CLANDESTINE COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION PART ONE THE COMMUNIST PARTY UNDERGROUND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02546R000100080001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 116
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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COMMUNISM
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Clandestine Communist Organization
Part One
The Communist Party Underground
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INTERIM REPORT
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TABLE O F CONTENTS
Page
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS, . 1
PART OT L' : THE C0j,u NI ST PARTY UNDERGROUND
I ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEMLI ' . ? o . ? . . 9
A. Police and Party . ? . . . 9
1, Geographical Factors
2, Population Density ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? e ? ? ? 10
3. Political Factors ? ? o ? ? ? ? . ? ? ? r 10
4. Mass Support for Police . 11
B. Adaptability of Party Organization
to Illegal Conditions ? . ? ? ? . ? ?.. ? ? 12
1. Organizational Continuity . . 4'? . ? ? . . . 12
2.. Cadre Continuity . . ? . .
13
3. Discipline and Security . . ? . . . . . ? . 14
4. Doctrine as Morale-Builder . , , . . ? ? , 15
5. Attraction of Doctrine
6. Cell System 16
7. Backlog of Conspiratorial Experience . . . . 17
C. Organizational Problems: Adjustment to
Illegal Conditions . . . 18
1. Reduction of Party Apparatus . . . . . 18
a. Consolidation of Territorial
3.
organizations 18
b, Reduction of staffs ? o , . . . . . , 18
The Command Function: The Triad System . . . 19
Compartmentalization . , ? . ? . . , . , , 20
s. Party and military branches . ? . . ? . ? 20
Internal Party Compartmentalization ,
organizations . . . . . . ? . . ? . ? 21,
Party and auxiliary (front)
organizations ? , . . . . . . 21
Party and auxiliary illegal
21
1) Elimination of horizontal liaison . 21
2) Restriction of contacts
3) Functional restrictions . . . , , . , 21
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II. CASES OF COn1',1UNIST PARTIES UNDERGROUND . ,, . ? ;
A.. The Bolshevik Party Underground ? . ? . ,
1. Organization ,, ? ?
a. The Moscow Organization . . ? ? . . ? .
b. The Odessa Organization ? . , , , ? ? ?
Operational Problems
a, Security Measures ?
b. Technical Services ?
c, Finances
35
36
3$
39
40
41
41
43
47
CP France Underground , , ?
4
1 Organization . , ,
48
a. The Party Center
49
b. Territorial Levels
50
Technical Services
52
3. Security . . . . .
53
a. Modification of Structure ? . ? . ,
53
b. Compartmentalization
54
c. Security Rules
54
1) Restriction of Contacts . ? . . . .
54
2) Security of Meetings . . . . . . . . .
3) Safeguarding Party Records and
55
Materials ,? 55
4) Personal Conduct 56
d, Control of Cadres ? . . . . ? . . ? ? 57
Finances 61
C. CP Germany Underground ? 63
1, Organization ? ? 63
a. Initial Confusion 64
b, The Failure of Centralized Control ? ? . 64
c, Decentralized Control ? . . . , , ? 67
d. Attempt to Revive Centralized
Control ? ? ? ? , ? , ? ? ?
A ? 70
2. Security ? . ? . . . . . . . ? . .. ? . . ?
72
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D. CP Greece Underground 74
1a Organization . . ?.? 74
2., Operational Problems . . 78
a. ' Security . 78
b. Communications 80
1) Couriers . 80
2) Press and Radio . ? . . . . . ? ? , 81
c. Recruitment and Transport . . . 83
d. Finances . 83
1) Sources of Revenue . . . . . . . 84
2) Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . 85
E. CP Spain Underground 87
1. Thu Party Center Abroad ? 87
2. Organization within'Spain . . . . . . . . . 89
3. Other Party Organizations Abroad . . . . . 91
F. CP Portuzal Underground . . . . . . . . 92
1. Organization . . . . . . . . . . . 92
20 Security 95
3. Agitprop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4. Communications Abroad . . . . . . . . . . 99
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GE FERA C CONSD ,RATIONS
The international Communist movement has not merely survived,
but has actually flourished, in the face of difficulties which
have ruined political forces with less constancy of purpose and
with less practical a technique, It has maintained itself as the
"vanguard of the proletariat" through Tsarist and totalitarian
suppression, armed intervention, two world wars, and a decade of
general 1ibourgeois" prosperity. In large measure, Communist suc-
cesses cant be explained by the organizational adaptability of the
Communist Party and its mastery over a mass of practical techni-
ques. The Party knows what it must do and how to go about doing
it, in any given circumstance. This competence was responsible
in the first place for the success of the Bolshevik Revolution,
and since then, for the endurance of the Party as a continuing
threat to all "bourgeois" states, Whatever the political climate,
the Party goes on, working openly and legally where it can,
secretly and illegally where it must. It is this latter capabil-
ity for "conspirratorial" work which largely accounts for the
survival and success of the international Communist movement in
the face o? adverse conditions.
The scope of the "conspiratorial" activities of the Commu-
nist Party encompasses defensive and offensive purposes. As an
organization of professional and practical revolutionaries bent
upon the eventual achievement of revolution, the Communist Party
is enveloped by an atmosphere of hostility. Realizing this, the
international movement has naturally developed a system of defen-
sivo measures designed to protect the Party against the police,
intelligence agencies, hostile groups and the hostile public, and
has boon. normally organized so as to keep knowledge of the most
.? significant aspects of Party activity restricted to a minimum of
individuals. For similar reasons, the Party has made it a gener-
al practise to conceal as thoroughly as possible the mechanics of
the political. controls through which it extends its influence be-
yond Party confines. The Communist Party is generally designed
.ice .- . .~.
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and able to operate under any conditions of opposition, hostility
and outright suppression. It is capable of going totally under-
ground when outlawed, and it is sufficiently security-conscious,
even under normal conditions, to conceal many of its "normal"
activities. The "conspiratorial" practises of Communist Parties
oporating in hostile societies are largely defensive in nature.
They are designed to preserve political and organizational gains
made by the Party, rather than to advance the Party's aims fur-
ther.
The defensive side of the Party's conspiratorial behavior
can be extensively illustrated by its organizational and opera-
tional methods when proscribed. Part One of this study deals
extensively with this subject -- the general patterns of under-
ground organization are presented there, supplemented by de-
scriptive analyses of the actual underground experience of
several Communist Parties.
Defensive measures are normally adopted also by Parties
which function more or less openly and legally. "Legal"
Parties give their program a maximum publication and expose a
groat number of functionaries as well as parts of their organ-
ization to the public eye. However, even when admitted to the
political scene, the Party usually acknowledges the hostility
of the society it lives in, and attempts to submerge, auto-
matically and'by virtue of its organizational principles, the
more significant areas of Party work.
Every Communist Party is a centralized and centrally-
directed mechanism controlled by a comparatively small group
of professional, paid and full-time functionaries -- the cadre.
Within this cadre-hierarchy the functionaries at national head-
quarters occupy the central position and have a monopoly on
policy-making and organizational direction, Accustomed to
strict semi-military discipline, the lower Party cadre and the
,rank and file are more instruments of the Party center. By
virtue of its leadership function the Party center normally
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guards the professional- secrets of the Party, not unlike the
management of a business enterprise. The Party center, then,
puts the stamp of secrecy on such matters as Party finances,
particularly on the origin of funds not derived from normal
sources; infra-Party communications of more than normal admin-
istrativo significance; relations with other fraternal Parties
exceeding the normal interchange of Party literature and other
routine communications and relations with the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union or representatives of the Soviet Government
and the Cominform, which arc likely to compromise the Party.
Experience has further shown that Soviet intelligence agencies
frequently channel their recruitment of Party members through
individual functionaries in national Party headquarters -
operations which require secure and secret handling. Thus, even
under normal conditions, highly significant aspects of Party
work are managed by a small nucleus of trusted functionaries and
are tightly scaled off from the rest of the Party and the outside
world.
Further, Communist Parties generally maintain intra-Party
police organs, frequently identical with the Cadre Department
and the Control Commission. Those agencies are organizational
corollaries of the cadre principle. As the Party is built upon
its cadre, it is essential for the center not only to train, pro-
tect and properly assign tho'professional personnel, but also to
preserve constant ideological and security control. Thus, most
Parties maintain a confidential corps of Party "detectives" who
must often perform counter-espionage duties such as' the identi-
fication of police agents infiltrated into the ranks of the
Party, and "illegal" support functions such as the procurement
of false papers and passports for the cadre. Clearly, the
existence of such a Party police force must be concealed, not
only for security reasons, but also for ideological reasons.
The Party is supposed to be run according to the principle of
?Tdemocratic centralism", and the centralism exercised through
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police control methods may be distasteful to the rank-and-file.
On the level of "normal" Party operations, secrecy is also
unavoidable. Considering the smallest operative Party unit, the
individual Party member, it is a woll-known fact that many Commu-
nists operate without ostensible' connection with the Party. This
apparent lack of connection may be aimed at personal protection
or at safeguarding a particular, often secret, mission. In any
case, the secret Party member shows up in almost every Party --
one need only recall the case of the Indonesian Socialist leader
and government official, Sjarifooddin, who, at the time of the
Moose putsch in 194 admitted that he had been a secret member
of the Communist Party of Indonesia since 1935.
The Party, however, needs not only secret Party members --
_it is bent upon the manipulation of non-Communist groups and
organizations in order to establish "mass support" as a pre-
requisite for revolutionary action. The approaches to this or-
ganizational problem obviously vary from Party to Party, and the
extent of secrecy with which they are handled is determined by
the political climate prevailing in the particular country. In
general, however, the Party will attempt to surround itself with
a solar system of front organizations in order to attract acces-
sible groups, and will further direct its fractions into non-
Communist mass organizations -- for example, labor unions and
political movements in colonial countries -- in order to expand
Party control. In all those cases, it will be a problem of con-
cealing Party control over fronts and fractions, a problem which
becomes increasingly difficult to solve as the manipulative tech-
niques-of the Party are exposed in public.
Clearly, however, as a revolutionary organization, the Party
cannot confine itself to defensive tactics alone. No matter what
.its status, whether legal or proscribed, the Party must at least
plan such activities as will weaken the coercive power mechanism
of the "capitalist" state, as well as hostile groups and politi-
cal parties, in concrete operational, rather than in general
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political, terms. No matter what its tactical shifts, the Party
can never neglect its fundamentally military-revolutionary
character and it must attempt to organize support functions di-
rectly or indirectly related to future revolutionary action.
This concept, which is by no means clear-cut and free from
straight political considerations, involves what amounts to the
setting up of intelligence and counter-intelligonco organizations
and/or operations, with all their operational ramifications. The
general operational program of the Communist Party provides for
the organization of secret Party nuclei in the armed forces, the
police, the navy, the govornmont, and occasionally also within
opposition; groups in order to specialize and concentrate upon
a) the procurement of information which would clarify the organ-
nation and capabilities of the hostile power mechanism; b)
clandestine subversion within "the citadel of the enemy," parti-
1
cularly in the armed forces. The program may also at times in-
elude the organization of clandestine nuclei operating in
strategic plants and enterprises to provide industrial and eco-
noic information systematically -- the productive capabilities
and facilities'of the hostile society are clearly related to the
problems of revolutionary action. Party security in its widest
sense may also require a more aggressive approach, particularly
when the physical liquidation of hostile individuals and
traitorous or insecure Party members is concerned. Finally, ww.hen.
a revolutionary situation approaches, the Party must provide for
a paramilitary organization to form the executive core of
revolutionary action--action, however, which sets into coordi-
n^tod motion the entire Party mechanism and the social forces
al.icd with it.
Such and similar clandestine action auxiliaries of the Party
have boon occasionally observed in operation. Part Two of this
paper includes a factual presentation, and a tentative analysis
of their significance in detail. These offensive clandestine
Party operations probably represent the most significant area of
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Party work. `They perform functions which transgress the area of
"normal" political action and they may constitute an acute threat
to the existing social order. However, it is not yet possible to
generalize on the subject. While the normal aspects of Party or-
ganization follow a pattern anywhere, it is by no means certain
that every Party organizes clandestine action auxiliaries in the
same fashion--if at all.
On the basis of evidence available at present, it appears
that Leninist -Stalinist action theory applies practically to the
organization of clandestine action auxiliaries as it applies to
any other aspect of Party work. Thus, the actual organization of
clandestine military auxiliaries prior to the all-out revolutionary
effort depends not only upon such factors as availability of train-
ed manpower, loaders and arms, but also upon the making of a clear-
cut policy decision that a revolutionary situation, which may be
successfully exploited by the Party, is at hand. While it may be
expected that all Parties. include individuals or even groups who
,are specialists in military matters, it, would be futile to search
for a facsimile of the Military Revolutionary Organization of the
Bolshevik Party (1917) in the Communist Party of Great Britain at
present. Incipient or underdeveloped Parties are more likely to
concentrate upon political action'in order to achieve mass influ-
once. Parties which have reached a stage of relative mass propor-
tions may find it practicable to organize secret military cadres
and formations. Again, however, policy considerations and the
degree of expectable opposition will affect planning, timing and
organization.
Similar considerations apply to the organization of counter-
intelligence, intelligence, sabotage, liquidation and other clandes-
tine action agencies. Materials studied indicate that a stepping-
up of such activity and its formalization in special auxiliaries
occurs during critical periods considered by the Party favorable to
aggressive, revolutionary action in general, such as the middle
Twenties and the early Thirties when the "relative stabilization"
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of capitalism was estimated as coming to an end. It is conside F red,
therefore, that a definite relation exists between the particular
phase of the action-philosophy governing the Party at any given
time and the incidence, of well-defined clandestine action auxiliar-
ies. Informally, however, and in a less pronounced fashion, the
Party will naturally never pass up any chance for clandestine work
in the power apparatus of the State or in hostile grcups and or-
ganizations.
In focussing upon the organization of underground Parties as
well as on the organization of clandestine action auxiliaries, this
paper attempts to clarify the problem in terms of both past and cur-
rent Party experiences. Again however, this paper must be examined
against the totality of the Party's work in a given society -- over-
estimation, as well as underestimation, of clandestine Party opera-
tions may dangerously distort the terms on which each national
Party must be appreciated.
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 PART ONE
TH_E_,COM UNIST.PA
UJ-D E.RU.,N
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A TONAL AD PE AYONAL PROBLEMS
A. Police and Party
0g general principles, the Party prefers to assume the form of
a Illegal" political party, in order to achieve more easily a mass
basis. Under "legal!" conditions, the entire propaganda and agita-
tion apparatus can be employed overtly; front organizations can be
set up at will; the Partyts drawing power can be demonstrated at
the polls; Communists can operate with greater case in labor
unions, and enter the government by way of "democratic" processes.
The Party will therefore fight desperately and until the last
minute to maintain itS legal status. It will marshal public
opinion with the aid of liberal sympathizers and follow-travellers.
It will employ for its defense sympathetic or crypto-Communist
lawyers, who are frequently pooled in international front organiza-
tions. It will receive the moral assistance of,foreign Parties
and the Soviet party-government, making an international propaganda
issue of the Partyts case.
In any case, the Party will seek to delay its transfer to il-
legality as long as possible, realizing that its organization and
operations will be severely hampered by the loss of legal status.
Once driven underground, it will make every effort to become
Illegal" again.
The Party knows that it can be paralyzed by an efficient
police. The primary concern ?f the Party underground, therefore,
is with the law enforcement agencies, for these can control the
fate of the Party and its leaders. It is often extremely diffi-
cult for the Party to protect itself against police penetration,
arrests, and searches. Even in areas where the police is not
particularly efficient, the Party must spend considerable effort
and time on defensive measures,
The_over-all success of the police, however, is conditioned
by several factors, some of which may work to the Party's advan-
tage.
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1. Gecgr^phical Factors. In large countries and in countries
with inaccessible territories (mountains, marshland, jungles, vast
forests), the surveillance and border-control problems are difficult
for the police. The experience of the Bolshevik Party before 1917
shows how great distances favor individual escapes and illegal
border traffic. More recent events in Brazil, Greece, the Philip-
pines, Malaya, et. al., illustrate the sane point.
2. Population Density_ Overcrowded metropolitan areas with
vast slums, as well as port cities, also enhance chances for sur-
vival. It is comparatively easy for the underground Communist to
shake off pursuit in highly populated street-amazes and among the
wharves,
3. Political Factors. Police oction against the Party may be
hindered or encouraged by public opinion. Under a totalitarian
anti-Communist government, police persecution of the Party will
obviously be far more effective than under the rol?tively r.Lild,
legalistic approach of democratic governments. Mussolini, for
example, took a great personal interest in police and intelligence
operations against the Italian Party) and frequently directed them
himself -- a factor which clearly increased the efficioncy of the
Italian security agencies.
