SINO-SOVIET BLOC PROPAGANDA FORGERIES 1 JANUARY 1957 TO 1 JULY 1959

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02646R000300130001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 200
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1960
• Content Type: IS

25X1A2g
COMMUNISM
SINO-SOVIET BLOC
Cc)
PROPAGANDA FORGERIES
1 January 1957 to 1 July 1959
1960 Copy N?
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SINO-SOVIET BLOC PROPAGANDA FORGERIES
1 January 1957 to 1 July 1959
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? I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. CASES OF DISCOVERED FORGERIES 5
? A. Multiple-Forgery Campaigns 5
B. Single-Forgery Campaigns 12
C. Forgeries in 1959 13
D. Descriptions of Specific Forgery 13
Campaigns
III. THE TECHNIQUE OF SOVIET BLOC 15
FORGERIES
A. Political Objectives 15
B. The "Secret Documents" Used 19
1. Form in Which Surfaced 19
2. Types of "Secret Documents" 20
Fabricated
Source Materials 22
1. Fact 22
2. Fiction 26
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D. Crudities and Errors
29
1.
Mistakes in Fact
2.
Mistakes in Format
30
3.
Use of British Spelling in
Documents Supposedly Written
by Americans
34
4.
Use of British Expressions as
American
34
5.
Use of Expressions Which are
Foreign in Usage, or Bad Trans-
lations f rom a Foreign Language
35
6.
Mistakes in U. S. Military Termi-
nology and Usage
36
7.
Operational Carelessness in
Referring to Dates
37
8.
Operational Carelessness -- Using
Typewriters Which Betray the
Forgery
39
IV.
SURFACING AND REPLAY TECHNIQUES
41
A. Areas and Operational Methods Used
in Surfacing
41
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ERRATA
Page 78, line 19 ... for "in only eight" read in only seven.
11
Page 101, line 14 ... for '"HVA (Haupverwaltung Aufklaerung)"
read '"HVA (Hauptverwaltung Auf klaerung). 11
Page 109, line 1 ... for "non-Bloc press" read "non-Bloc
CP press."
ANNEX 4b, Summit Conference Campaign ... renumber the
chart to read "ANNEX 4-B" in the upper right corner.
ANNEX 5a, Israeli General Staff Campaign ... renumber the
chart to read "ANNEX 5-A" in the upper right corner.
ANNEX 7c, Ceske Slovo Campaign.., for the last line of the
third block in the extreme right column of the chart read
"list which was stolen 15 June."
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~ erg ~ee~
1. 1957
41
2. 1958-59
41
B.
Replay - Methods of Delivery to
Target Audiences
43
C.
Combined Use of Overt and Covert
Assets in Surfacing and Replay
47
1. Rumor Campaign - France - Spring
1957 - French/Israeli General Staff
Plans
48
2. Diplomatic Report - Lebanon -
Spring of 1957
49
3. False Intelligence Report - Italy -
Spring of 1957
49
4. Press Allegation - India - Fall of
1957 - Secret Strategic Plan
50
5. "Secret Strategic Plan" Forgery
Surfaced - India - Fall of 1957
51
6. Soviet "Whisper" - France - Spring
51
of 195 8
7. Press Replay on "French/Israeli
Plan" - India - Spring of 1958
52
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8. Blitz Replay Ties French/Israeli 52
General Staff Plan with Secret
Strategic Plan - India - April 1958
9. USSR Adopts the Secret Strategic 53
Plan - Fall of 1958
10. Press Replay - India - Fall of 1958 55
11. Press Replay - USSR - Spring of 56
1959
D. Types of Operation Used in Covert/Semi- 57
Covert Surfacing and Replay
1. False Intelligence Reports 57
2. Rumor Campaigns and "Whispers" 59
3. Mailing "Black" 60
4. Hand-to- Hand Distribution 66
5. Clandestine Newspaper as Sur- 68
facing Point
6. Covert Planting in Overt Non-CP 69
Newspapers
7. Clandestine Radio 69
8. Semi-Covert: Official Distribution 69
by Diplomatic Missions (UAR)
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V. ASSETS USED IN SURFACING AND REPLAY - 71
OVER T
B. Assets Located in Countries of the 75
Free World
VI. ASSETS USED IN SURFACING AND REPLAY - 77
COVERT AND SEMI-COVERT
A. Assets Located Within the Sino-Soviet 77
Bloc (Covert)
B. Assets Located in Countries of the Free 78
World
1. Soviet Assets
2. East German Assets
3. Czechoslovakian Assets
4. Chinese Communist Assets
5. Non-CP Press Assets Used in 83
Covert (Unattributable) Surfacing
and Replay of Bloc Propaganda
Forgerie s
VII. NOTES ON CENTRAL PLANNING AND 93
ORGANIZATION OF FORGERY CAMPAIGNS
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A. Possible Soviet Origin of Interna-
tionally-Distributed Forgeries 93
B. The Soviet Center
C. The East German Centers
1. Political Targets
2. Black Propaganda against Military
Targets
101
VIII.
IX.
ROLE OF UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
(UAR) MEDIA IN DISTRIBUTION OF BLOC
FORGERIES
ROLE OF THE CP PRESS IN FORGERY
DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE THE BLOC
109
X.
EFFECTIVENESS OF FORGERY CAMPAIGNS
110
Annex 1 - Individual Forgeries Surfaced 1 January 1957
to 1 July 1959
Annex 2 - Multiple Forgery Propaganda Campaigns
Annex 3 - Berry Letter
Annex 4 - 1957-59 Propaganda Forgeries - Worldwide
Targets
4a - Rockefeller Letter Campaign
4b - Summit Conference Campaign
~snes~+w~
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Annex 5 - 1957-59 Propaganda Forgeries - Middle
Eastern and African Targets
5a - Israeli General Staff Campaign
5b - Rountree Circular Campaign
5c - U. S. Soldiers in Lebanon Campaign
Annex 6 - 1957-59 Propaganda Forgeries - Asian
Targets
6a - Taipeh Cables Campaign
6b - Frost Letter Campaign
Annex 7 - 1957-59 Propaganda Forgeries - European
Targets
7a - Berry Letter Campaign
7b - Hoover Letter Campaign
7c - Ceske Slovo Campaign
Annex 8 - Dulles Memorandum
Annex 9 - Rountree Circular
Annex 10 - Bishop Directive
Annex 11 - Taipeh Cables
Annex 12 - Rockefeller Letter
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This paper is based upon investigations of the modus
operandi and organization of covert Sino-Soviet bloc political
action and psychological warfare operations in countries of
the Free World. The term "covert political action and
psychological warfare" as used here refers to clandestine
operations which are conducted for the purpose of influencing
public and/or governmental opinion in the target countries
along the lines desired by the Bloc. It does not apply to
activities and propaganda which are overtly attributable to
Communist parties or front groups, or to operations con-
ducted solely for the purpose of collecting intelligence on
behalf of Bloc governments.
One of the classic tools of covert psychological warfare
is black propaganda of the type known as "deception" or
"misinformation". A device used for this purpose is the
forged document which offers seemingly incontrovertible
evidence of a "fact" or set of "facts" which the forger wants
his target audience to believe. It is to this aspect of covert
Bloc psychological warfare- -propaganda by forgery-- that
the present study is devoted. Propaganda by forgery is not
by any means new in Bloc operations, but a noticeable
increase in its use in 1957 and 1958 led to an intensive
investigation of the subject. This study covers interna-
tionally-distributed forgeries only. It does not touch upon
the equally important subject of propaganda forgeries which
are targeted at a single country and are surfaced and
replayed within that country only. Such forgeries appear
from time to time in various parts of the world. West
Germany, in particular, has been flooded with them during
the past few years.
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25X1 C5b
black propaganda in the field of foreign affairs (as
distinguished from ideological CP propaganda) is a function
of the foreign intelligence services of the Bloc countries,
closely directed by high-echelon units of the Communist
Party. The skill with which recently noted internationally-
distributed forgeries have been delivered to their target
audiences and the highly complex pattern of overt, covert,
and semi-covert and official media used to deliver these
materials make it evident that such international
campaigns are centrally directed and raise the possibility
that a single, central unit plans and prepares these forged
documents. More information on this point is needed,
however, before definite conclusions can be drawn.
As this study is written, what seems to be a break-
through in our knowledge of Soviet covert political action
and psychological warfare operations, including propa-
ganda forgeries, has been actualized.
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25X1X6
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II - CASES OF DISCOVERED FORGERIES
In the period of 1 January 1957 to 1 July 1959, a
total of thirty-six forgeries of known or apparent Soviet
bloc origin were distributed to targets outside the
countries in which they first appeared. Annex 1
lists these documents, in chronological order of surfacing.
As indicated therein, the thirty-six forgeries appeared as
follows:
1957
1958
1959
1st quarter
3
2
3
2nd quarter
0
6
1
3rd quarter
6
7
4th quarter
3
5
12
20
4 (first half of year)
Multiple-Forgery Campaigns
1. An odd characteristic of the 1957-59 forgeries is
that they rarely come singly. Of the total of
thirty-six known forgeries, thirty were clearly
established by their content (and frequently by
Bloc editorial comment as well) as preludes to or
"confirmation" of other forgeries. Following
these lines of interconnection, these thirty
individual forgeries emerge as the component
parts of ten separate multiple-forgery campaigns.
The campaigns are listed in tabular form in
Annex 2.
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2. The Berry Letter Campaign
The method in which a multiple-forgery campaign
is developed is illustrated by the Berry Letter
Campaign, which began with a series of remarks
made by Nikita Khrushchev in November 1957. By
the time of its final replay in December 1958, it
had involved the surfacing of no less than seven
separate forgeries. (Whether the Khrushchev
role was planned as the first step in the campaign
or whether his statements were simply drawn upon
by the Berry Letter writer as idea material is
unknown.)
In the TASS release quoting Khrushchev's
interview of 22 November 1957 wtih three
American journalists (William Randolph
Hearst, Jr., Frank Conniff and Robert
Considine), Khrushchev was quoted as saying:
"I would like to express my views with regard
to statements made by certain representatives
of military circles and published in the press.
It was reported that, allegedly, a part of the
American bomber force, with hydrogen and
atomic bombs, is constantly in the air and
always ready to strike against the Soviet
Union. Reports have it that one-half of the
planes are in the air. This is very dangerous.
