INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 4 FOR WEEK ENDING 25 JANUARY 1949

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004900010022-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: January 25, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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S.FeptifT
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP
OFFICZ OF IMPORTS AND ESTIUATES
CENTRAL INTELL/GENCE AGENCY
=NINO PAPER
NOTICF: This document is a working paper, NOT an
official CIA issuance, and has not necessarily been
coordinated with other ORE producing components.
It represents current thinking by one group of
specialists in CIA, and is designed for use by
others engaged on similar or overlapping studies.
The opinions expressed hetein may be revised before
final and official publication. It is intended
solely for the information of the addressee and not
for further dissemination.
Copy for*
Document No.
NO CHANGE in Class. 0
GebEcussIFIED
Class. CHANGED TO: TS
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA NEG. i711116
Date: LUE11.4928. BY: ?
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP
nu= SMEARY NO. 4
Par week ending 25 January 1949
Volume II
The Intemftional We0
The Security Council appears about to pass a four-power resolution
on Indonesia setting a timetable for estahlishment of a sovereign state
by 1950. The Rhodes armistice talks between Israel and Egypt are
temporarily deadlocked over who shall remain where in the Negeb. Secession
of UK, US and Dutch unions from the WFTO will be followed by open efforts
to create a new Western trade union grouping under the aegis of the ERP
Trade Union Advisory Committee. As the International Wheat Conference
convened in Washington, it was highlighted by attendance of both Argentina
and the USSR.
cs 0 011.
immes.j.Euzanunittulelieved temporary. **Despite the ap-
parent impasse in the Western Union study group on "European unification,"
it appears likely that a comprcmise solution will be achieved, if not at
the current Western Union Foreign Ministere meeting, at least by the time
of the next meeting three months hence. The compromise will probably in-
clude not only a Council of Ministers, as proposed by the UK, but some form
of parliamentary assembly, as favored by the other four Brussels Pact powers.
The chief stumbling block is the UK, which proposes instead of an assembly
a European Conference of delegates appointed by the various governments,
who would vote by country instead of individually. The French reportedly
believe the UK suggestion to be dictated largely by the Labor Government's
fear of the role Churchill would play in any assembly to which he could be
elected. The isolated British position appears untenable in the long run,
however, and may in time have to be modified to meet the views of the 'Abell
powers. British opposition will also be influenced by the UR belief that
the US favors prompt steps toward greater European unity.**
no 0 les
Soviet interest in International Wheat Conference. The action of the
USSR in sending a delegation, reportedly with full powers to sign any
agreement, to the current International Wheat Conference in Washington is
directly contrary to previous Soviet policy toward international economic
organizations and agreements. The USSR has not only failed to join most
UN economic bodies except the ECE (where it played little role in actual
operations) but also did not attend the GATT or ITO meetings and ignored
the previous International Wheat Conferences of 1947 and 1948. Soviet
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eotivee in atteading the Coeference, whica fe3 te draft an international
agreerent, may stem from: ?(1) Scviet desire tb demonstrate more
interest in international ecoeomic affairs ac part of a "peace offensive";
(2) Soviet interest in developing East-West trade in order to permit imports
of. otrateeic itens :lacking in the Soviet cebit econcmy; (3) Soviet concern
Over merheting its exportable stir/Ave of 'Kent. Argentina, the only other
major exporter ohiee did not sipn t evicue ereft agreement, is also
attending),
FrancoeBritish talks on Italian Colons. *-'1Recent discussions on the
Italian colonies between Foreign Ministers Bolin end Schuman forecast
another attempt to secure US-UR-French agreement on returning Tripolitania
to Italy, Although Schuman urged restoration of -noth Tripolitania and at
least the Massawa-Asmara portion of Eritrea to Italy, Bevin appeared re-
ceptive only to the return of the former. Schuman favored Italian trustee-
ship for Tripolitania on the grounds that: (1) the Italians had sufficient
military force to make possible their return, particularly if undertaken
in stages; (2) the Government might otherwise fall; and (3) denying Italy
this colony would be a setback to Italian adherence to the Western Eurcpean
bloc. Although the present Foreign Office view is that the Government
would not fall and Bevin seriously doubted Italian ability to control tile
colony, he agreed to ask the US whether it wished to alter the US-UN
agreed position favoring postponement. Schuman also urged either a
collective trusteeship, with Italian and Ethiopian participation, for
Massawa and Asmara or at least postponement on these areas, but Bevin
adhered firmly to the US-UK position for cescion of the bulk of Eritrea
to Ethiopia.** It appears pessible that Italy is pressing its campaign
for both colonies largely in the hope of recovering at least one. The
Italian reaction is now apparently the key factor in the colonies picture,
and despite other unfavorable consideration, the desire of the Western
powers to cement Italian relationships with the Western bloc and bolster
the present Government may well lead them to favor granting Italy some
form of control over Tripolitania.
0
Prospects for Rhodes negotiations. **After an encouraging start, the
Rhodes armistice talks between Egypt and Israel have reached a deadlock.
