COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02646R000300050001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 573
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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COMMUNISM IN THE FREE
WORLD.
r'':isi'F?ti (. r
a,. 014 lok"
IR-6165
January 1953
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
Department of State
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State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
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INDEX
Individual Country Studies
IR-6165 .1
BURMA
IR-6165.16
IR-6165.2
INDOCHINA
IR-6165.17
IR-6165.3
INDONESIA
IR-6165.18
IR-6165.1+
MALAYA
IR-6165.19
IR-6165.5
THE PHILIPPINES
IR-6165.20
IR-6165.6
THAILAND
IR-6165.21
IR-6165.7
JAPAN
IR-6165.22
IR-6165.8
ALGERIA
IR-6165.23
IR-6165.9
EGYPT
IR-6165.2
IR-6165.10
GREECE
IR-6165.25
IR-6165.11
INDIA
IR-6165.26
IR-6165.1.2
IRAN
IR-6165.27
IR-6165.13
IRAQ
IR-6165.28
IR-6165.1
ISRAEL
IR-6165.29
IR-6i65.15
MOROCCO
IR-6165.30
IR-6165.31
IR-6165.32
iR-6165.33
. IR-6165.3I+
IR-6165.35
Regional Surveys
SOUTHEAST ASIA
FRANCE
ICELAND
ITALY
SOUTH AFRICA
THE UNITED KINGDOM
WEST GERMANY
ARGENTINA
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA
WESTERN EUROPE
LATIN AMERICA
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IR-6165 .1
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, BURMA
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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Page
Foreword . . . . ? . . .
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND, CAPABILITIES . . ?
Objectives . . . . . . ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. Tactics . . . ? . ? . . ? . . 2
III. Capabilities . . . . 0000 . . . . . ? . . 600#*
I. Numerical Strength , .
ASSETS . . . ? . . . . . ? ?
II.. Electoral Strength . . . . ? ? . ? ? ? ? . ? r
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action
IV. Government Policy. Toward Communism ? . ? . . .
V. Communist Influence in Labor . . . . r .. . .
VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and
Professional Organizations . . . . . ? .
VII* Communist Infiltration into Government ? . . . . . . ?
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation ? . .
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non?.Communist Political
Parties'
. ? ? ? ? ? ? . ? ? . . ? ? ? ? ? . . ? . ?
9
10
13
13
1'l
X. Communist Propaganda Media . < . < . . . 15
XI. Financial Condition . . . . < . ? . . ? . 18
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . r . . , ? . . r 19
XIII. Communist International Organizations . . . . ? ? . . 20
XIV. Communist Communication Network . < . . . . 21
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FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.-
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
.the best available to the Department at the present time.
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COMMUNISM IN BURMA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
the Communists in Burma are at present pursuing a two-pronged,
\and not completely consistent, policy. The illegal Communist under-
ground) is continuing the insurrection which began in 1948, and seems
it present to be concentrating on maintaining and consolidating its
control over."base areas," while training and strengthening guerrilla
units for future action. Efforts are also being made to develop
effective alliances with other insurgent groups such as the White Band
element of the People's Volunteer Organization and the Karen National
Defense Organization.
At the same time, the above-ground, Communist-dominated Burma
Workers and Peasants Party (MPP), which is recognized by the govern-
ment as a legal opposition group, seems most concerned with its own
internal organization and with programs designed to develop popular
support for the Party. The BWPP is agitating for an end to insurgency
through formation of a coalition government including opposition
elements. Communist efforts to recruit support within the Overseas
Chinese Community are spearheaded by the China Democratic League (CDL).
Within the framework of these general objectives, the Communist
parties seek a number of immediate goals. Domestically, current efforts
are concentrated on:
1. combating the growth of anti-Communist sentiment among ,the over-
seas Chinese;
2. penetrating Buddhist organizations;
3. increasing the membership of "mass organizations," which have
thus far been relatively small in Burma; and
4. undermining the political position of the government and the
Socialist Party which is its dominant element.
Internationally, the chief immediate goal is to prevent a shift in
official Burmese foreign policy toward the West and the US in
particular.
References in this section to insurgent activity refer principally
to action by the Burma Communist Party (BCP). Other Communist
underground groups include: (1) the Communist Party (Burma) --
CP(B) -- which is a relatively small splinter group, and (2) a band
of China-trained guerrillas under leadership of the Kachin renegade
Naw Seng, which does not appear to be in contact with the BCP.
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.. 2 ..
There is, to some extent, a conflict between the policy of
preparation for eventual overthrow of the government and "legal"
efforts to establish a broad popular base and to create pressures
leading to a coalition government. The GUB is unlikely to be respon-
sive to demands for a coalition as long as armed insurrection continues
to threaten the political and economic stability of the nation, despite
its apparent acquiescence in a rather artificial distinction between
BCP insurgency and BWPP legal action. At the present time, overall
Communist strategy seems to favor the "legal" efforts of the BWPP.
II. TACTICS
Current tactics include attempts to establish collaborative
arrangements with other political groups and attempts to win direct
following, for the party or'its fronts, from diverse elements within
the Burman and minority populations. The strength of the Communist
appeal rests in the coincidence of certain aspects of current Communist
policy with general Burmese fears and aspirations -- neutralist, anti-
colonialist, and "peace" sentiments. The basically Marxist orientation
of most present-day Burmese leaders, and the lingering sense of attach-
ment to the homeland among the Chinese community also favor Communist
efforts.
Special appeals are directed to identifiable groups within the
population -- particularly youth and students and, most recently, the
Buddhist leaders. There are some reports that Communist propagandists,
perhaps aided by Chinese specialists, are attempting to subvert the
minority peoples along the Sino-Burma border.
The BWPP's small delegation in the Chamber of Deputies is
important primarily as a focal point for expression of what are
basically extra-parliamentary political pressures. Popular organiza-
tions controlled by the BWPP or its labor wing, the Burma Trade Union
Congress, are utilized to create the impression of popular demand for
policies favored by`the Party. In addition, to opposing the-specific
actions or presumed intentions of the Government, political pressures
have been used in an attempt to destroy public confidence in the
competence of the present Government. In planning its program, the
BNPP seems to be responsive to direction from the Chinese Embassy,
through which it apparently receives some financial support.
At the same time, guerrilla activity is continuing among under-
ground groups. Although the BCP forces have increasingly been broken
up into small groups by Government military pressure, marauding bands
still render large areas of the country insecure. Present insurgent
military operations seem designed primarily to secure supplies and
manpower, and to keep government forces off balance.
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III. CAPABILITIES
The BCP is capable of continuing its present level of guerrilla-
type insurgency, thereby preventing the consolidation of government
control over all Burma and retarding economic recovery and development.
The BWPP appears to have sufficient leadership, and an adequately dis-
ciplined organization, to continue its agitational and penetration
tactics, designed to maintain political pressure on the government and
retard its slowly emerging trend toward a closer relationship with the
West.
The prospects for future Communist action will be determined
largely by developments outside Burma, particularly decisions concerning
broader Asian strategy. In the.event of direct invasion or a greatly
magnified program of direct aid to insurgent groups, the stability of
the GUB would be seriously threatened. The Government might, in the
absence of immediate and effective help from the West, seek accommoda-
tion with Asian Communism, and it is relatively certain that the
prestige and power of local Communist elements would be rapidly
magnified.
In the absence of external intervention, however, the Government
will probably continue to make progress in its efforts to suppress the
insurgents and may, as larger areas of the country are secured, be
emboldened to,take more restrictive measures against "legal" Communist
elements. In that event, the BNPP, which now appears to be the chief
instrument of international Communist policy in Burma, might find its
access to propaganda outlets circumscribed and its ability to manipulate
front groups curtailed before its present organizational efforts have
born fruit. In the absence of actual or imminently threatened invasion,
or of unforeseen internal economic disorders, it seems unlikely that
the parliamentary position of the BWPP will improve significantly or
that its mass base will grow materially.
The capacity of Burmese Communist groups to support Soviet
policy will, therefore, depend directly on Soviet (or Chinese) action.
The 1948 insurrection by the BCP has this far failed in its primary
aim of overthrowing the government and, balanced against an improving
government position, its future is even less promising. Were it not
for the ever-present threat that the Burmese future will be over-
whelmed by events beyond its borders, it might be predicted that the
Communist conspiracy would continue,to wither, although at an
agonizingly slow rate.
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4 -
COMMUNISM IN BURMA: ASSETS
I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
An assessment of Communist strength in Burma must include both
the illegal insurgent movement and above-ground Communist elements.
Available data are insufficient to permit a definitive statement of
total numerical strength.
The Burma Communist Party (BCP) is the most important element
of the underground movement. Its membership is estimated to be
.about 5,000. A small splinter group, the Communist Party (Burma) --
CP(B) -- was estimated in 1951 to have about 300 members and candi-
dates. The CP(B) split from the BCP in 1946 as a result of personal
differences within the Communist leadership. The two groups, however,
reportedly concluded an agreement for at least limited military
cooperation in August 1952.
The principal above-ground group now appears to be the Burma
Workers and Peasants Party (BPPPP), which was formed in December 1950
by a group of dissident Socialists.. The party membership is unknown,
but it has become increasingly well disciplined and energetic, taking
effective leadership of Communist-dominated "front groups." The most
significant of the latter ares (1) the Burma Trade Union Congress
(BTUC) with a present estimated membership of about 2,000; (2) the A11-
Burma Peasants Organization (ABPO), which claims a membership of
100,000, probably with considerable exaggeration; (3) the World Peace
Congress (Burma) with a small but vocal membership; and (4) the People's
Youth Organization (PYO), which was founded only in December 1952 but
which has considerable potential importance. Communist organizations
within the Overseas Chinese community are dominated by the China
Democratio League (CDL), the nearest equivalent of a Chinese Communist
Party. The League's membership is unknown.
Although the membership of Communist organizations therefore
seems relatively small, the number of individuals who are subject to
Communist influence and pressure is probably significantly higher,
partly because of widespread receptivity in Burma to a number of aspects
of current Communist propaganda efforts. The number who are "strongly
influenced" by Communist elements should probably include most of the
membership of the non-Communist Trade Union Congress (Burma), and the
membership of the People's Peace Front (PPF) and Mahabama parties, which
collaborate with the B1fPP. The Chinese population as a whole remains
vulnerable to Communist pressure, but since 1950 vigorous efforts
by non-Communist Chinese elements have probably reduced the number who
are strongly influenced. Rural populations are exposed to Communist
propaganda and organizational effort for short periods in the course
of guerrilla operations. Although no adequate figures are
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available, it seems likely that 5 percent of the total Burmese
population may be controlled or strongly influenced by Communist
elements.
Geographically, Communist strength is heavily concentrated in
Rangoon and the southern towns of Burma (the BRTPP and CDL groups)
and in insurgent pockets in central and northern Burma (BOP). The
main sources of Burmese Communist recruits appear to have been
students and youth, intellectuals, and peasants; urban labor has thus
far been less significant. Among the resident Chinese, the leadership
is predominantly middle class in origin; laboring classes provide the
bulk of membership; and a number of businessmen appear to be passive
sympathizers.
Comparatively little is known concerning the quality and
reliability of the Communist membership or of its leaders, Although
the guerrilla groups undoubtedly include some elements whose principal
motivation is organized banditry, the leadership appears to possess
firm political resolve and to be in effective control of its following.
The surrender rate among insurgent groups has remained relatively low
despite mounting government military pressure. Most of the leadership
has belonged to Marxist, if not Communist, organizations for a period
of five to ten years.
The above-ground BWPP has recently been reorganized and "puri-
fied" in a move which has apparently strengthened its internal
homogeneity and removed elements of doubtful reliability. Although
it is probable that the total membership has declined somewhat since
mid-1951, it seems likely that the strength and dependability of the
party has increased, and that it will continue to exercise effective
leadership of above-ground pro-Communist groups.
The leadership of the China Democratic League is relatively
more experienced and many of its important leaders have been trained
in China. The membership of the League increased markedly between
1946 and 1950; in the last two years, however, its total strength has
remained relatively stable and may have declined somewhat.
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
Since the underground Communist parties are outlawed, Communist
voting power is reflected only in the votes received by candidates of
the BWPP and the parties which support it -- chiefly the People's
Peace Front and the Mahabama. The parliamentary strength of these
groups in the Chamber of Deputies elected in 1951, related to the
representation of other parties, is as follows:
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Party Number of seats
BWPP 9
PPF 3
Mahabama 1
Other opposition groups 27
The Government Coalition,
including the Socialist Party 196
The most recent test of Communist electoral strength occurred
in the Rangoon municipal elections of February 20, 1952. The three
.opposition parties listed above ran joint candidates, under the
banner of the Triple Alliance. The coalition won only one seat out
of 35, in contrast with a representation of 15 seats for comparable
parties in the Council elected in 1949. However, these figures do
not reflect BWPP strength adequately, for Triple Alliance candidates
are reported to have received almost half the total vote given to
candidates of the governing coalition (the Anti-Fascist People's
Freedom League). Nevertheless, the drastic decline in Council seats
is significant because of the predominant role of Rangoon in national
life.
Although the BWPP and its affiliated groups are currently
agitating for a coalition government including the Communists, there
is no evidence of specific planning for future elections.
III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
The Communist insurrection in Burma, coupled with Karen
insurgency and the depredations of non-political bandit gangs, has
effectively and seriously retarded Burmese recovery from wartime
devastation. It is a continuing, though somewhat diminishing, threat
to the integrity of the state. The insurgency is exploited by above-
ground Communist elements in their attacks on the government.
Of the various insurgent elements, the Burma Communist Party
(BCP) has been and remains the most significant. The party controls
as many as 8,000 guerrillas, which are now organized in small bands. _
There have been no recent report of concentrations of more than 300
in a single group. The BCP is reported to have succeeded recently
in establishing a coalition with two other underground elements:
(1) the Communist Party (Burma), with an estimated strength of 1,000;
and (2) some elements of the White Band People's Volunteer Organization
-- total PPO strength is estimated at 3,000, but the effective
strength of collaborating groups is unknown. A potentially important
group, which is now apparently independent of the BCP, is a force of
Kachin-Burman-Chinese guerrillas, estimated at 1,500, under the
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leadership of the renegade Naw gong. Naw Seng'a two battalions have
been trained in China, and may represent the best disciplined and most
thoroughly indoctrinated insurgent group.
All insurgent groups appear to be currently concentrating on
strengthening their control of limited, relatively inaccessible "base
areas." BCP groups have been pushed back within the past year by
government military operations; their current strength is located
chiefly in central Burma south of Mandalay, in northern Burma, and
in the western region stretching toward the Chin Hills. CP(B) groups
are located primarily in the Irrawaddy delta and westward toward the
Arakan. Naw Seng's force is reported to be in the Bhamo area in
northern Burma.
No significant military operations have been undertaken recently
by-the insurgent groups except the BCP, and these have been confined to
hit-and-run raids against government outposts, attacks on trans-
portation and communications lines, and harassment of villages which
are inadequately protected. Troops not so engaged are concerned
primarily with protecting Communist-held areas from government forces,
but in case of attack, the Communists prefer to withdraw rather than
fight as long as it is possible to remove supplies and equipment.
Little has been learned concerning the administrative apparatus
established by BCP groups in areas which they control. Although the
party claims to govern local areas -- appointing officials, directing
education, and controlling marketing -- it is doubtful whether any
permanent administrative apparatus has been established. Above-
ground Communist groups are primarily responsible for propaganda
activity, but the BCP has undoubtedly carried on some propaganda work
in connection with local recruiting efforts.
The degree of popular support which Communist guerrillas have
received seems to be a function of the military force which they can
apply in any area. For the most part, the rural population appears
to be passive, reacting to preponderant military pressure and aiding
guerrillas only when coercion is present or threatened. The guerrilla
groups live off the country, and no central supply organization is
known to exist. Even though the several groups are relatively
independent, there is some intercommunication (including radio), and
Communist intelligence concerning government operations appears to
have been generally good.
The BCP leadership has made persistent-efforts to secure
effective working arrangements with other insurgent groups. In
August 1952, an agreement was reportedly reached with representatives
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of the Communist Party (Burma) and some White Band elements of the
People's Volunteer Organization, providing for collaboration and
demarcation of respective areas of activity. Because of past. personal
antagonisms among leaders of the various groups, the realization of a
working arrangement would appear to reflect desperation born of
declining strength, or perhaps a BCP effort to qualify for more
extensive Chinese assistance by providing evidence of effective leader-
ship of all guerrilla elements.
External assistance (from China) to the Communist guerrillas
has thus far been sporadic and at a relatively low level. Some BCP
cadres are reported to have received training in Yunnan. Naw Song's
guerrilla units have been trained in China, and may pose a more
significant long-term threat to the government by establishing a
protected base area in a remote region of northern Burma. There are
no reliable reports of significant amounts of arms being furnished to
Burmese guerrillas from China.
In its efforts to suppress the Communist insurgency, the Burma
Government has been handicapped by the necessity of simultaneously
containing Chinese Nationalist troops in eastern Burma, attempting to
subdue Karen rebels,.and suppressing'Moslem dissidents in the Arakan.
Total government strength of about 60,000, including the Union
Military Police, is heavily taxed by its varied responsibilities,
and the forces available for anti-Communist efforts fluctuates from
time to time, in accordance with demands created by the actions of
other dissident groups. Key posts are manned; mobile reserves are
maintained at central locations; and from time to time offensive
actions are taken against isolated pockets of resistance.
In the absence of stepped-up external assistance, the future
capabilities of the Communist insurgents are not likely to improve.
Although the guerrilla forces have been able to maintain their
strength for some time, no significant expansion has taken place. It
is not clear whether manpower or arms shortages represent the chief
limitation. On balance, the government position has improved within
the past year; perhaps the most significant development has been the
increasing fragmentation of guerrilla forces and the restoration of
agricultural production in some areas of the Irrawaddy delta which
have been cleared on insurgents. In addition to weakening the
resource base of the Communists, this development will, in the long
run, contribute to the strength and stability of the government.
So far as is known, the above-ground BWPP has organized no
paramilitary units, and has no plans for participation in violent
action. In order to keep its present legal status, the party must at
least preserve the appearance of being no more than an opposition
political party.
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IV. GOVERNMENT. POLICY TOWARD CO1gMUNISM
Present government policy draws a somewhat artificial distinction
between political pressure and insurgency which, in turn, hat led to
the development of the two arms of the Communist movement in Burma.
The insurrectionary Communist parties -- BCP and CP(B) -- have been
outlawed by the Government, and exist only as underground movements.
The E PP, however, is a legal, political party, has a small parlia-
mentary representation (9 seats out of 232) and is relatively unob-
structed in its manipulation of front groups. (Exceptions the
government has occasionally denied passports to proposed delegates to
international Communist meetings.)
Because of official reluctance to prevent distribution of
literature which is not openly seditious, Communist propagandists
have secured important outlets for dissemination of printed propa-
ganda, taking advantage of an existing market for any literature which
is interpreted as shedding light on "experiments in sooialism."
Recently, however the Home Minister issued a.atrong warning to
publicists who spread false information, advocate armed uprising, or
undermine the security of the state.
Within the Chinese community, the CDL and other Communist fronts
have been permitted considerable political freedom of action in Burma,
owing to the Burma Government's neutralist foreign policy, its desire
not to antagonize Communist China, and to. the fact that Peiping has not
encouraged the Burma Chinese to indulge in overt agitation against
the Burma Government. Nevertheless, Chinese Communist political
activity is limited by the Burmese constitutional provisions that only
Burmese nationals may vote and by the exclusion of a large proportion
of the Chinese from Burmese citizenship.
During 1951-52, the increasingly vitriolic anti-Western tone of
local Chinese Communist propaganda, which the Burma government deemed
injurious to Burma's neutral position, and the affiliation of pro-
Communist Chinese with Burmese extreme leftist opposition elements, led
to the government's tacit encouragement of anti-Communist elements
in the Chinese community. It is expected that the government will
continue its present policy of sharply scrutinizing, though not
severely restricting, local Chinese Communist political activities,
and of tacitly encouraging the anti-Communist Chinese.
V. COD'MtJNI ST INFLUENCE IN LABOR
There is relatively little organized labor in Burma; total
union membership is probably leas than 70,000. The Socialist-
controlled Trade Union Congress (Burma) -- TUC(B) -- split in
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December 1950 when the BWPP was organized; the dissident union leaders
formed the Burma Trade Union Congress (BTUC), which is now Communist-
controlled.
The most important affiliates of the BTUC are the All-Burma
Ministerial Services Union (ABMSU), which is small but vital because
its members staff government offices, and the Chauk Oilfields Workers
Front. Total BTUC membership was estimated in mid-1952 at less than
2,000. The percentage of Communists to non-Communists within the
BTUC unions is unknown; the leadership is Communist, however, and
.appears to be in effective control.
In addition to the BTUC, there are at least a dozen Chinese
labor unions, most of them small and concentrated in Rangoon; all
except the Carpenters Union are Communist-controlled. The Most
important are those which deal with food marketing and handling, the
Teachers Union, and the Stevedores Union.
Apart from Communist-controlled unions, there is probably some
surviving Communist influence in most of the unions affiliated with
the Socialist-led TUC(B). Since the 1950 split, the struggle for
control between BTUC and TUC(B) leaders has been particularly strong
in the Inland Water Transport Workers Union and its. five subsidiary
groups. Although the leadership now supports the TUC(B), Communist
influence may still be prevalent in some locals.
The Communist-controlled BTUC has been affiliated with the
World Federation of Trade Unions (vFTU) since July 1951. The status
of the TUC(B) in relation to WFTU is at present unclear. Prior to the
1950 split which led to formation of the BTUC, the parent organization
had been affiliated. A 1951 May Day resolution expressed interest in
continued membership, but TUC(B) leaders have since stated that the
group is not presently affiliated. It is certain that the TUC(B) has
not been active in WFTU affairs.
VI. COMt(UNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL,
CULTURAL, TONS
The most active Communist front organizations are in the fields
of youth and student activities, international "friendship" societies
and the Communist "peace movement," and among the Overseas Chinese.
The following groups merit special mention:
1. Youth: There are two underground youth organizations, the
Communist Youth League and the Democratic People's Youth League, which
are probably small but under effective BCP control. The BWPP sponsored
no distinct youth organization until December 1952, when the People's
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Youth Organization (PYO) was founded. Although at present, in the
formative stage, the PYO may become the focal point for Communist
activity among youth and students. The only non-Communist youth
organization, the Burma Youth League, is non-political and relatively
insignificant.
2. Studentes The All-Burma Students Federation (ABSF) and the
All-Rangoon u en s Union are believed to be Communist-controlled.
The ABSF is probably affiliated with the International Union of
Students, The only competing organization is the Rangoon University
Students Union (RUSU) which has experienced.a continual struggle for
control between Communist and non-Communist elements. The most recent
elections for union officers reflect some persisting. Communist
influence.
3. The World Peace Councils The Burma Branch of the World Peace
Council -- WPC(!) -- is probably one of the most significant "front"
groups although its active membership is believed to be relatively
small. Branches of the parent organization have been established in a
number of towns, and the group may be the most effective instrument
for dissemination of Communist propaganda outside of Rangoon. The
Council is controlled by the BWPP; its Secretary General, Ba Nyein,
is a member of the BRPP Executive Committee and is considered the
party's "leading thinker."
4. Chinese Organizationez A number of organizations within the
Overseas CM MO community are ommunist-controlled or at least pro-
Peiping. Next to the China Democratic League, the most important
Chinese group is the Chamber of Commerce. Its leadership is pre-
dominantly pro-Peiping, although control is being vigorously contested
by anti-Communist elements within the Chamber. The Hui-an Young Men's
Association, the Chinese Youth Society, and the Chinese Students Union
attempt to spread Communist influence among youth and students; the
first two are outstanding among all Chinese youth organizations. Of
the several regional Chinese societies, the Fukienese Association is
the only ohe which is considered to be Communist-dominated. Other
Communist-oontrolhed Chinese organizations includes the Chinese
Women's Association, the Women's Welfare Workers Society, the Burma
Chinese Relief Association, and the Burma Chinese Cultural Union.
.5. Women: The All-Burma Women's Freedom League, formed by
the BWPP in-Tanuary 1951, is the most active of three legal women's
organizations in Burma. A smaller group, the A11-Burma Women's Union,
is controlled by the BCP and has been underground since'1947.
6. Friendship Societies: The Sino-Burmese Friendship Society.,
and the Burma-Soviet Cultural ssooiation are small but significant ,
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groups, because membership is drawn largely from educated and therefore
relatively influential classes. The former is now composed exclusively
of.Burmese, and is devoted to promoting interest in China and preserving
"traditional ties of friendship." The latter was formed with tacit
approval of the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon, but appears to be operated
by Burmese, including some non-Communists, who are interested in
Soviet culture.
7. Minorities: Apart from the numerous Chinese organizations,
the principal minority groups controlled by Communists or Communist-
sympathizers are the All-Burma Indian Youth League and the All-Burma
Indian Congress. Communist penetration of the Indian minority has
been largely limited to laborers, some of whom are also represented
in Communist-dominated unions.
Organizational efforts appear to be directed at present toward
enlarging Communist-controlled units within important organizations
and securing mass support for the propaganda appeals of above-ground
Communist groups. Most politically conscious Burmese support some
policies which are currently advocated by local Communists: eg.,
resolution of the problem posed by the Chinese Nationalist troops in
Burma, some aspects of the "peace" campaign, and anti-colonialism.
