BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02646R000100050001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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BASIC CONCEPTS
OF THE
I NTELL I . ENCE PROCESS
MAY 1959
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BASIC CONCEPTS
OF THE
INTELLIGENCE PROCESS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................... 1
A. The Role of Intelligence 1
B. The Intelligence Process ,.......?.????????? 5
C. Information and Intelligence ......++....... 7
D. Subdivisions of Intelligence .,...+..e?... 8
1. Subject Matter ......,..,,???????,?,???? 8
2. Purpose and Time Range ................. 9
3. Use ?e ...................oer....ea.o.*.? 11
II. COLLECTION OF INFORMATION ........?.?.?????.?... 12
A. Introduction .......?or.......?a.+..oe.e.o.. 12
B. Collection Guidance e..........e+.......e.e.
1. Collection Guides
14
14
2. Collection Requirements ................ 15
C. Spontaneous Collection 15
D. Priorities .....r.+......++..+.......o..+... 16
E. Sources of Information ..a..........a..eo.e. 17
F. Collectors and Methods .............e......+ 18
1. Clandestine Collection .+-.....o.......e 18
2. Diplomatic Collectors ............+..... 19
3. Military Collectors ...........+........ 19
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14. Other Collectors in Foreign Areas a...... 20
5. Collection of Overt Publications ....... 20
6. Collection by Radio Monitoring 20
7, Collection by Photography 21
8. Domestic Collection .s+.es.?o.o....e.... 21
G. Reporting of Information 22
III. PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE 23
A. Introduction ..eee?s...+e.r+....?.oeeoeeee.. 23
B. Guidance of Intelligence Research ..o-....... 24
C. The Research Process
..r.........e.......... 26
1. Assembly ............................... 27
2. Evaluation ......e ................e+.... 29
3?
Analysis o..s?ee..a...e...?a.a.o.......a
31
4o Integration ?ro.er.r+...a..a.saaaaaaaaa. 32
5. Interpretation e....e......r?....aaa??aa 33
6a Presentation ........... ......aaa..?..+? 34
IV. DISSEMINATION .................................. 35
A. Introduction ...?....o..aer....a........a..+ 35
B. Information Dissemination ?+++......a...+r.. 36
C. Intelligence Dissemination
37
V. USES OF INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 37
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BASIC CONCEPTS
OF THE.
INTELLIGENCE PROCESS
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Role of Intelligence
Intelligence is the knowledge about; other countries
which policy makers and operating officials need in order
to arrive at.wise-?decisions. There is general agreement
that it is the task of the intelligence organization to
provide that knowledge. There are, however, differences
of opinion about'. the extent to which intelligence should
contribute to the decision-making process. One view is
that intelligence organizations should collect data as
needed and. report these data to the decision-maker, who
will determine for himself their worth and will integrate
them with other data required to reach his decision.
Another view, essentially an extension of the first, is
that in addition to collecting and transmitting data to
the decision-maker, the intelligence organization should
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determine the worth, validity, and significance of the
data. This additional responsibility considerably
broadens the task of the intelligence organization and
relieves the decision-maker from examining masses of
data. A third view, a still further extension of the
first, is that the intelligence organization should
imagine itself in the position of the decision-makers
of another country and should attempt to predict what
those decision-makers are going to do.
Each of these
terms of the relative
decisions are needed,
these views:
views is valid, but only in
complexities of situations in which
The following examples illustrate
(7_.} The commander of a military unit assigns
a soldier the task of manning a forward
observation post and instructs the
soldier to report his findings. The
commander receives the information as
it is reported by the soldier, assesses
it, and decides what to do, basing his
decision on the sum of his knowledge of
the situation.
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(2.) The commander of a military unit assigns an
intelligence officer to receive information
from a number of forward observation posts.
The intelligence officer assesses the ob-
servation and reporting qualities of the
soldiers at the posts; evaluates the
incoming information in terms of its worth,
consistency, and relation to other data at
hand and informs the commander of its
significance.
(3.) The commander of a military unit knows
that the enemy commander has a number
of courses of action open to him. The
enemy might retreat, advance, perform a
flanking movement., or remain in his
present position. The intelligence
officer, putting himself in the enemy7s
position and using all available knowledge
about the enemy and his situation, tries
to determine which course of action the
enemy commander is most likely to adopt.
This, the most probable course of action
of the enemy, is what the intelligence
officer reports to the commander.
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These views of the role of intelligence can be
applied similarly to intelligence support in the formulation
of foreign policy. In this context, intelligence once
meant, almost exclusively, the gathering, by secret means,
of information to be used by statesmen. The determination
of the significance of the information was left to those
who were going to use it. Side by side with this secret
collection went the reporting, by duly accredited repre-
sentatives to foreign countries, of information more or
less generally available about the politics, economics,
armed forces, and other information of the country in
which they were stationed. Until recently, however, this
type of reporting was not generally considered to be a
part of the intelligence function.
