NEAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 6 OCTOBER 1948 VOL. III NO. 39

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010023-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: October 6, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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NEAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH
INTELLIOENCE SUMMARY
For Week Ending
6 October 1948
Volo III No, 39
Document No.
NO CHANGE in Class.
?(DECLASSIFIED
lass. CHANCED TO: TS
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA REG. 7711763
Date: _Lin By:
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CRET
NEAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH
INTELLIGENCE SUM4Aa
For Week Ending
6 October 191.8
GREECE
Vol. III NO.39
There have been no significant changes in the militag situation dur?
ing the week. The Greek Army and the guerrillas have continued the
same tactics used by each in the past and with about the same degree
of success by both. The army has made advances against guerrilla
strongholds and has captured significant stocks of material; the
guerrillas have successfully carried out their usual program of
sabotage raids throughout Greece. The largest guerrilla concentra?
tion (6,000) in Greece continues to resist the army in the Vitsi
area. Meanwhile, the Greek Government has requested additional funds
from the US to make possible an increase of 70,000 in the army,
The Greek Parliament convened on 1 October, The body is faced with
no particular crisis, but there are several controversial matters
which may turn into major issues, notably the problem of decentraliza?
tion of government authority, Certain Populists (including the Minister
of the Interior) are violently opposed to decentralization because, in
the transfer of power to the local governments, the national politicans
would lose many Of the perquisites of patronage. These Populists may
resign their posts if the issue reaches a showdown. Certain liberals,
feeling in a rebellious mood, may take exception to any one of a
number of issues. While at the moment there is no organized group in
parliament with sufficient strength to muster a vote which, in itself,
would cause the downfall of the government, the session promises to
be a stormy one,
TURKEY
The Turks continue wary of the regional group idea. Reports from
Paris that conversations are in progress among representatives of
twelve "Middle taste countries, including the Arab states, Turkey,
and Greece, with a view toward formation of a regional group within
the UN, have been denied. The subject is bound to come up again,
however, and the Turks will be particularly skeptical if the proposal
should contain any suggestion of mutual defense, Multilateral defense
agreements among the twelve nations would involve considerable risk
Inert
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2.
for Tueegriithout providing any great benefits. On the other hand,
should the suggested regional agreement be non-military in character,
the Turks might be tempted to participate. If any one of the twelve
countries were represented in UN bodies like BCOSOC and the SC, it
could act as a spokeaman for them all. Moreover, the Turks would see
great advantage in joining the group if there should be promise of
effective, US support and hope of regional strengthening against Soviet-
Communist penetration such as is envisioned by the corresponding group
in Western Europe. Nevertheless, the Turks would undoubtedly prefer
to await more settled conditions?particularly in Palestine and Greece--
before assuming even such nebulous obligations as the agreement would
probably impose.
PALESTINE
The UN General Assembly's decision to place the Palestine question in
third place on its agenda, where it will not be formally considered
for several weeks, has increased the atmosphere of restlessness and
tension in Palestine itselfn Although both sides have been involved
in the increase in military preparations and expressions of suspicion,
the Jews have been much more active than the Arabs. Now that the
initial shock of Bernadottets assassination has worn off, Israel appears
to be using a double-barrelled strategy: while Foreign Minister
Shertok, rounding up votes in Paris for a revision of the Bernadotte
plan, is arguing Israelle need for the Negeb, the Israeli authorities
in Palestine are doing everything possible to demonstrate to the UN
the difficulties involved in attempting to internationalize Jerusalem
instead of handing it over to the Jews. Israeli officials have per-
sistently-resisted the UN's attempts to demilitarize Jerusalem, and
they have been officially charged by the UN Truce Commission with
holding the truce in contempt and hampering the work of UN personnel.
Although the Jews have apparently increased their military strength
in the Lake Hula region and have maintained their forces in Jerusalem,
there is little present justification for new Arab fears that the Jews
plan to provoke an attack by the Arabs, as a pretext for denouncing
the truce and taking the offensive. Such a move would only be likely
if Israel were to conclude that: (1) no satisfactory solution could
be obtained through the UN; and (2) the UN control machinery in Palestine
could not function effectively against a renewal of hostilities.
French hopes that crude oil might be shipped from Haifa to 'Astern
tnrope soon, without waiting far an over-all Palestine solution, are
not likely to be fulfilled. Since Iraq's refusal to allow oil to be
Prekfar?
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33
shipped through its pipeline to Jeeish-hold Haifa is the crux of the
problem, the French have informally suggested to the US and UK that
both Jewe and Arabs might consent to the passage of crude oil through
the pipeline if it were marked for export only. The US has pointed
out, however, that although it is willing to explore the question
with France and the UK, Israeli control of Haifa may make it essential
that Israeli needs be provided for in any proposal that is drawn up.
Such a draft agreement would immediately encounter Iraq's opposition.
Although the Iraqis might be willing to ship oil on a transit basis
under adequate controls, there is little likelihood that they would
aigp any agreement 'bid' provided oil for Israel, even from non-Iraqi
sources.
