(ANNEX) IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET RECOGNTION OF THE HO REGIME IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A006100060052-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: February 1, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP78-01617AO06100060052-7
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A N N E X
1 February 1950
IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET RECOGNITION OF THE
HO REGIMEIN INDOCHINA
Soviet recognition of Ho Chi Mi.nh's "Democratic
Republic of Vietnam" early this week, following similar
action by the Chinese Communists, has jeopardized the al-
ready,uneasy position of the French--and the French-
sponsored Bao Dai regime--in Indochina. The implicit
threat in the Communist diplomatic maneuvers is strength-
ened by the presence of Chinese Communist forces on the
Indochina frontier and their ability to make substantial mili-
tary supplies available to the pro-Communist Ho regime.
This combination, of political and military pressure may, by
itself, force the French to withdraw from Indochina within
a year. In the unlikely event that the Chinese Communist
Government should send a major military force into Indochina
for action against the French, French withdrawal could be ex-
pected within six months.
If France is driven from Indochina, the resulting
emergence of an indigenous Communist -dominated :regime
in Vietnam, together with pressures exerted by Peiping and
Moscow, would probably bring about the orientation of adjacent
Thailand and Burma toward the Communist orbit. Under these
circumstances, other Asian states--Malaya and Indonesia, par-
ticularly--would become highly vulnerable to the extension
of Communist influence.
Meanwhile, by recognizing the Ho regime, the USSR
has revealed its determination to force France completely
out of Indochina and to install a Communist government.
Alone, France is incapable of preventing such a development.
Although Western nations are committed to support of the
State Dept. review completed
Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP78-01617AO06100060052-7
 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP78-01617A006100060052-7
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French on the diplomatic level--the US and the UK, for ex.-
ample, plan shortly to extend recognition to the French
sponsored Bao Dai regime--such actions are unlikely to
halt the present trend in Indochina. Prospects for obtaining
additional diplomatic support for the French or Bao Dai are
poor in view of the unwillingness of most Asian nations to
assist what. they regard as a "colonialist"' puppet regime.
In fact, many of these nations can interpret Soviet and Chinese
recognition of Ho as concrete action in support of Asian na-
tionalism.
In resisting the Communist advance, France can,
now turn for assistance only to the US, which, in the face of
recent actions by the USSR and China in seizing the initiative
in Southeast Asia, is now confronted with the general alter-
natives of either increasing its support of Bao Dai or with-
drawing such support as has already been afforded. Adoption
of the first alternative sets up Bao Dai as the principal anti-
Communist instrument in Indochina, despite the inherent
weakness of his position. Asian nations, moreover, would
tend to interpret such US action as support of continued
Western colonialism. The second alternative, which would
result in the inevitable downfall of Bao Dai, would open the
way for intensified Communist action in Southeast Asia and
would render increasingly difficult the containment of Soviet
influence throughout the Far East.
Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP78-01617A006100060052-7