Such a situation serves as an illustration of
the extent of the military psychosis in the
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United States. When planes with hydrogen
bombs take off that means that many people
will be in the air piloting them. There is
always the possibility of a mental blackout
when the pilot may take the slightest signal
as a signal for action and fly to the target
that he had been instructed to fly to. Under
such conditions a war may start purely by
chance, since retaliatory action would be
taken immediately. Does this not go to show
that in such a case a war may start as a
result of sheer misunderstanding, a derange-
ment in the normal psychic state of a person,
which may happen to anybody? Such a
horrible possibility must be excluded. It may
be that both sides will be against war, and yet
war may still start as a result of the military
psychosis whipped up in the United States....
Even if only one plane with one atomic or one
hydrogen bomb were in the air, in this case,
too, it would be not the Government but the
pilot who could decide the question of war."
(Underlining supplied to indicate statements
on which the Berry Letter was apparently
based.)
Basic Forgery: The Berry Letter
Some five months after the above interview, on
7 May 1958, the official East German Com-
munist Party (SED) daily Neues Deutschland
surfaced a letter purportedly written by
Assistant Defense Secretary Frank B. Berry
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to Defense Secretary Neil McElroy. The
letter stated that 67.3 per cent of all U. S.
Air Force flight personnel had been found to
be psychoneurotic, a condition which led to
all sorts of phobias, unaccountable animosity
and other irrational behavior. It mentioned
excessive drinking, drug-taking, sexual ex-
cesses and perversions and constant card-
playing as further evidence of the general break-
down, adding that "moral depression is
a typical condition of all crew members making
flights with atomic and H-bombs. " Annex 3
is a copy of the Berry Letter as surfaced in.
Neues Deutschland of 7 May 1958.
First Supplement: The Morgan Crash (True)
Having thus provided "official evidence" that
Khrushchev's "pilot who could decide the question
of war" was, in two-thirds of all cases, men-
tally unstable, the planners of the Berry Letter
methodically supplied "examples". The first was
a plane crash in England, reported as a news item
on 17 June 1958 and tied with the Berry Letter by
Radio Moscow on 18 June. (The crash, which
actually occurred, is one of the rare instances in
which a current news story has been picked up
for use in replay of a previously-launched forgery.
It involved an American plane mechanic named
Vernon Morgan, who had managed to get into the
air in a non-operational U. S. Air Force bomber
which he was neither authorized nor qualified to
fly. The plane crashed shortly after takeoff,
killing Morgan. The incident had been reported
in the press on 14 June, but was not picked up
for Soviet propaganda use until three days later,
as above. )
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Second Supplement: The U. S. Pilot Letters
(Four Forgeries)
The next step in the campaign was taken on
3 July 1958, when the Soviet Embassy in
London released to the Western press and the
British Foreign Office a letter purportedly
written by a U. S. Air Force pilot stationed
in England, in which the pilot threatened to
drop an atomic bomb in the North Sea near
England, in order to alert English opinion to
the dangers of an accidentally-triggered
nuclear war. On 4 July Radio Moscow tied
the letter to the Berry Letter and the Morgan
crash. The letter and the fact that it had been
released by the Soviet Embassy attracted
extensive comment in the non-Communist
press throughout the Western world. No
doubt in the hope of repeating this delightful
burst of publicity, the Soviet Embassy in
London released two more U. S. Pilot
Letters" (along the same lines as the first
but varying in detail) on 9 July, and still
another on 15 September 1958. These were
virtually ignored by the press.
Third Supplement: The Power Order (Forgery
in Allegation Form)
On 2 October 1958 the campaign was given
another push when Neues Deutschland published
an article claiming that the indiscretion of a
USAF officer stationed at Kaiserslautern, in
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West Germany, had disclosed the recent
issuance of a secret order by Strategic Air
Command (SAC) chief, General Power ,
forbidding any flights over U. S. territory by
planes carrying atomic or hydrogen bombs.
Bloc replay promptly tied this (non-existent)
order to the Berry Letter.
Fourth Supplement: Content of the Forged
Schlagzeug Envelope
In December 1958 the Berry Letter campaign
received what seems to have been its final
replay, in a booklet mailed "black" in West
Germany. Forged copies of the mailing
envelopes used by a bona fide West German
periodical named Schlagzeug were mailed in
West Germany, to an estimated 4, 000
addressees. They were accurate forgeries of
the real Schlagzeug envelope except for one
detail: they carried a West Berlin return
address which, on investigation, proved to be
a vacant lot. The envelopes contained an overt
East German propaganda booklet, with the
address of the Kulturverlag der Deutschen
Jugend (Publishing House for German Youth) in
East Berlin. The booklet was devoted to a
suggested "culture program", giving songs,
skits, and the like, for use as an amateur
theatrical performance. One of the songs,
printed complete with score for piano
accompaniment, was a direct tribute to the
Berry Letter. Freely translated, it ran:
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The Flying Psychoneurosis
by Werner Braunig
There flies Jim from Alabama,
there flies Jack from Tennessee
high above the city
wearing heated pants,
with the bomb aboard
and the psychoneurosis,
and on the automatic pilot is printed: Liberty.
And what can happen--
how does that concern us?
That does not concern us at all !
There flies Jim from Alabama
high over the State of Wisconsin
and there is a city
and people walk in rows,
and there is a (psychoneurotic) crack
and he shoots them up--
there were a few people killed
And if such a thing can happen--
doesn't this concern someone?
Doesn't this concern us at all?
There flies Jim from Alabama
Over you, and over me.
With death in his head,
and then he sees red,
and he pushes the button
and it's over for you and for me!
And because that can happen tomorrow,
it does concern us !
Mankind! It even concerns you!
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3. The ten multiple-forgery campaigns show some
indication of a pattern of annual targeting for 1957
and 1958. As shown by the content and the
emphasis in replay of each campaign, they have
been targeted primarily as follows:
Target
1957
1958
Worldwide
1
1
Middle East/Africa
1
2
Asia
1
1
Europe
1
2
Thus, of the total of ten campaigns surfaced
in the period 1957-59, five have been targeted at
Middle Eastern and Asian audiences and two at
worldwide audiences, making a total of seven of
the ten campaigns targeted wholly or in part at
audiences in the industrially underdeveloped areas
of the world, while five of the six single forgeries
were targeted at Asian and African audiences.
During this period there has been occasional
replay of propaganda forgeries to audiences in
North and Latin America, but no forgeries have
been reported as surfaced in or targeted primarily
at countries of the Western Hemisphere.
B. Single-Forge Campaigns
Of the six forgeries which were launched singly,
one (the O'Shaughnessy Letter) was established by its
subject and by certain operational details as part of
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n T T
a known East German IS operation. The other five
were overtly launched and thereafter died on the vine,
with little or no subsequent replay.
C. Forgeries in 1959
No new forgery campaigns appeared during the
first half of 1959, although three new forgeries were
surfaced in continuance of two of the 1958 campaigns
and one new single forgery wxs launched. Replay on
certain of the campaigns begun in 1957 and 1958 also
continued during the first half of 1959, as shown in
the final column of Annex 2.
D. Descriptions of Specific Forgery Campaigns
The known propaganda forgeries which were
internationally distributed during the period of this
study are described, by target area, in Annexes
4 through 7.
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A. Political Objectives
The political objective of the 1957-59 forgeries,
viewed as a whole, can be defined simply: creation
of a climate of Governmental and public opinion which
will tend to (a) break up the Western Alliance and
(b) discredit the West in general and the United States
in particular.
The specific objective of each of the propaganda
forgeries has been readily identifiable by its content
and timing, and often by accompanying Bloc editorial
comment, as an effort to supply "documentary
confirmation" of propaganda charges which were
being made at the same period through conventional
Bloc media. The Berry Letter, for example, "proved"
the unreliability of individual U. S. pilots in the midst
of a Bloc propaganda campaign against the flights of
the Strategic Air Command (SAC). The Rockefeller
Letter "confirmed" chronic Bloc charges of U.S.
imperialistic aims, while its Dulles Memorandum
supplement "proved" that the recently announced
Eisenhower Doctrine on the Middle East -- a major
current target of conventional Bloc propaganda -- was
simply a local step in implementing the worldwide
U.S. imperialist policy.
As the content descriptions in Annexes 4 through
7 show, the specific propaganda objectives of the
1957-59 forgeries have included:
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a. U. S. imperialistic aims (Rockefeller
Letter Campaign);
b. Charges made in the chronic "U.S.
plots" and "Western plots" propaganda
(Taipeh Cables, Frost Letter and
Rountree Circular campaigns and
several of the single forgeries);
c. Current propaganda charges concerning
the SAC flights as a danger to world
peace (Berry Letter Campaign);
d. U.S. plans for large-scale military
aggression (U.S. Soldier in Lebanon
Campaign);
e. Eftorts of a belligerent U.S. to sabotage
plans for a Summit Conference (Summit
Conference Directive);
Bloc efforts to:
a. Fan U.S. and Arab distrust of France
and Israel (Secret Strategic Plan
Campaign);
b. Fan French and British distrust of the
U. S. and, secondarily, of West Germany
(Hoover Letter Campaign and the
O'Shaughnessy Letter);
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c. Discredit anti-Communist emigre leaders
and the U. S. in particular, and the West
in general, in the eyes of Bloc nationals
and emigres (Ceske Slovo Campaign).
Presentation of the propaganda message within
each of the forged documents is far from subtle. An
example is the Hoover Letter. The forgery itself is
a long, rambling document, but its message appears
succinctly in the opening paragraphs, which (a) estab-
lish that the writer is offering the addressee a job and
is making the offer on behalf of the U. S. Government,
and (b) define the job: "You will never persuade me
that we might find a better person to work on the
project. Do you seriously believe that there is some-
one else who would know how to grab and hold on to the
good old Sahara Desert the way you would? They
think highly of you in Washington and give your abilities
full credit. I don't have to tell you about the impor-
tance of African oil."
