CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILURE OF THE WESTERN POWERS TO REMAIN IN VIENNA AS A RESULT OF A SOVIET BLOCKADE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A003200100001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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DECLAZCMID
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
50. C-IA ":"D TO: TS a
ORE 33-48 DDA Lo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA ::G. 77 1763
Date:
ENCLOSURE A
By:
CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILURE OF THE WESTERN POWERS TO REMAIN
IN VIENNA AS A RESULT OF A SOVIET MUM
GEMRALCONS.IDERATIONS.
The present Austrian regime, backed by the Western Powers, is a
disadvantage' to the USSR. The USSR would therefore seek to isolate'
Austria from western political and economic influence, and ultimately
attempt to gain complete control over the country with a view to inte-
grate Austria into the eastern bloc?
In the event that the USSR should decide that the US is susceptible
to additional pressure, the Kremlin would employ pressure tactics
wherever desirable. It is by no means certain that the USSR would take
action in Austria. Although a blockade of Vienna and partition of
Austria would improve the Soviet political position in 'eastern Austria,
It would be harmful to Soviet economic interests.
A Soviet decision to blockade Vienna and force a partition of Austria
would be based primarily upon a Soviet estimate of the future course of
US/USSR relations after the conclusion of the current discussions on the
Berlin issue. Specifically, such a decision unuld,be based on a Soviet
estimate of US readiness to resist militarily any further Soviet pressure.
UN consideration of the Berlin issue would not in itself substantially
influence Soviet tactics in Austria.
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2. ASSUMPTIONS .
Tb': abandonment of Vienna by the 17estern Powers as the
result of a Soviet blockade of Vienna.
Ampssationj,ugtAtted: In the event of E. blockade, the Western Powers
could remain in Vienna only by force.
a. ?ail, road, and water transportation would to under Soviet control.
b. Airlift facilities could not be sufficient..
Both the US airport and the combined British-French airport
TO in the Soviet zone and would be ,Inder Soviet control.'
(2) FL=Ile facilities are available for cor.struction of an emergency
airctrip in the US sector, it is estlitated that this eould handle
only tho minimum requirements of Mi forces. It watitd be
Impossible to amply the other occupation forces or the civilian
population through use of this strip.
(3) Construction of two C-54 airetripn in the British a3ctor would
require 40 days. At present no troops or equ:Ipment are avail-
able for such a project.
Subetantia41 all elactric power, all =tar, ant: most of the gas in
Vienna would be under Soviet oontrol.
d. All telecomennitootion linos between Vienna itra the western zone's
would be under Soviet cool.
Afifinguitkelak The crUnued occupation by the Vestarn Powers of the
western zones of Austria.
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3. ggpsatzms.
Dxternagiumislatta.
(1) Zrilmsgmatt_of.Sar ;timer.
(a) Further development of E-W rift.
(1) Abandonment of Vienna would be a retreat before Russian
pressure.
i. Vienna is the seat of a legal government for Austria.
The US has committed itself formally to the support
of a popularly elected Austrian Government. Western
guarantees to a strongly pro-Western Government and
people would, in effect, be abandoned.
ii. A blockade of Vienna would be the most aggressive
action yet undertaken by the USSR against the West.
(2)
??
? ?
US
? ?
(a)
Abandonment of the pro-Western political entity of Austria
might be decisive in weakening the re-aistance of inhabitants
of Berlin to Russian Oressure.
(b) toss 'in prestige might require preater.US arms ail to
Western European countries.
b. rutrasata-ILituttrIB.
(1) aliaisalattelta-
(a) Possibility of concluding a treaty with Austria would vanish.
(W Partition of Austria would result. Present Austrian govern-
ment can be.expeOted to remain pro-Western and would not
subject itself to Soviet dictation, choosing rather to move
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to the *astern tone, claiiing jurisdiction over all
Austria.
In spite of Western Power withdrawal from Vienna,
Austrians in the three western zones would continue to:
' support Western policies.
i. Western zone Austrians would probably appreciate
the logistic impossibility of remaining in Vienna
under a land blockade.,
ii. Immediate action could be initiated to present the
case to the UN emphasizing the abrogation of agree..
vents pertaining 'to Austria..
Iii. The US could mitigate the adverse reaction to such
a withdrawal by demonstrating firm opposition to
Soviet aggression in western Austria.
iv. Increased economic and military aid would have to be
seat to western Austria.
,(d) The USSR would probably assume administrative control of
the eastern zone, thus depriving the legally constituted
Austrian government of ite authority in that area, and
would force a satellite government an eastern iturrtria.
i. The majority of Austrian people in the eastern zone
would not voluntarily support a Soviet-created govern-
ment.
ii. Political repression would be,forcefully pursued by
Soviet authorities.
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iii. A satellite eastern Austria would be /inked by
the USSR with the eastern bloc.
(2) EraltiMatrnedel: serious economic dislocation would result
from partition.
(a)
The interdependence between eastern and western Austria
is such that economically, neither could exist isolated
from the other. (Population of eastern Austria: 3,448,000;
western Austria: ),497,000).
(b) In totaling the agricultural, raw material, and industrial
assets of the two areas, the western zones hive the
advantage.
i. The Soviet zone normally produces two-thirds of the
grain, potatoes, and sugar crops; the western zones
produce two-thirds of the livestock and forest products.
ii. The eastern zone contains all oil and oil processing
industries; the western zones contain all metal ore
deposits, about 090% of the coal (brown), and the
great majority of electric power sources and facilities.
iii. The Soviet zone would have greater capacity and pro-
duction in the fields of electrical and electronics
equipment; in capital equipment, however, the western .
zones enjoy the advantage.
iv. Most of the finishing plants for consumer goods are
located in the eastern zone; the majority of factories
for semi-finished goods are located in the western zones.
/MET"
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v. The location of Vienna (with approximately one-fourth
of the population of the entire country) in the
eastern zone constitutes a considerable drag on the
economy of that zone.
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