NEAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 21 JULY 1948 VOL. III NO. 28

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010012-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: July 21, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

1
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Document No. _SAPP/
NO CHAIME in Class.
V3/4D3,"CLASSIFIED
lass. CHADCLD TO: TS S C
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA MG. 77 1763
Date: __LLISC?n9783y:
NEAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH
INTELLIGENCE STEUART
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For Week Ending
21 July 19148
Vol. III No. 28
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GREEK ARMY GRAMMOS OFFENSIVE ?16 JULY 1948
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WAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH
INTMLICENCE SMART
For Week Ending
21 July 1948
Vol. III No.28
The Creek Any, after a brief lull, has reuumed the offensive against the
guerrillas in the Grammes Mountains with sharp artillery and air activity,
With the conclusion of the fourth week of action the guerrillas have
suffered heavy casualties, but they have stubbornly refused to give ground
and have already been reinforced with about 1,000 troops from without the
battle area. Another 2,000 troops immediately threaten the rear of the
army cordon. Army casualties have not been quite so heavy as those of the
guerrillas. The operation, however, is behind schedule; continued prolonga-
tion of the campaign will result in serious logistical, reserve and morale
difficulties and will also raise grave political problems in Athens.
Although the army may be able to clear the Grammes area by the end of
August, the guerrillas have mon an important tactical advantage. The unpre-
cedented success of their static defense has forced the army to make drastic
revisions in its original plan of action and has also fortified guerrilla
determination.
When the much-publicized Marne drive in finally-over, Greek morale,
which has been steadily rising, will plunge to a new low unless it is
apparent to. the refugee peasant and the weary soldier that guerrilla
activity is definitely on the wane, If the guerrillas are able to prevent
a decisive army victorai, elemente in the satellite states which have recently
been lukewarm in their support of Markos may inspired to release a new
flood of military supplies across the border.
TURKEY
The Vandenberg Resolution, as interpreted by the Turkish Government,
woula make it necessary for Turkey to participate in a regional defense
scheme similar to the union of Western Europe in order to apply for assur-
ances of US military support. The Turks foresee many obstacles, however,
to the formation of such a group in their part of the earl& The Palestine
situation, for example, would nullify-the value of any m4 agreement
between Turkey, Greece, and the Arab states, as proposed by Greek Foreign
Minister Taaldaris, Furthermore, the conclusion of a defense pact with ?
any of Turkey's militarily weak anti-Soviet neighbors (Greece, Syria, Iraq,
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(At beginning of second U. N. Truce)
11023
PALESTINE
APPROXIMATE LINES BETWEEN
ARAB-CONTROLLED AND JEWISH.
CONTROLLED AREAS:
?During period of 1st U. N. truce
(11 June-9 July 1948)
--Beginning of 2nd U. N. truce
(18 July 1948)
JEWISH GAINS BETWEEN 1st
AND 2nd TRUCES
CONFIDENTIAL
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11023 blyy arm,. ce ? 48 CONFIDENTIAL
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SEetier
2,
and Iran) mould involve considerable risk to the Turks without any compensat-
ing gain. In view of the difficulties obviating Turkey's inclusion in any
regional group, therefore, the Turks fear that they will not be eligible for
such military support as the union of Western Europe desires from the US.
Turkish harvest prospects are bright. If the expected bumper harvests
materialize, the Turks should-be able to export surpluses in sufficient
quantities to alleviate Turkey's severe foreign exchange difficulties, There
is also. a possibility that, through ECA mediation, a part of Turkey's current
excess Stocks of tobacco may find an outlet in Western Germany. Thus
although the Turks continue to be confused and confounded by innumerable
economic and financial difficulties a bit of brightness may soon cast its
rays on the agricultural and pastoral scene,
PALESTI1E
The Palestine truce_, which was re-established by the Security Council
following a week of violent Arab-Jewish hostilities, is not likely to
result in a permanent settlement between Jews and Arabs. The opposing
armies will hold to their present positions, extremist groups on both
sides will become involved in at least minor violations, and neither Israel
nor the Arab states are likely to modify their claims sufficiently to bring
about a general agreement. If Israel can effectively restrain the Irgun
Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang, and if the Arab governments can control the
extreme nationalism of their peoples, the stalemate will continue, and the
whole issue may well come up again in the General Assembly in September.