To avoid any possibility that target audiences
might miss the point, replay comment usually explains
it again and as bluntly as possible. Continuing with
the Hoover Letter as an example, Radio Moscow
explained in replay that the letter showed "the desire
of the U. S. monopolies to seize control of oil wherever
it is found in the Middle East, and that the State
Department gives them all possible aid." The con-
tent of the letter itself made its primary targeting at
France clear, but to be sure the message was not
lost on this audience, Radio Moscow broadcast a
comment in French citing the letter as proof that
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"the United States desires to prevent France from
settling her disputes in North Africa in order that the
U. S. may take over the resources there. "
Another example of editorial lily-gilding is
provided by Bloc comment on the Rockefeller Letter.
The forgery itself was purportedly a plan for
achieving U. S. domination of the world, in part
through military alliances but primarily through
economic aid programs. In surfacing the letter on
15 February 1957, Neues Deutschland supplied its
own paragraph headings for the various sections of
the letter. These included:
"American Prestige Catastrophically Fallen"
"What Is Good for Standard Oills Good for U.S.A."
"Iranian Foreign Policy under U. S. Control"
"Economic 'Help' Draws Military Pacts after It"
"Forcing Neutral States in Direction of U. S.
Wishes"
"Bring Colonies of Others under U. S. Control"
"Re 'Selflessness' of U. S. Assistance".
Comment in a later replay by the East German
press agency ADN was equally forthright in explain-
ing the ideas the forgery was expected to convey:
"Rockefeller's letter to Eisenhower is causing a
stir throughout the world. Indignation at the plans
for brutal enslavement and oppression, hidden
behind what is termed aid, is running particularly
high in the countries receiving U. S. economic 'aid'."
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MOM
Radio Moscow, in a broadcast in Indonesian to
Southeast Asian audiences, also removed all danger
that its listeners might miss the propaganda point,
by explaining that the Rockefeller Letter "shows that
the imperialist interests of Rockefeller and other
U. S. billionaires decide the direction of the foreign
policy of the U. S. Government, which is the
fascistic executor of their wishes. "
B. The "Secret Documents" Used
1. Form in Which Surfaced
A propaganda forgery may be surfaced in any of
three forms:
a. Facsimile reproduction. Annexes 3 (copy
of the Berry Letter) and 9 (copy of the
Rountree Circular) are examples of this form
of surfacing. Used in twenty-two of the
thirty- six forgeries.
b. Verbatim quotation of the text of the alleged
documents, with no effort at facsimile pre-
sentation. Annex 8 (copy of the Dulles
Memorandum) is an example. Used in six of
the thirty-six forgeries.
c. Allegation only, i.e., disclosure of the details
of the alleged document, with no attempt at
either facsimile reproduction or verbatim
quotation. Annex 10 (copy of the Bishop
Directive) is an example of this type. While
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an unsupported allegation is not, strictly
speaking, a forgery, the surfacing and relay
system used for these forgeries-by-allega-
tion is the same as for the other two types.
Allegation of the existence of the document
in question is sometimes a prelude to sur-
facing in one of the other two forms, while
in other cases the campaign may run its full
course on the basis of the allegation alone.
Used in eight of the thirty-six forgeries.
2. Types of "Secret Documents" Fabricated
Of the thirty-six separate forgeries, twenty-
seven were supposedly written by or to U. S.
nationals:
Twelve (cables, dispatches, letters) pur-
porting to be correspondence between the
State Department and its diplomatic
missions abroad (OtShaughnessy Letter,
Bishop Directive, the five Taipeh Cables,
Bruce Letter, Summit Directive,
Rountree Circular, Directive.on UAR
and the Murphy Letter)
Two purporting to be internal U. S. Govern-
ment letters or memoranda (Dulles
Memorandum to President Eisenhower
and Berry Letter to Defense Secretary
McElroy)
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Two semi-official letters by former U. S.
Government officials (Rockefeller Letter
to President Eisenhower and Hoover
Letter to a U. S. oil company executive)
Four letters or other correspondence between
U. S. officials and foreign nationals
(Kishi Dulles Pact, Sjamsuddin Letter to
Ambassador MacArthur, Frost Letter to
the Indonesian rebel leader Kawilarang,
and Chiang Kai Shek Letter to President
Eisenhower)
Seven letters or verbal indiscretions of U. S.
military personnel abroad (four U. S.
Pilot Letters, "John H" Letter, Powers
Order and U. S. Paratrooper Cables).
Of the remaining nine forgeries, five have
purported to be internal documents of other
Western and pro-Western Governments (French/
Israeli General Staff Plan; Secret Strategic Plan
of the Israeli Army; Erhard Letter to West
German Chancellor Adenauer; Sudan Government
Documents and Welensky Document).
The other four were the three forgeries
comprising the Ceske Slovo Campaign (one forged
issue of an emigre newspaper and two series of
letters purportedly written by the editor of the
same periodical) and the forged Schlagzeug (West
German periodical) mailing envelope which
carried the last known replay on the Berry Letter.
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C. Source Materials
A typical Bloc propaganda forgery consists of two
distinct sets of source material: a framework of
overt fact, used to give verisimilitude to the forgery,
and the fictional statements which convey the propa-
ganda message.
1. Fact. The factual material may include any or
all of several kinds of data:
Names and titles of the purported writer, the
addressee and any other persons who may be
mentioned in the document. A frequent
practice is the inclusion, either in the forgery
itself or in accompanying editorial comment,
of the full name and title of the purported
writer and addressee. Thus, a NCNA
(Chinese Communist press agency) news
release replaying the Frost Letter begins,
"Bintang Timur today published a letter sent
by Rear Admiral Laurence Frost, Chief of
the U. S. Naval Intelligence Bureau, to
Kawilarang, one of the ringleaders of the
rebel clique, " and then explained that
"Kawilarang was the former Indonesian
Military Attache to Washington." In sur-
facing the Power Order (allegation only),
Neues Deutschland identified "General Thomas
Power , Commander of the Strategic Air
Command of the United States," as originator
of the order. The Berry Letter is signed
"Frank B. Berry, M. D., Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Health and Medical);"etc.
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Place names and names of organizational units.
The Berry Letter refers to USAF bases on
Midway Island and to the Patuxent River and
Cooke bases. The "John H" Letter identifies
its purported writer as a member of the 79th
Engineers. The Rockefeller Letter mentions
"the discussions at Camp David which re-
sulted in my resignation;" etc.
Official format, if the forgery is presented as a
Government cable, dispatch or memorandum.
(See Annex 11, which is a copy of one of the
Taipeh Cables as surfaced in Blitz, and
Annexes 3, the Berry Letter, and 9, the
Rountree Circular.)
References to recent news items, used in the
body of the forged document or in accompanying
editorial comment. The "John H" Letter
states, "I arrived from Munich July 27 by
Globemaster with a group of the U. S. Army. "
(The forgery itself was based upon the landing
of U. S. troops in Lebanon, and the world
press of the period was full of details of their
transportation by air from West Germany.)
In surfacing the Dulles Memorandum, Neues
Deutschland explained editorially that the
document had been written "in the last half of
December /1956_/, just after the NATO meeting
in Paris". (NATO had held a widely publi-
cized meeting in Paris at that time. The Camp
David talks between President Eisenhower
and Nelson A. Rockefeller, mentioned in the
Rockefeller Letter, had taken place and had
been reported in the press. )
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Statements the purported writer has actually made
in speeches, press conferences, magazine
articles, etc., or statements published by
other individuals which might plausibly be
attributed to him. An example of this occurs
in the Rockefeller Letter. On 5 December
1955 the New York Times carried a front-
page article in which this paragraph appears:
"Although economic and technical aid in
the underdeveloped countries has been
running at more than one billion dollars a
year, more than half has been concentrated
in three places where military-political,
rather than economic factors are controlling.
These are South Korea, Formosa and South
Vietnam. "
The Rockefeller Letter, surfaced 15 Feb-
ruary 1957, contained this paragraph:
"Although, for instance, economic and
technical aid to underdeveloped countries
last year amounted to more than one billion
dollars, more than half of this sum was
actually devoted to three countries in which
military and political rather than economic
considerations were the determining factors.
These countries were South Korea, Formosa
and South Vietnam. "
Names and addresses needed for operational use.
Still another type of factual data used is, of
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course, the names and addresses of target
individuals when the forgery is to be surfaced
by covert mailing rather than by overt means.
Target addresses for use in "black" mailing
of psychological warfare material are known
to be obtained by the East German IS (and,
presumably, by the Soviet IS as well) through
overt research facilities--telephone direc-
tories, diplomatic lists, names and addresses
culled from local newspapers, overt direc-
tories of government units, from lists of
foreigners visiting Bloc countries, etc.
Others are known, in the case of East
Germany, to be obtained from East German
intelligence agents travelling in the West. In
the one known Czech intelligence operation
discussed in this paper (the Ceske Slovo
Campaign), mailing addresses were obtained
by burglarizing the offices of the real
Ceske Slovo and making off with its sub-
scription list.
The overt material used in Bloc forgeries is
culled from an enormous supply of research
material: newspapers, books and periodicals of
all nations, diplomatic lists, telephone and other
published directories, overt information hand-
outs of Western official units, and so forth. The
extent of Bloc overt-materials research facilities
is established not only by the factual detail used
to embellish the propaganda forgeries but also
by the content of conventional Bloc radio and
printed propaganda. Books such as The State of
Israel--Its Situation and Policies (see paragraph
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C-9 of Section IV) are built by stringing together
quotations--usually out of context and occa-
sionally false--from a fantastic number of
published non-Bloc sources ranging from the
world's major newspapers to obscure local books
and brochures. - the overt evidence in 25X1 C5b
itself leaves no room for doubt as to the method 25X1 C5b
and extent of Bloc research of this type- 25X1 C5b
2. Fiction. The fictional statements which constitute
the raison d'etre of any forgery obviously have
the writer's own imagination as their immediate
source. The ideas which these statements are
intended to. convey, however, are those of the
Bloc propaganda themes of the period.
An interesting note on the general guide lines
which give rise to specific Bloc forgery texts was
provided by an editorial comment in the Neues
Deutschland article in which the Rockefeller
Letter was surfaced: "Lenin made the important
remark that one of the tasks of Communists in
dealing with questions of international politics
is to reveal the secret of the origin of wars to
the masses. We were guided by this remark
when we published the text of the secret letter of
Nelson Rockefeller to Eisenhower. From the pen
of the scion of the blood-stained Rockefeller
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dynasty the world learns the secret of how
people are robbed of their national sovereignty
and independence and brought. under the sway of
the U.S. monopolies in order to help in a U.S. -
instigated war for world domination." With the
substitution of "we wrote" for "we published",
this statement furnishes a succinct explanation of
the thinking which produces a specific Communist
propaganda forgery.
