FIRST PROGRESS REPORT TO OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD BY BROADCAST EVALUATION SECTION ESTABLISHED UNDER PARAGRAPH 8A OF NSC-169

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01634R000300060037-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 1998
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: September 1, 1955
• Content Type: PERRPT

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r.:
1 September 1955
First Progress Report to operations Coordinating Board
Broadcast Evaluation Section
established under paragraph 8a of
NSC-169
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Scientific Intelligence
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WARNING
THIS DOCUNENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING
TEE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITH-
IN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18,
USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 791i,' THE TRANSMISSION OR
REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTH-
ORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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1 September 1955
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Scientific Intelligence
First Progress Report to Operations Coordinating Board
by
Broadcast Evaluation Section
established under paragraph 8a of
NSC-169
I. Summ~.r~
A. The significance of the technical effectiveness of U.S.
controlled international broadcasting to the national security and
the importance of determining the degree of effectiveness for policy-
making purposes has been recognized at the government level and is
set forth in NSC-169, paragraph 8 (a). The problem of determining
technical (signal) effectiveness of broadcasting within areas to
which access is generally denied or at least limited.and against
which broadcast jamming and related activities are directed is
unprecedented. Methods and techniques used in making such evalua-
tions of commercial broadcasting are entirely inapplicable to this
problem. New methods and new approaches have had to be evolved and.
are still in the process of evolution.
B. The Broadcast Evaluation Section was established under
paragraph 8 (a),?NSC-169, by CIA in conjunction with the Department
of State, the Department of Defense, and USIA, and under the
coordination of the Operations Coordinating Board, for intelligence
QX@ cation of information concerning the technical effectiveness of
U.S. International Broadcasting, particularly to the Soviet Bloc.
C. The purpose of this report is to provide information on
the activities of the Broadcast Evaluation Section, CIA, since its
establishment inaanua 19 4; to provide information on problems
encountered and studies undertaken with respect thereto; to provide.
information of assistance in interpreting statistical data presented
in reports of the Broadcast Evaluation Section; to appraise future
possibilities and limitations of the task; and to provide a general
estimate of the technical effectiveness of U.S. international broad-
casting (See Part 1i).
D. The organization and staff pattern of the Broadcast
Evaluation Section was planned by CIA with the advice of USIA and
the Departments of State and Defense.
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E. A Technical Evaluation Advisory Committee (TEAL) of
technically qualified representatives of CIA, the Department of
Defense, USIA, and the Department of State.was provided for to
advise concerning methods, standards, priorities, etc. This
Committee was organized on 27 January 1954.
F. The reports of technically trained observers established
by the cooperating agencies in a number of peripheral locations
have been the primary raw material for evaluation. This has been
supplemented by occasional reports from U.S. missions in the
European Soviet Bloc countries, by reports from the BBC, interro-
gations of defectors
analyses of these data are published in monthly reports. The
Broadcast Evaluation Section takes the raw data from the monitors'
log sheets and processes it ontooIBM punch cards for analysis and
recording.
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O. Under authority of NSC-169, technical monitors were
established in U.S. missions behind the Iron Curtain. The project
was established on a trial basis for three months beginning
15 March 1954, under the name of Project This project
provided data of a different type, from which important conclusions
were drawn. It is planned to make this project permanent where
possible.
B. The first roblem encquntered in evaluating the technical
effectiveness of the three broadcasting organizations wa nd-
rdi7a~tion of reporting mehods. Agreement was reached on the
definitions of good, fair, poor, and nil intelligibility. For
most analyses, "good" and "fair" are lumped as Satisfactory, and
"poor" and "nil" are lumped as Unsatisfactory.
I. The problem of developing a method of summarizing and
presenting the considerable quantity of data was given to a private
consulting firm. Their recommendation, approved by TEAC, has been
used. No single measure of technical efficiency was found which
would be completely satisfactory and two measures are currently
used. The,"program effectiveness" is a measure of how many days
a program was intelligible during the month on at least one fre-
enc regardless of how many frequencies the program was trans-
mitted on simultaneously. The "channel time effectiveness" reports
the per cent of intelligible reception for observations of a
particular program on all frequencies used and for all days of the
reporting period. Monthly reports have been issued beginning with
October 1954 using these measures.