With the developing realization of the close inter-
relationship between foreign affairs in the traditional
sense, and military, and economic, and propaganda
activities affecting foreign relations and national security,
intelligence organizations were increasingly called upon
to provide policy makers and operational personnel in all
of these areas of activity not only with evaluated data,
but also with interpretations of its significance,
estimates of the possible and probable courses of action
of foreign countries, and finally with estimates of probable
foreign reactions to the adoption of policies and actions
under consideration.
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B. The Intelligence Process
On the combat level of an army, intelligence
serves the commander's needs far. data on the enemy, terrain,
and weather. The.intelligence officer translates these
needs into requirements for the collection of information.
Collection of the information is accomplished by those
elements of the command capable of gathering such information.
The intelligence officer evaluates the information
collected;, particularly that on the enemy, interprets the
information in terms of enery'capabilities (actions-open-to tht
ere.my) and enemy vulnerabilities (enemy weaknesses which
are exploitable) and advises the commander of the most
probable course of action open to the enemy. The
commanderps decision to embark on a course of action of
his own is based on the intelligence provided him plus his
knowledge of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of his
own military force. The consequences of his action
create needs for new information, and the process is
repeated.
In terms of national security, the need for
intelligence generally originates with a policy maker or
executor of policy, who requires intelligence on foreign
areas to enable him to do his job. If the data is not
immediately available in a useful form, intelligence-
producing organizations may be asked to provide it.
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Intelligence producers, in turn, need information
in order to produce intelligences Part of this information
isc obtained 'from. files, ' lihrariee, acid other repositories,. bf
information. Some information, however, must be obtained
by ordering its collection. Such orders are called
"collection requirements." The intelligence producers,
using the collected information and data in intelligence
files, perform a research function, the final product of
which is designed to serve the needs of the policy makers
and executives.
Government policymaking and operational decib1ons
are participated in by many persons in a wide variety of
roles--all of whom have a need for collected information.
Such information may be disseminated simultaneously to
those elements of the government conducting operations
and making policy decision, as well as to intelligence
reference! facilities and to intelligence research analysts.
A central intelligence reference service, which
makes available information collected and produced in the past
is, however, a recent and very important part of a modern
intelligence system. To this service all the intelligence
components of government submit the information they collect
and it in turn makes available to all the components the
sum total of that information. properly indexed.
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C. Information and Intelligence
Information refers to the whole range of data
collected. When a collector:: however, selects some infor-
mation in answer to requirements of potential users, it
becomes "intelligence information," which differs from raw
information in that it is selected for its bearing on an
operational or policy problem.
Intelligence information,although sometimes useful,
is not generally considered to be intelligence until it is
further processed, that is, evaluated, analyzed, integrated,
and interpreted. This processing is something like an
industrial. process: iron ore, coal, and limestone are
smelted to make iron or steels The resultant product,
iron or steel, is something quite different from the various
materials assembled in the furnace.
It is not until the information is compiled and
fully processed in terms of an operational or policy
problem, that it may be said to have become intelligence.
The Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint
Usage summarizes the processes in its definition of
intelligence:
The product resulting from the collection
evaluation, analysis, integration and inter-
pretation of all available information which
concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations
or of areas of operations and which is immediately
or potentially significant to planning.-
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Evaluation, analysis, integratior interpretation"
are factors in intelligence processing, or production of
intelligence, and will be discussed later.
D, Subdivisions of Intelligence
.The present broad range of intelligence activities
has resulted in the subdivision of intelligence into three
kinds of specialized categories: (1) subject; (2) purpose
and time range and (3) use.
Intelligence Categories
(1) SUBJECT
Political
Social
Cultural
Scientifica
Technical
Military
Economic
Counterintelligence
Other
(2) PURPOSE AND TIME RANGE
Basic
Current
Estimative
(3 ) USE
Departmental
Interdepartmenta].,.$nd Joint
National
1. Sub:iect_Matter: The entire field of
intelligence can-Lbk-.classifisd in tanns...dfr,the,-._stbject
matter with whidh it is.boncerned..' InteUlgence specialists
concentrate their efforts in_sudh'fields as science; I
economics, polit'ice, sociology; and geography. Indeed;.
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as the division of labor in intelligence production progressesy
additional. intelligence specialties developed such ask
biographic or photographic intelligence. This extensive
array of mental disciplines is today necessary to serve
governmental foreign policy and military planners. The
ipilitary capability of a modern nation is dependent on the
economy which supports its armed forces, the scientific and
technological advances which can be turned into weapons of
warp the attitudes of its people toward war and the political.
conditions which permit, encourage, or prohibit war. The
military planner must take into consideration all these
factors in considering whether a nation must prepare to
defend itself against a potentially hostile nation.
