARTELS
There is increasing evidence of renewed activity in the
formation of combines, trusts, and international cartels in
Western Germany, particularly in the steel and chemical in-
dustries. An example of the process of cartelization, and the
instance in which the process has gone the farthest, is afforded
by the chemical industry, where German management groups
are now battling for control.of the remnants of the former
I. G. Farben empire. The management of one of the largest
I.,G. enterprises, the Bayer plant at Leverkusen in. the Brit-
ish lone, seems to be in the most powerful position to dominate
and control the Western German-chemical industry. Although
occupation law provides for thel'egal dissolution of the I. G.
combine, as well as for sale of the individual plants, current
.reports reveal that these plants are already being drawn back
into a new organization by financial pressure and voluntary
agreement, encompassing so large a proportion of the chem-
ical industry as to constitute a combine with monopolistic
tendencies..
Within Germany, cartels are not opposed by any influ-
ential segment of society, and, in fact, are welcomed by
organized labor as a means of guaranteeing steady employ-
ment. Although the Minister of Economics of the Federal
Republic has expressed strong opposition to cartels as un-
warranted concentration of economic power and a barrier to
free competition, effective measures cannot be expected from
the Bonn Government, despite its commitment to the western
powers to take legislative action to effect decartelization and
combat monopolistic practices.
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a
a
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is
Moreover, the problem of cartels is international in scope.
There are indications that the chemical interests of France,
the UK, and Italy, with Switzerland acting as the financial
clearing house, are actively encouraging international cartel
arrangements with the West German chemical industry to
facilitate price control and division of the market. As long
as the French, British, and Italian chemical interests engage
in cartel arrangements, the German chemical industry will
endeavor to cooperate rather than face the possibility of being
driven from the world markets. Present trends suggest that
cartels will remain an integral part of the economic structure
of Western Europe, including Germany. There are as yet no
signs that, in Germany at least, governmental controls will
effectively minimize the economic, political, and security
dangers inherent in excessive concentrations of industrial power.
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Although Sweden is supplying substantial quantities of
anti-friction bearings to the USSR and the Satellites under
current trade agreements, in general Sweden is moving
toward fuller cooperation with western. powers in their
practice of denying strategic products and materials to
the USSR and Satellite areas. Sweden is now preparing
an executive order scheduled to go into effect during
January 1950, which will provide for more effective
contrbl over the export of war materials. Although the
new and enlarged list of items restricted for export
will contain additional items now on the US prohibited
list, Sweden's export restrictions still will not parallel
those thought to be necessary by the West. A new type
of export restriction for Sweden may be found, however,
in the possible embargo of machinery and equipment
which can be used to manufacture or process materials
carried on the restricted list,
With the exception of certain implements of war,
Sweden has heretofore refused to cooperate with the
West on restricting the export of strategic materials
because of the feeling that such restrict- ions would
prejudice Sweden's traditional policy of_neutrality.
In order to avoid the appearance of reversing this
policy, Sweden will probably attribute the extension
of embargoed items to security requirements arising
from recent technical developments. Although an ex-
tension of restrictions may be interpreted as Sweden's
tacit admission of the danger of future military ag-
gression by the USSR, Sweden has more immediate and
more practical reasons for modifying its neutrality.
Sweden is concerned. (1) over the possibility of arousing
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0
adverse public reaction in the US; and (2) lest Swedish
"uncooperativeness" influence the allocation of funds
O by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.
Moreover, Sweden hopes that maintaining the goodwill
of the western. nations will make it possible to obtain
much-needed military equipment even though Sweden is
not a signatory of the North Atlantic Pact.
o A cartel agreement between the Villar Perosa Company
of Italy and SKF of Sweden is reported to have specified
Q that the Italian company should have preference in, the
West European market, SKF apparently was willing to
O make this concession in an area where it formerly held
dominance, largely because of Sweden's current trade
agreements under iahich SKF is shipping substantial
Q quantities of its anti-friction. bearing production to the
USSR and Satellite nations,
0
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 The recent deterioration in inter-American. solidarity,
while posing no immediate or serious threat to US policy
in world affairs, will, if continued, weaken US influence
in Latin America and contribute to further unrest and
tension.