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as tentative and with a background of full understanding of the
circumstances and conditions under which the intercept was made
and the process of analysis applied to the data.
K. Some of these variable factors are listed below.
1. Monitor's judgment of intelligibility! Since tki
J. Conclusions drawn from statistical-anal a
monitors'
obseservatigns must ~be vie wed ~r :o ut" is an ",tin' erstanuing. The
"significance of the sample'', that is the indiv du `" Loring
intercept is not known as yet with respect to a great many factors;
and, therefore, any conclusions drawn from such data must be viewed
judgment of intelligibility by a monitor is largely subjective,
what is "good" to one man may sometimes be "Poor" to another.
To what extent this variable factor affects the - final evalua-
tion is not known at this time. .However, to minimize this
error, standard tapes have been prepared in four principle
languages with samples of intelligibility rated good, fair,
poor, and nil by the consensus of a panel of linguists.
Copies of these tapes will be furnished to the monitors for
use in standardizing their judgment. A seminar for monitors
was held during July 1955 for the purpose of setting
standards of reporting and monitoring procedure. Study is
being given to possible methods of separately measuring signal
and jammer interference and relating these values directly to
intelligibility as a means of reducing the range of operator
judgment and thereby getting more objective data.
2. Frequency and duration of sampling observations: A
monitor cannot listen to a whole program. He must check the
same program on a number of frequencies and often check a
number of simultaneous programs, each on a number of frequencies.
The length of the sample, that is the time of observation, is
of great importance. Since the jammer operations are ever
changing, the significance from a statistical standpoint
becomes very great. Study is being given to the optimum
period of monitoring by an engineering consultant based on
special test recordings of broadcast reception.
3. Receiving equipment used in monitoring; Study has indicated that there Is no such thing as a "typical indigenous
receiver." The variables of design, state of adjustment, type
of antenna, etc., introduce wide variables. It has been found
desirable to use a precision receiver whose characteristics
and sensitivity are precisely known and can be standardized
and to cross-check this against the nearest thing to a "typical.
indigenous receiver."
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4. Area of validity of observations made at one particular
location: Perhaps the most significant problem not yet satis-
factorily answered is the determination of how far from the
monitoring post the observations may be considered representa-
tive of reception conditions. It appears likely that no
general rule applies and the area of validity varies from
case to case. Certainly the area of validity is small in
cases involving jamming signals from nearby transmitters,
i.e., signals transmitted by ground wave.
L. It has been suggested that a study of the basic factors
involved in intelligibility might indicate methods of improving
the intelligibility and better methods of observing and evaluating
the. Intelligibility. No work on this suggestion has yet been done.
M. So far, analysis of monitor reports has been by program,
that is, language and time of day. Some investigation has been
made as to variation with frequency and transmitter location. No
investigation has yet been made to variation with respect to type
of program broadcast. Special methods of analysis applicable to
standard band and long wave signals may be fruitful, but the matter
has not yet been fully investigated.
N. Therefore, it may be seen that, although the organization
has been established, procedures put into effect, a staff recruited
and trained, and data flow initiated, results to date must generally
be considered as tentative and subject to many qualifications.
Progress has been and is being made in narrowing the probable
limits of error and sharpening the significance of the conclusions
derived from statistical treatment of monitoring data.
II. Technical Effectiveness of U.S. International Broadcasting
f
A. It in estimated that. in spite oftheeffort put into the
Jamming o U. S. international broadcasting, the effect of the jamming
-varies widely with frequency band, geographic location, and target
languagi and the programs are fre uentl reaching wide sections
of the tag areas.
B. In the following paragraphs, a selection of more particular
conclusions is presented. This may serve to indicate the kind of
answers which the Broadcast Evaluation Section is prepared to make
to specific questions. No attempt is made to arrive at conclusions
regarding all possible details in view of the many variables of
time, frequency, location, and language involved and the differing
reliability of information concerning them. Sampling of reception
conditions in the target area is extremely meagre both in time and
space. The sampling on the periphery, while probably adequate in
time, is subject to some question as to the geographic extent of
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t eover, roadcast Evaluation Section has
investigated available information regarding medium and low frequencies
only with respect to a few specific questions. For these reasons,
conclusions are labelled estimates. It is expected that where more
reporting from within the target area becomes available, the above
general conclusions will be confirmed, although estimates as to
the detailed situation may be modified and extended.
