COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9
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RIFPUB
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S
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573
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November 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 14, 2000
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1
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Publication Date: 
January 1, 1953
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REPORT
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pproved For Release 2000/05/23 CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD. r'':isi'F?ti (. r a,. 014 lok" IR-6165 January 1953 OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH Department of State SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION roved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION INDEX Individual Country Studies IR-6165 .1 BURMA IR-6165.16 IR-6165.2 INDOCHINA IR-6165.17 IR-6165.3 INDONESIA IR-6165.18 IR-6165.1+ MALAYA IR-6165.19 IR-6165.5 THE PHILIPPINES IR-6165.20 IR-6165.6 THAILAND IR-6165.21 IR-6165.7 JAPAN IR-6165.22 IR-6165.8 ALGERIA IR-6165.23 IR-6165.9 EGYPT IR-6165.2 IR-6165.10 GREECE IR-6165.25 IR-6165.11 INDIA IR-6165.26 IR-6165.1.2 IRAN IR-6165.27 IR-6165.13 IRAQ IR-6165.28 IR-6165.1 ISRAEL IR-6165.29 IR-6i65.15 MOROCCO IR-6165.30 IR-6165.31 IR-6165.32 iR-6165.33 . IR-6165.3I+ IR-6165.35 Regional Surveys SOUTHEAST ASIA FRANCE ICELAND ITALY SOUTH AFRICA THE UNITED KINGDOM WEST GERMANY ARGENTINA THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA WESTERN EUROPE LATIN AMERICA SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9. Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165 .1 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, BURMA OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY I ORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Page Foreword . . . . ? . . . OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND, CAPABILITIES . . ? Objectives . . . . . . ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 II. Tactics . . . ? . ? . . ? . . 2 III. Capabilities . . . . 0000 . . . . . ? . . 600#* I. Numerical Strength , . ASSETS . . . ? . . . . . ? ? II.. Electoral Strength . . . . ? ? . ? ? ? ? . ? r III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action IV. Government Policy. Toward Communism ? . ? . . . V. Communist Influence in Labor . . . . r .. . . VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations . . . . . ? . VII* Communist Infiltration into Government ? . . . . . . ? VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation ? . . IX. Communist Infiltration of Non?.Communist Political Parties' . ? ? ? ? ? ? . ? ? . . ? ? ? ? ? . . ? . ? 9 10 13 13 1'l X. Communist Propaganda Media . < . < . . . 15 XI. Financial Condition . . . . < . ? . . ? . 18 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . r . . , ? . . r 19 XIII. Communist International Organizations . . . . ? ? . . 20 XIV. Communist Communication Network . < . . . . 21 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance.- The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather .the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET -'SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN BURMA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES the Communists in Burma are at present pursuing a two-pronged, \and not completely consistent, policy. The illegal Communist under- ground) is continuing the insurrection which began in 1948, and seems it present to be concentrating on maintaining and consolidating its control over."base areas," while training and strengthening guerrilla units for future action. Efforts are also being made to develop effective alliances with other insurgent groups such as the White Band element of the People's Volunteer Organization and the Karen National Defense Organization. At the same time, the above-ground, Communist-dominated Burma Workers and Peasants Party (MPP), which is recognized by the govern- ment as a legal opposition group, seems most concerned with its own internal organization and with programs designed to develop popular support for the Party. The BWPP is agitating for an end to insurgency through formation of a coalition government including opposition elements. Communist efforts to recruit support within the Overseas Chinese Community are spearheaded by the China Democratic League (CDL). Within the framework of these general objectives, the Communist parties seek a number of immediate goals. Domestically, current efforts are concentrated on: 1. combating the growth of anti-Communist sentiment among ,the over- seas Chinese; 2. penetrating Buddhist organizations; 3. increasing the membership of "mass organizations," which have thus far been relatively small in Burma; and 4. undermining the political position of the government and the Socialist Party which is its dominant element. Internationally, the chief immediate goal is to prevent a shift in official Burmese foreign policy toward the West and the US in particular. References in this section to insurgent activity refer principally to action by the Burma Communist Party (BCP). Other Communist underground groups include: (1) the Communist Party (Burma) -- CP(B) -- which is a relatively small splinter group, and (2) a band of China-trained guerrillas under leadership of the Kachin renegade Naw Seng, which does not appear to be in contact with the BCP. Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION .. 2 .. There is, to some extent, a conflict between the policy of preparation for eventual overthrow of the government and "legal" efforts to establish a broad popular base and to create pressures leading to a coalition government. The GUB is unlikely to be respon- sive to demands for a coalition as long as armed insurrection continues to threaten the political and economic stability of the nation, despite its apparent acquiescence in a rather artificial distinction between BCP insurgency and BWPP legal action. At the present time, overall Communist strategy seems to favor the "legal" efforts of the BWPP. II. TACTICS Current tactics include attempts to establish collaborative arrangements with other political groups and attempts to win direct following, for the party or'its fronts, from diverse elements within the Burman and minority populations. The strength of the Communist appeal rests in the coincidence of certain aspects of current Communist policy with general Burmese fears and aspirations -- neutralist, anti- colonialist, and "peace" sentiments. The basically Marxist orientation of most present-day Burmese leaders, and the lingering sense of attach- ment to the homeland among the Chinese community also favor Communist efforts. Special appeals are directed to identifiable groups within the population -- particularly youth and students and, most recently, the Buddhist leaders. There are some reports that Communist propagandists, perhaps aided by Chinese specialists, are attempting to subvert the minority peoples along the Sino-Burma border. The BWPP's small delegation in the Chamber of Deputies is important primarily as a focal point for expression of what are basically extra-parliamentary political pressures. Popular organiza- tions controlled by the BWPP or its labor wing, the Burma Trade Union Congress, are utilized to create the impression of popular demand for policies favored by`the Party. In addition, to opposing the-specific actions or presumed intentions of the Government, political pressures have been used in an attempt to destroy public confidence in the competence of the present Government. In planning its program, the BNPP seems to be responsive to direction from the Chinese Embassy, through which it apparently receives some financial support. At the same time, guerrilla activity is continuing among under- ground groups. Although the BCP forces have increasingly been broken up into small groups by Government military pressure, marauding bands still render large areas of the country insecure. Present insurgent military operations seem designed primarily to secure supplies and manpower, and to keep government forces off balance. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 III. CAPABILITIES The BCP is capable of continuing its present level of guerrilla- type insurgency, thereby preventing the consolidation of government control over all Burma and retarding economic recovery and development. The BWPP appears to have sufficient leadership, and an adequately dis- ciplined organization, to continue its agitational and penetration tactics, designed to maintain political pressure on the government and retard its slowly emerging trend toward a closer relationship with the West. The prospects for future Communist action will be determined largely by developments outside Burma, particularly decisions concerning broader Asian strategy. In the.event of direct invasion or a greatly magnified program of direct aid to insurgent groups, the stability of the GUB would be seriously threatened. The Government might, in the absence of immediate and effective help from the West, seek accommoda- tion with Asian Communism, and it is relatively certain that the prestige and power of local Communist elements would be rapidly magnified. In the absence of external intervention, however, the Government will probably continue to make progress in its efforts to suppress the insurgents and may, as larger areas of the country are secured, be emboldened to,take more restrictive measures against "legal" Communist elements. In that event, the BNPP, which now appears to be the chief instrument of international Communist policy in Burma, might find its access to propaganda outlets circumscribed and its ability to manipulate front groups curtailed before its present organizational efforts have born fruit. In the absence of actual or imminently threatened invasion, or of unforeseen internal economic disorders, it seems unlikely that the parliamentary position of the BWPP will improve significantly or that its mass base will grow materially. The capacity of Burmese Communist groups to support Soviet policy will, therefore, depend directly on Soviet (or Chinese) action. The 1948 insurrection by the BCP has this far failed in its primary aim of overthrowing the government and, balanced against an improving government position, its future is even less promising. Were it not for the ever-present threat that the Burmese future will be over- whelmed by events beyond its borders, it might be predicted that the Communist conspiracy would continue,to wither, although at an agonizingly slow rate. SECRET .. SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 4 - COMMUNISM IN BURMA: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH An assessment of Communist strength in Burma must include both the illegal insurgent movement and above-ground Communist elements. Available data are insufficient to permit a definitive statement of total numerical strength. The Burma Communist Party (BCP) is the most important element of the underground movement. Its membership is estimated to be .about 5,000. A small splinter group, the Communist Party (Burma) -- CP(B) -- was estimated in 1951 to have about 300 members and candi- dates. The CP(B) split from the BCP in 1946 as a result of personal differences within the Communist leadership. The two groups, however, reportedly concluded an agreement for at least limited military cooperation in August 1952. The principal above-ground group now appears to be the Burma Workers and Peasants Party (BPPPP), which was formed in December 1950 by a group of dissident Socialists.. The party membership is unknown, but it has become increasingly well disciplined and energetic, taking effective leadership of Communist-dominated "front groups." The most significant of the latter ares (1) the Burma Trade Union Congress (BTUC) with a present estimated membership of about 2,000; (2) the A11- Burma Peasants Organization (ABPO), which claims a membership of 100,000, probably with considerable exaggeration; (3) the World Peace Congress (Burma) with a small but vocal membership; and (4) the People's Youth Organization (PYO), which was founded only in December 1952 but which has considerable potential importance. Communist organizations within the Overseas Chinese community are dominated by the China Democratio League (CDL), the nearest equivalent of a Chinese Communist Party. The League's membership is unknown. Although the membership of Communist organizations therefore seems relatively small, the number of individuals who are subject to Communist influence and pressure is probably significantly higher, partly because of widespread receptivity in Burma to a number of aspects of current Communist propaganda efforts. The number who are "strongly influenced" by Communist elements should probably include most of the membership of the non-Communist Trade Union Congress (Burma), and the membership of the People's Peace Front (PPF) and Mahabama parties, which collaborate with the B1fPP. The Chinese population as a whole remains vulnerable to Communist pressure, but since 1950 vigorous efforts by non-Communist Chinese elements have probably reduced the number who are strongly influenced. Rural populations are exposed to Communist propaganda and organizational effort for short periods in the course of guerrilla operations. Although no adequate figures are SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646ROO0300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION available, it seems likely that 5 percent of the total Burmese population may be controlled or strongly influenced by Communist elements. Geographically, Communist strength is heavily concentrated in Rangoon and the southern towns of Burma (the BRTPP and CDL groups) and in insurgent pockets in central and northern Burma (BOP). The main sources of Burmese Communist recruits appear to have been students and youth, intellectuals, and peasants; urban labor has thus far been less significant. Among the resident Chinese, the leadership is predominantly middle class in origin; laboring classes provide the bulk of membership; and a number of businessmen appear to be passive sympathizers. Comparatively little is known concerning the quality and reliability of the Communist membership or of its leaders, Although the guerrilla groups undoubtedly include some elements whose principal motivation is organized banditry, the leadership appears to possess firm political resolve and to be in effective control of its following. The surrender rate among insurgent groups has remained relatively low despite mounting government military pressure. Most of the leadership has belonged to Marxist, if not Communist, organizations for a period of five to ten years. The above-ground BWPP has recently been reorganized and "puri- fied" in a move which has apparently strengthened its internal homogeneity and removed elements of doubtful reliability. Although it is probable that the total membership has declined somewhat since mid-1951, it seems likely that the strength and dependability of the party has increased, and that it will continue to exercise effective leadership of above-ground pro-Communist groups. The leadership of the China Democratic League is relatively more experienced and many of its important leaders have been trained in China. The membership of the League increased markedly between 1946 and 1950; in the last two years, however, its total strength has remained relatively stable and may have declined somewhat. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH Since the underground Communist parties are outlawed, Communist voting power is reflected only in the votes received by candidates of the BWPP and the parties which support it -- chiefly the People's Peace Front and the Mahabama. The parliamentary strength of these groups in the Chamber of Deputies elected in 1951, related to the representation of other parties, is as follows: SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001.-9 Party Number of seats BWPP 9 PPF 3 Mahabama 1 Other opposition groups 27 The Government Coalition, including the Socialist Party 196 The most recent test of Communist electoral strength occurred in the Rangoon municipal elections of February 20, 1952. The three .opposition parties listed above ran joint candidates, under the banner of the Triple Alliance. The coalition won only one seat out of 35, in contrast with a representation of 15 seats for comparable parties in the Council elected in 1949. However, these figures do not reflect BWPP strength adequately, for Triple Alliance candidates are reported to have received almost half the total vote given to candidates of the governing coalition (the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League). Nevertheless, the drastic decline in Council seats is significant because of the predominant role of Rangoon in national life. Although the BWPP and its affiliated groups are currently agitating for a coalition government including the Communists, there is no evidence of specific planning for future elections. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The Communist insurrection in Burma, coupled with Karen insurgency and the depredations of non-political bandit gangs, has effectively and seriously retarded Burmese recovery from wartime devastation. It is a continuing, though somewhat diminishing, threat to the integrity of the state. The insurgency is exploited by above- ground Communist elements in their attacks on the government. Of the various insurgent elements, the Burma Communist Party (BCP) has been and remains the most significant. The party controls as many as 8,000 guerrillas, which are now organized in small bands. _ There have been no recent report of concentrations of more than 300 in a single group. The BCP is reported to have succeeded recently in establishing a coalition with two other underground elements: (1) the Communist Party (Burma), with an estimated strength of 1,000; and (2) some elements of the White Band People's Volunteer Organization -- total PPO strength is estimated at 3,000, but the effective strength of collaborating groups is unknown. A potentially important group, which is now apparently independent of the BCP, is a force of Kachin-Burman-Chinese guerrillas, estimated at 1,500, under the SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORM&TION leadership of the renegade Naw gong. Naw Seng'a two battalions have been trained in China, and may represent the best disciplined and most thoroughly indoctrinated insurgent group. All insurgent groups appear to be currently concentrating on strengthening their control of limited, relatively inaccessible "base areas." BCP groups have been pushed back within the past year by government military operations; their current strength is located chiefly in central Burma south of Mandalay, in northern Burma, and in the western region stretching toward the Chin Hills. CP(B) groups are located primarily in the Irrawaddy delta and westward toward the Arakan. Naw Seng's force is reported to be in the Bhamo area in northern Burma. No significant military operations have been undertaken recently by-the insurgent groups except the BCP, and these have been confined to hit-and-run raids against government outposts, attacks on trans- portation and communications lines, and harassment of villages which are inadequately protected. Troops not so engaged are concerned primarily with protecting Communist-held areas from government forces, but in case of attack, the Communists prefer to withdraw rather than fight as long as it is possible to remove supplies and equipment. Little has been learned concerning the administrative apparatus established by BCP groups in areas which they control. Although the party claims to govern local areas -- appointing officials, directing education, and controlling marketing -- it is doubtful whether any permanent administrative apparatus has been established. Above- ground Communist groups are primarily responsible for propaganda activity, but the BCP has undoubtedly carried on some propaganda work in connection with local recruiting efforts. The degree of popular support which Communist guerrillas have received seems to be a function of the military force which they can apply in any area. For the most part, the rural population appears to be passive, reacting to preponderant military pressure and aiding guerrillas only when coercion is present or threatened. The guerrilla groups live off the country, and no central supply organization is known to exist. Even though the several groups are relatively independent, there is some intercommunication (including radio), and Communist intelligence concerning government operations appears to have been generally good. The BCP leadership has made persistent-efforts to secure effective working arrangements with other insurgent groups. In August 1952, an agreement was reportedly reached with representatives SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION of the Communist Party (Burma) and some White Band elements of the People's Volunteer Organization, providing for collaboration and demarcation of respective areas of activity. Because of past. personal antagonisms among leaders of the various groups, the realization of a working arrangement would appear to reflect desperation born of declining strength, or perhaps a BCP effort to qualify for more extensive Chinese assistance by providing evidence of effective leader- ship of all guerrilla elements. External assistance (from China) to the Communist guerrillas has thus far been sporadic and at a relatively low level. Some BCP cadres are reported to have received training in Yunnan. Naw Song's guerrilla units have been trained in China, and may pose a more significant long-term threat to the government by establishing a protected base area in a remote region of northern Burma. There are no reliable reports of significant amounts of arms being furnished to Burmese guerrillas from China. In its efforts to suppress the Communist insurgency, the Burma Government has been handicapped by the necessity of simultaneously containing Chinese Nationalist troops in eastern Burma, attempting to subdue Karen rebels,.and suppressing'Moslem dissidents in the Arakan. Total government strength of about 60,000, including the Union Military Police, is heavily taxed by its varied responsibilities, and the forces available for anti-Communist efforts fluctuates from time to time, in accordance with demands created by the actions of other dissident groups. Key posts are manned; mobile reserves are maintained at central locations; and from time to time offensive actions are taken against isolated pockets of resistance. In the absence of stepped-up external assistance, the future capabilities of the Communist insurgents are not likely to improve. Although the guerrilla forces have been able to maintain their strength for some time, no significant expansion has taken place. It is not clear whether manpower or arms shortages represent the chief limitation. On balance, the government position has improved within the past year; perhaps the most significant development has been the increasing fragmentation of guerrilla forces and the restoration of agricultural production in some areas of the Irrawaddy delta which have been cleared on insurgents. In addition to weakening the resource base of the Communists, this development will, in the long run, contribute to the strength and stability of the government. So far as is known, the above-ground BWPP has organized no paramilitary units, and has no plans for participation in violent action. In order to keep its present legal status, the party must at least preserve the appearance of being no more than an opposition political party. Approved For R km&ux -02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION IV. GOVERNMENT. POLICY TOWARD CO1gMUNISM Present government policy draws a somewhat artificial distinction between political pressure and insurgency which, in turn, hat led to the development of the two arms of the Communist movement in Burma. The insurrectionary Communist parties -- BCP and CP(B) -- have been outlawed by the Government, and exist only as underground movements. The E PP, however, is a legal, political party, has a small parlia- mentary representation (9 seats out of 232) and is relatively unob- structed in its manipulation of front groups. (Exceptions the government has occasionally denied passports to proposed delegates to international Communist meetings.) Because of official reluctance to prevent distribution of literature which is not openly seditious, Communist propagandists have secured important outlets for dissemination of printed propa- ganda, taking advantage of an existing market for any literature which is interpreted as shedding light on "experiments in sooialism." Recently, however the Home Minister issued a.atrong warning to publicists who spread false information, advocate armed uprising, or undermine the security of the state. Within the Chinese community, the CDL and other Communist fronts have been permitted considerable political freedom of action in Burma, owing to the Burma Government's neutralist foreign policy, its desire not to antagonize Communist China, and to. the fact that Peiping has not encouraged the Burma Chinese to indulge in overt agitation against the Burma Government. Nevertheless, Chinese Communist political activity is limited by the Burmese constitutional provisions that only Burmese nationals may vote and by the exclusion of a large proportion of the Chinese from Burmese citizenship. During 1951-52, the increasingly vitriolic anti-Western tone of local Chinese Communist propaganda, which the Burma government deemed injurious to Burma's neutral position, and the affiliation of pro- Communist Chinese with Burmese extreme leftist opposition elements, led to the government's tacit encouragement of anti-Communist elements in the Chinese community. It is expected that the government will continue its present policy of sharply scrutinizing, though not severely restricting, local Chinese Communist political activities, and of tacitly encouraging the anti-Communist Chinese. V. COD'MtJNI ST INFLUENCE IN LABOR There is relatively little organized labor in Burma; total union membership is probably leas than 70,000. The Socialist- controlled Trade Union Congress (Burma) -- TUC(B) -- split in SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION December 1950 when the BWPP was organized; the dissident union leaders formed the Burma Trade Union Congress (BTUC), which is now Communist- controlled. The most important affiliates of the BTUC are the All-Burma Ministerial Services Union (ABMSU), which is small but vital because its members staff government offices, and the Chauk Oilfields Workers Front. Total BTUC membership was estimated in mid-1952 at less than 2,000. The percentage of Communists to non-Communists within the BTUC unions is unknown; the leadership is Communist, however, and .appears to be in effective control. In addition to the BTUC, there are at least a dozen Chinese labor unions, most of them small and concentrated in Rangoon; all except the Carpenters Union are Communist-controlled. The Most important are those which deal with food marketing and handling, the Teachers Union, and the Stevedores Union. Apart from Communist-controlled unions, there is probably some surviving Communist influence in most of the unions affiliated with the Socialist-led TUC(B). Since the 1950 split, the struggle for control between BTUC and TUC(B) leaders has been particularly strong in the Inland Water Transport Workers Union and its. five subsidiary groups. Although the leadership now supports the TUC(B), Communist influence may still be prevalent in some locals. The Communist-controlled BTUC has been affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions (vFTU) since July 1951. The status of the TUC(B) in relation to WFTU is at present unclear. Prior to the 1950 split which led to formation of the BTUC, the parent organization had been affiliated. A 1951 May Day resolution expressed interest in continued membership, but TUC(B) leaders have since stated that the group is not presently affiliated. It is certain that the TUC(B) has not been active in WFTU affairs. VI. COMt(UNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, TONS The most active Communist front organizations are in the fields of youth and student activities, international "friendship" societies and the Communist "peace movement," and among the Overseas Chinese. The following groups merit special mention: 1. Youth: There are two underground youth organizations, the Communist Youth League and the Democratic People's Youth League, which are probably small but under effective BCP control. The BWPP sponsored no distinct youth organization until December 1952, when the People's SECRET - SECURITY INFORM&TION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Youth Organization (PYO) was founded. Although at present, in the formative stage, the PYO may become the focal point for Communist activity among youth and students. The only non-Communist youth organization, the Burma Youth League, is non-political and relatively insignificant. 2. Studentes The All-Burma Students Federation (ABSF) and the All-Rangoon u en s Union are believed to be Communist-controlled. The ABSF is probably affiliated with the International Union of Students, The only competing organization is the Rangoon University Students Union (RUSU) which has experienced.a continual struggle for control between Communist and non-Communist elements. The most recent elections for union officers reflect some persisting. Communist influence. 3. The World Peace Councils The Burma Branch of the World Peace Council -- WPC(!) -- is probably one of the most significant "front" groups although its active membership is believed to be relatively small. Branches of the parent organization have been established in a number of towns, and the group may be the most effective instrument for dissemination of Communist propaganda outside of Rangoon. The Council is controlled by the BWPP; its Secretary General, Ba Nyein, is a member of the BRPP Executive Committee and is considered the party's "leading thinker." 4. Chinese Organizationez A number of organizations within the Overseas CM MO community are ommunist-controlled or at least pro- Peiping. Next to the China Democratic League, the most important Chinese group is the Chamber of Commerce. Its leadership is pre- dominantly pro-Peiping, although control is being vigorously contested by anti-Communist elements within the Chamber. The Hui-an Young Men's Association, the Chinese Youth Society, and the Chinese Students Union attempt to spread Communist influence among youth and students; the first two are outstanding among all Chinese youth organizations. Of the several regional Chinese societies, the Fukienese Association is the only ohe which is considered to be Communist-dominated. Other Communist-oontrolhed Chinese organizations includes the Chinese Women's Association, the Women's Welfare Workers Society, the Burma Chinese Relief Association, and the Burma Chinese Cultural Union. .5. Women: The All-Burma Women's Freedom League, formed by the BWPP in-Tanuary 1951, is the most active of three legal women's organizations in Burma. A smaller group, the A11-Burma Women's Union, is controlled by the BCP and has been underground since'1947. 6. Friendship Societies: The Sino-Burmese Friendship Society., and the Burma-Soviet Cultural ssooiation are small but significant , SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-0 646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION groups, because membership is drawn largely from educated and therefore relatively influential classes. The former is now composed exclusively of.Burmese, and is devoted to promoting interest in China and preserving "traditional ties of friendship." The latter was formed with tacit approval of the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon, but appears to be operated by Burmese, including some non-Communists, who are interested in Soviet culture. 