NEAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 20 APRIL 1949

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010049-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: April 20, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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CIA USW
NEAR EAST/AFRICA filtANCII
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WORKING PAPER
NOTICE: This document is a working paper, NOT
ast?offrcial CIA issuance, and has not necessarily
been coordinated with other ORE producing compo-
nents. It represents current thinking by one
group of specialists in CIA, and is designed. for
use by others engaged on similar or overlapping
studies, The opinions expressed herein may be
revised before final and official publication.
it is intended solely for the iriormation of the
addressee and not for further dissemination,
ri
Document No. 4111011
NO CHANGE in Class. 0
I_ADECLASSIFIED
ss. CHANGED TO: TS S
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
?Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763
Date: C MAR 1.478 By : 06'
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NEAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
For Week Ending
20 April 1949
GREECE
Stclier
Vol. IV No. /5
Minor Greek crises: The Greeks have recently experienced several.
minor crises which are merely symptoms of the major ailments--
military, political, and economic?still plaguing Greece nearly five
years after liberation. The initial impetus of the guerrilla attack of
early April in the Grammos area has been spent, but the guerrillas have
apparently reoccupied some 200 square miles of the rugged terrain from
which the Greek Army drove them with great effort in the summer of 1948.
With the formation of the fourth Sophoulis cabinet, following the upset of
its predecessor as a result of partisan pressure, the continuance of
coalition government seems assured so long as Prime Minister Sophoulis
and Foreign Minister Tsaldaris can keep the members of their parties
(Liberal and Populist, respectively) in a cooperative mood within as well
as outside party setts. The recent strike of government workers over
wage and price difficulties has been ended chiefly through the government's
judicious handling of the matter. Small bonuses of money, food, and
clothing have been awarded the civil servants, and improved wage scales
are promised for 1 July. In order to finance the present settlement,
however, the government had to borrow from the pension and welfare
fund of the civil servants3 union itself.
TURKEY
Turks may seek re-definition of Tripartite Ageement The Turks, in
their efforts tobe included in Western security plans, have sought a
formal US commitment. If such is not forthcoming, Turkey may possibly
seek a re-definition of the UK-French-Turkish Treaty of 1939 on the
ground that the treaty does not conform to present, and possibly to
future, conditions.
There might well be reluctance in both Paris and London to extend
firmer commitments to Turkey at this time because of objections which
some members of the North Atlantic Treaty group might raise, and
because of possible demands by other Eastern Mediterranean or Near
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2.
Eastern states for similar commitments. Furthermore, neither UK nor
French military strength in the Near East is what it was when the treaty
was negotiated. For that reason alone, the French (in particular) might
well spurn Turkey's efforts to have the treaty rejuvenated.
The Turks would doubtless argue that Turkey, through its strategic
location and military strength, has much to offer to a rejuvenated mutual
assistance pact, and that, besides, Turkey's record of resistance to
Soviet pressure entitles it even to formal acceptance as a full member of
a Western security group. The Turks might also offer (provided the US
approved) to use their goad offices in attempting to persuade their Arab
neighbors and co-religionists to adopt a friendly attitude toward any
future UK treaty proposals. Turkey's own efforts to promote friendship
with the Arab states would fit in nicely with such a program.
PALESTINE
Israeli peace strategy: Israel, which has not taken pains to soothe UN
sensibilities in the past, made clear last week that it intends to write
its own final peace settlement with the Arab states, without going out of
its way to obtain the prior approval of the UN or the Palestine Concilia-
tion Commission (FCC). While Jewish Agency officials were underlining
Israel's intention to hold New Jerusalem by announcing plans for doubling
the city's 100,000 Jewish population in the next five years, Israeli repre-
sentatives bluntly informed the PCC that Israel does not plan either to
accept internationalization of Jerusalem or to yield ground on the other
two major issues involved in a settlement; the refugee problem and the
question of boundaries. The Israeli Government was represented as
being unable to accept repatriation of any substantial numbers of Arab
refugees in view of the strain being placed on it by the present influx
of immigrants. The Israelis further indicated that they were not prepared
to give up any of their holdings and would even ask for additional terri-
tory if Arab Palestine were to fall to Transjardan; although such an
approach would conflict with the US "territorial compensationnformula for
preserving the general lines of the 1947 partition scheme, the Israelis
indicated that they counted on "changing Washington's mind" on the
subject.
