Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 22, 2013
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 29, 1948
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP78-01617A004900010008-9.pdf293.98 KB
) - Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004900010008-9 IIMSRRATIONAL ORGAMIZATIon PAM ? _ wasKLYIARYiO.7 tor week ending 29 June 1948 USBALmay seek reconvening 9? CPC The Soviet squeeze on the Xestern allies in Berlin may well be designed to force a re- ?00nVioning of the Counoil of Foreign Ministers WSW, nos in a state of suspended animation. The sudden breaking off of the London Cilf meeting last November is known to have coma as a shook to Foreign Commissar Molotov. The USSR has already brought about a situation of such gravity in Berlin that action at highest government levels would seem to be suggested. Franoe, in her exposed oontinental position, is already most anxious for the resumption of ,some Itegotiations between East and West. The USSR probably has taken the French ,crise 4 wee into account in its Berlin demarohe. 1 Obie_ottops 9f SW countries forogvrovisiog of bilateral ts. Strong objections by most of the 18 RIP countries, arp.i'ttcUI1y the US. and France, to the original US draft bi-. lateral rip agreements, hamsforced the US to modifY these agree- ments to make them acceptable to these nations. The SRP participants protested' that their sovereignty was infringed by the stringent provisions and didactic tone of the US draft, which would make parliamentary approval ot these agreements difficult if not Impossible. As a result of these objections, the f US made substantial concessions designed to make the obligations of the NW countries more permissive and less mandatory and to soften the 'most objectionable provisions. The requirement for consultation on exchange rate revision when desired by the US was eliminated. UK and French unwillingness to extend most favored nation (MIN) treatment to occupied Japan and Korea, forced its deletion from the UK and French agreements altbough MTh for Germany was included in a separate protocol. ,The RP nations' insistence upon modification of these agreements in- dioates that, while anxious to receive US aid, they are unwilling to accept limitations upon their individual freedom which would expose them to the politioally explosive charge that they had , become subservient to the US. : Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004900010008-9 Document No. NO ccz in Class. 0 =ASS/FIND Class. CHANCED TO: TS DDA Nemo. 4 Apr 77 Auths DDA 1 1.91111.11.1.M.MMII.M1111111 *AR Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004900010008-9 Vieft'ff Western Trade Unions-consult on ERP. The 15-nation ERP Trade-UETUEMMZITTOFERITe7177757-fast March by Western European labor organizations interested in cooperating with the Recovery Program, will meet 29 ;eine in Paris to review the steps taken towards this objective and to hear Ambassador Harriman. Although this body was conceived as the nucleus for a possible t;estern trade union federation renewing the expected break-up of the Communist-oriented World Federation of Trade Unions (FTU), the prolongation of-East-West unity within the !FU has limited the Committee's field of action. Effective cooperation among the participating national labor organizations has been handicapped by conflicting views regarding the Committee's functions. British trade union Leaders contend that its main task should be to see that the component labor organizations work closely with their governments on ECA matters. They favor establishing a small staff for this purpose. The AFL member, however, visualizes an active U.RP trade union organization equipped with staff and funds sufficient for olose liaison with OEEC, participation in OREC programs, propagandizing of European workers, and preparation of counter measures against Communist strike saboteurs. The British unions will probably remain reluctant to develop a vigorous Western organization along the lines proposed by the AFL so long as they and the CIO are unprepared to break permanently with the WETU. Palestine Truce prospects. Israel's vigorous reaction' against truce violation perpetrated by the extremist Irgun Zvai Leumi strengthened the moral position of the newly-proclaimed state in world opinion. In contrast, UN Mediator Bernadotte denounced Egypt for two truce violations -- the first breaches of sufficient gravity to provoke a formal protest. **Meanwhile it would appear desirable to concentrate efforts on prolonging the truce rather than attempting to effect a formal settlement.** If the status gao. can be extended long enough, perhaps a gradual de facto settle- ment can, be brought about and an unacknowledged acquieseeace in the existence of a state of Israel will ensue. Soviet veto of Ceylon UN membership unlikely. There is some speculation concerning a Soviet veto of Ceylon's application for UN membership in an attempt,to link, this application with those of the excluded Satellite states. In view of the recent Soviet , courtship of Southeast Asia however, the USSR will probably inter- - 2 -3,,C0lerr Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004900010008-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004900010008-9 0 s- pose no more opposition to Ceylon's application than to Burma's. Czech Kashmir appointee favors West. Anti-Communist aosef :orbs', Masaryk-nominated ana Communist-confirmed Czech delegate tQ the UN Kashmir Commission, has stated he is serving only to id the western powers. He doubte that any effective control will e exercised by Prague over his Commission activities. - 0 - USSR believed behind attempted revival of Spanish,itsue. Ath eeli the USSR and the Ukraine in favor, the SC rejected a recent eotion to place the Spanish question on its agenda. There has been no change in the situation since the Generel Assembly last fall reaffirmed its original policy of diplomatic aloofness. When .7,ecretary General Lie decided to refer the question to the SC, it vas thought that no power was backing the move. However, Asyg Kernel (Czechoslovakia) and Asyg Protich (Yugoslavia), the two secretariat officials active in tLe matter, are rumored to be politically subservient to Moscow-controlled Asyg Sobolev. 0 - Admission of Czech refutees to IRO cam .s is ur ed. Following e vis t to Czech re gees in German administered camps, the Fxecutive Secretary of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) has proposed that these victims of the Communist coup in Czecho- slovakia be admitted to ILO assembly centers. At present some e,000 Czechs are living in these camps under conditions which have been exploited by Communists in Czechoslovakia in order to discredit the US. While difficulties are expected in caring for the un- precedented number of refugees now in the US Zone, the IRO-0,4GUS egreement to give shelter on an emergency basis to Czechs who entered the US Zone on or after 1 February 1948, will alleviate the present situation. Consideration is being given to a grant of fall IRO. status to these refugees as a further move toward counteracting foreign and domestic criticism. Soviet inconsistency in UN. That consistency is not the bug- bear of the Soviet mind appears from its DIN maneuvres in the field of domestic relations. Chile recently placed on the next agenda its charge that the USSR prevented the Russian-born wife of a Chilean Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004900010008-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004900010008-9 0 IEC?ItteT diplomat from emigrating. This brought forth a wrathful Soviet . protest that Chile was attempting illegally to meddle in a matter of Soviet domestic jurisdiction. In sharp contrast, the USSR felt itself called upon in the Trusteeship Council to advocate UN action in the case of a Bikom Chief in British Cameroon, encumbered with 110 wiveas The chance to interfere in the internal affairs of a British mandate was too good to be overlooked. Khalidi, the Iraqui delegate, more wisely suggested that the Te "leave the man to discover the futility of his actions himself." Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004900010008-9