On the,other hand, a loosely controlled police force my grow
lax and sock only to make occasional arrests for publicity pur-
poses, without seriously affecting the Partyts operations. A pro-
cariously balanced political situation, such as obtains particu-
larly in countries near the Soviet borders, may also affect police
operations. A shaky "liberal" government may be forced by in-
creasing pressure from rightist parties to soften its attitude to-
ward the Party, which might become an ally in case of need. The
individual police official, too, fearful for the future of his
position, may fool it unwise to be too strict and choose rather to
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4. Mass Support for Police, If there is mass support for the
regime and its punitive policy, as in Nazi Germany, police opera-
tions against the-Party may prove extremely effective. Under such
conditions, the police are able to procure a groat number of infor-
mars and penetration agents, as well as disaffected.Party members
who remain in the Party as police agents. Large-scale cultivation
of disaffected elements and the development of penetration opportu-
nities have been favorite police tactics since the early days of
the Bolshevik Party.
t", enever it has been feasible to put these methods into practice,
they have produced astpnishing results. The Tsarist police, for
example, ,,aoro able to recruit i .linovsky, who for atime was second
in importance only to Lenin in'tiie Bolshevik wing of the underground
Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. In Germany, mass support for
National ,Socialism provided the security authorities with a wealth of
informers and penetration agents. The Italian OVRA (originally the
CECA) is estimated to have controlled the greater part of the Italian
underground Party, exploiting the breakdown in morale which follows
vigorous punitive action. The Greek dictator Metaxas greatly corm
plieato the operations of the underground Greek Party by setting
up a.parallel police-controlled underground Party.
The greatest d.r grer which the Party underground must face is
often not the police itself but the psychological impact of the anti-
Communist movement upon the population and upon the morale of the
Party members themselves.' Nevertheless, various Parties which have
undergone this persecution, such as the Bolshevik Party and the
European Parties in the Fascist period, have managed, in one form or
other, to survive. While the drawing- power of Communist ideology
may partially account for the Party's durability, the adaptability of
Party organization to illegal conditions is an important'additional
factor in the struggle between Party and police.
wqmjm~
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-B. AMdaptab liter of Party Organization to Illegal Conditions
The modgi pattern of Party organization, developed by the
Bolshevik Party during more than a decade of illegality, was grafted,
through the Comintern, upon al foreign Parties. Thus, the basic
forms of Party organization, as encountered today,- have been pro-
tested under illegal conditions. Consequently, when a Party is do-
..bared illegal, there is no need to alter its basic structure._,,.111
that is necessary is an adaptation of organization to illegal condi-
t~ons. The, specific advantages inherent in "normal" Communist Party
organization, may be summed up as follows:
(a) The Party preserves its continuity in terms of organi-
zation and personnel.
'(b) The Party emphasizes discipline and security even in
legal periods.
(c)' Communist doctrine acts as a.morale-builder in illegal
periods, and may become attractive to the non-Communist leftist
in times of general suppression-of all "progressive" movements.
(d) The basic cell organization of the Party, practiced at
all times, facilitates underground operations.
(e) More than any other "normal" political party, the Com-
munist Party has acquired a"backlog of "illegal" experience,
even under legal conditions.
1. O anizational Continuity. By its nature as a revolutionary'
organization, the Communist Party will operate under any conditions,
legal or illegal. On the basis of its theory, it considers the
transition to illegality an extremely undesirable but otherwise
"normal" consequence of the class struggle.
This advantage is not enjoyed by the evolutionary Marxist par-
ties (Social Democrats) which operate strictly by legal, parliamen-
tary-democratic methods. When ostracized and suppressed, such
parties often undergo severe morale and organizational crises.
Because of their fundamental inability (so often attacked by the
Communists) to cone;ivo of a revolutionary approach, they interpret
their ostracism as "failure of the leadership", "failure of
.doctrine", and begin to disassociate themselves, psychologically
and organizationally, from their past. "In a;l Fascist countries,"
states a loading, Social Democrat, referring to events in the
thirties, "there grows this idea within the illegal (Socialist)
cadre; We are something new; We are not a more continuation of the
old partyo... The old is dead -- something entirely new must develop
now."
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Behind the security of its prefabricated doctrine, the Communist
Party does not, as a rule, need to scrutinize its basic philosophy or
raison d'etrc under illegal- conditions. Party continuity is taken
for granted by the Communists. ?hen the Party is outlawed it does
not waste prscious time and energies wrangling over basic theory
and metaphysical issues. It does not have one form of organization
for legal and another for illegal conditions. The underground Party
is the ?arty"underround.
2. Cadre Continuity. A further guarantee of continuity is the
fact that the Party is at all times a "cadre Party". As rlany execu-
tive and administrative positions as possiblo arc occupied by trained,
experienced, full-time. and salaried functionaries or "professional
revolutionaries". Mlhile the size, reliability and capabilities of
the cadre obviously vary from country to country, the. Party
habitually, and asa matter of principle, creates a caste of func-
tionaries who are entirely dependent upon the Party center in finan-
cial, personal and ideological terms, and who can therefore be
depended upon to follow the center underground.
The extent to which the individual cadre-na.n is tied to the Party
by personal interest is ably describes by A. Rossi (-a'h: siolo .of he
French Communist P rty , Paris, 194) 6
IrThe role played by personal interest in this faithful
adherenco to the Party is greater than one might think... The
Party functionary cannot become a functionary without quitting
his factory, his office, his profession -- he takes on new
habits and lives differently. He sheds his roots, he becomes
a sort of outcast.,,. He has'ontored a noun social class, a
class sui Zoneris it is true, 'but still"dlovated as only the
salaried class of industry and cowmerce... To quit (t.is'class)
means to be thrown,back into the limbo from where he came..']
As an added incentive for its cadre, the Party also dispenses
power, which Rossi describes as frequently greator.than that of high-
level government officials. Having tasted this sense of power, the
functionary is reluctant to give it up.
A party run both at the center and at the periphery by a well-
trained and disciplined cadre -bureaucracy has the advantage of a con-
crete and specific approach to the problem of going underground. It
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can prepare and provide for the event in terms of cadre protection
and replacement, ,'Ihatevor action potential a Party may salvage in
illegality depends less on the extent to which it can protect its
rank and file from arrest, than on the success it achieves in sal-
vaging or replacing its entire cadre. The disadvantage of the
system, however, is that if the cadre fails, the Party fails. The
P~__r puriderground is the cadre underground,
3. Discipline and Security. The stress on strict discipline
which is required under illegal ;conditions constitutes no problem
for the Party. The cadre will have boon trained already and condi-
tioned to depend on the instructions of the center in any circum-
stance, The center will therefore encounter little resistance in
strengthening its control over the cadre, and will be able to dis-
pense with those features of "democratic centralism" which permitted
the rank and file to participate in the' selection of the cadre
during legal periods. Instructions issued by the illegal CP France
of 1940, for example, stated specifically that the election of
functionaries was out of the question, and that only Cont'alism was
to be conserved. 11hile this relationship has the definite opera-
tionc l advantage of permitting co-ordinatod ac'Lon evun under haz-
ardous conditions, the dependence of the cadre on the center can
choke the initiative of the individual cadre-man and impede the
efficiency of the Party.
Discipline under illegal conditions means not only strict ad-
horence to the political and organizational direction of the center,
but also rigorous conformity with underground security rules govern-
ing the conspiratorial behavior of cadre and militants. A function-
ary who has "betrayed" Party secrets under severe police pressure is
punished by the competent organs of the Party for a "breach of
discipline", vrith no regard for the circumstances in which the be-
occurred.
trayal
The maintenance of discipline and security by special Party
organs (Control Commission, Cadre Commission, and other specialized
sections) is a traditional feature of Party organization which can
=nom r=
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be conveniently adapted to underground conditions. The main factor,
however, which endangers the successful preservation of discipline
and security in the Party underground is that, in the course of
extremely severe police action, morale may disintegrate and result
in factionalism, mass defections and penetrations.
4. Doctrine as 1Jlorale-8uilder. Efficient underground organiza-
tion and conspiratorial skill are, of course, the decisive elements
in the Part's struggle to maintain itself when illegal, The
demands of underground life on the underground Party worker, however,
are frequently extremely taxing, and good morale becomes an opera-
tional necessity. No matter how much opportunism, adventurism, or
lust for power go into the hake-up of the individual functionary or
activist, a willingness to sacrifice everything for the sake of the
Party dom^.nds a stronger motive than these. This motivation is
furnished by the Party, ready-made, in the form of its doctrine, the
Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology. As a morale-building clement,
doctrine stands in the first line of defense of the Party underground.
Thorough indoctrination (which is, of course, a continuous and well-
organized process in legal as well as illegal periods) appears to
induce the following psychological habits in Communists:
a. Suficriority Coriplex. The doctrine is dispensed as
"absolute truth!/, providing the believer with a set of answers
for every political,,, social and philosophical-problem. The sincere
individual Communist, in possession of "absolute truth", consi-
ders himself, a crusader, a fighter for a "now world". The
longer he stays in the Party, the less he is able to think in
un-Communist terms. Ho feels eternally misunderstood by non-
Corrmunists and, when ostracized, feels victir:Lized. In brief,
his indoctrination produces tlic_conviction that he is fighting
for a just cause -- a definite morale asset.
b, Hostili . Based upon the idea of class struggle, the
doctrine systematizes and cultivates hostility generated by
social conflict, frustration and maladjustment; The doctrine
is one of hatred directed at the "class enemy", the latter be-
ing anyone viho'does not share the Party's point of view. Such
indoctrination, required by the revolutionary-military nature
of the Party, pays off during periods of illegality. Hostility
grows with the increasing pressure exerted by the "class enemy"
andaadded to the instinct for self-preservation, leads to vigor-
ous resistance.
c. Optimism. Communist doctrine has a strong morale-
building clement in its "scientific" certainty of the inevitable
doom of capitalist society. Defeat can be rationalized as a
temporary setback, a deficiency in organization, or the result
of the work of tr Lors. But it can never be accepted as definite
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and final, Optimism is prescribed as the Communistts.basic
attitud;, and pessimism becomes a heresy; In this outlook
.there is a modicum of religious strength, an asset not to be
underestimated during a period of underground activity.
5. Attraction of Doctrine. In situations where repressive
measures are applied to the non-Communist evolutionary Iarxist,
liberal and progressive parties, as ell as to the Communist Party,
Communist doctrine may actually extend beyond its defensive func-
tion and further the growth of the illegal Party. When repression
becomes total,, as under the Fascist regimes, the peaceful evolution-
ists and liberal democrats may lose their faith in moderate tactics
and join the Communists, who always maintain that socialism cannot
be established by legal methods alone. Under Nazi control, the
Austrian working class felt that the Socialists' democratic methods
had brought about their defeat and began to place their hope in Com-
munist objectives. C? Austria became a significant organiziation for
the first time in its-history during the term of Nazi suppression;
it declined when suppression was lifted.
6. Cell...stam: Under illegal conditions, when security consi-
derations doma.nd'tho atomization`of Party organization, the Party
neeclonly adjiist its cell system, through which basic operations are
eff ectod The grouping of the rank and file into small nuclei at
the place of work, at the place of residcncc, and in non-Communist
parties and organizations' ensures the systematic exploitation. of the
cell momber'ts normal outside contacts for propaganda and recruitment
purposes. This is an all-important'task in the underground when other
Party'activitiets may be curtailed. The importance of illegal cell
activity is intensified by the fact that intermediate echelons are
usually reduced to' sko1etons; honco,.for practical purposes the
PortY underground often'consists :nly of the center and the numerous
'Ifront line cell organizations. There is.inherent in this system,
however advantageous, a considerable risk of isolation. When communi-
cations break down, as,they frequently do, the basic Party organiza-
tions become ineffective or detached from the Party line. If the
Party
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is reduced to a multitude of isolated nuclei, which can do little
more, than maintain their clandestine existence for the day when the
Party may be revived. It is at this point that the extent to which
the Party has accumulated and transmitted lessons learned from con-
spiratorial experience becomes effective,
7. Backlog of Conspiratorial Experience, Through the Comintern,
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has shaped the organizational
policy of all foreign Parties, and has passed on its own considerable
experience in underground work. Throughout the years of its exist
once, the Comintern exhorted and obliged its sections to prepare ade-
quately for periods of illegality. By moans of its Organization
Bureau, hcadod until about 1936 by Piatnitzky, a leading organizer of
the Russian unto rground, the Comintern furnished specific advice on
underground operations and problems. Terms used in the Russian under-
ground, such as "technical apparatus"for illegal printing and distri-
bution facilities, have consistently found their way into the nomen-
clature of foreign Parties. The Greek Party, for.example, currently
uses a Russian word, "Yavka", meaning a clandestine reporting center.
The "groups of three" upon which illegal Party organization appears
to be based so frequently, have their equivalent in the Russian under-
ground term, "troika" (team of three).
The fundamental problems. of illegal activity are now widely
understood by the various Parties. The practical experiences of
many Parties, accumulated during underground periods and pooled by
the Comintern prior to 1943, have increased the conspiratorial com-
petence of the movement. There is hardly a significant Party which
has not gone through illegal or semi-legal phases.
'.Milo first-hand
experience probably remains the best task-master, it is evident that
a pattern at least exists in general outlines, and that a Party faced
with illegality acts on it. To what degree this pattern has been.
created by a centralized effort, or by the appearance of identical
Y
problems treated in a similar fashion by different Parties, is a
minor point. It ism 4V-Wtgrat niz: and understand the
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basic Communist approach to the organizational and operational pro-
blems of the Party underground,
C. Organizational Problems: Ad,~ustrient to Illegal Conditions
The fundamental organizational "problem faced by the Party going
underground is this: How to combine maximal, security with maximal
activity -- how to expose its agencies and functionaries to the police
as little as possible, Therefore, the primary concern is with a
realistic and practicable streamlining of the bureaucratic apparatus,
1. Reduction of Party ApDaratus. The extent of the streamlining
process is determined by the size of the legal Party, the severity of
repressive action upon it, and general policy considerations; A
small or underdeveloped P-rty apparatus cannot be drastically reduced;
a mass Party may find it necessary to run the risk of proserving an
extensive organization. Within the limits of such considerations,
action may be taken along the following lines:
a? Consolidation of territorial organizations-. The torri-
torial.organization of the 'Party, particularly in a large country,
can be conveniently consolidated and reduced. This makes it pos-
sible to utilize staff personnel with greater economy, and to
concontrato communications with the Party center. All levels of
territorial organization (region, district, subdistrict and sec-
tion)-may be reduced simply by unifying the various staff'com-
i nds, and combining their original areas of. jurisdiction. The
twenty-eight regional organizations (Bezirke) of the German Com-
munist Party before 1933., for example, were consolidated after
the advent of Nazi suppression into eight inter-regional organi-
zations (Oborbozirke); other territorial organizations were
apparently also reduced in number while their jurisdiction was
extended,
The Party center itself may be less affected by the pro-
cess of consolidation: a large Party may-need a largo central
organization.. On the cell level; however, consolidation is not
practical. For security reasons, cells must be broken up into
small units if they are to escape police attention. Hence, at
the same time that torritorial?organizations may decrease in
number or disappear altogether, the cell organizations in the
Party underground may be atomized and grow in number.
b, Re;uGtion of Staffs. In addition to the consolidation of
territorial organizations, the number of staff positions through-
out the Party is normally reduced in the underground. The terri-
torial Party committees are apparently strongly affected in this
respect.. According to-,a Comintern instruction, the committees of
illegal Parties should, as a rule, consist of no more than five
people, and a secretary should take the place of the executive
bureau. In practise, the composition of illegal Party committees
appears to be more elastic, depending on prevailing conditions.
The . extent. to which the membership of the Central Committee may be
reduced is also determined by the actual situation, Members of
the Central Committee are elected at the national Party Congress
or Party Conference, and their tenure of office is valid for both
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legal and illegal periods. Over and above the losses sustained
by a Central Committee through arrests and other operational
mishaps, there is, however, no general indication-of how nurieri-
cal composition is affected by illegal conditions. It may be as
large or as small as conditions warrant
There seems to be a general tendency to eliminate Party Cora
mittees during illegal periods, and to assign actual organiza-
tional and political work to the oxocutive-adriinistrative appara-
tus of the Party. CP Chile, for example, simply eliminated all
Cora.i.ttces and transferred the direction of the Party to its
executive, agencies, as follows:
REGIONAL I
SECRETARY
LOCAL
SECRETARY
11% CELLS
REGIONAL
SECRETARY 3
LOCAL
SECRETARY
Insofar as the executive-ad inistrative apparatus of a Central
Committee is concerned, practical security-reasons obviously re-
comrlend the paring down of staff personnol. If the actual vwork-
load is too heavy to permit reduction, the Secretariat and the
various Departments or-Comiissions of the Central Committee (such
as Cadre, Organization, Youth, Agit-Prop, etc,) may continue,
while new commissions r my be created for"technical services, re-
lief for interned comrades, and the like. In"some Parties, the
personnel of these Departments may be reduced,, In others, the
staff may continue or be replaced. One Central Committee may
dissolve its Politburo and transfer its functions to the National
Secretari.^at, Another may enlarge its r,orlborsI i?, in order to make
up for expected losses in executive positions. There is no gen-
eral rule except adaptability to the situation at hand,
2. The Command Function
territorial organizations
CONTROL
POLITI C ,L
I C01,21ISSION
SECRETARY
GENERAL... _._.!