C. With respect to frequency band, as a generalization, high
frequency broadcasting is the most effective. The effectiveness
indexes computed from the observations by the peripheral monitors
and summarized in the monthly reports indicate that even Russian
language programs -- which receive the greatest attention by the
jammers -- are frequently receivable.*
*For example, the summary report for the four winter months,
November 1954 through February 1955, shows channel effectiveness
(per cent of total observations which were classified as intelligible)
for one or more monitoring locations as follows :
Pro ram
25X1erved at
Channel
Effectiveness
VOA - Armenian
13
VOA - Russian
17
VOA - Georgian
.25
VOA - Latvian
31
VOA - Hungarian
37
VOA - Estonian
38
VOA - Lithuanian
43
VOA - Polish
43
44
45
(These figures cannot be taken too literally since they are based
on subjective observations by a number of individuals using equip-
ment and procedures not completely standardized and since it is as
yet uncertain how far into the target areas observations made on
the periphery can be applied. Nevertheless, it is believed that
the figures are generally indicative of the situation in. adjacent
Bloc territory in the absence of local ;round wave7 ja rs.)
Poor reception is largely, but not entirely, a reflection of the
effect of the Soviet jamming effort; some of the poor reception
reported is due to vagaries of sky-wave propagatbon and other causes.
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D. These reports also indicate that programs in languages of
the USSR are generally less frequently intelligible than prograea
in Satellite languages. Persian and Turkish are the only non-Bloc
languages that are consistently ja=ed. Some ja ing has recently
occurred on German language programs directed to Austria.
E. There is certainly a considorable geographic variation
over long distances where reception of the broadcast and jamming
signals are by sky waves. This is apparent from considerations of
the broadcast antenna patterns and high frequency propagation
variations taken together with knowledge of the locations of the
Jars used and is confirmed by the variation between the reports
of peripheral monitors.*
F. In.addition to this large area variation, there exist
relatively small areas near jamming stations where steady ground
wave signals, not subject to the vagaries of sky-wave propagation,
will succeed in Ja?saing a high frequency program whenever the jammer
is on the frequency. From time to time, reports from observers
in the target areas have given us the location of some of these
local Jamming areas. A number of reports from Moscow state that
high frequency broadcasts are consistently jammed** and indications
are that the taming transmitters are located in the Moscow area.
In Czechoslovakia, an embassy traveller reported the existence of
high frequency Jamming stations in twelve cities (ten of the
stations specially designed for the purpose) scattered throughout
*For example, the channel effectiveness of VOA Polish programs
during the four winter months as observed at different places were
as follows:
41
51
35
39
An even more extreme example is the case of VOA Russian language
programs which are as follows:
21
22
2
19
While three locations showed remarkably consistent results,
found only 35 intelligible samples out of a total of.1871.
**e.g., on twenty-four days during March 1955, the embassy in
Moscow monitored 324 VOA Russian language transmissions and 87
transmissions of Radio Liberation. VOA was heard with good intelli-
gibility on two occasions; Radio Liberation was not heard.
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Czechoslovakia. He reports that reception in urban areas is
generally bad; but in the rural areas, especially east of Prague,
it is much better. He further reported that listening to VOA and
RYE outside the areas surrounding these twelve stations, "It is
probable that over 75% of the time intelligible VOA or RYE broad-
casts may be found by the patient Czech listener."
G. In the Far East, information until recently was derived
entirely from the VOA monitor
In May, reporting was begun There have been no sig-
nificant reports on reception from within the target area. The
distances from the monitor posts to the target areas are generally
somewhat larger than in the European area. Jammers associated
with the regular Soviet Bloc fanning system (i.e., using two-letter
"identa") are observed jamming VOA and ACLB Russian language broad-
casts. Unidentified Jamming signals have been recently reported
on programs directed to the Chinese mainland.