7. Minorities: Apart from the numerous Chinese organizations, the principal minority groups controlled by Communists or Communist- sympathizers are the All-Burma Indian Youth League and the All-Burma Indian Congress. Communist penetration of the Indian minority has been largely limited to laborers, some of whom are also represented in Communist-dominated unions. Organizational efforts appear to be directed at present toward enlarging Communist-controlled units within important organizations and securing mass support for the propaganda appeals of above-ground Communist groups. Most politically conscious Burmese support some policies which are currently advocated by local Communists: eg., resolution of the problem posed by the Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma, some aspects of the "peace" campaign, and anti-colonialism. It has not been possible to determine the extent to which advocacy of such programs by non-Communist Burmese represents conscious support of particular Communist policies. Quite clearly, however, Communist influence extends beyond those organizations which are controlled or strongly influenced by Communists. SECRET -.SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000705723 : 8-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 13 - VII. COMMW IST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT Direct Communist infiltration of the Burma Government appears to' have been slight. So far as is known, no Communists are represented in policy-making bodies or in top levels of the military and police organ- izations. Although there are probably some Communists or Communist- sympathizers on the staffs of the several government departments, there is no evidence that they have had a direct impact on policies and pro- grams of the government. Nevertheless, it may be well to point out that, indirectly at least, Communist "influence" is present within the government' at almost all levels. The most important Communist asset is the strength of Com- munist China; fear of antagonizing the powerful neighbor to the north has been directly responsible for the government's rigid verbal adherence to a neutral foreign policy. Secondly, most government officials subscribe to Marxist views in fields such as economic organization, and their background has stimulated an interest in "socialist experiments" in other parts of the world. Many are known to read Soviet and Chinese. literature. This indirect influence is stronger with.some individuals than others. The present Minister of Land Nationalization, Thakin Tin, for example, holds extreme leftist views on nationalization and collectivization, although he is not known to be a Communist. In general, there is far more interest in the Chinese "experiment" than in the Soviet Union, and it is doubtful whether such interest is attributable, at the top levels of government, to direct Communist infiltration. Just as there is some indirect Communist influence at official levels, so interest in China and to a limited degree a curiosity about the USSR have opened the way to some Communist influence on the public opinion-forming process. This is attributable as much to the predispo- sitions of non-Communist Burmese as to direct efforts by Communist elements. There is some Communist influence in educational circles, partio- ularlythe Chinese schools and in higher Burmese educational institutions. Of the more than 200 Chinese schools in Burma, a majority appear to be using Peiping-approved textbooks, although there has been some recession in Communist penetration since 1950. There is also continuing Communist penetration of student groups at Rangoon University . Penetration of Buddhist, circles has thtrs far been slight, although efforts to secure Buddhist support for international Communist `"causes`" SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFGRb1ATION - 14 - are currently being intensified, apparently with some success. The government has shown genuine concern over these developments, and is endeavoring to counteract Communist influence by stimulating Buddhist revival programs, denying passports to Buddhist priests recruited for international Communist conferences, etc. The Communist press is relatively small, but non-Communist publications, on their own initiative, support some current Communist propaganda themes (most notably, the "menace" of Chinese Nationalist troops in eastern Burma, and evidences of "colonialism" in all parts of the world.) The Soviet Embassy in Rangoon has recently secured an outlet for Chinese and Russian films, by renting the King Theater on .a monthly basis. During 1951 over 100 Chinese films were exhibited in Rangoon, and although the contents are not known, it seems safe to assume that many ccntained Communist propaganda themes. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-CO)~119JNIST POLITICAL PARTIES No noteworthy infiltration of right-wing political organizations and parties has come to light. Among left-wing, non-Communist politi- cal groups, there has been considerable indirect influence; some ele- ments of Communist dogma (anti-colonialism, collectivism) have wide appeal in most political circles in-Burma, due to historical experience and Marxist training of most national leaders. Direct Communist in- fluence, however, appears to be declining. There is an increasing tendency, particularly at the top levels, to distinguish between cur- rent Soviet behavior and the theoretical Marxist formulations to which many Burmese leaders. still adhere. Collaboration with Communist elements by some Karen leaders and Dr. Ba Maw's Mahabama party appears to be based on expediency, rather than on ideological compatibility. Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY IWFOR;,'ATION - 15 - X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA ^AEDIA For practical purposes,.the Rangoon press is synonymous with the Burmese press. Very little publishing activity is carried on out- side the capital city, and for that reason, human-carrier techniques are probably more important in the dissemination of Communist propa- ganda than formal media of communication. In addition to the periodicals listed below, there is a considerable amount of pamphlet literature circulated within Burma, a good deal of it prepared or controlled by Communist organizations. A. Communist Newspapers and Periodicals Ludu 2,000 The nearest approach to a i Thu Ne Zin Unknown "party organ," except possi- bly for clandestine newsheets circulated in guerrilla areas* Said to be financed by (Peopletsily) Chinese Embassy. Has ap- peared spasmodically since 1951. Zin Min Pao 2,000 (1950 est.) Organ of CDL B. Pro-Communist Publications Guide Daily 3,000 Generally pro-Communist. Tainglonekyaw 3,000 Sometimes prints Communist propaganda materials. Red Star 1,500 Generally follows interna- tional "line." New Rangoon EveninE ' 2,500 (1950 est.) Pro-Corr nist Post (Chinese New China Pao 4,000 (1950) Pro-Peiping, but does not Life `+'ieekly (Chinese) Unknown A weekly "scandal sheet." SECRET - SECURITY INFORM TION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -16- C. Printing Establishments The following information is incomplete, but probably covers the most important local sources of Cor.ununist publications, excluding newspaperss 1. KKyaw Linn Booksellers and Publishers, 180, 51st Street, Rangoon -- Kyaw Linn has translated and printed books on China and the USSR, in addition to distributing literature reportedly sup- plied through Soviet and Chinese Embassy channels in Delhi. Kyaw Linn reportedly has been aided by the Rangoon Chinese Embassy with an Initial capital investment. The firm manages at least four bookstalls on Bogyoke Street. The US Embassy has estimated that sales at each average more than 1,000 books per week. 2. Myint Swe Publishing House, Rangoon -- This firm is reported to have translated and published some of the works of Mao Tse-tung. It is not a prosperous concern. 3. Central Publishing House, Bogyoke Market, Rangoon - This firm pub ashes and sells Burmese translations of popular Communist literature. D. Imported Publications The following periodicals have been available, at various times, at the People's Literature House, 546 Merchant Street, Rangoon: 1. Weekly New Times Soviet Weekly Cross Roads Cominform Journal 2. Fortnightly Peoples China World Trade Union Movement. World Student Movement Soviet Land 3. Monthly Russia Today Soviet Literature Soviet Union SECRET - SECURITY INFOMTION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 17 - Masses and Main Street Political Affairs Indo Soviet Czechoslovak Life .China Monthly Review 4. Bi-Monthly Soviet Women In addition, pamphlet literature seems to be distributed in fairly large quantities. E. Publications of Soviet-Satellite Diplomatic Establishments Viet Minh representatives in Rangoon publish a weekly bulletin entitled "Vietnam Information." Its total circulation is unknown. Distribution to many parts of the world is handled in Rangoon. The Chinese Embassy apparently subsidizes one or more papers in Rangoon, but is not known to publish any periodicals itself. Local radio broadcasting is a government monopoly, and no direct Communist influence has been discernible. There is no known Communist broadcasting activity in Burma, except possibly for some radio communi- cation among guerrilla units. The military network, if it exists, is probably used primarily for operational liaison and not for public propaganda activity. There is a limited audience for both Soviet and Chinese broad- oasts. Soviet broadcasting appears to be confined to daily trans- missions in English directed to Southeast Asia, plus the Soviet Chinese-language service which can perhaps be heard in Burma. The audience for Chinese Communist broadcasts is probably limited to the Chinese community. Approximately 30 hours per week on international beams can be picked up in Burma. Although no figures are available, the number of radio receivers is sufficiently low so that radio is a much less significant medium for external propaganda than publications and personal contaot. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 18 - XI. FINANCIAL C(NDITION No quantitative data on Communist finances are available. It is doubtful whether the dues-paying membership of Communist organiza- tions, particularly in the labor unions, is very large, and direct receipts of this kind can be only a minor element in total party finances. The underground guerrilla groups appear to be heavily de- pendent on local requisitioning and foraging in the areas of current military operations. Above-ground Communist groups are known to receive contributions from businessmen and other groups which are vulnerable to persuasion or pressure. The China Democratic League, in particular, probably derives part of its financial support from merchants engaged in trade with China. It is not known, however, whether any of these firms exist primarily for purposes of financing Communist activity. Leaders of the Burma Workers and Peasants Party apparently re- ceive some financial assistance through the Chinese Embassy in Rangoon. The money spent on local rallies (where, frequently, no collections are taken) suggests outside financial help. In addition, supplies of Chinese Communist publications are a direct contribution to local Communist propaganda activity. It is not known whether the Soviet Embassy has contributed directly to local party finances. In general, the financial condition of the Burmese Communists appears to be poor, with the exception of activities connected with the increasingly virulent propaganda campaign. The guerrilla groups have been able to sustain their present level of activity, but do not appear to have financial resources adequate to attract wider support or to procure additional arms. Chinese Communist elements, by virtue of their ability to exact donations from local businessmen, are in much better financial condi- tion than the Burmese groups. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 19 - XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS A. Communist China The first Chinese Communist Ambassador to Burma presented his credentials in September 1950. By August 1952, the Embassy staff was reported to include 15 principal officers and 26 other members. Many of these individuals are described as "active outside," implying that considerable efforts are made to keep in contact with local Chinese organizations of.various types. Supplies of printed propaganda are apparently funneled through the Embassy for distribution throughout the Chinese community, utilizing schools, commercial, labor, and cul- tural organizations as outlets and as centers for displays. It is probable that propaganda activity, in the broadest sense, is an impor- tant responsibility of most members of the Embassy staff. The Sino-Burmese Friendship Society also functions with support from the Chinese Embassy. Its membership (total unknown but apparently relatively small) includes non-Communists interested in cultural re- lations with China as well as pro-Communist elements. The Soviet Embassy was established in Rangoon in April 1951, with an original staff of eight. In late 1951, the total staff was reported to number 31, including housekeeping and administrative personnel. The Embassy has a Press Attache, and it seems probable that other staff members are.engaged in essentially propaganda and contact work, since the size of the Embassy is greater than regular Embassy activities would justify. The Burma-Soviet Cultural Association, headed by a respected 'member of the Rangoon University faculty, was founded early in 1952. The Soviet Embassy appears to have left the initiative primarily to Burmese intellectuals interested in the USSR, with quiet encouragement for the society's activities. The first open meting was attended by about 200 persons, but active membership is not known. C. European Satellites A Czechoslovak Consulate General was opened July 10, 1952, but no information on its staff is available. A Hungarian trade delegation is reported to be in Rangoon, but its size also is unknown. The activities of both the Czech Consul General and the Hungarian trade delegation members, although ostensibly directed toward increasing trade, probably include activities which should be labeled as propaganda. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 20 - XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Although no international Communist organizations maintain permanent bureaus or offices in Burma, the activities of some of these groups have been an important part of the total Communist propaganda effort in Burma. Local propaganda organs play up Burmese participation in international conferences both before and after Burmese delegations have gone abroad. conferences: Delegations have been sent to the following recent , Meeting Date Size of Delegation World Youth Festival - Berlin Aug. 1951 5 'Moscow Economic Conference April 1952 7 P ifi i d P A eace ac c s an an Conference - Peiping Sept. 1952 26. lt l t ti l C I ona ura erna u n Conference - Moscow Oct. 1952 10 WFTU General Council - Berlin Nov. 1952 3 World Peace Council - Vienna Dec. 1952 20 Although the delegations have usually included Communists, they have not been composed exclusively of known party members. Burmese participation in the work of international "front" organizations seems to have been largely limited to att ndanoe at these conferences. Although no reliable data'are available,, t seems/ un- likely that financial contributions have been received from,Burmese groups. On the contrary, the international organization,i 3 appear to subsidize the participation of Burmese groups, at least to~thq extent of underwriting expenses while travelers are in orbit countries. Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 21 - XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK A. International Party Channels All Communist elements in Burma emphasize the country's ties to China, because of a general Burmese sense of nearness to China and an interest in Chinese developments. Outwardly, therefore, the closest international links appear to be with Communist China. Ties with the Indian Communist Party have not been close, although one finds occasional references to liaison with representatives of the East Bengal Communist Party. There is ample, although circumstantial, evidence that above-' ground Communist elements follow international Communist directives concerning propaganda drives, although local implementation of specific campaigns is frequently tardy. Under the direction of local "front" groups, the world-wide "signature campaigns" are carried on in Burma, and particular propaganda themes related to Far Eastern affairs are generally carried in local organs. It is not known, however, whether the Chinese or the Soviet Embassy is the original source of directives to local groups. Although there are frequent reports of directives from Chinese or Soviet officials concerning party strategy in Burma, it is impossible to determine whether specific moves, particularly with reference to guerrilla'aotivity, are the direct result of Chinese or Soviet direction. Since early in 1952, there seems to have been a shift in emphasis, from direct military action to above-ground agitation for a "united front" government and an end to insurgency. It is not clear whether the mili- tary weakness of the insurgent groups is responsible for the shift, or whether it was made in response to a directive concerning general Asian Communist strategy. 1. International courier system. The Chinese Embassy in Rangoon is known to have a regular courier service, and it is probable that the Soviet Embassy provides similar facilities. In addition, commercial channels are readily-available within the Chinese community. There are reports that crew members of ships calling at Rangoon serve as contacts with both Chinese and Soviet Embassies, but details are unavailable. There is also direct overland communication with China, but it is not possible to state whether these routes are more important than sea con- tacts. Available evidence suggests, without definite proof, that the above-ground BWPP has direct access to the Chinese Embassy in Rangoon, and that the underground BCP maintains overland contact with China. Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORM TION It is probable that arrangements for guerrilla training in China are made by direct liaison with Chinese officials in Yunnan. 29" Domestic communications. The nature of current Communist operations reduces the need for close integration among the several elements. Above-ground activities are concentrated in Rangoon and in major towns, and personal travel is limited only by deficiencies in local transportation. Underground activity is apparently linked by courier and radio facilities between guerrilla areas, but details are unavailable. Radio equipment is frequently moved to avoid capture, and the location of present installations is unknown. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.2 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: ' CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, INDOCHINA OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1 I. Objectives . . 1 Ii. Tactics , . .. .. .. .. .. . 1 III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ASSETS.. . . . . . . . . . 4 I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . ? . . 4 II. Electoral Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 III, Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 6 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism , . . . .. . . . . 10 V. Communist Influence in Labor . . . . . . 12 Vi. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional organizations . . . . . . . . . . . .. 13 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . . . . 14 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . 14 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-.Communist Political Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? . . . . . . . 15 X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . , . . . . . . . . 15 XI. Financial Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . . .. 17 XIII. Communist International organizations . . . . . . . . 18 XIV. Communist Communication Network. . . . . . . . . 19. Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance.- The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFCRMPTION COMMUNISM IN INDOCHINA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES All of the immediate objectives of the Communists in Indochina are related to their effort to win the bitter civil war which they are waging against the forces of the French Union. Within the area which they have conquered, the Communist objective is to improve their control over popu- lation and resources in order to maximize their total military effort. Within the areas controlled by the legitimate Governments of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the Communist objectives are: 1. To subvert the loyalty of the population. 2. To improve the party's covert organization. II. TACTICS Communism's objectives in Indochina are furthered by the Soviet and satellite-recognized "Democratic Republic of Vietnam," its Chinese-supported and equipped army, its administrative and control organizations (police, secret and security services, propaganda organizations, administrative cadres), and by its popular front movement, the "Lien Viet" or 'National Unity Front." The entire insurrectionary structure is held together and controlled by the Laodong (Comunist) Party. It is the Laodong Party which, in the final resort, operates the complex mechanism of war, propaganda, and compul- sion which appears to the people of Vietnam and to the outside world as the "Viet Minh" movement. And the Laodong Party, in turn, is managed by a group of highly trained and thoroughly experienced revolutionary leaders. The Communist Party in Indochina uses both military tactics and political warfare tactics to further its over-all objectives. Its military tactics are designed: (1) to inflict maximum disrup- tion and destruction on enemy forces and enemy war potential in the rear zones, with the minimum expenditure of Viet Minh forces; (2) to infiltrate, occupy, and consolidate territory with a view to securing a continuing reservoir of potential manpower recruitment for the army and to finding the necessary economic means (mainly food) to support intensification of the war. These tactics have been highly successful. For over six years the Viet Minh has inflicted heavy casualties on the Franoo-Vietnamese forces, while paralyzing Indochinese economic life and preventing the country's recovery. The Viet Minh is now strongly established in North and Northwest Tonkin, in the lightly industrialized and food-producing regions Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION of North Central Vietnam, and in the coastal plains of South Central Vietnam. Most of China's long common boundary with Indochina is now in Viet Minh hands, permitting continued Chinese Communist assistance % to the Viet Minh armed forces. Communist political warfare tactics are designeds (1) to ex- tend Communist Influence among all social and economic groups in the populations of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos; and (2) to consolidate Communist control over conquered areas and populations. Communist propaganda attempts to exploit sentiment "for independ- ence" and "against French colonialism." To some extent, but only within carefully-drawn limits, the attempt to make the Viet Minh effort appear one of genuine national resistance to a foreign colonizing power con- tinues to displace certain other considerations in Communist tactics. Thus, Catholics in the Viet Minh zones have not been persecuted, nor, until very recently, attacked ideologically, so that the pretense of continued Catholic support for the "war of resistance" could be main- tained. Similarly, although agrarian reform has been strongly stressed, landlords have been dispossessed only where it was essential to secure fuller cooperation on the part of the landless peasantry. Orthodox Communist doctrine has generally taken second place to "anti-imperialist" themes in Viet Minh propaganda. However, whenever the priority needs of intensifying the armed struggle have demanded that themes of "national unity" and nationalistic propaganda be soft-pedalled, this has been done, particularly since 1951. Efforts to consolidate Communist control over areas and popula- tions already under Communist influence center upon the peasantry. Basic Viet Minh policies and the major part of its propaganda output are calculated to increase the peasantry's contribution to the military effort. Both within and outside the zones under direct Viet Minh control, the Communists rely heavily upon conspiratorial methods and upon a large and widespread system of terror and compulsion. Such a system has been essential not only in providing the necessary vehicle for Communist control of the vast masses of people (some 12 million) and the variegated leader- ship which the Viet Minh movement has brought under its banners,, but also in order to gather the necessary intelligence for military operations and political warfare. SECRET - SECURITY INFCRMAT ION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFO tM&TION If Franoo-Vietnamese military strength in Indochina does not increase, the Viet Minh may become strong enough within the next few years to be able, without identifiable Chinese Communist interven- tion, to break the current stalemate. While the Viet Minh's military capabilities are at present limited by its exclusion from the more . productive regions of Vietnam, this might be overcome by significantly increased Chinese Communist materiel and technical assistance and by conquest of further territory. At the same time, although the regime continues to be based largely on compulsion and terror and to depend mainly for the achievement of its objectives upon increasingly harsh exploitation of a war-weary peasantry, the Viet Minh's administrative and control capabilities seem adequate to counteract any growth of discontent among the populations and armies under its control. The Viet Minh's popular hold on substantial portions of the populations outside its own zones, based partly on military prestige, partly on continued nationalist appeal, and partly on a widespread mechanism of compulsion and terror, is likely to be increased or decreased in. proportion to the military power and ideological dynamism which the free world, and above all the free states of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos may be able to bring to bear against it. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH Communist Party membership, following and strength are heavily concentrated in the areas of Indochina controlled by the "Demooratio Republic of Vietnam." In the "DRY", the official Communist party, the LAO DONG (Workers) Party,has a membership variously estimated at be- We-on56,000 and 715,000. Although reliable data on the number of people under Communist Party discipline is lacking, the all-enocaspassing coverage of the constituent organisations of the Communist-controlled National Unity Front (LIEN VIET), suggests that a majority of the 12.7 million inhabitants of the "DRY" may be considered under effective Communist control. In the areas under the control of the Associated States govern- ments of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, the Communist party is proscribed. However, there are obviously Communists in all of these areas, due to the ease with which the non-Cosmunist regions can be infiltrated. In Vietnam particularly, but also in Cambodia and Laos, a number of clandestine Viet Minh or Chinese-Communist-controlled organizations are believed to be operating. How many of the 9.9 million population of free Vietnam are under Communist discipline cannot be estimated. Clandestine Communist opera- tions are, however, relatively successful. In part, this is due to a widespread Communist system of compulsion; on the other hand, the Viet Minh cause continues to exert considerable national appeal in the free zones of Vietnam. It is possible that a substantial portion of the Vietnamese population and of the 800,000 Chinese in Vietnam are sympathetic to the objectives of the Viet Minh and therefore susceptible to Communist influence. In Cambodia, it is unlikely that more than 10 percent of the population of 3 million (including the Chinese) are strongly influenced by Communism. However, acme 5000-10,000 Viet Minh guerrillas, mainly concentrated in the Southern provinces, are reported fighting in units of about company-.size against Franco-lbaer forces. In early 1952, the Chinese Communist regime claimed the loyalty of 60 percent of the 300,000 Chinese in Cambodia. While this claim is undoubtedly exaggerated, a sub- stantial percentage of the Chinese in Cambodia are believed to be under Communist influence. In Laos, the number of people under Communist influence is believed to be extremely small - perhaps one percent of the one million population. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The number of Viet Minh guerrillas in Laos is estimated at about 5,000. Communist strength is believed heaviest in the DRV-controlled provinces of North Tonkin and North Central Annam; less numerous in "DRV" areas in Central Annam and Cochinohina. Communist influence in free Vietnam is probably strongest in the urban areas of Saigon-Cholon, ?anoi, and Haiphong. In Cambodia, Viet Minh influence is strongest in the southern provinces where guerrilla units are concentrated. Chinese Communist influence in Cambodia is strongest in Phnom-Penh where the Chinese population is heavily concentrated. In Laos, Communist influence is strongest in the Bolovens Plateau region where the Viet Minh guerrillas are mainly based. Communist Party membership in Indochina is believed to be composed principally of professionals and government employees. In the "DRY", industrial workers probably constitute an additional important membership group. Communist leadership in Indochina is believed to be well-eduoated (Western Europe, China and the USSR), thoroughly experienced, completely dedicated, and competent to fulfill not only its present responsibilities but those it would inherit as a consequence of total victory in Indochina. The average age of the sixteen current top-level Communist leaders is 47. Many top leaders have been active since 1930. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH On January 6, 1946, the Viet Minh Government held elections for a "Vietnam National Assembly" in an effort to legitimize its rule. In addition to the polling in-areas of North and Central Vietnam under DRV control, clandestine votes were taken in parts of South Vietnam. There is considerable doubt as to the extent to which these elections re- flected the popular will; an implausibly large vote was olaim.ed for a country where the parliamentary system is all but unknown. Among the 300-odd members of the "elected Assembly," the Viet Minh (then ostensibly a coalition of left-wing and nationalist parties under Communist domina- tion) emerged as the largest party with 80 delegates. The 90 independents probably also included a significant number of Communists and another group of 15 Communists was elected under the label of the "Marxist Party." No further elections have been held in the Communist-held areas of Indochina. Elections have, however, taken place in Laos and Cambodia and are now about to take place in free Vietnam, although, of course, without Communist participation. SECRET - SECURITY INKRMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION A. Total Strength and Character of Communist Forces The Viet Minh disposes of a total armed strength of about 315,000 men, distributed as follows: Regular Aray: 1300000 Regional Forces: 750000 Peoples Militia: 110,000 The Regular Army is a well-trained, well-equipped, highly aobile, modern fighting force capable of waging effective positional warfare against France-Viet amese forces. The Regional Forces are lase well equipped and generally recruited regionally for static support of the Regular Army. The Peoplets Militia is locally recruited for village defense and small-scale guerrilla action. B. Security of Controlled Areas The Viet Minh armed forces of 315,000 men, which are employed both for the defense and security of controlled areas and for offensive opera- tions based on these areas, are distributed within the "DRV"-controlled areas as follows: 174,000 men in Tonkin; 80,000 men in Central Vietnam; 46,000 in South Vietnam; 10,000 in Cambodia; and 5,000 in Laos. The population in Communist-controlled areas has generally been stable and tightly-controlled. Disturbances and riots have, however, occasionally been reported, particularly in the strongly Catholic Vinh and Thanh Boa regions of Korth Central Vietnam. Civil administration in "DRV"-controlled zones is in the hands of administrative cadres directly responsible to the "DRV" Ministry of Interior. It is logical to suppose, although no information is available on the subject, that the Viet Minh armed forces have at least temporary control of civil administration in regions only recently conquered. This control is presumably exercised by political and administrative cadres of the Army. C. Military Support Organizations "DRV" supply, cgmmunioations, and intelligence organizations are highly developed units operating at all levels of the military administra- tion. Their authority is derived from Directorates attached to the General Staff of the army. Information concerning the strength of the various support organizations is not available although these organiza- tions may be assumed to be quite large. Their networks are known to embrace all of Vietnam, including Franoo-Vietnamese areas. LERET Approved For 78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORI[ATrON In view of the fact that North Vietnam is not only the theater of the most active military operations but also the seat of the "DRV" govern- ment, supply, cormnunioations, and liaison functions are presumably conr- oentrated in that area. Intelligence activities are probably concentrated in urban centers (chiefly Hanoi and Saigon) as strongly as in strategic military areas. Available reports indicate that "DRV" support organizations have achieved a high degree of efficiency. D. External Military Support rrrrrr i r r.r.rr.Reports from a variety of sources, in most oases neither evaluated nor confirmed, suggest that while certain supplies may originate else- where in the Soviet bloc, Communist China is the main source of ailitary support to the Viet Minh. The following types of supplies have been rsportedsl 1. Arms and ammunitions Mountain guns; anti-aircraft guns; light machine guns; heavy mac ne guns; field guns; howitzers; mortars; rifles, including Browning automatic rifles; pistols; rocket launchers; spare parts; ammunition; TNT and other explosives; fuzes; detonators; projectiles; grenades and grenade throwers; and land mines. 