This growing disunity has resulted primarily from-
(1) revolutionary changes in several governments and
resultant charges of foreign intervention in internal
affairs; (2) the feeling prevalent in Latin. America that
the US is neglecting Hemisphere economic needs; (3)
continued reluctance by many countries to use formal
inter-American machinery to settle international disputes;
and (4) a tendency on. the part of the Latin American
countries to follow a line in certain international affairs
independent of that of the US,
The failure of the US to make extensive loans will
remain a political irritant and continue to obstruct the
full realization. of US international economic policy
objectives. Furthermore, most Latin American,
countries want to industrialize and, in. attempting to
protect their embryonic industries, have opposed the
US-sponsored campaign to lower trade barriers.
A decided breach in Western Hemisphere solidarity
has grown out of revolutionary changes in government and
charges of intervention in internal affairs, particularly in
the Caribbean area. The disputes between Costa Rica
and Nicaragua and between Haiti. and the.Dominican
Republic illustrate the tension in the Caribbean. This
tension has also resulted in ruptured or strained
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/15 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300340001-8
 diplomatic relations between the Dominican Republic and
four of its neighbors as well as between Guatemala and
Nicaragua. US recognition of governments which have
come into being through force has been attacked by the
"democratic" countries of Latin America on the ground
that it is not in accordance with US policy of encouraging
democracy in the Hemisphere.
Meanwhile, ratification of inter-American treaties
has been slow. Despite considerable activity by the
Organization of American States (OAS) since its creation
in 1948, the charter of the OAS remains unratified by the
great majority of American states, including the US. The
effectiveness of the Rio Treaty of 1947 has been weakened
by the failure of five nations to ratify, and, in addition, the
1948 Pact of Bogota has also failed of ratification by the
great majority of American states, The present status of
these treaties demonstrates the weakness of the inter-
American machinery in the settlement of Hemisphere
disputes and emphasizes the threat to US security in the
event of future disturbances.
Although Latin American countries continue in general
to support US foreign policy in the UN and in the cold war,
they have often sponsored or supported programs not
favored by the US. For example, on the important question
of the Italian colonies, the Latin American bloc in the UN--
by strongly supporting the Italian position--embarrassed
the US In its efforts to promote a compromise agreement.
Again, in resuming normal diplomatic relations with Spain,
several Latin American nations took a course independent
of the US. As regards the USSR, however, only five Latin
American countries have representatives in Moscow, and
none of them is expected to exploit its relations with the
USSR in such a way as to affect US security interests
adversely,
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 Q
0
1
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t
Q
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Secretary of State
3,4.........
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Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
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Secretar
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8,70........
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Chairman, National Security Resources Board
9,71........
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
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10. .......
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
11,69.. .....
Chief of Staff, US Army
12,13,14......
Director of Naval Operations
15,16,17......
Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
18..........
Director of Plans and Operations, General Staff, U.S.Arm3
19. . . . . . . . e .
Deputy Chief of Staff (Operattons)U,S. Air Force
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20..........
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
21. .....
Director of Plans and Operations,U.S.Air Force
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22,23,28..... .
Special Assistant to Secretary of State for Research
and Intelligence
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25,26,27,28,29, Director of Intelligence, General Staff,U.S.Army
30,31,32,33,34.
35,36,37,38,39,
Chief of Naval Intelligence
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43
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Director of Intelligence, U.S. Air Force
50..........
Director of Security and Intelligence, Atomic Energy Com
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51..........
Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
Atomic Energy Commission
d
52,53,54,55,56..
57..........
Chief, Acquisition & Distribution Division, OCD,Dept.State
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
58.......:..
Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
59...... . ...
Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
60..........
Secretary of State (Attention: Chief, Policy Report Staff)
61.... . .....
Deputy Director, joint Intelligence Grout), joint Staff
62,63........
Secretary, joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
65..........
US Air Force Representative on joint Strategic
68...........
Surrey Committee
Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration
N
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/15 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300340001-8
 Document No. 001 ~.x
NO C::ANGE in Class.
GJ/uECLASSIFIED
Class. CHANGED TO: TS S C
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA REG. 7741763
Date: 31-1-~1b Bys. 0l3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/15 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300340001-8
 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
2691-s-1048
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/15 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300340001-8