H. A review of the program and channel effectiveness
statistics for July 1954 and from October 1954 through March 1955
revealed few trends to indicate major changes in Communist high
frequency jamming activities during this period. A large portion
of the variations noted could be accounted for by seasonal varia-
tions in propagation conditions. However, jamming of VOA Georgian,
Armenian, and Ukrainian increased; and regular jamming of VGA Persian
and Turkish language programs began.
1. As a rule, reception on the higher high-frequency broadcast
bands (15 and 17 me.) is more often intelligible than on the lower
bands.
J. TOe investigation of medium frequency broadcasting has
been carried forward by the Broadcast Evaluation Section only with
respect to a few specific projects.
2. It is apparent that medium wave reception is usually
impossible in most areas of Czechoslovakia. A member of the
U.S. Embassy staff indicates that "medium frequencies are not
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intelligible reception of VUA programs on 173 kc. cannot be expected
heard except when the jauaners have apparently broken down."
This comment was said to apply both to RFE (719 and 854 kc.)
and-VOA (1196 ke. broadcasts. At the same time, the VOA `
monitors report that the VOA Czech medium frequency
programs are frequently (25 to 50% of the observations)
intelligible at that location.
3. Fear other reports have been received from within other
target areas concerning medium wave reception. Reports of the
peripheral monitors indicate the possibility of a wide range
of intelligibility in different target areas. Jamming signals
are observed on the MF transmissions of VOA in the Far East,"
including programs directed to China, but the extent and
effectiveness of the Jamming has not been determined.
K. No investigation has been made of the coverage of the VOA
broadcasts on long wave (173 kc.), although reports of peripheral
monitors are included in the mach a files of the Section. The
reporter states that except for the area
of Czechos ovak immediately adjacent to the West German border,
information from all sources on the effectiveness of each of the
several broadcasting efforts in aspects other than program content."
The plan provided that in its operation, the Section is to avoid
duplication of effort by other organizations and to make use of the
facilities of other organizations as far as feasible.
light of Soviet countermeasures, as well as economic, military,
and psychological factors, by providing a means of collating
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USIA, State, and Defense. It proposed a staff of six technical
personnel and two clerical. The ob,iect was defined as follows.
B. Planning. The plan for the Broadcast Evaluation Section
was drafted with the cooperation and advice of representatives of
March 1954 .
creation of a Broadcast Evaluation Section in the Office of
-scientific Intelligence was confirmed by official Agency action on
g
o
CIA by NSC-169 on 27 October 1953.- Plannings for the organization
A. Authorization by NSC-169. The responsibility for estab-
;lishment of of the Broadcasting Evaluation Mechanism was assi
ned t
"To assist top policy officers of this Government in determining
the desirable extent and nature of American official and unofficial
broadcasting operations, particularly to the Soviet bloc, in the
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C. Staff of the Broadcast Evaluation Section. Staffing of
the six technical positions of the Broadcast Evaluation Section
proved difficult because of the rather specialized experience
which was sought in prospective employees. A Section Chief was
recruited by 14 March 1954, two additional personnel were trans-
ferred from within the Agency in November and December, two more
were cleared and assigned in March and May 1955, and the sixth
analyst is currently being cleared. Experience of these employees
includes, broadcast station design and operation, radio parts manu-
facturing, teaching of radio subjects, radio wave propagation
analysis and mathematics, including statistical analysis. It is
considered that each of these varied backgrounds will contribute
to making a strong evaluation team.
D. TEAC. An advisory committee of technically qualified
representatives of the Department of Defense, USIA, and Department
of State was specified to advise concerning methods, standards,
priorities, etc. This committee was organized on 27 January 1954.
it is called the Technical Evaluation Advisory Committee (TEAC)
for International Broadcasting. Its charter was approved by the
Department of Defense,, USIA, and the Department of State. It has
met fifteen times for the-purpose of approval of evaluation methods,
planning special tests, improvement of reporting procedures, etc.
.E. Sources of information. The source of raw material for
the evaluation has been primarily the reports of technically-trained
observers established by the . cooperating. agencies in a number of
peripheral locations. 'This is supplemented occasionally by observers
in U.S. missions in the European Soviet Bloc countries. (For an
25X1A2g account of Project, - see paragraph III G below.) In
addition,-:, informet.ion concerning effectiveness is 'obtained from
other sources 'such as the BBC, interrogations of defectors, and
mail intercept information.