2. Cosmnissarys a. Foods Rice; maize; dried sweet potatoes; cereals; and soy beans, flour. be Clothin s Uniforms; cotton material; army blankets; cloth shoes; rub ear sus; steel helmets. 3. Transportation and communication uipments Trucks; tires; spare parts; gasoline; o ; kerosene; radio sets and field transmitters. 4. Others Medical and clinical supplies; X-ray metal testing equip- ment; baoes; electric meters; electric drills; files; abrasives; saw 1 Reports often-include quantity figures, frequently between400 and 800 tons per month. overlapping of the time periods covered and non-comparable quantity designations (e.g. rounds, cases, or tons of ammunition), however, make it impossible to arrive at meaningful totals. Moreover, in a few oases where cross-checking of reported totals has been possible, resultant discrepancies have cast further doubt upon the validity of the figures reported. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 blades; iron and steel for making cables; electrical distributing machinery; agricultural machinery; oxygen containers oxygen-generating machines; gas masks; binoculars; industrial machinery. E. Military Operations Military operations in Indochina since 1946 have been conducted in virtually all areas of the peninsula, but have.been principally concentra- ted in-North Vietnam (Tonkin). There, Communist forces have been fighting a savage battle for over six years for control of the crucial rice. producing Red River Delta (in which the key cities of Hanoi and Haiphong are located). At present about 174,000 Communist troops are pitted against an estimated 185,000 Franoo-Vietnamese forces in the Tonkin region. The principal tactic of the Communist forces has been to harrass the Franoo-Vietnamese Army by guerrilla warfare inside the Delta and by massive attacks against isolated French posts and cities outside the Delta.. A turning point in the battle for Tonkin was reached in the fall of 1950, when Viet Minh forces, in quick succession. seized all French .posts along the China border (Langson, Caobang, Laokay), excepting only Monoay in the extreme eastern coastal sector. In the fall of 1952, Communist forces expelled the French from all of Northwest Tonkin, ex- cept Laiohau and Nason. At this moment, therefore, the Communist forces hold most of Tonkin outside of the key Delta region. The latter, how- ever, in which the vast bulk of Franco-Vietnamese foroes is now oonoen- traced, has been heavily infiltrated by Viet Minh forces and is besieged at its periphery by some five Viet Minh divisions. In Central Vietnam, an estimated 75,000 Franco-Vietnamese forces hold the narrow coastal plain from Faifo to Dong Hoi against some 80,000 Communists who are in control of the remainder of the area. In South Vietnam, an estimated 162,000 Franco-Vietnamese forces control most of the region, but conduct frequent and difficult operations against some 46,000 Viet Minh guerrillas, oonoentrated principally in the unhealthy and almost impenetrable swamps of the Plaine den Jonas. In Laos and Cambodia, Communist military operations are apresen limited to small- scale harrassment by guerrilla forces. F. Popular Attitudes. Toward the War The peasantry of Indochina has borne the main brunt of the long war. The peasantry serves as a reservoir of manpower for the armies involved, performs the coolie duties of supply, engages in sabotage and informer Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 9 - operations at the order of one aide or the other, constructs public works, and -- over and above all this -- produces the food for its own subsistence and that of the non-productive hundreds of thousands in the armies. By this time, the peasantry clearly abhors the war and anxiously hopes for its and. General passivity toward either side in the conflict may in fact be said to characterize the sentiments of the vast majority of Indoohina's civilian population. However, passivity is less noticeable, and the effects of political warfare and propaganda by either side are more marked, among city dwellers. The nationalist pretentious of the Viet Minh, rather than Communism itself, continue to hold much appeal for Indochina's urban population, whether inside the Viet Minh zones or in areas of Franoo-Vietnamese control. G. Current Strategic and Tactical Objectives of the Communist Insurrection Current strategic and tactical objectives of the Communist insurrection are military and political consolidation over newly-won territories in northwest Tonkin, and intensified penetration by Viet Minh regular forces into the Franoo-Vietnamese held Tonkin Delta area, The "DRV" probably will intensify guerrilla warfare in the plateaux region of Central Vietnam as well as in Cambodia and South Vietnam and may also attempt a limited military penetration into Laos. In Central Vietnam, the Communist forces will probably continue to maintain strong pressure against the Franoo-Vietnamese forces along the coast. H. Relations of Communist to Non-Communist Insurrectionary Organizations 1. Vietnam. In June 1951 Colonel Trinh Minh The, former Chief of Staff ohs armed forces of the autonomous politico-religious Caodaiet movement, took to the bush with 2,500 men in South Vietnam to set up "the National Resistance Front," a "third force" opposed to both the Viet Minh and the French. Since the spring of 1952, when the French launched military operations against this group, Coionel The has not been heard from and his current whereabouts are unknown. There is no evidence that Colonel The has collaborated with the Viet Minh. 2. Cambodia. In March 1952, Son Ngoc Thanh, a leading Cambodian nationaUet, organized a dissident nationalist movement. At first, the activities of this group seem to have been limited to propaganda attacks against the French and Cambodian King. In recent months, broadcasts of Son Ngoo Thanh have been increasingly favorable to the Viet Minh, but the present relationship between these two movements is not clear. 3. Cambodian and Laotian Issaraks. The Cambodian and Laotian Iesaraks, un er the-leader-ship-respectively of Son Ngoo Minh and Prince SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Souphanouvong, have been formally allied with the Viet Minh movement since March 1951 when the "United National Front of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos" was established. In the past, military efforts of the Issaraks have been for the most part limited to sporadic guerrilla warfare, banditry, and arms smuggling across the Thai border. A closer degree of cooperation seems to have been achieved during the past year between the Viet Minh and the Cambodian and Laotian Issaraks. From 5,000 to 10,000 Viet Minh are reportedly with the Cambodian Issaraks and 5,000 with the Laotian Issaraks. In October and November, 1952, a Laotian delegate accompanied the Viet Minh delegation to the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference in Peiping. In December delegates from both "Free Cambodia" and "Free Laos".participated in the World Peace Conference in Vienna, anabilities for Expansion and Action in the Near Future Despite the relatively low level of military industrial production within "DRV" areas and a reportedly increasing food shortage, the "DRV" could probably expand the present scope of its military activities to a limited extent without significantly increased support from Communist China or from other Orbit countries. If, as seems likely, the Issaraks receive greater material assistance and technical advice from the Viet Minh, they would be able to expand theirnumbers and extend their operations. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM A. Repressive Capabilities of the Associated States and France French and Associated States policy toward Communism in Indochina is the military destruction of the Viet Minh armed forces and complete eradication of Communist activities and influence throughout the peninsula. No Communist parties, groupings, or organizations are allowed to exist or operate in the Associated States of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The overt circulation of Communist publications in Franco-Vietnamese controlled areas is prohibited and the possibility of Communist-oriented material appearing in the controlled press is negligible due to tight censorship exercised by both the French and the Associated States. Severe repressive measures are taken against any individuals, groups, or organiza- tions believed operating under Communist instructions or for Communist SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 11 - purposes. Such repressive measures are expected to continue until hostilities in Indochina have ceased and internal political stability is assured. They are carried out by civilian security services of France and the Associated States, and insofar as the security of components of the French Union Armed Forces is concerned, by the military intelligence and counter-intelligence services of these forces. At present, the scope and effectiveness of repressive action of which the French and Associated States civilian and military security agencies are capable in Indochina cannot be rated better than fair. By contrast, Communist subversive operations are believed to be,'on the whole, very effective. Possibly the greatest asset of Communist under- ground and subversive organizations of all types lies in the generally apathetic attitude of the Vietnamese population as a whole toward the conflict which is raging in its territory. B. Extent and Effectiveness of Communist Subversive Operations Communist subversive operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos fall into two major categoriess those carried out by Viet Minh subversive teams and underground networks, and those carried out by clandestine Chinese Communist organizations. Viet Minh organizations operating in the French and Associated States-oontrolled zones of Indochina are for the most part responsible directly to the central "DRV" government, or its regional representatives. They perform three general types of assigned tasks: propaganda; political, economic, and oounter-intelligence;l and terrorism and sabotage.' The propaganda function is carried out by teams responsible to the Information Services of the central "DRV" government. The total number or size of such teams is unknown, but their effectiveness seems to have been considerable. Espionage activities are carried out by organizations and units of unknown size believed to be attached to the regional Cong An (Public Security Service) of the Viet Minh, which is the latter's internal security organization. Espionage agents reportedly are assigned specialized tasks, the most important of which is the infiltration of French and Associated States intelligence and security services. Terrorism and sabotage within the free zones is performed by the Dich Van which in- cludes Death Volunteer Brigades, apparently assigned to operate in specific regions. The effectiveness of the,Dich Van is reportedly great; it has seriously disrupted. highway and rai7i raTffc, damaged industrial and Military espionage is carried out by intelligence organizations responsible to the Directorate for Military Intelligence of the "DRV" Armed Forces General Staff. 2. Certain types of sabotage activities are carried out by organized guerrilla and commando units of the Armed Forces. 3. In 1951, ten such Information teams were reported to be operating in South Vietnam. Approved For Release 2 09M&29zc(dlor-IR@NA06R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 12 - military installations, and organised numerous terroristic acts in major urban centers, the most important of which was the assassination of a number of highly prominent French and Vietnamese civil and military personalities. One of the most successful activities of Viet Minh sub- versive organizations has been the extortion of money from prominent French and Chinese as well as from Vietnamese business firms. Many of these firms regularly pay large sums of "protection money" to Viet Minh agents in order to avoid bombing of their premises. The "DRV" benefits considerably by the intelligence activities carried out by Chinese Communist underground organizations in the non- Communist zones. Since 1949, the Communist-directed "Association for the Liberation of Overseas Chinese in Indochina" has organized various clandestine student, women's and workers' organizations in Saigon-Cholon where approximately 80 percent of the total overseas Chinese population of some 800,000 is concentrated. During 1952, the creation of a clandestine "United Action Committee of Democratic Sino-Vietnamese" was reported, also in Saigon-Cholon. In North Vietnam, the "Society of New Chinese Democrats of Hanoi and Haiphong" reportedly intensified intelligence activities during 1952. The size of these organizations is unknown although it is believed they have been fairly successful in gaining the sympathy .of certain of the Chinese population, particularly among students and workers. Specific underground activities which have been reported include extortions of money for the protection of relatives in China, the circula- tion of Communist tracts and publications believed to be for the most part procured in Hong Kong, and the placement or pro-Communist instructors in Chinese schools. In Cambodia, the Chinese Communist Party, whose head- quarters reportedly is located in Phnom-Penh, claims the sympathy of 60 percent of the 300,000 overseas Chinese in that country. No information is available concerning its activities or effectiveness. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR In "DRV" controlled areas, all workers in key industries are con- trolled by Communist elements, although the number of Party members in specific enterprises is unknown. In the Associated States of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, the number of Communists in key industries, if any, is unknown. In "DRy" areas of Vietnam, the General Confederation of Labor, which is controlled by the communist Party, claimed "500,000 members" in 1952. The Confederation is composed of numerous affiliated trade unions organized at provincial levels throughout Vietnam. It has been reported that although not all of its directors are Party members, those exercising any real authority are. The Confederation has been affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) since the former's organization in 1946 and has been represented at WFTU Conferences since 1948. In addition to the General Confederation of Labor, the Viet Minh reportedly organized a Trade Union Council in 1950 to embrace "intellectuals and civil servants." Ab Approved For Fe 2g~ &R?78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 No further information is available concerning this Council. In the free areas of Vietnam, labor organizations were prohibited until the promulgation of the Labor Code on November 16, 1952. The principal Vietnamese labor union, which until last November operated as an association, is the Christian Confederation Vietnamienne du Travail Chretien, reported to have 5,000 members. A number of civil servants in i the French and Vietnamese. administrations, belong to Force Ouvriere which has its headquarters in France. Although provisions of the new Labor Code in Vietnam do not extend to the overseas Chinese population, Chinese labor groups have for some time been loosely associated in a Federation of Chinese Mutual Aid Societies. The 19 organizations comprising this Federation claim an aggregate membership of some 11,000. No information is available on Communist infiltration of, or in- fluence in, these labor unions in Franco-Vietnamese areas of Vietnam. However, the Chinese organizations are the most likely to have been infiltrated or influenced by Communists. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS In both the free and the Communist zones, the Lien Viet (National Unity) Front has developed an extensive and intricate network of front organizations to enlist the support of the peasants and special interest groups for the "resistance against French aggression." The leaders of the front organizations are believed to be mostly well-indoctrinated and capable party cadres, many of whom work in more than one organization. What appear to be the most important front organizations are listed belows 1. The Union of Vietnamese Youth claims a membership of 2,500,000 and has been affiliated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth since 1947. 2. The Union of Vietnamese Students and Pupils has been affiliated with the International Students Union since 1948, 3. The Union of Vietnamese Women claimed 3,000,000 members as of 1950. It has been affiliated with the Women's Inter- national Democratic Federation since 1945.. 4. The Catholic Association for National Salvation. 5. The Association of Vietnamese Journalists has been affiliated with the World Federation of Journalists since 1950. 6. The Vietnam World Peace Committee is affiliated with the World Peace Council. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 14 7. -The Vietnamese Peasants Association for National Salvation. 8. The Sino-Vietnamese friendship Association. 9, The Soviet??Vietnamese Friendship Association. In addition to Viet Minh front organizations, the Chinese Communist Party has organized various youth, workers', women's and cultural under- ground front organizations. These organizations are believed to be strongest in the Saigon-Cholon area of South Vietnam and in the Phnom- Penh region of Cambodia, where the majority of the overseas Chinese residents in Vietnam and Cambodia are located. Many, if not all, of the "Lien Viet front groups have effective underground organizations within -Me areas under Franoo.-Vietnamese con- trol. Little information is available concerning non-Communist social, cultural, or professional organizations which may have been infiltrated by Comanunists. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT Such infiltration is unquestionably a serious problem for the anti-Communist governmentsof the Associated States. Although policy- making bodies of these states are believed to be to a large extent free from subversive Communist personnel and influences, the same can probably not be said with regard to the Armed Services, police and security services, and administrative cadres of the States. Communist subversion is believed to have reached particularly serious proportions within Vietnam's National Army. The Army Officer's Training School at Dalat has been reported strongly infiltrated by Coiunist elements, and certain Vietnamese troop companies in action in North Vietnam have proved of marked unreliability. The Vietnamese, and even French, security services in North Vietnam are also believed penetrated to sons extent by Communist elements. No reports of Communist penetration of government agencies and services in Cambodia and Laos have been received, although it is likely that a limited degree of infiltration may be considered to have occurred. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION In the "DRV"-controlled zones of Vietnam, leaders of public pro- paganda organizations are usually Party cadres. Communist propaganda has undoubtedly reached nearly the entire population in these zones, chiefly through the effective organization of mass front organizations and compulsory study groups at provincial and village levels. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : 78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 15 - In free Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, no known Communists are in a position to influence public opinion. There are probably a considerable number of concealed Viet Minh sympathizers or agents, however, in schools, journalistic, and literary groups. The prohibition of Communist publics.. tions, tight press censorship,and the extremely limited number of radio sets among the population in Franco-Vietnamese controlled areas have tended to insulate the population from Communist publications and broad- casts. Nevertheless, it is likely that Communist influence has been spread fairly successfully through clandestine operations and through direct contact of many individuals with underground Viet Minh agents. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST The most important non-Communist nationalist organizations and parties in Indochina are the Dai Viet Party, the Cao Dai politico- religious group, the Vietnam a ona ist Party (V- and the Catholics in Vietnam, and the Democratic Party in Cambodia. Although information is generally laoking on their membership, these parties and groups are thought to embrace several hundred thousand members. The extent of Communist influence in these organizations is unknown, but is not be. lieved to be large due to the strongly anti-Communist, although clearly pro-nationalist, sentiments of most of their leadership. Branches of the above-mentioned organizations are still in some instances allowed to operate in "DRV"-controlled zones, where the Catholics and some Caodaists, for example, maintain social organizations. However, the Communists have undoubtedly strongly infiltrated these branches and probably control them completely. The same would be true for nominally non-Communist parties and organizations existing only in the "DRV" Zones, such as the Vietnam Democratic Party and the Socialist Party, which the Communists continue to tolerate in order to bolster their nationalist pretensions. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA A. Newspapers and Periodicals Listed below are the newspapers and periodicals known to have been published by the Viet Minh in 1951 or 1952. Where known, the frequency of publication and the principal area of circulation are in- dicated. These publications are also clandestinely distributed in Franoo-Vietnamese-controlled areas by Viet Minh underground organiza- tions. %ftr SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Name(Translation) Circulated lYhen.pub- in lished 1. Major Papers Tonkin (occasion- Cuu Quoo (National Salvation) Lien Viet ally throughout fly am Vi t ) e n Nhan Darn (The People) Laodong North Vietnam Weekly (Worker's Party) (distributed in 27,000 copies) Nhan Dan (The People) Laodong South Vietnam Monthly (Worker's Party) (distributed in 24,000 copies) Lao Dons (The Worker) Vietnam Federa- tion of Labor 2. Specialised and Provincial Publications Gia Dinh Administrative Unknown Two or Committee of three People's Army times Weekly quan Viet Bac People's Army and North Unknown Militia Vietnam China-Vietnam Sino-Vietnamese Unknown Unknown Friendship Association Doc Lap (Independence) Democratic Party Tien Lien (Fob) Sooialist Party To oo Than Het (The People's National Saigon-Cholon 3 or 4 a on=vs AlIT- Union times Weekly Dung Tien (To Go Forward "Organ of young son South Vietnam Unknown Y 7 - and children" Danh sang Chus. Catholic Patriots Hanoi Sector Unknown Dan Gay Association Nambo of Unknown Unknown uan Doi (Neer Strength) Economic Front Peasants for National Salvation Unknown Phuyen Province Unknown South Trungbo Unknown Unknown Unknown Ministry of Eduoatim Unknown Unknown Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 17 ?. The "DRV" controls the following broadcasting stations which have regularly scheduled programs beamed to Indochina and to Southeast Asia: 1, Voice of Vietnam is regarded as the official government s on. is reportedly located in the Vinh area. News is broadcast daily to Indochina and Southeast Asia in French, English, Tonkineae, Thai, Mandarin, and Cantonese. 2. Voice of South Vietnam has tentatively been located north of gon, roa oasts three programs daily of news and commentary in Coohinohinese and one in Mandarin. 3. Voice of Nambo is reputedly located in the Mekong Delta area. It carries our programs of news and commentary daily, one each in Cochinchinese, French, Cantonese, and Cambodian. In Cambodia, the Voice of Issarak Cambodia is operated by the Issarak leader Son Ngoo Minh. One-half hour of news an comment is broadcast daily in Cambodian. Radio Moscow broadcasts one hour daily in Tonkinese and occasionally in Coo no nese. Radio Pekin broadcasts one hour daily in Tonkinese, and twice daily for 15 to nutes in Thai. Reception of the Thai language program is reported to be poor. Considering the small number of radio receiving sets in the Associated States, it is likely that Communist radio broadcasts reach only a very limited audience and achieve only limited propaganda effects outside the Communist zones. Within these zones, however, they are used as an extremely important,and probably effective, means of disseminating propaganda and official orders to the population. The "DRV" authorities collect both direct and indirect taxes, many of then in kind, impose "duties" on goods entering Communist zones from the Franco-Vietnamese zones, and exact "voluntary"donations through various "emulation campaigns." The amount of revenue thus collected is unknown, as is the size of any subsidies from international Communist organizations, donations or credits by Soviet or Satellite governments. or dues from party-controlled labor unions and fronts. Nor is any information available on the amount of revenue collected through extortion of Vietnamese, French, and Chinese business firma in the non-Communist zones. XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS There are no Soviet bloc diplomatic establishments, trade, or cultural missions in free Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos. Approved For Release @5428ECtiR6R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23.: CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -18- Although the USSR, Caamaunist China, and other satellite countries have recognized the "DRV", they have not established diplomatic missions there. However, Communist China has sent various temporary military and economic missions to the Viet Minh. During 1952 a 50-man Chinese cultural mission was reportedly sent to Thai Nguyen in North Vietnam for the purpose of establishing political liaison with the "DRV" govern- ment, and an economic mission is said to have been not up also in North Vietnam to study economic resources. Current estimates place the number of more or less permanent Chinese Communist personnel-- technicians, instructors, military and political advisors -- with the Viet Minh at approximately 5,000. All Chinese Communist Missions are surrounded by secrecy. It is believed that contact between Chinese personnel and natives is held to a minimum. A Sino-Vietnamese Friendship Association and a Soviet-Vietnam Friendship Association were organised inside the "DRV" in early 1950. Both organizations are associated with the "Lien Viet Front" and have established branches throughout "DRV"-oontrollC d areas of Vietnam. These organizations are reported to have clandestine branches in the free areas, particularly in the Saigon-Cholon district. Propaganda committees are m"eported to have been established at the branch levels of both Associations. In addition to parrying out regular propaganda activities, these associations are responsible for sponsoring celebrations of major Chinese Communist and Soviet holidays. The Sino-Vietnamese Friendship Association has published a journal, China-Vietnam, since May 1950. While it is not known to what extent, if any, the Viet Minh move- ment may have been aided materially by international Communist organiza- tions, it has been granted a significant extent of moral support by such organisations through invitations to participate, often in a glorified role, in Communist international conferences. In the past two years, delegates from the "DRV" and in two instances from "Free Cambodia" and "Free Laos" have attended the following international Communist *eetingsz Meeting Date Size of representation from Indochina Vienna Peace Congress December 1952 11 (including 2 from Cambodia and 1 from Laos) Asian and Pacific Peace October- 14 (including 2 Conference, Peiping November 1952 from Laos) SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For 78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ??19> Size of re resentation Meeting Date from Indochina Preparatory Meeting for,Peace June 1952 2 Conferenoe of Asia and Pacific Regions, Peiping International Conference for June 1952 2 Defense of the Rights of Young People Chinese May Day Celebration, April-May 3 Peiping 1952 International Conference for April 1952 3 the Defense of Children, Vienna International Economic March-April 4 Conference, Moscow 1952 World Peace Council, Vienna Nov.-Deo. 1951 5 Berlin Youth Festival August 1951 16 XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK The Communists in Indochina maintain closest international ties with Communist China, which recognized the "DRV" on January 18, 1950 and received the credentials of the first "DRV" Minister in April, 1951 (his status has now been raised to that of Ambassador), and with the USSR, which recognized the "DRV" on January 30, 1950, and received the credentials of a "DRV" ambassador in April 1952. Close ties are_ also maintained, although much less prominently and for the most part covertly, with leaders of the French Carsmunist Party. Relations have also developed between the Viet Minh leadership and leaders of the Eastern European and Korean Communist regimes. The clear harmony between Viet Minh and international Communist policies leaves no doubt that close coordination with the international Communist movement prevails. Proof that Communist China supplies high- level guidance to the Viet Minh leadership was recently received in the form of a Chinese Communist broadcast supplying the "DRV" government with the draft of a proposed address by Ho Chi Minh, written in China by the "DRV" Ambassador to that country. It is likely that frequent consultations between China and the "DRV" take place, and that a certain amount of day-to-day guidance is provided by the temporary technical and. military missions now present in the "DRV" areas. It is also probable that the Viet Minh representative in Moscow sends home frequent guidances and reports. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000705723 : 6R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 20 - Efficiency of "DRV" contacts with the main Communist centers in Pei-p+ing and Moscow is presumably very good, since the French now control only one of the customary routes across the Chinese-Vietnamese border. Radio contact between Communist China and the "DRV" is main- tained through stations BAL 6 and GMH in China, which relay broadcasts between the "DRV", China, and other Communist countries. It is be- lieved that contacts maintained by the Indochinese Communists with France and with other Southeast Asian or Pacific countries are probably less efficient, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-665.3 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, INDONESIA OFFICE OF INTEI LIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS ge Foreword .. . .. .. .. ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1 I* Objectives* . . . . o* . . . . ? we* ? ? . . . ? ? 1 He Tactics . ? . . . . . . . ? ? . . ? ? . ? ? . . . . . 1 III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . ? . . ? ? . . ? ? ? 4 ASSETS I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 He Electoral Strength . . . . . . . .. ... 