The Triad Ssteri._ Consolidation of
and reduction of staff personnel, can, in
some cases, be combined with a special organization of the command
-function ,observable only in undo r~rouu' gtios. According to this
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system, at all echo l_ons f ror..i the national down to the cell level,
groups of three functionaries may be established with two-fold re-
sponsibilities: the over-all direction and supervision of Party
work at their level, and maintenance of vertical liaison with each
other. In the latter capacity these triads represent the live
chain of commend in the illegal Party. Whenever observed, those
triads have consisted of a) a specialist for political work, b)
a specialist for organizational problems, and c) a specialist for
agitation and propaganda, or for labor union works
The trims, however, do_not necessarily replace whatever other
Party organizations may remain effective. They arc sometimes mere-
ly superimposed on the illegal Party machinery in order to monopo-
lize direction. Triads at national and territorial levels have
been known to direct the work of the various admministrative and
executive departments and commissions of the Party. However, it
cannot be clearly determined at present to what extent the nation-
al triad may combine executive command with policy-makin.; functions.
Theoretically it remains responsible to the Politburo, but in fact
it may well become the actual loadorrhip of the Party. The triad
principle may even be applied to cell organization. Cells can be
constituted as throe-man groups, ja.ch member recruiting and direct-
ing another group of throe who are not cell members and who comprise
sub-cell basic twits.
The trued represents an effective concentration of the command
function in the hands of a comparatively few individuals,, It per-
mits neater centralization and compartmentalization,
3. Comportiiontalization. Tight compartmentalization is an
organization and security problem of the first order, since it is
necessary to prevent the police from learning too much when Party
members or functionaries are arrested. Compartmentalization i s ap-
plied to Party operations as follows:
a, lty and military branch. Whenever an undorCround Party
is in the position to create a military organization, the latterts
staff ccm,3osition is kept distinct from the Partyls political
mechanism. The two structures merely coordinate on policy and re-
cruitment problems at tieir..Y~hest~?Che~ ins.
it K 4 M A-. 1~ii,
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b. PPcrt r and auxiliary front) orf,anizations. As in le3al
periods various Party auxi_litiric,s youth organizations, women's
orC,aniz",tions, sport clubs, etc.,) remain connected with the
Party throuf;h interlockin; staff personnel' only. They function
on their own, os independently as pessihle.
C, P^r rt an' n iliary ille;,^1 or,,anizotions. Party organi-
zations, or teams for the performance of such specialized tasks
as espionage, sabotage, clandestine penetration of police and
other ,ovornr.i nt agencies, liquidation and terror grou,)s, etc.,
arc est^.hlished as largely independent and self-contained groups
even in legal periods. They are maintained on. this basis in
times of illegality.
d. Internal 1 arty cam rtmonta3..ization? Jithin the Polit-
ical mcchar:i sm of the Party proper, the desired effect can be
ideally achieved by the followi_nd measures:
l) i' 7.i min1'.tlul!_ h,:~rizontal liaison. No cell and no
territorial organization is oerm7_tte(.to maintain contact
with any other Party or;;an opora.tinr-; on the same level.
Liaison may only '.5e conducted vertically with the designated
functionary of tho superior Party orb,;anization, whose task
it is to direct the lower organizations under his jurisdiction.
2) Restriction of contact s : The fewer comrades a func
tionary or activist knows and meets in the course of his work,
the hotter. This principle is sound if applied realistically.
It can, however, be formalized to an extreme degree. CP
France in 1941, for example, applied the triad system not only
to the organization of the command function, but apparently
also, as a security measure, to all Party activities. No com
racie was to know more than two other Party workers. It is
questionable whether the French principle can be put into
practice r1rgid'ly. Even CP France frequently had to threaten
disciplinary action in order to push its compartmentalization
program to the extreme,
3) Functional rostri.cti?ons.. "The comrades of a group
of three must not know anything but (what refers to) their
work proper,"''states an instruction of CP France (1941).
More than over, it is incumbent upon' the directors of illegal
Party work to c,ef-i-no the job of each functionary and activist
clearly, so that he "may not stray beyond security limits. It
is not always possi'le, howcvcr,, for the individual function-
ary to "stick to his runs".- Nothing, is less permanent than
an underground organization, and shifts from one job. to
another occur ofton, As a result, a functionary may learn
more than is goon for the "71
4. Election of Party Coamittoos, The streamlining process ap-
plied to the illegal Party organization may not always be extensive,
and the direction of the Party may actually lie in the hands of the
national and territorial committees and their administrative organs.
When this is the case, the illegal election of Party committees re-
presents an organizational problem. The Con ntern advised its member
Parties that in an underground situation illegal Party elections were
once members would, not know who was elected,, It is not certain whether
possible, though they must take place in restricted conferences and
the cleet.oris themselves handled in such a way that even the confer
?
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this advice has boon [.,morally hooded, as the problems of illegal
Parties arc never identical.
a. Election of Central Committees. Electing a Central Com-
mittee at a conference abroad is one way of circumvontin#; secur-
ity'restrictions at home when the Party is under..;round. In this
way, the Bolshevik'undcr;round elected its Central Committee at
conferences abroad, attended by delegates who travelled illegally
from the interior of Russia.. Currently, the Party conferences
of.CP`Greece are held abroad for practical nurposos (in the rebel
area). This is also true of CP Spain at present. On the other
hand, conditions prevailing in a particular country may permit
the holding of large illegal meotin;;s at homo. For example, the
illegal Central Committee (38 members) of CP Yugoslavia was elect-
ed in that country at'a national conference of more than 100 dole-
atos in October 1940.
The Party may not be able to hold a national Party Con-
cress for the election of the Central Cowrnittoe, but may be able
to convoke the smaller national conference. Again in the case of
CP Yugoslavia, special dispensation was granted by the Comintern
in 1940 to allow the election of'a Central Committee at a national
conference instead of a congress.
e ..
b, Territorial Part committees and electoral commissions..
Spocial electoral commissions have sometimes boon created for the
purpose of electin.- members of territorial Party Committees. A
Comintern document refers to two types of such commissions:
1) An electoral commission chosen by the P.o.rty confer-
ence for the counting of secret votes cast. Tho commission
chocks the votes but does not announce election results to
the conference.
2) A small electoral commission, elected by a Party
conference, toicther with a representative of the next higher
Party committee actually "elects" (i.e. appoints) the: new
Party coru_i_ttee. In this - caso, the Party conference does not
cast votes for candidates. It merely elects the commission,
c. Co-o:station, Elections of Party committees at'all levels
can bo replaced by or combined with "co-optation" appoint-
ment to its membership by a specific Party committee. This
practice, hozvover, app,.rs to be regarded as an interim solution.
Under normal conditions, all members of Party committees are sup-
posed to be elected. One of the most severe of the criticisms
directed by the CP Soviet Union a,ainst CP Yu~;oslavia in 1948 was
that the latter had carries; over a. disproportionate number of co-
opted Central Committee rnombors into the le;;al post-war period.
Administrative-oxecutive positions may also be filled by co-opting
responsible functionaries.
5. Party Organizations Abroad, When repressive measures become
severe, the central Party organs, as well as special support centers,
often have to be established abroad, working, from the outside into
"illegal" territory. This method of salvaging and maintaining cen-
tralized loadoruhip abroad has been traditional with the movement
since the days when Marx and Enels wrote in exile, and when Lenin and
his staff abroad laid the foundation for the CP of the Soviet Union.
The typos of central organizations commonly transferred to, or created
upon, foroi4;n soil are the following;:
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a. Central Committee and Central Departments the Central'
Committoe and its administrative-executive apparatus (Politburo)-
Secretariat, Departments, Control Commission) may be transferred,
either in their entirety or in their salvageable components.
Such was the case with CP Germany under the Hitler regime. At
present, the central organs of CP Spain and CP Greece are func-
tioning, in the same manner. The freedom of action enjoyed by
centers outside the home country obviously varies with the atti-
tuces of the government and police of the host country. Party
centers abroad are often forced to operate illegally or semi-
illegally and are therefore not always effective. The current
solution to this problem lies, when practical, in transferring;
the center to the Soviet Union or to-satellite areas. The con-
trol organs of CP Spain., for exermple, are apparently at present
being moved from Paris to Prague.'
The central organs abroad, as well as performing a coat
mand assignmont, must also provide the Party at home with propa-
ganda and indoctrination material, printing equipment, funds,
specialists in underground work, a central repository for files
and archives, training facilities for the illegal cadre, communi-
cation services, arms and ammunition, safe haven, and financial
support for exiled Party iwaorkers. In short, the central Party
organization abroad becomes the chief operational support center
for the home Party. It must therefore frequently croatd
new types of auxiliary and administrative or_anizations.?.
b. Forei!-;n Bureau. The Bolshevik Party abroad and the
Italian Party during the Mussolini era (the Ufficio Estero in
Paris) are known to have established Foreign Bureaus. This
organization represents a central administrative-executive agency
charged with the direction of support functions, such as cormu=
nications, production and distribution of press and propaganda,
etc. Theoretically, the supervision of the Foreign Bureau'
rests with the Central Committee, but in the cases at hand, the
Bureaus have been the real directing centers.
c. Regional si ort centers. The apparatus of the Contrftl
Committee abroad may prove unable to handle all its workload,
particularly when it must operate into a country with long
frontiers. Consequently,, the command and support function may
have to be decentralized, and several support centers, operating
from various countries into sectors of the homeland, may be
created, The central organization of CP Germany, established
abroad in the thirties, created such regional support centers in
the form of regional cor:-manc' posts (Abschnittsleitungen), which
operated out of several countries bordering on Germany. Coordii-
nation with the Central Corm ittee was effected through the
assignment of Central Committee members to the regional centers,
d. Party organizations for emit ,rants. Special Party organi-
zations for exiled Communists, such as the ntE igrantenleitungen"
of the German Party organization abroad, may be created. They
do relief work and carry out the indoctrination and training
functions of basic Party organizations. They also furnish person--
nel'for special underground assignments (couriers, border guides,
etc.).
Party organizations for emigrants should not'be confused
with front organizations created by the Party abroad. The latter,
sometimes set up instead of special Party organizations for
emigrants, serve political propaganda purposes from which the
home Party may benefit. They are convenient money-raising instru-
ments for the Party under the pretext furnished by the front's
ostensible purpose. The far-flung organizgtion of the Free
German Lovcment during the war was such a front constituted
abroad. The German Central Committee in Moscow practically merged
with the Free Germany center in the USSR; other Party nuclei
abroad, particularly in Latin. America, Great Britain and the
United States, followed suit.
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e. Special service organizations. The Party Center abroad
usUtAly has to cidate special organs to facilitate communications
with the homeland. Communications may be expedited through a
border-crossing mechanism, either under direct control of the
center or manipulated by a regional support station. The prpduc-
ti,n of printed materials and their distribution via special colm..
nunic.ations routes may have to be entrusted to a separate organi-
zation, usually referred to as a Technical Service or Apparatus.
These groups,-indispensable for the effective functioning of the
illegal Party, will be discussed in greater detail below,-as they
are characteristic not only of Party organizations abroad, but
appear in the home country as well.
Party organizations abroad fulfill extremely necessary
and sensitive support functions. Their efficiency is frequently
raised. by the assistance obtained from the CP of-the host country
in the shape of funds, living space, safe houses, courier person-
nel, etc. Their operational problems, however, merge with those
of the Party at home. Failure to solve these problems may spell
the do:^.th of the Party.
D. Operational Problems of the ' fart Underground.
While the Party is le-;al, it normally exposes most of its cadre
to the public eye. Once it is outlawed, therefore, a certain number
of functionaries and activists have to be withdrawn from. active
duty.. Those ranking, functionaries who are indispensable must be
safely housed or otherwise protected from the police. The compromised
cadre .dust be replaced, and now personnel has to be trained for the
various now functions which are characteristic of un-.lerground work.
In view of the hazardous conditions which prevail in the underground,
a special typo of cadre must be developed: self-controlled, self-
sacrificingg and intrepid. More than ever, able cadre selection and
supervision become the problems of the Partyts personnel agencies
(cadre departments and commissions). Numerically, a balance crust be
struck between a cadre which is too large -- and therefore in danger
of exposure -- and a cadre which is too small -- and therefore in-
capable of r.ia.ss work, shrinking into insignificant study and discus-
sion circles.
1. The Cadre Problem.
a. Ru2laccment of the cadre must be undertaken as a pro-
para;tory measure efore the party is actually outlawed. Sensi-
tive functions be secretly transferred to an "invisible
cadre, o compare ivoly unknown individuals. The orlintern
stby advised the creation of an invisible cadre, an ltillegal-
ly directing core", which must be kept distinct and separate
from the Party Committee t s legal apparatus, and thus ready to
take over numeroug, supervisory functions when the Party goes un-
derground. This cadre, according to the Comintern, was to be
formed from those Communist leaders whp were comparatively un-
known, to the police and the rank and fire of the Party, but who
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wore well trained in practical-Party works
According to the Comintorn, the process of developing and
bring into play an invisible cadre should be applied to the
entire Party structure and its auxiliaries, within trade unions
and other legal "revolutionary" organizations. If, by the time
the Party is outlawed, these invisible cadres have boon
strategically placed and properly trained, the most sensitive
functions of the Party apparatus, as well as Party documents,
can be handed over to them, Hence, when the police seize Party
premises, very little of the Party's activities and few of its
personnel will be revealed to them.
It also becomes necessary to deceive the police further by`
divesting ostensibly important functions of their significance.,
The Secretary ofa Party comriittee, normally the most important
functionary, may, in the underground, be degraded from political
leader to administrative officer. The Comintern instructs on
this point as follows:
Tot only is it not necessary for the secretary of the
Committee of a Coaaunist Party to be the political leader
of the Committee;-but as a rule he should not be its
political leader.... Thy is such a rule essential? It is
important because the secretary of the Party Committee in
illegal or semi-legal conditions is the person upon whom,
above all, the blow of action will fall. If that person is
the political leader of the Party Committee, his arrest will
affect the work of the entire Committee.... The political
leader of the Party Committee should not be coErnectod with
the technical functions of the Party apparatus.11
rJhether or not this principle has become general practise
is not known; it would certainly need revision'in the case'of
small Parties with insufficient cap re, material. There are,
however, paBt and recent indications that Parties expecting to
go underground do prepare invisible cadres for underground work.
In 1927, for example, when-central records of the illegal CP
Italy were seized in Genoa, none of the regional loaders whose
names were revealed had previous records as Communists or Party
members. In January 1949, Togliatti, Secretary General of CP
Italy reportedly instructed a leading functionary to make a
tour of the regional organizations in Northern Italy and to
'nominate new regional secretaries, who would oper'atc under il-
legal conditions if the Party should be outlawed.
The extent to which an invisible cadre may be created ap-
pears in practise to depend largely upon the availability of a
reserve of"trained but unknown Party workers and crypto-
Communists.
b. An adequate cadre reserve must be maintained by the
Party uzzdorround i order t~ 0-7lave the means for re-constituting
the Party. It is not always possible, however, to defer good
workers from active duty, especially as the Party becomes pro-
gressively decentralized. Larger numbers of active functionar-
ies are required in an illegal than in a legal situation. "The
cadre requirements of our Party are unlimited," the CP France
organ Vie du Parti stated in late 1941. The discovery of new
cadre material, so necessary for replacement purposes, is no
bureaucratic affair in the underground. This responsibility
does not rest exclusively with the personnel (cadre) officers.
A. Rossi (op, cit?)points out that the CP France in-1941 recog-
nized the fact that the recruitment of cadre personnel must
preoccupy the entire Party and could not be loft, as in legal
times, to individual (cadre) functionaries. The French Commu-
nist functionaries were instructed, at that period, to Live up
bureaucratic methods applicable to legal activity; only through
an over-all Party effort could a new and capable cadre be
developed.
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C Ideological and practical training of the now eac.'.re must
also be ogre-- ca,ucrat :zed in tie unciorcround, This is necessary
for the simple reason that it becomes extremely hazardous to run
Party schools and not very practical to send large numbers of
militants out of the country to attend courses arranged by'Party
organizations abroad. Only specialized technical training, such
as radio operation, is occasionally conducted abroad. Ideologi-
cal training mar be acquired in the course of cell work, simply
by reading and discussing the illegal press, and the standard
works of Communist literature; Functionaries, who are ti-Jell-
versed in theoretical r_atters, may merely pass on their knowledge
to small groups of other comrades (sometimes no more than two),
and create "within the Party a multitude of small schools whose
students m, ,y, in their tine, become teachers of other Comrmnists,"
(Rossi, ppP* cite)
On the whole, however, ideological training is likely to be
pushed into the background by more pressing operational problems,
The current emphasis of the Cominform on the ideological re-
training of the Eastern European Parties is based, at least
partially, upon the neglect of idooloieal matters during the il-
legal war years.