It has not been possible to determine the extent to which advocacy
of such programs by non-Communist Burmese represents conscious support
of particular Communist policies. Quite clearly, however, Communist
influence extends beyond those organizations which are controlled or
strongly influenced by Communists.
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VII. COMMW IST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
Direct Communist infiltration of the Burma Government appears to'
have been slight. So far as is known, no Communists are represented in
policy-making bodies or in top levels of the military and police organ-
izations. Although there are probably some Communists or Communist-
sympathizers on the staffs of the several government departments, there
is no evidence that they have had a direct impact on policies and pro-
grams of the government.
Nevertheless, it may be well to point out that, indirectly at
least, Communist "influence" is present within the government' at almost
all levels. The most important Communist asset is the strength of Com-
munist China; fear of antagonizing the powerful neighbor to the north
has been directly responsible for the government's rigid verbal adherence
to a neutral foreign policy.
Secondly, most government officials subscribe to Marxist views
in fields such as economic organization, and their background has
stimulated an interest in "socialist experiments" in other parts of the
world. Many are known to read Soviet and Chinese. literature. This
indirect influence is stronger with.some individuals than others. The
present Minister of Land Nationalization, Thakin Tin, for example, holds
extreme leftist views on nationalization and collectivization, although
he is not known to be a Communist. In general, there is far more
interest in the Chinese "experiment" than in the Soviet Union, and it
is doubtful whether such interest is attributable, at the top levels of
government, to direct Communist infiltration.
Just as there is some indirect Communist influence at official
levels, so interest in China and to a limited degree a curiosity about
the USSR have opened the way to some Communist influence on the public
opinion-forming process. This is attributable as much to the predispo-
sitions of non-Communist Burmese as to direct efforts by Communist
elements.
There is some Communist influence in educational circles, partio-
ularlythe Chinese schools and in higher Burmese educational institutions.
Of the more than 200 Chinese schools in Burma, a majority appear to be
using Peiping-approved textbooks, although there has been some recession
in Communist penetration since 1950. There is also continuing Communist
penetration of student groups at Rangoon University .
Penetration of Buddhist, circles has thtrs far been slight, although
efforts to secure Buddhist support for international Communist `"causes`"
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are currently being intensified, apparently with some success. The
government has shown genuine concern over these developments, and is
endeavoring to counteract Communist influence by stimulating Buddhist
revival programs, denying passports to Buddhist priests recruited for
international Communist conferences, etc.
The Communist press is relatively small, but non-Communist
publications, on their own initiative, support some current Communist
propaganda themes (most notably, the "menace" of Chinese Nationalist
troops in eastern Burma, and evidences of "colonialism" in all parts
of the world.)
The Soviet Embassy in Rangoon has recently secured an outlet
for Chinese and Russian films, by renting the King Theater on .a monthly
basis. During 1951 over 100 Chinese films were exhibited in Rangoon,
and although the contents are not known, it seems safe to assume that
many ccntained Communist propaganda themes.
IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-CO)~119JNIST POLITICAL PARTIES
No noteworthy infiltration of right-wing political organizations
and parties has come to light. Among left-wing, non-Communist politi-
cal groups, there has been considerable indirect influence; some ele-
ments of Communist dogma (anti-colonialism, collectivism) have wide
appeal in most political circles in-Burma, due to historical experience
and Marxist training of most national leaders. Direct Communist in-
fluence, however, appears to be declining. There is an increasing
tendency, particularly at the top levels, to distinguish between cur-
rent Soviet behavior and the theoretical Marxist formulations to which
many Burmese leaders. still adhere.
Collaboration with Communist elements by some Karen leaders and
Dr. Ba Maw's Mahabama party appears to be based on expediency, rather
than on ideological compatibility.
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X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA ^AEDIA
For practical purposes,.the Rangoon press is synonymous with
the Burmese press. Very little publishing activity is carried on out-
side the capital city, and for that reason, human-carrier techniques
are probably more important in the dissemination of Communist propa-
ganda than formal media of communication. In addition to the
periodicals listed below, there is a considerable amount of pamphlet
literature circulated within Burma, a good deal of it prepared or
controlled by Communist organizations.
A.
Communist Newspapers and Periodicals
Ludu
2,000
The nearest approach to a
i Thu Ne Zin
Unknown
"party organ," except possi-
bly for clandestine newsheets
circulated in guerrilla areas*
Said to be financed by
(Peopletsily)
Chinese Embassy. Has ap-
peared spasmodically since
1951.
Zin Min Pao
2,000 (1950 est.)
Organ of CDL
B.
Pro-Communist Publications
Guide Daily
3,000
Generally pro-Communist.
Tainglonekyaw
3,000
Sometimes prints Communist
propaganda materials.
Red Star
1,500
Generally follows interna-
tional "line."
New Rangoon EveninE
'
2,500 (1950 est.)
Pro-Corr nist
Post (Chinese
New China Pao
4,000 (1950)
Pro-Peiping, but does not
Life `+'ieekly (Chinese) Unknown
A weekly "scandal sheet."
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C. Printing Establishments
The following information is incomplete, but probably covers
the most important local sources of Cor.ununist publications, excluding
newspaperss
1. KKyaw Linn Booksellers and Publishers, 180, 51st Street,
Rangoon -- Kyaw Linn has translated and printed books on China and
the USSR, in addition to distributing literature reportedly sup-
plied through Soviet and Chinese Embassy channels in Delhi. Kyaw
Linn reportedly has been aided by the Rangoon Chinese Embassy with
an Initial capital investment. The firm manages at least four
bookstalls on Bogyoke Street. The US Embassy has estimated that
sales at each average more than 1,000 books per week.
2. Myint Swe Publishing House, Rangoon -- This firm is
reported to have translated and published some of the works of
Mao Tse-tung. It is not a prosperous concern.
3. Central Publishing House, Bogyoke Market, Rangoon -
This firm pub ashes and sells Burmese translations of popular
Communist literature.
D. Imported Publications
The following periodicals have been available, at various times,
at the People's Literature House, 546 Merchant Street, Rangoon:
1. Weekly
New Times
Soviet Weekly
Cross Roads
Cominform Journal
2. Fortnightly
Peoples China
World Trade Union Movement.
World Student Movement
Soviet Land
3. Monthly
Russia Today
Soviet Literature
Soviet Union
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Masses and Main Street
Political Affairs
Indo Soviet
Czechoslovak Life
.China Monthly Review
4. Bi-Monthly
Soviet Women
In addition, pamphlet literature seems to be distributed in fairly
large quantities.
E. Publications of Soviet-Satellite Diplomatic Establishments
Viet Minh representatives in Rangoon publish a weekly bulletin
entitled "Vietnam Information." Its total circulation is unknown.
Distribution to many parts of the world is handled in Rangoon.
The Chinese Embassy apparently subsidizes one or more papers in
Rangoon, but is not known to publish any periodicals itself.
Local radio broadcasting is a government monopoly, and no direct
Communist influence has been discernible. There is no known Communist
broadcasting activity in Burma, except possibly for some radio communi-
cation among guerrilla units. The military network, if it exists, is
probably used primarily for operational liaison and not for public
propaganda activity.
There is a limited audience for both Soviet and Chinese broad-
oasts. Soviet broadcasting appears to be confined to daily trans-
missions in English directed to Southeast Asia, plus the Soviet
Chinese-language service which can perhaps be heard in Burma. The
audience for Chinese Communist broadcasts is probably limited to the
Chinese community. Approximately 30 hours per week on international
beams can be picked up in Burma. Although no figures are available,
the number of radio receivers is sufficiently low so that radio is a
much less significant medium for external propaganda than publications
and personal contaot.
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XI. FINANCIAL C(NDITION
No quantitative data on Communist finances are available. It
is doubtful whether the dues-paying membership of Communist organiza-
tions, particularly in the labor unions, is very large, and direct
receipts of this kind can be only a minor element in total party
finances. The underground guerrilla groups appear to be heavily de-
pendent on local requisitioning and foraging in the areas of current
military operations.
Above-ground Communist groups are known to receive contributions
from businessmen and other groups which are vulnerable to persuasion or
pressure. The China Democratic League, in particular, probably derives
part of its financial support from merchants engaged in trade with
China. It is not known, however, whether any of these firms exist
primarily for purposes of financing Communist activity.
Leaders of the Burma Workers and Peasants Party apparently re-
ceive some financial assistance through the Chinese Embassy in Rangoon.
The money spent on local rallies (where, frequently, no collections
are taken) suggests outside financial help. In addition, supplies of
Chinese Communist publications are a direct contribution to local
Communist propaganda activity. It is not known whether the Soviet
Embassy has contributed directly to local party finances.
In general, the financial condition of the Burmese Communists
appears to be poor, with the exception of activities connected with
the increasingly virulent propaganda campaign. The guerrilla groups
have been able to sustain their present level of activity, but do not
appear to have financial resources adequate to attract wider support
or to procure additional arms.
Chinese Communist elements, by virtue of their ability to exact
donations from local businessmen, are in much better financial condi-
tion than the Burmese groups.
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XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
A. Communist China
The first Chinese Communist Ambassador to Burma presented his
credentials in September 1950. By August 1952, the Embassy staff was
reported to include 15 principal officers and 26 other members. Many
of these individuals are described as "active outside," implying that
considerable efforts are made to keep in contact with local Chinese
organizations of.various types. Supplies of printed propaganda are
apparently funneled through the Embassy for distribution throughout
the Chinese community, utilizing schools, commercial, labor, and cul-
tural organizations as outlets and as centers for displays. It is
probable that propaganda activity, in the broadest sense, is an impor-
tant responsibility of most members of the Embassy staff.
The Sino-Burmese Friendship Society also functions with support
from the Chinese Embassy. Its membership (total unknown but apparently
relatively small) includes non-Communists interested in cultural re-
lations with China as well as pro-Communist elements.
The Soviet Embassy was established in Rangoon in April 1951, with
an original staff of eight. In late 1951, the total staff was reported
to number 31, including housekeeping and administrative personnel. The
Embassy has a Press Attache, and it seems probable that other staff
members are.engaged in essentially propaganda and contact work, since
the size of the Embassy is greater than regular Embassy activities would
justify.
The Burma-Soviet Cultural Association, headed by a respected
'member of the Rangoon University faculty, was founded early in 1952.
The Soviet Embassy appears to have left the initiative primarily to
Burmese intellectuals interested in the USSR, with quiet encouragement
for the society's activities. The first open meting was attended by
about 200 persons, but active membership is not known.
C. European Satellites
A Czechoslovak Consulate General was opened July 10, 1952, but
no information on its staff is available. A Hungarian trade delegation
is reported to be in Rangoon, but its size also is unknown. The
activities of both the Czech Consul General and the Hungarian trade
delegation members, although ostensibly directed toward increasing trade,
probably include activities which should be labeled as propaganda.
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XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Although no international Communist organizations maintain
permanent bureaus or offices in Burma, the activities of some of these
groups have been an important part of the total Communist propaganda
effort in Burma. Local propaganda organs play up Burmese participation
in international conferences both before and after Burmese delegations
have gone abroad.
conferences:
Delegations have been sent to the following recent ,
Meeting
Date Size of Delegation
World Youth Festival - Berlin
Aug. 1951
5
'Moscow Economic Conference
April 1952
7
P
ifi
i
d P
A
eace
ac
c
s
an an
Conference - Peiping
Sept. 1952
26.
lt
l
t
ti
l C
I
ona
ura
erna
u
n
Conference - Moscow
Oct. 1952 10
WFTU General Council - Berlin
Nov. 1952 3
World Peace Council - Vienna
Dec. 1952 20
Although the delegations have usually included Communists, they have not
been composed exclusively of known party members.
Burmese participation in the work of international "front"
organizations seems to have been largely limited to att ndanoe at these
conferences. Although no reliable data'are available,, t seems/ un-
likely that financial contributions have been received from,Burmese
groups. On the contrary, the international organization,i 3 appear to
subsidize the participation of Burmese groups, at least to~thq extent
of underwriting expenses while travelers are in orbit countries.
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XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK
A. International Party Channels
All Communist elements in Burma emphasize the country's ties to
China, because of a general Burmese sense of nearness to China and an
interest in Chinese developments. Outwardly, therefore, the closest
international links appear to be with Communist China. Ties with the
Indian Communist Party have not been close, although one finds
occasional references to liaison with representatives of the East
Bengal Communist Party.
There is ample, although circumstantial, evidence that above-'
ground Communist elements follow international Communist directives
concerning propaganda drives, although local implementation of specific
campaigns is frequently tardy. Under the direction of local "front"
groups, the world-wide "signature campaigns" are carried on in Burma,
and particular propaganda themes related to Far Eastern affairs are
generally carried in local organs. It is not known, however, whether
the Chinese or the Soviet Embassy is the original source of directives
to local groups.
Although there are frequent reports of directives from Chinese
or Soviet officials concerning party strategy in Burma, it is impossible
to determine whether specific moves, particularly with reference to
guerrilla'aotivity, are the direct result of Chinese or Soviet direction.
Since early in 1952, there seems to have been a shift in emphasis, from
direct military action to above-ground agitation for a "united front"
government and an end to insurgency. It is not clear whether the mili-
tary weakness of the insurgent groups is responsible for the shift, or
whether it was made in response to a directive concerning general Asian
Communist strategy.
1. International courier system. The Chinese Embassy in Rangoon is
known to have a regular courier service, and it is probable that the
Soviet Embassy provides similar facilities. In addition, commercial
channels are readily-available within the Chinese community. There are
reports that crew members of ships calling at Rangoon serve as contacts
with both Chinese and Soviet Embassies, but details are unavailable.
There is also direct overland communication with China, but it is not
possible to state whether these routes are more important than sea con-
tacts. Available evidence suggests, without definite proof, that the
above-ground BWPP has direct access to the Chinese Embassy in Rangoon,
and that the underground BCP maintains overland contact with China.
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It is probable that arrangements for guerrilla training in China are
made by direct liaison with Chinese officials in Yunnan.
29" Domestic communications. The nature of current Communist
operations reduces the need for close integration among the several
elements. Above-ground activities are concentrated in Rangoon and in
major towns, and personal travel is limited only by deficiencies in
local transportation. Underground activity is apparently linked by
courier and radio facilities between guerrilla areas, but details are
unavailable. Radio equipment is frequently moved to avoid capture,
and the location of present installations is unknown.
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IR-6165.2
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: '
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, INDOCHINA
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
ii
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES .
. .
1
I. Objectives . .
1
Ii. Tactics , . .. .. .. .. ..
.
1
III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
ASSETS.. . . . . . . .
. .
4
I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . ?
. .
4
II. Electoral Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
5
III, Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action
6
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism , . . . .. . .
. .
10
V. Communist Influence in Labor . . . . .
.
12
Vi. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and
Professional organizations . . . . . . . . . . .
..
13
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . .
. .
14
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation .
. .
14
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-.Communist Political
Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? . . . . .
. .
15
X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . , . . . . . .
. .
15
XI. Financial Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
17
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . .
..
17
XIII. Communist International organizations . . . . . .
. .
18
XIV. Communist Communication Network. . . . . . .
. .
19.
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FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.-
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
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COMMUNISM IN INDOCHINA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
All of the immediate objectives of the Communists in Indochina are
related to their effort to win the bitter civil war which they are waging
against the forces of the French Union. Within the area which they have
conquered, the Communist objective is to improve their control over popu-
lation and resources in order to maximize their total military effort.
Within the areas controlled by the legitimate Governments of Vietnam, Laos,
and Cambodia, the Communist objectives are:
1. To subvert the loyalty of the population.
2. To improve the party's covert organization.
II. TACTICS
Communism's objectives in Indochina are furthered by the Soviet and
satellite-recognized "Democratic Republic of Vietnam," its Chinese-supported
and equipped army, its administrative and control organizations (police,
secret and security services, propaganda organizations, administrative
cadres), and by its popular front movement, the "Lien Viet" or 'National
Unity Front."
The entire insurrectionary structure is held together and controlled
by the Laodong (Comunist) Party. It is the Laodong Party which, in the
final resort, operates the complex mechanism of war, propaganda, and compul-
sion which appears to the people of Vietnam and to the outside world as the
"Viet Minh" movement. And the Laodong Party, in turn, is managed by a
group of highly trained and thoroughly experienced revolutionary leaders.
The Communist Party in Indochina uses both military tactics and
political warfare tactics to further its over-all objectives.
Its military tactics are designed: (1) to inflict maximum disrup-
tion and destruction on enemy forces and enemy war potential in the rear
zones, with the minimum expenditure of Viet Minh forces; (2) to infiltrate,
occupy, and consolidate territory with a view to securing a continuing
reservoir of potential manpower recruitment for the army and to finding
the necessary economic means (mainly food) to support intensification of
the war. These tactics have been highly successful. For over six years
the Viet Minh has inflicted heavy casualties on the Franoo-Vietnamese
forces, while paralyzing Indochinese economic life and preventing the
country's recovery. The Viet Minh is now strongly established in North and
Northwest Tonkin, in the lightly industrialized and food-producing regions
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of North Central Vietnam, and in the coastal plains of South Central
Vietnam. Most of China's long common boundary with Indochina is now
in Viet Minh hands, permitting continued Chinese Communist assistance %
to the Viet Minh armed forces.
Communist political warfare tactics are designeds (1) to ex-
tend Communist Influence among all social and economic groups in the
populations of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos; and (2) to consolidate
Communist control over conquered areas and populations.
Communist propaganda attempts to exploit sentiment "for independ-
ence" and "against French colonialism." To some extent, but only within
carefully-drawn limits, the attempt to make the Viet Minh effort appear
one of genuine national resistance to a foreign colonizing power con-
tinues to displace certain other considerations in Communist tactics.
Thus, Catholics in the Viet Minh zones have not been persecuted, nor,
until very recently, attacked ideologically, so that the pretense of
continued Catholic support for the "war of resistance" could be main-
tained. Similarly, although agrarian reform has been strongly stressed,
landlords have been dispossessed only where it was essential to secure
fuller cooperation on the part of the landless peasantry. Orthodox
Communist doctrine has generally taken second place to "anti-imperialist"
themes in Viet Minh propaganda. However, whenever the priority needs of
intensifying the armed struggle have demanded that themes of "national
unity" and nationalistic propaganda be soft-pedalled, this has been done,
particularly since 1951.
Efforts to consolidate Communist control over areas and popula-
tions already under Communist influence center upon the peasantry.
Basic Viet Minh policies and the major part of its propaganda output
are calculated to increase the peasantry's contribution to the military
effort. Both within and outside the zones under direct Viet Minh control,
the Communists rely heavily upon conspiratorial methods and upon a large
and widespread system of terror and compulsion. Such a system has been
essential not only in providing the necessary vehicle for Communist control
of the vast masses of people (some 12 million) and the variegated leader-
ship which the Viet Minh movement has brought under its banners,, but also
in order to gather the necessary intelligence for military operations and
political warfare.
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If Franoo-Vietnamese military strength in Indochina does not
increase, the Viet Minh may become strong enough within the next few
years to be able, without identifiable Chinese Communist interven-
tion, to break the current stalemate. While the Viet Minh's military
capabilities are at present limited by its exclusion from the more .
productive regions of Vietnam, this might be overcome by significantly
increased Chinese Communist materiel and technical assistance and by
conquest of further territory. At the same time, although the regime
continues to be based largely on compulsion and terror and to depend
mainly for the achievement of its objectives upon increasingly harsh
exploitation of a war-weary peasantry, the Viet Minh's administrative
and control capabilities seem adequate to counteract any growth of
discontent among the populations and armies under its control. The
Viet Minh's popular hold on substantial portions of the populations
outside its own zones, based partly on military prestige, partly on
continued nationalist appeal, and partly on a widespread mechanism of
compulsion and terror, is likely to be increased or decreased in.
proportion to the military power and ideological dynamism which the
free world, and above all the free states of Vietnam, Cambodia, and
Laos may be able to bring to bear against it.
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I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
Communist Party membership, following and strength are heavily
concentrated in the areas of Indochina controlled by the "Demooratio
Republic of Vietnam." In the "DRY", the official Communist party, the
LAO DONG (Workers) Party,has a membership variously estimated at be-
We-on56,000 and 715,000. Although reliable data on the number of
people under Communist Party discipline is lacking, the all-enocaspassing
coverage of the constituent organisations of the Communist-controlled
National Unity Front (LIEN VIET), suggests that a majority of the 12.7
million inhabitants of the "DRY" may be considered under effective
Communist control.
In the areas under the control of the Associated States govern-
ments of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, the Communist party is proscribed.
However, there are obviously Communists in all of these areas, due to
the ease with which the non-Cosmunist regions can be infiltrated. In
Vietnam particularly, but also in Cambodia and Laos, a number of
clandestine Viet Minh or Chinese-Communist-controlled organizations are
believed to be operating.
How many of the 9.9 million population of free Vietnam are under
Communist discipline cannot be estimated. Clandestine Communist opera-
tions are, however, relatively successful. In part, this is due to a
widespread Communist system of compulsion; on the other hand, the Viet
Minh cause continues to exert considerable national appeal in the free
zones of Vietnam. It is possible that a substantial portion of the
Vietnamese population and of the 800,000 Chinese in Vietnam are
sympathetic to the objectives of the Viet Minh and therefore susceptible
to Communist influence.
In Cambodia, it is unlikely that more than 10 percent of the
population of 3 million (including the Chinese) are strongly influenced
by Communism. However, acme 5000-10,000 Viet Minh guerrillas, mainly
concentrated in the Southern provinces, are reported fighting in units of
about company-.size against Franco-lbaer forces. In early 1952, the
Chinese Communist regime claimed the loyalty of 60 percent of the 300,000
Chinese in Cambodia. While this claim is undoubtedly exaggerated, a sub-
stantial percentage of the Chinese in Cambodia are believed to be under
Communist influence.
In Laos, the number of people under Communist influence is believed
to be extremely small - perhaps one percent of the one million population.
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The number of Viet Minh guerrillas in Laos is estimated at about 5,000.
Communist strength is believed heaviest in the DRV-controlled
provinces of North Tonkin and North Central Annam; less numerous in "DRV"
areas in Central Annam and Cochinohina. Communist influence in free
Vietnam is probably strongest in the urban areas of Saigon-Cholon, ?anoi,
and Haiphong. In Cambodia, Viet Minh influence is strongest in the
southern provinces where guerrilla units are concentrated. Chinese
Communist influence in Cambodia is strongest in Phnom-Penh where the
Chinese population is heavily concentrated. In Laos, Communist influence
is strongest in the Bolovens Plateau region where the Viet Minh guerrillas
are mainly based.
Communist Party membership in Indochina is believed to be composed
principally of professionals and government employees. In the "DRY",
industrial workers probably constitute an additional important membership
group.
Communist leadership in Indochina is believed to be well-eduoated
(Western Europe, China and the USSR), thoroughly experienced, completely
dedicated, and competent to fulfill not only its present responsibilities
but those it would inherit as a consequence of total victory in Indochina.
The average age of the sixteen current top-level Communist leaders is 47.
Many top leaders have been active since 1930.
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
On January 6, 1946, the Viet Minh Government held elections for a
"Vietnam National Assembly" in an effort to legitimize its rule. In
addition to the polling in-areas of North and Central Vietnam under
DRV control, clandestine votes were taken in parts of South Vietnam.
There is considerable doubt as to the extent to which these elections re-
flected the popular will; an implausibly large vote was olaim.ed for a
country where the parliamentary system is all but unknown. Among the
300-odd members of the "elected Assembly," the Viet Minh (then ostensibly
a coalition of left-wing and nationalist parties under Communist domina-
tion) emerged as the largest party with 80 delegates. The 90 independents
probably also included a significant number of Communists and another
group of 15 Communists was elected under the label of the "Marxist Party."
No further elections have been held in the Communist-held areas of
Indochina. Elections have, however, taken place in Laos and Cambodia
and are now about to take place in free Vietnam, although, of course,
without Communist participation.
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III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
A. Total Strength and Character of Communist Forces
The Viet Minh disposes of a total armed strength of about 315,000
men, distributed as follows:
Regular Aray: 1300000
Regional Forces: 750000
Peoples Militia: 110,000
The Regular Army is a well-trained, well-equipped, highly aobile,
modern fighting force capable of waging effective positional warfare
against France-Viet amese forces. The Regional Forces are lase well
equipped and generally recruited regionally for static support of the
Regular Army. The Peoplets Militia is locally recruited for village
defense and small-scale guerrilla action.
B. Security of Controlled Areas
The Viet Minh armed forces of 315,000 men, which are employed both
for the defense and security of controlled areas and for offensive opera-
tions based on these areas, are distributed within the "DRV"-controlled
areas as follows: 174,000 men in Tonkin; 80,000 men in Central Vietnam;
46,000 in South Vietnam; 10,000 in Cambodia; and 5,000 in Laos.
The population in Communist-controlled areas has generally been
stable and tightly-controlled. Disturbances and riots have, however,
occasionally been reported, particularly in the strongly Catholic Vinh
and Thanh Boa regions of Korth Central Vietnam.
Civil administration in "DRV"-controlled zones is in the hands of
administrative cadres directly responsible to the "DRV" Ministry of
Interior. It is logical to suppose, although no information is available
on the subject, that the Viet Minh armed forces have at least temporary
control of civil administration in regions only recently conquered. This
control is presumably exercised by political and administrative cadres of
the Army.
