Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 30, 2008
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Publication Date: 
February 17, 1950
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PDF icon CIA-RDP78-01617A006100060037-4.pdf154.95 KB
Li GENERAL Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP78-01617AO06100060037-4 24822 1218 Soviet motives in Berlin traffic Si a -US High Commissioner McCloy in Frankfurt suggests that the intermittent slowdown of truck traffic to Berlin may be motivated by Soviet desires too (a) prevent the unauthor- ized shipment of materials and goods from the East Zone; (b) divert shipments from trucks to trains, because the Reichsbahn needs the revenue and trains are easier to control; and (c) test the firmness of Western policy in Berlin, McCloy expresses the opinion that pressure on the USSR through a selective embargo on industrial and raw material items badly needed in the Soviet Zone would be more effective and less open to Soviet reprisal than a general imposition of traffic restrictions. (CIA Comment.- CIA concurs in this analysis of the Berlin traffic situation.) 2. ECC views on strikes against military aid We-US coordinating committee for European military aid (ECC), in estimating the purposes of the current Commu- nist strike campaign against MDAP shipments, expresses the view that the principal objectives are to: (a) exploit European popular fear of war by instilling doubts regard- ing the objectives of the North Atlantic Pact and US policy; and (b) convince the US Congress and US public that MDAP is a waste of money and equipment because European recipients of military aid are unreliable allies. ECC be- lieves that physical interference with MDAP shipments is a secondary objective and that the Communists have no illusions regarding their ability to interfere seriously with deliveries, State Dept. review completed 4 Apr 77 6MAR9za Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP78-01617AO06100060037-4 0 FER iqc i CC) 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP78-01617AO06100060037-4 TOP SECRET 3o France to call on US for aid to Indochina--According to US Charge Bohlen. in Paris, French Ambassador Bonnet in W.shington. has been instructed to request large-scale US assistance to Indochina on a long-term basis. Bonnet's instructions reportedly convey the view of the French Gov- ernment that a US -UK-.French conference on Indochina is less urgent at this time than a direct approach. to the US with a view to ascertaining the general attitude of the US. Bohlen recommends that Bonnet be impressed both with the importance of development by the French of a "concrete and realistic" program for Indochina and with the primary responsibility of France in that area, 4. Pro osals to improve Austrian osi.tion--US Minister Erhardt in Vienna expresses the view that in the event there is no Austrian treaty, the Western Powers should take steps to strengthen .the sovereign control of the Austrian Government. As preliminary measures, Erhardt suggests that the Western Powers first propose to the USSR the immediate termination of the occupation.; if this is re- fused, the West should press the USSR to agree to a sub- stantial reduction of occupation forces, abolition of zonal boundaries, renunciation, of occupation costs, and elimina- tion of unnecessary functions of the Allied Council. Erhardt adds that after Soviet rejection of all these proposals, which would demonstrate Soviet responsibility for the continued occupation, the Western Powers could proceed with their own measures to strengthen Austria by.- (a) a renunciation by the UK and France of claims for occupation costs; (b) termina- tion of the few unilateral controls in the Western zones; (c) the appointment of a civilian High Commissioner, who would symbolize the end of the military phase of the occupation; and (d) a reduction, in occupation forces. Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP78-01617AO06100060037-4