6 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action. 7 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . .. . 7 V. Communist Influence in Labor ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ? 8 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional organizations . . . . . . . . . ? . . . 9 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . ? 11 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . IX. Communist Infiltration of Nan-Communist Political Parties ? ? ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? X. Communist Propaganda Media . . 12 XI? Financial Condition . . . . . . . ? . ... . . . . . . 13 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . . . . 13 XIII. Communist International. Organizations . . . . . . . 14+ XIV. Communist Communication Network . ? . . .. . . . ?.. 15 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance.- The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 COMMUIiISU IN INDONESIA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The major current goals of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) are to gain general acceptance as a genuine nationalist party in Indonesia, to perfect the party organization and to consolidate control over 's, variety of front groups, including the largest of the labor federations in Indonesia. In pursuing these aims the PSI has attempted to recoup such prestige as it lost, first, in the course of the Madiun uprising in September 1948 and, second, as a result of a series of arrests of Communist leaders by the Indonesian government in August 1951. Secondarily, the PKI attempts, especially through the activities of its front organizations, to cause Indonesia's "independent foreign policy" to be directed in such a way that ties with the Soviet bloc are strengthened at the expense of relations with the West. Thus, the PKI advocates the exchange of diplomatic representatives with the USSR, non-cooperation with the UN embargo on shipments of strategic items to Communist China, increased trade with the Soviet bloc, and rejection of US economic.. and military aid. The political climate in Indonesia, characterized by a lack of cohesive policy on the part of the major political parties and a general uncertainty as to the direction Indonesia will take in the immediate future both domestically and internationally, enhances the PKI's capability to pursue these several objectives concurrently. 'While present emphasis is on furthering the domestic political fortunes of the party,'particularly with the prospect of general elections in the next year, past experience suggests that should the requirements of international Communism demand it, a quick reversal might be effected, and international considerations be given precedence. At this stage it is not clear whether the PKI hopes to achieve its ultimate goal of direction of the Indonesian state through peace- ful constitutional means, involving subversion of non-Communist groups, or through eventual armed insurrection. It is likely that the party's internal consolidation is pursued with both possibilities in view. In its attempt to gain popular acceptance, the PKI has been able to capitalize on existing anti-colonial sentiment and has taken a strong stand on a number of issues which also form a part of the programs of other political parties. Thus, the PKI advocates abroga- tion of the Round Table Conference agreements with the Netherlands, Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION termination of the activity of the Netherlands Military Mission, "restoration" of Western New Guinea (Irian) to Indonesian control, and nationalization of such foreign enterprises as the North Sumatra oil fields and the Bangka and Billiton tin mines. These pronounced aims of the PKI,,shared as they are with other political groups, appear to be only means to enhance the national standing of the party. More general tactics directed toward this same and are the publicly announced support of the present Wilopo government by the PKI and efforts apparently undertaken in various localities to form a series of "Representative Councils" under PKI leadership. These united front tactics were justified in a party statement issued in explanation of the first Communist support rendered an Indonesian government since Madiun: The formation of .the Wilopo cabinet opened rather extensive possibilities to the PKI and the other people's organi- zations to work publicly; they need no longer perform under- ground activities as they did during the Suleiman... cabinet 5reoeding government ...This is the conclusion; in the present condition, a PKI and the people have to choose one of these two; a democratic bourgeois government or a fascist bourgeois one.... On several occasions since the and of the war, the PKI has stressed the desirability of a united front. The PAI has also attempted in the past year to seize the initiative in organizing celebrations of national holidays. At the same time that the PKI has endeavored to reestablish a patriotic reputation by positive action, it has refrained from outspoken opposition to the government's programs, thus trying to overcome a reputation for negativism. In conformance with this policy, the PUI was relatively restrained in recent Parliamentary debates critical of the leadership of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense, and took care to deny complicity in the resulting anti- Parliament demonstrations. In paying lip service to respect for democratic institutions the PKI has probably also been concerned for its political future should anti-Communist military leaders seize a larger measure of control. The PKI- has attempted to appeal to all social groups, and has had its greatest success in the organization of labor. SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia), the PKI-controlled traion a erattion dom na es the Indonesian labor movement and is an affiliate of WFTU. SOBSI's potential for disruptive activity was demonstrated in 1950 when it spearheaded a campaign of widespread SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION strikes in vital industries throughout Indonesia. Harbor operations, transportation, petroleum and some estate rubber production were brought to a virtual standstill. Since that time, the Indonesian government has restricted labor activity through a series of committees to which labor disputes are to be referred for compulsory settlement. Although SOBSI organizations have refrained from disruptive activity in the past several months in conformity to the PRI program of cooperation with the government, a potential for renewed agitation exists. Among the more important other PKI front organizations in Indonesia are women's, youth, students, and peasants organizations, the People's Cultural League and the Indonesian Committee for World Peace. These groups echo the PKI program and propaganda in parlia- ment, communicate Communist propaganda to mass groups, attempt to enlist the support of non-Communist groups for Communist causes, and participate in national conferences and international meetings of Communist front organizations. SOBSI and two peasant organizations are represented in the Indonesian parliament. Although there is no separate Chinese Communist Party organization in Indonesia, many of the same purposes are accomplished within the Chinese community by a separate series of front organizations. In addition to controlling completely the activities 'of the above organizations, clearly recognizable as Communist front groups, PKI members attempt to infiltrate other mass organizations. An article published in the official PKI organ in February 1951 on 'The Role of the PKI and Mass Organizations" states: "Communists who are assigned to join organizations, such as labor unions which are under the leadership of Trotskyite: or Social Democrats, are not to leave such organizations, for that would mean that we were allowing these masses to continue under the leadership of those who are really enemies of the people.... Therefore, we Communists may not refuse to work in a mass organization, no matter how reactionary it is." Communist efforts are also made to infiltrate ministries of the government, the police and military forces. Apart from the known presence of Communists in the Ministries of Labor and Information, there is little evidence to indicate the degree of success enjoyed by the PSI to date in attaining this objective. Since the abortive Madiun rebellion in 1948, the PSI has, in general, refrained from violent activity. Nevertheless, the party controls several small armed bands and is believed to continue attempts to infiltrate other dissident organizations. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET : 3ECUAITY INFORMATION The PKI in the course of its past history was often divided in its leadership and evidenced the same lack of cohesion and direction that characterized most other Indonesian political groups. Today, fol- lowing the injection of considerable new blood into the party, there is every evidence that the PKI adheres closely to policy as transmitted through international Communist channels. Liaison is believed to be effected through the Chinese Communist Embassy and at international Communist meetings. Should the dictates of international Communism so demand, the PKI today would probably not hesitate to reverse its tactics, even at the risk of weakening seriously its domestic position. III. CAPABILITIES The PKI today.is better organized and better-led than at any time in its past history. The party appears to be enjoying a considerable degree of success as a result of its policy of cooperation with the Indonesian government and its espousal of generally popular causes. As long as it adheres to this policy of united front tactics its potential for expanding membership and enhancing its following would appear great. At the same time, the fact that the other major political parties advocate much the same program and are not faced with the PKI'a constant problem of establishing its identity as an indigenous party, militates against the party's becoming so strong that it might participate in an Indonesian government. One major purpose of the party's united front tactics has been to assure that it will not lose its present parliamentary representation when general elections are held. It is not possible to forecast election results at this time, but judging from the Indian experience in conduct- ing elections with a largely illiterate electorate, the organization of the PKI, particularly among front organizations, will probably assure it representation disproportionate to its real popular support. As a vehicle for gaining sympatby for international Ccinxmmist causes, the PKI is limited in its success among politically articulate Indonesians by a general awareness of the nature of Ccnnudsm and the role played by front organizations, and by suspicion of the motives of advocates of either side in the cold war. The party's appeal among the masses, in turn, suffers Prom a lack of awareness on-the part of most Indonesians of all but immediately pressing local problems. Nevertheless, PSI propaganda as delivered through the several front organizations capitalizes on the strongly nationalist sentiment of the people. Thus it is probable that the people as a whole are more susceptible to Communist propaganda influence than the more politically sophisticated leadership groups. JICRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION It is unlikely that the PKI will in the foreseeable future be able to wage organized warfare against the Indonesian state, but it may be expected that all opportunities will be developed to subvert dissident groups with an eye toward future eventualities. The party does continue to possess the capability of disrupting economic life through the activities of the labor unions it controls, but such activity would run counter to the law and might jeopardize the reputation for cooperation and concern for the national interest that the party has been nurturing. so carefully. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 yaCRE - ZCURITI INFORMATI -6- C **WNISK IN INDONESIAs ASSETS I. .~CA,ALL STRENGTH Estimates of Indonesia. Con n nist Party (PKI) strength vary from 30,000-100,000 but no details are available. No separate Chinese Com- munist Party organization is known to exist in Indonesia, although the Chinese community, as noted below, possesses its own mass front organi- zations. The PKI is strongest in Java and Sumatra and party activity seems best organized in the major cities, but little information is available concerning regional organization. Much of the leadership and probably a large portion of party membership are middle class intellectuals, but the bulk of party sym- pathizers are unskilled agricultural and industrial laborers and farmers. A majority of the party leaders have been educated or trained abroad, and Samsun, one of the PKI'S founders, is in Moscow where he is credited with playing a major role in Soviet planning for Indonesia. Other Indonesian Coammnists are known to be in Prague, Pei-piing and Amsterdam. Beset by undistinguished and ineffective leadership thrnughont most of its history of three decades, the PKI in the postwar period has experienced a new vigorous direction on the part of both the overt Central Committee and its underground directorate. Party leadership today may be divided between a small group of older prewar members and a majority group of more recent leaders - averaging 30-35 years in age -- who have ac- knowledged adherence to the party or front organizations only in the post- war period. While the government's security action of August 1951 against the Communists increased pressure on the party and for a time restricted its freedom of action, the most prominent and important leaders of the PKI escaped capture at the time, and many lesser lights have since been re- leased. There has been no evidence of dissension within party ranks in the past two years,, and the present leadership appears prepared to under- take whatever action party strategy demands. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH No general elections have been held in Indonesia to date. The PKI occupies 15 seats (7 percent) out of 220 in the provisional Parliament. If satellite parties and fellow travellers are included, a total of 40 seats (19 percent) are controlled by the PKI. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 0-7 - III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION Current PKI policy is to refrain from violent activity and to enhance its popular support through ostensible cooperation with the government and other political parties. Past experience in the post- war period, however, indicates that the party will not hesitate to en- gage in violent action when strategy so demands. In September 19,8 during negotiations between the Republic and the Netherlands, the PKI undertook an armed uprising at Madiun in Republican-held territory. Party strategy at that time was apparently aimed at precipitating a renewal of Dutch military action against the Republic in the course of which the PKI hoped to seize leadership of the Indonesian resistance. Premature action on the part of some of the rebelling units and prompt counteraction on the part of the Republic resulted in the suppression of the Communists after considerable loss of life. In August 1951, the Communists led a raid on Tandjung Priok, port area of Djakarta, in order to test the party's ability to execute this type of maneuver as well as the government's capability of coping with disruptive activity. It was this action that hastened the Indonesian Government's decision to effect a series of security sweeps, in the course of which many prominent Communists and fellow-travellers were arrested. The Indonesian Communists are believed to have infiltrated dis- sident organizations currently engaged in armed insurrection and may possess small armed bands of their own, but reliable information on this subject is lacking. Judging from their conduct of and participation in non-violent demonstrations, Party members presumably would be available in major cities for conducting violent demonstrations. Although the PKI probably has an organization for violent action and the quality of leader- ship is greatly improved over 1948, the success of any large-scale insur- rection would probably depend on complete Communist subversion of existing dissident groups or units of the armed forces. PKI control of most or- ganized labor, the largest farmers' organizations and important youth groups might provide considerable backing for whatever violent action the Party might undertake. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COWUNI94 The PKI enjoys the same freedom as other Indonesian political parties, but the Indonesian Government limits the extent to-which the PKI and its allied organizations can engage in propaganda attacks on friendly states and the degree to which it may express its international ties. Thus, pictures of international Communist leaders are occasionally prohibited at Communist rallies, and propaganda films of a flagrant nature are banned. In August 1951 the Government, fearing another attempted coup, arrested numerous outstanding Communists and fellow travellers. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - a - The Party's past experience with the ability of the Indonesian Government to curtail overt activity has presumably led it to form an underground organization. However, no details are known regarding the size or efficiency of such an organization. An.elaborate array of front organizations and the probable existence of numerous undercover party members would seemingly enable the PKI to maintain its structural or- ganization and engage in limited activity in the face of Goverment re- pression of the Party proper. V. COWUNIST INFLUENCE IN lABO 3 The number of Communists in key industries is not known but is appreciable in view of the strength of PKI dominated unions. SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Selmruh Indonesia), the trade union branch of the PKI, dominates the Indonesian labor movement and is an affiliate of the WFTU. It is represented in the Provisional Parlia- ment, where it holds four seats. SOBSI claims three million members, although its actual membership is estimated at about 800,000. Its largest affiliate is SARBUPRI, a federation of estate workers unions which claims a membership of one million as against an estimated actual membership of 350,000. Other Important SOBSI affiliates exist among ship, dock, rai, road, transport, sugar, and oil workers. SOBSI's potential for disruptive activities was demonstrated in 1950 when it spearheaded a campaign of widespread strikes in vital in- dustries throughout Indonesia. Harbor operations, transportation, petroleum and some estate rubber production were all brought to a virtual standstill. Because of the threat to security, strikes were banned by local military commanders in several provinces in late 1950, followed by a nationwide ban in February 1951. In October of the same year the ban was replaced by a comprehensive decree calling for a three-week oooling-off period and es- tablishing oemunittees of government officials for the compulsory settlement of disputes where voluntary mediation failed. A series of disruptive har- bor strikes in March and April 1952 were settled by committee action. A strike of sugar estate workers in mid-1952 was called off only after the government threatened to arrest strike leaders. For the last several months there have been no strikes by SOBSI organizations, apparently in response to the PKI's avowed policy of cooperation with the goverment. Attempts by leaders of various non-Communist parties, particularly the Socialist, Labor and Masjiaai parties, to organize non-Communist unions capable of challenging SOBSI's domination of labor have been largely mi.- successful. The lack of capable union organizers and funds and the desire of various party leaders to bolster their own political strength have thus far prevented the formation of a lasting united non-Communist federation embracing all non-Communist labor groups. Approved For C= 78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATICH -9- VI. CO I41JNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL. CULTURAL. AHD PQ P -TICKS A. Front Organizations The most important Communist front organizations are described briefly below: 1. .Ikatan Pemuda Peladiar Indonesia (IPPI), Indonesian Youth and Students Union. This group claims a membership of 50,000 to 75,000, and is second in its field only to the Moslem youth, organization. It is especially influential in the secondary schools and is affiliated with the International Students Union. 2. Pemba & Mat, People's Youth. With an estimated membership of 30,000 this is the most active politically of the numerous Indonesian youth groups. Peruda Rakiat is affiliated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth. 3. Gerakan Wanita Indonesia Sedar (GERWIS), Enlightened Indonesian Woanen&s Movement. GE14I3 does not possess nearly as extensive an organization as the older women's organizations, although it is the most active politically. To date it has been unable to influence the national Congress of Indonesian Women to affiliate with Women's International Democratic Federation, of which GZIMIS is a member. 4. .B_arisan Tani Indonesia (BTI), Indonesian Farmers Corps. This group is strongest in Central Java and is represented in Parliament. 5. kikun Tani Indonesia (RTI), Indonesian Farmers Union. RTI, active in West Java and South Sumatra, and BTI are the two most powerful Indonesian farmers organizations. Plans are in the offing for merger of the two groups. 6. Indonesian Committee for World Peace. This organization has branches in major cities and appeals to mapy non-Communist in- tellectuals. 7. Lembaga Kebudaiaan Rakiat (IEERA), People 'a Cultural League. Apparently the successor to the Chinese-Indonesian Cultural League, this group also has branches in major cities. The above groups all serve as instruments for communicating Communist propaganda to mass groups, lend their names to the support of Communist . causes, attempt to enlist the support of non-Communist groups for Communist SECRET - SECURITY INFO JATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATII -10_ causes, and participate on behalf of Indonesian women, youth, etc., as the case may be, at international Communist conferences. Within the Chinese community the most important Communist organiza- tion appears to be the Min She (People's Life Society), incorporating a great many womenrs, youth, educational, professional and sports associa- tions. Little detailed information is available concerning its activities, but it appears to be the most active organization today among the overseas Chinese ooiunity. When the Chinese Communist Ambassador arrived in Indonesia he was greeted by representatives of 180 Chinese associations, which may serve as an indication of the complexity of the organization of the Chinese community in Indonesia. In addition to the above group, perhaps a majority of the Overseas Chinese Associations (Chung Hua char, Hui), which have existed since the prewar period organized on a regional bas a,, have declared their support for the Communist cause. Many of these have been brought together in a series of Communist-dominated United Overseas Chinese General Associations. The Chinese schools are a further vehicle for transmitting Communist propaganda, and a large number of these are known to be Commmist-dominated. A majority of Chinese labor unions are believed to be aff,.liated with SOBSI, the overall Indonesian Com9uunist labor organization. In North Sumatra, at least, the Chinese Commmiat Farmers Association is a member of the broad farmers front dominated by the Indonesian Communists. Few details are available concerning the operations, leadership or membership of this array of organizations. Chinese Communist leadership has been active in seizing control of a good many associations whose members were apathetic to the political implications of Communist efforts. In some oases comparable non-Communist organizations east, generally organized by the KMT, but in general, the Comunist-dominated organizations are predominant in the overseas Chinese community. B. Infiltration of Non-Communist Organizations The fact that many of the non-Communist mass organizations in Indonesia are inclined to the left and have programs that bear a striking similarity to those under Communist discipline makes it difficult to dis- tinguish all organizations that might properly be included in this category. It seems probable that the PKI attempts to infiltrate all such organizations. An article in the official organ of the PKI states, "It is the fundamental duty of the Communists to give gradual training to all mass organizations and to supply them with progressive leadership." This publication also declares, "Every Communist must work hard to unite all kinds of mass or- ganizations into one mass organization." It appears to be the PKI ob- jective gradually to merge infiltrated organizations into larger Commmist- dominated front groups. Approved For dFA0 9%0%01 40 %PF1 Ail PR ONMIA.01 78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION It is doubtful whether any of the non-rCoffinunist mass organizations consciously support Commonuiist programs, but there is often considerable agreement between the Communist and non-Communist groups. The distinction between the two groups is often only in the degree of eagerness to take sides in international issues and willingness to affiliate with inter- national Comamuhist front organizations. GOVERTT VII. CNIST INFILTRATION INTO A nwnber of Communists are known to hold positions in the Ministry of Labor and Information and in their regional offices. The total number of Commnmists and Communist sympathizers in these offices is not known., but the ratio to total personnel is believed to be small. The arrests of August 1951 ferreted out a number of Communists and Communist sympathizers in the Ministry of Labor. DIalan Baru (The New Roth), often cited as a guide for PKI members, declares, "The armed forces must receive special attention as the most im- portant instrument of national power. Armed forces cadres and personnel must be given special attention in line with their role as the most important instrument for the defense of the National Revolution." Although it is as- sumed that the PKI has attempted to infiltrate units of the armed forces, little evidence exists to indicate success to date. There are no known Communists or Communist sympathizers at the top levels of the armed forces. The same publication further states, "The police and associated personnel must learn the meaning of the National Revolution.... The police must be led by progressive cadres." Nevertheless, the mobile brigade, national police force, is regarded as the most reliable of the Indonesian government security forces and there is no evidence of Commmnmist success at subversion. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION , the national news agency is believed to be influenced by either Partai Murba, a so-called "nationalist Camanunist" party, or by the PKI,1 and a number of newspapers, avowedly independent, are believed to be operated by PKI members or sympathizers. Nevertheless, the fact that the Connmiats advocate many of the same issues that fore part of the programs of major non-Communist parties and Coxa nmist publications share many opinions with the non-Communist majority of the press makes it difficult to assess Comsnunist influence on public opinion formation. It would seems that the influence exerted by the Communists on public opinion media is limited and of much less importance than the impact on public opinion of the activities of Communist-dominated front organizations. 1. Adam Malik, head of Antara is thought to be a member of Partai Murba, but the possibility exists that Murba itself is today a PKI front. In any case, attitudes of the two parties on most issues are similar.. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 fECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION IX. CCHMUJNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES Past experience indicates that attempts at infiltrating all political parties are probably made by the PKI. In.1948, several leading members of the Socialist and Labor parties joined the PKI in the Madiun rebellion pro. claiming themselves to have been Communists for a number of years. Little concrete information is available, however, to support the above assumption. M V1 as, which describes itself as "nationalist .Communist," has a program that differs from that of the PKI only in refusing to subscribe to a world Communist order. cannot be described as Titoist or Trotskyist, since it acknowledges a position of world leadership for the USSR. ?Murba has four seats in Parliament, and has its own series of labor unions and front organizations. Failure of the PKI strongly to attack M rba, suggests the possibility that since the death of its founder, Tan Melaka, who strongly opposed the PHI, the party may have been infiltrated by PKI members. X. _C MIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA A. Newapaners and Periodicals Bin Merah (.Red Star) is the official publication of the PKI. Formerly restricted to Party members Bin Merah is now available to the general public, but its circulation is not known. The most important of the other Communist newspapers is Sin g, with a Chinese edition of about 20,000 circulation and an Indonesian edition of about 15,000 cir- culation. There are seven other known Communist dailies, none of which is believed to have a large circulation. In addition, a large umber of Communist or pro-Communist books and pamphlets are sold at virtually all bookstores in Indonesia. B. PubligNM Houses B9,ataag MMeeah and all important PKI propaganda publications, in- cluding translations of foreign Communist writings, now are published by the Jam, aax P n (Modern Institute) in Djakarta, a corporation in which the PKI is reported to have a financial interest. Jaiaaan PPS may have replaced the translating committee Komiai Penterdiemah) formed in March 1951 by members of the Politburo. This committee was charged with translating books and essays on Communist theory such as Lenin's State and Revolution, and Liu Shaw-chtits On the Part . Three other known st publishing houses are -the jaja" publishing house and the Life Press Publishing Coampariy, both in Djakarta, and the Hwang Lung (Yellow Dragon) Publishing Company in Makassar. C. Cammannist Propaganda from Abroad The Soviet magazine Times and the Soviet novel Star, both in English, have been seen on sale in Medan, Sumatra. Other specific foreign Approved Fore 2nnnins-u 3 78-02646R000300050001-9 e- W-G-Wrr Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 33 - Communist publications available in Indonesia are not lawn, but transla- tion of Soviet writings is a constant part of PKI propaganda efforts, and a great umber of Chinese Communist publications, including textbooks, are distributed among both the Chinese and Indonesian commmmi.ties. . The Soviet radio devotes one hour a day and Pei ping radio a half hour daily to broadcasts in Indonesian. The effectiveness of these programs, which is difficult to judge, is limited by the fact that only about 230,000 radio sets are registered in Indonesia. II. FINANCIAL CONDITIC Party dues are collected monthly on a sliding scale in proportion to income, but do not exceed 1- percent of gross income. Details concern- ing other sources of Party revenues, including possible subsidies from abroad are not known. The PKI has had some difficulty in the past in financing its publications, but organizational capabilities of the party do not seem to have been hampered by want of funds. Demonstrations or- ganized by the PKI and its affiliates appear well-supplied with posters, etc. It does not appear that the party will suffer in the foreseeable future from financial difficulties. SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS Neither the USSR nor the East European satellites maintain diplo- matic missions in Indonesia. There is a Taos representative and a Czech consul-general in Djakarta, however, both of whom are reported to be en- gaged in political activity. Communist China has an embassy in Djakarta and consulates at Surabaya, Makassar, Medan, Banjermasin, and Djogjakarta. The embassy staff is reported limited to fifteen persons, and in July 1951 the Indonesian government refused the entry of sixteen additional members. No details are available concerning the consulate staffs. In 1951 the Chinese CoDinunist representatives were active in or- ganizing demonstrations on the part of the Chinese oamomiunity. The poor reception accorded this activity by many Indonesians has caused greater .restraint to be exercised so that the hand of the Chinese Commmist embassy in such affairs in the past year has not been obvious. There is no Soviet-Indonesian Friendship Association, and the Chinese-Indonesian Friendship Association appears to have been superseded by the People's Cultural League, the size of which is not known. ;SECRET _ SEC__, ITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 RECRET - ECU1 IT 4 TION "24 - XIII. COMM N ?NTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIOTi3 Np meetings of Communist international organizations have been held in Indonesia. The following is a list of meetings of Communist international or- ganizations herd abroad, which are known to have been attended by Indonesian Commmmists during the past two years: 1122 Ito }Size Indones re entationn International Students Union Executive meeting, Peiping April 1951 1 World Federation of Democratic Youth Executive meeting, Budapest May 1951 1 World Federation of Trade Unions .Conference, Vienna July 1951 2 Berlin Youth Festival August 1951 53 World Federation of Democratic Youth Annual Council Meeting, Berlin August 1951 2 Moscow Economic Conference April 1952 23 International Student Conference, Bucharest July-August 1952 unknown World Peace Council, Berlin July 1952 unknown Peiping Peace Conference September 1952 about 10 Netherlands Communist Party Congress November 1952 Vienna Peace Congress December 1952 16 Czech Communist Party Cbngress,, Prague December 1952 2 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -15- XIV. _QMMUNIST CGINtJNICATION NETJ01 Close relations are maintained by the PKI with the Communist parties in the USSR, the Netherlands, and Communist China. Leaders of the PKI have received training in these three countries, and, as noted above,. Samsun, one of the founders of the PKI is in Moscow. Perhaps the most striking example of compliance with international Communist directives took place in 1948. Indonesian delegates to the Congress of the Communist Party of India and the Calcutta Youth Congress held early that year reported home the adoption of a policy of armed in- surrection. In September, following also the return of Muso, Samaun's lieutenant, from Moscow, the PKI instigated the Madiun rebellion. A more recent example of direction from abroad was the criticism of SOBSI by WFTU representatives at the 1952 SOBSI national congress for not maintaining proper liaison with WFTU international headquarters and for failing to report SOBSI activities in sufficient detail. Representatives of WFTU and foreign Communist trade unions have attended past congresses of SOBSI, and a sixteen man delegation from Peiping is known to have been present at the national youth congress held in Djakarta in November 1952. Apart from liaison that is assumed to take place at such meetings, it is believed that the Chinese Communist embassy is used as a channel of conamication for the PKI. -=w r - - URIT,,,,,Y INFORMATION rr r rr.r. ~. Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . . . 1 1. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Ii. Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 ASSETS . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 5 II. Electoral Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 5 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . . . . . 7 V. Communist Influence in Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . ... . . . . 9 VIII. Cormnuniet Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . . . 9 IX, Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties 9 X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 XI. Financial Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 XIII. Communist International Organizations . . . . . . . . . . 10 XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to them out; and the capability of the party to achieve assessed in the light of both past and present performance.- The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION CCIMUNISM IN MALAYA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES 1. OBJECTIVES Communist guerrillas, 95 percent of whom are Malayan Chinese, have been carrying'out hit-and-run warfare against the British and their supporters in the Federation of Malaya since mid-1948, when the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and its fronts and labor organiza- tions were banned. Documents captured near the beginning of the guerrilla campaign'indioated that the objective of the MCP was to drive the British out of Malaya. This was to be accomplished in three successive phases by: 1) disrupting the economy 2) setting up governments in "liberated" areas 3) joining up liberated areas. The inability of the party to achieve its first goal -- disruption of the economy -- in the first three years of the campaign has according to other, more recent, captured documents, brought about a revision of party policy from one of indiscriminate and un- bridled terrorist activity to an attempt to guide guerrilla warfare away from activities harmful to the interests of workers and peasants and toward military targets. This move, combined with others, is calculated to broaden the base of party support. MCP recognition of the necessity for this changed course of action has aroused some speculation, unsupported by any evidence, that the party, in admitting this initial failure, may also have reached the conclusion that it is incapable of achieving its ultimate objective through its-own efforts, but must preserve itself as a guerrilla force until an outside power can undertake the "liberation" of Malaya. II. TACTICS During the past six months it has become increasingly apparent from the lessened number and changed character of terrorist incidents that the MCP, probably in response to progressively more effective pressure by British Security Forces, has put into effect its new strategic policies. The MCP's aim -- to gain the support of laborers and peasants -- has required modification, rather than abandonment, of guerrilla warfare tactics. A party directive indicates that military and police targets may be attacked, but that the destruction of dwellings and public utilities, and the seizure of food without compensation is to be discontinued. The destruction of mine and estate property is also prohibited, since it affects the livelihood of laborers. Urban organizations, particularly labor unions, are to be infiltrated or, if necessary, secret unions formed. Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The MCP's chief guerrilla organization, the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) is estimated to have from 3,000 to 5,000 members. Grouped into twelve regiments, the MRLA:usually utilizes the company or the platoon as its operating unit. The MRLA is supported by the MIN YUEN, or Peoples Movement, which is responsible for furnishing supplies, intelligence, and recruits to the MRLA. Rather than a single organization, the MIN YUEN is a collecton,of organizations controlled by party executives for work among the masses. Among the MIN YUEN organizations are groups of armed xhen numbering about 4,000, cooperating closely with the MRLA. It is through MIN YUEN organizations that intelligence is secured, men recruited, and funds obtained. While some financial support comes from regular contributions by members'of MIN YUEI organizations, the bulk of the funds collected apparently comes from the "protection" money paid by Chinese businessmen, estate owners, and tin mine operators. The MIN YUEN probably numbers upwards of 10,000 members. MCP activity capitalizes on anti-British sentiment and, to some extent, the economic rivalry between the Malayan Chinese and the paramount British economic group. Since 1949 the nationalist character of the party has been stressed in propaganda,, but there is little indication that this line has been effective. Despite the receipt of one small shipment of arms from Thailand, there is no evidence that the MCP regularly receives material aid from outside Malaya. 'There is reason to believe, however, that some trained leaders have been infiltrated from China. Propaganda circulated covertly by the. party' follows the lead of Peiping and Moscow broadcasts for the most part and it is likely that these broadcasts serve as one of the chief means of liaison between the MCP and'both these Communist centers-. III. CAPABILITIES Malaya is not characterized by the existence of either a strong unified nationalist movement or depressed economic condi- tions that could be exploited by the Communists. The guerrillas do not have widespread public sympathy, and the movement appears to be inspired by a hard core of Communists acting in response to the policies of international Communism. The party has sustained itself largely by intimidation of the Malayan Chinese community. The recent change in the MCP's strategic policy away from wide- spread terroristic activity and the intimidation of peasants and laborers is in part at least an admission of the failure of this course of action. The effectiveness of new emphasis on gaining SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFO ATION - 3 - the support of peasants and laborers, conducting a more selective terrorist campaign, and infiltrating labor unions and other organizations, cannot yet be evaluated. Over the past four years the British, utilizing military political, psychological, and socio-economic measures, have .successfully contained but have failed to suppress the Communists.' In additionto'the difficulties of guerrilla warfare in the jungle, the failure of the Malayan Chinese to cooperate in the anti-guerrilla campaign, political apathy, and the lack of a Malayan national consciousness have contributed to the inability of the British to eradicate the guerrillas. The diversity of Malaya's population has prevented the development of a national consciousness and hampered British attempts to arouse an anti-Communist spirit based on nationalism. The largest elements of the population, the Malays (49 percent) and the Chinese (38 percent) form separate, mutually antagonistic communi- ties. Major causes of the friction are the Malay fear of eventual domination by the energetic Chinese whom they regard as alien, and the Chinese resentment of the favored position traditionally accord- ed the Malays by the British. In contrast with the non-committal attitude of the Chinese toward the present struggle, the Malays support the British, forming the bulk of the police and staffing most of the lower echelon administrative posts. Traditionally oriented toward China as the Motherland, the Malayan Chinese have sought to preserve Chinese culture through their schools and their family life. Loyalty to the Motherland is basically cultural rather than political, however, and the majority of Malayan Chinese are committed neither to the Communist regime in Peiping nor to the Nationalists in Taipei. Apart from a few leaders, political apathy has extended to Malayan affairs, the primary Malayan Chinese interest in Malaya being commercial. The Malayan Chinese attitude is also due to the emergence of a strong government in China to which the overseas Chinese feel that they may eventually be able to look for protection of their interests; to the fact that the majority of the Communist guerrillas are Chinese; and to the British failure to demonstrate clearly the ability to eradicate the guerrillas. Moreover, the Chinese fear local reprisals should they aid the British, or the punishment of their relatives or the confiscation of their property in China should they openly support an anti-Communist drive. The new Communist course of action is likely to pose new problems to the British, particularly since the infiltration of labor unions is to be attempted. Nevertheless, it is likely that SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFO} ATIQN the British, now organized more effectively and imbued with better morale under the leadership of Gen. Sir Gerald Templer, will continue as during the past year to make slow progress against the guerrillas. It is unlikely, however, that the British will be able to wipe out the guerrillas completely; at the same time it is .improbable that the guerrillas, without outside aid, can make the British position untenable. The eventual outcome of Malaya's Communist problem is-probably to a large extent dependent upon events outside Malaya. SECRET - SECURITY INFOPMA.TION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -5- COMMUNISM IN MALAYA: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH Although more than 15,000 persons, or about 0.3 percent of Malaya's population, are controlled or strongly influenced by Communism, the MCP itself is estimated to have only 3,000 to 5,000 members drawn almost wholly.from the'peasant and laborer class of the Malayan Chinese community. Some 600 to 800 members are estimated to constitute the "hard core" of the party and to have been active in the MCP for more than ten years. During World War II, these hard core members took part in the British-aided guerrilla organization known as the Malayan People's Axiti- Japanese Army. Probably not more than 1,000 members have been associated with the party for more than five years. The actual leaders of the MOP are virtually unknown, but from the fact of continued guerrilla resistance over the past four years and from the statements of surrendered guerrillas it would appear that these leaders are determined.,.-aggressive., well-trained men. Despite the strong leadership of the party, however, some of the rank and file members have become discouraged at the continual hardships of life in the jungle and have surrendered to British Security Forces. Nevertheless, few of those surrendering have been associated with the movement for a long period, and it,is probable that the hard core of the party has remained virtually intact for the past four years. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH No general elections have been held in the Federation of Malaya. The MCP,, banned in mid-1948, has, of course, entered no candidates in the few municipal elections that have been held. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION Communist forces are estimated to consist of 3,000 to 5,000 members of the Malayan Races Liberation Party (MRIA) and approximately 11,000 armed members of MIN YUEN organizations. Despite guerrilla casualties in surrendered, captured and killed, amounting to half the estimated Communist force over the past four years, total guerrilla strength continues to be set at a constant level by British sources because of steady recruitment by the guerrillas. Lack of arms apparently prevents any expansion of guerrilla forces. All Communist support organizations, necessarily covert, are blanketed into the MIN YUEN or People's Movement. It is from these organizations that the receives recruits, funds, food, and SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -6 information. The MIN YUEN has a strength estimated at 10,000 or more. MIN YUEN organizations and their functions are: . 1. Self Protection Units -- to supply food 2. Protection Corps -- to sabotage and ambush 3. Armed Work Force -- to propagandize and organize I. District Unit -- to propagandize and organize 5. Suicide Squad -- to assassinate reactionary leaders 6. Labor Protection Corps -- to lead strikes, to sabotage, to propagandize 7. Reserve Corps --- to train executives 8. Executive Committee of the Masses -- to gather information and food Sympathizers Cells -- to train prospective party members, to gather funds and food, and to act as couriers. The guerrillas have employed hit-and-run tactics against police stations and villages, ambushed patrols, sabotaged transportation and public utilities, and attacked rubber estates and mines. Newly adopted tactics will, according to a captured directive, confine such attacks to military; and police targets, or to the property of "reactionary capitalists." In the past, the guerrillas have received support because of their ability to intimidate the rural and to some extent the urban populations. However, the recent resettlement of some 400,000 Chinese "squatters," who were living on the fringe of the jungle, into controlled and protected "now villages" has removed one major source of guerrilla support. Henceforth, the guerrillas must rely more upon Malay villagers, estate labor, and urban dwellers. Whether the newly adopted policy of paying for, rather than simply requisitioning food, and of safeguarding the interests of peasants and laborers will prove effective in winning voluntary'support remains to be seen. The guerrillas have been unsuccessful in achieving the economic disruption of Malaya, but their tactics have nevertheless affected adversely the economies of both Malaya and the United Kingdom. Prospecting, on which the future of the tin industry in part depends, has been prevented for the past four years.. Rubber trees have been slashed, and a large- scale program of replanting made impossible. Nevertheless, current production has not been seriously affected, and it will probably be a number of years before Malayan production feels the full affect of the present situation. Aft SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION _7_ The expense of the anti-guerrilla campaign to the Federation has prevented the undertaking of needed economic development projects, while the expense of maintaining troops in Malaya and of contributing to extraordinary expenses of local government has constituted a financial drain on the United Kingdom. Guerrilla warfare has hampered the rapid achievement of political innovations desired by the populace and sponsored by the government as a means of encouraging Malayan nationalism as an anti-Communist force. Thus, while political progress toward autonomy has been slowed by guerrilla warfare, it is the opinion of high-ranking officials that political advance is nevertheless imperative if Malaya is to remain non-Communist. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The Government banned the MCP, its fronts,-and its labor organiza- tion in mid-1948, when it also adopted Emergency Regulations placing extraordinary powers in the hands of the administration. British Security Forces consist of about 10,000 soldiers and 60,000 regular and special police. In addition, a part-time Home Guard of 140,000 has been recruited. The Home Guard and most of the special police are employed on static guard duty. In addition to the military campaign, the Government has undertaken special measures under the Emergency Regulations, as well as broader social, political, and economic steps designed to create a climate unfavorable to the growth of Communism. By the end of 1952, more than 1400,000 Chinese "squatters" living on the edges of the jungle and beyond administrative control had been moved to protected "new villages" beyond the easy reach of Communist forces that had been intimidating them as a means of getting food, funds, and information. During 1952, as in previous years, several thousand Malayan Chinese and a lesser number of Indians were deported from Malaya., and additional thousands were detained. Moreover, in several instances entire villages were punished for refusing information to Security Forces or ignoring warnings to cease sheltering or feeding guerrillas. Under the Emergency Regulations all inhabitants have been required to carry identity cards; carrying arms without a license has been made a capital offense; the movement of food has been restricted; pro-Communist newspapers have been banned; and the solicitation of money or food for the guerrillas has been made a capital offense. An additional important regulation has placed in the hands of a comptroller the power to direct any person into the police or military forces or to perform any other duty. The announced British aim has been to guide the colonial territories to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth and, as a means to that end, to do everything possible to establish the required economic and social conditions. The Federation Government's SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION efforts in this direction has been given a sense of urgency by the belief of high-ranking Federation officials that such measures will provide a long term solution to the problem of Communism. Inter- racial harmony is seen as a prerequisite to the development of Malayan nationalism, and organizations, including political parties, embracing all communities in Malaya have been encouraged. Local elections have been held in several municipalities, while some public members (as opposed to government officials) of the Legislative Council have been given responsibility for government departments as a first step toward cabinet government. Citizenship provisions have been relaxed to allow a much larger number of Malayan Chinese to qualify, and agreement has been reached that a certain proportion of Malayan Chinese will be allowed in the Malayan Civil Service. In the field of education, regarded as a critical element in "Malayanizing" the Chinese, the decision has been taken to establish national schools based on the Malay and English languages. Economic development, although slowed by the present guerrilla problem, has aimed at expanding the national income by improving and diversifying agricultural production, encouraging light industry, and improving power supply and communication. Propaganda measures, both with the guerrillas and with the civilian population., have been intensified recently. Leaflets, posters, radio, and mobile public address systems are used. One of the most effective measures has been the use of surrendered guerrillas to recite their unfortunate experiences with the Communists to a group of villagers. The recent change in tactics by the MCP would seen to indicate that measures taken by the Government have, at a minimum, been effective in containing the guerrillas. The party's new tactics, however, will force the Government to adopt new methods, particularly since the in- filtration of labor unions is to be attempted. Since police training has been directed toward the conduct of operations rather than the collection of intelligence it is possible that the new Communist methods may achieve some success before being checked by the Security Forces. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR A policy of encouraging responsible trade unionism was inaugurated shortly after World War II in Malaya. In the early stages, the Malayan Communist Party gained control of the labor movement, organized general labor unions on a regional basis and finally established a top-level executive body known as the Pan--Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU), which claimed affiliation with the World Federation of Trade Unions. The WFTU was declared illegal in June 1948. Subsequently, many unions rapidly disintegrated and many labor leaders went underground. Despite the fact that organized labor remains a Communist target, the Federation Government continues to encourage trade unionism as a Approved For R4 N 3=5 i 8-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -9- means of developing social responsibility and combatting Communism. Under government guidance, trade unions have been rebuilt and a modest nucleus of non-Communist unions now exists as a basis for further expansion. A Malayan Trade Union Council,, which was formed in March 1950, subsequently affiliated with the International Confederation of Trade Unions. . No labor unions in Malaya are known to be Communist infiltrated at the present time and no Communist influence on the leadership has been observed. While Communists have forced strikes among rubber tappers in certain areas of Malaya, Communist pressure was exerted from outside the unions rather than from within. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL1 CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS There have been no indications of-Communist influence in social, cultural, or professional organizations. It is highly probable, however,, that there has been some Communist infiltration of Chinese secret societies. VII. CO!h&UNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT There is no known Communist infiltration into the Government of the Federation of Malaya. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION There is some evidence pointing to the infiltration of the faculties of Chinese schools by operatives of the Chinese Communist Party. The placement of'pro-Communist teachers in Chinese schools appears to have been accomplished at times with the connivance of school trustees. Such infiltration appears to be designed not only to spread Communist doctrine but to recruit students to go to China for completion of their education. IX. COA'IUUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES There is no known Communist infiltration of any of the Malayan political parties. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA Publications of the MCP, usually attributed to various of the District Committees,, are mimeographed news sheets circulated clandestinely or covertly posted in a public place. Publications which have appeared with some regularity include Freedom News, Workerst ress, and Workers' and Students' News. The number of copies c rcu a ed s own. At one time, large numbers of Communist or pro-Communist Chinese publications were imported from Hong Kong. The police, however, have SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 10 - now undertaken to prevent such trade, and overt importation has ceased. There is presumably some clandestine circulation of such publications. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION No information concerning the financial condition of the 3CP is available. XII. SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS Neither the USSR and its European satellites, nor the Pei-p'ing regime, maintain diplomatic, trade, or cultural missions in the Federation of Malaya. XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS - No Communist international organizations maintain installations within Malaya, and no conferences of such organizations have been held in Malaya.. Communist sources have reported the presence of Malayan representatives at meetings of various Communist international organiza- tions. Since 1918, however, these representatives have been Chinese who at one time lived in Malaya. No representatives have left Malaya specifically to attend a particular meeting, or could be said to represent any particular Malayan organization. Many have been deportees. XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK The MCP is thought to maintain its closest ties with Communist organizations in Thailand, and in Sumatra, Indonesia, and with the Chinese Communist Party. It is assumed that at the present time instructions to the MCP are relayed through Pei-piing and Moscow radios, which have not only given propaganda support to.the 1CP but have, prior to the adoption of a new propaganda line by the MCP, indicated what that line should be. The beginning of a campaign of violence in 1948, already favored by some MCP leaders, was given impetus by the decisions of the Second Congress of the Communist Party of India, held concurrently with the Calcutta Youth Festival sponsored by the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students in early 1948. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-665.5 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THE PHILIPPINES OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword . . . ... _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . . . I. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Ii. Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Ill. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 IV. Supplementary Data. on the Chinese Communists in the Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 ASSETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. Numerical Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 ii. Electoral Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action . . 6 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . . . . . 7 V. Communist Influence in Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Vi. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . . . . . 8 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . . . 9 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties 9 X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Xi. Financial Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 -XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . . . 10 XIII. Communist International Organizations . . . . . . . . . 10 XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . . . . . . . . 10 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to. carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance.- The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 MCRET - 9ECUI ITX INFORMATI9N CC*4MUNISM IN THE PHILIPPINES: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The leadership of the Philippine Commmmist Party apparently does not believe that the situation will favor a drive for immediate power for some years to come. They regard the present period as a preparatory one and place main emphasis on organizational and propaganda work. Their principal immediate objectives in rough order of priority, appear to be: 1. To win over the masses to the Communist cause. 2. To discredit anti-Communist parties and leaders. To weaken the close ties existing between the Philippines and the US. 4. To prevent further dissipation of the party's military arm. II. TACTICS Although the Philippine Communists consider the workers and the landless peasants as the backbone of their movement and plan to concentrate their organizational propaganda efforts on them, they are also striving to enlist the support of bourgeois groups with a popular front program. In order to facilitate its work of laying a basis for a seizure of power, the Philippine Coaamnuiist Party has outlined a program calling for the intensifica- tion of what it calls "legal" and "illegal" activities among the masses. (Although all Communist activities are illegal in the Philippines and have been driven underground, the Communists consider as illegal only their military activities and activities directly relating to the support of their military arm.) Their program consists of (1) revival of popular front political parties; (2) infiltration of cadres into Government agencies, i.e., schools, military forces, into strategic industries, and into or- ganizations and groups, i.e., labor unions, peasant organizations, women's and youth organizations, etc.; (3) increased indoctrination of the rank and file of the movement; and (4) intensification of propaganda activities. Party planning apparently envisages the possible negotiation of an amnesty settlement with the Government which would enable it to expand its non. military activities. Tactics for the 1953 Presidential and Congressional elections seem to call for support to candidates allegedly sympathetic to Communism. Communist propaganda planning calls for an intensification of the "peace" and "national independence" themes. "Peace" appears designed to bring about a weakening of public support for the Government's anti-Communist policies in both the domestic and foreign fields. "National independence" %%W SECRET - SECURITY INFORM4TION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ..2.. will attempt to place blame for all the i31s of the Philippines on US policies and US influence on its "puppets" -- the major Philippine political parties. The Communists are charging that US military and economic aid programs are disadvantageous to the Philippine masses. Both themes are to be infused into all party activities and, with suitable adaptations, directed to all classes of the populace. Ccwn unists are using their military arm, the People's Liberation Army (HMB), for disrupting Government operations, e.g. assassinations of prominent anti-Communists, sabotaging the economy, procuring supplies, and as an agency for recruiting the more violent malcontents among the masses. At present, however, a policy of conserving H MB strength and limiting its operations appears to be in effect. It may be that in the face of continued Government pressures and in order to gain from the Government freedom of operation for their organizational and propaganda programs, Philippine Communists might further reduce their military activities. III. CAPABIIITIES The Philippine Coasnunist Party, which in 1950 was strong enough to carry on widespread and well-coordinated armed rebellion, had by 1953 reached a low point in revolutionary potential and no longer constituted a serious threat to the Philippine Government. The party's once formidable military arm, the IINB, now has capabilities for only small-scale raids and ambuscades, while the party is reduced to attempts to infiltrate and organize front groups in the face of very severe government repressive measures. Moreover, the party is suffering from a serious shortage of capable executives and theoreticians, its organizational apparatus is scattered and harassed by increasingly effective Government intelligence' operations, its propaganda output is small and distributed with difficulty, and its finances are in a precarious state. Whether the PKP can again develop sufficient strength to threaten the stability of the Philippine Government depends mostly on factors outside the control of the PKP. For the future strength or weakness of the PEP hinges on (1) whether or not the Philippine Government continues its strong anti- Connnunist programs; (2) whether or not the US can maintain effective eoo-- noQnic'and military aid to the Philippines; and (3) whether or not the Philippine Government increases its efforts to alleviate social and economic ills. In the event of fraudulent elections in 1953 with accompanying civil disorders and a loss of popular support for the Government, or the accom- modation of one or the other major political parties to amnesty negotiations, a situation probably would be created in which short term Communist objec- tives and planning could operate with a fair degree of success. However, Commnunist tactics and planning appear to envisage a lengthy period of time as necessary before they will be in a position to effectively challenge the Philippine Government with a resurgence of their military arm and SECRET - SECURITY INFOI 4ATICH Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -3- widespread mass support. With the uncertainties at present threatening the continuance of a strong anti-Communist policy on the part of some Government leaders, and in the absence of an effective Government reform program, it appears that the defensive strategy of the pgp is well suited to Philippine conditions through 1953. IV. SUPPLEMFJ.rTTARY DATA ON THE CHINESE CCI4MUNISTS IN THE PHILIPPINES Because of excellent security practices, very little information Zs available concerning the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the Chinese Commaists in the Philippines. Nevertheless, to judge by their known ac- tivities, their objectives include the followings . 