The Party' underground does afford considerable opportunity
for practical, on-the-job training. In. the course of its
decentralization (for example, CP France with its multitude of
basic three-man units), the Party may require n:.ore low and medium
level functionaries than usual, It may be forced, as a result,
to assign Party workers to responsible positions without regard
to bureaucratic considerations, Although admittedly low in the
hierarchy, this now cadre may in the long run?-receive T--.bettor and
more valuable 'practical training than it could obtain in formal
Party schools. Similarly.,. the'Partyts special underground ser-
vices (corn ..uumications, housing, production and c istribution of
printed matter, etc,) must be established ad hoc and require now
personnel who must receive their training en r:rc,iant. Thus, an
illegal period, if it can be successfully %w,eatlered, may prove'
beneficial for the Party. Upon emergence from the underground,
the Party may have a cadre larger than in the normal legal
period and possessed of practic7.1 experience not previously
available,
d. The, protection-of the ille~al cadre rust be given top
priority. Deffnsiveiy, the cadre and with it the entire Party)
must be protected against infiltration"by police agents and un-
reliable elements into Party positions, Obviously.,-this is not
a special problem of the underground, and it may be effectively
handled by the national and territorial cadre departments (ccrz-
missions) which are norm.aily'charged with the investigation and
loyalty program of the Party. In Communist terms, however,'
loyalty is an elastic word. Deviations from the Party line,,
factionalism, lack of discipline, foolhardiness, breach of secur-
ity rules, and lack of initiative constitute acts of disloyalty
as reprehensible to the Party as the actual work of a police
agent.. Consequently, the cadre department may also be charged
with the political supervision of the Party functionaries. Dur-
in, the war years, when CP France was illegal, the "Cadre
Responsible" of the Paris Inter-region attended certain meetings
of the responsible regional triad, and reported to the political
"responsible" at national headquarters on the political conduct
of the regional functionaries, Disciplinary action, including
expulsion, based on the investigation of the Cadre Commission,
rests with the National Control Commission in legal as in
illegal periods. In o~erational terms, however, cadre protection
in the underground requires the provision of false papers, as
well as the maintenance of an adequate number of safe houses and
apartmonts whore the functionary may live or hide out from the
police, and make his professional contacts securely. This is an
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elementary underground requirement, especially since functionar-
ies and militants must frequently change their domicile,
2. The "Housjg" Problem and Communications The provision.% of
safe shelter for illegal Party functionaries and fugitives constitutes
merely one aspect of a much lamer problem, The Party underground re-
quires numbers of safe houses or apartments for a variety of acbii.nis-
tration and operational purposes. Arehiveg?files and Party corres-
pondence can no longer be kept at "legal", premises, and bank deposits
cannot be maintained in the Party's name, In fact, the entire process
of '"going, underground" and of sustaining an illegal Party machine can
be reduced to the prosaic but intricate search for safe space: homes
of unsuspected sympathizers, shops and offices of crypto-Communists,
houses and. farms in the country, and the like. Particularly important
is the safe housing of communications.
a. Internal lcommunications Liaison between the illegal
national and territoriar organization -- whether constituted on a
"normal" basis or reorganized as triads -- requires safe meetin
and contdct places for representatives of the higher and lower
echelons,
Re;Portir, points. The Comintern advised Parties under-
g;round to establish special addresses or flats where at appointed
times representatives of the coils and fractions of the mass
organizations could meet representatives of the Party committee
.for consultation and instruction, Such reporting points may be
established at all echelons of the Party' underground. Even a
legal Party may find it useful to create clandestine reporting
points whenever the legal Party premises become insecure. Pro-
tective measures include the establishment of safety signals and
special passwords for verification purposes. At the central
reporting point of the Bolshevik underground Party, for-example,
different passwords wore used for rank and file workers, for
district'#unctionaries, and for functionaries of the central
apparatus
otter dr?s,and contact points for couriers, Written
communications between higherhigher and lower echo .ors presuppose the
existence of safe addresses where "mail" can be delivered and
picked upH The Corniutorn's instructions specify that such safe
addresses must'trot coincide with those of reporting points. By
the same tok9,n4s1)ecial addresses may be established for the use
of intra-Party couriers carryinu verbal mossaZese.
hp External conniunicati..ns Communications with the Party
organizat:ion:7 abroad pose special "housiing' problems,
Bordo eteasing mechanism.. There must be established
on the boy?clers spoci.al corro'de' points and safe houses (such as
overnight stations) for the use of couriers., instructors, and
the various special sorvicos of the Party, as well as for fugi-
tives,, In practical terms, the Party crust either use the homes
of "safe" Party members or sympathizers in the border regions,
or buy the services of non-Party individuals who may be helpful
by virtue of their experience. In the Bolshevik underground it
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eras common ,practise to hire smug_;lers operating in border areas.
Recruitment or bribery of individuals employed by border-control
authorities may also be attempte-'. Fishermen, barge-owners, and
maritime workers may be utilized when the crossing; of waterways
and maritime frontiers is required.. The porinections of Danish
fishermen with their German friends in the Hamburg area were
exploited in the thirties by the regional support station of the
German Party in Denmark for the infiltration of liaison personnel.
Security considerations demand that border-crossing mechanisms
remain specialized and compartmentalized, The Party must create
as many of these as possible: special border-crossing points for
couriers, for Party emissaries from abroad, for the transportation
of propaganda material, and for escapees. They may exist side by
side, So lon, as they are separate, if one mechanism is discover-
ed, the others will not be endangered.
co. Rortin, Toints for liaison personnel from abroad? The
success of liaison personnel sent by the foreign support station
into the. homeland hinges upon a very simple requirement: the man
must know where and to whorl to report securely. In the CP Germany
underground during the Hitler regime, such.liaison personnel
.(referred to at that time as "instructors'lwore assigned the ad-.
dresses of trusted 'Party workers (Vortrauenspcrsonen) inside Ger-
many. The provision of adequate shelter for such liaison officers
from abroad adds to the nu Brous housing difficulties of the under-
ground,
3. Technical Ap;...aratus? Maintaining and distributing illegal
Party newspapers, information shoots and propaganda material necessi-
tates the establishment of additional safe space for production,
storage and distribution. Since considerable security risks are in-
volved in the running of an illegal production and distribution
machine ( or "technical apparatus"), the importance which the Party
attaches to this work merits attention.
The function of the Party press in the underground is, in
Lenin's - words, that of a "collective organizer". As such, it not only
organizes the rind of the reader along Party lines, but also groups
the readers around the distribution personnel in loose, but neverthe-
less important, nuclei. In some cases, the Party may be reduced to
just this level of operations: an illegal newspaper and several cir-
cles of readers connected with the center through the workers who
bring the shoot to the house or factory. Further, the Party press
tangibly demonstrates the strength of the suppressed Party. In
highly organized Parties, the press serves the center as a vehicle
for political direction on a mass basis. The abilities of Parties
to maintain illegal publications vary. On the one hand, the il-
legal CP France was able produce large numbers and many
editions of national and rogional newspapers, leaflets, factory
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28
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papers and reviews within France, On the other hand, CP Germany under
Gestapo suppression-had to rely almost exclusively on the production
of its foreign support centers. In general, however, an attempt will
be made by the Party to follow Comintern instructions:
GAll Communist Parties must without fail have an extensive-
apparatus for the publication of illegal Party literature,
printing plants, various kinds of rotary machines, copying
machines, mimeographs and simple hectographs in order to
publish illegal literature, newspapers, leaflets, etc. In
particular it is absolutely essential that the local Party
Committee guarantee the'publication of the factory paper
for the factory cell..,4~~
In addition to the production apparatus a special distribution
mechanism must be set up. For security reasons, the technical appara-
tus of the illegal Party must be divorced from the center and compart-
mentalized on all levels; it may assume the character of a semi-
independent Warty section. According, to Comintern instructions,
special personnel must be brought. in for this purpose; special ad-
dresses are needed for the safckcop inC of literature from the press
and for passing it along to all levels of the underground; and only
one member of the Party Committee should be made responsible for
publication and distribution.
The production process itself is dependent on the availability
of paper, equipment and trained personnel. The acquisition of paper
.is often a troublesome problem. At times it must be stolen or pil-
fered by a Communist employee from his place of work. Equipment
must frequently be improvised. However, when production is on a pro-
fessional scale, as it was in France, the process may be broken up
into as many component parts as possible; decentralization of the pro-
duction of a leaflet provides better security. Depending on the
scale of production and its decentralization, the number of persons
engaged in technical work may vary. Three types of personnel, however,
can be distinguished: 1) the responsible functionaries who supervise
and direct production and distribution, 2) the skilled technicians
(typesetters, printers, etc.), and 3) liaison and distribution per-
sonnel. The function of the supervisors appears to be restricted to
technical problems; the writing and editing rest with the political
functionaries. Liaison personnel may be needed in increasing numbers
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A. M
when the production process is decentralized. Six liaison agents,
for example, were reportedly involved in the production of an illegal
French leaflet, taking the text from the editor to the typesetter,
and so on, down to the central storage place and distribution point.
Final distribution of the product apparently is undertaken by
the political organization (local Party committee, etc.). The tech-
nical :apparatus merely brings the product to the political section.
If the center of the technical apparatus is abroad (as in the case of
the German "Etc ichstechnikum"), it must provide its own courier and
border-crossing; service As a rule, the jurisdiction of the techni-
cal apparatus ends when the product is delivered. Special function-
aries of the local Party organization may be in charge of the
ultimate storage places and distribution to the rank and file. The
distribution process itself, according; to the capabilities of the
technical apparatus, may be put on a mass or on a selective basis.
If there are only a few copies of a paper available it is obvious4y
essential to distribute them among persons with good contacts,
capable of passing on the information to wider circles. In any case,
it can readily be soon that the housing of the technical apparatus
constitutes a major problem. Homes must be rented for the keeping
of equipment (even if only a handpress and a typewriter). Paper
must be stored. Central and local distribution points must be es-
toblished. Couriers must be sheltered. The component operations of
the production process must be safely installed.
There has not so far been any evidence to indicate that there
is a pattern which various Parties follow in treating the housing
problem. Each Party organization, whether political or special,
national or regional, appears to handle the problem according to its
needs.
4. The Secur t,Z Problem. The severe impact of security consi.d--
orations on the organization and operations of the outlawed Party has
been amply demonstrated in the preceding sections. Two special
aspects arise to be treated: personal and administrative security.
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a. Perms l securityO Functionaries and members alike must
adhere to certain "conspiratorial rules" if their security'is'to
be protected. All Parties evolve a set of practical regulations
affecting the member's entire may of life under illegal conditions.
These cover such details as alcohol consumption; behavior in case
of arrest, threatened or actual; private correspondence; selection
and change of apartments; storage of letters, notes, newspapers
clippings and literature in general; 'attitudes towards wife, girl
friend, children, unreliable comrades, etc. Provision is also
usually made for the use of fictitious (Party) names. In the CP
Portugal, for example, members in close contact over a long period
mew each other only by such pseudonyms. Some Parties advocate
the creation of a "Party language", prohibit the use of telephone
or mail for Party communications, advise the frequent changing of
clothes and coiffure, and even of posture and gait. Y articular
attention is paid to security at meetings which should, a s a rule,
be attended by small numbers and should not last long, Playing
cards may be displayed on the table to give the meetings a social
appearance.' Resolutions taken at meetings should be as succinct
as possible,
A breach of security constitutes not only a breach of disci-
pline but also a major political crime: "To be a good Communist
under the present circumstances means above all to apply strictly
the rules of illegal work, it means to understand that each fail-
ure in this respect represents a danger for the Party and a veri-
table-crime against the working class." (lip du Party, 1941)
b, Administrative security. Over and above the need for
safe storage space, special security measures may be introduced
to protect Party records. Paper work is necessary even in the
underground, although its reduction to minimal proportions is a
constant prescription.
Mbership records, Preparatory to going underground,
functionaries will usually destroy membership lists and records
indicating the affiliation of individuals with the Party. Some
Parties may stop their`recruitmont program altogether, or for a
certain period of time. During illegal periods, the issuance of
membership cards or books and clues stamps is often discontinued.
In some cases, the responsible personnel officer may simply rely
on his memory to keep track of the members. The consequences of
failing to carry out such an elementary security measure are il-
lustrated in the case of CP Germany. The Gestapo was able to
seize voluminous central records, which had been allowed to re-
main stored at Berlin headquarters.
Intra-Party communications. Written reports from lower
to higher echelons and instructions from above, when permitted
at all, will be as brief as possible, They should'not contain
any specific details of police interest, such as names of func-
tionaries, cities, villages, and addresses, Confidential com-
munications may be composed in code or ciphers, and written in
invisible ink. Documents will generally be forwarded by a trusted
courier, and delivered at special roporting points. In case of
arrest, the courier must attempt to destroy the communication by
all-possible means. In the underground, Party functionaries will
not, as a rule, sign with their names: they may use their
initials or assigned numbers.
Bio ra hical documentation. The Cadre Commissions ( or
Departments may find it necessary to increase their bureaucratic
activities. Cadre control in the underground is essential, and
detailed biographical statements may be requested of each func-
tionary and militant, particularly replacements. Such biographi-
cal reports may be transmitted by special couriers of the Cadre
Commission,, which may bo in charge of safe-guarding these records.
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TIie actual volume of administrative paper work will depend
chiefly on the size of the Party. .~ mass Party will not be able
to function effectively without substantial administrative
records.
5. The Financial Problem. Operating uno',orground is much more expen-
sive than oporatin;:; locally. That is more, the "normal" sources of
income dry up. On the one hand, illegal conditions impose a new and
often heavy financial burden on the Party. "Ls a consequence of the
atomization of Party oranizatiomand the specialization of personnel,
cadres must be increased -- and payrolls with them. Functionaries
and militants must be constantly an the move, either to escape the
police or to minimize the risks of their work. They nay have to
change their domicile, sometimes at the slightest alert, and must not
be handicapped by a lack of money. Rentals of safe houses and
apartments, storage places, etc., may be considerable; one individual
may frequently have to rent several apartments, cadh under a separate
false identity. Printing and distribution costs rise; equipment is
constantly being, seized by the police and must be replaced. Further,
the Party must aid the families of arrested functionaries and mem-
bers, an expense which may be extremely heavy in the event of mass
arrests.
On the other hand, the collection of duos is hampered. Contri-
butions from sympathizers dwindle; front organizations, through which
fund-collecting campaigns are channeled, may .-Iither; the sale of
Party literature decreases; and commercial ventures of the Party may
fail.
Thus, Party finances frequently become a priority operational
problem. Preoccupation with fin^ncia.l questions is shown in the
instructions of the ( illegal) CP France, calling for a discussion of
finances at the beginning, of every cell meeting. Tight budgeting can
partially solve the dilemma, but essential costs cannot be eliminated.
CP France in 1941 considered the following categories as essential;
a) propaganda material -- paper, equil7mcnt; b) travel expenses; and
c) couriers. The same Party further advised all echelons to budget
as follows: 50% for propaganda costs (paper, .machinery, etc.) and
50% for organizational expenses (salaries, indemnities, travel expenses,
rents, etc.).
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In view of the scarcity of funds in the underground, the Party
must frequently look for support from abroad. Party centers in
foreign countries, or Party auxiliaries with foreign connections,
such as maritime Party units, are particularly suited to collecting
funds with the help of fraternal Parties and their front organiza-
tions... Prior to the dissolution of the Comintern, underground Parties
could also present their case to the Budget Commission of the Commu-
nist International, While it is difficult to estimate the current
financial policy of the CP Soviet Union towards foreign underground
Parties, it is probable that if a significant Party should be forced
underground in the near future (CP Italy or Cf France, for example),
direct or indirect financial support from the Soviet and, satellite
Parties would be forthcoming..
Whatever the origin of underground funds, their administration
poses a critical security problem. Party funds, in possession of
the national and territorial finance departments or finance officers,
can in some cases simply be placed with trusted Party workers. ,1?~gain,
security considerations recommend decentralization of hiding places.
When practical, dummy accounts and dummy corporations can be created.
The administration of funds may also be taken out of the hands of
territorial organizations and centered upon the national Party
treasury, when the latter operates in safe territory -- a procedure
recently reported to be followed by Cr Greece.
6. Mass Support: the Crucial Political Problem. The Partyls
financial difficulties may be overcome, and the Party machine may be
salvaged to a*certain extent. Even so, deprived of its legal outlets,
the Partyls basic strategy of developing into the directing force of
the entire working class and other susceptible strata, will be severe-
ly hindered under illegal conditions.. Fronts and auxiliaries fall by
the wayside in a state of political suppression, and the entire
propaganda and agitation apparatus must restrict its operations. The
strength o? the Party as a political force is based upon free access
for its propagandizers and organizers to wide masses of workers,
farmers, intellectuals.-minority groups, etc.. The legal Party can
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oi>tain a 'maximum of mass support; the illegal Party may fall far short
of this basic objective. "The fundamental deficiency of every illegal
Party," in words of the Comintern, 'H(is) that an illegal Party appara-
tus makes contacts with the masses difficult - and yet the fundamental
task of the Communist, Party is to have close contact with the masses,"
There are several methods by which the Party may attempt to surmount
these obstacles.
a. .penetration and control of le al non-Communist parties
representing workers and rel .tedl class elements. This approach
has only limited possibilities. In the first place, during
severe repression all "progressive" or "liberal" parties may be
outlawed, and another illegal*party is not worth penetrating be-
cause it is itself restricted. In the second place, Communist
efforts to take over a non-Communist "Workerst Party" will moot
with considerable resistance wherever these p-irties are control-
led by Socialists. The attempt made by Cr Austria to take over
the Austrian Social Democratic Party as a whole, through a tacti-
cal alliance made by the two parties during the middle thirties,
met with failure in this way.
b. Penetration and control of legal trade unions. This is a
tactic recommended by the Comintern. Even if control cannot be.
achieved, Party fractions working in legal trade unions can exert
a certain degree of political influence. Illegal trade unions
are clearly loss valuable than legal outlets. The penetration,
process of the trade union movement is a permanent requirement,
no matter what the political status of the Party may be.
