Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 30, 2008
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 23, 1950
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP78-01617A006100060033-8.pdf107.29 KB
Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP78-01617A006100060033-8 ,L_46 zb TOP c T T1 T GENERAL 1. Prospects for East-West accord reviewed--US Ambas- sador Kirk in Moscow, in commenting on recent public proposals for high-level talks between the US, the UK, and the USSR, expresses the opinion that there are no new developments in Moscow Indicating improved pros - pects for a basic settlement between the West and the USSR. Kirk adds that he does not expect a worthwhile agreement until the free world's collective security attains sufficient stability and promise of permanency to raise doubts in the minds of the Soviet leaders regarding their chances for gaining control of the world for Communism. The Ambassador also believes that an East-West compro- mise at this time can only be to the advantage of the USSR, 2. Yugoslavs reportedly refuse to compromise on Trieste- US Ambassador Dunn in Rome has learned from the Italian Foreign Office that Yugoslav Foreign Minister Kardelj recently stated in most emphatic terms that "under no cir- cumstances" would Yugoslavia consider abandoning to Italy any portion of the Free Territory of Trieste now occupied by Yugoslavia. Dunn observes that this position is contrary to the whole spirit of the informal Italo-Yugoslav talks, which up to this time had been going quite favorably. The Ambas sador adds that the Italian Government is most disappointed: over this development, which would seem to put an end to the present attempt to settle the Trieste issue, unless the Yugo- slavs were making a bargaining gesture. 3. Views on Yugoslav recognition of Ho Chi Minh--US Ambas- sador Allen in Belgrade suggests that it would have been virtually impossible for Yugoslavia, as an avowed Marxist state, to refuse the request of Ho Chi Minh (Moscow-trained zment TO, I r.1.._ .,r? in class. cI.a";r_. P +; & E T Date; ~ ! 47ry .;y: F E8 1950 1222 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP78-01617A006100060033-8 State Dept. review completed Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP78-01617AO06100060033-8 TOP SECRET leader opposing Bao Dai) for recognition of his regime as the government of Indochinao Allen points out that the Yugoslavs have been most anxious to establish con- tact with the Chinese Communists in order to hasten a split between Mao and the Kremlin and that Tito sees a possi- bility of accomplishing this through Ho. The Ambassador comments that Yugoslavia's primary value to the US at the moment arises from its position as a Marxist state independent of both the Cominform and the West and that Tito's recognition of Ho is consistent with his "independ- ent" position. R {fijL ET Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP78-01617AO06100060033-8