C. Military Support Organizations
"DRV" supply, cgmmunioations, and intelligence organizations are
highly developed units operating at all levels of the military administra-
tion. Their authority is derived from Directorates attached to the
General Staff of the army. Information concerning the strength of the
various support organizations is not available although these organiza-
tions may be assumed to be quite large. Their networks are known to
embrace all of Vietnam, including Franoo-Vietnamese areas.
LERET
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In view of the fact that North Vietnam is not only the theater of
the most active military operations but also the seat of the "DRV" govern-
ment, supply, cormnunioations, and liaison functions are presumably conr-
oentrated in that area. Intelligence activities are probably concentrated
in urban centers (chiefly Hanoi and Saigon) as strongly as in strategic
military areas.
Available reports indicate that "DRV" support organizations have
achieved a high degree of efficiency.
D. External Military Support
rrrrrr i r r.r.rr.Reports from a variety of sources, in most oases neither evaluated
nor confirmed, suggest that while certain supplies may originate else-
where in the Soviet bloc, Communist China is the main source of ailitary
support to the Viet Minh. The following types of supplies have been
rsportedsl
1. Arms and ammunitions Mountain guns; anti-aircraft guns; light
machine guns; heavy mac ne guns; field guns; howitzers; mortars;
rifles, including Browning automatic rifles; pistols; rocket launchers;
spare parts; ammunition; TNT and other explosives; fuzes; detonators;
projectiles; grenades and grenade throwers; and land mines.
2. Cosmnissarys
a. Foods Rice; maize; dried sweet potatoes; cereals; and soy
beans, flour.
be Clothin s Uniforms; cotton material; army blankets; cloth
shoes; rub ear sus; steel helmets.
3. Transportation and communication uipments Trucks; tires; spare
parts; gasoline; o ; kerosene; radio sets and field transmitters.
4. Others Medical and clinical supplies; X-ray metal testing equip-
ment; baoes; electric meters; electric drills; files; abrasives; saw
1 Reports often-include quantity figures, frequently between400
and 800 tons per month. overlapping of the time periods covered
and non-comparable quantity designations (e.g. rounds, cases, or tons
of ammunition), however, make it impossible to arrive at meaningful
totals. Moreover, in a few oases where cross-checking of reported
totals has been possible, resultant discrepancies have cast further
doubt upon the validity of the figures reported.
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blades; iron and steel for making cables; electrical distributing
machinery; agricultural machinery; oxygen containers oxygen-generating
machines; gas masks; binoculars; industrial machinery.
E. Military Operations
Military operations in Indochina since 1946 have been conducted in
virtually all areas of the peninsula, but have.been principally concentra-
ted in-North Vietnam (Tonkin). There, Communist forces have been fighting a
savage battle for over six years for control of the crucial rice.
producing Red River Delta (in which the key cities of Hanoi and Haiphong
are located). At present about 174,000 Communist troops are pitted
against an estimated 185,000 Franoo-Vietnamese forces in the Tonkin
region. The principal tactic of the Communist forces has been to harrass
the Franoo-Vietnamese Army by guerrilla warfare inside the Delta and by
massive attacks against isolated French posts and cities outside the
Delta..
A turning point in the battle for Tonkin was reached in the fall
of 1950, when Viet Minh forces, in quick succession. seized all French
.posts along the China border (Langson, Caobang, Laokay), excepting only
Monoay in the extreme eastern coastal sector. In the fall of 1952,
Communist forces expelled the French from all of Northwest Tonkin, ex-
cept Laiohau and Nason. At this moment, therefore, the Communist forces
hold most of Tonkin outside of the key Delta region. The latter, how-
ever, in which the vast bulk of Franco-Vietnamese foroes is now oonoen-
traced, has been heavily infiltrated by Viet Minh forces and is
besieged at its periphery by some five Viet Minh divisions.
In Central Vietnam, an estimated 75,000 Franco-Vietnamese forces
hold the narrow coastal plain from Faifo to Dong Hoi against some 80,000
Communists who are in control of the remainder of the area. In South
Vietnam, an estimated 162,000 Franco-Vietnamese forces control most of
the region, but conduct frequent and difficult operations against some
46,000 Viet Minh guerrillas, oonoentrated principally in the unhealthy
and almost impenetrable swamps of the Plaine den Jonas. In Laos and
Cambodia, Communist military operations are apresen limited to small-
scale harrassment by guerrilla forces.
F. Popular Attitudes. Toward the War
The peasantry of Indochina has borne the main brunt of the long war.
The peasantry serves as a reservoir of manpower for the armies involved,
performs the coolie duties of supply, engages in sabotage and informer
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operations at the order of one aide or the other, constructs public
works, and -- over and above all this -- produces the food for its own
subsistence and that of the non-productive hundreds of thousands in the
armies. By this time, the peasantry clearly abhors the war and
anxiously hopes for its and.
General passivity toward either side in the conflict may in fact
be said to characterize the sentiments of the vast majority of Indoohina's
civilian population. However, passivity is less noticeable, and the
effects of political warfare and propaganda by either side are more
marked, among city dwellers. The nationalist pretentious of the Viet
Minh, rather than Communism itself, continue to hold much appeal for
Indochina's urban population, whether inside the Viet Minh zones or in
areas of Franoo-Vietnamese control.
G. Current Strategic and Tactical Objectives of the Communist Insurrection
Current strategic and tactical objectives of the Communist
insurrection are military and political consolidation over newly-won
territories in northwest Tonkin, and intensified penetration by Viet
Minh regular forces into the Franoo-Vietnamese held Tonkin Delta area,
The "DRV" probably will intensify guerrilla warfare in the plateaux
region of Central Vietnam as well as in Cambodia and South Vietnam and
may also attempt a limited military penetration into Laos. In Central
Vietnam, the Communist forces will probably continue to maintain strong
pressure against the Franoo-Vietnamese forces along the coast.
H. Relations of Communist to Non-Communist Insurrectionary Organizations
1. Vietnam. In June 1951 Colonel Trinh Minh The, former Chief of
Staff ohs armed forces of the autonomous politico-religious Caodaiet
movement, took to the bush with 2,500 men in South Vietnam to set up
"the National Resistance Front," a "third force" opposed to both the
Viet Minh and the French. Since the spring of 1952, when the French
launched military operations against this group, Coionel The has not
been heard from and his current whereabouts are unknown. There is no
evidence that Colonel The has collaborated with the Viet Minh.
2. Cambodia. In March 1952, Son Ngoc Thanh, a leading Cambodian
nationaUet, organized a dissident nationalist movement. At first, the
activities of this group seem to have been limited to propaganda attacks
against the French and Cambodian King. In recent months, broadcasts of
Son Ngoo Thanh have been increasingly favorable to the Viet Minh, but
the present relationship between these two movements is not clear.
3. Cambodian and Laotian Issaraks. The Cambodian and Laotian
Iesaraks, un er the-leader-ship-respectively of Son Ngoo Minh and Prince
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Souphanouvong, have been formally allied with the Viet Minh movement
since March 1951 when the "United National Front of Vietnam, Cambodia,
and Laos" was established. In the past, military efforts of the
Issaraks have been for the most part limited to sporadic guerrilla
warfare, banditry, and arms smuggling across the Thai border.
A closer degree of cooperation seems to have been achieved during
the past year between the Viet Minh and the Cambodian and Laotian Issaraks.
From 5,000 to 10,000 Viet Minh are reportedly with the Cambodian Issaraks
and 5,000 with the Laotian Issaraks. In October and November, 1952, a
Laotian delegate accompanied the Viet Minh delegation to the Asian and
Pacific Peace Conference in Peiping. In December delegates from both "Free
Cambodia" and "Free Laos".participated in the World Peace Conference in
Vienna,
anabilities for Expansion and Action in the Near Future
Despite the relatively low level of military industrial production
within "DRV" areas and a reportedly increasing food shortage, the "DRV"
could probably expand the present scope of its military activities to a
limited extent without significantly increased support from Communist
China or from other Orbit countries.
If, as seems likely, the Issaraks receive greater material assistance
and technical advice from the Viet Minh, they would be able to expand
theirnumbers and extend their operations.
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM
A. Repressive Capabilities of the Associated States and France
French and Associated States policy toward Communism in Indochina
is the military destruction of the Viet Minh armed forces and complete
eradication of Communist activities and influence throughout the peninsula.
No Communist parties, groupings, or organizations are allowed to
exist or operate in the Associated States of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.
The overt circulation of Communist publications in Franco-Vietnamese
controlled areas is prohibited and the possibility of Communist-oriented
material appearing in the controlled press is negligible due to tight
censorship exercised by both the French and the Associated States. Severe
repressive measures are taken against any individuals, groups, or organiza-
tions believed operating under Communist instructions or for Communist
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purposes. Such repressive measures are expected to continue until
hostilities in Indochina have ceased and internal political stability
is assured. They are carried out by civilian security services of
France and the Associated States, and insofar as the security of
components of the French Union Armed Forces is concerned, by the
military intelligence and counter-intelligence services of these forces.
At present, the scope and effectiveness of repressive action of
which the French and Associated States civilian and military security
agencies are capable in Indochina cannot be rated better than fair. By
contrast, Communist subversive operations are believed to be,'on the
whole, very effective. Possibly the greatest asset of Communist under-
ground and subversive organizations of all types lies in the generally
apathetic attitude of the Vietnamese population as a whole toward the
conflict which is raging in its territory.
B. Extent and Effectiveness of Communist Subversive Operations
Communist subversive operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos
fall into two major categoriess those carried out by Viet Minh subversive
teams and underground networks, and those carried out by clandestine
Chinese Communist organizations.
Viet Minh organizations operating in the French and Associated
States-oontrolled zones of Indochina are for the most part responsible
directly to the central "DRV" government, or its regional representatives.
They perform three general types of assigned tasks: propaganda; political,
economic, and oounter-intelligence;l and terrorism and sabotage.'
The propaganda function is carried out by teams responsible to the
Information Services of the central "DRV" government. The total number
or size of such teams is unknown, but their effectiveness seems to have
been considerable. Espionage activities are carried out by organizations
and units of unknown size believed to be attached to the regional Cong An
(Public Security Service) of the Viet Minh, which is the latter's internal
security organization. Espionage agents reportedly are assigned
specialized tasks, the most important of which is the infiltration of
French and Associated States intelligence and security services. Terrorism
and sabotage within the free zones is performed by the Dich Van which in-
cludes Death Volunteer Brigades, apparently assigned to operate in specific
regions. The effectiveness of the,Dich Van is reportedly great; it has
seriously disrupted. highway and rai7i raTffc, damaged industrial and
Military espionage is carried out by intelligence organizations
responsible to the Directorate for Military Intelligence of the "DRV"
Armed Forces General Staff.
2. Certain types of sabotage activities are carried out by organized
guerrilla and commando units of the Armed Forces.
3. In 1951, ten such Information teams were reported to be operating
in South Vietnam.
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military installations, and organised numerous terroristic acts in major
urban centers, the most important of which was the assassination of a
number of highly prominent French and Vietnamese civil and military
personalities. One of the most successful activities of Viet Minh sub-
versive organizations has been the extortion of money from prominent
French and Chinese as well as from Vietnamese business firms. Many of
these firms regularly pay large sums of "protection money" to Viet Minh
agents in order to avoid bombing of their premises.
The "DRV" benefits considerably by the intelligence activities
carried out by Chinese Communist underground organizations in the non-
Communist zones. Since 1949, the Communist-directed "Association for
the Liberation of Overseas Chinese in Indochina" has organized various
clandestine student, women's and workers' organizations in Saigon-Cholon
where approximately 80 percent of the total overseas Chinese population
of some 800,000 is concentrated. During 1952, the creation of a
clandestine "United Action Committee of Democratic Sino-Vietnamese" was
reported, also in Saigon-Cholon. In North Vietnam, the "Society of New
Chinese Democrats of Hanoi and Haiphong" reportedly intensified intelligence
activities during 1952. The size of these organizations is unknown although
it is believed they have been fairly successful in gaining the sympathy
.of certain of the Chinese population, particularly among students and
workers. Specific underground activities which have been reported include
extortions of money for the protection of relatives in China, the circula-
tion of Communist tracts and publications believed to be for the most part
procured in Hong Kong, and the placement or pro-Communist instructors in
Chinese schools. In Cambodia, the Chinese Communist Party, whose head-
quarters reportedly is located in Phnom-Penh, claims the sympathy of 60
percent of the 300,000 overseas Chinese in that country. No information
is available concerning its activities or effectiveness.
V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR
In "DRV" controlled areas, all workers in key industries are con-
trolled by Communist elements, although the number of Party members in
specific enterprises is unknown. In the Associated States of Vietnam,
Cambodia and Laos, the number of Communists in key industries, if any,
is unknown.
In "DRy" areas of Vietnam, the General Confederation of Labor,
which is controlled by the communist Party, claimed "500,000 members" in
1952. The Confederation is composed of numerous affiliated trade unions
organized at provincial levels throughout Vietnam. It has been reported
that although not all of its directors are Party members, those exercising
any real authority are. The Confederation has been affiliated with the
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) since the former's organization in
1946 and has been represented at WFTU Conferences since 1948. In addition
to the General Confederation of Labor, the Viet Minh reportedly organized
a Trade Union Council in 1950 to embrace "intellectuals and civil servants."
Ab
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No further information is available concerning this Council.
In the free areas of Vietnam, labor organizations were prohibited
until the promulgation of the Labor Code on November 16, 1952. The
principal Vietnamese labor union, which until last November operated as
an association, is the Christian Confederation Vietnamienne du Travail
Chretien, reported to have 5,000 members. A number of civil servants
in i the French and Vietnamese. administrations, belong to Force
Ouvriere which has its headquarters in France. Although provisions of
the new Labor Code in Vietnam do not extend to the overseas Chinese
population, Chinese labor groups have for some time been loosely associated
in a Federation of Chinese Mutual Aid Societies. The 19 organizations
comprising this Federation claim an aggregate membership of some 11,000.
No information is available on Communist infiltration of, or in-
fluence in, these labor unions in Franco-Vietnamese areas of Vietnam.
However, the Chinese organizations are the most likely to have been
infiltrated or influenced by Communists.
VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
In both the free and the Communist zones, the Lien Viet (National
Unity) Front has developed an extensive and intricate network of front
organizations to enlist the support of the peasants and special interest
groups for the "resistance against French aggression." The leaders of the
front organizations are believed to be mostly well-indoctrinated and
capable party cadres, many of whom work in more than one organization.
What appear to be the most important front organizations are listed belows
1. The Union of Vietnamese Youth claims a membership of
2,500,000 and has been affiliated with the World Federation
of Democratic Youth since 1947.
2. The Union of Vietnamese Students and Pupils has been
affiliated with the International Students Union since 1948,
3. The Union of Vietnamese Women claimed 3,000,000 members as
of 1950. It has been affiliated with the Women's Inter-
national Democratic Federation since 1945..
4. The Catholic Association for National Salvation.
5. The Association of Vietnamese Journalists has been affiliated
with the World Federation of Journalists since 1950.
6. The Vietnam World Peace Committee is affiliated with the
World Peace Council.
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7. -The Vietnamese Peasants Association for National Salvation.
8. The Sino-Vietnamese friendship Association.
9, The Soviet??Vietnamese Friendship Association.
In addition to Viet Minh front organizations, the Chinese Communist
Party has organized various youth, workers', women's and cultural under-
ground front organizations. These organizations are believed to be
strongest in the Saigon-Cholon area of South Vietnam and in the Phnom-
Penh region of Cambodia, where the majority of the overseas Chinese
residents in Vietnam and Cambodia are located.
Many, if not all, of the "Lien Viet front groups have effective
underground organizations within -Me areas under Franoo.-Vietnamese con-
trol.
Little information is available concerning non-Communist social,
cultural, or professional organizations which may have been infiltrated
by Comanunists.
VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
Such infiltration is unquestionably a serious problem for the
anti-Communist governmentsof the Associated States. Although policy-
making bodies of these states are believed to be to a large extent free
from subversive Communist personnel and influences, the same can
probably not be said with regard to the Armed Services, police and
security services, and administrative cadres of the States. Communist
subversion is believed to have reached particularly serious proportions
within Vietnam's National Army. The Army Officer's Training School at
Dalat has been reported strongly infiltrated by Coiunist elements, and
certain Vietnamese troop companies in action in North Vietnam have proved
of marked unreliability. The Vietnamese, and even French, security
services in North Vietnam are also believed penetrated to sons extent by
Communist elements.
No reports of Communist penetration of government agencies and
services in Cambodia and Laos have been received, although it is likely
that a limited degree of infiltration may be considered to have occurred.
VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
In the "DRV"-controlled zones of Vietnam, leaders of public pro-
paganda organizations are usually Party cadres. Communist propaganda has
undoubtedly reached nearly the entire population in these zones, chiefly
through the effective organization of mass front organizations and compulsory
study groups at provincial and village levels.
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In free Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, no known Communists are in a
position to influence public opinion. There are probably a considerable
number of concealed Viet Minh sympathizers or agents, however, in schools,
journalistic, and literary groups. The prohibition of Communist publics..
tions, tight press censorship,and the extremely limited number of radio
sets among the population in Franco-Vietnamese controlled areas have
tended to insulate the population from Communist publications and broad-
casts. Nevertheless, it is likely that Communist influence has been
spread fairly successfully through clandestine operations and through
direct contact of many individuals with underground Viet Minh agents.
IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST
The most important non-Communist nationalist organizations and
parties in Indochina are the Dai Viet Party, the Cao Dai politico-
religious group, the Vietnam a ona ist Party (V- and the Catholics
in Vietnam, and the Democratic Party in Cambodia. Although information
is generally laoking on their membership, these parties and groups are
thought to embrace several hundred thousand members. The extent of
Communist influence in these organizations is unknown, but is not be.
lieved to be large due to the strongly anti-Communist, although clearly
pro-nationalist, sentiments of most of their leadership.
Branches of the above-mentioned organizations are still in some
instances allowed to operate in "DRV"-controlled zones, where the Catholics
and some Caodaists, for example, maintain social organizations. However,
the Communists have undoubtedly strongly infiltrated these branches and
probably control them completely. The same would be true for nominally
non-Communist parties and organizations existing only in the "DRV" Zones,
such as the Vietnam Democratic Party and the Socialist Party, which the
Communists continue to tolerate in order to bolster their nationalist
pretensions.
X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA
A. Newspapers and Periodicals
Listed below are the newspapers and periodicals known to have
been published by the Viet Minh in 1951 or 1952. Where known, the
frequency of publication and the principal area of circulation are in-
dicated. These publications are also clandestinely distributed in
Franoo-Vietnamese-controlled areas by Viet Minh underground organiza-
tions.
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Name(Translation)
Circulated lYhen.pub-
in lished
1. Major Papers
Tonkin (occasion-
Cuu Quoo (National Salvation) Lien Viet ally throughout
fly
am
Vi
t
)
e
n
Nhan Darn (The People)
Laodong North Vietnam
Weekly
(Worker's Party) (distributed in
27,000 copies)
Nhan Dan (The People)
Laodong South Vietnam
Monthly
(Worker's Party) (distributed in
24,000 copies)
Lao Dons (The Worker)
Vietnam Federa-
tion of Labor
2. Specialised and Provincial Publications
Gia Dinh
Administrative
Unknown
Two or
Committee of
three
People's Army
times
Weekly
quan Viet Bac
People's Army and
North
Unknown
Militia
Vietnam
China-Vietnam
Sino-Vietnamese
Unknown
Unknown
Friendship
Association
Doc Lap (Independence)
Democratic Party
Tien Lien (Fob)
Sooialist Party
To oo Than Het (The
People's National
Saigon-Cholon
3 or 4
a on=vs AlIT-
Union
times
Weekly
Dung Tien (To Go Forward
"Organ of young son
South Vietnam
Unknown
Y 7 -
and children"
Danh sang Chus.
Catholic Patriots
Hanoi Sector
Unknown
Dan Gay
Association Nambo of
Unknown
Unknown
uan Doi (Neer Strength)
Economic Front
Peasants for National
Salvation
Unknown Phuyen Province Unknown
South Trungbo
Unknown Unknown Unknown
Ministry of Eduoatim Unknown Unknown
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The "DRV" controls the following broadcasting stations which have
regularly scheduled programs beamed to Indochina and to Southeast Asia:
1, Voice of Vietnam is regarded as the official government
s on. is reportedly located in the Vinh area. News
is broadcast daily to Indochina and Southeast Asia in French,
English, Tonkineae, Thai, Mandarin, and Cantonese.
2. Voice of South Vietnam has tentatively been located north
of gon, roa oasts three programs daily of news and
commentary in Coohinohinese and one in Mandarin.
3. Voice of Nambo is reputedly located in the Mekong Delta area.
It carries our programs of news and commentary daily, one
each in Cochinchinese, French, Cantonese, and Cambodian.
In Cambodia, the Voice of Issarak Cambodia is operated by the Issarak
leader Son Ngoo Minh. One-half hour of news an comment is broadcast daily
in Cambodian.
Radio Moscow broadcasts one hour daily in Tonkinese and occasionally
in Coo no nese. Radio Pekin broadcasts one hour daily in Tonkinese,
and twice daily for 15 to nutes in Thai. Reception of the Thai
language program is reported to be poor.
Considering the small number of radio receiving sets in the
Associated States, it is likely that Communist radio broadcasts reach
only a very limited audience and achieve only limited propaganda effects
outside the Communist zones. Within these zones, however, they are used
as an extremely important,and probably effective, means of disseminating
propaganda and official orders to the population.
The "DRV" authorities collect both direct and indirect taxes, many
of then in kind, impose "duties" on goods entering Communist zones from
the Franco-Vietnamese zones, and exact "voluntary"donations through various
"emulation campaigns." The amount of revenue thus collected is unknown,
as is the size of any subsidies from international Communist organizations,
donations or credits by Soviet or Satellite governments. or dues from
party-controlled labor unions and fronts. Nor is any information available
on the amount of revenue collected through extortion of Vietnamese, French,
and Chinese business firma in the non-Communist zones.
XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
There are no Soviet bloc diplomatic establishments, trade, or cultural
missions in free Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos.
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Although the USSR, Caamaunist China, and other satellite countries
have recognized the "DRV", they have not established diplomatic missions
there. However, Communist China has sent various temporary military and
economic missions to the Viet Minh. During 1952 a 50-man Chinese
cultural mission was reportedly sent to Thai Nguyen in North Vietnam
for the purpose of establishing political liaison with the "DRV" govern-
ment, and an economic mission is said to have been not up also in North
Vietnam to study economic resources. Current estimates place the number
of more or less permanent Chinese Communist personnel-- technicians,
instructors, military and political advisors -- with the Viet Minh at
approximately 5,000. All Chinese Communist Missions are surrounded by
secrecy. It is believed that contact between Chinese personnel and
natives is held to a minimum.
A Sino-Vietnamese Friendship Association and a Soviet-Vietnam
Friendship Association were organised inside the "DRV" in early 1950.
Both organizations are associated with the "Lien Viet Front" and have
established branches throughout "DRV"-oontrollC d areas of Vietnam.
These organizations are reported to have clandestine branches in the
free areas, particularly in the Saigon-Cholon district. Propaganda
committees are m"eported to have been established at the branch levels of
both Associations. In addition to parrying out regular propaganda
activities, these associations are responsible for sponsoring celebrations
of major Chinese Communist and Soviet holidays. The Sino-Vietnamese
Friendship Association has published a journal, China-Vietnam, since
May 1950.
While it is not known to what extent, if any, the Viet Minh move-
ment may have been aided materially by international Communist organiza-
tions, it has been granted a significant extent of moral support by
such organisations through invitations to participate, often in a glorified
role, in Communist international conferences. In the past two years,
delegates from the "DRV" and in two instances from "Free Cambodia" and
"Free Laos" have attended the following international Communist *eetingsz
Meeting Date Size of representation
from Indochina
Vienna Peace Congress December 1952 11 (including 2
from Cambodia and
1 from Laos)
Asian and Pacific Peace October- 14 (including 2
Conference, Peiping November 1952 from Laos)
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??19>
Size of re resentation
Meeting
Date
from Indochina
Preparatory Meeting for,Peace
June 1952
2
Conferenoe of Asia and
Pacific Regions, Peiping
International Conference for
June 1952
2
Defense of the Rights of
Young People
Chinese May Day Celebration,
April-May
3
Peiping
1952
International Conference for
April 1952
3
the Defense of Children, Vienna
International Economic
March-April
4
Conference, Moscow
1952
World Peace Council, Vienna
Nov.-Deo. 1951
5
Berlin Youth Festival
August 1951
16
XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK
The Communists in Indochina maintain closest international ties
with Communist China, which recognized the "DRV" on January 18, 1950 and
received the credentials of the first "DRV" Minister in April, 1951 (his
status has now been raised to that of Ambassador), and with the USSR,
which recognized the "DRV" on January 30, 1950, and received the
credentials of a "DRV" ambassador in April 1952. Close ties are_
also maintained, although much less prominently and for the most part
covertly, with leaders of the French Carsmunist Party. Relations have
also developed between the Viet Minh leadership and leaders of the
Eastern European and Korean Communist regimes.
