(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A006100060033-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: February 23, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP78-01617A006100060033-8
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GENERAL
1. Prospects for East-West accord reviewed--US Ambas-
sador Kirk in Moscow, in commenting on recent public
proposals for high-level talks between the US, the UK,
and the USSR, expresses the opinion that there are no
new developments in Moscow Indicating improved pros -
pects for a basic settlement between the West and the
USSR. Kirk adds that he does not expect a worthwhile
agreement until the free world's collective security attains
sufficient stability and promise of permanency to raise
doubts in the minds of the Soviet leaders regarding their
chances for gaining control of the world for Communism.
The Ambassador also believes that an East-West compro-
mise at this time can only be to the advantage of the USSR,
2. Yugoslavs reportedly refuse to compromise on Trieste-
US Ambassador Dunn in Rome has learned from the Italian
Foreign Office that Yugoslav Foreign Minister Kardelj
recently stated in most emphatic terms that "under no cir-
cumstances" would Yugoslavia consider abandoning to Italy
any portion of the Free Territory of Trieste now occupied
by Yugoslavia. Dunn observes that this position is contrary
to the whole spirit of the informal Italo-Yugoslav talks, which
up to this time had been going quite favorably. The Ambas
sador adds that the Italian Government is most disappointed:
over this development, which would seem to put an end to the
present attempt to settle the Trieste issue, unless the Yugo-
slavs were making a bargaining gesture.
3. Views on Yugoslav recognition of Ho Chi Minh--US Ambas-
sador Allen in Belgrade suggests that it would have been
virtually impossible for Yugoslavia, as an avowed Marxist
state, to refuse the request of Ho Chi Minh (Moscow-trained
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Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP78-01617A006100060033-8
State Dept. review completed
 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP78-01617AO06100060033-8
TOP SECRET
leader opposing Bao Dai) for recognition of his regime
as the government of Indochinao Allen points out that
the Yugoslavs have been most anxious to establish con-
tact with the Chinese Communists in order to hasten a split
between Mao and the Kremlin and that Tito sees a possi-
bility of accomplishing this through Ho. The Ambassador
comments that Yugoslavia's primary value to the US at
the moment arises from its position as a Marxist state
independent of both the Cominform and the West and that
Tito's recognition of Ho is consistent with his "independ-
ent" position.
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Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP78-01617AO06100060033-8