(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A005800010017-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: March 12, 1946
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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GENERAL
Proposed Arrxs and Air Force provisions of Italian tr a ..-.
USFET London reports that.the Four-Powor Military Group
has decided to recommend to the Deputies of the Council of',
Foreign Ministers the following provisions, for inclusio:a in
the peace treaty with Italy: (a) Army .and C?arabivierl per-.
sonnel will be limited to 265,000 -(Army, 200,000; Gar: bt.-
nieri, 65,000), but , fixed type of organization or system of
recruitment will not be prescribed. (b) The Air Force xvsrltl
be limited to 25,000 personnel, 150 fighter and 200 other
aircraft of which not more than 60 may be transport.
(Organization, armament, and deployment of both Army and
Air Force will be designed to meet only. thy, necessities for
maintenance of order and frontier and A;A defenses.) (c)
Italy shall not possess or experiment with guided xmnissiles,
guns with range over 30 kilometers, sea mi- es, torpedoes,
submarines or assault craft. (Inspection anal control
machinery has not yet ",been agreed upon.)
These proposals provide ratios of (a) ground force
to air force personnel of approximately 10 to 1 an," (b) air
force personnel to aircraft of approximately 72 to 1. TSFlT
suggests that similar ratios be followed in drafting the Balkan
treaties.
Polish trop referendum-Regarding the disposition of Polish
troops in Italy, the US representative ACC reports that: (i')
General Anders was to depart on 12 March for London whera
the British will attempt to obtain his cooperation in a plan to
circularize Bevin's statement urging all Polish troops in
Italy to return voluntarily to Poland; (b) every effort will be
made to complete the circularization before the m=eting of
the Security Council on 21 March; and (c) informed British
officials in Italy state that the support of General Ands ?s is
necessary for the successful execution of the plan but believe
that, regardless of the General's stand, only about 10 percent
of the Polish troops in Italy will elect to return to Poland.
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3. US cruiser co }Ipetina courtesy calls--The Navy reports
that the cruiser USS LITTLE ROCK is completing a round
of courtesy visits to South American ports. It arrives' at
the -Canal Zone on 11 March and will visit Cartagena,
Colombia, during 16 to 18 March.
EUROPE -AFRICA
4. IRAN: Premier reviews Moscow talks--In a long con??er-
cation with Am assa or urray eliran on 10 March,
Premier Qavam gave the following account of his rec? nt
talks in Moscow:
Qavam raised three points on which he sought
Soviet agreement: (a) a promise to withdraw troops
before 2 March; (b) moral support in settling the
Azerbaijan difficulty; and (c) the appointment of a
new Soviet Ambassador to Tehran. On only the lant
point was he successful. In regard to point (a), this
Soviets fell back on the statement that their "inter -
ests" required the retention of troops. In regard :.o
point (b), the Soviets said that they could do nothin,
because "Soviet honor was involved."
?.avam quoted Stalin and Molotov as saying: "We
do not care what the US and Britain think and we a=?e
not afraid of them." Ambassador Murray believe:,
that this statement may have been prompted by an
effort on 2avam's part to advance the US and UK
attitude as the reason for his inability to comply,
with Soviet wishes.
Both Stalin and Molotov raised the question of
oil concessions, but Qavam stated that he was unable
to discuss the matter and refused a Soviet offer to
form a joint Soviet-Iranian company in which the
Soviets would have a 51 percent interest.
Murray has made clear to both Qavam and the Shah
the seriousness with which the US views the retention of
Soviet troops in Iran and the US intention to place the
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matter before the Security Council immediately.
Murray adds that (avam "made a point" of telling
him that (a) on arriving in Baku on his way from Moscow he
had observed the city "impressively surrounded by anti-
aircraft guns," and (b) according to the Iranian Cc,nsul
General in Baku, "this was the result of an order for gen-
eral mobilization in the Soviet Union."
5. USSR: Soviet attitude. toward Churchill speech--Embassy
Moscow believes that the Soviet, press attack on C: iurchill's
Fulton speech was initiated only after the Soviet lEaders
noted hostile reactions to the speech in the US and Britain
and therefore concluded that Soviet influence could profit-
ably be exerted on international public opinion. The Embassy
feels that Moscow's approach reflects relief, and i. he belief
that the western democracies will not likely succead in
organizing an effective military bloc against the USSR.