IRAQ
Internal unrest and external Dressure continue to drive the Iraqi
UOvernment along a path marke?y uncertainty. The Cabinet evidently
considers a firm Palestine policy its greatest source of strength
against the outbreak of demonstrations which might even exceed the
rioting of last January in scope; it has steadily reiterated that it
is ready to resume fighting in Palestine and, evidently to emphasize
the points has taken the calculated risk of sending additional troops
to Palestine since the beginning of the second truce, despite the
growing problem of maintaining internal order. At the same time,
however, the recent resignation of Sadig Bassam as Minister of Defense
indicates that the government's underlying policy is more cautious
than that of the extremists; Hassam reportedly urged playing off the
USSR against the Western bloc, and he was publicly charged by the Prime
Minister with having falsely accused the government of unwillingness
to resume the Palestine war and with having urged an intensification
of the official campaign against Iraqi Jews.
Iraqcs external position is also critical. Caught in the
center of the rift between Abdullah and the rest of the Arab League
over the Palestine Arab Government, Iraq has remained silent so far;
it will probably be forced to declare itself in a meeting between its
prime minister and Abdullah scheduled to take place at Amman in the
next few days. The present indications are that Iraq's desire to go
along with Arab nationalism may prove more powerful than its Hashimite
ties with Abdullah. Iraq reportedly-applied to Egypt as well as the
UK in a recent appeal for three million pounds sterling with which to
meet governmental payrolls, and the recent betrothal of the Regent
and an Egyptian official's daughter may be an indication that Iraq's
dynastic link with Transjordan is being weakened.
?Reef
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SAUDI ARABIA
The USSR is shrewdly using religious factors in a current effort to
restore diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, after a lapse of
neaely 10 years. The Soviet First Secretary in Cairo, who has been
conducting the prelindnary negotiations, is himself a Moslem and
his overtures were timed to come lust before the start of the annual
pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. Some 2,500 Moslems from the USSR
reportedly plan to visit the two holy cities in the coming pilgrimage
weeks (in contrast to the 200 who participated in 1946), and it is
likely that the USSR is using the prospective arrival of so larga a
number as an argument for reopening the Soviet Legation in Jidda.
The USSR can scarcely hope for any genuine rapprochement with Saudi
Arabia in view of Ibn Saud's well-known antipathy for Communism and
the Soviet Union. By using the religious issue skillfully, however,
the Soviets may possibly make it difficult for Ibn Saud to refuse them
their legation, which would be useful in keeping tabs on US oils and
air activities in the Arabian peninsula despite the fact that Ibn Saud
restricts the sentient of foreigners almost as severely as do the
Soviets. If the USSR succeeded in opening a legation, it would probably
make a point of having Moslems on the staff, following a practice which
has already worked to advantage in Cairo and Damascus.
IRAN
Opposition to the Haiir Government is increasing, although the Shah
continues to support the-Prime Minister. The government's request
that the annual budget be approved without delay has been rejected
by the Majlis, and the prospects for early Majlis action on the
Economic Development Plan are unfavorable. The government has reacted
to bitter press attacks by attempting to curb the freedom of the
press, thus dlienating many deputies and various labor groups who
inspired a large anti-Hajir demonstration in Tehran, The Prime Minister,
however, has increased his personal power and acquired a firmer control
over domestic matters by taking over the Ministry of the Interior,
although the recent cabinet changes do not appear to have strengthened
the position of the government itself.
The renewal of the US Military Mission contract is being delayed by
Iran's objection to the clause that only US nationals be accredited to
the Iranian Army except by special agreement between the US and Iran.
The Shah has requested elimination of this clause, apparently with the
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>Veer
idea of arranging with the British a program for training jet pilots
and of acquiring some Vampire jet aircraft. The British have discussed
these matters with the Shah and would undoubtedly agree to such an
arrangement if they thought it would improve their position in Iran,
although they remain skeptical of the practicability of introducing
suet% advanced weapons there.
The recently reported evacuation of Soviet civilians from the Asters-
benkoran area of Soviet Azerbaijan (if confirmedrmay presage the in-
stallation of an aircraft warning system and interceptor bases for the
defense of Baku. 'Rile Asters would be the logical jump-off point
for Soviet troops invading Iran, evacuation of civilians from the area
before an attack would be unlikely.
INDIA-PAKISTAN
India is not expected to invade Pakistan in the near future, despite
the tension existing between the two dominions. The Government of
India is still involved in Hyderabad, where 10,000 or more Indian
troops are engaged in "cleaning out" Communists and other extremists.
It is estimated that these troops will not be available for action
elsewhere for several months. The recent incendiary statements of
Prime Minister Nehru and other Indian leaders probably represent an
attempt to intimidate Pakistan into withdrawing its troops from
Kashmir. Pakistan, still fearful of Indian invasion, is taking
steps to increase its military potential, and the possibility remains
that an unforeseen incident may touch off large-scale hostilities.
Srsettri
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