2 Puryose and Time ltan e: Another way the
entire field of intelligence can be divided is by the
purpose and time range of the intelligence. Specialized
elements of intelligence agencies concern themselves with
(1) Basic Intelligences (2) Current Intelligence and
(3) Esti.inative Intelligence. The time element is an
essential part of these categories---past, present, and
future--and it is related to the purpose--background, action,
and planning
Basic Intelligence is an encyclopedic
compilation of information of a more or less permanent or
static nature and of general interest. Its purpose is to
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provide basic data and background information for military
planners and other government executives and for intelligence
research workers.
Current Intelligence is that spot intelligence
of all types and forts of iraediate interest and value to
operating or policy staffs which is used by them usually
without the delays incident to complete evaluation or
interpretation. The most usual form of current intelligence
is a digest piece of..i.nformati6n..received from .any source and
accoiapanied by an intelligence specialist's statement
concerning the significance of that information. The
intelligence specialist, usually an area or functional
specialist, weighs this piece of information against other
information at his disposal and interprets the significance
of this information in terms of his knowledge of the
intelligence needs of various users or operating or policy
staffs. Nor'ia11y, current intelligence is produced on the
most recently procured and important information, so that
the timeliness or newness of the information is a prime
consideration. It is quite possible, however, that a
report of an event which occurred some time ago but
which has a distinct bearing on current events will be
processed as current intelligence. As an extreme example,
if a highly reliable source of information reported that
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Joseph Stalin was done away with by the other members of
the Presidium of the CPSU in 1953, this would most likely
be an item worthy of current intelligence evaluation and
interpretation.
Estiiative Intelligence is that intelligence
which, using other intelligence as a base, attempts to
predict trends and probable courses of action of a foreign
nation or of opposing military forces. Although limited
predictions are made in both current and basic intelligence,
the strategic estimate of conditions in foreign areas and the
probable courses of actions of other nations is a recent
development. not because it is an estimate but because it is
based on all the information available in intelligence
organizations of the government. An estimate may range from
a prediction of conditions during the next six months in a
small South American country to an estimate of Soviet capa-
bilities for global war during the next ten years,
3., Use-. Three distinctions are made in the
use of intelligence,
Departmental Intelligence is that intelligence
needed and normally produced by a Department or independent
agency of the Federal Government to aid in the execution of its
mission and lawful responsibilities. Departmental
intelligence generally refers to intelligence produced by
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the intelligence components of the Departments of the Army,
Navy, Air Force, State and some elements CIA to meet the
needs of the planners and operating officials in their
own agencies
Interdeparmental Intelligence is integrated
departmental intelligence which is required by departments
and agencies for the execution of their missions but
transcends the competence of a single department to produce.
Joint Intelligence is a term peculiar to the
Department of Defense. It is a special category of
interdepartmental intelligence jointly produced by the
Departments-of the Army, Navy and Air Force. It is used
for the joint planning done at the level of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff of the Department of Defense.
National Intelligence is integrated depart-
mental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national
policy and national security, that is of concern to more
than one Department or Agency, and that transcends the
exclusive competence of a single Department or Agency.
National intelligence is normally produced by combining
finished intelligence contributions from those intelligence
agencies most competent to produce intelligence in a
particular field. For example, the Armys intelligence
organization is best equipped to provide intelligence on
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the Soviet Array the Navy~s intelligence organization, on
the Soviet Navy and States intelligence organization, on
the political situation in the USSR. The contributions of
these agencies and others may well be integrated into an
intelligence estimate of Soviet capability to conduct war.
The overall estimate is national intelligence.
II. COLLECTION OF INFORTATION
A. Introduction
The word -collection is often used to refer to any
one of three different intelligence processes (1) initial
gathering (2) cumulative filing, and (3) assembly of
information, or to combinations of these processes. To
obtain a sharp and clear understanding of the intelligence
processes to which these terms refer. Each term is here
defined.
Assemb:1, a part of the research process, is primarily
the exploitation of reference facilities to accumulate data
relating to a specific problem under consideration.
Cumulative filing refers to the indexing and filing
for reference purposes of information already reported as
is done in the library, in analysts files, and in other
specialized repositiories.
Initial gathering is the selection of pertinent data
on the basis of collection requirements and guidance lists
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out of the whole gaa:iut of existing facts obtainable by
direct observation, and from '_;ersons, docu.ients9 publi-
cations broadcasts, and other sources. This is the job
done by the collection elements of the intelligence
community and is what is most often meant by the term
collection,, Once the material has been gathered, the
collector has the responsibility of reporting or forwarding
it to producers of intelligence or to other users.