The clear harmony between Viet Minh and international Communist
policies leaves no doubt that close coordination with the international
Communist movement prevails. Proof that Communist China supplies high-
level guidance to the Viet Minh leadership was recently received in the
form of a Chinese Communist broadcast supplying the "DRV" government
with the draft of a proposed address by Ho Chi Minh, written in China by
the "DRV" Ambassador to that country. It is likely that frequent
consultations between China and the "DRV" take place, and that a certain
amount of day-to-day guidance is provided by the temporary technical and.
military missions now present in the "DRV" areas. It is also probable
that the Viet Minh representative in Moscow sends home frequent guidances
and reports.
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Efficiency of "DRV" contacts with the main Communist centers in
Pei-p+ing and Moscow is presumably very good, since the French now
control only one of the customary routes across the Chinese-Vietnamese
border. Radio contact between Communist China and the "DRV" is main-
tained through stations BAL 6 and GMH in China, which relay broadcasts
between the "DRV", China, and other Communist countries. It is be-
lieved that contacts maintained by the Indochinese Communists with
France and with other Southeast Asian or Pacific countries are probably
less efficient,
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IR-665.3
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, INDONESIA
OFFICE OF INTEI LIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ge
Foreword .. . .. .. .. ii
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1
I* Objectives* . . . . o* . . . . ? we* ? ? . . . ? ? 1
He Tactics . ? . . . . . . . ? ? . . ? ? . ? ? . . . . . 1
III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . ? . . ? ? . . ? ? ? 4
ASSETS
I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
He Electoral Strength . . . . . . . .. ... 6
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action. 7
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . .. . 7
V. Communist Influence in Labor ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ? 8
VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and
Professional organizations . . . . . . . . . ? . . . 9
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . ? 11
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . .
IX. Communist Infiltration of Nan-Communist Political
Parties ? ? ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
X. Communist Propaganda Media . . 12
XI? Financial Condition . . . . . . . ? . ... . . . . . . 13
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . . . . 13
XIII. Communist International. Organizations . . . . . . . 14+
XIV. Communist Communication Network . ? . . .. . . . ?.. 15
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FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.-
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
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COMMUIiISU IN INDONESIA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
I. OBJECTIVES
The major current goals of the Communist Party of Indonesia
(PKI) are to gain general acceptance as a genuine nationalist party
in Indonesia, to perfect the party organization and to consolidate
control over 's, variety of front groups, including the largest of the
labor federations in Indonesia. In pursuing these aims the PSI has
attempted to recoup such prestige as it lost, first, in the course of
the Madiun uprising in September 1948 and, second, as a result of a
series of arrests of Communist leaders by the Indonesian government
in August 1951.
Secondarily, the PKI attempts, especially through the activities
of its front organizations, to cause Indonesia's "independent foreign
policy" to be directed in such a way that ties with the Soviet bloc are
strengthened at the expense of relations with the West. Thus, the
PKI advocates the exchange of diplomatic representatives with the USSR,
non-cooperation with the UN embargo on shipments of strategic items to
Communist China, increased trade with the Soviet bloc, and rejection
of US economic.. and military aid.
The political climate in Indonesia, characterized by a lack of
cohesive policy on the part of the major political parties and a
general uncertainty as to the direction Indonesia will take in the
immediate future both domestically and internationally, enhances the
PKI's capability to pursue these several objectives concurrently.
'While present emphasis is on furthering the domestic political fortunes
of the party,'particularly with the prospect of general elections in
the next year, past experience suggests that should the requirements
of international Communism demand it, a quick reversal might be
effected, and international considerations be given precedence.
At this stage it is not clear whether the PKI hopes to achieve
its ultimate goal of direction of the Indonesian state through peace-
ful constitutional means, involving subversion of non-Communist
groups, or through eventual armed insurrection. It is likely that
the party's internal consolidation is pursued with both possibilities
in view.
In its attempt to gain popular acceptance, the PKI has been
able to capitalize on existing anti-colonial sentiment and has taken
a strong stand on a number of issues which also form a part of the
programs of other political parties. Thus, the PKI advocates abroga-
tion of the Round Table Conference agreements with the Netherlands,
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termination of the activity of the Netherlands Military Mission,
"restoration" of Western New Guinea (Irian) to Indonesian control,
and nationalization of such foreign enterprises as the North Sumatra
oil fields and the Bangka and Billiton tin mines. These pronounced
aims of the PKI,,shared as they are with other political groups,
appear to be only means to enhance the national standing of the party.
More general tactics directed toward this same and are the
publicly announced support of the present Wilopo government by the
PKI and efforts apparently undertaken in various localities to form
a series of "Representative Councils" under PKI leadership. These
united front tactics were justified in a party statement issued in
explanation of the first Communist support rendered an Indonesian
government since Madiun:
The formation of .the Wilopo cabinet opened rather extensive
possibilities to the PKI and the other people's organi-
zations to work publicly; they need no longer perform under-
ground activities as they did during the Suleiman... cabinet
5reoeding government ...This is the conclusion; in the
present condition, a PKI and the people have to choose one
of these two; a democratic bourgeois government or a
fascist bourgeois one....
On several occasions since the and of the war, the PKI has
stressed the desirability of a united front. The PAI has also
attempted in the past year to seize the initiative in organizing
celebrations of national holidays.
At the same time that the PKI has endeavored to reestablish a
patriotic reputation by positive action, it has refrained from
outspoken opposition to the government's programs, thus trying to
overcome a reputation for negativism. In conformance with this policy,
the PUI was relatively restrained in recent Parliamentary debates
critical of the leadership of the armed forces and the Ministry of
Defense, and took care to deny complicity in the resulting anti-
Parliament demonstrations. In paying lip service to respect for
democratic institutions the PKI has probably also been concerned for
its political future should anti-Communist military leaders seize
a larger measure of control.
The PKI- has attempted to appeal to all social groups, and has
had its greatest success in the organization of labor. SOBSI
(Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia), the PKI-controlled
traion a erattion dom na es the Indonesian labor movement and
is an affiliate of WFTU. SOBSI's potential for disruptive activity
was demonstrated in 1950 when it spearheaded a campaign of widespread
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strikes in vital industries throughout Indonesia. Harbor operations,
transportation, petroleum and some estate rubber production were
brought to a virtual standstill. Since that time, the Indonesian
government has restricted labor activity through a series of committees
to which labor disputes are to be referred for compulsory settlement.
Although SOBSI organizations have refrained from disruptive activity
in the past several months in conformity to the PRI program of
cooperation with the government, a potential for renewed agitation
exists. Among the more important other PKI front organizations in
Indonesia are women's, youth, students, and peasants organizations,
the People's Cultural League and the Indonesian Committee for World
Peace.
These groups echo the PKI program and propaganda in parlia-
ment, communicate Communist propaganda to mass groups, attempt to
enlist the support of non-Communist groups for Communist causes, and
participate in national conferences and international meetings of
Communist front organizations. SOBSI and two peasant organizations
are represented in the Indonesian parliament. Although there is no
separate Chinese Communist Party organization in Indonesia, many of
the same purposes are accomplished within the Chinese community by a
separate series of front organizations.
In addition to controlling completely the activities 'of the
above organizations, clearly recognizable as Communist front groups,
PKI members attempt to infiltrate other mass organizations. An
article published in the official PKI organ in February 1951 on 'The
Role of the PKI and Mass Organizations" states:
"Communists who are assigned to join organizations, such as
labor unions which are under the leadership of Trotskyite:
or Social Democrats, are not to leave such organizations,
for that would mean that we were allowing these masses to
continue under the leadership of those who are really
enemies of the people.... Therefore, we Communists may not
refuse to work in a mass organization, no matter how
reactionary it is."
Communist efforts are also made to infiltrate ministries of
the government, the police and military forces. Apart from the
known presence of Communists in the Ministries of Labor and
Information, there is little evidence to indicate the degree of
success enjoyed by the PSI to date in attaining this objective.
Since the abortive Madiun rebellion in 1948, the PSI has, in
general, refrained from violent activity. Nevertheless, the party
controls several small armed bands and is believed to continue
attempts to infiltrate other dissident organizations.
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The PKI in the course of its past history was often divided in
its leadership and evidenced the same lack of cohesion and direction
that characterized most other Indonesian political groups. Today, fol-
lowing the injection of considerable new blood into the party, there is
every evidence that the PKI adheres closely to policy as transmitted
through international Communist channels. Liaison is believed to be
effected through the Chinese Communist Embassy and at international
Communist meetings. Should the dictates of international Communism
so demand, the PKI today would probably not hesitate to reverse its
tactics, even at the risk of weakening seriously its domestic position.
III. CAPABILITIES
The PKI today.is better organized and better-led than at any time
in its past history. The party appears to be enjoying a considerable
degree of success as a result of its policy of cooperation with the
Indonesian government and its espousal of generally popular causes. As
long as it adheres to this policy of united front tactics its potential
for expanding membership and enhancing its following would appear great.
At the same time, the fact that the other major political parties advocate
much the same program and are not faced with the PKI'a constant problem
of establishing its identity as an indigenous party, militates against
the party's becoming so strong that it might participate in an Indonesian
government.
One major purpose of the party's united front tactics has been to
assure that it will not lose its present parliamentary representation
when general elections are held. It is not possible to forecast election
results at this time, but judging from the Indian experience in conduct-
ing elections with a largely illiterate electorate, the organization of
the PKI, particularly among front organizations, will probably assure it
representation disproportionate to its real popular support.
As a vehicle for gaining sympatby for international Ccinxmmist
causes, the PKI is limited in its success among politically articulate
Indonesians by a general awareness of the nature of Ccnnudsm and the
role played by front organizations, and by suspicion of the motives of
advocates of either side in the cold war. The party's appeal among the
masses, in turn, suffers Prom a lack of awareness on-the part of most
Indonesians of all but immediately pressing local problems. Nevertheless,
PSI propaganda as delivered through the several front organizations
capitalizes on the strongly nationalist sentiment of the people. Thus
it is probable that the people as a whole are more susceptible to Communist
propaganda influence than the more politically sophisticated leadership
groups.
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It is unlikely that the PKI will in the foreseeable future be
able to wage organized warfare against the Indonesian state, but it
may be expected that all opportunities will be developed to subvert
dissident groups with an eye toward future eventualities. The party
does continue to possess the capability of disrupting economic life
through the activities of the labor unions it controls, but such
activity would run counter to the law and might jeopardize the
reputation for cooperation and concern for the national interest
that the party has been nurturing. so carefully.
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C **WNISK IN INDONESIAs ASSETS
I. .~CA,ALL STRENGTH
Estimates of Indonesia. Con n nist Party (PKI) strength vary from
30,000-100,000 but no details are available. No separate Chinese Com-
munist Party organization is known to exist in Indonesia, although the
Chinese community, as noted below, possesses its own mass front organi-
zations. The PKI is strongest in Java and Sumatra and party activity
seems best organized in the major cities, but little information is
available concerning regional organization.
Much of the leadership and probably a large portion of party
membership are middle class intellectuals, but the bulk of party sym-
pathizers are unskilled agricultural and industrial laborers and farmers.
A majority of the party leaders have been educated or trained abroad, and
Samsun, one of the PKI'S founders, is in Moscow where he is credited with
playing a major role in Soviet planning for Indonesia. Other Indonesian
Coammnists are known to be in Prague, Pei-piing and Amsterdam.
Beset by undistinguished and ineffective leadership thrnughont
most of its history of three decades, the PKI in the postwar period has
experienced a new vigorous direction on the part of both the overt Central
Committee and its underground directorate. Party leadership today may be
divided between a small group of older prewar members and a majority group
of more recent leaders - averaging 30-35 years in age -- who have ac-
knowledged adherence to the party or front organizations only in the post-
war period.
While the government's security action of August 1951 against the
Communists increased pressure on the party and for a time restricted its
freedom of action, the most prominent and important leaders of the PKI
escaped capture at the time, and many lesser lights have since been re-
leased. There has been no evidence of dissension within party ranks in
the past two years,, and the present leadership appears prepared to under-
take whatever action party strategy demands.
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
No general elections have been held in Indonesia to date. The PKI
occupies 15 seats (7 percent) out of 220 in the provisional Parliament.
If satellite parties and fellow travellers are included, a total of 40
seats (19 percent) are controlled by the PKI.
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III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
Current PKI policy is to refrain from violent activity and to
enhance its popular support through ostensible cooperation with the
government and other political parties. Past experience in the post-
war period, however, indicates that the party will not hesitate to en-
gage in violent action when strategy so demands.
In September 19,8 during negotiations between the Republic and
the Netherlands, the PKI undertook an armed uprising at Madiun in
Republican-held territory. Party strategy at that time was apparently
aimed at precipitating a renewal of Dutch military action against the
Republic in the course of which the PKI hoped to seize leadership of
the Indonesian resistance. Premature action on the part of some of the
rebelling units and prompt counteraction on the part of the Republic
resulted in the suppression of the Communists after considerable loss
of life. In August 1951, the Communists led a raid on Tandjung Priok, port
area of Djakarta, in order to test the party's ability to execute this
type of maneuver as well as the government's capability of coping with
disruptive activity. It was this action that hastened the Indonesian
Government's decision to effect a series of security sweeps, in the course
of which many prominent Communists and fellow-travellers were arrested.
The Indonesian Communists are believed to have infiltrated dis-
sident organizations currently engaged in armed insurrection and may
possess small armed bands of their own, but reliable information on this
subject is lacking. Judging from their conduct of and participation in
non-violent demonstrations, Party members presumably would be available
in major cities for conducting violent demonstrations. Although the PKI
probably has an organization for violent action and the quality of leader-
ship is greatly improved over 1948, the success of any large-scale insur-
rection would probably depend on complete Communist subversion of existing
dissident groups or units of the armed forces. PKI control of most or-
ganized labor, the largest farmers' organizations and important youth groups
might provide considerable backing for whatever violent action the Party
might undertake.
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COWUNI94
The PKI enjoys the same freedom as other Indonesian political
parties, but the Indonesian Government limits the extent to-which the
PKI and its allied organizations can engage in propaganda attacks on
friendly states and the degree to which it may express its international
ties. Thus, pictures of international Communist leaders are occasionally
prohibited at Communist rallies, and propaganda films of a flagrant nature
are banned. In August 1951 the Government, fearing another attempted
coup, arrested numerous outstanding Communists and fellow travellers.
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The Party's past experience with the ability of the Indonesian
Government to curtail overt activity has presumably led it to form an
underground organization. However, no details are known regarding the
size or efficiency of such an organization. An.elaborate array of front
organizations and the probable existence of numerous undercover party
members would seemingly enable the PKI to maintain its structural or-
ganization and engage in limited activity in the face of Goverment re-
pression of the Party proper.
V. COWUNIST INFLUENCE IN lABO 3
The number of Communists in key industries is not known but is
appreciable in view of the strength of PKI dominated unions.
SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Selmruh Indonesia), the trade
union branch of the PKI, dominates the Indonesian labor movement and is
an affiliate of the WFTU. It is represented in the Provisional Parlia-
ment, where it holds four seats. SOBSI claims three million members,
although its actual membership is estimated at about 800,000. Its largest
affiliate is SARBUPRI, a federation of estate workers unions which claims
a membership of one million as against an estimated actual membership of
350,000. Other Important SOBSI affiliates exist among ship, dock, rai,
road, transport, sugar, and oil workers.
SOBSI's potential for disruptive activities was demonstrated in
1950 when it spearheaded a campaign of widespread strikes in vital in-
dustries throughout Indonesia. Harbor operations, transportation, petroleum
and some estate rubber production were all brought to a virtual standstill.
Because of the threat to security, strikes were banned by local military
commanders in several provinces in late 1950, followed by a nationwide ban
in February 1951. In October of the same year the ban was replaced by a
comprehensive decree calling for a three-week oooling-off period and es-
tablishing oemunittees of government officials for the compulsory settlement
of disputes where voluntary mediation failed. A series of disruptive har-
bor strikes in March and April 1952 were settled by committee action. A
strike of sugar estate workers in mid-1952 was called off only after the
government threatened to arrest strike leaders. For the last several months
there have been no strikes by SOBSI organizations, apparently in response
to the PKI's avowed policy of cooperation with the goverment.
Attempts by leaders of various non-Communist parties, particularly
the Socialist, Labor and Masjiaai parties, to organize non-Communist unions
capable of challenging SOBSI's domination of labor have been largely mi.-
successful. The lack of capable union organizers and funds and the desire
of various party leaders to bolster their own political strength have thus
far prevented the formation of a lasting united non-Communist federation
embracing all non-Communist labor groups.
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VI. CO I41JNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL. CULTURAL. AHD
PQ P -TICKS
A. Front Organizations
The most important Communist front organizations are described
briefly below:
1. .Ikatan Pemuda Peladiar Indonesia (IPPI), Indonesian Youth and
Students Union. This group claims a membership of 50,000 to
75,000, and is second in its field only to the Moslem youth,
organization. It is especially influential in the secondary
schools and is affiliated with the International Students Union.
2. Pemba & Mat, People's Youth. With an estimated membership of
30,000 this is the most active politically of the numerous
Indonesian youth groups. Peruda Rakiat is affiliated with the
World Federation of Democratic Youth.
3. Gerakan Wanita Indonesia Sedar (GERWIS), Enlightened Indonesian
Woanen&s Movement. GE14I3 does not possess nearly as extensive
an organization as the older women's organizations, although it
is the most active politically. To date it has been unable to
influence the national Congress of Indonesian Women to affiliate
with Women's International Democratic Federation, of which GZIMIS
is a member.
4. .B_arisan Tani Indonesia (BTI), Indonesian Farmers Corps. This
group is strongest in Central Java and is represented in
Parliament.
5. kikun Tani Indonesia (RTI), Indonesian Farmers Union. RTI,
active in West Java and South Sumatra, and BTI are the two
most powerful Indonesian farmers organizations. Plans are in
the offing for merger of the two groups.
6. Indonesian Committee for World Peace. This organization has
branches in major cities and appeals to mapy non-Communist in-
tellectuals.
7. Lembaga Kebudaiaan Rakiat (IEERA), People 'a Cultural League.
Apparently the successor to the Chinese-Indonesian Cultural
League, this group also has branches in major cities.
The above groups all serve as instruments for communicating Communist
propaganda to mass groups, lend their names to the support of Communist .
causes, attempt to enlist the support of non-Communist groups for Communist
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causes, and participate on behalf of Indonesian women, youth, etc., as
the case may be, at international Communist conferences.
Within the Chinese community the most important Communist organiza-
tion appears to be the Min She (People's Life Society), incorporating
a great many womenrs, youth, educational, professional and sports associa-
tions. Little detailed information is available concerning its activities,
but it appears to be the most active organization today among the overseas
Chinese ooiunity. When the Chinese Communist Ambassador arrived in Indonesia
he was greeted by representatives of 180 Chinese associations, which may
serve as an indication of the complexity of the organization of the Chinese
community in Indonesia.
In addition to the above group, perhaps a majority of the Overseas
Chinese Associations (Chung Hua char, Hui), which have existed since the
prewar period organized on a regional bas a,, have declared their support
for the Communist cause. Many of these have been brought together in a
series of Communist-dominated United Overseas Chinese General Associations.
The Chinese schools are a further vehicle for transmitting Communist
propaganda, and a large number of these are known to be Commmist-dominated.
A majority of Chinese labor unions are believed to be aff,.liated with SOBSI,
the overall Indonesian Com9uunist labor organization. In North Sumatra, at
least, the Chinese Commmiat Farmers Association is a member of the broad
farmers front dominated by the Indonesian Communists.
Few details are available concerning the operations, leadership or
membership of this array of organizations. Chinese Communist leadership
has been active in seizing control of a good many associations whose members
were apathetic to the political implications of Communist efforts. In some
oases comparable non-Communist organizations east, generally organized by
the KMT, but in general, the Comunist-dominated organizations are predominant
in the overseas Chinese community.
B. Infiltration of Non-Communist Organizations
The fact that many of the non-Communist mass organizations in
Indonesia are inclined to the left and have programs that bear a striking
similarity to those under Communist discipline makes it difficult to dis-
tinguish all organizations that might properly be included in this category.
It seems probable that the PKI attempts to infiltrate all such organizations.
An article in the official organ of the PKI states, "It is the fundamental
duty of the Communists to give gradual training to all mass organizations
and to supply them with progressive leadership." This publication also
declares, "Every Communist must work hard to unite all kinds of mass or-
ganizations into one mass organization." It appears to be the PKI ob-
jective gradually to merge infiltrated organizations into larger Commmist-
dominated front groups.
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It is doubtful whether any of the non-rCoffinunist mass organizations
consciously support Commonuiist programs, but there is often considerable
agreement between the Communist and non-Communist groups. The distinction
between the two groups is often only in the degree of eagerness to take
sides in international issues and willingness to affiliate with inter-
national Comamuhist front organizations.
GOVERTT
VII. CNIST INFILTRATION INTO
A nwnber of Communists are known to hold positions in the Ministry
of Labor and Information and in their regional offices. The total number
of Commnmists and Communist sympathizers in these offices is not known.,
but the ratio to total personnel is believed to be small. The arrests of
August 1951 ferreted out a number of Communists and Communist sympathizers
in the Ministry of Labor.
DIalan Baru (The New Roth), often cited as a guide for PKI members,
declares, "The armed forces must receive special attention as the most im-
portant instrument of national power. Armed forces cadres and personnel
must be given special attention in line with their role as the most important
instrument for the defense of the National Revolution." Although it is as-
sumed that the PKI has attempted to infiltrate units of the armed forces,
little evidence exists to indicate success to date. There are no known
Communists or Communist sympathizers at the top levels of the armed forces.
The same publication further states, "The police and associated personnel
must learn the meaning of the National Revolution.... The police must be
led by progressive cadres." Nevertheless, the mobile brigade, national
police force, is regarded as the most reliable of the Indonesian government
security forces and there is no evidence of Commmnmist success at subversion.
VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
, the national news agency is believed to be influenced by
either Partai Murba, a so-called "nationalist Camanunist" party, or by the
PKI,1 and a number of newspapers, avowedly independent, are believed to be
operated by PKI members or sympathizers. Nevertheless, the fact that the
Connmiats advocate many of the same issues that fore part of the programs
of major non-Communist parties and Coxa nmist publications share many opinions
with the non-Communist majority of the press makes it difficult to assess
Comsnunist influence on public opinion formation. It would seems that the
influence exerted by the Communists on public opinion media is limited and
of much less importance than the impact on public opinion of the activities
of Communist-dominated front organizations.
1. Adam Malik, head of Antara is thought to be a member of Partai Murba, but
the possibility exists that Murba itself is today a PKI front. In any
case, attitudes of the two parties on most issues are similar..
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IX. CCHMUJNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES
Past experience indicates that attempts at infiltrating all political
parties are probably made by the PKI. In.1948, several leading members of
the Socialist and Labor parties joined the PKI in the Madiun rebellion pro.
claiming themselves to have been Communists for a number of years. Little
concrete information is available, however, to support the above assumption.
M V1 as, which describes itself as "nationalist .Communist," has
a program that differs from that of the PKI only in refusing to subscribe
to a world Communist order. cannot be described as Titoist or
Trotskyist, since it acknowledges a position of world leadership for the
USSR. ?Murba has four seats in Parliament, and has its own series of labor
unions and front organizations. Failure of the PKI strongly to attack M rba,
suggests the possibility that since the death of its founder, Tan Melaka,
who strongly opposed the PHI, the party may have been infiltrated by PKI
members.
X. _C MIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA
A. Newapaners and Periodicals
Bin Merah (.Red Star) is the official publication of the PKI.
Formerly restricted to Party members Bin Merah is now available to
the general public, but its circulation is not known. The most important
of the other Communist newspapers is Sin g, with a Chinese edition of
about 20,000 circulation and an Indonesian edition of about 15,000 cir-
culation. There are seven other known Communist dailies, none of which
is believed to have a large circulation. In addition, a large umber of
Communist or pro-Communist books and pamphlets are sold at virtually all
bookstores in Indonesia.
B. PubligNM Houses
B9,ataag MMeeah and all important PKI propaganda publications, in-
cluding translations of foreign Communist writings, now are published by
the Jam, aax P n (Modern Institute) in Djakarta, a corporation in
which the PKI is reported to have a financial interest. Jaiaaan PPS
may have replaced the translating committee Komiai Penterdiemah) formed
in March 1951 by members of the Politburo. This committee was charged
with translating books and essays on Communist theory such as Lenin's
State and Revolution, and Liu Shaw-chtits On the Part . Three other
known st publishing houses are -the jaja" publishing house
and the Life Press Publishing Coampariy, both in Djakarta, and the Hwang
Lung (Yellow Dragon) Publishing Company in Makassar.
C. Cammannist Propaganda from Abroad
The Soviet magazine Times and the Soviet novel Star, both in
English, have been seen on sale in Medan, Sumatra. Other specific foreign
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Communist publications available in Indonesia are not lawn, but transla-
tion of Soviet writings is a constant part of PKI propaganda efforts, and
a great umber of Chinese Communist publications, including textbooks, are
distributed among both the Chinese and Indonesian commmmi.ties. .
The Soviet radio devotes one hour a day and Pei ping radio a half
hour daily to broadcasts in Indonesian. The effectiveness of these programs,
which is difficult to judge, is limited by the fact that only about 230,000
radio sets are registered in Indonesia.