The difficulties which have defied the efforts of Mediator Bunche center
about the disposition of such strategic strongpoints as Bir Asluj, Beer-
sheba and El Auja in the Negeb.** With the January 25th elections at hand,
the MI has found it difficult to compromise the military advantages which
it has gained during the past three months The ultimate outcome of the
Rhodes negotiations will depend to some extent on the results of the
Israeli elections. Should Menahim Beigin's militant Hebrew Freedom Move-
ment roll up an unexpectedly large vote, the chances for compromise will
be reduced to almost nothing. However, should the moderate government party,
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the Mapai,exhibit strength) the outlook for breaking the deadlock will be
much improved. **An indioation that Israel may eventually adopt a rock:mate
attitude toward territorial adjustments may be inferred from a chance remark
of the Israeli UR representative that Israel might concede a Mediterranean
corridor and a mall ceastae strip around Gaza tu Transjordan." In any
caee, simultaneous application of British pressure to the Arabs and US
persuasion to the Jews eey be R neceesary prerequisite to success at Rhodes.
? 0 e
Indonesian dev9lopmeet3,1 The SC is now confronted with a choice be-
tween four competing reeoletions on Indonesia; the joint US-Norway-China-
Cuba resolution, a Dutch, an Australian, and one proposed by the nineteen-
nation Nes Delhi Conference. Tbe Conference displayed considerable
moderation in limiting itself to adoption of a resolution exhorting the
Security Council to take strorgest action against the Dutch. Without taking
explicit steps to erect a permanent Asian bloc, it succeeded in placing the
collective weight of rag:tonal opinion behind a call for vigorous SC measures.
Australia, one of the New Delhi participants, is pressing for a resolution
strongly denouncing the Netherlands and setting up an SC Commission with
discretionary powers to determine the time and extent of Dutch troop with-
drawals from Republican territory. Australia opposes adoption at present
of a fixed timetable and favors letting the commission study the situation
and prepare a definite plan for Dutch evacuation. The Dutch in turn have
drafted a resolution which renders lip service to the Renville principles
and envisages the establishment through free elections of a United States
of Indonesia prior to 15 November 1950. The Dutch draft, however, ignores
the existence of the Republic and calls for replacement of the Good Offices
Committee by a UN Plenipotentiary with powers limited to the observation
and verification of Dutch good works. All of these resolutions probably
will be scrapped in favor of the US-backed four-power resolution.
Despite the pressure of the New Delhi conference, it is unlikely that
the four-power resolution can be materially strengthened and still hold
in line all of the precarious seven votes required for passage. The res-
olution atterpts to apply the maximum practical pressure on the Dutch to
carry out their avowed intentions to establish a United States of Indonesia
and directs that the Dutch deal with the Republic. Any resolution which
passes the Security Council is almost certain to be unsatisfactory to the
New Delhi nations and they will probably study further steps to bring
pressure against the Netherlands. Under Indian leadership, they may seek
to invoke sanctions against the Dutch independently of the UN. Such
measures would conflict with the UN Charter which, while authorizing
collective measures of self-defense under Article 51, does not allow im-
position of sanctions by regional groups without the approval of the SC.
Nevertheless, it is improbable that the letter of the UN Charter would as
a practical matter restrain these nations from employing strong economic
measures against the Netherlands. Moreover, Dutch defiance of the several
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SEtirET
resolutions of the SC would furnish some moral justification for the Asian
rations themselves taking action which they could well claie should in the
firat instance have been taken by a forthright and fearless X.
an 0w-'
USSR rAtarmaa.held on world labor forcpc to meet Western labor
apaIlme. The accession of the British, IYS, and Dutch labor crganizations
from the World Federation of Trade Unions and their cement moves to
entablish a Western-oriented labor internctional are apparently inducing
Soviet Russia to tighten the grip it maintains on world labor forces through
Communiat trade unions. A recent Cominform directive stresses Soviet labor
leadership in the international labor rovement and the necessity for
"exclusive obedience" by boa]. Communist parties to Moscow. Tighter
Communist Party control of labor forces has been instituted in recent
months in the Soviet Zone of Germany, rtmre the functions of the old"iwork
oouncils" are being transferred to the Communist-directed trade union
executive committal:lop and in France and Italy where the Communists have
seated themselves on labor-management councils in key industries. These
successive =yes probably reflect a revised Soviet world labor strategy
designed largely to minimize any loss of influence among the workers should
a strong anti-Communist labor international be established.
Despite the valkout of its US, UK and Dutch delegations, the WFTU,
with 64 of its 67 national labor organizations still members, will continue
to function as a world forum for propagation of Soviet foreign policy ob-
jectives. The Communist members of the WYTU Executive Bureau, who "abstained"
from voting on the British proposal for WFTU suspension, will probably
utilize the January 28 meeting of the Executive Committee (a larger WFTU
body embracing 26 national labor centers) ,to censure the seceding Western
labor organizations and to try to prevent the defection of other non-
Communist national labor groups.
Efforts of the 15-nation ERP Trade Union Advisory Committee, currently
meeting in Bern, to set up a new labor international will be retarded so
long as the AIL and the CIO are unable to agree on the terms of US labor
representation and on a joint international labor program. Continued AFL
insistence on recognition as the predominant US labor organization will
impede the coordinated participation which the Western European, particularly
the British, trade unions desire and will probably deter their adherence in
substantial numbers to any US-UR sponsored international. Such disunity in
the Western labor camp is likely to be still further aggravated by current
AFL attempts to block selection of a veteran Belgian trade unionist, now a
WFTU Assistant Secretary-General, au Secretary of the Trade Union Advisory
Committee. This official, who is supported by the TUC and the CIO, would
probably be assigned responsibility for drawing up the ground-plan for the
new international.
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