6. BULGARIA: Government is a rehensive of elect` ons--
Barnes reports that the growing g popular "`? "` r ""
Bulgarian opposition has made the Communists in+jr asingly
apprehensive of holding elections or convoking a Constituent
Assembly until the peace has been signed. Soviet encourage-
ment has led the Bulgarian Government to expect ~ early
conclusion of a peace treaty and recognition by the western
democracies.
7. - RUMANIA: US replies to King's inquiries on US )lic
As previously noted , ing Michael recently asked for an
expression of US economic and political policy toward
Rumania during and after peace treaty negotiation:: (Daily
Summary of 4 March, item 3). The State Departm ant has
replied that (a) the US desire for the establishmeng. of truly
representative democratic governments is well kn awn; (b)
the great powers, as stated in Secretary Byrnes' E peech
of 28 February, have no right to garrison troops 1i other
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/VT/41
sovereign states without their approval and must not
impose troops on small, impoverished states; (c) all
territorial questions should be postponed until the final
peace settlement, when the US will approach these prob-
lems with sympathy for the wishes of the populations
involved and with careful attention to ethnographic, eco-
nomic and political factors; and (d) the US continues to
view the economic rehabilitation of nations that have
suffered from the war and the establishment of normal
world-wide commercial relations as cornerstones of a
stable peace.
8. HUNGARY: Army
strength--Voroshilov, during an in-
formal discussion with the American representative ACC,
stated that the present strength of the Hungarian Army is
32,000 ,and will soon be reduced to 25,000. Voroshilov
denied press reports that the Hungarian Army, with Soviet
help, would be increased to 100,000.
Freedom of press and speech curtailed--Schoenfeld
has reported further encroachments on the freedom of
press and speech in Hungary during the past two weeks.
The Soviets have taken control of the Hungarian radio,
which now has a definite pro-Soviet and anti-British bias.
Four newspapers were suspended briefly for articles
unfavorable to the USSR. The AP correspondent states
that his dispatches have been censored and subjected to
inordinate delay. ,
FAR EAST
9. CHINA: Inactivation of the China Theater--General.
Wedemeyer, at the suggestion of General Marshall,
recommends that the China Theater be inactivated on
1 May. He feels that the step might be expected to
strengthen China's hand in pressing for the early removal
of Soviet troops from Manchuria.
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tO\f~bENT!AIi
General Wedemeyer is opposed to the permanent
assig invent of additional functions to the US Military
Advi,Ic ory Group in China, although he believes that there
woulc be no breach of faith if the group were charged with
overt 11 supervisory duties of winding up residual functions
in the, theater. He proposes that the Shanghai Port Command
be re.)rganized to take over residual operational functions
of the China Theater.
10. CHIN : Tsin taa and Tientsin harbor facilities--According
to the Commander, Seventh Fleet, the Navy will make
avail;:able for commercial and UNRRA shipping at Tsingtao
ample deep-water berthing' at piers having warehouse space.
At Ti mtsin.-Taku the virtual completion of Japanese repatria-
tion and Chinese Army embarkations, as well as some
decrE-ase-in US Marine regiArements, make it feasible to
-resur ie moderate scale shipping. Lighterage at Tientsin-
Taku. controlled-by the Chinese Merchants Association, is
reoos ced to be adequate.
II. TAPA:.~: Administrative division recommended--CINCPAC
has r .3commendedthat the Izu Islands north of 30 degrees
latitude be controlled by SCAP because of currently unsa.tis-
factor,y administrative conditions and a threatened serious
food shortage. Under the Japanese regime, these islands
were administered as a part of the Tokyo metropolis.
12. N.E.L: Dutch-Indonesian discussions Consul General Foote
repoi is that Sjahcir has ignored Soekarno's latest order to
return to Djocjakarta for further talks, and is ready to begin
negotiations with van Mook on 12 March. Foote believes that
Clark Kerr's threat to terminate his visit, the introduction
of ne' i money in the N.E.I., and the landing of additional
Dutcl troops in Java, led Sjahrir to renew talks without
delay
DOIFIDENTIAL1
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