INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 5 JANUARY 1949 VOL. IV NO. 1

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010035-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: January 5, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010035-1
FieRC
CIA LIBRARY
IRTELLICENCE SINLIAIN
For Week Ending
5 January 1949
Vol. IV Noal
Document No.
41111,
NO CHANGE in Class. n
XDECLASSIFIED
Class. CNA7GED TO: TS
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA FPG. 77 1763
Date: A___WW497813y:
REAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Declassified and and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010035-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010035-1
..?Sreettrire
NEAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH
INTELLIGENCE mamma Vol. XV Not1
For Week Ending
5 January 1949
PALESTINE .
Iaraelts`nee Nageb Offensive: International repercussions arising out
of the tikes treaty obligations to Egypt will probably induce Israel
to Withdrawithe task force it cent into Egyptian territory. Neverthe?
loss, Israelts;22 December offensive in the Negebi?of which the foray.
toward the .Egyptian base of El Arish was the culmination--has put the
Jews in a strong position to force the remaining Egyptian troops out ?
'of the Negeb entirely if their government continues to balk at the
definitive? armistice which the Israelis want. Although fighting cone
tinues? the Jews have apparently achieved both of their major mili?
tary objectiVes'in the Naga itself, the encirclement (except for a
narrow escape route) Of the Egyptian garrison at Gaza and the clearing
of. the main road from Beersheba south to the Egyptian border. There
appears to be little likelihood that Israel will pay serious attention
to. the UN Security Counciles'29 December resolution calling for a .
withdrawal to the 14 October position:: in the Negeb.
With the. Egyptian threat sharply reduced, Israel can now concentrate
on the two remaining Arab forces in Palestine: the Iraqi Amy and the
Transjordan Arab Legion. International complications .caused by the
drive into Egypt, may temporarily deter the Israelis from undertaking
a new offensive against these two armies. Nevertheless, if Israel
and the Arab states are unable to find a basis for negotiating a ?
definite settlement, the Jews are likely to take matters into their
own hands and drive the remaining Arab armies completely out of
Palestine,
EGYPT
?
?
Wedists may enter government: If current efforts of the new Egyptian
Mies Minister, Abdiai Nadi, to broaden his Cabinet by including members
of the Ward (Egypt vslargest party) are successful, the Egyptian
Government will be materially strengthened. At present the Cabinet
is a minority party coalition like its predecessor, and the new Cabinet
members (with the exception of Abdel Hadi) are little more than political
nonentities. It now appears, however, that a number of prominent
Verdicts may be willing to enter the government. For several yeara.
the Wafd has refused to participate largely because of a personal
feud between Ring Farouk and Nahas Pasha, leader of the teed. Conse?
quently the !Pardo as a strong opposition party, has frequently been
able to prevent the government from taking effective action on
Declassified and and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010035-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010035-1
I
important issues. Inclusion of Tafdists in the Cabinet mad sub-
? stantially-etrengthen the countries internal security. EorcoVert, it ,
would enable the government to present a united front in attempting,
? to force the Egyptian people, to accept &compromise on .thcatwo most
4 'critical foreignieauess a politic settlement in Palestine andre-
tegOtiatien of the kngle-Bentian Treaty. ? ?
IRAN
Government pins strength: The Sacd Government, which received a
? vote of confidence only by a very slim majoritl; early in December,
has succeeded in obtaining Eajlis'pasange.of an important budget bill
byan.ovorwhelming majority. In order to secure this majority, ?
'however, Seed had to form a coalitiorawith various factions in the
Magic, including Qavamgs. In exehange for this additional support, '
he -reportedly promised to auk Najlis.consideration of the Justice. .
Committeeisraport exonerating Qavam of charges of malfeasance immediatelr
after passage of the budget bill.. Although acceptance of this report
by the Najlis would remove a major obstacle-to Qavam's return to the
premiership, the Shah's hostility still stands in the way of his
' obtaining the Office. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of the Seed Govern-
dent Will depend on the durability of the present factional arrange-
mente.
? -INITA-PAHISTAN
Indonesian repercussions: Public and official opinion in India con.;
tinuee to run high regarding the sudden Dutch reopening of hodtilities
in Indonesia on 18 December and the weakness of the UN Security Council's
attempts to deal with the situation. India, which, considers itself
? the.championaof Asiatic interests, was persuaded to take no action
on its threat to break off -diplomatic relations with the fletherlands?
but Prime- dnister Nehru has now reaffirmed India's desire to act on
the matter by calling d conference of 16 Miele and Far Eastern Govern-
ments to consider the Indonesian question. India has cancelled landing
rights and transit privileges of the KLU Wel Ditch Airlines, and,
although they feel less strongly-on the subject, Pakistan and Oaylon
have done likewise; the latter has also closed its ports to Dutch ships
bearing troops or arms to Indonesia.