II. FINANCIAL CONDITIC
Party dues are collected monthly on a sliding scale in proportion
to income, but do not exceed 1- percent of gross income. Details concern-
ing other sources of Party revenues, including possible subsidies from
abroad are not known. The PKI has had some difficulty in the past in
financing its publications, but organizational capabilities of the party
do not seem to have been hampered by want of funds. Demonstrations or-
ganized by the PKI and its affiliates appear well-supplied with posters,
etc. It does not appear that the party will suffer in the foreseeable
future from financial difficulties.
SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
Neither the USSR nor the East European satellites maintain diplo-
matic missions in Indonesia. There is a Taos representative and a Czech
consul-general in Djakarta, however, both of whom are reported to be en-
gaged in political activity.
Communist China has an embassy in Djakarta and consulates at
Surabaya, Makassar, Medan, Banjermasin, and Djogjakarta. The embassy
staff is reported limited to fifteen persons, and in July 1951 the Indonesian
government refused the entry of sixteen additional members. No details are
available concerning the consulate staffs.
In 1951 the Chinese CoDinunist representatives were active in or-
ganizing demonstrations on the part of the Chinese oamomiunity. The poor
reception accorded this activity by many Indonesians has caused greater
.restraint to be exercised so that the hand of the Chinese Commmist embassy
in such affairs in the past year has not been obvious.
There is no Soviet-Indonesian Friendship Association, and the
Chinese-Indonesian Friendship Association appears to have been superseded
by the People's Cultural League, the size of which is not known.
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XIII. COMM N ?NTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIOTi3
Np meetings of Communist international organizations have been held
in Indonesia.
The following is a list of meetings of Communist international or-
ganizations herd abroad, which are known to have been attended by Indonesian
Commmmists during the past two years:
1122
Ito
}Size Indones
re entationn
International Students Union
Executive meeting, Peiping
April 1951
1
World Federation of Democratic
Youth Executive meeting,
Budapest
May 1951
1
World Federation of Trade Unions
.Conference, Vienna
July 1951
2
Berlin Youth Festival
August 1951
53
World Federation of Democratic
Youth Annual Council Meeting,
Berlin
August 1951
2
Moscow Economic Conference
April 1952
23
International Student Conference,
Bucharest
July-August 1952
unknown
World Peace Council, Berlin
July 1952
unknown
Peiping Peace Conference
September 1952
about 10
Netherlands Communist Party
Congress
November 1952
Vienna Peace Congress
December 1952
16
Czech Communist Party Cbngress,,
Prague
December 1952
2
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XIV. _QMMUNIST CGINtJNICATION NETJ01
Close relations are maintained by the PKI with the Communist
parties in the USSR, the Netherlands, and Communist China. Leaders of
the PKI have received training in these three countries, and, as noted
above,. Samsun, one of the founders of the PKI is in Moscow.
Perhaps the most striking example of compliance with international
Communist directives took place in 1948. Indonesian delegates to the
Congress of the Communist Party of India and the Calcutta Youth Congress
held early that year reported home the adoption of a policy of armed in-
surrection. In September, following also the return of Muso, Samaun's
lieutenant, from Moscow, the PKI instigated the Madiun rebellion.
A more recent example of direction from abroad was the criticism
of SOBSI by WFTU representatives at the 1952 SOBSI national congress for
not maintaining proper liaison with WFTU international headquarters and
for failing to report SOBSI activities in sufficient detail.
Representatives of WFTU and foreign Communist trade unions have
attended past congresses of SOBSI, and a sixteen man delegation from
Peiping is known to have been present at the national youth congress held
in Djakarta in November 1952. Apart from liaison that is assumed to take
place at such meetings, it is believed that the Chinese Communist embassy
is used as a channel of conamication for the PKI.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . . . 1
1. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Ii. Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
ASSETS . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 5
II. Electoral Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 5
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . . . . . 7
V. Communist Influence in Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and
Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . ... . . . . 9
VIII. Cormnuniet Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . . . 9
IX, Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties 9
X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
XI. Financial Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
XIII. Communist International Organizations . . . . . . . . . . 10
XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.-
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
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CCIMUNISM IN MALAYA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
1. OBJECTIVES
Communist guerrillas, 95 percent of whom are Malayan Chinese,
have been carrying'out hit-and-run warfare against the British and
their supporters in the Federation of Malaya since mid-1948, when
the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and its fronts and labor organiza-
tions were banned. Documents captured near the beginning of the
guerrilla campaign'indioated that the objective of the MCP was to
drive the British out of Malaya. This was to be accomplished in
three successive phases by:
1) disrupting the economy
2) setting up governments in "liberated" areas
3) joining up liberated areas.
The inability of the party to achieve its first goal --
disruption of the economy -- in the first three years of the campaign
has according to other, more recent, captured documents, brought
about a revision of party policy from one of indiscriminate and un-
bridled terrorist activity to an attempt to guide guerrilla warfare
away from activities harmful to the interests of workers and peasants
and toward military targets. This move, combined with others, is
calculated to broaden the base of party support.
MCP recognition of the necessity for this changed course of
action has aroused some speculation, unsupported by any evidence,
that the party, in admitting this initial failure, may also have
reached the conclusion that it is incapable of achieving its ultimate
objective through its-own efforts, but must preserve itself as a
guerrilla force until an outside power can undertake the "liberation"
of Malaya.
II. TACTICS
During the past six months it has become increasingly apparent
from the lessened number and changed character of terrorist incidents
that the MCP, probably in response to progressively more effective
pressure by British Security Forces, has put into effect its new
strategic policies. The MCP's aim -- to gain the support of laborers
and peasants -- has required modification, rather than abandonment,
of guerrilla warfare tactics. A party directive indicates that
military and police targets may be attacked, but that the destruction
of dwellings and public utilities, and the seizure of food without
compensation is to be discontinued. The destruction of mine and
estate property is also prohibited, since it affects the livelihood
of laborers. Urban organizations, particularly labor unions, are to
be infiltrated or, if necessary, secret unions formed.
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The MCP's chief guerrilla organization, the Malayan Races
Liberation Army (MRLA) is estimated to have from 3,000 to 5,000
members. Grouped into twelve regiments, the MRLA:usually utilizes
the company or the platoon as its operating unit. The MRLA is
supported by the MIN YUEN, or Peoples Movement, which is
responsible for furnishing supplies, intelligence, and recruits to
the MRLA. Rather than a single organization, the MIN YUEN is a
collecton,of organizations controlled by party executives for work
among the masses. Among the MIN YUEN organizations are groups of
armed xhen numbering about 4,000, cooperating closely with the
MRLA. It is through MIN YUEN organizations that intelligence is
secured, men recruited, and funds obtained. While some financial
support comes from regular contributions by members'of MIN YUEI
organizations, the bulk of the funds collected apparently comes
from the "protection" money paid by Chinese businessmen, estate
owners, and tin mine operators. The MIN YUEN probably numbers
upwards of 10,000 members.
MCP activity capitalizes on anti-British sentiment and, to
some extent, the economic rivalry between the Malayan Chinese and
the paramount British economic group. Since 1949 the nationalist
character of the party has been stressed in propaganda,, but there
is little indication that this line has been effective.
Despite the receipt of one small shipment of arms from
Thailand, there is no evidence that the MCP regularly receives
material aid from outside Malaya. 'There is reason to believe,
however, that some trained leaders have been infiltrated from
China. Propaganda circulated covertly by the. party' follows the
lead of Peiping and Moscow broadcasts for the most part and it
is likely that these broadcasts serve as one of the chief means
of liaison between the MCP and'both these Communist centers-.
III. CAPABILITIES
Malaya is not characterized by the existence of either a
strong unified nationalist movement or depressed economic condi-
tions that could be exploited by the Communists. The guerrillas
do not have widespread public sympathy, and the movement appears
to be inspired by a hard core of Communists acting in response to
the policies of international Communism. The party has sustained
itself largely by intimidation of the Malayan Chinese community.
The recent change in the MCP's strategic policy away from wide-
spread terroristic activity and the intimidation of peasants and
laborers is in part at least an admission of the failure of this
course of action. The effectiveness of new emphasis on gaining
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the support of peasants and laborers, conducting a more selective
terrorist campaign, and infiltrating labor unions and other
organizations, cannot yet be evaluated.
Over the past four years the British, utilizing military
political, psychological, and socio-economic measures, have
.successfully contained but have failed to suppress the Communists.'
In additionto'the difficulties of guerrilla warfare in the jungle,
the failure of the Malayan Chinese to cooperate in the anti-guerrilla
campaign, political apathy, and the lack of a Malayan national
consciousness have contributed to the inability of the British to
eradicate the guerrillas.
The diversity of Malaya's population has prevented the
development of a national consciousness and hampered British attempts
to arouse an anti-Communist spirit based on nationalism. The
largest elements of the population, the Malays (49 percent) and the
Chinese (38 percent) form separate, mutually antagonistic communi-
ties. Major causes of the friction are the Malay fear of eventual
domination by the energetic Chinese whom they regard as alien, and
the Chinese resentment of the favored position traditionally accord-
ed the Malays by the British.
In contrast with the non-committal attitude of the Chinese
toward the present struggle, the Malays support the British,
forming the bulk of the police and staffing most of the lower
echelon administrative posts. Traditionally oriented toward China
as the Motherland, the Malayan Chinese have sought to preserve
Chinese culture through their schools and their family life.
Loyalty to the Motherland is basically cultural rather than political,
however, and the majority of Malayan Chinese are committed neither
to the Communist regime in Peiping nor to the Nationalists in
Taipei. Apart from a few leaders, political apathy has extended to
Malayan affairs, the primary Malayan Chinese interest in Malaya being
commercial. The Malayan Chinese attitude is also due to the
emergence of a strong government in China to which the overseas
Chinese feel that they may eventually be able to look for protection
of their interests; to the fact that the majority of the Communist
guerrillas are Chinese; and to the British failure to demonstrate
clearly the ability to eradicate the guerrillas. Moreover, the
Chinese fear local reprisals should they aid the British, or the
punishment of their relatives or the confiscation of their property
in China should they openly support an anti-Communist drive.
The new Communist course of action is likely to pose new
problems to the British, particularly since the infiltration of
labor unions is to be attempted. Nevertheless, it is likely that
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the British, now organized more effectively and imbued with better
morale under the leadership of Gen. Sir Gerald Templer, will
continue as during the past year to make slow progress against the
guerrillas. It is unlikely, however, that the British will be
able to wipe out the guerrillas completely; at the same time it is
.improbable that the guerrillas, without outside aid, can make the
British position untenable. The eventual outcome of Malaya's
Communist problem is-probably to a large extent dependent upon
events outside Malaya.
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COMMUNISM IN MALAYA: ASSETS
I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
Although more than 15,000 persons, or about 0.3 percent of
Malaya's population, are controlled or strongly influenced by Communism,
the MCP itself is estimated to have only 3,000 to 5,000 members drawn
almost wholly.from the'peasant and laborer class of the Malayan Chinese
community. Some 600 to 800 members are estimated to constitute the "hard
core" of the party and to have been active in the MCP for more than ten
years. During World War II, these hard core members took part in the
British-aided guerrilla organization known as the Malayan People's Axiti-
Japanese Army. Probably not more than 1,000 members have been associated
with the party for more than five years.
The actual leaders of the MOP are virtually unknown, but from the
fact of continued guerrilla resistance over the past four years and from
the statements of surrendered guerrillas it would appear that these
leaders are determined.,.-aggressive., well-trained men. Despite the strong
leadership of the party, however, some of the rank and file members have
become discouraged at the continual hardships of life in the jungle and
have surrendered to British Security Forces. Nevertheless, few of those
surrendering have been associated with the movement for a long period,
and it,is probable that the hard core of the party has remained virtually
intact for the past four years.
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
No general elections have been held in the Federation of Malaya.
The MCP,, banned in mid-1948, has, of course, entered no candidates in the
few municipal elections that have been held.
III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
Communist forces are estimated to consist of 3,000 to 5,000
members of the Malayan Races Liberation Party (MRIA) and approximately
11,000 armed members of MIN YUEN organizations. Despite guerrilla
casualties in surrendered, captured and killed, amounting to half the
estimated Communist force over the past four years, total guerrilla
strength continues to be set at a constant level by British sources
because of steady recruitment by the guerrillas. Lack of arms apparently
prevents any expansion of guerrilla forces.
All Communist support organizations, necessarily covert, are
blanketed into the MIN YUEN or People's Movement. It is from these
organizations that the receives recruits, funds, food, and
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information. The MIN YUEN has a strength estimated at 10,000 or more.
MIN YUEN organizations and their functions are: .
1. Self Protection Units -- to supply food
2. Protection Corps -- to sabotage and ambush
3. Armed Work Force -- to propagandize and organize
I. District Unit -- to propagandize and organize
5. Suicide Squad -- to assassinate reactionary leaders
6. Labor Protection Corps -- to lead strikes, to sabotage,
to propagandize
7. Reserve Corps --- to train executives
8. Executive Committee of the Masses -- to gather information
and food
Sympathizers Cells -- to train prospective party members,
to gather funds and food, and to act as couriers.
The guerrillas have employed hit-and-run tactics against police
stations and villages, ambushed patrols, sabotaged transportation and
public utilities, and attacked rubber estates and mines. Newly adopted
tactics will, according to a captured directive, confine such attacks
to military; and police targets, or to the property of "reactionary
capitalists." In the past, the guerrillas have received support because
of their ability to intimidate the rural and to some extent the urban
populations. However, the recent resettlement of some 400,000 Chinese
"squatters," who were living on the fringe of the jungle, into controlled
and protected "now villages" has removed one major source of guerrilla
support. Henceforth, the guerrillas must rely more upon Malay villagers,
estate labor, and urban dwellers. Whether the newly adopted policy of
paying for, rather than simply requisitioning food, and of safeguarding
the interests of peasants and laborers will prove effective in winning
voluntary'support remains to be seen.
The guerrillas have been unsuccessful in achieving the economic
disruption of Malaya, but their tactics have nevertheless affected
adversely the economies of both Malaya and the United Kingdom. Prospecting,
on which the future of the tin industry in part depends, has been prevented
for the past four years.. Rubber trees have been slashed, and a large-
scale program of replanting made impossible. Nevertheless, current
production has not been seriously affected, and it will probably be a
number of years before Malayan production feels the full affect of the
present situation.
Aft
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The expense of the anti-guerrilla campaign to the Federation
has prevented the undertaking of needed economic development projects,
while the expense of maintaining troops in Malaya and of contributing
to extraordinary expenses of local government has constituted a
financial drain on the United Kingdom.
Guerrilla warfare has hampered the rapid achievement of political
innovations desired by the populace and sponsored by the government as a
means of encouraging Malayan nationalism as an anti-Communist force.
Thus, while political progress toward autonomy has been slowed by
guerrilla warfare, it is the opinion of high-ranking officials that
political advance is nevertheless imperative if Malaya is to remain
non-Communist.
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM
The Government banned the MCP, its fronts,-and its labor organiza-
tion in mid-1948, when it also adopted Emergency Regulations placing
extraordinary powers in the hands of the administration. British Security
Forces consist of about 10,000 soldiers and 60,000 regular and special
police. In addition, a part-time Home Guard of 140,000 has been recruited.
The Home Guard and most of the special police are employed on static
guard duty. In addition to the military campaign, the Government has
undertaken special measures under the Emergency Regulations, as well as
broader social, political, and economic steps designed to create a
climate unfavorable to the growth of Communism.
By the end of 1952, more than 1400,000 Chinese "squatters" living
on the edges of the jungle and beyond administrative control had been
moved to protected "new villages" beyond the easy reach of Communist
forces that had been intimidating them as a means of getting food,
funds, and information. During 1952, as in previous years, several
thousand Malayan Chinese and a lesser number of Indians were deported
from Malaya., and additional thousands were detained. Moreover, in
several instances entire villages were punished for refusing information
to Security Forces or ignoring warnings to cease sheltering or feeding
guerrillas. Under the Emergency Regulations all inhabitants have been
required to carry identity cards; carrying arms without a license has
been made a capital offense; the movement of food has been restricted;
pro-Communist newspapers have been banned; and the solicitation of
money or food for the guerrillas has been made a capital offense. An
additional important regulation has placed in the hands of a comptroller
the power to direct any person into the police or military forces or to
perform any other duty.
The announced British aim has been to guide the colonial
territories to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth
and, as a means to that end, to do everything possible to establish
the required economic and social conditions. The Federation Government's
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efforts in this direction has been given a sense of urgency by the
belief of high-ranking Federation officials that such measures will
provide a long term solution to the problem of Communism. Inter-
racial harmony is seen as a prerequisite to the development of Malayan
nationalism, and organizations, including political parties, embracing
all communities in Malaya have been encouraged. Local elections have
been held in several municipalities, while some public members (as
opposed to government officials) of the Legislative Council have been
given responsibility for government departments as a first step toward
cabinet government. Citizenship provisions have been relaxed to allow
a much larger number of Malayan Chinese to qualify, and agreement has
been reached that a certain proportion of Malayan Chinese will be
allowed in the Malayan Civil Service. In the field of education,
regarded as a critical element in "Malayanizing" the Chinese, the
decision has been taken to establish national schools based on the
Malay and English languages.
Economic development, although slowed by the present guerrilla
problem, has aimed at expanding the national income by improving and
diversifying agricultural production, encouraging light industry, and
improving power supply and communication.
Propaganda measures, both with the guerrillas and with the
civilian population., have been intensified recently. Leaflets, posters,
radio, and mobile public address systems are used. One of the most
effective measures has been the use of surrendered guerrillas to recite
their unfortunate experiences with the Communists to a group of villagers.
The recent change in tactics by the MCP would seen to indicate
that measures taken by the Government have, at a minimum, been effective
in containing the guerrillas. The party's new tactics, however, will
force the Government to adopt new methods, particularly since the in-
filtration of labor unions is to be attempted. Since police training
has been directed toward the conduct of operations rather than the
collection of intelligence it is possible that the new Communist methods
may achieve some success before being checked by the Security Forces.
V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR
A policy of encouraging responsible trade unionism was inaugurated
shortly after World War II in Malaya. In the early stages, the Malayan
Communist Party gained control of the labor movement, organized general
labor unions on a regional basis and finally established a top-level
executive body known as the Pan--Malayan Federation of Trade Unions
(PMFTU), which claimed affiliation with the World Federation of Trade
Unions. The WFTU was declared illegal in June 1948. Subsequently,
many unions rapidly disintegrated and many labor leaders went underground.
Despite the fact that organized labor remains a Communist target,
the Federation Government continues to encourage trade unionism as a
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means of developing social responsibility and combatting Communism.
Under government guidance, trade unions have been rebuilt and a modest
nucleus of non-Communist unions now exists as a basis for further
expansion. A Malayan Trade Union Council,, which was formed in March 1950,
subsequently affiliated with the International Confederation of Trade
Unions.
. No labor unions in Malaya are known to be Communist infiltrated
at the present time and no Communist influence on the leadership has
been observed. While Communists have forced strikes among rubber
tappers in certain areas of Malaya, Communist pressure was exerted
from outside the unions rather than from within.
VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL1 CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
There have been no indications of-Communist influence in social,
cultural, or professional organizations. It is highly probable, however,,
that there has been some Communist infiltration of Chinese secret societies.
VII. CO!h&UNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
There is no known Communist infiltration into the Government
of the Federation of Malaya.
VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
There is some evidence pointing to the infiltration of the
faculties of Chinese schools by operatives of the Chinese Communist Party.
The placement of'pro-Communist teachers in Chinese schools appears to
have been accomplished at times with the connivance of school trustees.
Such infiltration appears to be designed not only to spread Communist
doctrine but to recruit students to go to China for completion of their
education.
IX. COA'IUUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES
There is no known Communist infiltration of any of the Malayan
political parties.
X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA
Publications of the MCP, usually attributed to various of the
District Committees,, are mimeographed news sheets circulated clandestinely
or covertly posted in a public place. Publications which have appeared
with some regularity include Freedom News, Workerst ress, and Workers'
and Students' News. The number of copies c rcu a ed s own.
At one time, large numbers of Communist or pro-Communist Chinese
publications were imported from Hong Kong. The police, however, have
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now undertaken to prevent such trade, and overt importation has ceased.
There is presumably some clandestine circulation of such publications.
XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION
No information concerning the financial condition of the 3CP
is available.
XII. SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
Neither the USSR and its European satellites, nor the Pei-p'ing
regime, maintain diplomatic, trade, or cultural missions in the Federation
of Malaya.
XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS -
No Communist international organizations maintain installations
within Malaya, and no conferences of such organizations have been held
in Malaya.. Communist sources have reported the presence of Malayan
representatives at meetings of various Communist international organiza-
tions. Since 1918, however, these representatives have been Chinese
who at one time lived in Malaya. No representatives have left Malaya
specifically to attend a particular meeting, or could be said to represent
any particular Malayan organization. Many have been deportees.
XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK
The MCP is thought to maintain its closest ties with Communist
organizations in Thailand, and in Sumatra, Indonesia, and with the
Chinese Communist Party. It is assumed that at the present time
instructions to the MCP are relayed through Pei-piing and Moscow radios,
which have not only given propaganda support to.the 1CP but have, prior
to the adoption of a new propaganda line by the MCP, indicated what
that line should be.
The beginning of a campaign of violence in 1948, already favored
by some MCP leaders, was given impetus by the decisions of the Second
Congress of the Communist Party of India, held concurrently with the
Calcutta Youth Festival sponsored by the World Federation of Democratic
Youth and the International Union of Students in early 1948.
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IR-665.5
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THE PHILIPPINES
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Foreword . . . ... _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . . .
I. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Ii. Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Ill. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
IV. Supplementary Data. on the Chinese Communists
in the Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ASSETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Numerical Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
ii. Electoral Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action . . 6
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . . . . . 7
V. Communist Influence in Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Vi. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and
Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . . . . . 8
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . . . 9
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties 9
X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Xi. Financial Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
-XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . . . 10
XIII. Communist International Organizations . . . . . . . . . 10
XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . . . . . . . . 10
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FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to. carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.-
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
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CC*4MUNISM IN THE PHILIPPINES: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
I. OBJECTIVES
The leadership of the Philippine Commmmist Party apparently does
not believe that the situation will favor a drive for immediate power for
some years to come. They regard the present period as a preparatory one
and place main emphasis on organizational and propaganda work. Their
principal immediate objectives in rough order of priority, appear to be:
1. To win over the masses to the Communist cause.
2. To discredit anti-Communist parties and leaders.
To weaken the close ties existing between the
Philippines and the US.
4. To prevent further dissipation of the party's
military arm.
II. TACTICS
Although the Philippine Communists consider the workers and the
landless peasants as the backbone of their movement and plan to concentrate
their organizational propaganda efforts on them, they are also striving to
enlist the support of bourgeois groups with a popular front program. In
order to facilitate its work of laying a basis for a seizure of power, the
Philippine Coaamnuiist Party has outlined a program calling for the intensifica-
tion of what it calls "legal" and "illegal" activities among the masses.
(Although all Communist activities are illegal in the Philippines and have
been driven underground, the Communists consider as illegal only their
military activities and activities directly relating to the support of
their military arm.) Their program consists of (1) revival of popular
front political parties; (2) infiltration of cadres into Government agencies,
i.e., schools, military forces, into strategic industries, and into or-
ganizations and groups, i.e., labor unions, peasant organizations, women's
and youth organizations, etc.; (3) increased indoctrination of the rank and
file of the movement; and (4) intensification of propaganda activities.
Party planning apparently envisages the possible negotiation of an amnesty
settlement with the Government which would enable it to expand its non.
military activities. Tactics for the 1953 Presidential and Congressional
elections seem to call for support to candidates allegedly sympathetic to
Communism.
Communist propaganda planning calls for an intensification of the
"peace" and "national independence" themes. "Peace" appears designed to
bring about a weakening of public support for the Government's anti-Communist
policies in both the domestic and foreign fields. "National independence"
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will attempt to place blame for all the i31s of the Philippines on US
policies and US influence on its "puppets" -- the major Philippine political
parties. The Communists are charging that US military and economic aid
programs are disadvantageous to the Philippine masses. Both themes are
to be infused into all party activities and, with suitable adaptations,
directed to all classes of the populace.
Ccwn unists are using their military arm, the People's Liberation
Army (HMB), for disrupting Government operations, e.g. assassinations of
prominent anti-Communists, sabotaging the economy, procuring supplies, and
as an agency for recruiting the more violent malcontents among the masses.
At present, however, a policy of conserving H MB strength and limiting its
operations appears to be in effect. It may be that in the face of continued
Government pressures and in order to gain from the Government freedom of
operation for their organizational and propaganda programs, Philippine
Communists might further reduce their military activities.
III. CAPABIIITIES
The Philippine Coasnunist Party, which in 1950 was strong enough to
carry on widespread and well-coordinated armed rebellion, had by 1953 reached
a low point in revolutionary potential and no longer constituted a serious
threat to the Philippine Government. The party's once formidable military
arm, the IINB, now has capabilities for only small-scale raids and ambuscades,
while the party is reduced to attempts to infiltrate and organize front
groups in the face of very severe government repressive measures. Moreover,
the party is suffering from a serious shortage of capable executives and
theoreticians, its organizational apparatus is scattered and harassed by
increasingly effective Government intelligence' operations, its propaganda
output is small and distributed with difficulty, and its finances are in a
precarious state.