C, Creation of dummy front organizations or parties. As a
rule, this method has little chance of success because it is usual-
ly too transparent. Exceptions may occur when suppression is not
severe (such as currently in Brazil) or when the Party is in a
position to exploit a national emergency (such as foreign occupa-
tion or colonial unreBt) and to marshal national or colonial
"liberation" movements.
The fact remains that no matter what political alliances the Party
underground may conclude, or what additional strength it may gain in
illegal membership, it still is not a legal Party and cannot fully
develop its potential strength. The "combination of legal and il-
legal methods" is never adequate; ultimately the illegal Party must
attempt to become legal. The passing from illegality into legality,
however, may only be possible in acutely revolutionary situations.
The Party may have to organize military-revolutionary action (as in
Russia, China and Greece), or it may have to wait for such an inter-
national crisis as World agar II, during which the regime suppressing
the Party is destroyed.
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II, CASES OF COMMUNIST PARTIES UNDERGROUND
This section contains analyses of six Communist
Parties during periods of illegality, showing the particular
organizational and operational problems which each of them
faced and how they tried to solve them.
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 Approved For Release 1999/Otulzm2ro." DP78-02546R000100080001-9
ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY
FOREIGN
BUREAU
TECHNICAL
ORGANIZATION
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
EDITORIAL
BOARD
RUSSIAN
BUREAU
(after 1910)
REGIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
PROVINCIAL
ORGANIZATIONS
CITY
ORGANIZATIONS
TECHNICAL
ORGANIZATION
MILITARY
ORGANIZATION
MILITARY TECHNI-
CAL BUREAU
FINANCE
COMMISSION
LECTURING AND
LITERARY BOARD
SUB- DISTRICTS
CELLS
MOSCOW
DISTRICT ORGANIZATIONS
I Bolshevik fraction
in the Central S-D
Students Organiza-
tion.- - - - -
- Moscow Trades-
Union Bureau.
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DP78-02546R000100080001-9
THE ODESSA BOLSHEVIK ORGANIZATION
(1905)
ODESSA PARTY COMMITTEE
(5 members, headed by a Secretary, with
organizers for each of 3 Districts, and an
Agitprop functionary)
ORGANIZATIONAL
COMMITTEE
TECHNICAL
APPARATUS
CITY
DISTRICT
COMMITTEE_
PERESYPSKY
DISTRICT
COMMITTEE
BOLSHEVIK
STUDENT
ORGANIZATION
DALNITSKY
DISTRICT
COMMITTEE
SUB-DISTRICTS
(No sub-- districts) FONTANSKY
CELLS
VOKZALNY~
666 66666 66 6 666
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THE BOLSHEVIK TECHNICAL MECHANISM
FOREIGN
BUR EAU
OF' THE C.C
EDITOR'IAL
BOARD
TBCHNIAL
SERVICE
Instructions,
copy, literature;
organizers,
couriers, etc.
TR 4NSPORT
EEIV'ICE
Reports,
refugees,
couriers,
etc.
TRANSPORT
SERVICE
Bolsheviks
O in factories
O and shops
PASSPORT
PROCUR MEN
AND PRO...
ORGANIZATION
PUBLISHING
AND DISTRIBUTION
MECHANISMS
(Decentralized) 11
ENGRAVING SHOPS
COMPOSING
PRINT SHOPS
CENTRAL STORAGE
LOCAL STORAGE
BORDER
CROSSING
STATIONS
Copy
from the local
Bolshevik
organization
Dissemination
Copy
from the local
Bolshevik
organization
RU SI'' N
in-r
where supplies
could be got
PRINT SHOP
STORAGE PLACE
a .1 \~
QQQQQ FUNCTIONARIES
RESPONSIBLE
FOR DISTRICT
D
ISTRIBUTION
Dissemination
(Centralized)
Paper Mill
TECHNICAL
SERVICE
''
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THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY UNDERGROUND
In setting up the basis of the Bolshevik Party, it was Lenin's
view that its organization must be stable, solid and continuous, and
that the personnel engaged to take part in the enterprise must be pro-
fessionally experienced in revolutionary activity -- so well 'trained
in subterfuge and c.pnspiratorial devices that the police would not be
able too undermine their organization. From 1900 to 1917, Lenin never
swerved from this concept of the Party; and in 1917, when the big
chance came, only the Bolsheviks among the several opposition factions
possessed the necessary self-confidence and organizational efficiency
to enable them to take power and to hold it.
The development of factions within the original Russian Social-
Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP), which was comprised of a large number
of local Marxist organizations $aroso over organizational differences
in 1903. Lenin insisted on restricting Party membership to a relative-
ly small group of devoted, single-minded, well-disciplined militants,
leaving sympathizers and revisionists to the Party's auxiliaries and
mass organizations. He wanted a "monolithic and militant party with a
cloarlT defined organization." Following the split, Bolsheviks and
Mensheviks constituted two separate parties in fact, if not in name.
They vied with each other for control over loading organs and over
local organizations in Russia. They held separate congresses in 1905;
and finally in 1912, the schism, which had continued to widen during
the 1905 Revolution and the reaction which followed, was made permanent.
Until Stolypin's death in 1911 all opposition parties were severe-
ly repressed except for a brief period in 1905. Against the Bolsheviks,
the Government wqs, if anything, inclined to be less severe, because it
underestimated the capabilities and staying powers of the Party and
because it correctly believed that Lenin's splitting would weaken the
other revolutionary parties. Those others, along with the bourgeois
reformist parties, were considered by the Government to be much more
dangerous than the Bolsheviks. The Tsarist police made mass arrests
and kept the'Bolshevik Party under close surveillance, of course, and
police agents penetrated all major Party organizations. Trade unions,
Jii.~?, l I ST
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the proper subject for Party work, were tolerated only when organized
on a local basis, Among those measures of the Government which hinder-
..ed Bolshevik activity were internal passport requirements and the
registration laws, Travellers and people changing residence were re-
quired to sign the register at new lodgings. However, lower police
functionaries, when they were not ignorant, v~~;..re likely to be corrupt-
ible. It was often no great task to bribe a prison guard, frontier
patrol, or local police chief, or to "talk"onoself.out of
situation.
a tight
Other difficulties faced by Lenin in the building of the Party
along the highly centralized lines he had laid down, were imposed by
the long distances over which command channels were stretched, both
from abroad and within Russia itself. Transport networks sot up by the
,Party's technical services, the employment of couriers, and the use of
special communications devices overcame such troubles in some measure.
Considerable aid was rendered local Russian organizations from abroad,
not only by the Partyts Foreign Centers, with their propagandizing-
indoctrinating-money-raising auxiliaries, but also by foreign Social-
Democratic Parties ( particularly the German) and by the International
Socialist Bureau, Within Russia, bandit gangs ("Expropriators")
operated for Lenin's benefit, sending him funds with which he could
construct his system of organizers, couriers, and agents, who succeed-
ed in taking over the control of many previously non-Bolshevik Marxist
groups in Russia.
Stolypinxs death brought some relief from repression. Prima, a
general propaganda paper, and Zvezda~ a weekly political journal, both
Bolshevik organs, began to appear legally, along with several others.
These were tolerated as long as they veiled their revolutionary intent,
subject to a relatively liberal censorship. Violating those conditions,
Pravda was repeatedly suppressed, but each time reappeared with only
small changes in name, none in content. The Bolsheviks elected six
members to the Duma in 1913, They formed a coalition with Menshevik
deputies at first; but they soon broke away to form their own fraction?
With its legal press and its Duma fraction, and with some influence on
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a number of labor, social, and welfare organizations, the Party pursued
legal activities. It continued its illegal work at the same time, build-
ing up its Party organizations, issuing illegal, inflammatory leaflets,
carrying on secret revolutionary work among the masses.
The Party was again forced wholly underground with the outbreak of
the War in 1914. It devoted its energies to preserving what remained
of its own strength and to sabotaging the Russian war effort, to which
end it formed cells and committees in the armed forces for agitation,,
encouraged insubordination and fraternization among t he troops, etc.
When the March 1917 ("bourgeois") Revolution overthrow the Tsar,
the Bolshevik Party emerged into full legal status and resumed publi-
cation of its various periodicals. In April, Lenin hastened to Russia
from Switzerland, through the charity of the German Government. By
November, what with the incompetence of the Provisional (Kerensky)
Government, the chaos brought about by Russian military defeats, and
general economic and social debilitation within Russia, the Bolsheviks
found their small, well-disciplined machine able to achieve a now
Revolution, from which the Party emerged victorious.
1. Organization. (See Chart, "Organization of the Bolshevik Party.)
The Bolshevik apparatus was marked by a high degree of centraliza-
tion of'comma.nd and decentralization of structure. It consisted of
those organs of the RSDLP which the Bolsheviks controlled at any given
time. During most of the period to 1912, and from then until 1917,
those were the Central Committee, the Foreign Bureau of the Central
Committee, and the Editorial Board of the successive central newspapers
of the Bolshevik faction. After 1911, the Bolsheviks were able to cen-
tralize their machinery inside Russia through a Russian Bureau of the
Central Committee, and were able to develop command channels running
down from the Russian Bureau through territorial echelons -- Provincial,
Regional, City, City District, and Cell organizations. The Latvian and
one section of the Polish Social-Democratic Parties suppor''.:ed the
Russian Bolshevik Party. Some of the other independent Communist Croup:
in the Empire sided with the Mensheviks, whose leading organ was an
Organization Commission.
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Most important of t heBolshevik organizations inside Russia wore
those of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Odessa, and a few other large cities.
Those received some direction, when communications permitted, from the
Russian Bureau of the Central- Committee. However, the Foreign Bureau
and the Editorial Board, headed by Lenin, carried the decisive weight
with the local organizations inside Russia,
The Central Committee was elected by occasional Party Congresses,
most of which were hold abroad and to which delegates were sent by
local organizations according to their numerical strength. The Central
Committee elected at the Prague ,Conference in 1912 consisted of six
members and five alternates. Stalin was coopted into membership after
the Conference. Membership of the Editorial Board varied between three
and seven, but the Board was always headed by Lenin. All Bolshevik
organizations enjoyed the right to co-opt new members into their com-
mittees.
The following analyses of the Moscow and Odessa Bolshevik organi-
zations show the structural principles followed by the Party during
these years,
a. The Moscow Organization. In Moscow, three Party units worked
practically independently of each other, although their activities
sometimes overlapped. The Moscow City Committee worked exclusively
within the city; the Moscow Regional Committee administered the Pro-
vince of Moscow; and the Provincial Bureau of the Central Industrial
Region comprised sovoral Provincial organizations.
The Moscow City Committee, consisting of a Secretary and
several District organizers and one trade union organizer, administered
the work of several city Districts, which, in turn, were divided into
Sub-Districts and factory coils, Auxiliaries and Party organizations
attached to the City Committee included:
1) Moscow Central Trade Union Bureau, a Bolshevik organization
with some strength in many of the illegal labor unions;
2) Central Social-Democratic Students' Organization;
3) Lecturing and Literary Board;
4) Finance Commission;
5) Central . Tochnical,Or anization for production of passports
and production and distribution of literature;
ONE*
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6) Military Organization, actually independent of the City
Committee, but with interlocking membership with the. latter.
7) Military Technical Bureau, also independent of the City
Committee except through liaison with the Secretary: responsible
for the procurement and preparation of arms and other weapons.
b. The Odessa Organization (See Chart.) Osip Piatnitsky, the
veteran organizer, has described the organization of the Odessa
Party for the. benefit of post-Revolutionary comrades and for foreign
Parties who were, at the time of writing, "in great straits because
they cannot find a suitable guise in which to clothe their local or-
ganizations under illegal conditions...."
"The organization of that t ime, in?Odossa as well as in the
rest of Russia, was built from top to bottom on the principle-of
co-optation; in the plants and factories and in the workshops, the
Bolsheviks who worked there invited (co-opted) workers whom they
considered to be class-conscious and who were devoted to the
cause. The regional committees of the large towns had divided
among; its members the work of uniting all the Party cells of a
given district (or sub-district), and of organizing now cells
where there were none. The organizers of the sub-districts in-
vited the best elements of the cells to the sub-district commit-
tees. V;'hen a member of the sub-district commAttee dropped out
(if he had boon arrested or had Cone away) , the remaining mem-
bers co-opted another with the consent of the district committee.
The district committees in turn wore. composed of the best ele-
ments of the sub-district committees. The city committees wore
formed by the union of the various groups and cells of a given
city and were subject to the approval of the Central' Committee.
City committees had the right to co- opt now members. When a
city committee was arrested as a body, the Central Committee of
the Party designated one or more members to form a new committee
and those appointed co-opted suitable comrades from the workers
of that region to complete the new committee..!,
Piatnitsky was himself co-opted into the Odessa Party Committee.
The Central Committee had notified the Odessa organization of his ar-
rival from Germany, and the co-optation had boon effected even before
he reached the city. He was appointed organizer of the city District.
The Odessa Committee possessed a large illegal printing plant in
the city, and was able to publish numerous leaflets on political
events. The Committee also distributed literature received from.the
Central Committee and Technical Apparatus abroad, sent speakers to
factories and meetings, and chose leaders for advanced circles in the
districts.
Piatnitsky gives the following description of the way in which the
Odessa organization functioned:
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f1Each member of the District Committee was connected with the
groups and cells of the trade in which he worked at the tine; and
through the groups and cells he got in touch with the workers of
that same trade. Thus there was-direct contact between the
Odessa Committee and the workers of the plants, factories and work-
shops at Odessa; the district organizer connected the city commit-
tee with the district committee, the members of the district com-
mittee in their turn were connected with the groups and calls, the
members of which carried out the instructions of the Odessa comit-
tee and the district committee among the workers; they in their
turn informed the Odessa committee and the district committee of
the mood of the Odessa workers.
The district committee met at least once a week; often more
frequently. The members of the district committee wore sufficient-
ly well qualified. All questions were discussed fully and in
detail.'
2. Operational Problems,.
Security measures and communications techniques for cutting, across
the difficulties imposed on the Party by the Government developed slow-
ly, through painful experience. Some of them were taken over from the
practice of older revolutionary groups, such as the Narodnaya Volya,
which had been crushed in the 1880'so
a. Security Measures, Security precautions wore directed to two
chief ends: to prevent exposure and imprisonment of cadres, and to
prevent exposure of plans and police interference with Party activi-
ties. Some of the devices used in maintaining security were:
1) Codes, cyphers, and other communications techniques;
2) Assumption and frequent changing of false identities;
3) Secrecy of meeting; places and lodgings, which were changed
frequently to avoid registration with police;
4) 'Restriction of contacts among members (letters of intro-
duction, intermediaries, restriction of plans to minimum circula-
tion);
5) Techniques of avoiding police surveillance (wearing of
inconspicuous clothing, dodging police shadows, etc);
6) Careful disposition of records (encoding, safekoepingA
committing facts to memory, provisions for quick destruction, etc);
7) Uso of contacts within police as counter-intelligence
producers, (ineffectual and very limited, as it turned out).
8) Compartmentalization: especially applicable to comraes
engaged in "conspirative" work (as in the-technical organizations),
who loft "day-to-day" work severely alone.
Meeting places and safehouses. Large meetings were held with a
minimum of publicized preparation, usually in the woods several miles
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I'then it was necessary to call more or less general meetings
they were arranged under the guise of excursions to the country in
the name of some educational society. After leaving St. Peters-
burg a couple of dozen versts behind, we would go 'for a walk'
into the depth of the forest., '1e would then place patrols who
would direct the way only by a previously arranged password and
then we would hold our meeting."
(Krupskaya, Memoirs of Lenin, II, 129)
Measures taken by functionaries in the carrying out of organiza-
tional business were more strict. Piatnitsky (Memoirs of a Bolshevik)
describes those adopted in Odessa:
I/Comrades arriving in the city usod'to report to'the secretary
of the Odessa Committee, Comrade Gusev. He himself, except on days
when the committee itself met, had a different meeting place every
day where we, the members of the committee, could find-him." These
meetings were in cafes, restaurants, private dwellings, etc:. Com-
mittee meetings were very frequent, at least once a week. They
took place at the private houses of sympathizing intellectuals.
At these meetings the instructions of the Central Committee,-the
political situation, and the progress of political campaigns, were
discussed..., Decisions passed by the committee were communicated
to the district meetings by district organizers. The Odessa organ-
ization maintained several safe meeting places where members of
the Central Committee, of the central organ- of the RSDLP, and of
Party organizations in neighboring tovms could stay and moot./l
Police restrictions on travel called for the expenditure of consi-
derable energy and ingenuity. Piatnitsky emphasizes the time and
effort wasted in changing lodgings every night to avoid being discov-
ered through the regular police inspections of residential registers.