B. Collection Guidance
Since collection is meant to satisfy users* needs
for data, collectors must have some form of guidance as to
what is needed. This guidance is provided by collection
guides and collection reciuirements9 and by formal training.
la Collection Guides?, Collectors of information
are usually equipped with a broad statement of their
collection responsibilities, often referred to as collection
guides. These guides indicate general subjects about which
there is a continuing need for information. For examples
political analysts and others are continually assessing
the strength and activities of national Communist parties.
Those collectors capable of providing this type of infor-
mation have a continuing collection responsibility which
is spelled out in a collection guide. The collection guide
will indicate the specific aspects of national Communism
upon which the collector should concentrate his efforts.
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20 Collection RenuirenLents? Collection
requirements are requests for collection of quite specific
information, These require .ents usually include background
data already known on the subject and recommendations
relative to possible sources of information and methods of
collection. For example, a military attache in a foreign
country may be asked to observe as closely as possible,
while attending a military maneuver, the supply system
employed by a foreign army. Included in this requirement
may be a summary statement of what is currently known about
the supply system. He may be reouested to attempt tor,have
himself assigned to this phase of the maneuvers as an
observer. For the most part, the instructions for collection
are merely suggestions to the field collector, since he
best knows the opportunities for collection and his own
collection capabilities.
r
C. spontaneous Collection
liost information collection is stimulated by
requirements as discussed above, but the field collector
is often in a position to procure information for which he
has no requirements. If, on the basis of his own judgment
and experience, he feels that the information has intelligence
value, he should collect the information. For example, if a
diplomat in. the normal course of his duties were to overhear
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a remark of military significance, normally outside his
collection responsibilities, he would report this information
to the military attache who, in turn, would report the
information to the proper component of the military intel-
ligence organization.
D. Priorities for Collection
1h.enever the demand for something is greater than
the supply, a priority system is needed to assure that the
most pressing needs are satisfied first. Intelligence
collectors usually are in the position of having many more
requests for information than they can possibly fulfill in
complete detail. (This is particularly true of clandestir.--
collectors.) As a consequence systems have been devised
to help collectors determine which subjects or sources to
give attention first and how much effort to allot to each.
Attaches normally are provided with reporting schedules
for required reports. These schedules often include detailed
outlines of the subject matter to be reported s well as
the time the reports are due. Collectors exploiting a
particularsource such as radio broadcasts or publications
usually give first attention to the ;sources proven most
fruitful by experience. These would be the broadcasts which
normally contain most items of intelligence interest. Any
available extra time might be used on other less fruitful
broadcasts. In special or urgent situations, a special
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directive would turn the attention of collectors to some
usually insignificant broadcast for information on a
special event. Priorities for clandestine collection are
determined by a special coordinating committee and staffs
set ur for this purpose.
E. Sources of Information
A source of information is that person, place, or
document from which information of value can be obtained.
In the strictest sense, the collector of information
collects from the source, or collects the source itself. A
source of information can be a map that a military attache
receives from the army of another nation. A source can be
a person who provides information verbally. It can be a
document or an event witnessed by the field collector. The
types of sources of information are many; varied, and
widely dispersed.
Sources of information commonly exploited
by collectors are newspapers, magazines, technical journals,
books, radio transmissions, foreign officials, travelers,
aliens, refugees, defectors, photographs and films. The
collector is rarely the initial source of information. In
general, the source of information is the document, object,
or a person, exploited by collection methods.
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F. Collectors and- ilethods
Most governments have some form of systematic col.=?? -
lection of information to serve intelligence needs. The
system normally includes a covert and an overt collection
effort and a domestic and a foreign effort. Usually, the
clandestine effort is conducted in foreign areas, that of
overt collection effort both at home and abroad.
1. Clandestine Collection? The high costs in terms
of personnel, time, and money and the risks involved in
clandestine collection, militate against its extensive use
except when the access to desired information is denied.
During periods of international tension or in time of war,
when positive security steps are taken by nations to prevent
information of value coming into the hands of a hostile
state? covert collection becomes important. An intelligence
axiom might well be stated as followse clandestine collection
of information is undertaken only if the information is
inaccessible to overt means of collection. Clandestine
collectors thus concentrate on the collection of information
considered sensitive by the target country, and in areas of
denied or limited access. One instance where clandestine
collection can occur domestically is in the field of counter-
intelligence in which the internal security forces of a nation
attempt to thwart the penetration efforts of the intelligence
services of other nations.
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Normally, clandestine collectors of information
work ;through paid or otherwise motivated agents. The
agents are chosen on the basis of many factors. A most
important one of these is accessibility to the desired
information. For example, a dissatisfied member of a foreign
Communist party may be hired to provide information on party
membership and activities which the party normally would
not reveal. Although clandestine collection of information
can be very profitable;-,, it can c!eate difficulties in
terms of acceptance of the validity of the information by
the users, as well as pose problems of strained political
relationships between nations when it is exposed.
