NEAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 26 MAY 1948 VOL. III NO. 20

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010004-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 26, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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? NEAR E1t6T/AFRICA BRANCH
INTELLIqNCE SUBIZARY
For Wq. e k Ending
26/14s719148
Vol0 III No,, 20
Document No.
NO CHANGE in Class. o
LDECLASSIFIED 777,77A
ss. CHANGED/TO: TS -. S C.
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77 ?
Auth; DDA REG. 77/1763 ?
Date: 2 MAR 1978 By; 0 /t
SILL
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"??? " w" 'as" ' '?????? Ks's.' I "ley CONFIDENTIAL
PALESTINE
Border of Jewish held area
WO Jewish attack
/ Arab troop concentration
Arab troop movement
British evacuation area
Partition Boinxlery las emoted by the Wiled
Noterel G414/01 Assembly. Pipe 19471
International Boundary
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CONFIDENTIAL u s.GP0-5
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elACRET
NEAR FAST/AFRICA BRANCH
INTELLICIFXCE SUMMARY
For Week Ending
26 May 1948
Vole III No.20
GENERAL
The situation in Palestine: Arab rejection of the UN "cease?fire"
order is further indication that the Arabs still cannot be brought
to accept a Jewish state in Palestine. The war is popular in the
Arab states and has relieved domestic pressure. It has also been a
strong unifying force among the Arab leaders, whose own convictions
on Palestine have been fortified by the realization that if they were
.to give up the fight, even at the behest of the UN, the Arab peoples
would turn against them and demand that the war be carried on. Con?
sequently; their determination to continue the fight--in defiance of
the UN, the US, and the Me?is not likely to weaken. /f the Jews are
strongly supported 'with arms shipments from the DS and immigrants
from Europe, the Arab campaign will almost certainly be unsuccessful,
and the stability of the Arab governments will be endangered. Ensuing
chaos and the disappearance of US and UK influence in the area will
leave the Arab world vulnerable to Soviet exploitation.
There has been little ehange in the military situation in Palestine
since last week,, In the crucial battle for Jerusalem, the Arab Legion
has captured most of the Old City and is currently exerting great pres?
sure on the remaining Jewish forces. In the New City, vhere the main
Hagana forces are strongly entrenched; the Arab Legion is pressirg the
attack from all sides and has succeeded in cutting the supply road to
Tel Aviv, which is blocked at Bab el Wad and at Latrum by another Arab
force. Egyptian troops have advanced northeard slightly beyond Mejdal
on the mast; another Egyptian force has passed north through Hebron
and has reportedly linked up with the Stab Lesion beyond Bethlehe,a0
Except for Transjordan and Egypt, the Arab states have done little
militarily. Iraqi and eyrian troops appear unable to advance beyond
the southern tip of Lake Tiberias. Lebanese troops are on the frontier
and seem in no hurry to take the offensivee Saudi Arabia has sent
only token troops to join the Egyptian forces.
Jerusalem remains the key to the situation for both sides. Unless
Haggai can hold the Jewish sections of the city and simultaneously
reopen the supply route from Tel Aviv, Israel will suffer the
of a large Zionist population and considerable prestige. Yoreovee, if
the Arab Legion can vin a decisive victory there, it will be free to
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agtan.
reinforce the Syrians and Iraqi in Eastern Galilee. The combined. Arab
forces consequently might be able to achieve further successes before
Hagana could be reinforced with arms and men from abroad.