The Jeffs agreed to renew the truce because its terms favor Israel
militarily and politically. The Arabs, on the other hand, accepted the
extension only because of military weakness and fear of UN sanctions.
Arab support of the truce will depend largely on the reaction of the
Arab people who were confident of victory and were assured by their leaders
that the truce would not be extended, Their bitterness may well erupt
into violence against their governments or the Western powers or both.
If their wrath is turned against their leaders, some of the Arab governments
in an attempt to survive will probably resume the Palestine war. Arab
leaders, however, will first make every effort to turn the anger of their
people against the UN, the IIS, and the UK,
The Israeli forces made substantial gains during the nine days of fighting
between the expiration of the UN truce on 9 July and its renewal on 18
July. The Arab threat to Tel Aviv was eliminated by the capture of Ramie,
Lydda, and Ras al Ein. A Jewish thrust southeast of Isdud effectively
-SEEK-Tr
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?
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`Harr
3.
prevented the Egyptian forces from joining the Arab Legion at Iatrun. The
Jews are supplying Jerusalem through the widened strip of territory between
that city and Tel Aviv by skirting Latrun and Bab el Wad, the only remain-
ing Arab blocks along the in road, and a Jewish offensive within Jerusalem
succeeded in breaching the walls of the Arab-held Old City. In the north,
Jewish forces took the strategic Arab-Christian town of Nazareth. The only
Arab advance of-any consequence was made by the Iraqi Army north of Jenin.
The Transjordan Arab Legion engaged in no offensive action during the period
of fighting.
KUWAIT
Before the Kuwait Neutral Zone oil concession was granted to AMINOD
(American independent Oil-Company) on 28 June, Arab League members made
protest to the Sheik of Kuwait against granting a concession to the "pro-
Israel" US. The Sheik, however, chose to overlook the protest and to
pocket the rich prize of the concession terms.
AVE that the concession has been signed, the Sheik is giving at
least lip service to the Arab League attitude on oil. His secretary,
mat Jaffar, has said that Kuwait will comply with any sanctions on
Middle East oil companies voted by the Arab League. Jaffar is also of
the opinion that oil shipments from Aladan would suffer through sympathy
strikes.
Since Kuwait is not a mother of the Arab League, the Sheik is under
no compunction to follow Arab League decisions, Ibn Saud recently published
.an official statement on his willingness to sacrifice Saudi oil concessions
if the US took further pro-Israel steps. Since the Neutral Zone is under
the co-jurisdiction of both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the Sheik of Kuwait
perhaps throught it wise to echo the voice of his more powerful neighbor,
Ibn Saud,
Only as a last resort would the Arab League states--despite their
'fine phrases?cancel existing oil' concessions. That the Sheik of Kuwait,
however, has indicated, if in words only, his intention to abide by Arab
League decisons regarding oil is evidence that even a non-Arab League
state feels it necessary, at least verbally, to conform to the demands
of Arab opinion for action in regard to Palestine.
INDIA
The danger continues that the sporadic fighting in Kashmir may develop
into full-scale mar unless the UN Connisad.on acts quickly to effect a
-Skier
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in-Er
140
cease?fire. Indian officials, in Commenting to the Commission on the
undeclared war existing between India and Pakistan, claim that .a plebiscite
cannot be held in the state until Pakistani forces are withdrawn, and they
also threaten that India will "end with force that which began with force."
The Goverment of Paki.stan, which asserts that its troops (some 10,000 men)
are in Kashmir for defense purposes only, has shown no disposition to re?
treat from its position. Although neither dominion wants war, both are
?omitted to strong stands on the Kashmir issue. The Comisaion is accordingly
faced with the ultimate problem of finding a compromise which both dominions
can accept without loss of prestige.
A forced solution of the Hyderabad problem is threatened by Indian officials.
The Government of India has again asserted, that aircraft from Pakistan are
illegally transporting arms and ammunition to Hyderabad, although neutral
observers are of the opinion that the materiel does not come from Pakistan,
where an arms shortage exists. Continuation of the Indian economic blockade
of Hyderabad and predatory raids into Indian territory by Hyderabad extremists
presage increased violence.
;AMU"
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