2. Diplomatic Collectors:
One of the responsibiliti
of foreign service officers aside from their diplomatic duties
is the overt collection of information. Their duties in
collection are largely in the field of political information.
Their usual means of collection are through the exchange
of information, conversation, or observation.
30 military Collectors, Host peacetime military
collection is accomplished through attaches of the armed
forces assigned to foreign missions. Aside from their
duties as aides to ambassadors, they collect information on
the armed forces of the nation by contact with military
officials,; observation of maneuvers, visits to installations,
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and exchange of military information such as training manuals.
During time of war, each military commander in the chain of
command has an intelligence organization, one part of which
consists of units which are responsible for collecting
information necessary to accomplish the commander-s objective.
4. Other Collectors in Foreign Areas. Most
government officials stationed overseas, in addition to those
mentioned above, have collection responsibilities incidental
to their other activities. For example, agricultural and
commercial attaches collect information in their fields.
5. Collection of Overt Publications: The
collection of overt publications can be carried out either
by subscription to, or by purchase of, publications,in
foreign countries. The types of publications collected are
the more important newspapers, news magazines, professional
journals, books, government publications, and any other
publications which may contain information of intelligence
value. Maps compiled and printed in foreign areas are also
collected because of the wealth of detail they contain.
6. Collection by Radio Monitorin Much current
information can be procured by monitoring foreign voice
broadcasts. This monitoring yields current information from
::fear text messages, and communications information from
encoded messages. The latter information is useful in
breaking the codes of other governments.
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7. Collection by Photography? Photography, both
ground and aerial, is a technique employed to some degree, by
most collectors of information. Extensive use is made of aeri,-t
photography to discover enemy locations, strength, activityj
and installations. It also provides strategic information for
bombing missions and assessment of the effectiveness of
bombing. Ground photography of buildings, factories, ports,
and persons taken covertly or overtly, provides important
information for economic analysis as well as for target analyst
8. Domestic Collection:
1ithin any country there
are always people who have studied about or traveled to areas
of intelligence interest, and in some countries there are
large numbers of refugees and immigrants from areas of
intelligence interest. These people can be interviewed to
obtain information of intelligence value. In addition to
people, there are usually business, educational, religious,
sports, cultural, and social organizations with foreign
contacts and foreign information which may be of intelligence
value if proper and timely contacts are made with them.
Collection from such sources is termed domestic collection
of foreign intelligence information.
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G. 16eporti ng of Information
In r:iany instances, field reporting of information
means only the forwarding of gimps, photographs, physical object
or publications to those people who will exploit the intel=
ligence value of the information. In such instances, the.-
users are able to work directly with the source of information.
Other infor.:,.lation, however, must be reported in a different
form than that in which it appeared when it was collected.
For example, an attache who has observed a military i;ianeuver
of a foreign army must translate his observations into a
logical, objective account which will be useful for intel-
ligence purposes. On the other hand, the collector may receive
from an agent a hand-written report which needs only slight
editing to make it useful. Uhatever the case., the collector
should do as clear., complete, unbiased, and objective a
reporting job as he possibly can. The collector should
also give the users data which will establish the reliability
of the source of the information.
This he does by providing, if possible, details about the
source and how the information was collected. In some
instances an attempt is made by the field collector to give
a tentative evaluation of the relative truth of the content
of the report. Some collection agencies use a rating
syste:--t to indicate the degree of reliability of the source
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and the credibility of the information. This system consists
of six letters, usually running from A through F, each of
which indicates a different degree of reliability of the
source, and six numbers, usually running from 1 to 6, each of
which gives a tentative evaluation of the probable truth
of the content. This system is ordinarily used by organization
responsible for covert collection and when such organizations
are repor'ing information from agent personnel or other
sensitive sources. Organizations responsible. for overt
collection generally provide a narrative description of the
source to aid the user. In general, the collector should
give as much source information as time, space, and security
permit. In any case, the user of the information will re-
evaluate the information from his own vantage point. In
most instances an intelligence researcher will have at his
disposal more information on the topic than will the field
collector.
III. PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE (Intelligence Research)
A. Introduction
Intelligence production is a broad activity which
includes tasks ranging from the evaluation and interpretation
of a single information report to the compilation and
interpretation of all available relevant data on a subject
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such as the probability of attack by another major power.