Whether the PKP can again develop sufficient strength to threaten the
stability of the Philippine Government depends mostly on factors outside the
control of the PKP. For the future strength or weakness of the PEP hinges
on (1) whether or not the Philippine Government continues its strong anti-
Connnunist programs; (2) whether or not the US can maintain effective eoo--
noQnic'and military aid to the Philippines; and (3) whether or not the
Philippine Government increases its efforts to alleviate social and economic
ills. In the event of fraudulent elections in 1953 with accompanying civil
disorders and a loss of popular support for the Government, or the accom-
modation of one or the other major political parties to amnesty negotiations,
a situation probably would be created in which short term Communist objec-
tives and planning could operate with a fair degree of success. However,
Commnunist tactics and planning appear to envisage a lengthy period of
time as necessary before they will be in a position to effectively challenge
the Philippine Government with a resurgence of their military arm and
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widespread mass support. With the uncertainties at present threatening
the continuance of a strong anti-Communist policy on the part of some
Government leaders, and in the absence of an effective Government reform
program, it appears that the defensive strategy of the pgp is well suited
to Philippine conditions through 1953.
IV. SUPPLEMFJ.rTTARY DATA ON THE CHINESE CCI4MUNISTS IN THE PHILIPPINES
Because of excellent security practices, very little information Zs
available concerning the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the Chinese
Commaists in the Philippines. Nevertheless, to judge by their known ac-
tivities, their objectives include the followings .
1. To gain the loyalty and financial support of the
.Chinese community -- numbering about 200,000 --
for the Chinese Communist cause, and, conversely,,
to subvert and discredit Kuomintang forces in the
Philippines;
2. To construct an effective espionage network;
3. In general, to establish a firm mass base for more
violent revolutionary action in the future, and;
4. To support the Philippine Ccnmunist movement in any
manner which does not jeopardize fulfillment of the
first three objectives. Available evidence indicates
that the Chinese Communists in the Philippines place
highest priority on the objectives involving the
Chinese community.
In order to attain these goals, Chinese Communists employ a variety
of tactics, including infiltration, some terrorism, and propaganda. Up to
now, Chinese Communists have concentrated on infiltration of Chinese or..
ganizations, particularly secret societies, chambers of commerce, and
schools. However, some Chinese Communist infiltration of intelligence
agencies of the Philippine Government has been reported. Chinese Commmmmists
extort contributions from rich Chinese merchants by threats of violence to
them or their relatives in China. Some propaganda materials, most of which
apparently are smuggled into the country, are distributed among the Chinese
community.
Apparently, the Chinese Con mists in the Philippines still have
fairly considerable capacity for future espionage, infiltration, and
propaganda activities. The Philippine Goverment round up of Chinese
Communist suspects in December 1952 evidently did not cause material
damage to the Chinese Com mmist apparatus in the Philippines. Nevertheless,
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the Philippine Government and the Kuomintang organization in the Philippines
are united in opposition to Chinese Communist activity there. The great
majority of the Chinese in the Philippines apparently are either anti-
Communist or politically neutral. The ability of Chinese Communists in
the Philippines for forming front groups or labor unions is very limited.
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COWUNISM IN THE PHILIPPINES: ASSETS
1. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
The membership-of the Philippine Communist Party (PKP) probably
numbers about 3,000 to 5,000. There are about 8,000 to 10,000 Huks,
the Peoples' Liberation Army or military arm of the PKP, who are not
PKP members and an estimated 40,000 members of Communist-dominated
mass organizations. The number of people influenced by.partial, but
significant, Communist infiltration of non-Communist organizations is
unknown., Altogether, Communists and those strongly influenced by
Communism are estimated to account for 0.2 percent to one percent of
the total population. Chinese Communists are estimated to number
2,000-3,000 but there are no data on the number of members of
organizations controlled or influenced by them. PKP membership
increased from 1946 to 1950 but declined during 1951 and 1952; there
has been a great increase in Chinese Communist strength since 1946.
Approximately 90 percent of PKP members and following are located
in Central and Southern Luzon with the balance in Northern Luzon and
scattered localities in the Visayas and Mindanao. The leadership has
come primarily from Manila, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, and Bulacan in
-Central Luzon. Chinese Communists are primarily in Manila and the towns
and cities of Southern Luzon, Cebu, and Iloilo. The bulk of the PKP
membership and sympathizers are peasants while Chinese Communists are
primarily merchants, sohool teachers, and administrators.
Party members are for the most part poorly indoctrinated in
Communist theory,, have little education, but as a result of continuing
governmental suppressive action, are probably reduced now to a loyal
and hard working core. Morale and discipline among ordinary party
members is generally good, although some instances of financial dis-
honesty and sexual profligacy have occurred. The fanatical well-
indoctrinated "hard core" probably amounts to 20 percent in the case
of the PKP and 30 percent for the Chinese Communists. In the case of
the PKP, few have been members more than ten years.
The top leaders of the PKP apparently are not of high caliber
but the Chinese are of generally good quality. According to William
Pomeroy, the American Communist who served with the Huk$ for two years,
the various leaders displayed poor executive ability, poor ideological
training, or lack of flexibility. Taken as a group, the PKP leadership
has suffered from shortages of good exeoutives,and theoreticians since
at least 1948. On the other hand, most top PKP leaders are hard
working, resourceful, and hardened by the conditions of harassment
under which they live. They have close connections with the common
people and are responsive to their motivations. For the most part they
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are fairly young men in their late thirties or forties, and many have
had only military experience during World War II and afterward as an
occupational background.
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
The Communist Party is not a legal political party in the
Philippines and cannot run candidates on a ticket of its own. During
the last general elections the PKP called for a boycott of the.
elections. Chinese Communists in the Philippines apparently do not vote
and do not have an electoral strategy.
All political parties in the Philippines receiving votes in the
last elections are avowedly anti-Communist.
? III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
The military arm of the PKP, the Peoples' Liberation Army (HMB)
or Huks, numbers between 5,000-10,000. Not all of these are active at
any one time. Approximately half are farmers who only occasionally
participate in Huk raids, ambuscades, etc. HUB units operate as
guerrillas with the strength of individual bands'varying between five
and 100. They have no heavy weapons but an ample supply of small arms
in. fair to poor condition. So far as is known, the HLLB receives nog
military support from outside the Philippines but may receive military
advice from China. However, there is no definite information on the
number ordutie's of Chinese Communists operating with the HMB.
Opposed by approximately 23,000 government troops, the HMB
retains capabilities for small scale raids, ambuscades, kidnappings',
assassinations,and the dissemination of Communist propaganda. As a
result of their depredations, nearly one-third of total government
expenditures goes to the armed services. While the HMB does not threaten
the stability of the government, they nevertheless are a drain on its,
financial resources, hinder economic development, and tend to disrupt
the food supply situation.
HMB strength and activity is concentrated in Central and Southern
Luzon; their plans for expanding operations in the central and. southern
islands apparently have been abandoned for the present. In the face of
the increased effectiveness of government military action against them,,.
it is doubtful whether the HMB can expand its activities in the near
future unless in the event of a fraudulent national election in 1953.
HUB operations are hindered also by the improved discipline of the
Philippine Army which has had the result of gaining the cooperation of
many townspeople and peasants. While a sizeable number of local
residents in Central Luzon remain sympathetic with the HMB or are
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fearful, of HMB reprisals, large numbers are now supporting the Army's
efforts to eliminate HMB activities. Still, approximately 40,000
members of PKP mass organizations and Communist sympathizers aid the
HMB in the collection of intelligence, procure food and recruits, work
at HMB "production bases" in the Sierra Madres where root crops are
grown, or act as couriers. They enable the HMB to sustain its present
rather low level of activity.
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMISM
The Philippine Government and both major political parties are
anti-Communist and no overt Communist activities are permitted. Although
the PKP has not been outlawed by Congress, in 1951 a Philippine Court
ruled that the PKP was a seditious and illegal association. Although
this decision has been appealed, the Supreme Court probably will uphold
the lower court's ruling. In-any event, all PKP members and members of
auxiliary organizations are subject to arrest. All front organizations
are underground and severely hampered by government agencies. In areas
of the Philippines where Communists are most active, the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and the right to bail is denied to them. All
Chinese Communist activities are also forbidden and individual Chinese
Communists are subject to deportation to Taiwan on the sole grounds of
Communist membership.
Very little is known of the "underground" activities of Filipino
or Chinese Communists. PKP organizations apparently are poorly trained
and organized and with the exceptions of aiding Huks, collecting
intelligence, and passing on word of mouth propaganda, do not appear
to be very active.
During 1951, Communist influence in the Philippine Labor move-
ment was reduced drastically, and at present there are no Communist
unions or known significant infiltration of labor unions or key
.industries: The possibility of Communist infiltration exists. Party
members have been ordered to make lists including all factories, the
organizational status of laborers and leaders therein, and the problems
of the laborers.
VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL,
AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Communist front organizations apparently have been identified
by the government and driven deeply underground in the Philippines.
There appears to be no known significant infiltration of non-Communist
organizations by Philippine Communists.
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Since the suppression by the government of the large front labor
organizations in 1951, the largest mass organization probably has been
the National Peasants Union. It has an estimated 4,000-10,000 members
located mostly in Central Iixzon and was formerly the largest peasants'
organization. For the type of organization it is, it appears to have
had good leadership, and were the present severe restrictive measures
of the government to be relaxed, it probably could be considerably
expanded.
Two other known Communist mass organizations are the National
Women's League and the National Youth League. In 1951, the former
had a reported membership of 1,500 and the latter 2,200, but again,
these organizations are underground and very little is known of their
present activities.
All known Chinese Communist organizations have gone underground.
These include the Hwa Chi Comrades Association, the Anti-Japanese and
Anti-Collaborators League, and the K'ang Fan. There appears to have been
a significant infiltration of Chinese Chambers of Commerce in several
cities and reports indicate a possible infiltration of the leading
Chinese anti-Communist association -- the Anti-Communist Anti-Soviet
Salvation Association.
Present Communist planning calls for the organization and infil-
tration of various mass organizations -- youth, women, intellectuals,
etc., but to date there is no indication that they have made significant
progress with these plans. From Cavite Province comes a report that a
""peace" organization (Katahimikan ng Mahirap - Peace for the Poor) was
being organized.
Party theory conceives of two main types of infiltration
activities: "legal" and "illegal." ""Legal" infiltration activities
consist of working toward a policy-making position within an organiza-
tion, subtly exerting influence on its policies, and standing-by to
replace an "illegal" cadre if the latter is arrested. "Illegal"
activities include industrial sabotage and recruitment of new members
for the HMB. A party member sometimes engages in both types of
activities simultaneously.
VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
There is no known significant infiltration of the government by
Communists. That some infiltration has occurred was evidenced by the
court conviction in May 1951 of an official of the Department of Foreign
Affairs for participation in the Communist rebellion, and in 1952, of a
Nacionalista Congressman on a similar charge. There are reports of
suspected Communist sympathies on the part of fairly prominent
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Administration officials, but these have not been confirmed. In the
past there has also been some Chinese Communist infiltration of the
Military Intelligence Service.
VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
There is no known Philippine Communist influence in Philippine
public -opinion-forming circles, although a few journalists are reported
to hold views sympathetic to Communism. There is some Chinese Communist
penetration of Chinese schools and possibly one radio station.
IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST
POLITICAL PARTI
There is no known Communist infiltration of the non-Communist
Philippine political parties.
X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA
Current Communist periodicals are the Mapagpalaya (The Liberator),
Titis (the Spark), and Freedom. They appear at uncertain intervals and
none probably has a circulation exceeding 10,000. They are clandestinely
mimeographed in several or perhaps all-Party Regions at HMB camps.
Information on Chinese Communist publications is not available.
Two publications, Hungary, and The Working Youth in the Rumanian
People's Republic, have been received unsolicited by individuals in
Manila and Dumaguete and by the Philippine Education Company. There is
no regular importing of Communist publications from abroad, but
occasionally US Communist Party publications and Chinese Communist
newspapers are smuggled in, the latter from Hongkong.
There are no communist radio stations in the Philippines, with the
possible exception of one station in Manila (the Kuo Tai Station) which
in October 1952 was organized by an alleged Chinese Communist. Further
information on this station is unavailable. There are no foreign
Communist broadcasts directed specifically at the Philippines. The
reception and size of audience of Peiping's daily 30-minute broadcast
in English to Southeast Asia or its programs in Mandarin, Cantonese,
and Amoy dialects to overseas Chinese are unknown.
X'I. FINANCIAL CONDITION
In recent years PKP theoreticians have emphasized the significance
of finance and supply operations, both of which are called finance in
PKP terminology. Data about the actual financial status of the PKP as
of January 1953 are not available. Although foreign sources, notably
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the US Communist Party and Communist-dominated American labor unions,
furnished fairly considerable financial aid to the PKP in the prewar
period, the PKP apparently has received very little material assistance
from abroad since World War II. In 1951, the party leadership
promulgated a "one year program" for the PKP during fiscal year 1952, and
expected party revenues for this period were budgeted at the fantasti-
cally high figure of US $4,621,000. The captured American Communist,
William Pomeroy, testified in mid-1952 that only "a tiny fraction" of
this sum was collected. Party finances in 1952 probably were below those
during 1950, for example. The PKP "Statement of Income" for the first
six months of calendar year 1950 lists total party income for that
period as US $10,750. Apparently, the greatest source of income is
from raids and extortion practices. (In contrast, according to the
PKP "Statement of Income," only $28.50 was realized from the sale of
Titis in the period April-June 1950.)
?Data on the income of the Chinese Communists are unknown. Several
business firms are controlled by the Chinese Communists, but revenue
figures from these sources are not available. Probably'the over-all
health of the Chinese Communists is better than that of the PKP, in
view of the generally good financial standing of the Chinese community.
III. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
There are no Soviet or?satellite establishments diplomatic or
otherwise in the Philippines.
XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Since the suppression of the various Communist front organiza-
tions in the Philippines, there has been no evidence of any affiliation
of Philippine groups with Communist International Organizations. There
are no installations or meetings of these latter within the Philippines
and no known receipt or transmission of funds to or from them.
Philippine Communists, however, have attended several Congresses or
Conferences held abroad. One Filipino reportedly attended the meeting
of the International Union of Students in Peiping in 1951, and Teodosio
Lansang (alias Manuel Cruz) attended the Berlin and Vienna Peace Council
meetings in 1951 and 1952 respectively, and the Asian and Pacific Peace
.Conference in Peiping in 1952. There was no known attendance at, such
meetings by Chinese Communists in the Philippines.
XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK
The internal communication network of the PKP is a primitive one
consisting primarily of the use of women couriers. The Philippine Army
is supposed to have located the main north-south courier route on Luzon
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which ran down through the Sierra Madres. Inter-island communication
is by boat, and here there are infinite possibilities for'the Communists
to choose. There are reports that important leaders have radio .
receivers and that the Chinese Communists had established a transmitter
in the Batanes Islands. Chinese Communists apparently have excellent
covert communication and courier systems.
Contacts with the outside, of which China is most important and
US next, must be clandestinely arranged. The many islands and the long
coastline of the Philippines offer many places for couriers-to land.
There are reports of couriers landing in Manila, Albay Province, and
various places in the Sulu Archipelago. Landings from unidentified
submarines off the east coast of Luton are frequently reported but are
to date unconfirmed. Most couriers apparently are Chinese who, after
their arrival in the Philippines, manage to move about from place to
place with no great trouble.
The correlation of some PKP activities with general Communist
strategy in the Far East possibly is effected at international Communist
conventions and through couriers, but detailed proof of this is lacking.
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IR-6165.6
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THAILAND
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . ? . ? . ? . ? ? . ? ? . ? ? . ?
ii
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . .
1
I. Objectives . .. .. .. ....
1
II. Tactics .. . ..
1
III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . ?
2
ASSETS . . . ? ? ? ? ? . . ?
I. Numerical Strength . .
He Electoral Strength . ?
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action
5
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . . . .
6
V. Communist Influence in Labor . . . . ? . . . . . .
7
VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and
Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8
VII? Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . . . .
10
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . ? .
10
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political
Parties ? ? . ? . . . . . ? ? ? . ?... . . . . ?
10
X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . ? . . ? . ? . ? ? ? ?
10
XI. Financial Condition ? ? ? ? . ? ? ?
13
XII, Soviet-Satellite Official Assets ? ? . . ? ? ? ? . . .
14
XIII. Communist International Organizations ? . ? . .. ? ?
15
XIV. Communist Communication Network . . ? ? ? . ? ? . ? ?
16
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FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.-
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
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COMMUNISM IN THAILAND:. OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
I. OBJECTIVES
The immediate-Coals of the Communists in Thailand are not easily
discernible at the present moment, since the current vigorous anti-
Communist drive of the Thai-authorities has presumably forced Communist
leaders to reconsider their past strategy.
Before November 10, 1952, the date when the Thai Government
began its most recent attempt to suppress Communist activity, the imme-
diate Communist objectives in Thailand appear to have been:
1. To expand and improve their own organizations, in preparation
for the time when domestic events or external assistance might
make a direct drive for power possible.
2. To mobilize all varieties of domestic sentiment against the
present ruling group.
3. To undermine popular support for US policy in Asia and for
Thailand's pro-American international orientation.
4. To render material and propaganda assistance to Communist-led
rebels in Indochina and Malaya.
In the current crisis, these objectives have probably been sub-
ordinated to the overriding need to ensure the survival of key
personnel. If the Thai police persevere in-their suppression of overt
Communist activity, Communist strategy will probably be altered to give
greater attention to underground organizational work and less attention
to propaganda activity.
II. TACTICS
Two distinct Communist organizations-have developed in Thailand;
the Thai Communist Party (TCP) and the Chinese Communist Party in
Thailand (COP(T)). The TCP is small and appears to be dominated by
the larger and better organized COP(T). Two distinct parties are
maintained, however, because of the long-standing antipathy with which
many Thai regard the Chinese and the desire to create the appearance
of an indigenous Communist movement.
The CCP(T) has attempted to gain strength by recruiting personnel
for training, both in Thailand and in China; by soliciting funds for
local expenses and for transmission to the mainland; by penetrating;
Chinese schools, labor unions, business organizations, and regional
associations; and by utilizing newspapers, some of which are subsidized,
to carry propaganda.
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vote for municipal councilmen); Pernambuco (43,563 or 18.1 percent of
the total for state deputies); Rio de Janeiro State-(38,399 or 11.8
percent of the vote for federal deputies);.and Rio Grande do Sul
(38,759 or 6.1 percent of the total vote for federal deputies). In
Sao Paulo State the PCB was the fourth largest party, with about 40
percent of the vote received by the major party, and 66 percent of the
vote received by the_ runner-up. In the Federal District the PCB led
all other parties in elections for municipal councilmen, with a vote
more than 20 percent higher than either of its two closest rivals.
In Pernambuco the PCB was third, with about half the vote received by
each of the two leading parties.
III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
Current Communist policy puts considerable emphasis on violence.
Local party leaders in various parts of Brazil -- especially in Rio
Grande do Sul, Parana, Santa Catarina, Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais --
have-in many instances in the past year taken advantage of mass economic
grievances (rising prices, poor transportation, archaic landholding
systems) to instigate or assume the direction of strikes, street
demonstrations, and rural disorders. Data are not immediately available
as to the number of people involved in these disturbances, but in any
single instance the number probably would not surpass several hundred,
which probably would represent the maximum that the PCB could bring out
in any locality for violent demonstrations in connection with any current
issue.
There is evidence that the PCB is preparing, through organization
of an "Army of National Liberation", for an eventual insurrection in
which Communist participation would be more direct and on a broader
scale. Reliable detailed information concerning Communist efforts to
recruit, train, and equip such a force are lacking. The State of Minas
Gerais, and especially the strategically located "Minas Triangle"
bordering Sao Paulo, GoiAs , and Mato Grosso, is generally indicated
as the main center of insurrectionary preparations. This region would
appear to be especially well suited to guerrilla activities designed
to disrupt Brazilian internal communications and to obstruct the supply
of Brazilian strategic materials to the United States. A recent report
states that Minas Gerais has been supplanted by northern Brazil as the
.place of emphasis for PCB revolutionary activities.
Probably not more than 50,000 persons would be available for
guerrilla assistance to the Soviet Satellites in the event of an East-
West war. Leadership would be available from a small number of active
or inactive commissioned officers of the armed services and a larger
number of noncomnissionedi officers. Weapons would be limited largely
to small arms and explosives, of which the PCB quite likely has enough
available to permit, for a relatively short period, effective guerrilla
activity and sabotage in places isolated from main population centers.
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IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM
The Brazilian government for seven years has pursued a vigorous
anti-Communist policy which has been highly effective in some sectors
but of insignificant result in others. The PCB was outlawed in 1947
and all those elected to governmental office on the PCB ticket were
removed early in 19).8. The PCB attempted to circumvent its illegality
by simultaneous attempts to organize new parties as replacements for
the PCB and to infiltrate or make deals with established parties to
include Communists on their tickets. The government has refused to
register parties organized to substitute for the PCB, and Communist
efforts to infiltrate political parties and thereby gain entrance to
governmental bodies have in many instances been defeated by governmental
or party action to annul candidacies, invalidate elections of Communists
to office, and remove Communists from party posts. The PCB has been
unable effectively to infiltrate any party at the national level and
its ability to do so at'the state level, though perhaps not at the
municipal level, appears to have declined since 1948-L9. The PCB's
success in achieving and retaining elective office for individual
Communists likewise appears to have been minimal except in some munici-
palities.
The government in general has moved less vigorously and ef-
fectively against the PCB's press and its front activities. Here
governmental policy has been largely one of harrassment and obstruction
rather than outright suppression, although it has acted to close some
fronts and other Communist organizations which appeared especially
threatening to internal security. The government-has also sought
actively and with some success to influence public opinion against
Communist fronts and their propaganda. Communist ability to gain non-
Communist allies for their front activities is, together with the
opposition of some non-Communist political opponents of the admini-
stration to any measure which might threaten civil liberties, doubtless
a factor in the government's failure to take drastic action against
the PCB's press and its front activities.
The government has given especially close attention to the
problem of Communists in the labor movement. Under Dutra and until
relatively recently under Vargas, the government has kept tight con-.
trol over labor by intervention of unions, and legal proscriptions
against voting and holding of labor-union office by Communists.
Current policy favors greater independence for unions. Should the
Communists as a result make any important gain, government action to
vitiate it would be a reasonable expectation.
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Government action against the Communist underground organization
has until recently been limited and somewhat haphazard, although the
police, especially of Rio, Sao Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul, appear to
be vigilant and well informed of the PCB's activities. In the past
year, and especially in the past few months, the administration has
moved to break up the Communist; organization in the military and has
arrested numerous allegedly Communist officers and enlisted men and
brought them to trial. Pressure is now building up for similar action
against Communists in the civil service, where legal considerations
have thus far been a bar to a thorough anti-Communist purge.
V. CCHMIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR
A. Key Industries
According to a mid-1952 report, a majority of the directors of
the national dockworkers' organization (Sindicato National dos
Contra-mestres, Marinheiros, Mocos s Remadores em Trans -ones Maritimos)
were Communists and had succeeded in appointing a Communist delegate of
the` organization in the port of Santos, a major.shipping center. A
negro Communist, Geraldo Rodriguez, who had been on several trips to
Europe and was in touch with head officials of the international Communist
labor front, *7U,, was said to be playing a leading part in dockworkers'
circles in Santos. Moreover, the Communist directorate of the national
dockworkers' organization reportedly hoped to appoint Communist delegates
to the, ports of Belem, Porto Alegre, and Rio de Janeiro in addition to
Santos. Roberto Morena, Communist federal deputy and labor leader, was
active in. promoting a dockworkers' strike held in Rio de Janeiro in
the summer of 1952.
Communist labor has pockets of strength in the national railroad
system. In December 1952, according to the press, Communist labor
leaders were active among Central do Brasil railway workers in an
attempt to foment a railroad strike-.
PCB has had cells in government-operated arsenals. In the course
of its anti-Communist campaign, the government discharged a number of
Rio Naval Arsenal workers accused of Communist membership or ties, but
there is no assurance that a complete purge has been effected.
WFTU in December 1951 gave propaganda support to a national
strike of airline employees and pilots. The extent of Communist influence
in national airlines is not known.
B. Labor Unions
Communist strength in the national labor movement is represented
by the Brazilian Workers' Confederation (Confederagio dos Trabalhadores
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do Brasil, CTB). The Communist-dominated organization was outlawed
In 19-47-7but, operating underground, apparently still gives PCB some
strength in the labor movement. Communist capabilities for organization
and leadership in some sections of the Brazilian labor movement if
unchecked, would probably compare favorably with those of independent
or,government -controlled labor leadership. Under government repression,
Communist labor leadership has only limited capabilities to construct
an organization of its own, but it does have some power to undermine
non-Communist efforts to gain leadership of the workers. Thus in
November 1952 non-Communist labor elements called a meeting to establish
a National Trade Union Center designed to invigorate the Brazilian labor
movement. The Communists took over the meeting and established a
Permanent Inter-Syndicate Committee (Commissao Inter-Sindical Permanente,
LISP) with the reported purpose of destroying existing labor organizations
at their national level and replacing thew with a Communist apparatus.
Communist influence is probably present to a considerable degree
in many unions on the national level. Indeed, leaders of non-Communist
federations admitted as much in November 1952 when they announced plans
for an educational campaign within their affiliates to alert the
membership to both Communist and Argentine efforts at penetration.