In the interest of verisimilitude, fictional
embellishments are frequently added in the editorial
comment which accompanies overt surfacing
and replay of the forgeries. One example of this
was the Blitz article on the worries of Ambas-
sador Rankin, which served as prelude to the
Taipeh Cables series (see Annex 6). Another
was the "news item" supplied in a Delhi Times
replay of the Berry Letter and subsequently
included in a TASS English-language release.
The comment read: "As is always the case in
such circumstances, an intensified search is being
carried on to find the source of leakage of the infor-
mation which is so unfavorable to U. S. strategic
aviation. Judging from rumors circulating in Wash-
ington, Berry remains beyond suspicion and will
keep his post, but there is every possibility of some-
body from the Defense Department being forced to
leave Government service."
Still another kind of fictional embellishment
was noted in at least one of the 1957-59 forgeries:
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the use within a forgery of statements from non-
Bloc psychological warfare programs which
happen to be untrue but which have been published
frequently enough within the primary target area
that the audience might be expected to regard
them as fact. The ins tance noted was the follow-
ing statement, in the Hoover Letter: "Now as to
your doubts on the political side of this matter
and primarily the attitude of the French to all
this business, I must say that they proved far
more conciliatory than we expected as regards
our participation in exploiting Sahara oil. Though
the row that occurred last fall, because they
managed to seize some documents compromising
ARAMCO, made Paris more capricious in
selecting partners, it did not, however, close
the Sahara to us. (Editorial note: In the fall of
1956, a plane carrying five leaders of the
Algerian national liberation movement was
detained by the French authorities. Searches
made of the five Algerians, who were subsequently
arrested, revealed documents exposing the
intrigues of U. S. oil trusts, especially that of
the Arabian American Oil Co.)."
The statement that the five Algerian leaders
were arrested is true, and overt. The editorial
statement that search of the five "revealed
documents exposing the intrigues of U. S. oil
trusts, especially that of ARAMCO, " and the
reference in the forgery itself to "the row that
occurred last fall, because (the French) managed
to seize some documents compromising
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ARAMCO" are not true. The arrest of the five
Algerians was a cause celebre in France and
North Africa in 1956, and the heated French
press comment on the subject included a bit of
psychological warfare misinformation on the part
of the French nationalist Right in the form of a
report--published in several Paris newspapers
of the Right and Extreme Right--that documents
compromising ARAMCO had been found on the
Algerians. There was, however, no "row"
between the U. S. and French Governments on
the subject, since the documents found on the
men contained nothing which compromised
ARA.MCO. In view of the excellent psychological
warfare facilities available to the French ultra-
nationalist groups which had promoted the
ARAMCO story, there is no reason to assume
that the report itself had been a Bloc product,
and the Bloc writer may even have used the tale
in the Hoover Letter on the assumption that it
was true.
D. Crudities and Errors
There is no single clue which will lead infallibly
to identification of an alleged secret document as a
forgery. The forgeries which have been surfaced in
facsimile or verbatim-text form, however, have all
contained errors or evidences of operational care-
lessness which have been of definite assistance in
spotting them as forgeries. The errors are not
usually of a kind that would make the forged character
of the document obvious to a lay reader and some--
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such as use of a German-made typewriter for a
"U.S. Government" document -- require specialized
analysis. No one error has been found to be common
to all of the forgeries, but the errors and careless-
ness have fallen into certain categories.
The factual errors have been on points which
would not normally have appeared in the press
and would therefore be known to the agency in
which the document purportedly originated but
not to either the target audience or the overt-
materials researcher.
Examples:
The Berry Letter was based upon an
examination supposedly given to all USAF
flight personnel and the statistics compiled
as a result of that examination. Fact: No
such examination was given.
The Berry Letter was supposedly signed
by Dr. Berry on 27 March 1958. Fact:
Dr. Berry was away on an official trip on
that date and could not have signed the
letter even if he had written it.
The Rockefeller Letter (see Annex
12 for copy) contains many errors which
would in themselves be sufficient to
establish the document as fraudulent in the
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eyes of anyone who was familiar with
Mr. Rockefeller's own correspondence
practices. The forgery is a slipshod typing
job, with ragged margins and several
strikeovers, contains several errors in
punctuation, spelling (such as "allienation")
and grammar, and displays a rather uneven
typing touch. As it happens, Mr. Rockefeller's
letters, public or private, are always written
on an executive type electric typewriter and
thus display a mechanically even touch.
The copy is always clean, with no strikeovers,
and particular care is taken in punctuation,
spelling and grammar. It also happens that
Mr. Rockefeller dislikes frequent use of
the pronoun "I"--a fact of which the writer
of the forgery was obviously unaware.
Each of the purported State Department and
U. S. Embassy cables has looked more or less
like the real thing. None of them, however, has
been a good enough forgery of the cable form
itself to pass even a casual inspection by anyone
familiar with the forms in question.
Examples:
The Taipeh Cables (see Annex 11)
show ignorance of the use of a "Control
Number", and placing of the message numbers
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is incorrect. The text is written in a
leisurely, chatty style which might be
found in a dispatch but would be unusual
in a cable.
The Rountree Circular (see Annex 9)
did a little better on the "Control Number"
but managed to include an impressive
number of errors of its own:
The document was dated 17 April 1958,
and classified "CONFIDENTIAL/
SECURITY INFORMATION". This
classification was discontinued on
10 November 1953.
It purported to be a cable, but its text
called it a "circular letter". The
Department uses a form of correspondence
called a "circular instruction", but such
correspondence is not transmitted by
cable. There is no such thing as a
"circular letter" in Department nomen-
clature.
The purported numbering bears no rela-
tionship to the numbering series used at
that time for State Department communi-
cations to diplomatic and consular posts
abroad. The forgery was numbered
"Circular 11", and dated "April 17, 1958".
Under the State Department system, the
numbers begin anew with each fiscal year.
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The real Circular 11 for the period of
1 July 1957 to 30 June 1958 was sent on
20 July 1957.
The document was typed on a blank form
of a type which had actually been in use
until August 1955, but was replaced at
that time by a new form. The post-1955
form was headed "Incoming Telegram -
The Foreign Service of the United States
of America", and the location of the
Embassy had to be typed in. The form on
which the forgery was typed bore the
printed legend: "Incoming Telegram - -
American Embassy, Baghdad."
Official messages transmitted to U. S.
diplomatic and consular representatives
abroad are signed in the name of the
Secretary of State and not by other offi-
cials. The Rountree Circular was 'signed'
by William Rountree, who at the time was
an Assistant Secretary of State.
Letters and memoranda purportedly written
by U. S. Government officials run afoul of the
same problem of format. In the Berry Letter, for
example, the paragraphs are not numbered in
accordance with established procedures, the pages
are improperly numbered and the salutation and
closing are not consistent with established corres-
pondence format. In the Rockefeller Letter the
salutation is indented to align with the paragraph
indentations and not, as in American practice, with
the left margin of the text.
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3. Use of British Spelling in Documents Supposedly
Written by Americans
The most common error in the forgeries so
far discovered has been the use of British
spelling in the words in which British and
American spelling differ. The Rockefeller Letter,
for example, uses the words "favour", "econo-
mising", and "emphasising", and the Hoover
Letter speaks of "reorganisation". It should be
noted, however, that this error has not occurred
in all forgeries, and was not consistent even in
the Rockefeller and Hoover letters. The
Rockefeller Letter, while using "emphasising",
also uses "emphasize". The Hoover Letter uses
"reorganisation" but also "unfavorable". While
use of British spellings alone would indicate
that the writer is not American it would not, of
course, mean that he is necessarily English,
since it is British and not American English that
is taught in most schools outside the U. S. Use
of both spellings in the same document, however,
suggests the possibility that the writer (or
writers) may have learned English as a single
language, without mastering the differences
between the British and American versions that
a native of either country recognizes on sight.
4. Use of British Expressions as American
Examples: The Rockefeller Letter refers to the
idea that "the Flag follows trade" as an American
tradition, while in fact it is a phrase used by
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political scientists to describe British colonial
tradition.
The Rockefeller Letter also says, "the
hooked fish needs no bait", which is British
rather than American. Still another example,
in the same document, is the expression
"ramming home" (of an idea), which an American
would be more apt to write as "driving home".
5. Use of Expressions Which Are Foreign in Usage,
or Bad Translations from a Foreign Language
Examples: The Rockefeller Letter, in making a
statement, refers to "my friends" as supporting
authority. In German, "meine Parteifreunde"
or "politische Freunde" is often used to give
weight to an argument, but this would be an odd
practice in U. S. Government correspondence.
An instance which seems to be poor transla-
tion also occurs in the Rockefeller Letter. This
document begins, "I am reluctant to revert to
that lengthy and tiresome discussion. " An
American would not be apt to refer-to a discus-
sion with the President as "tiresome" in a letter
to the President. The word used in the German
text of the letter, however, is ermudende, which
can with equal validity be translated as "tiring".
In view of the fact that the President, at the time
of the Camp David meeting, was still convalescing
from his heart attack, reference to a "long and
tiring discussion" would be plausible.
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The Berry Letter uses the expression,
"during the medical examination progress",
which can only be a poor translation from
another language.
6. Mistakes in U. S. Military Terminology and Usage
Examples: The "John H" Letter is addressed "To
American Officers and Other Ranks" -- a saluta-
tion a Briton might use but an American would
not be apt to. The same letter used the term
1179th Engineering" rather than "79th Engineers".
It also contained fifteen spelling errors and
several mistakes in abbreviating military terms.
