(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A006100070026-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 26
• Content Type: SUMMARY

X951
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48130
TNFI~~ E T 15 0
GENERAL
1. French estimate of situation inside Communist China-
The French Foreign Office has passed along to US Em-
bassy Paris a recent report on the Chinese Communist
internal situation by French Military Attache Guillermax
who recently left Nanking and has just arrived in Hong
Kong. According to this report, the internal situation in
Communist China has "profoundly changed," both from the
morale and economic standpoints, and the Chinese Com-
munists have abandoned the "primary task of reconstruc-
tions' in order to adopt measures putting the country on a
war footing. US economic measures have obviously hurt
industry, particularly in Shanghai, but they are not sufficient
to change the "present situation." Police control is extremely
strict and there is no internal danger to the regime. Although
certain divergencies exist among Chinese Communist Politburo
leaders, the absence of purges or resignations among those
leaders provides evidence of a unity of views. Chinese Com-
munist military-diplomatic successes in the first action
beyond Chinese borders in a hundred years appeal to nation-
alistic instincts and pride.
The French Military Attache makes the following
estimates concerning Chinese Communist foreign policy:
(a) China will not be able for a decade or more to rid
itself of Soviet pressure and influence in foreign affairs;
(b) China's economic weakness and relative military weakness
in. "modern war" permits the USSR to take advantage and
strike at Western interests in Asia; and (c) Chinese initia-
tive is gradually adapting itself to the "rhythm desired" by
the USSR in relationship to the whole world situation, not
merely the Far East.
State Dept. review completed
Document No. 013
NO CHANGE in Class. ^
DECLASSIFII-D
Class. C ?A 'IC'ED TO: TS S
DVA L ommo, 4 Apr 77
Auth; DMA F G. 77/1763 - 8-APR Date: 1978 By:
FRET
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NFIRE
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2. Tito's views on world situation--US Ambassador Allen in
Belgrade reports that in a discussion between Tito and US
Congressman Kennedy concerning collective security
measures and the reluctance of the Yugoslav and other
governments to support such measures in Korea, Tito
said that collective security is a world-wide problem which
might fail if undue effort is expended in peripheral areas.
Tito expressed his confidence that general war would "in-
evitably result" from Soviet aggression against any in-
dependent. European nation, whether, covered by the Atlantic.
Pact or not; he said he was confident that the Western Powers
would not be foolish enough to let Yugoslavia, Finland, or
any other country be overrun by the USSR. Tito stressed
the vital importance of Yugoslavia's strategic position and
the fact that the Yugoslav Army would fight. He said he
does not expect an attack on Yugoslavia this spring but he
is "no prophet." He emphasized that in case of attack he
would not need foreign troops, stating he could put at least
two million men under arms, depending on the amount of
equipment he could get.
Regarding a Big Four meeting, Tito said he was in
favor of a meeting and he thought the German problem should
be settled politically before Western Germany is rearmed.
He did not specify his reasons but seemed to regard the
rearming of Western Germany prior to a political settlement.
as dangerously provocative. When asked whether the West
should negotiate with the USSR until it is stronger, Tito
replied that the USSR was well aware of Western ability to
fight a long war and would respect Western strength.
Iftmor 1~ T
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rG9~'FI~Mp,~ E T
EUROPE
3. FRANCE: Communist "fizzle" no sign of weakness--
US Embassy Paris expresses the opinion that it, would
be "grossly misleading" .to interpret the Communist
demonstration over General Eisenhower's'visit'as a
major setback for the Communist Party. Although from
a numerical standpoint the demonstration "obviously
fizzled badly," the Embassy points out that industrial
workers were notably lacking from the display. Whether
as a result of the government's effective show of force
or not, the Embassy believes the Communists decided
not to commit their cadres in any all-out demonstration
at this juncture and' that':therefore",the demonstration may
not be regarded as an honest test of Communist strength.
On the other hand, the Embassy states that the demonstra-
tion offers extremely encouraging evidence that the French
Government has both the will and capability of taking rapid
effective and energetic action against the Communists when
the occasion warrants.
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
4. IRAN: Grady proposes removal of US women and children--
US Ambassador Grady proposes, in view of "increasing tension"
in the international situation and the difficulties and dangers
attending any emergency evacuation, to effect a "quiet de-
crease" in the number of women and children in Tehran.
Grady says he realizes the, necessity of avoiding "both hysteria
in the American community there and the political implications
of any announced Embassy policy showing a lack of US con-
fidence in the local government or a fear. of imminent war, but
he desires authorization to evacuate the dependents of Embassy
personnel "at their requests"
T 8f ftf T
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FAR EAST
5. INDOCHINA. Possible French deal with Viet Minh--The
British Charge at Saigon, according to a report trans-
mitted by US Embassy London, believes that French High
Commissioner de Lattre is thinking of negotiating with
the Viet Minh. De Lattre's purpose, in the view of the
British Charge, would be to gain time to strengthen his
position against the possibility of Chinese attack, The
Charge also considers that de Lattre hopes, by going
slow in his military campaign against the Viet Minh, to
encourage the Chinese not to intervene. De Lattre is
reported to have said he could retake Langson but he
does not wish by so doing to run the risk of forcing the
Chinese to intervene. The Charge is uncertain what
de :Lattrre would be prepared to offer in negotiations with
the Viet Minh:, believing he has not yet had time to think
through the probleni, but reports a rumor that a condominium
may be contemplated for the areas of Indochina north of
the 16th Parallel. The purpose of such an arrangement
would be to keep the Chinese out, prevent the Indochinese
Communists from gaining control, and keep French troops
in the area. Indicating that a further purpose would-be to
detach the Viet Minh Nationalists from Ho Chi Minh, the
Charge comments that prospects are poor for this because:
(a) Communist control is too strict to permit such negotia-
tions; (b) the continued presence of French troops would be
an insuperable obstacle; and (c) a more nationalistic govern-
ment than that of Bao Dai would be required to attract the
Nationalists.
25X1
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