There are only two national unions which recent reports definitely
indicate are under.strong Communist influence. These are the dockworkers'
organization mentioned above and the National Federation of Teamsters
and Chauffeurs, with its 26 affiliated unions. In the 1952 union
elections a Communist sympathizer was elected president, but only 6 of
the,26 affiliates voted and the legality of the election was challenged
by the defeated candidate with the support of the Sao Paulo teamsters'
affiliate. The outcome of the challenge is not known.
The strength of Communists in local unions is a subject of
widely varying estimates. Trade union elections involving approximately
200 locals in the federal capital area during the period April-September,
1952 revealed no overall increase in Communist strength as measured by
changes made in leadership of the. unions. Such figures as are available
on Communist membership of local unions reveal that it is very small,
but a handful of militant Communists in local trade unions have shown
ability to agitate the workers, prolonging and worsening strike situations.
In view of PCB's apparent lack of a widespread, tightly organized
following in the labor movement, its leaders probably could not hope
to organize a general strike or even a series of significant strikes.
The Communist national labor front.. CTB, belongs to the hemisphere
labor front, CTAL. Roberto Morena, CTB leader, is a member of the CTAL
Central Committee. Another Brazilian is a member of the CTAL Secretariat
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in charge of CTAL liaison with the Trades Union Departments of the
international Communist labor front, WFTU. Still another Brazilian
labor leader, Joao Amazonas, was a member of the WFTU Secretariat
in 1952.
VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND
,'PROFESSIO ORGANIZATIONS
There are probably between 500 and 1,000 Communist front
,.organizations in Brazil, including local branches of national front
movements. The two largest and most widely effective'national.front
organizations are the Center for the Study and Defense of
Petroleum and the National Economy (Centro de Estudos e Defesa do
Petroleo a da Economia Nacional and he National rganiza on for
the eIense7-of -Peace and Culture (Or aniza ao Nacional de Defesa da
Paz a da Cultura, sometimes referred o as the Movimento Brasileiro
oos Partidarios da Paz) designed to propagate nationalism and
Isolation sm respectively. These organizations have branches in
every state, in all important cities, and in many smaller localities.
The Centro Nacional de Estudos e Defesa do Petroleo, which aims at
nationalization o Brazilian petroleum resources and the preservation
of other Brazilian mineral resources from exploitation by US capital,
has had much wider appeal than the "peace" movement. In both cases,
Rio, Sao Paulo, and Porto Alegre appear to be the main centers of
strength. Millions of Brazilians undoubtedly have been influenced
by the activity of both the "petroleum-defense" and the "peace"
campaigns, but active participants in these movements, and especially
the "peace" movement, are relatively few. In Rio de Janeiro, for
example, a city of more than two million population, there were,
fairly recently, only 623 dues-paying members of the local peace
organization. Communist or pro-Communist intellectuals tend to
take the leadership of the peace movement, and Brazilian nationalists
are especially prominent in the petroleum organization. A relatively
small number of Brazilian legislators and government officials
--
most of them minor -- are active in one or the other movement on the
national level. Members and-leaders in one movement tend to be active
also in the other. Present indications are that both the peace and
the petroleum fronts have reached the peak of their influence, and are
probably incapable of any substantial expansion. This is probably
especially true of.the_peace movement, which both the government and
the responsible press have combatted vigorously.
National fronts whose purposes and activities are to propagate
anti-US nationalist and "peace" propaganda include the National
Committee against the Brazil-US Military Agreement (Commissio Nacional
Contra o Acordo Militar Brasil Estados Unidos), the Humanitarian
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Crusade for the Prohibition of Atomic Weapons (Cruzada Humanitaria pals
P_rohibba2 o das Armas Atomicas), and the League for the Defense of
Electric Power Liga de Defesa da Energia Eletrica). The last-nemed
organization is active in Rio and other cities in combatting foreign
control of public utilities. The Brazilian Association of Democratic
Jurists (Associa ao Brasileira dos Juristas Democratas), whose activities
are centered at Rio,de Janeiro, is a national front which has special
importance internationally, being affiliated with the Communist
International Association of Democratic Jurists. The League for the
Defense of Democratic Liberties (Liga da Defesa das Libertades Democrfiticas)
is another national front of considerable importance. All these
organizations appear to be officered mostly by old-line Communists and
chronic joiners of Communist fronts and have few important non-Communist
adherents.
Among organizations of professionals and intellectuals Communist
influence is strong and in some instances predominant. Communists have
for several years completely controlled the Brazilian Writers' Association
(Associagao Brasileira do Escritores) of Rio de Janeiro, as a resuot of
the resignation of anti-Communist members in disgust at Communist tactics
of fraud and force. Various state organizations of writers, over which
the Rio de Janeiro organization pretends to exercise control, are in
some instances dominated.or strongly influenced by Communists or pro-
Communists., The Communist group among the writers contains some first-
rate literary men but in large degree appears to consist of pseudo-
intellectuals and journalistic hacks. In late 1952 anti-Communist
literary leaders took first steps toward organizing an anti-Communist
writers' association.
. Communist organizations among minority groups are especially
important among the Poles, who form a sizable colony in southern Brazil.
The principal Communist organization among the Poles is the Polish
Communist Party. There is also a Communist-infiltrated organization,
the Polish Association. These organizations are countered by the
Polish Cultural Union of Brazil, the only national Polish organization
in Brazil, which works for the defeat of Communism and the liberation
of Poland. The small Russian colony's Centro Russe, formed in 1943
as, a nonpolitical social center, was suspected in early'.1951 of being
a Russian espionage organ. Armenian cultural associations in Rio de
Janeiro and Sao Paulo are reported to be Communist or to contain pro-
Communists. The Syrian-Lebanese colony in Belo Horizonte, estimated
to consist of 250 to 300 members although not known to be formally
organized, is reported to be the financial backbone of the PCB in
that city.
Among students the Communists still exert considerable influence,
although in the past year or two they have lost control of the national
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organizations representing university students, the National Union of
Students (Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes) and high school students, the
Brazilian Union of Secondary Students Unniiioo Brasileira dos Estudantes
Secundarios). The Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes decided in August
1951 to sever its ties with the International Students' Union, a
Communist international front; the vote, 2011 to 159, indicated the
continuance of a strong Communist or pro-Communist minority in the
organization, although for a year or more the group had been free of
Communist officers. On both university and secondary school levels,
Communists remain in control of some state students organizations.
Communist strength among students appears to be especially pronounced
in Sao Paulo. It is believed that as a general rule Communist influence
among students as a whole is considerably less than in organizations
formed to represent the group.
The outstanding women's organization of political purpose in
Brazil is apparently the Communist-controlled Federation of Brazilian
Women (Federa ao das Mulheres do Brasil), believed to have been founded
about 1949 on Communist initiative.- T his organization, with headquarters
at Rio, appears to have branches in Sao Paulo, Ceara, Minas Gerais, Rio
Grande do Sul, Bahia, Pernambuco, and the State of Rio de Janeiro. It
may have branches also in other states. The organization apparently is
strongest in Sao Paulo. Delegates attending the first National Women's
Congress, sponsored by the Brazilian Women's Federation in 1951, are
reported to have been all Communists. Women in Brazil tend to be
politically apathetic. They are also strongly influenced by the Roman
Catholic Church. These factors tend to limit expansion of the Federation's
influence.
VII. CO?EMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
There is no comprehensive detailed information available
concerning the extent of Communist infiltration of the government.
.The anti-Communist press has alleged that there are a number of
Communists in high government positions, including the head of the
Price Control Commission, the director of the Public Service
Administrative Department, President Vargas' private secretary, and
several men in the Brazilian Foreign Office or its diplomatic missions.
(The Foreign Office is now investigating charges against some of its
personnel.) The evidence brought out'against most of these men in
some instances is sufficient to raise strong doubts as to their
loyalties, but it is not fully convincing, especially since the
allegations have come in large part from newspapers interested in
embarrassing. President Vargas.
A 1952 report states that there were at that time approximately
80 militants in the Ministry of Transportation and Public Works; 50
each in the Ministry of Education and Public Health and the Ministry
of Justice; 40 each in the Ministries of Agriculture, Labor and Finance;
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and one cell with an unknown number of militants in the Foreign Office.
These figures, if correct, indicate that percentagewise, the strength
of Communism in the agencies named is very small. Evidence to suggest
the level at which their influence can make itself felt, and how, is
not available. In the government-owned shipping company, Lloyd
Brasileiro, and the nationalized railroad, Estrado do Ferro Central,
Communist strength was reported in 1952 as being somewhat larger: about
200 militants and 450 contributing sympathizers in Lloyd Brasileiro and
150 militants and 200 contributing sympathizers in the Estrado do Ferro
Central. A number of reports indicate a fairly heavy infiltration of
the Federal Service for Protection of the Indians. Concerning infil-
tration of police and security services there is only scattered information.
The low pay and social origins of many policemen would seem to tend to
make them vulnerable to Communism, however.
Communist Party membership in the armed services has frequently
been estimated as about 5 percent at the maximum, with the navy probably
less heavily infiltrated than the other two service branches. Member-
ship is believed to be limited largely to enlisted men and noncommissioned
officers and to include few, if any, commissioned officers above the
middle echelons. According to a report of late 1951 there were 105
militants in the Ministry of Air, 90 each in the Ministries of War and
Navy, and 150 militants and 450 contributing sympathizers at the Navy
Arsenal. Apparently most of the Communist group at the Navy Arsenal,
and presumably many of the alleged Communists in the service ministries,
are civilian employees. The government recently dismissed a number of
alleged Communist workers at the Navy Arsenal, and has been arresting
and bringing to-trial alleged Communist servicemen.
VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
There is good indication that Communists and their sympathizers
are fairly numerous in the fields of education and entertainment
(including radio) and in the non-Communist press. For Brazil as a
whole there are no precise data available as to the number of Communists
in these activities, and there is no adequate basis for estimating the
number of people subject thereby to Communist propaganda.
A 1952 US Embassy report states that key positions in several
Sao Paulo radio stations (unidentified) are held by Communists, including
six Communists who are either program directors or station announcers.
A similar situation is reported with regard to radio stations in Rio de
Janeiro and Porto Alegre. In the latter city one of the leading stations
is directed by a suspected Communist. Radio Tupi and Radio Difusora
may be two of the stations reported to be under Communist influence in
Sao Paulo.
Communist influence in religious groups is small. The Greek
Orthodox Church in Belo Horizonte, composed entirely of Syrians and
Lebanese, reportedly looks to Moscow for its orientation.
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IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES
Except in isolated instances on the local level, Communist
influence in right-wing organizations and political parties appears
to be negligible, although the ultranationalism of some members of
conservative groups sometimes appears to put them in the same camp
with the Communists. Left-wing, non-Communist organizations and
parties are relatively few in Brazil. The most radical of these
groups is the small Brazilian Socialist Party, which recently has
appeared to be under considerable Communist influence. Other parties
(such as Vargas' Brazilian Labor Party) offering programs more or less
leftist in orientation tend to be officered at the top by conservatives,
although in the lower echelons, and especially at municipal levels,
there appears frequently to be considerable Communist influence.
X. COM1VJNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA
Communist Publications
The Communists publish a fairly large number of newspapers and
periodicals in Brazil, most of them small in circulation and poor in
quality. Total circulation has been estimated at 50,000. Twenty-six
Communist publications are listed below according to place of publication.
In addition the Communists are believed to produce a number of small
periodicals pointed toward special groups such as labor unions and the
armed forces..
Communist Newspapers and Periodicals
Place of
Publication
Rio de Janeiro
(Federal District)
Mom ento Femenino (weekly)
Literatura (monthly)
Problemas: Revista Mensal
Cultura otic`a
Title and Frequency Circulation
Im rensa Popular (daily) Variously estimated
at between 20-30,000
and at about 5,000
p Voz 0 eraria (weekly) 15-25,000
de
Nearly 20,000 of one
issue published in
early 1951 (including
5,000 for Sao Paulo,
3,500 for Fed. District,
1,500 for Rio Grande
do Sul, more than 700
each for Rio de Janeiro
Bahia, and Minas Gerais
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Place of
Publication
Sao Paulo
Belem
Title and Frequency Circulation
0 Popular de Hoe (weekly)
Fundamentos (monthly)
Tribuna do Para (semi-monthly) 200
Jornal de Povo (daily) 200
Micr6bio (clandestine
publication)
Campo Grande
Curitiba
Florianopolis
Fortaleza
Goiana
Guaratingueta
Maceio
Porto Alegre
Recife
Salvador
.Santos
Taubate
Vit6ria
Uberlandia
0 Democratica (weekly)
Jornal do Povo (weekly)
Novos Dias (monthly)
0 Democratica (daily)
0 Estado de Goias (thrice weekly)
Folha Popular (weekly)
Voz do Povo (irregular)
A Luta (weekly)
Tribuna Gaucha (daily but
irregular)
Folha do Povo (daily)
0 Momento (daily)
A T ribuna
0 Povo (weekly)
Folha Capixaba (weekly)
Tribuna do Povo
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1,500
1400 to 1,000
1,000 - 1,500
2,ObO - 3,000
Reported 6,000 to
8,000, but pro-
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B. Pro=Communist, Disguised Publications
There are undoubtedly some such publications in Brazil, but
they would for the most part be of little significance. Two years ago,
there were at least two publications of this type in the Federal
District, one of which was entitled Emancipagao, which appealed to
Brazilian nationalists interested in preventing foreign exploitation
of Brazilian petroleum and other mineral resources. Emancipa ao, which
may still be published, very soon lost its ncn-Communist disguise.
C. Communist Printing Establishments
Information on Communist printing establishments is scanty.
Two publishing houses founded by the PCB -- Edigoes Horizontes and
Editorial Vitoria, in the Federal District -- are known to have
published until 1917 Russian-language books in Portuguese translation.
These firms may still be active. Waldir Duarte, Editor, Livros-
Revistas-Jornais, of the Federal District, was reported in 1951 to be
engaged in the publication and distribution of Voz Operaria and other
Communist publications. Grifico Luxo Arte ana OZON, also in the Federal
District, reportedly have even uuse-T"By -t e PCB to print its propaganda.
Communist publishing houses in Belo Horizonte are reported to include
Grafico,Ne tunia and Tipogrtfia Cruzeiro.
D. Import of Communist Publications from Abroad
Soviet newspapers reportedly are not available for public
purchase but may be obtained by a few select customers at a few book-
stores or newsstands. A small number of Soviet publications also
enters the country by mail on a subscription basis. Satellite
publications from Czechoslovakia and especially Poland reportedly are
received in much larger quantities directly from Europe, in part (at
least until recently) by diplomatic pouch. Polish publications are
believed to have a wide circulation among Slavic groups. Montevideo
is reported to be animportant transfer point for import into Brazil
of some Communist publications from abroad.
Foreign Communist publications which are reported received in
Brazil include the Soviet publications Union Sovietica and Mundo
Es.tudiantil, and the pro-Communist Ukrainian D ly News, of New York.
The , ov et publications Tiem os Novo and Literratura ovietica probably
also enter Brazil.
The Moscow radio broadcasts one-half an hour daily in Portuguese
to Brazil. The broadcasts are of high intensity and intelligibility,
but their potential. audience is limited by the fact that they cannot
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be received on standard home radios except those equipped with short
wave bands. Soviet programs are not -- or were not in 1951 -
rebroadcast from any point outside the USSR or within Brazil. The
propaganda nature of Soviet broadcasts is completely obvious, and
they probably have slight if any influence among non-Communist groups.
X.I. FINANCIAL CONDITION
No specific data which would serve to give a general picture
of PCB revenues and financial assets are available. The general
financial condition of the party appears to be shaky. The printing
facilities and paper used for Communist publications in most instances
are poor,and the Communist press is frequently in financial difficulties.
XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
Poland and Czechoslovakia are the only countries of the Soviet-
Satellite Bloc which maintain diplomatic relations with Brazil. Their
missions at Rio de Janeiro are small, consisting of two diplomatic
representatives in the case of Poland and four in the case of Czechoslovakia.
Poland maintains a consulate general at Sao Paulo and a consul at Curitiba.
There is also a Polish consular agent at Porto Alegre.
Both Poland and Czechoslovakia maintain ostensibly commercial
enterprises in Brazil. These firms reportedly contribute to the fi-
nancial support of the PCB and are also said to operate as centers for
.espionage. The commercial firms with Czechoslovakian connections are
either subsidiaries of Czech state trading organizations bearing similar
names or are appointed representatives of the state trading corporations.
The Polish Legation sponsors two known trading organizations. A third
such enterprise was established by a represent;:.tive of the Polish Red Cross.
With regard to propaganda, Polish representatives are much more
active and influential than are the Czechoslovakians. Polish consular
establishments in southern Brazil are especially important centers for
the distribution of propaganda among the large Slavic population of the
region. Polish efforts appear to be directed mainly toward influencing
Slavic groups. However, both the Polish Minister at Rio and the Consul
General at Sao Paulo have also endeavored to promote Polish influence
among non-Polish Brazilian groups through social and cultural activities,
as have consular officials in other areas.
Polish diplomatic and consular establishments print or sponsor the
printing of a number of publications in Brazil. These include A Pol6nia
de Hoje, a monthly publication printed and distributed by the Pol ski -
mission at Rio; Siewca, a weekly controlled by the Polish mission and
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serving as a propaganda organ of the Polish Communist party; Kurier
Poiski, a'Polish-language weekly published in Sao Paulo under sponsorship
of the Polish mission; a Polish news bulletin -- for distribution to
the Brazilian press -- published by the Polish Cultural Union (Uniao
Cultural cos Poloneses no Brasil) presumably under the direction of the
Polish mission; and Glos Marynarza, a clandestine newspaper published
by the Polish consul general at Sao Paulo. The Czech 'mission puts out
at least one propaganda magazine.
XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The Brazilian front corresponding to the International Association
of Democratic Jurists, international Communist front, was host at a
regional meeting, the Continental Conference of Democratic Jurists of
America held in Rio de Janeiro in November December 1952. The meeting
was attended by Communists and fellow travellers from Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Guatemala,,and Mexico.
Attendance of Brazilian delegations at meetings of Communist
international organizations held abroad was as follows in the period
1951-52.
Meeting
Date Brazilian Representation
World Peace. Council (Berlin) February 1951
Regional Meeting., Partisans
of Peace (Montevideo) April 1951
Conference of Latin
`American Land and Air
Transport Workers
(Guatemala City) May 1951
Third World Youth Festival
(Berlin) August 1951 about 100
5th Congress of Inter-
national Association of
Democratic Jurists (Berlin) September 1951 8
American Continental Congress
of Peace Partisans
(Montevideo)
(no public sessions held) March 1952 about 100
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Brazilian Representation
(Moscow) April 1952 12(or more)
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Me~ Date
Moscow Economic Conference
International Conference
in Defense of Children
(Vienna)
13th Session, Executive
Council, International
Federation of Democratic
Women (Bucharest)
CTAL Central Committee
Meeting
(Mexico City)
Asian and Pacific Regions
Peace Conference
April 1952
July 1952
1 (possibly more)
September 1952
(Peiping) October 1952 3
*00
All-Union Communist
Party Congress
(Moscow) October 1952. 2-
World Congress of Peoples
for Peace (Vienna) December 1952 about 50
XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK
Little is known definitely concerning the nature of the Communist
international comunications network. The Czech and Polish missions
at Rio are available for use in international communications. The
Soviet nission at Montevideo also may be important in the international
communications network of the PCB9 with the large and freely operating
Communist-dominated S]aric Union of Uruguay possibly serving as an
intermediary. Brazilian Communists travelling between Brazil and Europe
doubtless serve frequently as couriers. Internally, intercommunication
between Communists appears to be effected without difficulty.
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IR-665.29
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:.
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, CHILE
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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TABLE OF CONFENTS
Foreword ? e ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? e ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
Page
ii
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES .
? .
1
I? Objectives ? e ? ?
?
1
II. Tactics . . . .
.
1
III. Capabilities . . .. .
3
ASSETS e
5
I. Numerical Strength . . . . .
. ?
5
II. Electoral Strength . . . . . .. . .
. .
5
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action
6
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . < . . . ? . .
. ?
6
Communist Influence in Labor . <
. .
7
VI? Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and
Professional Organizations . . . . ? . ? ? ? . .
? ?
9
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . ? .
..
11
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation .
. .
12
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political
Parties . .. .. ..
12
Communist Propaganda Media
.
12
XI. Financial Condition . . ? ? , ? . ? . . . ? .. ?
? .
14
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . ? . . . ? . ? .
. ?
14+
XIII. Communist International Organizations . .. . ? .
. .
15
XIV. Communist Communication Network . . ? ? . . ? . .
? ?
16
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FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.-
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
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COMMUNISM IN CHILE: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
I. OBJECTIVES
The chief concern of the Chilean Communist Party (Partido
Comunista de Chile, PCCh) is repeal of the anti-Communist eeffense of
Democracy Law of 1948 which seriously restricts the party's ability
to achieve its other objectives. These are mainly objectives which
directly impair US-Chilean relations and by so doing fulfill foreign
policy requirements of the USSR. They include (1) abrogation of the
Mutual Security Agreement (MSA) with the United States, (2),nationali-
zation of US-owned copper mines, (3) resumption of diplomatic and
trade relations with the Soviet bloc, and (4) creation of an anti-US
bloc of Latin American countries as advocated by Chilean nationalists.
The objective of regaining legal status through repeal of the
Defense of Democracy Law imposes certain tactical limitations upon
PCCh efforts to attain its other immediate objectives, counseling as
it does moderate and constitutional methods of action. Such consti-
tutional methods of action are apparently viewed by the Chilean
Communists as more effective, at least for the time being, than
violence.
The underlying strategic policy of the PCCh is to attempt to
win a direct following among key social groups -- labor, students,and
intellectuals - and to use this following to exert pressure upon
national policy. Current PCCh strategy is implemented through the
Communist-led "People's Front", which serves as the political instru-
ment of agitation for "national liberation" and for the specific
immediate objectives of PCCh. Unlike the old Chilean Popular Front,
this political front is dominated by the Communists and is not a
major political force. Communist organizational efforts among the
key social groups are directed to unifying these groups under the
'leadership of Communists and Communist sympathizers so that they may
give strength to the demands of the "People's Front".
PCCh has not committed its political front to either the new
regime led by nationalist ex-dictator Carlos Ibanez or to the de-
feated Radical Party which informer years worked with the Communists
in the Popular Front. Although the Communists opposed Ibanez in the
September 4, 1952 election, they hailed his victory as a defeat for
the United States arid offered him the conditional support of the
"People's Front" for a program of "liberation" from US influence.
They present their political action as designed to offset the in-
fluence of the rightists on the Ibanez administration and to force
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the administration to keep its campaign promises, which included
repeal of the Defense of Democracy Law, opposition to US influence,
and trade and diplomatic relations with all the countries of the
world. On the other hand, the Communists are maneuvering into
electoral combinations with the defeated Radical Party, which has
been moving left since its fall from power, and they have found
Radical and other non-Communist allies in labor and student groups
that oppose Ibanez.
Long influential in labor, the Communists have used unions
under their domination as effective instruments to promote their ob-
jectives. Their ability to hold together a labor following has
hinged largely upon their success in settling worker grievances and
the skill of Communist lawyers in handling involved labor-management
negotiations. Communist-influenced unions have brought pressure on
government officials, have fomented numerous strikes, and have
staged public demonstrations in favor of such Communist objectives
as repealing the anti-Communist law. In its efforts to regain
legality -, the party has, when possible, avoided taking open leader-
ship in strikes. To its labor target PCCh stresses the need of
unity to prevent government control of labor as in Argentina.
Communist propaganda to students and youth lays major stress
on the peace motif. Emphasizing that in all countries youth is the
first victim of war, the PCCh endeavors to create a feeling of in-
ternational youth solidarity by recruiting delegates to international
Communist-dominated youth conferences and otherwise encouraging a
spirit of international camaraderie. Enthusiastic delegates returning
from such conferences have been widely used to rally new members for
the PCCh. The Communists have also used students effectively in
demonstrations against high prices and the Defense of Democracy Law
because of government hesitation to use force against student
demonstrators.
In addition to labor and student targets, the Communists are
attempting to influence many other groups through a wide variety of
Communist fronts, including price-control committees which appeal to
housewives,' friendship centers for foreign groups in Chile, and clubs
for artistic and literary groups.
The Communists developed clandestine methods of operation in
the period 1948-50 when the Defense of Democracy Law was fully en-
forced and PCCh still operates clandestinely to some extent. Its
underground tactics included attempts to exert influence on labor at
the lower levels and to continue propaganda operations through a
range of Communist fronts and clandestine publications.
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Contacts between the Soviet bloc and Chile are maintained by
Chilean Communist officials or their trusted sympathizers, who at
fairly regular intervals visit'the Soviet orbit or exchange views
with Communist party leaders from other Latin American countries who
have been to Moscow. Moscow directs two and one-half hour radio
programs to Latin America daily, and Budapest an hour program.
Soviet literature comes into Chile direct from the Soviet bloc or
from Uruguay, Mexico, and other Latin American countries. The PCCh
is believed at the present time to receive little financial aid from
outside the country.