Peripheral monitoring stations (some part-time operations,
some with three or more observers) currently submit observations
as follows:
MONITOR APPROXIMATE NUMB R
ORGANIZATION LOCATION OF REPORTS PER MONTH
VOA 10,000
$,000
7.,000
5,000
6,ooo
2,500
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MONITOR APPROXIMATE NUNUR
ORGANIZATION LOCATION OF REPORTS PER MONTH
11,000
5,000
114, 000
700
100
300
NO
It will be noted that while there are many reporting locations
peripheral to the European Bloc area, there arc.only two at presort
in the Far East, located in
F. IBM machine processing. It was initially intended that
the voluminous observations by the peripheral monitors, which was
to be the basis of statistical reports, would be given a preliminary
suction by the contributing organization and that the Broadcast
Evaluation Section would combine and evaluate these. However, it
quickly became apparent that the quantity of data and the number
of ways of analyzing them was such that a centralized machine file
system was necessary. Accordingly, with the approval of TEAL, the
Broadcast Evaluation Section arranged to receive the raw reports
from the monitors, put the data from each observation on an IBM
card, and use sorting machinery to determine the statistics to be
reported. This was first applied to the analysis of Project Eariship
data'(see next paragraph) and to the first monthly report covering
October observations. Monthly summaries have been published since
then with a winter season summery (for November through February)
incorporated in the February report. To mechanize the process
still further, arrangements are currently being made to purchase
teleprinter machines with tape perforators for use by certain
peripheral monitors. The information typed by the monitor will
then appear on the teletype tape which can be forwarded to Washington
for automatic punching of the IBM cards.
G. Project The first major evaluation project of
the Broadcast Ev ua on Section was the analysis and presentation
of the results of Project - Under NSC-169, authorization
was given to establish tee ical monitors in U.S. missions abroad.
Responsibility for directing this operation was given to CIA. It
was established on a trial basis for three months from 15 March to
15 June 1951 in order to make sure that such technical reporting
could in fact be effective. The report on this project (eventually
published as CIA/SI 77-55, classification -- SECRET gave the
results of statistical analysis of the observations and concluded,
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among other things, that monitoring behind the Iron Curtain in the
cities and remote rural areas of the target countries is necessary
for a more complete knowledge of the technical effectiveness of
U.S. international broadcasting. It further concluded that it is
important that these monitoring officers be able to make observations
outside the capital cities because there was indication that local
jamming transmitters were largely responsible for the deterioration
of reception in the capital. From propagation considerations,
confirmed by a few reports of reception outside the capital, it was
recognized that where reception was degraded by the ground wave of
near-by ,hammers, such reception could not be used as an indicator
of reception in other areas. Planning for establishment of such
monitors where feasible on a permanent duty basis is currently
going forward. It is expected that this man can provide guidance
to other embassy personnel who have the opportunity: to make
intelligibility observations during the course of travels outside
the capital.
B. Methodology development. The first problem encountered
in evaluating the technical effectiveness of the three broadcasting
organizations was to standardize on a reporting method. Two organi-
zations reported five grades of intelligibility and the other used
four. By agreement, all three adopted four grades with definitions
as follows:
Good - good intelligibility is defined as easily understood.
Fair'- fair intelligibility is defined as understandable,
but with difficulty because of interference or
other causes.
Poor - poor intelligibility is defined as not being under-
standable because of interference or other causes.
Nil - nil means no reception at all because of interference
or other causes.
In analysis, this is usually further simplified by lumping the
first two as satisfactory and the second two as unsatisfactory.
The next problem confronting the Broadcast Evaluation Section after
organization was to develop a method of summarizing and presenting
the considerable quantity of data being furnished by the peripheral
monitors. The task was given to a consulting engineering firm, an
organization with considerable experience in monitoring procedures
including the problem of monitoring Soviet jaimming signals. Their
recommendation of the use of two figures was accepted by TEAC and
has been used in the monthly reports. These figures labelled.
