(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A006100060029-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: February 28, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

4 8 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP78-01617AO06100060029-3 w" 33 FES 1950
%JU
T O P SECRET 1 22/-'y V
1o Western European attitude toward neutrality--US Ambas-
sador Bruce in Paris believes that although the question
of neutrality in the East-West struggle has been debated in
the French press, there is no indication of a swing in public
opinion against the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) and .the
Military Defense Assistari.ce Program, Bruce is convinced
that the French Government retains its original motives
and objectives in participating in the collective plan to
strengthen the defense potential of Western Europe.
US Ambassador Murphy in Brussels expresses the
opinion that although the Belgians would probably not fight
if attacked during the spring of 1950, the Belgian Govern-
ment and people are firmly committed to the concept of
NAT. Murphy adds that the Belgians would fight at a later
date if they thought their side would be successful, but that
they have no desire to be "liberated again."
US Charge Villard in Oslo expresses some concern
over what seems to be growing apprehension among Nor -
wegian newspaper writers and individual businessmen that
the hydrogen bomb negates all efforts to prevent war. Villard
reports, however, that he has detected no sign of doubts or
waning enthusiasm in government circles or among Norwegian
people generally regarding the principles of mutual defense.
US Embassy The Hague believes the Dutch are "not
greatly attracted by the neutrality idea," The Embassy adds,
however, that there are indications of a revival of neutrality
sentiment among Western Europeans and that there is some
suspicion that the US has abandoned the policy of containing
the USSR without making an alternative known.
urn r]?; No.
State Dept. review completed
;0 ass. El
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cl T0: TS
4 Apr 77
Date:
Auth: 17~;;
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GENERAL
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EUROPE
20 RUMANIA.- Reaction to US withdrawal from Bulgaria--
US Minister Schoenfeld in Bucharest, in describing the
effect of the suspension. of CTS-Bulga.:ri.an relations on the
people of Rumania, reports that the initial gratification
of the non-Communist, majority at the vigorous US action
has been followed by a sense of discouragement. Accord-
ing to Schoenfeld, this "deepened dismay" results from
a growing belief that the US action in Bulgaria was in
substance a retreat and may presage retirements from
other Eastern European countries,
3. HUNGARY.- Legation position reviewed--US Minister
Davis in Budapest expresses a opinion that an abrupt
reduction of the Legation sta:ff, would cause the US to
lose so much prestige that continuation of US representa-
tion would become meaningless. Davis points out that
such a reduction, following Hungarian charges that the
US Legation is a spy ring, would constitute a tacit ad-
mission of the truth of the charges.
4. YUGOSLAVIA.- Tito concerned over possible attack--
US Ambassador Allen in Belgrade has learn that Marshal
Tito has expressed serious concern over the possibility of
a Cominform attack on Yugoslavia in the spring of 1950.
According to Allen"s informant, Tito believes such an
attack would be designed to eliminate Titoism before it
spreads to China and to divert attention within the Satel-
lites from current internal hardships, Tito reportedly be
lieves the greatest safeguard against a Soviet attack on
Yugoslavia would be for the US to let the USSR know that
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AL LIL
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such an attack would start. World War III. Allen's in-
formant commented that Tito appeared anxious to dispel
the impression given in. a recent speech that he was
anti-American and that he seemed genuinely worried
over the present situation.,
(CIA Comment- CIA believes that although. Yugo- .
slav leaders are probably genuinely concerned over the
possibility of some mayor Cominform move during the
spring of 1950, Tito's current expressions of alarm are
calculated primarily to counteract the unfavorable impres-
sion. resulting from both Yugoslav recognition of Ho Chi
Minh in Indochina and recent; anti-Western, speeches
apparently designed for Cominfform and internal consump-
tion.)
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
5. INDIA -PAKISTAN. Bengal situation termed threat to peace --
US Ambassador Henderson in New Delhi. reports that Prime
Minister Nehru and other top 'Indian leaders have been ex-
pressing serious concern over the current communal tension
in Bengal and have even asserted that recent developments
there present the "most grave" threat to the peace of South
Asia since partition, According to Henderson, Nehru has
stated that atrocities committed against minorities in East
Bengal (Pakistan) have produced an atmosphere Which might
result in a general exodus of a substantial proportion of
East Bengal's 12 million Hindus if India were to permit
them to enter; Nehru also expressed fear that a violent com-
munal reaction beyond the ability of the government to con-
trol might take place throughout India. Henderson suggests
that although British observers question the "authentic
quality" of the present Bengal crisis, believing it possibly
inspired by a desire to prejudice the UN Security Council
debate on Kashmir, the situation remains dangerous if only
because of Indian emotion. over the matter.
T 6MILE T
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6. IRAN Internal situation reportedly deteriorate, --us
Ambassador i ey in Tehran expresses the be-N that
the current situation in Iran, is "bad, deteriorating, and
dangerous," and that it requires considerably more
than "token" economic assistance from the US. Wiley
recommends that the US ;re-evaluate its strategic - i,nk-
ing in connection with. Iran and make a definite decision
either to let Iran "'go down the drain by default"' or to
attempt something effective.
(CIA Comment. CIA believes that although the
general economic decline i.n Iran has produced seriously
depressed conditions in certain sensitive areas, there
is no evidence available to date indicating that distress
and unrest are so widespread as to threaten the stability
of the country.)
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