III. CAPABILITIES
The Communists now face both favorable and unfavorable factors
in attaining; their objectives. Favorable factors include the new
Ibanez administration's support for the repeal of the Defense of
Democracy Law and the similarity between Communist objectives and
some of those advocated by Ibanez' nationalistic supporters. The
Interior Minister, the Public Works Minister, and the new chief dele-
gate to the UN have long been sympathetic to certain Communist ac-
tivities, such as propaganda for "peace", and agitation for greater
revenues from the US copper companies. Apparently through their ties
with the Interior Minister, the Communists have reportedly obtained
permission to hold a meeting of the Communist-dominated Latin
American Confederation of Labor (Confederation de Trabajadores de
America Latina, CTAL) in Santiago in March and a Continental Cultural
Conference at about the same time. The new foreign Minister, although
long.hostile to Communism, is nevertheless a leading advocate of a
Latin American economic bloc. The Communists are also having some
success in interesting the Radicals in the restoration of a Popular
Front. The Communist-Socialist candidate in the senatorial by-elec-
tion of January 4, 1953 received considerable Radical support. The
threat of possible government moves toward control of labor has
played into the hands of the Communists in their efforts to rally
labor unity against such a development.
The Communists' greatest recent membership gains have re-
portedly been among youth groups. This may stem in part from the
PCCh success in sending Latin America's most influential delegation,
including some prominent Catholic student leaders, to the Berlin
Youth Festival in 1951. Communist propaganda has also had consider-
able success among teachers, and the Teachers' Federation shows
strong Communist influence. The Communist press is allowed to cir-
culate freely, and two Communist senators have been permitted to.re-
main in congress despite the illegality of the party.
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These factors favoring the Communists are balanced and in some
respects outweighed by unfavorable factors. In the September 4, 1952
presidential election, the Communist-supported candidate won only
52,000 votes out of 900,000 in contrast to Ibanez' huge vote of
435,000. The Radical Party and its allies ran well behind the anti-
Communist right-wing parties. Ibanez is thus in a strong position
to curtail Communist activities as he did in his previous administra-
tion if the party becomes more aggressive. Ibanez knows that the US
is Chile's main copper market and its principal source of loans;
hence, he is not likely to be easily influenced by Communist demands
that Chile pursue a clear-cut anti-US policy. The Communists also
face increasing competition in labor, including the growing strength
of the rival Popular Socialists, who now control the Labor Ministry,
the expanding influence of the Catholic Falange in the nitrate fields,
and the new labor confederation-of Ibanezl leading woman supporter,
violently anti-Communist Senator Maria de la Cruz. Although the
Popular Socialists and the Falange might join with the Communists to
oppose government control of labor, they are well versed in Communist
maneuvers and would be unlikely to lend themselves to Communist cam-
paigns in general. Both parties have at times criticized the US but
they have been even more critical of the USSR. Furthermore, the
Communists have so far been notably unsuccessful in their efforts to
penetrate the Armed Forces and the national police.
Although the political-situation in Chile is still fluid under
the new administration, there seems little likelihood that the
Communists will attain their immediate objectives, with the possible
exception of the repeal of the Defense of Democracy Law. Since its
election, the Ibanez administration has specifically stated that it-
does not intend to nationalize copper, abrogate the Mutual Security
Agreement, or resume relations with the Soviet. Althou ghsome of
Ibanez' advisers favor a Latin American economic bloc, Ibanez himself
has been noncommittal since his election. If Chile's economic situa-
tion should deteriorate, however, the administration would be under
increasing pressure to pursue extremist policies, some of which would
be favorable to the Communists.
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COMMUNISM IN CHILE: ASSETS
I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
PCCh is believed to have about 35,000 members at,thejpresent
time, or about two-thirds of the membership it claimed in 194? prior
to the outlawing of the party. Most Communist membership is located
in the strategically important mining centers of the north, in major
urban centers, and in the coal-mining areas. Labor provides-the bulk
of PCCh membership although intellectuals, students, and professional
people are qualitatively as important to the party.
PCCh has apparently maintained a satisfactory level of organi-
zation and operation despite membership losses since being outlawed
in 1948. The party has carried, out several minor purges in this
period to tighten party organization and to eliminate members sus-
pected of weakness or disloyalty. Dissensions and purges do not seem
to have lowered the readiness of the party membership that remained
loyal after 1948 to accept the'party line. Party leadership is in
the hands of a predominantly middle-aged "old guard", most of whom
have had 20 years or more of service in the Communist movement.
Political Commission members must have at least 10, years as mili-
tants in the party. Most of PCCh's 35,000 members have at least
five years of service in the party ranks. Party membership dipped
sharply following the outlawing of PCCh in 1948 and has made some
slight recovery since 1950, when the party was able to resume more
or less overt operation.
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
The candidate of the Communist-Socialist People's Front
(Frente del Pueblo) won oily 52,000 votes (5 percent of the total)
in t e 5 p ember 4, 1952 elections. Many fellow travellers reportedly
defected to the victorious candidate, Carlos Ibanez, who made a strong
appeal to-leftist and mass groups. In January 4, 1953 by-elections
for Senator of Santiago Province (national capital and environs),
the candidate of the People's Front won 68,000 votes ( 33 percent of
the total). This area is a center of Communist strength, and the
Front candidate also had the support of any members of the major op-
position Radical Party. Should the Communists, as is now anticipated,
regain legal etatus', the Communist-Socialist ticket might be 'able to
rally 80,000 votes in the March 1953 elections for Congress, or
approximately 9 percent of the probable total vote.
The division of the national vote of about 900,000 in the
March 1953 elections is expected to be about as follows:
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Government-supporting parties
380,000
Rightist parties
255,000
Center-left parties
185,000
People's Front
80,000
Where the Peoplets Front is strongest, its vote is expected
to compare with that of the other major party groupings as follows:
Santiago
Antofagasta
Concepcion.
Valparaiso.
Peoplets Front
32,000
}4,000
10,000
8,000
Government
130,000
12,000
25,000
40,000
Right
70,000
3,000
12,004
20,000
Center-left
40,000
6,000
12,000
15,000
III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
PCCh at present opposes use of armed insurrection or violence
to effect Communist objectives. There have been no violent Communist
demonstrations since April 1949 when 19 or more persons were wounded
in resisting police action to break up an illegal meeting of several
thousand Communists and sympathizers in Santiago. In 1951 three
party leaders who favored use of violent tactics were expelled from
PCCh. Should PCCh revise its policy, which was outlined in a mani-
festo of August 1952, it is believed that the party could, under cer-
tain circumstances, bring out four to five thousand demonstrators in
the capital city of Santiago. Probably only a fraction of this
number would be willing to use violence.. PCCh apparently has no
armed units, but some Communists have collected arms in their homes.
Police investigation of an explosio. in a Communist workerts home in
1950 revealed an arms cache of 12 ;machine guns, a number of home-made
cartridges, and other n ateriel ;
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM
PCCh was outlawed by the Defense of Democracy Law of September 3,
1948. The present administration has promised repeal of the law, which
might be effected prior to the March 1953 congreosional elections. In
the event of Communist disturbances, however, the administration could
invoke the Law on the Internal Security of the State or request
special emergency powers which are usually granted.
For two years after the passage of the 1948 measure outlawing
PCCh, its activities and ability to circulate propaganda were severely
circumscribed. The law aroused strong opposition from non-Communist
as well as Communist labor because of certain restrictive features
affecting labor organizations in general, and it has not been strictly
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enforced since 1950. Communist activity was, in any case, never
-wholly eliminated because PCCh set up a number of Communist fronts
1-tnd also continued to wield influence in labor at the shop level of
labor organizations. Communist propaganda now circulates freely.
Should the government again undertake measures to curtail PCCh
activity, the party would no doubt make use of its experience in the
period 1948-50, when the anti-Communist law was enforced, to carry on
covert operations and disseminate propaganda through fronts.
V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR
Communists have been denied union office under Chile's anti-
Communist legislation and the government made strong efforts in the
period 1948-50 to stifle all Communist activity in the labor movement.
These efforts did not succeed, in large part because of the absence of
effective labor leaders of other parties and the inability of the
Chilean workers to gain hoped-for unity and effectiveness without the
collaboration of Communist labor elements. For a time it appeared
that the National Association of White-collar' Workers (Junta Nacional
de Empleados de Chile, JUNECH), a strong and largely non-oomunist
organization, might point the way toward reorganization of workers on
aurnified basis independent of Communist influence. JUNECH, however,
has recently been working in cooperation with the Communists to form
a unified organization of white-collar and manual workers. The degree
of collaboration of the white-collar unions with the Communist-led
workers may increase as the two groups find'a common cause in opposing
a projected government-controlled workers' federation.
Communist labor leaders are reportedly in virtually uncontested
control of unions in the nitrates fields and coal mines. The major'
copper workers' federation is'anti-Communist, but the Communists con-
tinue to command a minority following among copper-mine labor. At
present the Communists are not believed to have much strength in the
railway federation or in communications. If, however, the promises of
certain government officials to restore to their jobs workers dis-
charged for political purposes are kept, there may occur a recrudes-
cence of Communist influence in railway and communications unions.
There are no reliable figures on the present membership of the
Communist-controlled Confederation of Chilean Workers (Confederation
de Traba adores de Chile, CTCh) or on the Communist element therein.
Ch claims to represent 400,000 manual and white-collar workers, al-
though,it admits that these workers are not all members of affiliates,.
of the Communist CTCh. As the total legal trade-union membership in
1950 was 262,000 plus another 100,000 government employees and rail-
road workers in unions without legal status, this claim appears to be
exaggerated. Most CTCh affiliates, as the National Mining Federation
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(Federacion Nacional Minera) and the National Metallurgical Federation
( ed~ erasion Nacional Metal 'gica) are doubtless Communist-controlled.
Nevertheless, the majoritiyof rank-and-file members probably have
little real understanding of the meaning of Communism and are.interested
mainly in the material benefits promised to them by the Communist
leaders.
Labor organizations that are not controlled by the Communists,
but that are strongly influenced by PCCh on the national level, in-
clude affiliates of the important National Association of White-collar
Workers (JUNECH). Estimated membership of JUNECH is about 110,000 and
includes both government and private employees. Communist penetration
of JUNECH affiliates, though probably slight on a numerical basis, is
significant because of the posts held by Communists. Thus the JUNECH
official organ is under the virtual control of a Communist adminis-
trator and its Communist editor. The Secretary of Organization and
the Secretary of Union Problems of the association of white-.collar
workers in private industry are Communists. The president of the
association of government employees, while not a Communist, has be-
come a complete tool of the 'ommunists. The teachers' federation is
reportedly Communist-controlled and if the new governns nt rehires
teachers dismissed by the previous regime under the Defense of De-
n cracy Law provisions, Communist strength would be even further aug-
mented The president and two of the principal leaders of the semi-
government workers' federation are Communists. Thus, while JUNECH
relatively seldom follows the Communist line as such, its. affiliates
are very susceptible to'Communist influence.
The Communists have taken the lead in groups working for a
nat~on4 labor confederation to include all workers, both manual and
white-collar and have worked closely with leaders of JUNECH in these
endeavors. Strong Communist influence was apparent in the National
Unifying Movement for Workers, formed in 1950, and the National Com-
mittee for Workers and Employees, set up in late 1951. The under-
lying Communist purpose in encouraging the establishment of these
committees was to try to unify labor into a central organization
subject?to-Communist guidance. A so-called "National Committee for
Syndical Unity", which includes representatives of all major labor
groups was formed in October 1952. The Communist CTCh is sponsoring
a meeting scheduled for February 1953 to carry out the objectives of
this Committee.
The Communist CTCh is affiliated with the Communist-controlled
Latin American Confederation of Workers (CTAL) and is represented on
the CTAL Central Committee. CTCh is also affiliated with the WFTU and
the CTCh affiliate, the National Metallurgical Federation, is affiliated
with WFTU's international trades department in this field.
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VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL,
AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The PCCh has set up a wide variety of front organizations
--directed toward youths, women, professional, artists, intellectuals
and miscellaneous groups that can be interested in the PCCh goals of
"peace" and friendship with countries in the Soviet bloc. The largest
and most influential front group is the Peace Movement (Movimiento
for la Paz, MPP), which is affiliated with the World Peace Council.
The size of its membership is not known, but it has branches in all
the larger cities:. Its directorate includes not only top Communists
but also influential non-Communists such as Interior Minister
Guillermo del Pedregal, MPP president until his recent cabinet
appointment. Since the organization has close ties with members
of the Ibanez administration, its capabilities for expansion would
appear to be improved. In addition to the MPP, the PCCh has set up
additional peace fronts to attract specific groups, including the
Youth Committee for Peace, the National Committee of Labor Partisans
for Peace, and the Spanish Committee for Peace.
Closely allied with the Peace Movement are the various centers
of "friendship" with nations of the Soviet bloc, such as the Committee
of Friends of the Soviet Union, three committees relating to Communist
China, one to Poland, and two each to Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The
size of these "friendship" centers is not known, but more than 1,000
persons attended a function of the Committee of Friends of.the Soviet
Union on November 7, 1952, the anniversary of the Russian revolution.
In the group-were members of the Chilean Committee of Friends of
Czechoslovakia (Comite de Amigos de Checoeslova uia), Friends of
Hungary Center (Centro de Amigos de Hungar a , Chilean-Chinese
Cultural Institute Institute Chileno-Chino de Cultura), Friends of
Poland Center (Centro Amigos de Polonia, and other front groups;
numerous members of the Jewish colony, most of whom are foreigners;
and many students from the Unitersity of Chile. PCCh apparently con-
siders these "friendship" centers a valuable method of attracting non-
Communists to help promote Soviet international objectives, including
increased trade between Chile and the Soviet bloc. In some instances,
an anti-Communist organization has sprung up to rival the Communist
center. For example, the Polish Union of Chile and the Czech Union
are both strongly anti-Communist.
For Chilean youths, one of the key PCCh targets, the party con-
tinually organizes new fronts to attract additional non-Communist
leadership. Two youth fronts now in the field are the Popular Youth
Movement (Movimiento Juvenil Po ular) and the Front of Popular Youth
(Frente de uventudes ooppulares , which have their strongest following
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in the cities, particularly the university centers of Santiago,
Valparaiso, and Concepcion. Although the Communists have hitherto
been the most active party in the youth field, they are now re-
ceiving increasing competition from the new Ibanista youth movement.
Some of the most active Communist fronts have been set up to
attract artistic and professional groups. Among these are the Alliance
of Intellectuals of Chile (Alianza de Intelectuales de Chile, AICh),
Continental Art Group (Grouo de Arta Continents , "Gebriela Mistral"
Artistic Society (Con un-to Art!stico "Gabriela Mistral"), Union of
Painters (Union de 'ntoresxperimentater eatro Experimental),
Committee of mocratic wwyers (Cornite de Abo ados Democraticos , and
the Journalists' Cooperative (Cooperati-va de eriodistas . The numeri-
eal size of these fronts is not known. They are strongest in Santiago
and other populous centers and they have succeeded in attracting a
-number of influential non-Communists, including poetess Gabriela
Mistral, Nobel Prize winner.
Communist fronts to attract women have not been particularly suc-
cessful. The leading Communist front in this field, the Movement for
the Emancipation of Chilean Women (Movimiento Pro-Emanci~ de la
Mu erer de Chile, MEMCh), which was originally established to work for
nationa`1 suffrage for women, is considerably less influential than the
non-Communist Chilean Federation of Women's Institutions (Federacion
Chilena de Instituciones Femininas, FECHIF). The PCCh failure to
attract women was shown in the presidential election of September
1952 when the Communist-supported candidate had little feminine sup-
port in contrast to Ibanez' large following. The PCCh continues,
however, to operate fronts designed to attract women such as the
Foundation for the Protection of Childhood (Defensa de la Ninez) and
the National Housing Front (Frente Nacional de la ViviendaT.
Among minority groups in Chile, the well-established Germans
in southern Chile are the most important. They are generally anti-
Comnunist, and so far as is known no Communist fronts exist for this
group. The Yugoslavs, who are widely dispersed in Chile, are also
preponderantly anti-Stalinist. Spanish refugees who have entered
Chile in recent years are usually pro-Communist. They are active in
the various "peace" fronts and in the Confederation for Aid to the
Spanish Democracy (Confederacion de Ayuda a la Democracia Espanola)-
/A number of Communist fronts have been set up for Jewish residents
and refugees. Among these are"the Zionist Federation (federaci6n
Sionista de Chile), Representative Committee of the Jewish Community
its Representativo de la Colectividad Isra elita de Chile),
Maccabi Jewish Sport Club Elub Deportivo Israelita Maccabi),.and the
Committee for the Protection or ' ewis Migrantsom e? Protecci6n
a los Imigrantes Israelitas). Many of these, how ever, have their)
counterpart anti-Communist organization. One of the more recent PCCh
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fronts is the Chilean-4Iindu Cultural Center (Centro Cultural Chileno-
Hindu), organized by top Communist leaders for the stated purpose of
diffusing information on the attributes of Hindu culture.
Since the PCCh was outlawed, it has set up one front after
another to agitate for the repeal of the Defense of Democracy Law.
The most active front in this field at present is the National Executive
Committee of the Movement for Liberty and Human Rights (Comite
Ejecutivo Nacional del Movimiento por la Libertad Derechos Humanos),
which includes on its directorate such influential non-Communists as
Clotario Blest, president of the government employees federation.
The PCCh also attempts to infiltrate non-Communist organizations
in addition to establishing its own fronts. Two of the most important
successfully penetrated are the influential Students Federation of the
University of Chile (Federaci6n de Estudiantes de Chile, FECh) and the
Federation of Teachers, both of which frequently lend themselves to
Communist propaganda campaigns. At present the Communists appear to
be infiltrating some of the nationalist organizations such as the
Committee to Defend the Interests of Chile and Latin America, which
could readily be used to create difficulties for the United States.
VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
Following the outlawing of PCCh in 1948, the Gonzalez Videla
administration removed most Communists and fellow travellers from
government positions. In the present regime of Prewident Ibanez,
two of the 12 members of the Cabinet are reportedly Communist sympa-
thizers: Interior Minister Guillermo del Pedregal and Public Works
Minister Humberto Martones. Whether they will stay in office long.
enough to bring Communists into their ministries in significant num-
ber remains to be seen.
The Communists have been notably unsuccessful in efforts to
gain influence in the armed services at the top level. The Communist
youth organization has been instructed to penetrate the armed services,
but there is no indication that it is succeeding in this mission. There
is no evidence of any Communist influence in the police and. security.
services.
Communist influence in associations of government employees
affiliated with the white coller workers federation (JUNECH) indicates
that there is significant infiltration of the government service, es-
pecially in the teaching field, at middle and lower levels. With the
relaxation of the Defense of Democracy Law, which forced many Com-
munists out of government positions, some Communists have returned.
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VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
Communist influence is strong in the educational system al-
though the number of Communist teachers is not known. The Federation
of Teachers, the Union of Professors, and the Alliance of Intellectuals
are Communist-dominated. The Director of the National Symphony is
a Communist; the Experimental Theater is highly influenced by Communism;
and the leading art magazine of Chile, Pro-Arte, is Communist. The
important student federation at the University of Chile showed strong
Communist direction in its latest student election, in which a Communist-
Radical-Socialist coalition won control of the organization.
There is no Communist influence in the Church, which, on the
contrary, is a leading anti-Communist force. Most of the press and all
of the radio stations are anti-Communist.
IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF
When the Communists were disenfranchised by the Defense of
Democracy Law in 1948, many of them infiltrated other parties, including
even some of the anti-Communist rightist groups. The Communists have
very little, if any, influence in the top levels of the rightist parties.
The parties most seriously infiltrated by Communists were those
on the left, including the Radical Party, the Falange and the People's
Democratic Party. The Social Christian Conservative 'arty (center)
also may have been infiltrated to some extent. The Communists are cur-
rently trying to interest these parties and the Socialists in forming
a leftist front.
Z. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA
The principal Communist and pro-Communist newspapers and
periodicals in Chile (most of which are published in Santiago) with
estimated circulation, publisher and frequency of publication are as
follows :
Communist
Name
Circulation
Publishing House
Frequency
El Siglo
25,000-30,000
Empress Periodistica
daily
Horizonte
Vistazo
25,000
Empresa Periodistica
weekly
Horizonte
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Name
Circulation
Publishing House
Frequency
Nuestro Tiempo
3,000 10,000
Talleres Graficos
monthly
Lautaro
Paz
n a
Empresa Periodistica
sporadic
Horizonte
Principios
n a
n a
sporadic
Pro-Arte
5,000
n a
weekly
Tribuna Feminina
n a
n a
sporadic
E1 lles ertar
n a
na
na
( arapaca
El Popular
n a
n a
n a
!Antofagasta)
El Si gloo
na
n a
n a
(Coquimbo)
Inde endencia de
n a
organ of Communist
sporadic
spy
Spanish front
Pro-Communist
Las Noticias de
18,000-35,000
Empresa Periodistica
daily
Ultima okra
Las Noticias
15,000-45,000
Empresa Periodistica
daily
Graficas
Horizonte
The major printing establishments of the Communist and pro-
Communist press are the Em resa Periodistica Horizonte and Talleres
Graficos Lautaro (formerly yenta aci.fico). The equipment of the
Emppr-esa Period stica Horizonte is good. It includes six linotypes,
a large stock of type, a quarter-size mercury press, and a good supply
of type correction instruments, among other equipment. Talleres
Graficos recently installed a new press.
Although Chile does not maintain relations with the Soviet
orbit at the present time, publications of Soviet orbit diplomatic
missions in Mexico and international Communist fronts, especially the
labor and peace fronts, are imported in unknown quantity.
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The Communists do not control or influence domestic radio
broadcasting stations. Soviet orbit stations broadcast to Chile,
including daily programs of two and one half hours from Moscow and
one hour from Budapest. The broadcasting hours are in the early
evening and the reception is good. under favorable weather conditions.
Many Communists are reported to listen regularly, to these programs.
XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION
The size of present party revenues is not known 'In 1948
PCCh reportedly received three million pesos (about $30,000) from
membership fees. There are reported to be some three thousand pro-
fessionals in the party, each of whom was asked to lend the party
10,000 pesos (about $100) in 1950, but apparently only a limited
number complied. The party also attempts to collect funds by means
of quotas assigned to its units throughout the country and through
special fund-raising affairs.
Few business firms in Chile are Communist-controlled and funds
from this source are believed to be small. PCCh, so far as is known,
receives little financial aid from abroad for operations within Chile,
with the exception of books sent without charge from Communist pub-
lishing houses abroad, which are sold to help maintain. the expenses
of Communist propaganda.
Before the passage of the Defense of Democracy Law in 1948,
the party was reported to receive a considerable part of its revenues
from Communist-controlled unions. No recent information has been re-
ceived on its present. revenue from this source. The party receives
some revenues from collections regularly made at meetings of Communist
front organizations.
Reports on PCCh finances in 1951 indicated that the party was
in acute financial difficulties. Concrete reports for 1952 are not
available, but the party's expanding publications program suggests
that its financial condition has improved.
III. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
There are no Soviet orbit diplomatic, trade, or cultural mis-
sions in Chile.
The local Communists have organized a Committee of Friends of
of the Soviet Union (Comite de Amigos de la Union Sovietica) and
binational "friendship" ocieties relating to China, gary, Czecho-
slovakia, and Poland (see section VI).
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XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Attendance of Chilean delegations at meetings of Communist
international organizations held abroad was as follows in the period
1951-62:
Meeting
Regional. Meeting of April 1951
Partisans of Peace
(Montevideo)
Date
Chilean Representation
Latin American Land and May 1951
Air Transport Workers
Conference (Guatemala
City)
Third World Youth
Festival (Berlin)
August 1951
World Peace Council November 1951
(Vienna)
WFTU General Council November 1951
Meeting (Berlin)
American Continental. March 1952
Conference of Peace
Partisans (Montevideo)
(No public sessions
held)
Moscow Economic Conference April 1952
International Conference
in Defense of Children
(Vienna)
Preparatory Conference for
the Asian and Pacific Regions
Peace Conference (Peiping)'
13th Session, executive
Council, International
Federation of Democratic
Women (Bucharest)
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Meeting Date Chilean Representation
Council, International Union September'1952 n a
of Students (Bucharest)
CTAL Central Committee- September 1952 2
Meeting (Mexico City)
Asian and Pacific Regions October 1952 25
Peace Conference (Peiping)
AU-Union, Communist Party October 1952
Congress (Moscow)
Continental Conference of Nov Dec. 1952
Democratic Jurists of
America (Rio de Janeiro)
World Congress of Peoples December 1952 about 30
for Peace (Vienna)
Chilean Communists have reportedly been given some financial
aid in meeting their expenses for travel to the above Communist-
sponsored meetings, but the amount is unknown. The-method of supplying
funds appears generally to be through payment of passage for delegates
to the European offices of the transport company involved, and of ex-
penses -when the delegates arrive in the Soviet orbit.
XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK
PCCh leaders: have at fairly regular intervals gone to Moscow,
Prague, or Vienna, either individually or as delegates to international
Communist congresses, and have presumably received instructions from
international headquarters in person. International contacts have
also been supplied via members of other Latin American Communist par-
ties who have travelled to the Soviet orbit. Concrete evidence of
Soviet'instructions to PCCh beyond that indicated above, is not avail-
able.
PCCh maintains closest connections with the Communist parties
of Uruguay, Argentina, Guatemala, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru, and Cuba.
The Argentine Communist leader, Victor Codovilla, reportedly visited
Chile recently en route to the All-Union Communist Party Congress in
Moscow.
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