"cumulative program effectiveness" and "channel time effectiveness"
are defined in the preface of each report since they have a very
special meaning. (It is important to understand the method of
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derivation of these figures in order to have the proper assessment
of their mean ; they are discussed in more detail in Section V A
of this report.) The consultant firm also reviewed in a preliminary
way some of the problems and uncertainties in the evaluation pro-
cedure. These are also discussed in some detail in Section N.
One of the problems is the question of the optimum length of a
monitoring sample; i.e., how long should the observer listen to a
particular frequency to be able'to decide with reasonable accuracy
the technical effectiveness of the program, i.e., how long and how
often should an observer listen to a particular frequency in order
to make best use of his monitoring time and obtain reasonably
accurate monthly figures of technical effectiveness. A radio
engineering consultant of Washington has been employed to analyze
special test recordings of broadcast reception with a view to
determining the degree of accuracy which would result from observa-
tions of various durations and occurring at various points of the
program. This study is currently in progress. Other problems of
methodology discussed below, both in monitoring and reporting, have
received tentative answers; others are yet to be investigated.
IV. Problems of Technique
A. Problems of reporting.
1. Standardization of intelligibility grading. As
indicated above, the cooperating organizations all now use
similar reporting forms with the same definitions of intelli-
gibility. However, this grading is necessarily a matter of
.simple judgment by the monitor; and experiments to date
indicate that two persons listening to the same program and
provided with the same definitions of grades of intelligibility
will frequently disagree, particularly when the program is
partly degraded and not certainly "good" or "nil." It is not
known how much of an error in the final evaluation is intro-
duced by this variable. However, in an effort to minimize
the problem, tapes have' been prepared in four principal
languages (Russian, Polish, Czech, and Hungarian) with samples
of intelligibility rated good, fair.. poor, and nil by the
consensus of a group of linguists. Copies of these tapes will
be furnished to the monitors to use in standardizing their
judgment. They were also used to test the variation in present
judgment between those monitors who attended a seminar on
monitoring procedures conducted by the Broadcast Evaluation
Section with the cooperation of the VOA., RF.E, and Radio
Liberation in Munich during July 1955.
2. Standardization of equipment. The effect of ja rasing
on a particular program can vary with variation in certain
receiver characteristics. These characteristics in home
broadcast receivers can vary widely depending on the design
and state of adjustment. Rome antennas will often have some
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directional properties which might favor either the program
or the jammer. Some monitors have endeavored to simulate
home installations by the use of an indigenous receiver and a
"typical" antenna. However, recognizing that any particular
home receiver may or may not be typical and a stable veil-
made communications type receiver adjusted to simulate an
average home receiver is more apt to give consistent results,
most monitors now use the Collins 51J3 receiver at maximums
band-width setting. It still remains to make certain that
this adjustment in fact approximates reception on a home-type
set and that receivers at different stations will give con-
sistent results.-Also, with respect to antennas, standardi-
zation has been recommended on a vertical whip which is least
likely to have directional properties; and as soon as feasible,
will be universally applied.
3. Standardization of monitoring procedures. The length
of time of observations, i..e., the sample, by -& monitor is
necessarily less than the length of the program since it is
desired to check not one but all the frequencies used for the
program and to check other programs which may be transmitted
at the same period and receivable at the monitoring station.
This may for some cases require listening to twenty or more
frequencies In the course of a half hour and, if this is to
be done by one operator, he obviously cannot listen very long
on any one frequency. Since the intelligibility may vary
considerably in a abort time during the course of a program
because of the shifting pattern of jammer operations or changes
in radio wave propagation conditions, this necessity for
sampling introduces an unknown variable in the monitoring
results. As mentioned in paragraph III H above, a test con-
tinuous recording of a particular - and presumably typical -
program as received at five monitoring stations for a period
of two days is currently being analyzed to determine the
deviation in reported intelligibility which would result from
sampling in different ways. It is expected that recommendations
can be made as to the optimum period of listening.
All operators are instructed to "tune for the beat
intelligibility", and it is believed that possible variations
in grading due to tuning procedure are minimized.
Problems of operator judgment would be eliminated if
a procedure could be devised to measure the field intensity of
the signal and of the interference (or their ratio) and relate
these in some standard way to intelligibility. This approach
is under investigation. It is not yet clear whether a
practical solution will be obtained.