There is no mystery to intelligence production. In most
of its characteristics it is no different from the research
conducted by scholars. The techniques of research in
intelligence are those borrowed from the academic disciplines
or the press. Intelligence research differs from other
research in that it is conducted under security conditions,
may utilize classified material and serves the needs of
goveri.afit&.planners and operating officials engaged in
protecting the national security and in conducting foreign
affairs. As mentioned previously, the production of intel-
ligence, particularly in its simpler context of evaluation
and interpretation of information, may be performed by the
policy planner or by the operating official. ?ore often,
however, production is a task for intelligence specialists
trained and experienced in the complexities of intelligence
research.
B. Guidance of Intelligence Research
Intelligence research is conducted primarily as
a service to policy planners and operating officials. These
users of intelligence must provide guidance to the intel-
ligence res~earcvher-, by.i*ddi,catsin ,~ in clear terms precisely
what intelligence they.need in order te?accbmpli.sh? ? .
their missions successfully. Simply stated, a national
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security policy planner must know two things in order to
plan properly. He must know the capabilities, and vul-
nerabilities of his own country and,he must know the
capabilities, and vu~ rabilities; of the area concerning
which policy is being made. The latter is usually provided
him by the intelligence researcher. Since only the planner
knows the scope of the problem for which he needs intel-
ligence, he is the only one who can adequately define his need
for intelligence. The researcher working on an intelligence
problem cannot produce usable intelligence without proper
guidance from the planner. Clearly the intelligence
researcher needs guidance, the more specific the better.
Guidance consists of several major factors. First, a
statement of the intelligence problem, its limits and depth,
is required and, if possible, a statement indicating how
the intelligence is going to be used. Second, the analyst
should know whether he should interpret his research and
what sort of interpretation is desired. Third, the
analyst should know when the research should be finished so
that it will be of maximum use to the planner. In addition
to this direct guidance there exists an indirect fsrm of
guidance based on general and continuing needs of policy
planners and operating officials. These intelligence needs
are satisfied through the setting up and operating of
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intelligence programs as distinct from individual research
efforts. For example, continuing study of the status and
capabilities of the armed forces of a particular country
and periodic publication of the results of that study would
be such an intelligence program. There would be initial
guidance in great detail, but when this was completed,
very little guidance would be needed by the intelligence
researchers for the operation and maintenance of the:,,program.
C. The Research Process
After the intelligence analyst knows what his
research problem is, he proceeds to use the tools of
research to accomplish his tasks There are many ways of
describing the research process and the steps involved. The
process described here consists of the following; assembly
of data; evaluation, analysis, integration of the data;
interpretation of the product; and presentation of the
intelligence product to the user. Assembly of data and
presentation are primarily physical processes, while
evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation are
essentially ;~ntal processes. For purposes of description,
each of the above steps will be treated separately, but it
should be understood that several of the steps can occur
simultaneou.sly~ that certain of the steps may be omitted, and
that later steps can precede the earlier steps.
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1. Assembl : The process of assembly involves the
gathering of all data relevant to the intelligence problem.
The researcher needs to know what data-,.he must have and:.where to
find, them. He usbs both' :those'-data :which= hz ve beer*:. previously
collected and those which are constantly coming in from
collectors, perhaps during the entire p.criod of the reseerch'effc
Typical sources of data are:
a. The Researcher; i,iost intelligence research
specialists are employed because of their specialized training
in one or more of the academic disciplines such as political
science, economics, science, and language. They bring to the
.job specialized knowledge that enables thelfi to discriminate
in later mental processes.
b. The Researchers Files; Normally, a researche
in any type of intelligence will build up files of material
pertinent to his general field of responsibility. From those
files, he can draw material as specific intelligence problems
are assigned to him. For example, a political analyst dealing
with France would keep in his files information on all aspects
of French politics. From such files he could draw information
dealing with a specific political party.
c. Overt N;.n-intelligence Facilities- Many
libraries and other specialized repositories can provide a great
deal of information to the researcher. In fact, it is conceivab;
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that all the data necessary to the solution of the intelligence
problem can be obtained from such facilities. A familiarity
with such repositories is part of the basic knowledge of the
researcher.
d. Intelligence Repositories: General and
specialized intelligence repositories are exploited for data
by the researcher. Specialized intelligence repositories
include those set up for biographic data, industrial data,
photography, and maps.
e. Incoming Information- One c:f the most
time-consuming responsibilities of an intelligence researcher
is the reading of incoming information reports. He reads
these for three reasons: to keep his knowledge of his
subject current; to divert to his files information of
future use, and to extract information pertinent to the
intelligence research he is currently conducting. Incoming
reports bearing on his intelligence research may influence his
work up to the time of presentation of the intelligence to
the user.
As the intelligence researcher proceeds with the
gathering of information, he is forced, for the sake of
efficiency, to develop a logical system of recording the
information. He uses a system of note-taking, and develops
files in accordance with his preconceptions of the normal
subdivisions of the over-all intelligence problem. The
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mental aspects of assembly are the determination of what
kinds of information are needed and where the information
can be acquired and the st.ection of specific pieces of
information which are relevant to the research problem.