The Israelis were doubtless bothered by the UN General Assembly's
subsequent decision to postpone a vote on Israel's application for UN
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membership and by the Pope's Good Friday appeal for internatiersalizadon
of Jerusalem and other Holy Places, However, Israel is unlikely to
abandon its basic premise that the UN cannot bring itself to accept the
financial and military responsibility of intervening actively in Palestine,.
The Israelis evidently believe that they can work out an agreement for
dividing up Jerusalem with Transjordan which would lessen. UN qiialras
about the Holy Places by providing special international rights (or actual
UN control) over the Christian shrines, most of which are in the Arab
Old City,. If Israel were to make settlements regarding the other oustande
ing problems, the fears of outside powers regarding the refugees and
the final delimitation of boundaries could be allayed by pointing out that
the Arabs had already agreed to them, In the end, although Israeli brusque-
ness might cost it UN membership at this session, it would obtain the
settlement it wants and could then resubmit its application at the next
meeting of the General Assembly?
SYRIA
Government by apathy: Colonel Zaimss coup in Syria, which might have
been expect?to arouse politic:al passion and violence, has instead proved
to be one of the dullest revolutions in recorded history. The complete
absence of any opposition to Zaim would seem to indicate that the popula-
tion at large has few regrets over the ouster of President C)uwatli and his
entourage. At the same time, however, Zaim has been unable, after
almost three weeks in power,to obtain the support of a single Syrian,
political leader of any stature, with the possible exception of Foreign
Minister Adel Arslam After several lesser men proved unwilliuig or
unable ? to form a government, Zaim was forced to do the job himself,
personally assuming the posts of Prime Minister, Minister of Interior,
and Minister of Defense. 14lea:awhile, although Iraq and Argentina have
finally recognized the Zaim regime?with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and then
the major powers likely to follow suit?the external reaction to Zainiss
assumption of power has been almost equally listless. "Greater Syria' 3
. rumors have inevitably sprung ma, and the Iraqi Prime Minister is
reportedly discussing an Iraqi-Syrian railitary alliance with Zaim during
his current visit to Damascus. However, both Iraq and Transjordan, with
which it is allied, are probably too burdened with their own problems
to wish to become involved in Syrian matters at present, while Zaim
will probably shy away from close ties with his stronger Hashimite
neighbors while he stilt has a chance of becoming the Mustapha Kemal. cf
Syria.
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4.
The apathy which has greeted Zaim's appearance on the stage may
ultimately prove the undoing of his grandiose schemes for revitalizing
Syria. Aside from his obvious inexperience in politics, he does not
appear prepared to risk subverting the constitution in order to retain
power over the long run, and by deciding to deal with Israel he has
discarded one obvious means of whipping up popular support. Vacillation
over Tapline and the French monetary agreement is further specific
evidence that his regime may well become as colorless and ineffective
as the one it replaced.
IRAN
Soviet-Iranian relations: Soviet Ambassador Sadchikov's sudden departure
for Moscow on 15 April has emphasized the present unsettled state of
Soviet-Iranian relations. Points on which Sadchikov might be consulting
with the Kremlin include: (1) the alleged Iranian request for precise
determination of the Soviet-Iranian border east of the Caspian Sea; (2)
the changes in Soviet operations in Iran necessitated by the closing of the
Soviet consulates; (3) the possibility of getting Iran to withdraw its case
against the USSR from the Security Council agenda; and (4) the validity
and applicability of Article VI of the 1921 treaty between the two nations,
which furnishes a basis for Soviet intervention in Iran. The question of
Article VI was also raised over the weekend in a Tehran newspaper
report,later officially denie4 that /ran had informed the USSR that it
considered the 1921 treaty no longer valid in view of Iran's UN commitments.
INDIA-PAKISTAN
The Kashmir situation: Both India and Pakistan have continued to delay
the attainment of a7s?atislactory truce agreement in Kashmir by advancing
further proposals and counter-proposals regarding the terms of the truce.
India's actions are apparently motivated by a desire to prevent a plebis-
cite in 1949 and at the same time to counter Pakistani charges of obstruc-
tionism. Pakistan, on the other hand, may be influenced by pressure from
Mad authorities or by reports reaching the GOP that the strength of
Kashmir state forces is being increased.