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B. Problems of evaluation.
1. Statistics with different bases. So far, analysis of
monitor reports has been by 'program', i.e., language and
time of day. Some investigation has been made as to variation
with frequency and with transmitter location as machine pro-
cessing and analysts' time permits. No investigation has yet
been made as to variation with respect to type of program-
broadcast.
2.
to MF and LF.signals will probably be fruitful, but the
question has not yet been fully investigated. The situation
differs from that on high frequencies in that only a few fre-
quencies are used; and in general, the pattern of broadcasting
and Jamming is stable. One source of information which has
recently been exploited (a report is in preparation) is a
The results of
this are incorporated in the study mentioned above.
3. Basic intelligibility factors. It has been suggested
that a study of the basic factors involved in intelligibility
might indicate
a. methods of improving the intelligibility of
reception in the target areas.
b. better methods of observing and evaluating the
intelligibility.
Action on this suggestion awaits the completion of more
pressing problems.
V. Interpretation of Monitors' Reports
The approach thus far used by the Broadcast Evaluation Section
in statistical analysis of the peripheral monitors' observations
yields figures which must be used with understanding (their meaning
is not simply apparent) and caution (there are a number of variables
in addition to those listed in Section IV A, whose importance is
not yet fully clear) .
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A. The "five figure expression" concerning a particular pro-
gram or broadcast period e.g., VOA Ruiiaian at 1415 GMJ) observed
over a particular period of time (e.g., the month of January) gives
the following in sequence:
1. The total number of frequency unite broadcast (a
relative measure of the broadcasting effort).
2. The total number of frequency observations (a relative
measure of the corresponding monitoring effort).
3. The total number of ".good" or "fair" observations
(that is, the total observations of intelligible signals).
4. The technical efficiency of cumulative program (that
is, the percentage of days of the month on which the program
was intelligible on at least one fluency).
5. The technical efficiency of channel time (that is. ,.2
divided by 2 expressed as a percentage).
The reason for giving two different figures on technical efficiency
stems from the following considerations: In nearly all cases, the
seine program is transmitted simultaneously into the target area on
more than one frequency. It can be argued that if at least one of
the many frequencies can be received in the target area, then the
reception of that program can be considered technically effective.
On the other band, if more than one can be received, it can well
be argued that the reception of that program is more effective
since there is a greater chance that the listener will run across
one of several frequencies carrying the program in the crowded and
partially jammed broadcast bands. The program effectiveness is a
measure of how many days a program was intelligible during the
reporting period (e.g., a particular month) on at least one frequency.
The channel time effectiveness reports merely the per cent of
intelligible reception for observations of a particular program on
all frequencies used and for all days of the reporting period. The
latter figure may be unduly pessimistic as a measure of how often
a program is receivable, but the former may be somewhat optimistic,
particularly if it derives from the case of only one out of many
frequencies getting through.
B. Variables in the procedure which are recognized but have
been only partly evaluated are:
1. A monitor may at times check and report on frequencies
which are not beamed in his direction, even though beamed to
the target area proper. While he may nevertheless hear the
signal because of "minor lobes" of directional antennas and
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vagaries of radio waves, the liklihood is, of course, much
less than if he is "on the beam:" Operational procedures
have not yet been established to account for this which may
in some cases depress the reported technical effectiveness.
2. The monitor may be "on the beam" of the broadcast
signal but not receiving jamming to the save degree as the
target area. Several attempts have been made to evaluate
the importance of this and, so far, they have been inconclusive.
It certainly is important when jamming in the target area
occurs from near-by (ground wave) Jammers. Simultaneous
observations at two different locations of distant (sky wave)
Jamming signals on a certain channel often indicate that the
predominant Darr at one place at any instant is different
from the predominant japer at the other. Whether this means
that over, an extended period of observation the intelligibility
of the jammed signal would not correlate is not certain, and
tests generally have been inconclusive because of insufficiency
of samples or other variables (such as local jan~rners or unskilled
reporters).
3. While it is apparent that repetition of programs at
different times during the day will improve the chances of
that program getting through, no attempt has been made to
take this factor into account in the reports of the Broadcast
Evaluation Section.
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