The Berry Letter, purportedly written by a
USAF official, contains the following errors in
usage:
"Internal Zone" for "Zone of Interior"
"Air Force Command" and "AFC", which are
not used by USAF in referring to the
United States Air Force
"psychostenia" is an obsolete psychiatric
term not commonly used by American
medical personnel
"a group of experts" is mentioned as
authority. In such a letter, the "group
of experts" would be identified and not
inferred by a general term
"the Patuxent River AFB (M d)" should be
"Patuxent River Naval Air Station" and
use of parentheses to set apart State
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abbreviations is not an accepted
practice. The same errors occur in
"the Cooke AFB (Calif)". Still another
error occurring in both is use of the
article "the", which would be correct
in any of several other languages but is
not an American practice.
Use of vague generalities such as "further
improvement of aircraft equipment,
brighter lights of the ground signal
systems and beacons, installation of
additional direction signs. " These
terms are so obscure as to defy inter-
pretation and certainly would be identified
specifically if referred to in a letter to
the Secretary of Defense, especially if,
as this document states, they were
"proposed by experts".
7. Operational Carelessness in Referring to Dates
Examples: The Rockefeller Letter was purportedly
written in January 1956, but the writer says "If
I am not mistaken the Bill obtained your approval
following Sir Anthony Edent s visit to Washington."
Anthony Eden arrived in Washington on 30 January
1956 and remained until 2 February.
When Blitz replayed the Berry Letter on
30 August 1958, it explained editorially that "A
photostat of this confidential letter dated March
27, 1958, was published early this month in the
German newspaper Neues Deutschland." It was
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true that the forgery had been surfaced early in
the month--the 7th, to be exact--but the month
was May and not August. This error is of some
interest in itself, since it suggests that the replay
copy, complete with editorial comment, may
have been sent out at about the time the letter
was surfaced and either received late by Blitz
or allowed to lie around the Blitz offices for
some time and then published without editorial
reading.
The Rountree Circular Campaign provided
an interesting collection of conflicting dates
(and explanations of origin). On 9 April 1958,
the clandestine Our Radio, in East Germany,
broadcast to Turkey a news item which began,
"Report from Cairo: The American State
Department has sent a secret directive to its
envoys in the Middle East with a view to over-
throwing the UAR." The item continued with a
brief description oi` the "directive", which did
not mention the name Rountree but was otherwise
an excellent summary of the Rountree Circular.
The Rountree Circular itself was dated 17 April
1958, i.e., a week after the East German broad-
cast, but was not surfaced until 26 July (twelve
days after the Baghdad coup d'etat). The
document "had been sent to the American Embassy
in Baghdad in April of this year. " When Blitz
replayed the forgery on 2 August, it was under
an introduction which began, "With the storming
of Baghdad, the citadel of the Baghdad Pact, by
the forces of Arab nationalism, Americans have
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been caught with their pants down. The snakepit
that it was, Baghdad in Republican hands has
yielded a mass of secret documents which expose
the pretensions of American imperialism, showing
up Washington as the arch enemy of Arab unity and
laying bare its conspiracy to destroy the United
Arab Republic. One such incriminating document
was sent by the State Department on April 17, 1958,
to all its diplomatic missions in the Middle East...
and continued with quotations from the Rountree
Circular. Thus, the cable described by Our
Radio in Leipzig on 9 April did not, according to
the August implication in Blitz, come to light
until "the storming of Baghdad" on 14 July.
8. Operational Carelessness--Using Typewriters
Which Betray the Forgery
Examples: It has been determined that the machine
used in typing the Rockefeller Letter was not of
American manufacture, and was probably made
before World War II by Rheinmetall V. E. B.,
which is located at Sommerda bei Erfurt, in
Thuringia, East Germany.
Analysis indicates that the Berry Letter was
typed on either an unknown foreign machine or a
rebuilt combination of different typewriter machine
parts, possibly of American origin.
The typewriter used in addressing the
O'Shaughnessy Letter to its target was found, on
later analysis, to have been used a few weeks
earlier in another East German intelligence
operation (see paragraph C-1 of Section VII).
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A. Areas and Operational Methods Used in Surfacing
1. 1957. The twelve propaganda forgeries known
to have been surfaced in 1957 made their first
appearance as follows:
Surfaced within the Soviet Bloc - 2
both overtly, in East Germany
Surfaced outside the Bloc - 10
all unattributable
West Germany 1
France 1
India 8
Of the 1957 total of twelve forgeries, two were
surfaced overtly in Bloc propaganda media, two
covertly in West Europe and all the rest by
unattributable publication in the newspaper Blitz
in India--a total of only four surfacing channels
in four countries.
2. 1958-59. The 1957 simplicity of surfacing areas
and methods was not repeated in 1958 and the
first half of 1959. In that period, twenty-four
forgeries were surfaced, using fourteen coun-
tries--only two of them within the Bloc--as
surfacing points. Five of the twenty-four were
surfaced in overt Bloc media and four others
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7?T/lT' t -up TT /!` (NAT T TTTTTL-'~T~ !''1 P.T TD l1T
overtly by the Soviet Embassy in London. The
other fifteen were given unattributable surfacing
in a total of eleven non-Bloc countries. The
Indian newspaper Blitz, which had surfaced
eight of the twelve forgeries of 1957, surfaced
only one in 1958-59 although the paper was
heavily used in 1958 replay of forgeries sur-
faced elsewhere. The areas used were:
East Germany 4
Hungary 1
Surfaced outside the Bloc - 19
all but 4 unattributable
Middle East (6)
UAR 3
Iraq 1
Lebanon 1
India 1
Europe (8)
West Germany 3
France 1
England (series of 4) 4
(by Soviet Embassy, overtly)
Asia (2)
~lJ4li~~~
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Simultaneously in several areas (3)
West Germany & Austria 1
Lebanon & Iraq 1
Turkey, Iran & Sweden 1
B. Replay - Methods of Delivery to Target Audiences
Once a forgery has been surfaced, it is delivered
with remarkable precision to its target audience.
The means of delivery may range from a single
covert action (e. g., mailing the forged document
"black" to a single individual), through overt third-
country replay to a single target country, to a
complicated series of operations involving a large
number of Bloc assets in several countries, with
extent and methods of replay depending upon the kind
of target audience at which the forgery in question
is aimed.
1. An example of the simplest covert delivery was
the O'Shaughnessy Letter, targeted at the French
Government and mailed "black" to the French
Ambassador to West Germany. No overt sur-
facing and no replay were ever reported.
Another illustration, not mentioned elsewhere
in this paper because distribution was within a
single nation only, was a letter on a forged
State Department letterhead, addressed to
Ambassador Chapin in Iran and signed "John
Foster Dulles", which was transmitted (means
unknown) to the Shah of Iran in late February
1958. The letter, dated 8 October 1957, con-
sisted of statements which were highly derogatory
to the Shah. So far as known the letter was never
used in any other way.
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2. An example of surfacing outside the Bloc, followed
by a single replay by overt Bloc media into a
specific target area, is provided by the Taipeh
Cables series. The first two forgeries in this
campaign were the Rankin Cables, "proving" that
the U. S. Government was plotting to assassinate
Chiang Kai-shek. The two cables were surfaced
in Blitz, in India, on 21 September 1957 and, on
30 December, replayed by Radio Peking, in
Mandarin, to Taiwan. No other replay was ever
reported. (It is interesting to note that, while
replay on the forged document itself was thus
limited, the theme was not dropped. In late Feb-
ruary and early March 1959 a group of Latin
American CP representatives visited Peking on
their way home from the 21st Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. While in
Peking they heard talks on international affairs
by Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi and other Chinese
CP leaders. One of the "facts" communicated to
them in the course of these talks was that "the
U.S. realized that Chiang Kai-shek is an
obstacle (to its plans) and is trying to eliminate
him by means of a coup d'etat to be effected by a
Chinese officer who studied in the U.S. The
U. S. has a secret Provisional Government in
readiness. ") Similarly, the final cable in the
Taipeh series was a purported State Department
cable on U.S. plans for subversion in the SEATO
area, in Southeast Asia. The cable was surfaced
in Blitz on 12 October 1957 and a few weeks later
was reprinted in the newspaper La Patrie, in
Bangkok, Thailand (i. e. , in the capital of the only
country on the Southeast Asian mainland which is
a member of SEATO). No other replay was ever
reported.
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3. At the other end of the replay scale was the
Rockefeller Letter campaign, targeted at a
worldwide audience and replayed accordingly.
The Rockefeller Letter was surfaced in the East
German Party daily Neues Deutschland on
15 February 1957, and replayed by:
Radio Moscow, which picked it up within twenty-
four hours of surfacing and replayed it in
repeated broadcasts (some at normal speed
and others at dictation speed) to Vietnam,
Greece, the Middle East (in Arabic), Iran (in
Persian), Turkey (in Turkish), Yugoslavia
(in Serbocroat), Indonesia (in Indonesian),
Latin America (in Spanish), on 16 and 17
February; to foreign audiences in Arabic,
Turkish, Persian, Portuguese, Italian,
Spanish (Latin America), Japanese, Korean
and Mandarin on 18 February; a total of
twenty-one broadcasts, worldwide, including
the United Kingdom, France, Norway, Holland,
Denmark, Hungary, Rumania, Albania and
Finland,between 19 and 22 February. On
10 March the Dulles Memorandum was sur-
faced (also in Neues Deutschland) as a Middle
Eastern supplement to the Rockefeller Letter.
Radio Moscow thereafter replayed the two
forgeries, sometimes separately but usually
together, to the Middle East (in Arabic), Iran
(in Persian), Turkey (in Turkish) and to an
unspecified number of other foreign audiences
on 11 March; twenty-six commentaries, mostly
in Arabic, from 13 to 17 March; to the Middle
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i~ I^^~ /'~l~1~T TTl r\T
East in Arabic,on 18 March 1957 and again
on 4 November 1958 (this time in connection
with the withdrawal of U. S. troops from
Lebanon); a total of more than eighty
separate broadcasts from February 1957
through November 1958 (plus replay, in the
first three days only, by Pravda, TASS and
Soviet Russia to audiences in USSR).
East German media (press agency ADN, radio
Deutschlandsender and newspaper Neues
Deutschland) in eight comments to East and
West Germany.
Czech media (press) to Czechoslovakian audiences.
Rumanian media (Radio Bucharest and Party daily
Scinteia) to Rumania.
Chinese Communist media (Radio Peking and
press agency NCNA) to Communist China.
Assets outside the Sino-Soviet bloc (newspapers
Al Qabas in Damascus, Blitz in India and
unidentified newspapers in New Delhi and
Cambodia) to their readers in the Middle East
and Southeast Asia.
