(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A006100070004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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GENERAL
1. Nehru's views concerning Communist aggressiveness--
US Ambassador Henderson in New Delhi reports that in
a 20 February conversation which "lasted hours" Prime
Minister Nehru displayed more friendliness and seemed
to speak with more frankness than, in any previous talks
Henderson says, however, that the conversation contained
little that was new and Nehru's general theme was that he
is not convinced of the "inherent aggressiveness of inter-
national Communism" Nehru said both sides, the interna-
tional.C.ommuni.st world and the Western world, suspect
the other of aggressive intent and are preparing to resist.
In. this situation, India's policy is to restore confidence
and to persuade each side the other has no aggressive
intentions
Nehru believes that arming Germany or Japan might
well frighten international Communism and thus precipitate
adventures on the part of the USSR or Communist China
which might lead to war. He does not believe the Soviet bloc
would risk world war by attacking either Germany or Japan,
if they were neutralized and left unarmed. He considers
that settlement of the Japanese problem in a manner agreeable
to Communist China and the USSR is a necessary part of a
general Far East settlement.
EUROPE
2. GERMANY. Adenauer -Schumacher views on defense--The
US High Commission in Germany transmits its comments
I-h recent discussion between Chancellor Adenauer and
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1527
on
Socialist leader Schumacher on the basic issues facing West
Germany? According to the High Commission, the Socialists
State Dept. review completed
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Document No. V S
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DDA memo, 4 Apr 77.
Auth: DAR_,C. 77 1763
Date : - A'AR 1978 By
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basic position on defense still differs substantially from
that of the government, Adenauer is apparently convinced
that the USSR is not ready to start World War III or to
invade West Germany; Schumacher fears that such an
attack might be "provoked" if West Germany were to make
a 66premature" decision on its defense contribution, that
is, in the absence of sufficient Allied strength in Germany.
Schumacher reportedly shares Adenauer's opposition to
a solution of a unified and neutralized Germany through
a four-power conference; however, Schumacher realizes
that West Germany must be prepared to accept such a
decision if it is achieved by the conference,
NEAR EAST -AFRICA
3. FRENCH MOROCCO. Crisis with French not settled--US
Consul McBride in Rabat reports that contrary to previous
information French-Moroccan relations appear still to be
in a turmoil. According to McBride, the French have
apparently abandoned their efforts to overthrow the Sultan
of Morocco and are now reportedly threatening to ignore
the Sultan and force a rupture of relations with the Moroccan
Government if concessions are not forthcoming.
FAR EAST
4o INDOCHINA: Views on possible negotiations-- A French Em-
bassy official in London has expressed the view to the US
Embassy that the situation in Indochina, like that in Korea,
is now approaching a stalemate and that the establishment of
a situation of strength in Indochina might help create an atmos -
phere conducive to negotiations, presumably with the Chinese
Communists. The French diplomat told Embassy London that
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if General de Lattre got the reinforcements he is asking
for (understood.to be 10 battalions), de Lattre could prob-
ably maintain and improve his present relatively favorable
position. According to this official, the French are under
no illusions concerning Chinese Communist aid to the
Viet Minh, but they are as a matter of policy attempting
to play down any reference to Chinese assistance and to
ignore Chinese intervention as long as possible. Although
de Lattre continues to hope it may be possible to engage
in on-the-spot negotiations with local Chinese authorities,
he has come to realize that the initiative, if any, must
come from them,
T O`P~J'J~'EJF)7
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