1. To gain the loyalty and financial support of the .Chinese community -- numbering about 200,000 -- for the Chinese Communist cause, and, conversely,, to subvert and discredit Kuomintang forces in the Philippines; 2. To construct an effective espionage network; 3. In general, to establish a firm mass base for more violent revolutionary action in the future, and; 4. To support the Philippine Ccnmunist movement in any manner which does not jeopardize fulfillment of the first three objectives. Available evidence indicates that the Chinese Communists in the Philippines place highest priority on the objectives involving the Chinese community. In order to attain these goals, Chinese Communists employ a variety of tactics, including infiltration, some terrorism, and propaganda. Up to now, Chinese Communists have concentrated on infiltration of Chinese or.. ganizations, particularly secret societies, chambers of commerce, and schools. However, some Chinese Communist infiltration of intelligence agencies of the Philippine Government has been reported. Chinese Commmmmists extort contributions from rich Chinese merchants by threats of violence to them or their relatives in China. Some propaganda materials, most of which apparently are smuggled into the country, are distributed among the Chinese community. Apparently, the Chinese Con mists in the Philippines still have fairly considerable capacity for future espionage, infiltration, and propaganda activities. The Philippine Goverment round up of Chinese Communist suspects in December 1952 evidently did not cause material damage to the Chinese Com mmist apparatus in the Philippines. Nevertheless, %W ZCRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET -SECURITY INFORMATION -4- the Philippine Government and the Kuomintang organization in the Philippines are united in opposition to Chinese Communist activity there. The great majority of the Chinese in the Philippines apparently are either anti- Communist or politically neutral. The ability of Chinese Communists in the Philippines for forming front groups or labor unions is very limited. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY I NFORMAT I ON COWUNISM IN THE PHILIPPINES: ASSETS 1. NUMERICAL STRENGTH The membership-of the Philippine Communist Party (PKP) probably numbers about 3,000 to 5,000. There are about 8,000 to 10,000 Huks, the Peoples' Liberation Army or military arm of the PKP, who are not PKP members and an estimated 40,000 members of Communist-dominated mass organizations. The number of people influenced by.partial, but significant, Communist infiltration of non-Communist organizations is unknown., Altogether, Communists and those strongly influenced by Communism are estimated to account for 0.2 percent to one percent of the total population. Chinese Communists are estimated to number 2,000-3,000 but there are no data on the number of members of organizations controlled or influenced by them. PKP membership increased from 1946 to 1950 but declined during 1951 and 1952; there has been a great increase in Chinese Communist strength since 1946. Approximately 90 percent of PKP members and following are located in Central and Southern Luzon with the balance in Northern Luzon and scattered localities in the Visayas and Mindanao. The leadership has come primarily from Manila, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, and Bulacan in -Central Luzon. Chinese Communists are primarily in Manila and the towns and cities of Southern Luzon, Cebu, and Iloilo. The bulk of the PKP membership and sympathizers are peasants while Chinese Communists are primarily merchants, sohool teachers, and administrators. Party members are for the most part poorly indoctrinated in Communist theory,, have little education, but as a result of continuing governmental suppressive action, are probably reduced now to a loyal and hard working core. Morale and discipline among ordinary party members is generally good, although some instances of financial dis- honesty and sexual profligacy have occurred. The fanatical well- indoctrinated "hard core" probably amounts to 20 percent in the case of the PKP and 30 percent for the Chinese Communists. In the case of the PKP, few have been members more than ten years. The top leaders of the PKP apparently are not of high caliber but the Chinese are of generally good quality. According to William Pomeroy, the American Communist who served with the Huk$ for two years, the various leaders displayed poor executive ability, poor ideological training, or lack of flexibility. Taken as a group, the PKP leadership has suffered from shortages of good exeoutives,and theoreticians since at least 1948. On the other hand, most top PKP leaders are hard working, resourceful, and hardened by the conditions of harassment under which they live. They have close connections with the common people and are responsive to their motivations. For the most part they SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET -- SECURITY INFORMATION are fairly young men in their late thirties or forties, and many have had only military experience during World War II and afterward as an occupational background. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH The Communist Party is not a legal political party in the Philippines and cannot run candidates on a ticket of its own. During the last general elections the PKP called for a boycott of the. elections. Chinese Communists in the Philippines apparently do not vote and do not have an electoral strategy. All political parties in the Philippines receiving votes in the last elections are avowedly anti-Communist. ? III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The military arm of the PKP, the Peoples' Liberation Army (HMB) or Huks, numbers between 5,000-10,000. Not all of these are active at any one time. Approximately half are farmers who only occasionally participate in Huk raids, ambuscades, etc. HUB units operate as guerrillas with the strength of individual bands'varying between five and 100. They have no heavy weapons but an ample supply of small arms in. fair to poor condition. So far as is known, the HLLB receives nog military support from outside the Philippines but may receive military advice from China. However, there is no definite information on the number ordutie's of Chinese Communists operating with the HMB. Opposed by approximately 23,000 government troops, the HMB retains capabilities for small scale raids, ambuscades, kidnappings', assassinations,and the dissemination of Communist propaganda. As a result of their depredations, nearly one-third of total government expenditures goes to the armed services. While the HMB does not threaten the stability of the government, they nevertheless are a drain on its, financial resources, hinder economic development, and tend to disrupt the food supply situation. HMB strength and activity is concentrated in Central and Southern Luzon; their plans for expanding operations in the central and. southern islands apparently have been abandoned for the present. In the face of the increased effectiveness of government military action against them,,. it is doubtful whether the HMB can expand its activities in the near future unless in the event of a fraudulent national election in 1953. HUB operations are hindered also by the improved discipline of the Philippine Army which has had the result of gaining the cooperation of many townspeople and peasants. While a sizeable number of local residents in Central Luzon remain sympathetic with the HMB or are Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION M 7 M fearful, of HMB reprisals, large numbers are now supporting the Army's efforts to eliminate HMB activities. Still, approximately 40,000 members of PKP mass organizations and Communist sympathizers aid the HMB in the collection of intelligence, procure food and recruits, work at HMB "production bases" in the Sierra Madres where root crops are grown, or act as couriers. They enable the HMB to sustain its present rather low level of activity. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMISM The Philippine Government and both major political parties are anti-Communist and no overt Communist activities are permitted. Although the PKP has not been outlawed by Congress, in 1951 a Philippine Court ruled that the PKP was a seditious and illegal association. Although this decision has been appealed, the Supreme Court probably will uphold the lower court's ruling. In-any event, all PKP members and members of auxiliary organizations are subject to arrest. All front organizations are underground and severely hampered by government agencies. In areas of the Philippines where Communists are most active, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the right to bail is denied to them. All Chinese Communist activities are also forbidden and individual Chinese Communists are subject to deportation to Taiwan on the sole grounds of Communist membership. Very little is known of the "underground" activities of Filipino or Chinese Communists. PKP organizations apparently are poorly trained and organized and with the exceptions of aiding Huks, collecting intelligence, and passing on word of mouth propaganda, do not appear to be very active. During 1951, Communist influence in the Philippine Labor move- ment was reduced drastically, and at present there are no Communist unions or known significant infiltration of labor unions or key .industries: The possibility of Communist infiltration exists. Party members have been ordered to make lists including all factories, the organizational status of laborers and leaders therein, and the problems of the laborers. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Communist front organizations apparently have been identified by the government and driven deeply underground in the Philippines. There appears to be no known significant infiltration of non-Communist organizations by Philippine Communists. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Since the suppression by the government of the large front labor organizations in 1951, the largest mass organization probably has been the National Peasants Union. It has an estimated 4,000-10,000 members located mostly in Central Iixzon and was formerly the largest peasants' organization. For the type of organization it is, it appears to have had good leadership, and were the present severe restrictive measures of the government to be relaxed, it probably could be considerably expanded. Two other known Communist mass organizations are the National Women's League and the National Youth League. In 1951, the former had a reported membership of 1,500 and the latter 2,200, but again, these organizations are underground and very little is known of their present activities. All known Chinese Communist organizations have gone underground. These include the Hwa Chi Comrades Association, the Anti-Japanese and Anti-Collaborators League, and the K'ang Fan. There appears to have been a significant infiltration of Chinese Chambers of Commerce in several cities and reports indicate a possible infiltration of the leading Chinese anti-Communist association -- the Anti-Communist Anti-Soviet Salvation Association. Present Communist planning calls for the organization and infil- tration of various mass organizations -- youth, women, intellectuals, etc., but to date there is no indication that they have made significant progress with these plans. From Cavite Province comes a report that a ""peace" organization (Katahimikan ng Mahirap - Peace for the Poor) was being organized. Party theory conceives of two main types of infiltration activities: "legal" and "illegal." ""Legal" infiltration activities consist of working toward a policy-making position within an organiza- tion, subtly exerting influence on its policies, and standing-by to replace an "illegal" cadre if the latter is arrested. "Illegal" activities include industrial sabotage and recruitment of new members for the HMB. A party member sometimes engages in both types of activities simultaneously. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT There is no known significant infiltration of the government by Communists. That some infiltration has occurred was evidenced by the court conviction in May 1951 of an official of the Department of Foreign Affairs for participation in the Communist rebellion, and in 1952, of a Nacionalista Congressman on a similar charge. There are reports of suspected Communist sympathies on the part of fairly prominent SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Administration officials, but these have not been confirmed. In the past there has also been some Chinese Communist infiltration of the Military Intelligence Service. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION There is no known Philippine Communist influence in Philippine public -opinion-forming circles, although a few journalists are reported to hold views sympathetic to Communism. There is some Chinese Communist penetration of Chinese schools and possibly one radio station. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTI There is no known Communist infiltration of the non-Communist Philippine political parties. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA Current Communist periodicals are the Mapagpalaya (The Liberator), Titis (the Spark), and Freedom. They appear at uncertain intervals and none probably has a circulation exceeding 10,000. They are clandestinely mimeographed in several or perhaps all-Party Regions at HMB camps. Information on Chinese Communist publications is not available. Two publications, Hungary, and The Working Youth in the Rumanian People's Republic, have been received unsolicited by individuals in Manila and Dumaguete and by the Philippine Education Company. There is no regular importing of Communist publications from abroad, but occasionally US Communist Party publications and Chinese Communist newspapers are smuggled in, the latter from Hongkong. There are no communist radio stations in the Philippines, with the possible exception of one station in Manila (the Kuo Tai Station) which in October 1952 was organized by an alleged Chinese Communist. Further information on this station is unavailable. There are no foreign Communist broadcasts directed specifically at the Philippines. The reception and size of audience of Peiping's daily 30-minute broadcast in English to Southeast Asia or its programs in Mandarin, Cantonese, and Amoy dialects to overseas Chinese are unknown. X'I. FINANCIAL CONDITION In recent years PKP theoreticians have emphasized the significance of finance and supply operations, both of which are called finance in PKP terminology. Data about the actual financial status of the PKP as of January 1953 are not available. Although foreign sources, notably SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 10 - the US Communist Party and Communist-dominated American labor unions, furnished fairly considerable financial aid to the PKP in the prewar period, the PKP apparently has received very little material assistance from abroad since World War II. In 1951, the party leadership promulgated a "one year program" for the PKP during fiscal year 1952, and expected party revenues for this period were budgeted at the fantasti- cally high figure of US $4,621,000. The captured American Communist, William Pomeroy, testified in mid-1952 that only "a tiny fraction" of this sum was collected. Party finances in 1952 probably were below those during 1950, for example. The PKP "Statement of Income" for the first six months of calendar year 1950 lists total party income for that period as US $10,750. Apparently, the greatest source of income is from raids and extortion practices. (In contrast, according to the PKP "Statement of Income," only $28.50 was realized from the sale of Titis in the period April-June 1950.) ?Data on the income of the Chinese Communists are unknown. Several business firms are controlled by the Chinese Communists, but revenue figures from these sources are not available. Probably'the over-all health of the Chinese Communists is better than that of the PKP, in view of the generally good financial standing of the Chinese community. III. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS There are no Soviet or?satellite establishments diplomatic or otherwise in the Philippines. XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Since the suppression of the various Communist front organiza- tions in the Philippines, there has been no evidence of any affiliation of Philippine groups with Communist International Organizations. There are no installations or meetings of these latter within the Philippines and no known receipt or transmission of funds to or from them. Philippine Communists, however, have attended several Congresses or Conferences held abroad. One Filipino reportedly attended the meeting of the International Union of Students in Peiping in 1951, and Teodosio Lansang (alias Manuel Cruz) attended the Berlin and Vienna Peace Council meetings in 1951 and 1952 respectively, and the Asian and Pacific Peace .Conference in Peiping in 1952. There was no known attendance at, such meetings by Chinese Communists in the Philippines. XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK The internal communication network of the PKP is a primitive one consisting primarily of the use of women couriers. The Philippine Army is supposed to have located the main north-south courier route on Luzon SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION which ran down through the Sierra Madres. Inter-island communication is by boat, and here there are infinite possibilities for'the Communists to choose. There are reports that important leaders have radio . receivers and that the Chinese Communists had established a transmitter in the Batanes Islands. Chinese Communists apparently have excellent covert communication and courier systems. Contacts with the outside, of which China is most important and US next, must be clandestinely arranged. The many islands and the long coastline of the Philippines offer many places for couriers-to land. There are reports of couriers landing in Manila, Albay Province, and various places in the Sulu Archipelago. Landings from unidentified submarines off the east coast of Luton are frequently reported but are to date unconfirmed. Most couriers apparently are Chinese who, after their arrival in the Philippines, manage to move about from place to place with no great trouble. The correlation of some PKP activities with general Communist strategy in the Far East possibly is effected at international Communist conventions and through couriers, but detailed proof of this is lacking. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.6 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THAILAND OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword . . . . . . . . . . ? . ? . ? . ? ? . ? ? . ? ? . ? ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1 I. Objectives . .. .. .. .... 1 II. Tactics .. . .. 1 III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . ? 2 ASSETS . . . ? ? ? ? ? . . ? I. Numerical Strength . . He Electoral Strength . ? III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 5 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . . . . 6 V. Communist Influence in Labor . . . . ? . . . . . . 7 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 VII? Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . . . . 10 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . ? . 10 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties ? ? . ? . . . . . ? ? ? . ?... . . . . ? 10 X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . ? . . ? . ? . ? ? ? ? 10 XI. Financial Condition ? ? ? ? . ? ? ? 13 XII, Soviet-Satellite Official Assets ? ? . . ? ? ? ? . . . 14 XIII. Communist International Organizations ? . ? . .. ? ? 15 XIV. Communist Communication Network . . ? ? ? . ? ? . ? ? 16 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance.- The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646ROO0300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN THAILAND:. OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The immediate-Coals of the Communists in Thailand are not easily discernible at the present moment, since the current vigorous anti- Communist drive of the Thai-authorities has presumably forced Communist leaders to reconsider their past strategy. Before November 10, 1952, the date when the Thai Government began its most recent attempt to suppress Communist activity, the imme- diate Communist objectives in Thailand appear to have been: 1. To expand and improve their own organizations, in preparation for the time when domestic events or external assistance might make a direct drive for power possible. 2. To mobilize all varieties of domestic sentiment against the present ruling group. 3. To undermine popular support for US policy in Asia and for Thailand's pro-American international orientation. 4. To render material and propaganda assistance to Communist-led rebels in Indochina and Malaya. In the current crisis, these objectives have probably been sub- ordinated to the overriding need to ensure the survival of key personnel. If the Thai police persevere in-their suppression of overt Communist activity, Communist strategy will probably be altered to give greater attention to underground organizational work and less attention to propaganda activity. II. TACTICS Two distinct Communist organizations-have developed in Thailand; the Thai Communist Party (TCP) and the Chinese Communist Party in Thailand (COP(T)). The TCP is small and appears to be dominated by the larger and better organized COP(T). Two distinct parties are maintained, however, because of the long-standing antipathy with which many Thai regard the Chinese and the desire to create the appearance of an indigenous Communist movement. The CCP(T) has attempted to gain strength by recruiting personnel for training, both in Thailand and in China; by soliciting funds for local expenses and for transmission to the mainland; by penetrating; Chinese schools, labor unions, business organizations, and regional associations; and by utilizing newspapers, some of which are subsidized, to carry propaganda. SECRET Q2348R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -6- vote for municipal councilmen); Pernambuco (43,563 or 18.1 percent of the total for state deputies); Rio de Janeiro State-(38,399 or 11.8 percent of the vote for federal deputies);.and Rio Grande do Sul (38,759 or 6.1 percent of the total vote for federal deputies). In Sao Paulo State the PCB was the fourth largest party, with about 40 percent of the vote received by the major party, and 66 percent of the vote received by the_ runner-up. In the Federal District the PCB led all other parties in elections for municipal councilmen, with a vote more than 20 percent higher than either of its two closest rivals. In Pernambuco the PCB was third, with about half the vote received by each of the two leading parties. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION Current Communist policy puts considerable emphasis on violence. Local party leaders in various parts of Brazil -- especially in Rio Grande do Sul, Parana, Santa Catarina, Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais -- have-in many instances in the past year taken advantage of mass economic grievances (rising prices, poor transportation, archaic landholding systems) to instigate or assume the direction of strikes, street demonstrations, and rural disorders. Data are not immediately available as to the number of people involved in these disturbances, but in any single instance the number probably would not surpass several hundred, which probably would represent the maximum that the PCB could bring out in any locality for violent demonstrations in connection with any current issue. There is evidence that the PCB is preparing, through organization of an "Army of National Liberation", for an eventual insurrection in which Communist participation would be more direct and on a broader scale. Reliable detailed information concerning Communist efforts to recruit, train, and equip such a force are lacking. The State of Minas Gerais, and especially the strategically located "Minas Triangle" bordering Sao Paulo, GoiAs , and Mato Grosso, is generally indicated as the main center of insurrectionary preparations. This region would appear to be especially well suited to guerrilla activities designed to disrupt Brazilian internal communications and to obstruct the supply of Brazilian strategic materials to the United States. A recent report states that Minas Gerais has been supplanted by northern Brazil as the .place of emphasis for PCB revolutionary activities. Probably not more than 50,000 persons would be available for guerrilla assistance to the Soviet Satellites in the event of an East- West war. Leadership would be available from a small number of active or inactive commissioned officers of the armed services and a larger number of noncomnissionedi officers. Weapons would be limited largely to small arms and explosives, of which the PCB quite likely has enough available to permit, for a relatively short period, effective guerrilla activity and sabotage in places isolated from main population centers. Approved For Re ET29001&t t:iWARRDP 8-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 7 - IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The Brazilian government for seven years has pursued a vigorous anti-Communist policy which has been highly effective in some sectors but of insignificant result in others. The PCB was outlawed in 1947 and all those elected to governmental office on the PCB ticket were removed early in 19).8. The PCB attempted to circumvent its illegality by simultaneous attempts to organize new parties as replacements for the PCB and to infiltrate or make deals with established parties to include Communists on their tickets. The government has refused to register parties organized to substitute for the PCB, and Communist efforts to infiltrate political parties and thereby gain entrance to governmental bodies have in many instances been defeated by governmental or party action to annul candidacies, invalidate elections of Communists to office, and remove Communists from party posts. The PCB has been unable effectively to infiltrate any party at the national level and its ability to do so at'the state level, though perhaps not at the municipal level, appears to have declined since 1948-L9. The PCB's success in achieving and retaining elective office for individual Communists likewise appears to have been minimal except in some munici- palities. The government in general has moved less vigorously and ef- fectively against the PCB's press and its front activities. Here governmental policy has been largely one of harrassment and obstruction rather than outright suppression, although it has acted to close some fronts and other Communist organizations which appeared especially threatening to internal security. The government-has also sought actively and with some success to influence public opinion against Communist fronts and their propaganda. Communist ability to gain non- Communist allies for their front activities is, together with the opposition of some non-Communist political opponents of the admini- stration to any measure which might threaten civil liberties, doubtless a factor in the government's failure to take drastic action against the PCB's press and its front activities. The government has given especially close attention to the problem of Communists in the labor movement. Under Dutra and until relatively recently under Vargas, the government has kept tight con-. trol over labor by intervention of unions, and legal proscriptions against voting and holding of labor-union office by Communists. Current policy favors greater independence for unions. Should the Communists as a result make any important gain, government action to vitiate it would be a reasonable expectation. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 ? SECRET - SECURITY INFOR"TION Government action against the Communist underground organization has until recently been limited and somewhat haphazard, although the police, especially of Rio, Sao Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul, appear to be vigilant and well informed of the PCB's activities. In the past year, and especially in the past few months, the administration has moved to break up the Communist; organization in the military and has arrested numerous allegedly Communist officers and enlisted men and brought them to trial. Pressure is now building up for similar action against Communists in the civil service, where legal considerations have thus far been a bar to a thorough anti-Communist purge. V. CCHMIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR A. Key Industries According to a mid-1952 report, a majority of the directors of the national dockworkers' organization (Sindicato National dos Contra-mestres, Marinheiros, Mocos s Remadores em Trans -ones Maritimos) were Communists and had succeeded in appointing a Communist delegate of the` organization in the port of Santos, a major.shipping center. A negro Communist, Geraldo Rodriguez, who had been on several trips to Europe and was in touch with head officials of the international Communist labor front, *7U,, was said to be playing a leading part in dockworkers' circles in Santos. Moreover, the Communist directorate of the national dockworkers' organization reportedly hoped to appoint Communist delegates to the, ports of Belem, Porto Alegre, and Rio de Janeiro in addition to Santos. Roberto Morena, Communist federal deputy and labor leader, was active in. promoting a dockworkers' strike held in Rio de Janeiro in the summer of 1952. Communist labor has pockets of strength in the national railroad system. In December 1952, according to the press, Communist labor leaders were active among Central do Brasil railway workers in an attempt to foment a railroad strike-. PCB has had cells in government-operated arsenals. In the course of its anti-Communist campaign, the government discharged a number of Rio Naval Arsenal workers accused of Communist membership or ties, but there is no assurance that a complete purge has been effected. WFTU in December 1951 gave propaganda support to a national strike of airline employees and pilots. The extent of Communist influence in national airlines is not known. B. Labor Unions Communist strength in the national labor movement is represented by the Brazilian Workers' Confederation (Confederagio dos Trabalhadores SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 20070723 : 78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -9- do Brasil, CTB). The Communist-dominated organization was outlawed In 19-47-7but, operating underground, apparently still gives PCB some strength in the labor movement. Communist capabilities for organization and leadership in some sections of the Brazilian labor movement if unchecked, would probably compare favorably with those of independent or,government -controlled labor leadership. Under government repression, Communist labor leadership has only limited capabilities to construct an organization of its own, but it does have some power to undermine non-Communist efforts to gain leadership of the workers. Thus in November 1952 non-Communist labor elements called a meeting to establish a National Trade Union Center designed to invigorate the Brazilian labor movement. The Communists took over the meeting and established a Permanent Inter-Syndicate Committee (Commissao Inter-Sindical Permanente, LISP) with the reported purpose of destroying existing labor organizations at their national level and replacing thew with a Communist apparatus. Communist influence is probably present to a considerable degree in many unions on the national level. Indeed, leaders of non-Communist federations admitted as much in November 1952 when they announced plans for an educational campaign within their affiliates to alert the membership to both Communist and Argentine efforts at penetration. There are only two national unions which recent reports definitely indicate are under.strong Communist influence. These are the dockworkers' organization mentioned above and the National Federation of Teamsters and Chauffeurs, with its 26 affiliated unions. In the 1952 union elections a Communist sympathizer was elected president, but only 6 of the,26 affiliates voted and the legality of the election was challenged by the defeated candidate with the support of the Sao Paulo teamsters' affiliate. The outcome of the challenge is not known. The strength of Communists in local unions is a subject of widely varying estimates. Trade union elections involving approximately 200 locals in the federal capital area during the period April-September, 1952 revealed no overall increase in Communist strength as measured by changes made in leadership of the. unions. Such figures as are available on Communist membership of local unions reveal that it is very small, but a handful of militant Communists in local trade unions have shown ability to agitate the workers, prolonging and worsening strike situations. In view of PCB's apparent lack of a widespread, tightly organized following in the labor movement, its leaders probably could not hope to organize a general strike or even a series of significant strikes. The Communist national labor front.. CTB, belongs to the hemisphere labor front, CTAL. Roberto Morena, CTB leader, is a member of the CTAL Central Committee. Another Brazilian is a member of the CTAL Secretariat SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION -10- in charge of CTAL liaison with the Trades Union Departments of the international Communist labor front, WFTU. Still another Brazilian labor leader, Joao Amazonas, was a member of the WFTU Secretariat in 1952. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND ,'PROFESSIO ORGANIZATIONS There are probably between 500 and 1,000 Communist front ,.organizations in Brazil, including local branches of national front movements. The two largest and most widely effective'national.front organizations are the Center for the Study and Defense of Petroleum and the National Economy (Centro de Estudos e Defesa do Petroleo a da Economia Nacional and he National rganiza on for the eIense7-of -Peace and Culture (Or aniza ao Nacional de Defesa da Paz a da Cultura, sometimes referred o as the Movimento Brasileiro oos Partidarios da Paz) designed to propagate nationalism and Isolation sm respectively. These organizations have branches in every state, in all important cities, and in many smaller localities. The Centro Nacional de Estudos e Defesa do Petroleo, which aims at nationalization o Brazilian petroleum resources and the preservation of other Brazilian mineral resources from exploitation by US capital, has had much wider appeal than the "peace" movement. In both cases, Rio, Sao Paulo, and Porto Alegre appear to be the main centers of strength. Millions of Brazilians undoubtedly have been influenced by the activity of both the "petroleum-defense" and the "peace" campaigns, but active participants in these movements, and especially the "peace" movement, are relatively few. In Rio de Janeiro, for example, a city of more than two million population, there were, fairly recently, only 623 dues-paying members of the local peace organization. Communist or pro-Communist intellectuals tend to take the leadership of the peace movement, and Brazilian nationalists are especially prominent in the petroleum organization. A relatively small number of Brazilian legislators and government officials -- most of them minor -- are active in one or the other movement on the national level. Members and-leaders in one movement tend to be active also in the other. Present indications are that both the peace and the petroleum fronts have reached the peak of their influence, and are probably incapable of any substantial expansion. This is probably especially true of.the_peace movement, which both the government and the responsible press have combatted vigorously. National fronts whose purposes and activities are to propagate anti-US nationalist and "peace" propaganda include the National Committee against the Brazil-US Military Agreement (Commissio Nacional Contra o Acordo Militar Brasil Estados Unidos), the Humanitarian SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 I Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Crusade for the Prohibition of Atomic Weapons (Cruzada Humanitaria pals P_rohibba2 o das Armas Atomicas), and the League for the Defense of Electric Power Liga de Defesa da Energia Eletrica). The last-nemed organization is active in Rio and other cities in combatting foreign control of public utilities. The Brazilian Association of Democratic Jurists (Associa ao Brasileira dos Juristas Democratas), whose activities are centered at Rio,de Janeiro, is a national front which has special importance internationally, being affiliated with the Communist International Association of Democratic Jurists. The League for the Defense of Democratic Liberties (Liga da Defesa das Libertades Democrfiticas) is another national front of considerable importance. All these organizations appear to be officered mostly by old-line Communists and chronic joiners of Communist fronts and have few important non-Communist adherents. Among organizations of professionals and intellectuals Communist influence is strong and in some instances predominant. Communists have for several years completely controlled the Brazilian Writers' Association (Associagao Brasileira do Escritores) of Rio de Janeiro, as a resuot of the resignation of anti-Communist members in disgust at Communist tactics of fraud and force. Various state organizations of writers, over which the Rio de Janeiro organization pretends to exercise control, are in some instances dominated.or strongly influenced by Communists or pro- Communists., The Communist group among the writers contains some first- rate literary men but in large degree appears to consist of pseudo- intellectuals and journalistic hacks. In late 1952 anti-Communist literary leaders took first steps toward organizing an anti-Communist writers' association. . Communist organizations among minority groups are especially important among the Poles, who form a sizable colony in southern Brazil. The principal Communist organization among the Poles is the Polish Communist Party. There is also a Communist-infiltrated organization, the Polish Association. These organizations are countered by the Polish Cultural Union of Brazil, the only national Polish organization in Brazil, which works for the defeat of Communism and the liberation of Poland. The small Russian colony's Centro Russe, formed in 1943 as, a nonpolitical social center, was suspected in early'.1951 of being a Russian espionage organ. Armenian cultural associations in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo are reported to be Communist or to contain pro- Communists. The Syrian-Lebanese colony in Belo Horizonte, estimated to consist of 250 to 300 members although not known to be formally organized, is reported to be the financial backbone of the PCB in that city. Among students the Communists still exert considerable influence, although in the past year or two they have lost control of the national SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -12- organizations representing university students, the National Union of Students (Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes) and high school students, the Brazilian Union of Secondary Students Unniiioo Brasileira dos Estudantes Secundarios). The Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes decided in August 1951 to sever its ties with the International Students' Union, a Communist international front; the vote, 2011 to 159, indicated the continuance of a strong Communist or pro-Communist minority in the organization, although for a year or more the group had been free of Communist officers. On both university and secondary school levels, Communists remain in control of some state students organizations. Communist strength among students appears to be especially pronounced in Sao Paulo. It is believed that as a general rule Communist influence among students as a whole is considerably less than in organizations formed to represent the group. The outstanding women's organization of political purpose in Brazil is apparently the Communist-controlled Federation of Brazilian Women (Federa ao das Mulheres do Brasil), believed to have been founded about 1949 on Communist initiative.- T his organization, with headquarters at Rio, appears to have branches in Sao Paulo, Ceara, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, Bahia, Pernambuco, and the State of Rio de Janeiro. It may have branches also in other states. The organization apparently is strongest in Sao Paulo. Delegates attending the first National Women's Congress, sponsored by the Brazilian Women's Federation in 1951, are reported to have been all Communists. Women in Brazil tend to be politically apathetic. They are also strongly influenced by the Roman Catholic Church. These factors tend to limit expansion of the Federation's influence. VII. CO?EMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT There is no comprehensive detailed information available concerning the extent of Communist infiltration of the government. .The anti-Communist press has alleged that there are a number of Communists in high government positions, including the head of the Price Control Commission, the director of the Public Service Administrative Department, President Vargas' private secretary, and several men in the Brazilian Foreign Office or its diplomatic missions. (The Foreign Office is now investigating charges against some of its personnel.) The evidence brought out'against most of these men in some instances is sufficient to raise strong doubts as to their loyalties, but it is not fully convincing, especially since the allegations have come in large part from newspapers interested in embarrassing. President Vargas. A 1952 report states that there were at that time approximately 80 militants in the Ministry of Transportation and Public Works; 50 each in the Ministry of Education and Public Health and the Ministry of Justice; 40 each in the Ministries of Agriculture, Labor and Finance; SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For K016ase 2000105123 : CIA-KU P78-026468000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 13 and one cell with an unknown number of militants in the Foreign Office. These figures, if correct, indicate that percentagewise, the strength of Communism in the agencies named is very small. Evidence to suggest the level at which their influence can make itself felt, and how, is not available. In the government-owned shipping company, Lloyd Brasileiro, and the nationalized railroad, Estrado do Ferro Central, Communist strength was reported in 1952 as being somewhat larger: about 200 militants and 450 contributing sympathizers in Lloyd Brasileiro and 150 militants and 200 contributing sympathizers in the Estrado do Ferro Central. A number of reports indicate a fairly heavy infiltration of the Federal Service for Protection of the Indians. Concerning infil- tration of police and security services there is only scattered information. The low pay and social origins of many policemen would seem to tend to make them vulnerable to Communism, however. Communist Party membership in the armed services has frequently been estimated as about 5 percent at the maximum, with the navy probably less heavily infiltrated than the other two service branches. Member- ship is believed to be limited largely to enlisted men and noncommissioned officers and to include few, if any, commissioned officers above the middle echelons. According to a report of late 1951 there were 105 militants in the Ministry of Air, 90 each in the Ministries of War and Navy, and 150 militants and 450 contributing sympathizers at the Navy Arsenal. Apparently most of the Communist group at the Navy Arsenal, and presumably many of the alleged Communists in the service ministries, are civilian employees. The government recently dismissed a number of alleged Communist workers at the Navy Arsenal, and has been arresting and bringing to-trial alleged Communist servicemen. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION There is good indication that Communists and their sympathizers are fairly numerous in the fields of education and entertainment (including radio) and in the non-Communist press. For Brazil as a whole there are no precise data available as to the number of Communists in these activities, and there is no adequate basis for estimating the number of people subject thereby to Communist propaganda. A 1952 US Embassy report states that key positions in several Sao Paulo radio stations (unidentified) are held by Communists, including six Communists who are either program directors or station announcers. A similar situation is reported with regard to radio stations in Rio de Janeiro and Porto Alegre. In the latter city one of the leading stations is directed by a suspected Communist. Radio Tupi and Radio Difusora may be two of the stations reported to be under Communist influence in Sao Paulo. Communist influence in religious groups is small. The Greek Orthodox Church in Belo Horizonte, composed entirely of Syrians and Lebanese, reportedly looks to Moscow for its orientation. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -14 - IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES Except in isolated instances on the local level, Communist influence in right-wing organizations and political parties appears to be negligible, although the ultranationalism of some members of conservative groups sometimes appears to put them in the same camp with the Communists. Left-wing, non-Communist organizations and parties are relatively few in Brazil. The most radical of these groups is the small Brazilian Socialist Party, which recently has appeared to be under considerable Communist influence. Other parties (such as Vargas' Brazilian Labor Party) offering programs more or less leftist in orientation tend to be officered at the top by conservatives, although in the lower echelons, and especially at municipal levels, there appears frequently to be considerable Communist influence. X. COM1VJNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA Communist Publications The Communists publish a fairly large number of newspapers and periodicals in Brazil, most of them small in circulation and poor in quality. Total circulation has been estimated at 50,000. Twenty-six Communist publications are listed below according to place of publication. In addition the Communists are believed to produce a number of small periodicals pointed toward special groups such as labor unions and the armed forces.. Communist Newspapers and Periodicals Place of Publication Rio de Janeiro (Federal District) Mom ento Femenino (weekly) Literatura (monthly) Problemas: Revista Mensal Cultura otic`a Title and Frequency Circulation Im rensa Popular (daily) Variously estimated at between 20-30,000 and at about 5,000 p Voz 0 eraria (weekly) 15-25,000 de Nearly 20,000 of one issue published in early 1951 (including 5,000 for Sao Paulo, 3,500 for Fed. District, 1,500 for Rio Grande do Sul, more than 700 each for Rio de Janeiro Bahia, and Minas Gerais Approved For R&ease 20Ua/05/23: "CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 15 - Place of Publication Sao Paulo Belem Title and Frequency Circulation 0 Popular de Hoe (weekly) Fundamentos (monthly) Tribuna do Para (semi-monthly) 200 Jornal de Povo (daily) 200 Micr6bio (clandestine publication) Campo Grande Curitiba Florianopolis Fortaleza Goiana Guaratingueta Maceio Porto Alegre Recife Salvador .Santos Taubate Vit6ria Uberlandia 0 Democratica (weekly) Jornal do Povo (weekly) Novos Dias (monthly) 0 Democratica (daily) 0 Estado de Goias (thrice weekly) Folha Popular (weekly) Voz do Povo (irregular) A Luta (weekly) Tribuna Gaucha (daily but irregular) Folha do Povo (daily) 0 Momento (daily) A T ribuna 0 Povo (weekly) Folha Capixaba (weekly) Tribuna do Povo SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 1,500 1400 to 1,000 1,000 - 1,500 2,ObO - 3,000 Reported 6,000 to 8,000, but pro- bably much less Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -16- B. Pro=Communist, Disguised Publications There are undoubtedly some such publications in Brazil, but they would for the most part be of little significance. Two years ago, there were at least two publications of this type in the Federal District, one of which was entitled Emancipagao, which appealed to Brazilian nationalists interested in preventing foreign exploitation of Brazilian petroleum and other mineral resources. Emancipa ao, which may still be published, very soon lost its ncn-Communist disguise. C. Communist Printing Establishments Information on Communist printing establishments is scanty. Two publishing houses founded by the PCB -- Edigoes Horizontes and Editorial Vitoria, in the Federal District -- are known to have published until 1917 Russian-language books in Portuguese translation. These firms may still be active. Waldir Duarte, Editor, Livros- Revistas-Jornais, of the Federal District, was reported in 1951 to be engaged in the publication and distribution of Voz Operaria and other Communist publications. Grifico Luxo Arte ana OZON, also in the Federal District, reportedly have even uuse-T"By -t e PCB to print its propaganda. Communist publishing houses in Belo Horizonte are reported to include Grafico,Ne tunia and Tipogrtfia Cruzeiro. D. Import of Communist Publications from Abroad Soviet newspapers reportedly are not available for public purchase but may be obtained by a few select customers at a few book- stores or newsstands. A small number of Soviet publications also enters the country by mail on a subscription basis. Satellite publications from Czechoslovakia and especially Poland reportedly are received in much larger quantities directly from Europe, in part (at least until recently) by diplomatic pouch. Polish publications are believed to have a wide circulation among Slavic groups. Montevideo is reported to be animportant transfer point for import into Brazil of some Communist publications from abroad. Foreign Communist publications which are reported received in Brazil include the Soviet publications Union Sovietica and Mundo Es.tudiantil, and the pro-Communist Ukrainian D ly News, of New York. The , ov et publications Tiem os Novo and Literratura ovietica probably also enter Brazil. The Moscow radio broadcasts one-half an hour daily in Portuguese to Brazil. The broadcasts are of high intensity and intelligibility, but their potential. audience is limited by the fact that they cannot SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Reldase 2000105723 : -02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 17 - be received on standard home radios except those equipped with short wave bands. Soviet programs are not -- or were not in 1951 - rebroadcast from any point outside the USSR or within Brazil. The propaganda nature of Soviet broadcasts is completely obvious, and they probably have slight if any influence among non-Communist groups. X.I. FINANCIAL CONDITION No specific data which would serve to give a general picture of PCB revenues and financial assets are available. The general financial condition of the party appears to be shaky. The printing facilities and paper used for Communist publications in most instances are poor,and the Communist press is frequently in financial difficulties. XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS Poland and Czechoslovakia are the only countries of the Soviet- Satellite Bloc which maintain diplomatic relations with Brazil. Their missions at Rio de Janeiro are small, consisting of two diplomatic representatives in the case of Poland and four in the case of Czechoslovakia. Poland maintains a consulate general at Sao Paulo and a consul at Curitiba. There is also a Polish consular agent at Porto Alegre. Both Poland and Czechoslovakia maintain ostensibly commercial enterprises in Brazil. These firms reportedly contribute to the fi- nancial support of the PCB and are also said to operate as centers for .espionage. The commercial firms with Czechoslovakian connections are either subsidiaries of Czech state trading organizations bearing similar names or are appointed representatives of the state trading corporations. The Polish Legation sponsors two known trading organizations. A third such enterprise was established by a represent;:.tive of the Polish Red Cross. With regard to propaganda, Polish representatives are much more active and influential than are the Czechoslovakians. Polish consular establishments in southern Brazil are especially important centers for the distribution of propaganda among the large Slavic population of the region. Polish efforts appear to be directed mainly toward influencing Slavic groups. However, both the Polish Minister at Rio and the Consul General at Sao Paulo have also endeavored to promote Polish influence among non-Polish Brazilian groups through social and cultural activities, as have consular officials in other areas. Polish diplomatic and consular establishments print or sponsor the printing of a number of publications in Brazil. These include A Pol6nia de Hoje, a monthly publication printed and distributed by the Pol ski - mission at Rio; Siewca, a weekly controlled by the Polish mission and % SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION _ 18 - serving as a propaganda organ of the Polish Communist party; Kurier Poiski, a'Polish-language weekly published in Sao Paulo under sponsorship of the Polish mission; a Polish news bulletin -- for distribution to the Brazilian press -- published by the Polish Cultural Union (Uniao Cultural cos Poloneses no Brasil) presumably under the direction of the Polish mission; and Glos Marynarza, a clandestine newspaper published by the Polish consul general at Sao Paulo. The Czech 'mission puts out at least one propaganda magazine. XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The Brazilian front corresponding to the International Association of Democratic Jurists, international Communist front, was host at a regional meeting, the Continental Conference of Democratic Jurists of America held in Rio de Janeiro in November December 1952. The meeting was attended by Communists and fellow travellers from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Guatemala,,and Mexico. Attendance of Brazilian delegations at meetings of Communist international organizations held abroad was as follows in the period 1951-52. Meeting Date Brazilian Representation World Peace. Council (Berlin) February 1951 Regional Meeting., Partisans of Peace (Montevideo) April 1951 Conference of Latin `American Land and Air Transport Workers (Guatemala City) May 1951 Third World Youth Festival (Berlin) August 1951 about 100 5th Congress of Inter- national Association of Democratic Jurists (Berlin) September 1951 8 American Continental Congress of Peace Partisans (Montevideo) (no public sessions held) March 1952 about 100 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23: CIARDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Brazilian Representation (Moscow) April 1952 12(or more) - 19 - Me~ Date Moscow Economic Conference International Conference in Defense of Children (Vienna) 13th Session, Executive Council, International Federation of Democratic Women (Bucharest) CTAL Central Committee Meeting (Mexico City) Asian and Pacific Regions Peace Conference April 1952 July 1952 1 (possibly more) September 1952 (Peiping) October 1952 3 *00 All-Union Communist Party Congress (Moscow) October 1952. 2- World Congress of Peoples for Peace (Vienna) December 1952 about 50 XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK Little is known definitely concerning the nature of the Communist international comunications network. The Czech and Polish missions at Rio are available for use in international communications. The Soviet nission at Montevideo also may be important in the international communications network of the PCB9 with the large and freely operating Communist-dominated S]aric Union of Uruguay possibly serving as an intermediary. Brazilian Communists travelling between Brazil and Europe doubtless serve frequently as couriers. Internally, intercommunication between Communists appears to be effected without difficulty. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-665.29 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:. CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, CHILE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITI INFORMATION TABLE OF CONFENTS Foreword ? e ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? e ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Page ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . ? . 1 I? Objectives ? e ? ? ? 1 II. Tactics . . . . . 1 III. Capabilities . . .. . 3 ASSETS e 5 I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . ? 5 II. Electoral Strength . . . . . .. . . . . 5 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 6 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . < . . . ? . . . ? 6 Communist Influence in Labor . < . . 7 VI? Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations . . . . ? . ? ? ? . . ? ? 9 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . ? . .. 11 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . 12 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties . .. .. .. 12 Communist Propaganda Media . 12 XI. Financial Condition . . ? ? , ? . ? . . . ? .. ? ? . 14 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . ? . . . ? . ? . . ? 14+ XIII. Communist International Organizations . .. . ? . . . 15 XIV. Communist Communication Network . . ? ? . . ? . . ? ? 16 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance.- The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN CHILE: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The chief concern of the Chilean Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Chile, PCCh) is repeal of the anti-Communist eeffense of Democracy Law of 1948 which seriously restricts the party's ability to achieve its other objectives. These are mainly objectives which directly impair US-Chilean relations and by so doing fulfill foreign policy requirements of the USSR. They include (1) abrogation of the Mutual Security Agreement (MSA) with the United States, (2),nationali- zation of US-owned copper mines, (3) resumption of diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet bloc, and (4) creation of an anti-US bloc of Latin American countries as advocated by Chilean nationalists. The objective of regaining legal status through repeal of the Defense of Democracy Law imposes certain tactical limitations upon PCCh efforts to attain its other immediate objectives, counseling as it does moderate and constitutional methods of action. Such consti- tutional methods of action are apparently viewed by the Chilean Communists as more effective, at least for the time being, than violence. The underlying strategic policy of the PCCh is to attempt to win a direct following among key social groups -- labor, students,and intellectuals - and to use this following to exert pressure upon national policy. Current PCCh strategy is implemented through the Communist-led "People's Front", which serves as the political instru- ment of agitation for "national liberation" and for the specific immediate objectives of PCCh. Unlike the old Chilean Popular Front, this political front is dominated by the Communists and is not a major political force. Communist organizational efforts among the key social groups are directed to unifying these groups under the 'leadership of Communists and Communist sympathizers so that they may give strength to the demands of the "People's Front". PCCh has not committed its political front to either the new regime led by nationalist ex-dictator Carlos Ibanez or to the de- feated Radical Party which informer years worked with the Communists in the Popular Front. Although the Communists opposed Ibanez in the September 4, 1952 election, they hailed his victory as a defeat for the United States arid offered him the conditional support of the "People's Front" for a program of "liberation" from US influence. They present their political action as designed to offset the in- fluence of the rightists on the Ibanez administration and to force SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION the administration to keep its campaign promises, which included repeal of the Defense of Democracy Law, opposition to US influence, and trade and diplomatic relations with all the countries of the world. On the other hand, the Communists are maneuvering into electoral combinations with the defeated Radical Party, which has been moving left since its fall from power, and they have found Radical and other non-Communist allies in labor and student groups that oppose Ibanez. Long influential in labor, the Communists have used unions under their domination as effective instruments to promote their ob- jectives. Their ability to hold together a labor following has hinged largely upon their success in settling worker grievances and the skill of Communist lawyers in handling involved labor-management negotiations. Communist-influenced unions have brought pressure on government officials, have fomented numerous strikes, and have staged public demonstrations in favor of such Communist objectives as repealing the anti-Communist law. In its efforts to regain legality -, the party has, when possible, avoided taking open leader- ship in strikes. To its labor target PCCh stresses the need of unity to prevent government control of labor as in Argentina. Communist propaganda to students and youth lays major stress on the peace motif. Emphasizing that in all countries youth is the first victim of war, the PCCh endeavors to create a feeling of in- ternational youth solidarity by recruiting delegates to international Communist-dominated youth conferences and otherwise encouraging a spirit of international camaraderie. Enthusiastic delegates returning from such conferences have been widely used to rally new members for the PCCh. The Communists have also used students effectively in demonstrations against high prices and the Defense of Democracy Law because of government hesitation to use force against student demonstrators. In addition to labor and student targets, the Communists are attempting to influence many other groups through a wide variety of Communist fronts, including price-control committees which appeal to housewives,' friendship centers for foreign groups in Chile, and clubs for artistic and literary groups. The Communists developed clandestine methods of operation in the period 1948-50 when the Defense of Democracy Law was fully en- forced and PCCh still operates clandestinely to some extent. Its underground tactics included attempts to exert influence on labor at the lower levels and to continue propaganda operations through a range of Communist fronts and clandestine publications. SECRET - SECURITY Iii RMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET.- SECURITY INFORMATION Contacts between the Soviet bloc and Chile are maintained by Chilean Communist officials or their trusted sympathizers, who at fairly regular intervals visit'the Soviet orbit or exchange views with Communist party leaders from other Latin American countries who have been to Moscow. Moscow directs two and one-half hour radio programs to Latin America daily, and Budapest an hour program. Soviet literature comes into Chile direct from the Soviet bloc or from Uruguay, Mexico, and other Latin American countries. The PCCh is believed at the present time to receive little financial aid from outside the country. III. CAPABILITIES The Communists now face both favorable and unfavorable factors in attaining; their objectives. Favorable factors include the new Ibanez administration's support for the repeal of the Defense of Democracy Law and the similarity between Communist objectives and some of those advocated by Ibanez' nationalistic supporters. The Interior Minister, the Public Works Minister, and the new chief dele- gate to the UN have long been sympathetic to certain Communist ac- tivities, such as propaganda for "peace", and agitation for greater revenues from the US copper companies. Apparently through their ties with the Interior Minister, the Communists have reportedly obtained permission to hold a meeting of the Communist-dominated Latin American Confederation of Labor (Confederation de Trabajadores de America Latina, CTAL) in Santiago in March and a Continental Cultural Conference at about the same time. The new foreign Minister, although long.hostile to Communism, is nevertheless a leading advocate of a Latin American economic bloc. The Communists are also having some success in interesting the Radicals in the restoration of a Popular Front. The Communist-Socialist candidate in the senatorial by-elec- tion of January 4, 1953 received considerable Radical support. The threat of possible government moves toward control of labor has played into the hands of the Communists in their efforts to rally labor unity against such a development. The Communists' greatest recent membership gains have re- portedly been among youth groups. This may stem in part from the PCCh success in sending Latin America's most influential delegation, including some prominent Catholic student leaders, to the Berlin Youth Festival in 1951. Communist propaganda has also had consider- able success among teachers, and the Teachers' Federation shows strong Communist influence. The Communist press is allowed to cir- culate freely, and two Communist senators have been permitted to.re- main in congress despite the illegality of the party. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION These factors favoring the Communists are balanced and in some respects outweighed by unfavorable factors. In the September 4, 1952 presidential election, the Communist-supported candidate won only 52,000 votes out of 900,000 in contrast to Ibanez' huge vote of 435,000. The Radical Party and its allies ran well behind the anti- Communist right-wing parties. Ibanez is thus in a strong position to curtail Communist activities as he did in his previous administra- tion if the party becomes more aggressive. Ibanez knows that the US is Chile's main copper market and its principal source of loans; hence, he is not likely to be easily influenced by Communist demands that Chile pursue a clear-cut anti-US policy. The Communists also face increasing competition in labor, including the growing strength of the rival Popular Socialists, who now control the Labor Ministry, the expanding influence of the Catholic Falange in the nitrate fields, and the new labor confederation-of Ibanezl leading woman supporter, violently anti-Communist Senator Maria de la Cruz. Although the Popular Socialists and the Falange might join with the Communists to oppose government control of labor, they are well versed in Communist maneuvers and would be unlikely to lend themselves to Communist cam- paigns in general. Both parties have at times criticized the US but they have been even more critical of the USSR. Furthermore, the Communists have so far been notably unsuccessful in their efforts to penetrate the Armed Forces and the national police. Although the political-situation in Chile is still fluid under the new administration, there seems little likelihood that the Communists will attain their immediate objectives, with the possible exception of the repeal of the Defense of Democracy Law. Since its election, the Ibanez administration has specifically stated that it- does not intend to nationalize copper, abrogate the Mutual Security Agreement, or resume relations with the Soviet. Althou ghsome of Ibanez' advisers favor a Latin American economic bloc, Ibanez himself has been noncommittal since his election. If Chile's economic situa- tion should deteriorate, however, the administration would be under increasing pressure to pursue extremist policies, some of which would be favorable to the Communists. "SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN CHILE: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH PCCh is believed to have about 35,000 members at,thejpresent time, or about two-thirds of the membership it claimed in 194? prior to the outlawing of the party. Most Communist membership is located in the strategically important mining centers of the north, in major urban centers, and in the coal-mining areas. Labor provides-the bulk of PCCh membership although intellectuals, students, and professional people are qualitatively as important to the party. PCCh has apparently maintained a satisfactory level of organi- zation and operation despite membership losses since being outlawed in 1948. The party has carried, out several minor purges in this period to tighten party organization and to eliminate members sus- pected of weakness or disloyalty. Dissensions and purges do not seem to have lowered the readiness of the party membership that remained loyal after 1948 to accept the'party line. Party leadership is in the hands of a predominantly middle-aged "old guard", most of whom have had 20 years or more of service in the Communist movement. Political Commission members must have at least 10, years as mili- tants in the party. Most of PCCh's 35,000 members have at least five years of service in the party ranks. Party membership dipped sharply following the outlawing of PCCh in 1948 and has made some slight recovery since 1950, when the party was able to resume more or less overt operation. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH The candidate of the Communist-Socialist People's Front (Frente del Pueblo) won oily 52,000 votes (5 percent of the total) in t e 5 p ember 4, 1952 elections. Many fellow travellers reportedly defected to the victorious candidate, Carlos Ibanez, who made a strong appeal to-leftist and mass groups. In January 4, 1953 by-elections for Senator of Santiago Province (national capital and environs), the candidate of the People's Front won 68,000 votes ( 33 percent of the total). This area is a center of Communist strength, and the Front candidate also had the support of any members of the major op- position Radical Party. Should the Communists, as is now anticipated, regain legal etatus', the Communist-Socialist ticket might be 'able to rally 80,000 votes in the March 1953 elections for Congress, or approximately 9 percent of the probable total vote. The division of the national vote of about 900,000 in the March 1953 elections is expected to be about as follows: SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET -.SECURITY INFORMATION -6- Government-supporting parties 380,000 Rightist parties 255,000 Center-left parties 185,000 People's Front 80,000 Where the Peoplets Front is strongest, its vote is expected to compare with that of the other major party groupings as follows: Santiago Antofagasta Concepcion. Valparaiso. Peoplets Front 32,000 }4,000 10,000 8,000 Government 130,000 12,000 25,000 40,000 Right 70,000 3,000 12,004 20,000 Center-left 40,000 6,000 12,000 15,000 III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION PCCh at present opposes use of armed insurrection or violence to effect Communist objectives. There have been no violent Communist demonstrations since April 1949 when 19 or more persons were wounded in resisting police action to break up an illegal meeting of several thousand Communists and sympathizers in Santiago. In 1951 three party leaders who favored use of violent tactics were expelled from PCCh. Should PCCh revise its policy, which was outlined in a mani- festo of August 1952, it is believed that the party could, under cer- tain circumstances, bring out four to five thousand demonstrators in the capital city of Santiago. Probably only a fraction of this number would be willing to use violence.. PCCh apparently has no armed units, but some Communists have collected arms in their homes. Police investigation of an explosio. in a Communist workerts home in 1950 revealed an arms cache of 12 ;machine guns, a number of home-made cartridges, and other n ateriel ; IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM PCCh was outlawed by the Defense of Democracy Law of September 3, 1948. The present administration has promised repeal of the law, which might be effected prior to the March 1953 congreosional elections. In the event of Communist disturbances, however, the administration could invoke the Law on the Internal Security of the State or request special emergency powers which are usually granted. For two years after the passage of the 1948 measure outlawing PCCh, its activities and ability to circulate propaganda were severely circumscribed. The law aroused strong opposition from non-Communist as well as Communist labor because of certain restrictive features affecting labor organizations in general, and it has not been strictly SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 V SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION enforced since 1950. Communist activity was, in any case, never -wholly eliminated because PCCh set up a number of Communist fronts 1-tnd also continued to wield influence in labor at the shop level of labor organizations. Communist propaganda now circulates freely. Should the government again undertake measures to curtail PCCh activity, the party would no doubt make use of its experience in the period 1948-50, when the anti-Communist law was enforced, to carry on covert operations and disseminate propaganda through fronts. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR Communists have been denied union office under Chile's anti- Communist legislation and the government made strong efforts in the period 1948-50 to stifle all Communist activity in the labor movement. These efforts did not succeed, in large part because of the absence of effective labor leaders of other parties and the inability of the Chilean workers to gain hoped-for unity and effectiveness without the collaboration of Communist labor elements. For a time it appeared that the National Association of White-collar' Workers (Junta Nacional de Empleados de Chile, JUNECH), a strong and largely non-oomunist organization, might point the way toward reorganization of workers on aurnified basis independent of Communist influence. JUNECH, however, has recently been working in cooperation with the Communists to form a unified organization of white-collar and manual workers. The degree of collaboration of the white-collar unions with the Communist-led workers may increase as the two groups find'a common cause in opposing a projected government-controlled workers' federation. Communist labor leaders are reportedly in virtually uncontested control of unions in the nitrates fields and coal mines. The major' copper workers' federation is'anti-Communist, but the Communists con- tinue to command a minority following among copper-mine labor. At present the Communists are not believed to have much strength in the railway federation or in communications. If, however, the promises of certain government officials to restore to their jobs workers dis- charged for political purposes are kept, there may occur a recrudes- cence of Communist influence in railway and communications unions. There are no reliable figures on the present membership of the Communist-controlled Confederation of Chilean Workers (Confederation de Traba adores de Chile, CTCh) or on the Communist element therein. Ch claims to represent 400,000 manual and white-collar workers, al- though,it admits that these workers are not all members of affiliates,. of the Communist CTCh. As the total legal trade-union membership in 1950 was 262,000 plus another 100,000 government employees and rail- road workers in unions without legal status, this claim appears to be exaggerated. Most CTCh affiliates, as the National Mining Federation SECRET -.SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 8 - (Federacion Nacional Minera) and the National Metallurgical Federation ( ed~ erasion Nacional Metal 'gica) are doubtless Communist-controlled. Nevertheless, the majoritiyof rank-and-file members probably have little real understanding of the meaning of Communism and are.interested mainly in the material benefits promised to them by the Communist leaders. Labor organizations that are not controlled by the Communists, but that are strongly influenced by PCCh on the national level, in- clude affiliates of the important National Association of White-collar Workers (JUNECH). Estimated membership of JUNECH is about 110,000 and includes both government and private employees. Communist penetration of JUNECH affiliates, though probably slight on a numerical basis, is significant because of the posts held by Communists. Thus the JUNECH official organ is under the virtual control of a Communist adminis- trator and its Communist editor. The Secretary of Organization and the Secretary of Union Problems of the association of white-.collar workers in private industry are Communists. The president of the association of government employees, while not a Communist, has be- come a complete tool of the 'ommunists. The teachers' federation is reportedly Communist-controlled and if the new governns nt rehires teachers dismissed by the previous regime under the Defense of De- n cracy Law provisions, Communist strength would be even further aug- mented The president and two of the principal leaders of the semi- government workers' federation are Communists. Thus, while JUNECH relatively seldom follows the Communist line as such, its. affiliates are very susceptible to'Communist influence. The Communists have taken the lead in groups working for a nat~on4 labor confederation to include all workers, both manual and white-collar and have worked closely with leaders of JUNECH in these endeavors. Strong Communist influence was apparent in the National Unifying Movement for Workers, formed in 1950, and the National Com- mittee for Workers and Employees, set up in late 1951. The under- lying Communist purpose in encouraging the establishment of these committees was to try to unify labor into a central organization subject?to-Communist guidance. A so-called "National Committee for Syndical Unity", which includes representatives of all major labor groups was formed in October 1952. The Communist CTCh is sponsoring a meeting scheduled for February 1953 to carry out the objectives of this Committee. The Communist CTCh is affiliated with the Communist-controlled Latin American Confederation of Workers (CTAL) and is represented on the CTAL Central Committee. CTCh is also affiliated with the WFTU and the CTCh affiliate, the National Metallurgical Federation, is affiliated with WFTU's international trades department in this field. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ,Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The PCCh has set up a wide variety of front organizations --directed toward youths, women, professional, artists, intellectuals and miscellaneous groups that can be interested in the PCCh goals of "peace" and friendship with countries in the Soviet bloc. The largest and most influential front group is the Peace Movement (Movimiento for la Paz, MPP), which is affiliated with the World Peace Council. The size of its membership is not known, but it has branches in all the larger cities:. Its directorate includes not only top Communists but also influential non-Communists such as Interior Minister Guillermo del Pedregal, MPP president until his recent cabinet appointment. Since the organization has close ties with members of the Ibanez administration, its capabilities for expansion would appear to be improved. In addition to the MPP, the PCCh has set up additional peace fronts to attract specific groups, including the Youth Committee for Peace, the National Committee of Labor Partisans for Peace, and the Spanish Committee for Peace. Closely allied with the Peace Movement are the various centers of "friendship" with nations of the Soviet bloc, such as the Committee of Friends of the Soviet Union, three committees relating to Communist China, one to Poland, and two each to Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The size of these "friendship" centers is not known, but more than 1,000 persons attended a function of the Committee of Friends of.the Soviet Union on November 7, 1952, the anniversary of the Russian revolution. In the group-were members of the Chilean Committee of Friends of Czechoslovakia (Comite de Amigos de Checoeslova uia), Friends of Hungary Center (Centro de Amigos de Hungar a , Chilean-Chinese Cultural Institute Institute Chileno-Chino de Cultura), Friends of Poland Center (Centro Amigos de Polonia, and other front groups; numerous members of the Jewish colony, most of whom are foreigners; and many students from the Unitersity of Chile. PCCh apparently con- siders these "friendship" centers a valuable method of attracting non- Communists to help promote Soviet international objectives, including increased trade between Chile and the Soviet bloc. In some instances, an anti-Communist organization has sprung up to rival the Communist center. For example, the Polish Union of Chile and the Czech Union are both strongly anti-Communist. For Chilean youths, one of the key PCCh targets, the party con- tinually organizes new fronts to attract additional non-Communist leadership. Two youth fronts now in the field are the Popular Youth Movement (Movimiento Juvenil Po ular) and the Front of Popular Youth (Frente de uventudes ooppulares , which have their strongest following SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -10- in the cities, particularly the university centers of Santiago, Valparaiso, and Concepcion. Although the Communists have hitherto been the most active party in the youth field, they are now re- ceiving increasing competition from the new Ibanista youth movement. Some of the most active Communist fronts have been set up to attract artistic and professional groups. Among these are the Alliance of Intellectuals of Chile (Alianza de Intelectuales de Chile, AICh), Continental Art Group (Grouo de Arta Continents , "Gebriela Mistral" Artistic Society (Con un-to Art!stico "Gabriela Mistral"), Union of Painters (Union de 'ntoresxperimentater eatro Experimental), Committee of mocratic wwyers (Cornite de Abo ados Democraticos , and the Journalists' Cooperative (Cooperati-va de eriodistas . The numeri- eal size of these fronts is not known. They are strongest in Santiago and other populous centers and they have succeeded in attracting a -number of influential non-Communists, including poetess Gabriela Mistral, Nobel Prize winner. Communist fronts to attract women have not been particularly suc- cessful. The leading Communist front in this field, the Movement for the Emancipation of Chilean Women (Movimiento Pro-Emanci~ de la Mu erer de Chile, MEMCh), which was originally established to work for nationa`1 suffrage for women, is considerably less influential than the non-Communist Chilean Federation of Women's Institutions (Federacion Chilena de Instituciones Femininas, FECHIF). The PCCh failure to attract women was shown in the presidential election of September 1952 when the Communist-supported candidate had little feminine sup- port in contrast to Ibanez' large following. The PCCh continues, however, to operate fronts designed to attract women such as the Foundation for the Protection of Childhood (Defensa de la Ninez) and the National Housing Front (Frente Nacional de la ViviendaT. Among minority groups in Chile, the well-established Germans in southern Chile are the most important. They are generally anti- Comnunist, and so far as is known no Communist fronts exist for this group. The Yugoslavs, who are widely dispersed in Chile, are also preponderantly anti-Stalinist. Spanish refugees who have entered Chile in recent years are usually pro-Communist. They are active in the various "peace" fronts and in the Confederation for Aid to the Spanish Democracy (Confederacion de Ayuda a la Democracia Espanola)- /A number of Communist fronts have been set up for Jewish residents and refugees. Among these are"the Zionist Federation (federaci6n Sionista de Chile), Representative Committee of the Jewish Community its Representativo de la Colectividad Isra elita de Chile), Maccabi Jewish Sport Club Elub Deportivo Israelita Maccabi),.and the Committee for the Protection or ' ewis Migrantsom e? Protecci6n a los Imigrantes Israelitas). Many of these, how ever, have their) counterpart anti-Communist organization. One of the more recent PCCh SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 11 - fronts is the Chilean-4Iindu Cultural Center (Centro Cultural Chileno- Hindu), organized by top Communist leaders for the stated purpose of diffusing information on the attributes of Hindu culture. Since the PCCh was outlawed, it has set up one front after another to agitate for the repeal of the Defense of Democracy Law. The most active front in this field at present is the National Executive Committee of the Movement for Liberty and Human Rights (Comite Ejecutivo Nacional del Movimiento por la Libertad Derechos Humanos), which includes on its directorate such influential non-Communists as Clotario Blest, president of the government employees federation. The PCCh also attempts to infiltrate non-Communist organizations in addition to establishing its own fronts. Two of the most important successfully penetrated are the influential Students Federation of the University of Chile (Federaci6n de Estudiantes de Chile, FECh) and the Federation of Teachers, both of which frequently lend themselves to Communist propaganda campaigns. At present the Communists appear to be infiltrating some of the nationalist organizations such as the Committee to Defend the Interests of Chile and Latin America, which could readily be used to create difficulties for the United States. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT Following the outlawing of PCCh in 1948, the Gonzalez Videla administration removed most Communists and fellow travellers from government positions. In the present regime of Prewident Ibanez, two of the 12 members of the Cabinet are reportedly Communist sympa- thizers: Interior Minister Guillermo del Pedregal and Public Works Minister Humberto Martones. Whether they will stay in office long. enough to bring Communists into their ministries in significant num- ber remains to be seen. The Communists have been notably unsuccessful in efforts to gain influence in the armed services at the top level. The Communist youth organization has been instructed to penetrate the armed services, but there is no indication that it is succeeding in this mission. There is no evidence of any Communist influence in the police and. security. services. Communist influence in associations of government employees affiliated with the white coller workers federation (JUNECH) indicates that there is significant infiltration of the government service, es- pecially in the teaching field, at middle and lower levels. With the relaxation of the Defense of Democracy Law, which forced many Com- munists out of government positions, some Communists have returned. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION Communist influence is strong in the educational system al- though the number of Communist teachers is not known. The Federation of Teachers, the Union of Professors, and the Alliance of Intellectuals are Communist-dominated. The Director of the National Symphony is a Communist; the Experimental Theater is highly influenced by Communism; and the leading art magazine of Chile, Pro-Arte, is Communist. The important student federation at the University of Chile showed strong Communist direction in its latest student election, in which a Communist- Radical-Socialist coalition won control of the organization. There is no Communist influence in the Church, which, on the contrary, is a leading anti-Communist force. Most of the press and all of the radio stations are anti-Communist. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF When the Communists were disenfranchised by the Defense of Democracy Law in 1948, many of them infiltrated other parties, including even some of the anti-Communist rightist groups. The Communists have very little, if any, influence in the top levels of the rightist parties. The parties most seriously infiltrated by Communists were those on the left, including the Radical Party, the Falange and the People's Democratic Party. The Social Christian Conservative 'arty (center) also may have been infiltrated to some extent. The Communists are cur- rently trying to interest these parties and the Socialists in forming a leftist front. Z. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA The principal Communist and pro-Communist newspapers and periodicals in Chile (most of which are published in Santiago) with estimated circulation, publisher and frequency of publication are as follows : Communist Name Circulation Publishing House Frequency El Siglo 25,000-30,000 Empress Periodistica daily Horizonte Vistazo 25,000 Empresa Periodistica weekly Horizonte SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Name Circulation Publishing House Frequency Nuestro Tiempo 3,000 10,000 Talleres Graficos monthly Lautaro Paz n a Empresa Periodistica sporadic Horizonte Principios n a n a sporadic Pro-Arte 5,000 n a weekly Tribuna Feminina n a n a sporadic E1 lles ertar n a na na ( arapaca El Popular n a n a n a !Antofagasta) El Si gloo na n a n a (Coquimbo) Inde endencia de n a organ of Communist sporadic spy Spanish front Pro-Communist Las Noticias de 18,000-35,000 Empresa Periodistica daily Ultima okra Las Noticias 15,000-45,000 Empresa Periodistica daily Graficas Horizonte The major printing establishments of the Communist and pro- Communist press are the Em resa Periodistica Horizonte and Talleres Graficos Lautaro (formerly yenta aci.fico). The equipment of the Emppr-esa Period stica Horizonte is good. It includes six linotypes, a large stock of type, a quarter-size mercury press, and a good supply of type correction instruments, among other equipment. Talleres Graficos recently installed a new press. Although Chile does not maintain relations with the Soviet orbit at the present time, publications of Soviet orbit diplomatic missions in Mexico and international Communist fronts, especially the labor and peace fronts, are imported in unknown quantity. fir' SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 14 - The Communists do not control or influence domestic radio broadcasting stations. Soviet orbit stations broadcast to Chile, including daily programs of two and one half hours from Moscow and one hour from Budapest. The broadcasting hours are in the early evening and the reception is good. under favorable weather conditions. Many Communists are reported to listen regularly, to these programs. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION The size of present party revenues is not known 'In 1948 PCCh reportedly received three million pesos (about $30,000) from membership fees. There are reported to be some three thousand pro- fessionals in the party, each of whom was asked to lend the party 10,000 pesos (about $100) in 1950, but apparently only a limited number complied. The party also attempts to collect funds by means of quotas assigned to its units throughout the country and through special fund-raising affairs. Few business firms in Chile are Communist-controlled and funds from this source are believed to be small. PCCh, so far as is known, receives little financial aid from abroad for operations within Chile, with the exception of books sent without charge from Communist pub- lishing houses abroad, which are sold to help maintain. the expenses of Communist propaganda. Before the passage of the Defense of Democracy Law in 1948, the party was reported to receive a considerable part of its revenues from Communist-controlled unions. No recent information has been re- ceived on its present. revenue from this source. The party receives some revenues from collections regularly made at meetings of Communist front organizations. Reports on PCCh finances in 1951 indicated that the party was in acute financial difficulties. Concrete reports for 1952 are not available, but the party's expanding publications program suggests that its financial condition has improved. III. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS There are no Soviet orbit diplomatic, trade, or cultural mis- sions in Chile. The local Communists have organized a Committee of Friends of of the Soviet Union (Comite de Amigos de la Union Sovietica) and binational "friendship" ocieties relating to China, gary, Czecho- slovakia, and Poland (see section VI). SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 15 XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Attendance of Chilean delegations at meetings of Communist international organizations held abroad was as follows in the period 1951-62: Meeting Regional. Meeting of April 1951 Partisans of Peace (Montevideo) Date Chilean Representation Latin American Land and May 1951 Air Transport Workers Conference (Guatemala City) Third World Youth Festival (Berlin) August 1951 World Peace Council November 1951 (Vienna) WFTU General Council November 1951 Meeting (Berlin) American Continental. March 1952 Conference of Peace Partisans (Montevideo) (No public sessions held) Moscow Economic Conference April 1952 International Conference in Defense of Children (Vienna) Preparatory Conference for the Asian and Pacific Regions Peace Conference (Peiping)' 13th Session, executive Council, International Federation of Democratic Women (Bucharest) SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 1 (possibly more) n a Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R0003.00050001-9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -16- Meeting Date Chilean Representation Council, International Union September'1952 n a of Students (Bucharest) CTAL Central Committee- September 1952 2 Meeting (Mexico City) Asian and Pacific Regions October 1952 25 Peace Conference (Peiping) AU-Union, Communist Party October 1952 Congress (Moscow) Continental Conference of Nov Dec. 1952 Democratic Jurists of America (Rio de Janeiro) World Congress of Peoples December 1952 about 30 for Peace (Vienna) Chilean Communists have reportedly been given some financial aid in meeting their expenses for travel to the above Communist- sponsored meetings, but the amount is unknown. The-method of supplying funds appears generally to be through payment of passage for delegates to the European offices of the transport company involved, and of ex- penses -when the delegates arrive in the Soviet orbit. XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK PCCh leaders: have at fairly regular intervals gone to Moscow, Prague, or Vienna, either individually or as delegates to international Communist congresses, and have presumably received instructions from international headquarters in person. International contacts have also been supplied via members of other Latin American Communist par- ties who have travelled to the Soviet orbit. Concrete evidence of Soviet'instructions to PCCh beyond that indicated above, is not avail- able. PCCh maintains closest connections with the Communist parties of Uruguay, Argentina, Guatemala, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru, and Cuba. The Argentine Communist leader, Victor Codovilla, reportedly visited Chile recently en route to the All-Union Communist Party Congress in Moscow. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000105/23: CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 roved For Release 2000/05/23 CIA-RDP78-026468000 00050001-9 pp . SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION proved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9 Approved For/Release 2000/05/23 CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050.001-9 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/05/23 CIA-RDP78-02646RO00300050001 9