GREECE
The UNSCOB morale problem: The work of the UN's Special Ccarnittee on
the Balkans (UNSCO/) has been seriously handicapped by the personal
dissatisfaction of many members over their uninspiring living conditions
and relative isolation in Salonika. Part of the group has already gone
to Geneva to draft UNSCOBes initial report to the UT6 and it has been
suggested that the other members join them there for the necessary
discussions of the document. Meanwhile attempts are being made to
transfer the permanent headquarters of UNSCOB from Salonika to the
more cosmopolitan atmosphere of Athens, on the ground that UNSCOB? having
been unable to effect a reconciliation between Greece and its northern
neighbors, is no longer needed on the spot and can receive the reports
of its observer teams just as well in Athens as in Salonika, If the
headquarters is moved back to Athens, however, Greek morale will suffer
and UNSCOB will lose prestige and effectiveness,
TURKEY
Alarm over Palestine: While the Turks are increasingly concerned over
Palestine, they have no intention of intervening in the matter. They
nave hitherto remained aloof so far as possible, not wishing to became
involved in the struggle and yet apprehensive lest their passivity
offend their Arab neighbors and co?religionists. Thus Turkey voted
against the partition of Palestine in order to avoid the strategic
isolation which might have resulted from amused enmities south of the
Turkish border. At the same time, efforts were made to persuade Arab
leaders to avoid bloodshed and to strive for an understanding with the
Jews, Now, however, the Turks feel that the situation has woraened
to such an extent that Soviet?Communist influence cannot be prevtzlmid
from spreading in the area. They believe that already, by infiltration
or other methods, Sceriet agents are sctive in Palestine. Thay foresee
the dreaded possibility of the entry of Soviet troops as well, Such
thoughts undoubtedly underlay the Turkish Foreign Ministerla renewed,
plea last week for a settlement in 'Palestine, and for peace in the
Middle East, Significantly, however, he asked for a lasting solution
which would leave "the Arabs masters of their rights?"
MIEN
Love finds a way (or R.H.I.P0 in the High Tanen): The romances of
royalty tend to late a cut.-and.-drjea quility in Europe except (as
-2..
SECRET-N
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with the Duke of Windsor) when infringement of the rules causes an
explosion. Hbt so, however, in the High IismeN A few years age a
15?year old girl, born in the UK of a Yemeni father and an English
mother, came to Ignore Crown Prince Ahmed sought her hand in
marriage but was rebuffed; instead her parents gave her to a cousin,
as befits Arab custom. Ahmed went back to his anomalous existeece
as heir apparent to a crotchety, absolute monarch. Then in February
1948 the imam Yahya was murdered; Ahmed went to battle against the
usurping Nair, and in due course became Imam0 affairs of state
did net make him forget the girl, honever. Promptly, he issued a
command, which the girl, her parents, and her husband dared net
refuse. As a result, Ahmed, 56 years old and already pessessed of
several wives, is once again a bridegroom.
IRAN
New Soviet technique? Recent Soviet overtures to Iran suggest that
the USSR, having failed to achieve any success through its series of
threatening notes, may now turn to conciliatory techniques a ameans
of attaining its ends. Soviet representatives have voiced to Iranian
officials both in Tehran and in Washington the desire of the US3R to
reach an amicable settlement of the differences existing between the
two countries. Concurrently the USSR, complying with an old Iranian
request, has formally liquidated its holdings in Iransovtrans, a
Soviet transport agency established in Iran during the war and long
an irritant to Iran. By these tactics the Kremlin apparently hopes
to "soften" the Iranian Government and to effect a reduction of US
and UK influence in Iran. At the same time the USSR Is giving etrong
support to the pro?Soviet Tudeh Party, a potentially powerful political
instrument. This support includes both covert aid and an aggressive
propaganda campaign aimed at the underprivileged of Iran. Although
the present Iranian Government probably will not be beguiled by con?
ciliatory approaches, its continued failure to implement essential
economic and social reforms will provide the Tudeh Party with an
opportunity greatly to increase its strength.
INDIA?PAKISTAN
Hyderabad tension mounts: An attack on the BombayeMadeas mail
train as it passed through Hyderabad on 22 May has further heightened
the friction between Hyderabad and the Government of India and has
resulted in the hurried departure to New Delhi (at Indiass invitation)
of Hyderabadss prime minister. India is not likely to take overt
action to end Hyderabadss independence before the "standstill agree?
ment" between India and Hyderabad expires on 15 November, particularly
?3?
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r
-Mgr
since the Hyderabad Government is reportedly willing to grant India
some authority in Hyderabad affairsc. Nevertheless, strong pressure
from States Minister Patel and other ultra?nationalists may precipitate
a showdown now,
-4-
-RCM
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