The UN Commission for India and Pakistan, seeking to end discussion
of the most controversial points, submitted on 15 April to the Governments
IA India and Pakistan a new series of formal truce proposals, together
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5.
with the request that the proposals be accepted within three days. These
proposals include: (I) withdrawal of the Pakistani Army within seven
weeks according to an established schedule; (2) withdrawal of the Indian
Army within three months, also according to a stated schedule; and (3)
fixing of a cease-fire line based on the actual positions of the opposing
forces at the time of cease-fire. The Commission states that it will
station observers in northern Kashmir and that Indian garrisons will be
permitted there only if the Commission considers them necessary for the
region's defense. The proposals avoid the question of disarmament or
disbandment of the Azad Kashmir forces? although they provide for removal
of the Pakistani Army from the area. They also counter Indian claims
that Indian garrisons be posted in northern Kashmir and that administra-
tion of the region be returned by Pakistan to the state government. No
word has yet been received as to Indian and Pakistani reaction to the
draft agreement.
Burma seeks support from India and Pakistan: The Burmese Prime
Minister recently visited New Delhi and Karachi in an effort to obtain a
loan to finance Burma's exports of rice, and arms with which to quell
continuing revolts of several insurgents groups against the Government
of Burma. In New Delhi, he was told that financial assistance would not
be considered until peace had been negotiated between the Burmese
Government and the Fbarens. He also received no promises regarding
arms, the GOI being fearful for the safety of several hundred thousand
Indians now in insurgent-held territory if it became known among the
insurgents that weapons were being supplied to the Gonernment of
Burma. Results of talks in Karachi have not yet been reported, but the
Prime Minister will probably have no more success there than in New
Delhi. If no assistance of any kind is forthcoming from either India or
Pakistan, the Burmese Government will probably be forced into a new
series of peace negotiations with the Karens and other dissident groups
in order to maintain both its own position and the economic security of
the country..
NOTED IN BRIEF
Under Turkey's new program of greater tolerance of religion, the Turkish
Government is acting with caution and fore ought. A report from the
Naval Attache at Ankara states that, of the 7,298 beds in Turkish State
Hospitals, 140 have been set aside "for malaria" (sic), 225 for trachoma.,
25 for venereal diseases, 25 for rabies, and 250 for Religious Foundations.
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6.
The UK has allocated 113 one million to Transjordan for Arab refugee
resettle:me-it projects. The cont-Fifution, itithe-Vairm of a iorg term
interest-free loan, is distinct from the lures donated through the UN
to the relief program. This action gives Abdullah an opportunity to show
his mettle in initiating economic projects vital to his country in its role
of pr6:actor for some 500,000 refugees An Trausjordan and eastern
Palestine.
*
Although the Arab states plan to support the Tripolitanian delegation in
its demands tor a united, ina-ependerat Libya, a raernberoi the Lebanese
delegation has hinted that the Arab states might be willing to compromise
if the US woeld "lay off" the question of Israel. The Lebanese representa-
tive did not suggest other proposals, but it is likely that the Arab states
would consider a multi-power trusteeship, including at least one Arab
state, as well as trusteeship under either the Arab League or one of the
Arab states..
/rani= leaders have been groping for a suitable formula for a regional
pact, under whianee US and UK wournaird-Fr assistance to any signatoey
threatened by the USSR. Under consideration have been: (I) an Eastern
Mediterranean pact including Iran; (2) a Turko-lranian alliance; (3)
a steengthening and broadening of the Bar-Oaf:fad Pact, which at present
calls only for consuiation between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan;
and (4) a regional pact, as suggested by Foreige, Minister flekenat?
including Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries
in the area. Iranian thinking on the matter will probably become less
hazy after Tterkish Foreign Minister SadaTe returns to Ankara to report
on his recent conversation with US Secretary of State Acheson.
An outcome el the frSian Army's recently adopted policy of amicability
toward ther--triWis thes-rereirion of a strong tribal riapresentatiourt for
the forthcoming Constituent Assembly. How far this relicy has gone
may be judged from the election to the Assembly of Ammar Khan Shikkek,
the now strongly pro-US chief at the northern Kurds, who three years ago
was Minister o2 War of the Soviet-sponsored Kurdish Peoples Republic.
*
teekl.CEsre
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esjperr
pt.
Political tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan continues, but
no significant new developments have taken place during the week.
&USIA.Et.
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