Covert replay by an East German representative
in Cairo to the Arab League member govern-
ments,
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By the time the campaign ended, nine months
after surfacing of the first of its two forgeries,
more than one hundred instances of replay had
been reported, some eighty per cent consisting
of Radio Moscow broadcasts to audiences all over
the world.
The replay used in each of the ten multiple-
forgery campaigns of 1957-59 is shown in detail
on the attached charts, as follows:
Annex 4-a. Rockefeller Letter Campaign
" 4-b. Summit Conference Campaign
" 5-a. Israeli General Staff Campaign
5-b. Rountree Circular Campaign
5-c. U.S. Soldiers in Lebanon
Campaign
" 6-a. Taipeh Cables Campaign
" 6-b. Frost Letter Campaign
7-a. Berry Letter Campaign
7-b. Hoover Letter Campaign
7-c. Ceske Slovo Campaign
C. Combined Use of Overt and Covert Assets in
Surfacing and Replay
Once surfaced, three of the ten multiple-forgery
campaigns of 1957-59 (the Taipeh Cables, Frost
Letter and Summit-Directive campaigns) ran their
full replay course in overt press and radio media.
Each of the other seven was run through a combina-
tion of overt and covert replay operations, often
through assets situated in widely separated parts of
the world.
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An example of this overt/covert replay system
is the Israeli General Staff Campaign, which began
as a rumor in France in early 1957, traversed the
Mediterranean in false-intelligence form, appeared
in India in published form and received its latest
known replay in a book published in Moscow in the
spring of 1959.
The Israeli General Staff Campaign
1. Rumor Campaign - France - Spring 1957 -
French/Israeli General Staff Plans
In mid-March 1957 (six months after the
Israeli and French/British military action against
Egypt) rumors began circulating in official and
diplomatic circles in Paris that the French and
Israeli General Staffs were working together on
a plan for joint Israeli/French action against
Egypt. The rumors were traced through all
pertinent sources. It was learned that in the
first place they had no foundation in fact, and in
the second all traceable tales on the subject ran
back to a single local point of origin: a Paris
journalist who was
notorious both for his role as a pro-Soviet
propagandist and for his penchant for cultivating
acquaintances in Government and diplomatic
circles. By the first week in April, the rumors
had died out
25X1X6
25X1X6
25X1X6
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2. Diplomatic Report - Lebanon - Spring of 1957
During the first week in April 1957, a
Western diplomat stationed in Beirut cabled to
his Government that a high Lebanese official had
just informed him that "France was launching a
plot in cooperation with Israel. "
3. False Intelligence Report - Italy - Spring of 1957
A report (information date April-May 1957 no source description or evaluation given)
stated that
"France apparently intends to use the small port
of Nahariya, north of Haifa and a few kilometers
from the Lebanese border, as a naval base for
French intervention in the event that Middle East
25X1X6
25X1X7
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tension should worsen" and that France was
"financing an Israeli radar installation to protect
the Nahariya base". The report added, "The
Israeli press has not mentioned the matter, but
details are being talked about in public."
4. Press Allegation - India - Fall of 1957 - Secret
Strategic Plan
On 12 October 1957 Blitz, in India,carried a
long article headed "Israel Plans to Dismember
Arab States and Organise an Israeli Empire!"
The article reported that "a Blitz correspondent
in a West Asian country had an opportunity of
getting acquainted in detail with a secret
strategic plan of the Israeli General Staff. We
may be able to publish the plan in full in future."
The article gave details of the "Plan", which
"envisages military operations against the
countries bordering on Israel.... In general,
the Plan provides for the annexation of the
territory bounded by the Suez Canal, the River
Litani and the Persian Gulf.... " Blitz
added editorially that "the scheme takes into
account the circumstance that Israel will not be
able to rely on victory if she acts alone. In this
connection, assistance on the part of the U.S.A. ,
Britain and France is envisaged beforehand.
The Plan especially emphasizes that "the U. S.
is interested in a clash between Israel and the
Arab States" and that "the U. S. interest in the
strategic points of the Middle East is explained
by the striving to strengthen her positions in this
oil-rich area."
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5. "Secret Strategic Plan" Forgery Surfaced - India -
Fall of 1957
In November 1957 Blitz director R. K. Karanjia
fulfilled the promise of his October newspaper
article by publishing a 78-page booklet entitled
Dagger of Israel. The booklet was a vehicle for
surfacing the purported "Strategic Plan of the
Israeli Army for 1956-57 - Translated from the
original in Hebrew". This document, an obvious
fraud, is a rambling, badly written tract with the
details given in the Blitz article quoted just above
as its propaganda climax. In his introduction,
author Karanjia placed the date of beginning work
on the book as March 1957, i.e. the period in
which the "French/Israeli General Staff" rumors
had appeared in France. (The book is dedicated
to President Nasser of Egypt, and closes with a
reprint of an interview Nasser had given to the
Cairo daily Al Ahram. It opens with a foreword
by Haj Amin el Husseini, former Grand Mufti of
Palestine, whose autographed photograph is used
as frontispiece. Karanjia gives credit for the
title, Dagger of Israel, to "my brilliant friend
Colonel Serraj, Chief of the Intelligence Bureau
of the Syrian Army, who took pains to explain to
me for over an hour the aggressive strategy of
Israel supported by her British, French and
American parents and allies.")
6. Soviet "Whisper" - France - Spring of 1958
On 4 April 1958 Mikhail Stepanovich Rogov,
Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Paris, told
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a Western diplomat that his Government was
currently "worried about increased French/
Israeli political and military cooperation", a
worry which the diplomat promptly reported to
his own foreign ministry. (Rogov was identified
as a Colonel in 25X1 C5b
the service now known as KGB, and was later 25X1X6
identified as a key figure in
Soviet clandestine political action operations in
France.)
7. Press Replay on "French/Israeli Plan" - India -
Spring of 1958
On 5 April 1958 Blitz, in Bombay, carried an
article, "Israel Plotting Preventive War!" The
article, datelined Beirut, began: "Diplomatic
circles at Tel Aviv report that the Israeli Armed
Forces command is elaborating jointly with the
French Army General Staff a so-called 'Plan of
Preventive Hostilities' against the UAR" and
concluded with the statement, "Meantime, Israel
is frantically seeking other alliances.... The
Americans are now helping her to an alliance
with the anti-Arab NATO member Turkey."
8. Blitz Replay Ties French/Israeli General Staff
Plan with Secret Strategic Plan - India - April
1958
On 19 April 1958 another Blitz article,
"Dulles Openly Supports Israel's War Plans",
reported that Secretary of State Dulles "has
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announced (in a closed session of the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the U. S. House of
Representatives) that the United States would
support the demands of the Ben Gurion Govern-
ment on enlarging the territory of Israel at the
cost of the Arab lands." Under the subhead
"Secret Talks with France", the article revived
the year-old rumors of secret joint planning of
the French/Israeli General Staffs for military
action, and stated that the U. S. Government had
been kept fully informed of the plan by both the
French and Israeli Governments.
9. USSR Adopts the Secret Strategic Plan - Fall of
1958
In October 1958 the forgery originally sur-
faced in Dagger of Israel was reprinted, in the
form of a ten-page excerpt, in a 147-page book
published by the State Publishing House for
Political Literature, in Moscow. The book,
entitled The State of Israel - Its Situation and
Policies, is a vicious propaganda attack, of-the
misinformation variety, upon the State of Israel
and all of its political parties except the Israeli
CP, and against "the Zionist bosses", the
"important representatives of Jewry", the
United States in particular and the West in
general. It is presented as a history of Israel
and the Zionist movement and, on internal
evidence, seems to have been designed for use
in Communist study groups since it assumes a
"Marxist-Leninist" viewpoint on the part of the
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reader. Except for this assumption, its
similarity with the less comprehensive and more
generally-targeted Dagger of Israel is great
enough to present the possibility that both manu-
scripts were prepared in the same place, if not
written by the same individual.
The Secret Strategic Plan forgery is
strikingly reminiscent of the hoary propaganda
forgery known as the Protocols of the Learned
Elders of Zion. This was a crudely forged "plan
for Jewish world conquest" prepared by the
Czarist secret police at the turn of the century
and given worldwide distribution by anti-Semitic
groups through the 1920's. The rise of Nazism
in Europe gave it a fresh lease on life in the
1930's, and it was heavily used in Nazi propa-
ganda -- including Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf --
until the end of World War II. Exposed and
thoroughly discredited by that time, little was
heard of it until September 1958, when it was
re-launched by
25X6A
R. K. Karanjia of Blitz. This 25X6A
forgery would be an awkward property for Soviet
propagandists to attempt to promote, and it may
be that the Blitz-surfaced and Soviet-replayed
Secret Strategic Plan, with its purported proof
of Zionist plans to conquer all of Israel's
neighbors, was adopted (written?) by the Soviets
in an effort to find an equally durable substitute
which would not be vulnerable to the charge of
Czarist origin. The phrase "Elders of Zion" was
reiterated in supporting propaganda for the
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Protocols, during the early years of this
century, until the phrase itself took on a connota-
tion of hidden, conspiratorial evil in the ears of
people who had never seen the forgery in which
the term originated. The course of the "Israeli
General Staff" campaign so far suggests that its
promoters may be trying to repeat this propa-
ganda coup by building the phrase "Israeli
General Staff" into an emotionally-charged term
with the same aura of hidden but familiar threat
that the term "Elders of Zion" held in the
propaganda of the preceding half century. The
reference to foreign support, in the Secret
Strategic Plan, is sufficiently ambiguous to permit
editorial comment allying the "Israeli General
Staff" with any Western or Western-allied
country in later charges of cooperation on plans
for aggression in the Middle East.
10. Press Replay - India - Fall of 1958
The November 1958 edition of the book Arab
Dawn (q. v. also in Annex 4-a, for its role
in replay of the Rockefeller Letter Campaign),
published by Blitz, in India, states that "In
Beirut, at the beginning of October, this author
was told of the latest in the series of Anglo-
American plans to 'cut Nasser down to size',
which France has since endorsed. " The
alleged plan, "scheduled to take place next spring
or earlier", provided for Western action against
Lebanon, Iraq and the Sudan. The author added,
however, that "a supplementary plan has been
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attached to the main project. The supplementary
document introduces the latest plan of the Israeli
General Staff to take over the West Bank of the
Jordan River by means of a swift blitzkrieg....