Fake and doctored passports were prepared by technical units serving
Party organizations in most oft he large cities.
Coirmunications. Codes and cyphers, some of them quite complicated,
were employed for written communications. Piatnitsky recounts two-
day struggle to decyphor addresses sent to him in one letter by the
Secretary of the Foreign Bureau of the Central Corm-attee. Other tech-
niques included the use of invisible ink (cobalt and sulphuric acid
solutions, milk, lemon juice) written in the margins and between t he
lines of innocent books, letters, bills, etc.; the marking of words and
letters in innocuous literature; hiding of letters in picture frames,
in the spines of books, etc.
Written communications were carried safehand by couriers or sent
through the posts addressed to reliable sympathizers or to goncral
delivery. More important communications wore transmitted orally.
Penetration bey Police. Extensive penetration of t he Party by
police agents did.much to destroy the effectiveness of the most
WW"
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careful observance of security measures:
".... there was'not a single local organization into which
some provacateur had not crept. Every man regarded his comrade
with suspicion, was on his guard against those nearest to him,
did not trust his neighbor."
(Zinoviev, History of the Communist Party of Russia)
While recognition of the danger of police penetration undoubtedly
helped to keep Party members security-conscious, the suspiciousness
engendered must certainly have impeded efficient operation. There is
little doubt that the Tsarist police knew practically all important
details of Party business, and it was only because of their incident-
al belief that the Bolsheviks were not nearly so clangorous as the
other revolutionary parties that even more severely repressive meas-
ures were not taken.
Roman Malinovsky, Lenin's trusted intimate, member of t he Cen-
tral Committee, and Vice-Chairman of the Social-Democratic Duma
Fraction, was a police agent for years, and caused the arrest of in.
numerable Party members. So well did he conceal his purposes that
Lenin refused to believe charges levelled against him. Even Burtsev,
'who had several good police contacts and who acted as a one-man counter-
espionage service for the various revolutionary parties, failed to find
him out, and a special Party commission created to investigate rumors
against Malinovskycould not uncover any real evidence. Malinovsky was
only the most prominent of many police agents within the Bolshevik
Party.
b. Technical Services. As noted above, the Moscow City Comittee
maintained a Central Technical Organization for the procurement and
preparation of false passports, and for the production and distribution
of illegal literature, including the regular Party press and occasional
pieces. Similar technical mechanisms were supported by other city com-
mittees and by the Foreign and Russian Bureaus of the Central Committee.
The Central Committee operated border-crossing systems as part of their
technical sorvices,(See Chart, "The Bolshevik Technical Mechanism").
,Passports, The procurement of passports was a continuing pro-
blem. The following were the types of passports used by the Party
members with police records:
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1) False passports with fort;od seals, in which all details
wore fictitious;
2) Copies of genuine passports of persons without police
records;
3) Genuine passports bolont;in-,, to persons without police
records.
The third type, called "Iron," was. considered the most reliable, but
w.^6 the most difficult to obtain with descriptive data appropriate to
the illegal bearer. Another important function of the technical organ-
ization was to exchange passports and copies with other centers.
Production and distribution of Party literature. In 1906
Piatnitsky was put in charge of the contral technical organization of
the P:Soscow Com mittee, The printing establishment produced about / 0,000
copies each of various leaflets, broadsides, posters, and, at the time
of a Duma election, a list of candidates for t he voters. Located in
the basement of "The Caucasian Fruitshop," the printing plant was
equipped with an American press.. A bell was rigged to give warning of
the entrance of customers to the fruitshop, which was licensed
fictitiously. The operators of.t he fruitshop were registered under
false passports.
Procurement of newsprint and distribution of the literature pro-
ducE.d were, serious problems. Piatnitsky was given a letter, of intro-
duction to the man or of a papormill, from which he received credit
and large quantities of paper. A recommended book-binder cut the paper,
which was stored in an intermediate warehouse, then taken to a second
storehouse (a "depository"), from which it was taken as needed to the
printing plant. Printed matter was carried from the shop.diseuised as
fruit in wicker baskets, and was taken to a bakery operatod by a
sympathizer; there it was called for by a functionary responsible for
distribution, who took it to a house where distribution couriers from
all the Moscow Districts picked it up.
The Moscow Committee, through Party members in various factories,
was able to s upply the technical organization with needed production
materials. After t he Caucasian Shop had boon raided by police, a make-
shift establishment was set up with typo and other accessories supp;io
by members working in commercial printshops.
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Pi^tnitsky recounts techniques of distribution of printed matter
received by the Moscow organization from St. Petersburg:
"Tfle asked..,. the St. Petersburg comrades to pack the litera-
ture in'boxos and send it as merchandise, and to send us only the
receipts. As soon as wo received the receipts we picked out two
comrades to Set the boxes. One of them would hire a carter, to
whom he gave the receipts for getting the merchandise out of the
station. The carter was given a fictitious address to which he
was to deliver the boxes. Another comrade would keep an eye on
the driver, following him, about wherever he went with the receipts.
If overythin-1 locked safe, the second comrade would inform the
first comrade of this, and than the latter would moot the carter
on the road and direct him to the right address. If we suspected
that the comrades wore bein?; watched, three comrades wore selected:
one hired the carter; the second followed him all the way, to tho
station, in the station itself, and, on the way back; the third
acted as a courier for the second comrade. He informed the first
comrade whether it was safe for him to moot the carter. The fol-
.lowine precautions were also taken: evon'if the two comrades dis-
covered nothing suspicious at the station, they nevertheless
chan';-od the address riven at first for another fictitious address.
(In such cases we used to give the'addross of some acquaintance..,,
The driver was dismissed, and later, if there was no hitch, the
literature was sent to the depository and from there to the various
districts.)
It sometiaos happened that the carter would be called to the
gendarme office at the station after he had produced the lug,Lae
receipt. In such cases the comrade who was watching him warned
the other comrade not to meet the c^ rtor on the road; and he him-
self stayed to find out what would happen. Occasionally the
,gendarmes let the driver pass with the merchandise but send a de-
tachment of spies and gendarmes at his heels. However, in view
of the fictitious address given the carter, their labours were
in vain. Several eonsignmonts of literature fell into the hands
of the authorities, but nobody was ovary arrested."
The printing plant operated by the Tiflis organization was even
more elaborate, ovontually bccominf the largest underground plant in
Russia. It served both Menshevik and Bolshevik factions of tho RSDLP.
It was set up by Leonid Krassin, m^nacor of the Government power
station in Baku, who served as a member of the Central Comm:ittoc of
the RSDLP and who carried on i1logal activities so successfully that
for four years neither the management of the power company, nor the
police, nor the workers suspected his real role. He arranger, for the
smuggling of literature, forging of passports, raising of funds, and
the sotting up of tho clandestine printing shop. Krassin was able
to find reliable printers who would not only work long hours, but
live in the plant as well,clispite its discomforts. Through an arrange-
ment with Krupskaya, who was Secretary of the Foreign Bureau, ho ro-
ecived each issue of the RSDLP o1^;an, Iskra, from abroad, and managed
to publish 10,000 copies of it in Russia. The secret plant also
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produced the Communist Manifesto, Kautsky's Erfurt Program, and over
a million copies,in all of leaflets, pamphlets and periodicals. A
deluxe edition of one hundred copies of the Efurt Program was made up
for sale to wealthy sympathizers at a high price.
Illegal literature was also produced by more primitive means by
individuals and small organizations -- handwritten tracts circulated
a few copies at a time, and, on a slightly larger scale, those rum
off home-made hectographs. After 1912 the Parties were permitted
legal organs, subject to a partial censorship.
Revolutionary literature presented transportation problems be-
cause of its bulk. i']hcn the censorship was partially lifted, printed
material could sometimes be sent through the mails, disguised as in-
nocent material.. During most of the pre-revolutionary period, how-
ever, it was customary to smuggle literature in false-bottomed
suitcases, in "breastplates" (false bosoms), or sewed into skirts.
All travelling members and sympathizers were pressed into the service
of this "express transport."
The problem of bulk was later resolved by printin on onion skin
paper with narrow margins. As the underground organization developed,
Russian editions of papers printed abroad were run off from imported
copies or matrices.
Bow r-Crossiny. Communications with foreign centers necessitated
elaborate border-crossing establishments. In preparation for the
establishment of a transport service operating out of Berlin,
Piatnitsky made arrangements for the lodging; of visiting Russian
functionaries with German Social-Democratic elements, for the storing
and processing of smuggled literature, and for the creation of border-
crossing stations. The transport service in Germany had its counter-
part on the Russian side of the frontier. A second such system,
operating out of Leipzig in 1910 and also set up by Piatnitsky, illus-
trates the methods employed.
The Leipzig Social-Democratic organization supplied him with sovero:.'.
addresses to which communications could be safely sent and where visit-
in- Russians could moot and find lodging. He was Given the use of the
attic in the building of the Leipzig Social-Democratic newspaper
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for storing and packing literature. Two reliable comrades living near
the frontier were hired to do the actual smuggling. Both systeris
worked', with a very small staff. This organization, as well as the
persons who acted as connecting links, remained unchanged until 1913,
although the legal daily, Pravda, was already being published in Prussia,
c. Finances, Funds for both legal and illegal Party activities
were secured by conventional moans: donations by well-to-do Party mem-
bers and symp^thizers, and contributions by foreign Social-Democratic
parties and the International Socialist Bureau. Support auxiliaries,
such as Committees of Aid for skra,were set up abroad. Lenin's bene-
fits from organized banditry ( "expropriations") and counterfeiting also
Cave him access to large amounts of money which enabled him to,build up
and strengthen Party organizations under his ovm authority.
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%Wd
ORGANIZATION OF THE PCF
CENTRAL
COMMITTEE
"TRIANGLE DIRECTEUR"
(A Triad, possibly consisting
of chiefs for Political,
Organization, Propaganda work.)
Political
Cadres
Technical
Youth
Propaganda
INTER-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
"PR
61
"Clandestine
Action in ti)e ?
Public Servroe
PR
6 bis"
CONTROL
COMMISSION
Soldarite
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
I I ? I I I
"s '
11 m11
"F"
"D"
"H""
uxu
SECTORS
I I _
SECTIONS .
Sub-Sections
L___ --I-- I
CELLS
666
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTIONS
"WI'
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TECHNICAL SERVICES OF THE PCF
Political-
Apparatus
National
Responsible
for Propaganda
Inter-Regional
Responsible
for Propaganda
PARTY
CENTER
= Intermediary
(Courier, cut-
out, etc.)
Technical Apparatus
NATIONAL RESPONSIBLE
FOR TECHNICAL SERVICES
INTER-REGIONAL RESPONSIBLE
FOR TECHNICAL SERVICES
TYPOGRAPHICAL
MAKE-UP
RESPONSIBLE
PHOTOENGRAVING SHOP for photo-
(plates prepared) engraving a
composing
0
PRINT \ / PRINT
SHOP / \ SHOP
RESPONSIBLE
for print shops
and central
depots,
Sections
a
Cells
CENTRAL
DEPOT
DISTRI- ISTRI-
BUTION BUTION
DEPOT DEPOT
CENTRAL
DEPOT
ISTRI-
DE POT
-DISSEMINATION
MILITANTS
in charge of
transport a
procurement
of paper, ink,
& other sup-
plies.
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T Or
B. CP 'fl iNCE UNDERGROUND
CP France (PCF), supporting the Soviet-German non-aggression pact
of 24 August 1939 anti pursuing an anti-war policy, was legally dis-
solved by decree of the French Government in September 1939. With the
Armistice of 22 Juno 1940, the Party entered a brief period of "semi-
legality," during which it collaborated to some extent with the Ger-
rains and was tacitly permitted a limited activity, including the
regular publication of Party literature. It was again suppressed when
Hitler invaded the USSR in Juno 1941.
The ambiguity in its policy removed, the Party hastened to take the
load in the resistance movement. Uarxist demands were soft-pedalled in
favor of "National Liberation" -- harassing; the German occupation
forces, discrediting Vichy, and cooperating with the British and the
Free French of General Do Gaulle. Large numbers of enthusiastic
patriots were drawn into the movement through such auxiliaries as the
guerrilla Francs-Tirours, The Comitos Populairos, and the Socours
Populaire. Party propaganda called for a now National Front and for
sabotage of the sections of French economy which supported the Germans.
During the years of active resistance the Party completely rehabilitated
itself, strengthening its cadres, perfecting its organization and tactics
finding wide mass support. It emerged from the period of illegality
stronger than ever before.
1, Or nizzatti on, (See Chart, "Organization of the 'CF")
In the spring of 1939, the Partyls Central Committee decided to take
precautionary measures against the inevitable period of illegality.
Felix Cadras, heat, of the Organization Section, was instructed to Group
the seventy+Regions under a number of Inter-Fogional organizations. For
some reason, the work was not completed until the Party had already been
declared illegal, a failure which contributed to the general clemoraliza-
tion of the ranks which the flagrantly anti-nationalistic policy of the
Party had already begun. Given a second chance during the period of
semi-legality, the reorganization was apparently carried through.
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a, The Party Center. The Central Committee was reduced to a small
illegal Center that Liovuci fro,.i one city to another. Directing
authority, in the hands of a "Directorate of Three" (Triangle Directeur)
,
c,. rsistin~ of chiefs for Policy, Organization, and Agitprop, aci inis-
tere:?. Party affairs through the following, rational Res,ponsibles (see
Chart):
1) Political Responsible and -Assistant (Felix Cadras and Andre
Pican-in 1942): charged with over-all supervision, and, in parti-
cular, with the political education of cadres.
2) Responsible for Cadres and Assistant (Pierre Brossard and
Gilbert Delhaye at the end of 191,.2): charged with supervision and '
protection of cadres (frustration of ,police actions and penetration,
disciplinary measures, etc.). The Assistant was, in particular,
charged with furnishing ration cards, false identity papers and
other docu;_~ents to Party militants.
3) Technical Responsible and Assistant (Roger Payen and Leon
Ka~:~rnoney in 1942 charged with all questions of-
f Aprintin materials
and equipment. The Assistant was, in particular, responsible for
purchasing supplies an. for paying; salaries,
4) Responsible for Youth (Danielo Casanova at the beginning
of 1942)_.
Propaganda Responsible and Assistant (Geo
5) ~r6es a'olitzer and
Daniel Decourte i.anche at the ber;innin; of 1942) : responsible for
the editing of literature at the national level,
6) Responsible for' clandestine action in the public services
(T.;arcel Paul, and later, .Emile; 'asquierT
7). Resj)onsihle for "Solidarite" (uric-Claudc Jaillant
Couturier at the beginning; of 1942): supervised the technique and
activities of the regional Responsibles for "Secours Populaire."
8) Rcs2onsible for Internees (Depollior 1n-1942): concerned
with all questions relating; to PCF internees and, in particular,
with the preparation of escapes.
In addition, the following functionaries have been identified at
the Inter-Ro~ion level: !Les2onsibles for 17omc;n, Immigrant Laborers,
Peasants, and Enterprises. It is not known whether their counterparts
operated at the national level, or whether the functions were directed
by the eight L s)cnsibles already enumerated.
The majority of the old, well-known leaders of the PCF, unlike
their oppo`sito numbers in Germany , did not flee the country. Instead,
they apparently retired from active leadership in the illegal Party.
Real Party work was delegated to less well-known figures -- an invisi-
ble cadre. For example, Jacques Duclos delegated political responsi-
bility to T.arccau until 1941; later to Catholas, thcri to Felix Cadras,
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Benoit Frachon, Organization Chief, turned this work over to Cadre, and
then to Desire. Administration of Cadres devolved upon ITaurice Troand,
p .
Leon Dallidet, and Pierre Brossard. Pierre Villon., Responsible for the
Northern Zone, gave this work to .:aucherat. Georges Cogniot, Cadre
.Responsible for the Southern Zone, delegated his functions to Gerard
Beslay.
b. Territorial Levels. The territorial echelons of the Party i%icre
ranged by Intor-11erions, legions, Sectors, Sections, Sub-sections (in
some cases), and Cells.
Paris was divided into two Intor-Reg=ions (desig:;natec 6"
arid "Pit 6 bis") , each comprisin . four Regions, each of which was
designated by a letter. Outside Paris, a Region corresponded to d Do-
partment of t he Civil Government. A Regicn comprised five or six
Sectors., each of which was further divided into three or four Sections,
(In Paris a Section corresponded to an arro,n',isser..ont) .
Sub-sections were sometimes intercalated between Coll and Sec-
tion. During the legal, pre war period, cells normally numbered from
twenty to thirty members. From September 1939 until the 191+0 Armistice,
they wore reduced to Three-T`an Grou ~.s. During the period of semi-
legality the coil size was again expanded to eight or ten members, ox-
copt in ~''~lgeria, whore unrelieved suppression forced the continuance
of Three-T.Ta n Groups. In the fell of 1940, with increasing pressure
being brought to boar on Party activities, size was again reduced --
to six members in September, and to five in October. Finally, in
January'1941, the three-man cell was reinstated.