20 Evaluation. Each item of information assembled by
the intelligence researcher must be evaluated in terms of
(a) probable pertinence to the research problem and (b)
consistency of-fi.ct with known fact. The researcher is not
bound by any evaluation placed on a report by the field
collector. He should not, however, ignore the field eval-
uation since the evaluation was put there to guide him in
his determination of the worth of the information.
The researcher encounters relatively little difficulty
in evaluating information when the source is documentary
material in its original form, but when the original infor-
mation is clouded by translation and unclear reporting, the
analyst makes mental reservations about the probable truth
of the information. Furthermore, if he is judging a report
from an individual who has been the source of poor information
in the past, the analyst will be alerted to scruitinize the
information thoroughly.
researcher should examine the information in great detail
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and ma a some determination of the probable value of infor-
mation to the research problem. He has done this to some exten
in the selection of material,, but now he must make this
determination in greater depth. It is at this stage that
the analyst is forced to make tentative decisions about how
he will proceed with the research. Inevitably, as he
proceeds with the evaluation tentative hypotheses relating
to the intelligence problem will occur to him.
b. Consistency lvWith Other Known Facts; The
analyst must determine how the facts in the information
coincide with other known information. He may discover that
a new piece of information contradicts a broad base of
previous knowledge on the subject or that the information
contradicts one other known set of facts. In the latter
case, the analyst should carefully weigh the two opposing
sets of data before deciding which is the most probable,
Information which confirms previous information tends to
increase the value of the already known information= Even
here, however, the analyst must be alert for false confir-
mation and deception. It is quite possible that information
reported by two or more collectors might emanate from a
single source, and one report falsely confirm another.
Deception is the technique of feeding erroneous information
into several collection channels to mislead intelligence
personnel and, ultimately, the user. For example, a nation
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about to eri;:? ! rt.. on a war with another nation, may try to
funnel into the latterss intelligence system information
contrary to the former 's real intentions.
In addition to relating the information to
other known information, the researcher should examine a
report for internal consistency,, The report should not be
self-contradictory if it is to be of value. On initial
scanning, a, report may seem quite logical, but a detailed
examination can reveal glaring inconsistencies,,
3,, Analysis. Analysis is defined as "separation of
anything into its constituent parts or elemtns; also, an
examination of anything to distinquish its component parts
or elements, separately or in relation to the whole
Analysis is a division rather than a building process. At
this stage in the research process, the analyst attempts to
prove or disprove the validity of facts by critically com-
paring them with related facts.
Let us assume that an analyst is working on an intelligen,
problem dealing with the strategic implications of the dis-
position of the Soviet Army,, He has a report which states tha-'
the Russian 76th Airborne Division is located at Krakow,
Poland,, If true, this information would be highly useful fut,
unfortunately, the analyst is unsure of the source of the
information. By an analytical process he determines what
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else he should know in order to prove or disprove the statement
He might find a translation of a Polish newspaper article whicr
states that the Mayor of Krakow entertained the commanding
general of the 76th Division. A list of Soviet B3oc unit
designations might show that Russian airborne divisions are
numbered serially from 120 through 140, but that Polish
airborne divisions are numbered serially from 75 through 80.
The newspaper translation would tend to substantiate the
original statement, while the list of Bloc units would tend
to refute it but throw a different light on the information,
namely that this is probably a Polish division and not Russian
Thus, analysis is the examination of those sub-factors which
tend to prove or disprove a larger factor.
4. Integrationg Analysis divides, and integration
built:?. The latter process is often described in intelligence
as the building of a mosaic or putting the pieces of infor-
mation together in proper relation to one another to give
a unified whole. The whole is essentially different from any
of the individual pieces which went into the whole. A piece
of information, formerly an entity, may in the new product be
a statistic in a table, a countour line on a map, or part
of an idea expressed in words.
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The process, integration, is sometimes described by
using the terms correlation and synthesis. CorrelabiQn is
the act of e tablishing mutual relations--the mosaic idea.
Synthesis is the building of the parts into a unified whole
to create a new entity. The two terms are not mutually
exclusive.
Typical products of integration are intelligence maps,
statistical tables, and a report describing the chemical
industry of the Each of these is a result of a
reasoning and compilation process based on observable
phenomena. From these observable phenomena, certain con-
clusions are derived.
5. Interpretation: Interpretation is the determination
of the significance of the product resulting from integration.