The Israeli plan, which apparently has the
approval of the CIA, the British Ambassador in
Beirut and the U. S. Ambassador in Tehran...
is built around the possibility of either the flight
or the assassination of King Hussein of Jordan in
the near future. According to CIA Chief Eveland
in Beirut, Middleton (British Ambassador) and
(Loy) Henderson (of U. S. State Department), said
to be the three co-authors of the Plan, the net
result of the show organized for the Western
imperialists by their Israeli puppets would be to
demolish...Nasser,, . by demonstrating Arab
impotence to deal effectively with the Israeli
action. "
11. Press Replay - USSR - Spring of 1959
The "Israeli General Staff" canard, now
enshrined in an official Soviet publication, will
no doubt continue in its role as a perennial in
the Bloc psychological warfare collection. Its
latest appearance, in the Soviet periodical Red
Fleet, was protested by the Turkish Foreign
Ministry in a radio broadcast from Ankara on
13 April 1959: "The Information Bureau of the
Foreign Ministry has issued the following state-
ment - The Moscow magazine Red Fleet has
published a report that the Chief of the Israeli
General Staff came to Ankara toward the end of
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last month and held secret talks (in which) the
question of Turkey's support of Israel for an
attack against the Arabs, especially against the
UAR, in the near future, was discussed. There
is no doubt that such reports, which are fre-
quently seen in Communist newspapers and aim
at harming the relations of Turkey with its
neighboring, brotherly countries, are without
any foundation whatsoever."
D. Types of Operation Used in Covert/Semi-Covert
Surfacing and Replay
The covert and semi-covert operations observed
in the 1957-59 forgery campaigns have fallen within
the following categories:
1. False Intelligence Reports
1957. Lebanon. See subparagraph C-2 above
for appearance in April 1957 of the
French/Israeli General Staff Plan as
a report cabled by a West European
diplomat in Beirut to his European
headquarters.
Italy. See subparagraph C-3 above for
April-May 1957 report on the appear-
ance of the French/Israeli General
Staff Plan as a clandestine intelligence
report in Italy.
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1959. UAR. In January 1959,
UAR military attaches
in Ankara, Stockholm and Tehran .had
recently cabled to Cairo that they "had
obtaiied documentary evidence of
State Department briefings to those
posts to the effect that current U.S.
policy is to undermine UAR/USSR
relations and when that is accomplished,
to finish off Nasser." (This is an
obvious continuation of the Rountree
Circular itself, q.v. in Annex 5.
Since the Rountree Circular, itself was
promoted by the Bloc and UAR jointly,
it is difficult to judge whether the
military attaches, if they actually
received such reports, were being
used as targets of a Bloc action or as
channels for a UAR contribution to
what may still have been a joint UAR/
Bloc operation.)
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25X1X6
2. Rumor Campaigns and "Whispers"
1957. France. See subparagraph C-1 above for
March 1957 surfacing of the French/
Israeli General Staff Plan as a rumor,
by a Soviet propaganda agent in Paris.
1958. France. See subparagraph C-6 above for
4 April 1958 report of the "whisper" by
Mikhail Rogov of the Soviet Embassy
to a Western diplomat that his Govern-
ment was "worried about increased
French/Israeli political and military
cooperation. " In the context of the
year-old French/Israeli General Staff
rumor which, as it happened, was to
be replayed overtly in India the next
day, this might serve as an illustration
of a point made a year earlier in an
article in the April 1957 issue of the
French military periodical, Revue
Militaire d'Information. The article,
"La tPersuasion& des Consciences,
Methodes de Propagande Sovietique",
stated that "The auxiliaries of Soviet
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propaganda also hold a large sector in
day to day operations. Propaganda is
not satisfied with tracts, newspapers,
brochures and radio broadcasts; it
grants a large share to human contacts
which can be classified here into two
distinct groups, those which produce
'whispering propaganda' and those
which produce 'display propaganda'.
As to the first, groups or single
individuals belonging to Embassy
circles or the TASS Agency, repeat in
brief conversations the principal
themes developed in the USSR or the
Peoples' Democracies, and assure
them a rather wide diffusion."
3. Mailing "Black"
Dropping an anonymous letter or a letter with
a fictitious return address into a mail box is, in
itself, a simple operation. The 1957-59 propa-
ganda forgery campaigns in which this device has
been used, however, have usually been anything
but simple:
1957. West Germany. The O'Shaughnessy Letter.
On 5 July 1957 a letter was mailed in
Munich, addressed to the French
Ambassador to West Germany. Having
thus been delivered to its single target--
the French Government--the letter was
never published or replayed in any way.
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The document, mailed so simply, was
a forged letter addressed to the State
Department in Washington and carrying
the typewritten tsignature' of Elim
O'Shaughnessy, Chief of the Political
Division of the American Embassy in
West Germany. It called the attention
of "the State Department" to the
activity of reactionary ultranationalist
groups in West Germany, and advised
that the U. S. Government support
these groups and use them. In the
context of the period in which it was
mailed, the forgery was obviously
expected to suggest to the French
Government that the U. S. Govern-
ment viewed with favor "West German
ultranationalist groups" like the one
that was currently receiving extensive
publicity in the French press. One of
the biggest news stories of the summer
of 1957 in France was the terrorist
murder of Mme. Tremeaud, the wife
of the Prefet de Police at Strasbourg.
Mme. Tremeaud had been killed, on
17 May 1957, by a bomb mailed to her
husband in the guise of a gift package
of cigars, and the French press over
the following weeks emphasized the
growing conviction of the investigating
authorities that there was a connection
between this covertly-mailed bomb and
a flood of particularly vicious hate
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letters mailed at the same time (and
in the same Paris post office) to various
French officials and private individuals
in Paris and in Alsace-Lorraine. The
letters carried the 'signature' of a pur-
ported West German neo-fascist group
calling itself the Kampfverband fuer
ein Unabhaengiges Deutschland and
demanding that Alsace-Lorraine be
returned to Germany. (Other letters in
the series had been sent, at various
times, to Americans stationed in
Germany -- including Elim O'Shaughnessy. )
It has since been established that the
Kampfverband is a phantom organization,
existing only as a signature placed on
letters and leaflets which are prepared
by the East German foreign intelligence
service HVA, and mailed in France and
West Germany by couriers sent from
East Germany for that purpose (see
paragraph C-2 of Section VII below).
Bloc cooperation in promotion of psy-
chological warfare campaigns was
pointed up in connection with this cam-
paign when, in May 1958, a long Radio
Moscow broadcast to France, in French,
warned its listeners against the
nefarious activities of the "West German"
Kampfverband fuer ein Unabhaengiges
Deutschland and strongly implied that
this "West German neo-fascist organi-
zation" was secretly supported by the
West German Government.
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1958. France. In February 1958 the Bruce
Letter (never surfaced overtly) was
mailed to addressees in France and
England, from France. The identity
and number of addressees are unknown,
except for the fact that they included
two very prominent London journalists.
West Germany and Austria. The Ceske
Slovo Campaign. Ceske Slovo is a bona
fide Czech emigre newspaper, pub-
lished by Czech emigres in Munich.
In June 1958 a forged newspaper pur-
porting to be the July 1958 issue of
Ceske Slovo went into circulation. The
forged edition carried anti-Western
propaganda, including the claim that
Ceske Slovo was going out of existence
because its editors were disillusioned
with the West. It was an accurate
duplicate of the format and style of the
real Ceske Slovo. The forged issues
were mailed "black" from Munich and
Vienna to some current and some
former subscribers of the real news-
paper, through use of two genuine
mailing lists. One of these was an
out-of-date list obtained several years
earlier by means unknown. The other
was up-to-date, and had been obtained
through a recent burglary of the offices
of the real Ceske Slovo. The fact that
the burglary and forgery were a Czech
intelligence operation has since been
confirmed.
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The Ceske Slovo forgery proved to
be the first in a series of forgeries
designed to harass the publishers of
Ceske Slovo and injure the morale of
its readers. It has since been followed
by:
First Supplement: In July 1958,
several forged letters (total number
unknown) purportedly written by the
editor of the real Ceske Slovo were
mailed in Munich to various organiza-
tions in West Germany and the United
States. They were designed to create
bad feeling between the Ceske Slovo
editor and the addressee organizations.
Second Supplement: In April 1959
another series of forged letters, again
ostensibly written by the editor of the
real Ceske Slovo, was sent to individual
Czech emigres and people of Czech
descent in the United States, Sweden
and Canada. The letters were individually
written and varied in detail, but most of
those whose content is known informed
the recipients that the writer was dis-
continuing his work in exile.
West Germany. In December 1958 an
estimated 4, 000 copies of the forged
Schlagzeug mailing envelope carrying
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the final replay in the Berry Letter
Campaign, q. v. in paragraph A-2 of
Section II, were mailed in West Ger-
many. The mailing list used was an
obsolete one, containing the names of
several individuals who had long since
died or moved to other areas. Investi-
gation of the history and interests of
individual addressees showed no
'common denominator' to account for
their inclusion in an East German
propaganda mailing list. So far as
known, the envelopes were not mailed
to any of the individuals who were on
the mailing list of the real Schlagzeug.
1959. Iraq. In March 1959, a high official in the
Iraqi Government was known to have
received. a photocopy of the Murphy
Letter (q.v. under Rountree Letter
Campaign, in Annex 5), which he
said "someone had mailed" to him.
Lebanon. In March 1959 the Murphy
Letter was also transmitted -- presum-
ably by direct mail -- to an unspecified
number of Beirut newspapers, and to
members of the Lebanese Parliament.
25X1X7
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4. Hand-to-Hand Distribution
1957. Egypt. In late March 1957 an official
East German representative in Cairo
mailed a letter to the East German
Trade Delegation in Damascus. The
letter contained several enclosures,
including:
(a) A report dated 25 March 1957,
signed "Aulbach", which was appar-
ently an information copy of a report
which Aulbach had just cabled to
Berlin. Aulbach reported that the
Arab League had arranged to have the
Rockefeller Letter translated into
Arabic and distributed to the Govern-
ments of the Arab League member
states, "with instructions to follow the
same procedure with the Dulles
Memorandum". (The same report
discussed an interview granted to
Aulbach by Ahmed Shoukiry, Deputy
Secretary General of the Arab
League and representative of Syrian
President Kuwatli.)