Although the Dutch have naturally bornethe brunt of popular
Indignation in the subcontinent, the UR And borne.
US have also been -
under fire, and the Indonesian 'affair may well damage their standing
with the only three South Asian countries not riou.strongly affected
by communism. India- is out of sympathy with the Ws position on
r
I Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010035-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010035-1
3,
In,bnesia, and its already weak ties with the British Commonwealth
olffer accordingly. The Indiana are lees dissatisfied with the US
:1-rformance4, having been convinced thet the US is doing what it can
!'n the Security Council and, in any event, could not fallow indiets
nitcr:stion of withholding RCA assistance from the Netherlands. Nevel
t!;21nss, the failure of the on to restrain the afth must certainly
c:Ne discouraged both the Indians and their nelehbors regarding the
ability and willingness of the US to assist the Asiatic peoples.
Kara IN BRIF7
Turkey in still undecided about haw to deal with the imminent
passage of ex-itilian warships via the Straits to Soviet Black Sea
naval bases. The US and UK might persuade Turkey to pennit a technical
violation of the Montreux Agreement, which governs traffic through
the Straits by granting the veaselo passage under the Italian flag.
In view of Turkey's reluctance both to create precedents for evasion
of the Montreux Agreement and to facilitate the enlargement of the
Soviet Black Sea fleet, believer, the Turks are more likely tu insist
on strict compliance with the Montreux rules, which provide epecial
passage rights to warships of Black Sea powers only and would thus
force the USSR to get the ships transferred to Soviet registry before
they reached the Straits. 0 C 0 ..... Current public clamor
in Turkey for the return of Cyprus to Turkish rule does not reflect
any official desire for territorial aegrandisement? despite the presence
of a Turkish minority in Cyprusc The Turks are disturbed by the
agitation among the island's Week speaking majority for flenosispft or
union with Greece, chiefly because of the danger that Greece might fall
under Communist domination dragging strategically located Cyprus
with it. The Turks would Undoubtedly prefer that Cyprus remain under
the British rather than go to Greece and the unofficial view in Ankara,
that Cyprus should be returned to Turkey rather than be given to Greece,
will probably not be aired unless the OK's control is seriously chal-
lenged Abdullah continues to temporize in the
matter of accepting the Palestine crown, apparen* because of the
outspoken disapproval of the other Arab League members and the lack
of encouragement from the U1:0 The necessity for such self-restraint
is undoubtedly a hitter pill for Abdullah. The dream of his life has
been to rule over a Greater Syria; incorporation of Arab Palestine
into his kingdom would represent a substantial step toward the realiza-
tion of this ambition. Though he is now obliged to table the offer,
there is little doubt that it occupies a prominent position on his
agenda, to be accepted when circumstances indicate that he can do so
without unwelcome repercussions. ....... . The announced
program of the new Syrian Prime Ministe!, Bald ThIsressupon
the countryls economic difficulties. After the customary condemnation
Declassified and and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010035-1
time
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010035-1
Ne.
g,441 't"nr
he
,f Zionism and Abdullah, Arm stated that he would work for: (1) a
uancial agreement with France; (2) a general budget reduction,
rx.,ept for the army; (3) an economic accord with Lebanon; (14) unifica-
tion of internal security forces. and (5) formulation of a ten-year
vconomic development plan. implmentation of such a program would
probabily require a stronger man than the unpopular Arm. . 0
Several demonstrations in Baesdad, principally by students
exemolifeY dm present disturbed internl condition in Iraq. Unless
time government uses firm measures to check this trend, more serious
dit,t4rbancee may be expected. , ..? Israel has just
nolished an ordinance vesting in a POI actlinistra r a property
;Flilbaenteeen and giving him authority to sill the property and to
4.r.va..t the proceeds. Assuming that property of refugees will be sold
by the administrator, this action by the POI would appear to forestall
that oortion of the General Assembly resolution stating that "Arab refugees
wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors
should be permitted to do so at the earliest possible date," and in-
structing the Conciliation Commission to "facilitate the repatriation,
resettlement, and soonrAi c and social rehabilitation of the Arab
refugees..,"
seStrr
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010035-1