(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A006100070005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP78-01617A006100070005-8
21 FEB 1951
48151
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GENERAL
1. Possible warning to USSR, against attacking Yugoslavia--
US Embassy Moscow, in weighing the pros and cons of
a further Western warning to the USSR and the Satellites
against launching an attack on Yugoslavia, comes to the
conclusion it is probably undesirable at this time to make
a pronouncement. The Embassy recognizes the appre-
hension of British, French, and Italian representatives
in Moscow over the possibility that considerable doubt
exists in the minds of Soviet planners as to whether the
Western. Powers would react vigorously with military force
against a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia. The Embassy be-
lieves, however, that a categoric public announcement
would tend to "engage Soviet prestige" and would there-
fore seem likely to increase tensions. The Embassy
further considers that secretly warning the USSR would
be of "doubtful wisdom" because of the possibility of
VMle inadvertent leaks and subsequent confusion. The Embassy
also questions the advisability of giving Tito "a blank
check" through a warning to the USSR.
Concerning the possibility of Soviet, or Satellite
attack on Yugoslavia in the near future, the Embassy re-
ports it has no information to suggest any greater imminence
of such an attack, The Embassy notes, however, the recent
British withdrawal, at the NAT Council of Deputies, of their
previous estimate that a Satellite attack on Yugoslavia is
improbable until after the 1951 training season and refers
to information pointing to an increase in the tempo of
Satellite military activity., In these circumstances, the
Embassy believes it may be urgently necessary for the US
and the West to consider what the military reaction of the
West would be to an attack on Yugoslavia.
State Dept. review
completed
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DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
3
Auth: DDA REG. 771176
Date: 1MR197R By;
NO CHANGE in Class. p
0 DECLASSIFIED
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2, '~'rench_Italian conference on foreign policy--In. forwarding
a statement of the results of the recent conference between
the foreign ministers of France and Italy; US Embassy
Rome comments that 'the best :result of the conference, from
'the US point of view, may be that A disclosed no lessening
of French-Italian support of the primacy of NATO objectives
over the long-range problems of European unification. The
Embassy also believes that the conference has strengthened
the Italian Government by giving it an appearance of pursuing
an independent foreign policy, with the promise of French
support of Italian views in international forums,
EUROPE
3. FRANCE- Stabi _L oove.rnmen:t, deteriorating--US Em-
bassy Paris reports that the stability of the Pleven Govern
men has deteriorated in past weeks and attributes this
trend to the reluctance of the coalition, parties to compromise
on their difficulties" The Embassy believes there is not
much time for the government to maneuver away out of
the situation and points out that it is faced simultaneously
with two exceptionally tough problems- electoral law reform
and the choice of measures to cope with the economic im-
balance created by the West's rearmament program., The
Embassy considers that the Most ominous sign. has been the
growing indifference of the coalition partners to the fate of
'the present. government, with some members of almost everyY9
party declaring that the present Assembly itself, is "worn out
and elections should take place soon? The E mba~sy feels that
in this atmosphere much depends on the will, skill, and per-
severance of Pleven and on President Auriol's continued in-
tention to accept the government's resignation only if it is
overthrown by Assembly vote and not as a result of the
resignation of the ministers of one party.
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Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP78-01617A006100070005-8
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Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP78-01617AO06100070005-8