(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A006100060037-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: February 17, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Li
GENERAL
Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP78-01617AO06100060037-4
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Soviet motives in Berlin traffic Si a -US High
Commissioner McCloy in Frankfurt suggests that the
intermittent slowdown of truck traffic to Berlin may be
motivated by Soviet desires too (a) prevent the unauthor-
ized shipment of materials and goods from the East Zone;
(b) divert shipments from trucks to trains, because the
Reichsbahn needs the revenue and trains are easier to
control; and (c) test the firmness of Western policy in
Berlin, McCloy expresses the opinion that pressure on
the USSR through a selective embargo on industrial and
raw material items badly needed in the Soviet Zone would
be more effective and less open to Soviet reprisal than a
general imposition of traffic restrictions.
(CIA Comment.- CIA concurs in this analysis of
the Berlin traffic situation.)
2. ECC views on strikes against military aid We-US coordinating committee for European military aid
(ECC), in estimating the purposes of the current Commu-
nist strike campaign against MDAP shipments, expresses
the view that the principal objectives are to: (a) exploit
European popular fear of war by instilling doubts regard-
ing the objectives of the North Atlantic Pact and US policy;
and (b) convince the US Congress and US public that MDAP
is a waste of money and equipment because European
recipients of military aid are unreliable allies. ECC be-
lieves that physical interference with MDAP shipments is
a secondary objective and that the Communists have no
illusions regarding their ability to interfere seriously with
deliveries,
State Dept. review completed
4 Apr 77
6MAR9za
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TOP SECRET
3o France to call on US for aid to Indochina--According to
US Charge Bohlen. in Paris, French Ambassador Bonnet
in W.shington. has been instructed to request large-scale
US assistance to Indochina on a long-term basis. Bonnet's
instructions reportedly convey the view of the French Gov-
ernment that a US -UK-.French conference on Indochina is
less urgent at this time than a direct approach. to the US
with a view to ascertaining the general attitude of the US.
Bohlen recommends that Bonnet be impressed both with
the importance of development by the French of a "concrete
and realistic" program for Indochina and with the primary
responsibility of France in that area,
4. Pro osals to improve Austrian osi.tion--US Minister
Erhardt in Vienna expresses the view that in the event
there is no Austrian treaty, the Western Powers should
take steps to strengthen .the sovereign control of the
Austrian Government. As preliminary measures, Erhardt
suggests that the Western Powers first propose to the USSR
the immediate termination of the occupation.; if this is re-
fused, the West should press the USSR to agree to a sub-
stantial reduction of occupation forces, abolition of zonal
boundaries, renunciation, of occupation costs, and elimina-
tion of unnecessary functions of the Allied Council. Erhardt
adds that after Soviet rejection of all these proposals, which
would demonstrate Soviet responsibility for the continued
occupation, the Western Powers could proceed with their own
measures to strengthen Austria by.- (a) a renunciation by
the UK and France of claims for occupation costs; (b) termina-
tion of the few unilateral controls in the Western zones; (c) the
appointment of a civilian High Commissioner, who would
symbolize the end of the military phase of the occupation; and
(d) a reduction, in occupation forces.
Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP78-01617AO06100060037-4