In the FCF pamphlet, Comment so dofendre, circulated at the
beginning of 1941, the following instructions were set out for the or-
ganizational basis of the Party-
"Vie must decentralize our coils with method and intelligence,
in such away as to facilitate the work of the masses of Our
adherents. Specifically, this means that, in-the factory, decen-
tralization should proceed by war of the shop, part of'thc shop,
or even by bench. It means that, in the neighborhoods, decentral-
ization should be by groups of streets, by street, by groups of
households, and even by apartment. With such decentralization, the
organizations at the base of the Party, small in membership, and
immersed in the masses, are able to influence them, to gauge their
temper, and to enable the Party to understand their thoughts and
feelings,"
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One Regional organization of the Party circulated the follow-
ing instructions to its Sectors and Sections:
"In order to have strict control over the members, to avoid
repression, and to achieve the greatest activity, it is necessary,
in spite of resistance (on the part of militants unwilling to ro-
vise their way of thinking), to organize the Party according to
the principle of Groups of Three."
The Groups of Three were pyr ided, doubtless in the same man-
ner, as the following directive circulated in September 1941 for the
formation of Womcnts Comites PopulairS proscribes:
'The first task for the Responsible and Secretary of the Com-
mittee is to find two other comrades to help her; thus is the
first triangle constituted. Each of the two comrades should find
two other women for the propaganda of our committees; thus, two
now triangles are const ituted. These three triangles form the
first link.of the chain which should bo extended throughout the
city. Each now adherent should know only the two other members
of her triangle and the two friends whom she loads. It is th6
Responsible of the triang1e'61ono who receives the directives,
the' literature, the dues.... From triangle,to'triangle, the
instructions circulate throughout the committee."
Centralization of command and compartmentalization of work was
represented at all levels by the institution of the Triad, which com-
J i
prised RRes'oonsibles for political, organization, and either trade union
or agitprop work. The following scheme was set forth in Con ont so
defondre for the division of, work in the Sections:
1) Political Responsible, charged with the application of the
Party line by organizations and by the press. In addition., he
concerns himself with matters relating to youth, to women, and to
the fight against capitalist repression.
2) Organization Ros?onsible, charged with Party organization
at the factory and in the neighborhood. He has charge of prepara-
tion and, distribution of .propaganda, and is 'also concerned with'
various mass movements -- peasants, middle-classes, old workers,
local Popular Committees.
3) Trade Union Responsible, charged with supervision of the
work of Comrnwriists in the syndicates, and with factory and riiners'
Popular Committees.
IAs a further measure to centralize control over Party elements,
"Democratic Centralism" gave way to "Centralism," with suspension of
elections to Party organs, Functionaries were now appointed from above,
and wore co-opted into loading Party organs. Command channels operated
in a strictly vertical direction, with instructions passing from a
Rw~ponsible to his opposite number at the next lower level. Liaison
between functionaries and between organizations at the same level was
reduced to a minimum,
Lin
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.. .. W Wr fY{ w
Functionaries at the Party Center also directed the activities
and organization of separate technical and military mechanisms. These
were ortanizod and opergted independently of the PCF political appar^-
tus, with which they had contact only at top levels,
2. Technical Services (See Chart, "Technical Services of the T,-'CF")
Preparation and distribution of Party literature was effected by a
special technical mechanism, which w as kept entirely separate frorr the
political :zpparatus except at those points where contact between them
was indispensable. The political line of all literature was, of
course, controlled by rankin- functionaries in the political orLaniza-
Lion, and a :LZesnonsible for the technical apparatus served on the
national 'CF staff. The chart shows the pints of contact between
the two networks and the. high de.r;ree of c ecentralization obtainin` in
the technical service.
The Party published L-fIumari.te, its central or ;n, re ularly.
L IAyant-raz de, orr-an of the Young; Communists, and the trade union
publication, La L Ouvriore, appeared fairly regu.iaarly. In addition,
no loss than 38 local and regional publications were put out by lower
Party echelons between June 1940 and December 1941, lany of these
were ephemeral, in some cases appearinc for only a sinL;le issue.
V'lith the reimposition of illoUality, all but the central organs and
those of the lamest regional units were abandoned. Some of the lat-
ter appeared only in irregular "special editions.tt Enerj..es, cadres,
and rmiaterials were now too precious to be expended on any but the most
important publications.
The importance of the central, official party publications as
m cans of liaison and direction carrot be overemphasized. Every issue
carried the "mots diorder" -- indications of the -eneral political
line of the Party Center -- clown to the smallest com>artmentalizccl
unit.
The normal aCitrpron function was fulfilled as much by the enormous
volume of pamphlets, broadsides, posters, and wall-writin,s as by the
central press. Simplicity in preparation and distribution made the
occasional piece much less hazardous a medium than the rnoro elaborate
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periodical. The hectograph was a favorite for this reason. Vie du
Pa~ rtti printed detailed instructions on its manufacture. It made no
noise, was easily concealed, and supply of ink and paper was a rela-
tively simple matter. The mimeograph was somewhat loss favored be-
cause of t he difficulty in securing special paper, Presses neces-
sitating elaborate installations and security measures were generally
used only for the large editions of the central organs. It was
occasionally possible to print pieces clandestinely on legal presses,
sometimes with,, sometimes without the cooperation of the owner.
The problem of getting paper in sufficient quantities wLs diffi-
cult. Small quantities could be pilfered by members at their offices
or factories. 'But it eventually became necessary to organize burgling;
expeditions among the largest available stockpiles, local governmental
offices being favorite tart ets.
Distribution of literature was somewhat simplified by the printing
of small editions and by an increased use of the mails.
3. Security,
Police measures against the Party.;took two main directions:
(a) Systematic' subversion of members e,ncl penetration of
Party organizations, including the utilization of spies, pro-
vocateurs, and informers;
(b) Direct suppressive action, including mass arrests,
assassination and other terroristic ::reth6ds aimed at paralyzing
Party activities and immobilizing cadres.
To court: r those, the Party adapted its policies end structure
and took steps to perfect its control of cadres and their activities,
to maintain security, and to prevent provocation.
a. l.iodification of Structure.
As noted above, the PFC ro-
organized itself on the basis of the Triad, or Group of Three. 1'.s
further security, control passed in a vortical direction, and contact
among functionaries and between organizations was reduced to a minimum,
The following; instructions for the implomontation of these principles
were published in Vie du Parti for the second quarter of 1941:
"All efforts of a group of three to establish contact with a
similar group will be considered su,spoct and sanctions in conse-
quence will be taken. Liaison between organizations of the same
echelon is absolutely forbidden. (The groups of three should not
know each other; Bolls should not know each other; there should be
no horizontal liaison.)
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No meeting of more than three comrades should be hold. The
groups of three constitute the basis of organization of the Party
Coll, and all efforts to establish groups of more than three mem-
bers should be treated as violating Party discipline.
This principle of compartmentalization should be applied to
thy Party in all instances. The group of three should be the
basic compartment of the Party. The groups of three should be
hermetically insulated, one from another. The -comrades of `one
group of three should he familiar only with their own work.
Groups comprising more than three adherents should be decentralized
immediately."
','hen t he PCF became wholly iliogal, it even became necessary to
divorce regular Party work from that carried cut by the mass organiza-
tins. Those served as excellent cover for members, and it was con-
sidered relatively safe for those who were known to the police as Com-
munists to work within them. Emol_oymoni of known comrades - rithin the
Party itself, however, carried hazards which the Party sought to mini-
by strict enforcement of security rules. Es; ecially, partici-
pation of known members in the Party's technical apparatus was dis-
coura.god. In general, known mor;bors wore to avoid contact with other
comrades who had no police record, and the latter wer;'. to reciprocate,
being especially careful riot to be observed at or near the residence
of a known mer.?ber.
b. Comnartmerital9.zation. This has already been discussed the
section on organization. Briefly, it involved a prohibition of
horizontal liaison between Party units at the same level, a reduction
in the size of units, restriction`of contacts among; individuals, and
various rules surrounding the security of meetings which are discus-
sed below.
c. Security Rules. "To be a good Communist," declared Vie du Parti,
"it is first of all necessary to apply scrupulously the rules of illegal
work," Party -,publications reminded members periodically of the dangers
of falling into "legal cretinism." mules were laid down in various
pamphlets and periodicals for personal conduct, for meetin ;s, contacts,
and other co. rx n.ications, and for the safeguarding of documents.
1) a2ostriction o f Contacts. The separation of "legal" from
"illegal" Party work, a standard practice for all Communist Parties,
was complicated when the 'CF was declared illegal in all respects.
}
Comrades engaged in activities which would be illegal under any
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circumstance such as sabotage, espionage, strong-arm self-
defense, etc. , -- continued to operate within organizations which
wore separate from the Party's political mechanism. They left
:Political work severely alone; kept their identities and activities
apart from all Party political units; did not engage in the work
of the. Party's mass organizations. The purpose of this separation
was to preserve, not only their own security, but also that of any
"log,aln' comrades with whom they might come in contact.
2) Security of Meetings. The following regulations governing
clandestine meetings were posted in Vic du Parti and in the pan-
phlets Comment so defondre and Soyons hardis,soyons prudents early
in 1941:
a) Never more than three comrades at-a meeting; (two, in
the case of very important functionaries), which should never
last more than an hour.
b) Be on time; To be ahead of time at a rendez-vous is
to call attention to one's self. To be late is to call atten-
tion to'the comrade who must wait for you.. To arrive on time
is the first condition for food clandestine work.
c) Never arrange meetings in cafes or at the residences
of known comrades. Hest at the cinema; in t he street, in the
country, at the sea-shore, out fishing.
d) Do not use the same rectin place repeatedly. Sooner
or later it will become a trap. Rather, change the place as
often as possible.
e) Beware the mails, beware the telephone: hover arrange
a rleeting, by telephone, and, as a general rule, do not use the
telephone at all. The telephone and the post should be
banished as means of transmitting meetin arrangements.
I.J
f), A-mooting should not take place in the presence of
outsiders.
g) A militant Comounist..... should never ego to a rendez-
vous without being,. certain that he is not 'king followed. Take
little frequented streets, in which . "shadow" must reveal
hL-Lself. You cannot be sure that you are not being; shadowed
until you know that no one is behind you, Never ;o into the
house of a comrade, never o to a moetin; without being sure
you are not being followed. The police do not always arrest
immediately those comrades revealed by their spies; they orient
themselves with the first information received, to discover
and round up the whole organization.
3) SafeLuardin Party 1Zecords and Materials. The location of
Party records should be a closely guarded secret, restricted to
the smallest possible number of persons, warned the tract,
Renforcons la survoill nce:
"Ttiro comrades only should know where
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the materials and presses are kept." The keeping of records was
discouraged, but when this was unavoidable, it was required that
lists of names and locations of Party units and other details of
organization should be encyphered: "The compiling of lists in
free text is rigorously prohibited by the Party and should be con-
sidcred an act of provocation." T{atcrial of this nature should
never be kept in the regular residence of a Party member. Provi-
sion must be made for quick and easy destruction o f all records.
4) Personal Conduct. In addition to scrupulous observance of
the rules which have already been outlined, the militant was con-
stantly adrionishecl to preserve t he security of the Party organiza-
tion by keeping himself inconspicuous and refusing to answer any.
quest-ions which might compromise the Party or other comrades it
any wqy, incase of arrest. Vic du Pa ti denounced those militants
who,
"although little known before the war, instead of preserving
a strict anonymity with persons with whom they carte in con-
tact, behaved like pretentious, irresponsible bourgeois."
Other publications carried these instructions:
"An illegal militant should never describe his i.,work,
either to his wife, or his friends, or to anyone. Still less
should he make known his meeting places or where he works.
Never toll anyone any more than he must know to carry out his
work. 11
"Militants have no choice between family and Party," one
phamphlet declared. At the first sign of ;'anger, he must change
his residence and give up seeing his family, who are likely to be
under pol_,~ce surveillance.
Inconspicuous dis uisos, such as modifying the style of onets
dress or coiffure, affecting a different gait, otd,, were recom-
mended in case of necessity, and even more elaborate disguises in
certain instances. "It is better to err by an excess of vigilance
than by imprudence," militants wore tole:. However, the best de-
meanor was to '.ho natural, "to resemble the rest of the crowd."
Co-mm-mists c-:ore warned against drawing attention to therrmelvos by
too conspiratorial a manner; "Don't slink. Be natural,"
The conduct which a militant should follow in case of arr. st
was described in detail in the Party press during 19!1,. The burden
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of tho'c instructions was that nothing should be revealed which
would lead to further arrests. First of all, the militant should
keep his head:
"Dontt be panicky. Every militant knows that he may some clay
be arrested. The event should not surprise him."
He must reveal nothin; which could help the police in any way.
Until brou4ht before a court, he should preserve a strict silence.
Like Goor;i Dimitrov at Leilazi[11, the PCF member on trial should
take advantage of the opportunity to turn the proceedings into a
"veritable indictment of capitalist society." He should not
attempt to defend himself against specific charges, leaving that
"delicate" function to his lawyer. The lawyer should be chosen
from among those recommended by the Party, and under no circum-
stances should he be permitted to ar`ue the case in such a way as
to throw discredit on the Party or to compromise any of its
members,
d. Control of Cadres New organizational. f crms imposed by il-
le ;ali ty worked in the Party's favor in the develop silent of new cadres
and in their control. Decentralization of structure, based on the
Triad system and corresponclinniy smaller superior units, stimulated
the development of previously untrained militants who emerged to
assume command of the many now units. Centralization of direction
ensured rigorously close supervision of their work by experienced
superiors, an irimodiatciy personal surveillance which entailed con-
tinuous investi~,'ation and verification of character and of qualifica-
tions. There was an endless search for talents and patient training;
a constant reshuffling of functionaries and refinement of technique.
Finally, illogality forced a close attention to detail and to planning,
as well as a clear roco-nition of the necessity for strict discipline,
for personal safety, as well as for Party security.
It is testimonial enough to the flexibility of structure, to
tho ability of individuals, and to the effectiveness of principles
followed, that the Party was able, within a few months, to reconstitute
a strong, disciplined cadre structure from what had boon badly de-
moralized elements.
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The task of controlling the cadre and its activitios fell
immediately to the Cadre Section in the FCF Center, which exercised
this control throu;h the Cadre 2esnsibles at all Party levels.
Those were ch^rgod with the selection and supervision of functionaries,
with, checking their work, and with the vital task of verification.
The constant threat of police infiltration -was too great and the im-
portance of the selection of cadres on Party morale too profound to
trust to chance. The Cadre ibesponsiblos theriselvos could not be
expected to carry on the work alone. The Political y~esp onsible at
each level was specifically chared with double-checkin;:; his
Pes?onsil lefor Cadres:
"The Problem of the cadres is infinitely large. It is the
problem of the whole ;party. Each Aosponsible dust know the com-
rades who work directly under his supervision.... A. RoEional
i~tesponsible should be acquainted with his ca-workers in the Sec-
tors and Sections, but with discretion. He should seek out the
"reserve!, who will replace him should he fall, or become sick.
He must help' the ides ponsiblos who work under hi.-,,, to select their
replacements.. The Cadre Res;2onsible seconds him in this task and
accomplishes the myriad particular tasks of selection and verifi-
cation. It
-
C r (lu bolchevisrie, 1st Quarter 1941)
Cadre tiea,~onsibles also ke .:t close tabs on the political a;_)-
paratus, The Cadre iLes pns~,ble for one of the Paris Inter-lied;ions
attended some of the meetings of the "Trian,-;le Diroctour" of that
Inter-peCion, reporting on those to the National Political lies,onsible.
Prosunably, the reports dealt with the efficiency and ideological
security of the loaders of the political mechanism. The Party Center
was in this way pivon a double check on the caliber and into-;city of
its milidle and lower cadres.
Of the devices at the command of the Cadre Zesponsiblos in the
execution of this work, not the least important were the card files and
statistical surveys which they compiled from autobiographical reports
and periodic or;anizational reports. From those, it wag easy to deter-
mine the status and condition of the Party organization at any given
time. It was also possible, by having on hand a militant's sworn
statement as to his family and his personal and political back round,
to check those statements with confidential reports by other comrades
and with facts of public record. Thus, the Cadre Commission and lower
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Cadre 4osponsibles came close to performing functions of counter
espionage, such a s were set aside by CP Germany during this period
to its Abwehr Wossort of the illegal "Apparat. ";;
zational deport follow.
AUTO BIOGAAF HI CAL SCHFL
examples of the Autobiographical Report and periodic Organi-
Family Status
1, Date (year only) and department of birth. Do not give
name or address,
2. 1`-,'hat education do you have? Whore did you study?'
3. What is your occupation? Where have you Worked since
leaving school?
4. What is the occupation of your parents, brothers, sisters,
uncles? Have they en,ag;od in political activities and do they
belong to any organizations?
5. Are you married? `61hat is the occupation and nationality
of your wife? Of her parents? flat are their opinions?
6, Have you any children? How many? Their ages? Do they
belong to any organizations?
7.: In your family or in that of your wife are there any
Nazis, Socialists, or Trotskyites?
8. In your family or in that of your wife, are there any
policemen, ,gendarmes, or police informants? Persons with ques-
tionable means of existence? If so, what arc your relations with
them?