At this stage, the analyst must go beyond the information he
has integrated and ask the question, 11hat does all this
mean?- "'. is at this point that the analyst becomes less the
cautious scholar and more the intelligence officer. The
analyst is called upon to bring into play his ingenuity,
experience, and judgment. For example, having completed a
study of the development in another country of a new toxic
chemical, the scientific analyst should indicate whether this
chemical could be used as a nerve gas; whether it could be
spread broadcast, and, if so, by what means; or whether
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large scale production and storage is feasible, These are
the things which the policy maker and operating, official often
need because they do not have the specialized knowledge
necessary to derive such interpretations from the basic
.intelligence study. Furthermore, the analyst should say those
things which reflect accurately the results of his research
whether or not such results are palatable to the users.
There has been an attempt in the foregoing to isolate
the several factors in the mental process of intelligence
research. In practice, these factors operate simultaneously,
so while the analyst is evaluating a partict::ar document he
most likely is
he is working.
relating to the other information with which
He often automatically analyzes the informatio2
in the documents finding proofs and contradictions from his
memory. Also, interpretation can occur at this stage. As
the analyst scans a document he can make assumptions that if
a certain thing is true, then a certain significance etr:erges.
4. 6. Presentation. At the beginning of the research
problem, the analyst concerns himself with the form in which
the intelligence will be presented to the user. He shapes
his research effort to a great extent by the manner in which
he will present it. If his final product is to be an
annotated intelligence. map, the techniques he e;nploys would
be different from those he would use to prepare a detailed
written study. Generally speaking, intelligence is
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presented in written, 1>;raphic, or oral forms most intelligence
is provided in the form of the written word but often oral
intelligence briefings keep top officials and military
commanders abreast of intelligence developments.
IV. DISSEMINATION
A. Introduction
Dissemination is the process of getting information an(
intelligence into the hands of the persons who need it.
Dc3smination is actually composed of two separate functions.
The first of these functions is that of deciding who needs the
data. Since intelligence organizations strive to prevent their
methods and results from becoming known to hostile or potentia',
hostile states, much information collected, and virtually all
intelligence produced, are subject to varying degrees of
security classification. The -need to know, principle
operates to limit the nur,mber of recipients of classified data.
Strictly spealxtiing, this principle means that regardless of
the level of security clearance which an individual has been
given, he is entitled to receive only that classified informati
necessary to the efficient discharge of his responsibilities.
Another brake on overlapping dissemination is the rule pro-
hibiting an agency from disseminating another agency4s
material without permission of the originator. The second
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function involved in dissemination is the mechanical one of
distributing the data to the indicated recipients.
Ordinarily, an intelligence organization will place the
responsibility for this function with one of its service or
support components. Techniques such as electrical means and
special couriers can speed the distribution when time is an
important factor.
B. Information Dissemination
Information is often t .sseminated by the field collector
to other organizations which have field establishments
and personnel. For example, a military attache working
in an embassy abroad may disseminate collected information
to other attaches of his country, to the a.ubassador, and
even the attaches of friendly countries. He must be
assured when disseminating information in the field that
the other collectors, if they submit that information to
their headquarters organization, give the collection credit
to him. Failure to do this might ultimately lead to false
confirmation of information.
The headquarters of the collecting organization dissemina'
its information to potential users with a --need to know.
Among those are intelligence research (producing) organization:
policy makers, operating officials, and, in lime instances,
foreign intelligence organizations.
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0. Intelligence Dissemination
Finished intelligence is disseminated in a manner
similar to that used in information dissemination. The
recipients of intelligence can be the same as the recipients
of information, but intelligence is usually disseminated to
a narrower more specific group of users. In oral presentation
of intelligence, the researcher -disseminates, the intelligenc
directly to the user.
V. USES OF INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE INFMNATION
Intelligence provides knowledge about foreign countries
and peoples to government policy makers and executives to
help them in making their decisions. For example, intelligent
serves in the des,4.n of policies to maintain national security
Intelligence also provides estimates of the possible present
or futuxe threats to a government and its allies and points up
the character and location of possible threats. Such
estimates assist people in the executive agencies of the
government in making determinations of the over-'all magnitude
the defense effort necessary for security. Intelligence
may also indicate the intentions or probable courses of action
of allies and potential ene-nites, as well as their weaknesses
and vulnerabilities. Such indications allow policy makers and
executives of the government to adjust defense preparations to
meet the most probable dangers.
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The most immediate use of intelligence is in providing
information which assists in making operating decisions.
Operating decisions are made at all levels of government and
by all executive agencies of the government. For example, one
type of report is used by 18 different Departments, Boards, or
Bureaus, and 77 of their major Divisions and Offices, and
many more Branches and Sections. Although most intelligence
and intelligence information reports would not be used so
widely, a single report might be used in any of those same
Departments, Boards, Bureaus, Divisions, Offices, Branches,
or Sections.
Finally, '..ntelligence appraises the probable reactions
of foreign govermaents to alternative courses of action being
considered by policy matters.
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