Political Backe:round
9. How diet you become a Communist? At what date?
10. Dave
you boon -a member of any other party or organization?
l1. Have you over been a Free-Mason? How and when did you
quit that organization?
The Abwehr was reportedly transferred to the Control Commission
after the disbanding of the "Apparat," which apparently took place in
1935. Thus came to an end a p articulra.r separation of a normal Party
function under an independent :arty mechanism. The KPD was the only-
CP in our knowledge to have made this precise separation. CP France,
like other CT's in similar circumstances, delegated the normal, con-
tinuing work of verification, .along with such counter-espionage pur-
,suits as this involved, to its Cadre Commission. It is recognized
that this account, containing references to the unique KPD organization is
some*hat out of glace here. However, it would seem worthwhile to clear
up confusion which appears to exist in certain. quarters over the pro-
blem of verification as a normal function of all CP's, whether legal
or illegal.
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the
12. That have boon your successive Party functions? What is
nature of your current Party work?
13. Did you militate actively during the war? i`'Ihere?
14. Have there boon any interruptions in your Party or syn-
dical activity? when and why.?
15. Have you attendod Party schools? -Which ones? I'dhat
books have you read of ,'Iarx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin? Have you
studied the History of the Bolshevik Party? Do you read the
pamphlets and hooks of the Party?
16. Have you had contact with Trotskyites? With the Barbe-
Color group? Have you had any relations with Doriot, with Gitton,
or any other excluded person? Have you any acquaintances in their
camps? Of what kind?
17. What disciplinary measures have been taken against you in
the Party or in other organizations? ?',:den and why?
lg. Do you have a police record? Have you been sentenced
under the common law? When and why?
19. Have you been subjected to political repression? Have
you been arrested? Condemned? ?hen? After how lone and how were
you liberated?
20. Have you ever been to the colonies or abroad? When and why?
21. Have you previously filled in a biography? Do not pro-
serve the duplicate copy of this. Do not sign it.
A note accompanying the form forbade its reproduction or retention
and warned that false answers to the questions would render the off on-,
der liable to action by the Control Commission.
Party organizations wore required to return weekly reports on
their activities and the general conditions under w hick they worked.
A model report circulated in February 1941 suggested the following as
worthy of filing:'
Situation: current public temper; signs of unrest; demonstrations;
movements, etc.;
Pro:~a anda: literature received and produced; status of printing
ap )aratus;
Or nization: expansion or contraction of units and their consti-
tution; collections; etc,
I?bss Work: pro ros,s in the struggle of the workinuman, in the
formation of women's and ether auxiliary groups, and in penetra-
tion of bourgeois institutions;
repression: arrests of members and functionaries; nature of charges
and evidence; morale, etc.;
Solidarite; collections and methods for relief; liaison with.
prisoners and their families and with camps and prisons.
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Instructions for filing; the report called for brevity, security
in preparation (including the use of numerical designations for re-
spondent organizations and preservation of anonymity of personnel) and
transmission, and for quick destruction in the likelihood of police
"The weekly reports should be brief and concrete. It is use-
less to go into detail over steps taken or activities pursued in
connection with a particular task of a temporary nature. Tell us
only of actual'facts and ha-openings of the week, along with're-
sults obtained. For greater clarity, classify the subjects.
Avoid givinY names and Party names in the clear or in full. Re-
read your report always, checking it with this in mind: What
would happen if it were exposed? Take the necessary stops to
minimize dangers: put names and identifiable landmarks into
cypher. Force yourself to reduce your text to the smallest pos-
sible volume. Never give any indication of your own name, nor
of that of a town or Sector. Use the number assigned to'you. Your
number is .-...,. , Keep in mind that, .in case of necessity; the
liaison agent should first of all try to save the report, to'pre-
vent its falling into the hands of the police, to destroy it, if
necessary ( usually, by eating it).
4. Finance
With the end of the period of semi-legality, Ithe PCF underTrent a
financial crisis. Clandestine operation entailed difficulties in the
way of collections, and abnormal expenditures.. Lar,e-scale money-
drives were temporarily out of the question. Militant cadres,
driven underground, could no longer be expected to earn their own liv-
ing by normal pursuits and had to be put on the Party pay-roll. To
maintain their morale, it was necessary to guarantee some financial
support to their families in case of imprisonment or execution,, Large
sums were expended an organizing; escapes from concentration camps.
Maintenance of safe houses and a courier system were expensive. The
police seized quantit.i.es1 of agitprop materiel, including expensive
printing presses, which had to be replaced, with a corresponding drain
on the Party t r-,
ci's1 l.r ,i
An economy drive: was ordered. A circular at the beginning of 1941
had this to say:
"t''Je must cut expenses. Economies must not-fall on the propa-
ganda apparatus (purchases of paper, equipment, etc.), or on
travel or the courier system, which lie at the heart of the whole '
organization. They must, then, be imposed on salaries. Henceforth,
the following rule shculd',ovcrn our budgets at all levels: half
for propaganda expenses ,.., half for organizational expenses
(salaries, indemnities, travel, rents, etc..) The question of
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mutual aid (solidarite) is independent of the others. Eilthough
restrictions here are painful, they must he made in order to se-
cure maximum efficiency: for example, by placing militants so
that they can earn part of their living while continuing to work
for the Party. We can furnish them with supplementary aid. ie;-
ister with us your proposed budget, bearing in mind the above
consideraa.tions. '''e will settle upon whatever subsidy is possible
to give you, and lot you know by the next courier."
It is in terosting?to note that such subsidies from the Center
amounted to two-thirds of the income of the local organization hypo-
thetically stipulated in a model monthly financial report published
for the guidance of local secretaries.
Other receipts of local organizations were derived largely from
duos, special assessments, c ontributions, etc.. The Party Center re-
,.especially after the British Kogan to
ceived some aid from abroad
subsidize. the Free French and other resistance elements. . What the
extent of Soviet aid was is not known. The model report mentioned
above is appended here in order to show how the Party imagined various
sources of revenue and objects of expenditure,
MODEL OF ; MONTHLY FINANCIAL IMPORT
On Hand as of 1 December 1940 5 000
cceipts
5ucs, contributions, recovered losses,otc. 3 000
Subsidy from X .6 000
14 000 14 000
Salary for X..., secretary 2 000
for X..;, typist 1 500
Aid for family, PX 500
Lodgings. Clothing for security.
Disguises, MX; rent, BX, etc. 1 000
Travel and food, purchase or repair
of bicycles, etc. 1 000
Propag nda. Materials. Equipment.
Establishing stock, purchase of press. 5 000
Aid to prisoners and their families 1 000
Expe - nitures
Total
On Hand as of 31 January 1941
12 000 12 000
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CENTRAL
COMMITTEE
(Z K)
POLITBURO
REICHS-
TECHNIKUM
ORGANIZATION OF THE K PD
UNDER CENTRALIZED CONTROL
ORGBURO
DURCH-
GANGSTELLE
REICHSLEITUNG
(A triad, consisting
of Polleiter, Org-
leiter, Agitprop-
lei,ter.)
NORTH-
WEST
SECRE-
TARIAT
INTER-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
I(OBERBEZIRKE) I
BERLIN-
BRANDENBURG
SOUTH
GERMANY
MIDDLE
GERMANY
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
~BEZIRKE)
L
_
I I I i
I 1 , I
I I , I
DISTRICT ORGANIZATIONS
(UNTERBEZIRKE)
SUB-DISTRICT ORGANIZATIONS
Stadtteile, Ortsgruppe
CELLS
aaoao
CONTROL
COMMITTEE
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THE KPD FOREIGN DIRECTORATE NETWORK
ct~~rtza~scHr~orr.
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OPERATIONS OF A KPD FOREIGN DIRECTORATE
(AUSLANDSLEI TUNG)
~kw
"Responsible' for Security
"Responsible' for Finances
"Responsible' for Youth
"Responsible' for Trade-unions
"Responsible for Rote Hilfe
;TGH
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?4 'n UwI6
CP GEP . NY UNDERGP.OUND
The case of Cs Germany (KPD) is of special interest because it
illustrates the various ways in which -a highly-centralized, supposed-
ly "mature" Party may attempt to adapt its structure to illegal con-
ditions. The fact that, of the attempts of the KPD to maintain its
organization under Hitler, none succeeded is testimony, both to the
effective repressive measures which a police state can command, and
to the debilitating effect which a long period of bureaucratic com-
fort may produce on Party cadres. The failure of the KPD cannot be
laid to a failure to explore all possible devices. Centralized
control exercised by a central authority inside Germany failed; cen-
tralized control exercised by a Party Center abroad v ins no more suc-
cessful. Decentralized direction through a number of foreign support
centers was somewhat more rewarding, but was spiked by the Nazi
advance into countries from which such centers could operate. The
failure lay less in the principles which the Party projected, than
in its inability, from both internal and external causes, to carry
the projects through.
1. Organization.
The KPD leadership passed through a period of confusion following
the rise of Hitler to complete power in the Spring of 1933. Internal
factionalism and a totally wrong estimate of the political situation
played directly into the hands of Nazi security services. Though out-
lawed and suppressed, the Party could not believe that Hitler was in
to stay. As late as May 1933, the.Central Committee (ZK) passed a
resolution reaffirming the interpretation which the Comintern had put
upon the Nazi phenomenon, namely, that a revolutionary situation
ex.sted and that the new regime was purely transitory. The KPD would,
as Piecl~ put it, ride to power on Hitler's shoulders: "Nach Hitler
unsero Zoit" The Social-Democrats remained the chief enemy, and the
KPD actually abetted the Nazi rise to power on the strength of this
notion,
- 63 -
- ornftUftfsts 'wore dispatched, on Comintern orders to instruct the Party
on underground work. One was an organizer, the other, a specialist
STCE T
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in underground' press work. They accomplished nothing. In may, John
Schohr returned to Berlin from Moscow with Comintern instructions to
;set up a central directorate (iteichsleitunc) in the form of a Triad
(Dreierkopf), consisting of himself as Polleiter, and two others as
Ore,leitor and a1gitpropleiter. This system was reproduced at all
lower Party levels. (Soo Chart, "Or ,anization of the ',,PD under
Centralized Control,") Schohr was arrested in November, and a now
Dreierkopf appointed. Several such triumvirates followed in rapid
succession. Finally, with the arrest of the entire 'doicihisloitung, in
March 1935, the idea of a centralized leadership within Germany was
given up as impractical.
The territorial organization of the KPD was decentralized by.
the intercalation of eight Inter-regional units (Oberbezirko) between
RReichsleitung and Bezirke. The other levels were rot e.ined as they
had been, except for reduction in size. In reality, e.s result of 1-1 Nazi suppression, local Party units functioned independently and often
in ignorance of each other's existence. Gradually, whatever direction
they received come largely from the foreign support centers sot up in
adjacent countries.
Meanwhile, the loading organs of the KPD (Central Committee,
Politburo, and Secretariat) had boon removed abroad for safety? The
Central Coimmittoe and Secretariat mot in Prague; the Politburo met
occasionally in Paris. In 1936, headquarters were established in Paris.
In 1937 the Central Committee dissolved the Politburo, concentrating
authority in the Secretariat The latter development represented a
shift of emphasis from policy-making to organizational work, for by
this time the foreign support centers had practically taken over control
of KPD affairs within Germany.
Liaison between the Party Center at Prague and units within
Germany was maintained through two separate courier systems: the
Poichstechnikum and the Durchgangstolle network,
The lei ichstechnikum engaged in typically technical pursuits --
production and distribution of illegal literature -- and in the opera-
tion of a chain of couriers. Its lleichskurioro carried instructions
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back arc' forth between the Foreign Center and Berlin, as well as
literature and copy for local reproduction by the Berlin Technikuma
The German security services understood that the Peichskuriere
smuggled instructions, materiel, and funds into Germany from neigh
boring Soviet diplomatic osta'.elishmcnts,
The Durchrstelle (transit stations) offered an alternative
courier system, Lj.ko the eichstechnikum,-Durchgargstelle headquarters
were. originally in Saarbruclcen; later they moved to Holland. The
Durchgangstolle opcratod its own couriers, one for each of the eight
zones of Germany. ,1c.ch reported weekly to the Oberbozirl.sloitor to
whom he was assignel for materials and communications s Monthly ro-
ports wore made to ')urchgangstolle headquarters.
Communications abroad wore effected largely through the German
branch of the International of Seamen and Harbor W r-kers (ISH) under
'Ernst Wollweber.
The de4,roe to -.hich centralized control disintegrated during
the early years of ill.ogalit`, is illustrated by the case of Heinrich
Wiatrek. Comrade ~.iat:-ek, a KPD militant since 1922, trained at the
Lenin School in Moscow, was dispatched to Berlin as an organizer by
the head of the Foreign Directorate (Auslandsleitung) at Prague in 1934,
At Berlin he met his contact, a Communist from Wupporthal who offered
him the post of Bezirksleiter Niedorrhein.
I'Ho met the two tadvisorst (Obcrbdrtor) for Western Germany at
Dusseldorf: One of .these advisers was responsible for Party
activities, and the other for trade'unions. They came to the con-
clusion that Wiatrek was too inexperienced and placed him in the
No. 2 position (Orgieiter)'tc a man from Hamburg; knoti^an only as
1tFritzt. fiatrok, however, became Bozirkslcitor a month later
when ?'Fritz ! was summoned to Prague.
According to VTiatrok, there was no clear-cut delineation of
functions within the Bozirksleitung. In his position, he was re-
sponsible for D{zsselddorf and Solingen. His Nos. 2 and 3 wore
assigned to other areas; and apparently a ctcd very much on their'
own. Within his own area, ?;iatrok took charge of all activities,
producing a paper which he wrote largely himself, and even acting
as cashier. A courier from Berlin visited him regularly up to
February 1935, a fact which indicates that the Reichsleitung man-
aged to keep contact with at least one Bozirk until within a few
weeks of its extinction. After that, he received his instructions
from Amsterdam, via a woman courier who left them with the
Bezirksleiter of I ittoirhein, from whom tiiatrok picked them up
every Monday. He also had a weekly meeting with his Instrukteur
from the ?uslandsleitung,
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The Instrukteur showed him an illegal publication which
originated from the region and established the existence of a
Communist group with which Wiatrek should be in touch. When
Wiatrek (ad succeed after some yreeks in making contact with its
leader, it proved to be the Leiter of the Untorbezirk Dusseldorf-
Bilk -- one of his subordinates. This man, however, was extreme-
ly suspicious, and Wiatrek had great difficulty in establishing
that he and the instrukteur, who was also present, wore not
Gestapo agents. They succeeded in obtaining his cooperation only
after Vliatrok had agreed to a~number of conditions,., whose substance
was that ho'would leave the Dusseldorf-Bilk area completely to its
own devices."
c. Decentralized Control. The failure to maintain a centralized
direction of the K'D in Germany i.as recognized at the "Brussels" Con-
ference, which was actually hold in ioscow in October 1935. A new
and enlarged Central Committee was elected, and it was decided to de-
centralize control by means of the Foreign Directorates, the
Auslandsleitungen.
The Auslands leitLinf;en. (See Charts, 'The'-KPD Foreign-
Directorate Network;" and "Operations of a KID Foreign Directorate.."
The SL's, which had been sot up in various neighboring countries from
the beginning of the illegal period to serve as intermediate super-
visory-communications centers between the Central Committee and Party
elements in Germany, had assumed increasing importance as the
structure in Germany disintegrated. Central Committee supervision
over the work. of the ALts was assured by 477-VTertreter (representatives)
who sat on them until January 1937, at which time the Triad system was
introduced. By 1934, each AL was responsible for a specific area of
the Itcich, to which it (ispatched Instruktoure, each assigned to a
particular district,
The following 1LIs have been. described:
1) AL-Zentrum, located first at Prague, then in Goteborg, and
in Stockholm from 1939. It covered Borlin, Saxony, Hanover, and
Brunswick.
2)' AL-!'lest, Amsterdam. Covered Niederrhein, Aachen, Hagen,
Siegon, Fuhrgobiet, and Bielefeld.
3)' AL- Nord Copenhagen. Covered Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein,
Bremen, and the Baltic coast. Was also responsible for Communist
refugees in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Iceland.
4) AL-Sud. Covered South Germany.
5) AL-Saar;ebiet. Covered the Saar.
6) AL-Sudwest established at Brussels in 1936. Covered
Tlittelrhein,
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AL composition Varied from place to place, but generally in-
cluded the following personnel:
ZK Representative, acting as chief
Chief ,of the Technical A,pparat
Chief of the Border Station (Grenzstelle)
Chief of the Emigrant Directorate (Emigrantenloitung)
Representative of the German zone being serviced
Representative of the Red j"iid (:tote Hilfo)
In AL 1 s Holland, Belgium, and Denmark, the International of
Seamen and Harbor Workers (ISH) was also represented. Although under
nominal Central Committee supervision, the AL's necessarily acted with
a?fair amount of. independence.
As the AL1s gained in importance after 1935, and especially,
from 1937, they built up extensive organizations. AL-Nord, headed
from 1937 by `Ziatrek, consisted of the following; functionaries:
No. 1 (P olloitor) ("7iatrek)
No. 2 (Orgleiter)
No. 3 (Agitpro??^lcitcr)
Transit Agent (Gronzrl