(b) A copy of a replay article on the
Dulles Memorandum, from an
unidentified English-language news-
paper in Egypt.
66
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1958. Morocco. The Hoover Letter was replayed
by the official Chinese Communist press
agency NCNA (Hsinhua News Agency or,
in English, New China News Agency),
which reprinted it in full in its Daily
Bulletin of 25 January 1958. The
Hsinhua Daily Bulletin is an overt
daily press bulletin, mimeographed in
English and issued by the Prague
offices of NCNA. Its masthead gives
the editorial address of the publication
as Korejska 5, Praha 6-Bubenec,
Czechoslovakia, and carries a list of
subscription prices. The report which
disclosed the Hoover Letter replay,
however, stated that the publication
"is delivered daily and free of charge
by persons unknown to Al Alam, princi-
pal Arabic-language organ of the
Istiglal Party, in Morocco". (No
other reports of free delivery have
been received, but in view of the
propaganda purpose of the bulletin it
is almost a foregone conclusion that the
Morocco newspaper is not the only non-
Communist recipient of such informa-
tional largesse. )
Lebanon. On 15 August 1958 (i. e., ten days
before it was surfaced in the outlawed
Beirut Al-Masaa), a bundle of mimeo-
graphed copies of the "John H" letter
was found in Ras Beirut, a section of
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Beirut in which many well-to-do
foreigners and foreign diplomats live.
Origin and intended destination are
unknown.
5. Clandestine Newspaper as Surfacing Point
1958. Lebanon. The newspaper Beirut Al-Masaa,
in which the "John H" Letter was sur-
faced on 25 August 1958, became overt
when the new Lebanese Government
came into power in the fall of 1958.
At the time of the "John H" surfacing,
however, it was outlawed and anyone
caught with it (or other banned news-
papers) in his possession was liable to
a six-month jail sentence. The paper's
political line was that of violent Arab
nationalism, but according to an
October 1958 report, "it is reputed to
have Communists among its employees
and close ties with the Cairo Al-Masaa
(a daily which was noted for its heavy
proportion of pro-Bloc propaganda
items), and it publishes much material
from TASS and other Soviet bloc news
agencies." In other words, another
newspaper to which the type description
given in paragraph B-5 of Section VI
applies: not a CP paper, but a
chronic purveyor of pro-Bloc propaganda.
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6. Covert Planting in Overt Non-CP Newspapers
See Section VI, paragraph B, for discussion
of this technique and the newspapers so used.
7. Clandestine Radio
1958. East Germany (into Turkey). The sum-
mary of 9 April 1958 which proved to be
the prelude to the Rountree Circular
was broadcast by Our Radio, also known
as Bizim Radio. This is a clandestine
station which broadcasts only in
Turkish to Turkey and claims to be an
opposition radio located somewhere
within Turkey. It is located at
Leipzig, East Germany.
Rumania (into Spain). The Power Order
(q.v. in description of the Berry Letter
Campaign, in paragraph A-2 of Section
II above), surfaced overtly in the East
German daily Neues Deutschland on
2 October 1958, was replayed into
Spain the next day by the clandestine
radio Espana Independiente, which
claims to be located in Spain but is
actually in Rumania.
8. Semi-Covert: Official Distribution by Diplomatic
Missions (UAR)
1958. West Germany, India and Czechoslovakia.
During the last week in July and the
first week in August 1958, the Rountree
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Circular (surfaced 26 July 1958 in the
Cairo daily Al Ahram) was transmitted
officially to the West German Foreign
Minister by the Egyptian Ambassador
in Bonn, and was distributed to foreign
diplomatic missions in Prague and New
Delhi by the UAR Embassies in those
capitals. (See also Overt Bloc Assets,
paragraph B of Section V, the overt
distribution of four U. S. Pilot Letters
by the Soviet Embassy in London.)
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V - ASSETS USED IN SURFACING AND REPLAY - OVERT
The overt (attributable) Bloc, assets observed in use
in surfacing and replay of the internationally distributed
forgeries in 1957-59 are:
A. Located within the Sino-Soviet Bloc
USSR. The overt role of the USSR in surfacing
propaganda forgeries has been limited to its
appearance in the Berry Letter (prelude
supplied by Nikita Khrushchev) and the four
U. S. Pilot Letters surfaced by the Soviet
Embassy in London. In overt replay, how-
ever, Soviet propaganda media have played
by far the preponderant role in distributing
the forgeries to target audiences throughout
the world. The media thus used in 1957-59
were:
Radio Moscow. Replayed nine of the ten
forgery campaigns (i. e., all except the
Ceske Slovo campaign, which was a
Czech IS operation) to audiences in the
USSR and throughout the world.
TASS. Replayed six of the ten campaigns
to its outlets throughout the world and
to the Soviet press. Volume and fre-
quency of TASS replay, however, were
far less than for Radio Moscow.
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Publications within the USSR which were
also used for replay included:
Pravda (replayed three of the ten
campaigns);
Izvestia (replayed two of the ten
campaigns);
Daily Review of the Soviet Press
(published in English, in Moscow;
replayed the "John H" Letter);
Moscow News (replayed the Summit
Directive);
Soviet Fleet (replayed the Israeli
General Staff Campaign);
Book, The State of Israel, Its Situation
and Policies, published by the
State Publishing House for Political
Literature, in Moscow, in 1958
(replayed the Israeli General Staff
Campaign).
Communist China. No forgeries surfaced in Chinese
Communist media have so far been
reported. In overt replay to audiences out-
side its own territory, the role of Chinese
Communist propaganda media has been
second only to that of Soviet, media although
the volume of replay in each instance was
much lower than that of the USSR:
NCNA (Hsinhua Agency, or, in English,
New China News Agency) was used for
replay in eight of the total of ten forgery
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campaigns: distributed the Allison
Cables and the Rountree Campaign to
Europe, the "John H" Letter to North
Korea, and the Rockefeller Letter,
Berry Letter, Hoover Letter, Frost
Letter and Summit Directive campaigns
to audiences within Communist China.
Radio Peking replayed the Rockefeller
Letter campaign to Asian as well as
Chinese audiences, while the only
replay given to the Rankin Cables after
their surfacing in India was their
broadcast to Taiwan, in Mandarin, by
Radio Peking. (The Rankin Cables, a
part of the Taipeh Cables campaign,
concerned alleged U. S. plans to
assassinate Chiang Kai-shek.)
East Germany. Overt German media have surfaced
six of the total of thirty-six forgeries, but
their role in replay has been that of replay
to East and West German audiences only,
through the following media:
Deutschlandsender (official East German
radio) replayed four of the ten cam-
paigns.
ADN (official East German press agency)
replayed four of the ten campaigns.
Neues Deutschland (official Communist
Party- -SED- -daily newspaper) replayed
three of the ten campaigns.
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CTK (official press agency) picked up the
single forgery, the Sudan Government
Documents, from "the Cairo press" in
1959 for replay to its press outlets and,
in 1958, replayed to Europe, in English,
the Summit Directive which had just
been surfaced by Rude Pravo.
Rude Pravo (official CP daily, in Prague)
replayed two of the ten campaigns.
Rumania. Radio Bucharest replayed one campaign to
Europe and another to local audiences
only.
Agerpress (official news agency) replayed
one of the ten campaigns.
Sci nteia (official CP daily,, in Bucharest)
replayed two of the ten campaigns.
Hun gar . MTI (official press agency, in Budapest) in
1959 surfaced the Welensky Document,
which is the first of the forgeries that
has concerned Africa below the Sahara.
This is the only instance in which
Hungarian media have come to our
attention in either surfacing or replay
of internationally-distributed forgeries.
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Other Bloc Countries. No other members of the
Sino-Soviet bloc have so far been
reported as aiding in the distribution of
the forgeries.
B. Assets Located in Countries of the Free World
Official Bloc Installations. The only overt
(attributable) use of Bloc diplomatic or
other official assets in the distribution of
propaganda forgeries in the period 1957-
59 was during the summer of 1958, when
the Soviet Embassy in London officially
released to the British Foreign Office and
the press the series of four U. S. Pilot
Letters which were one phase of the Berry
Letter Campaign.
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VI - ASSETS USED IN SURFACING AND REPLAY -
COVERT AND SEMI-COVERT
The listing below refers to covert use of assets which
may in themselves be either overt or covert.
A. Assets Located Within the Sino-Soviet Bloc (Covert)
Rumania. Clandestine Radio, Espana Independiente.
See paragraph D-7, Section IV above, for use of
this radio in replaying the Power Order into
Spain. (Espana Independiente is the oldest of the
Bloc clandestine radios. It began broadcasting
in 1941 or earlier from somewhere within the
USSR. In January 1955 it ceased operation
briefly, then resumed broadcasting from the
Bucharest area, in Rumania. It is controlled
by the Spanish Communist Party in Exile, for
which it acts as spokesman, and broadcasts only
in Spanish, to Spain. )
East Germany. Clandestine Radio, Our Radio aka
Bizim Radio. See paragraph D-7, Section IV
above, for use of this radio in broadcasting the
prelude to the Rountree Circular into Turkey on
9 April 1958. Our Radio has been broadcasting
since 2 May 1958, through a transmitter located
at Leipzig, East Germany. It claims to be
located in Turkey, and broadcasts only in Turkish,
to Turkey. Unlike Espana Independiente, but like
the rest of the clandestine Bloc radios in current
use, Our Radio does not broadcast ideological
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Communist propaganda. In a broadcast on
7 August 1959 the station summed up its own propa-
ganda approach as follows: "Our Radio does not
belong to international Communism. It is the
voice of our people. Our Radio makes no
distinction between Communists, democrats,
republicans, or between workers, peasants and
intelligentsia.... It is the source of faith of all
those who have united together to throw the Ame r-
icans out of our country and to create an independ-
ent, peace-loving and democratic Turkey.... It
is our freedom in action -- our freedom which
sooner or later will triumph over the Inonus,
Mendereses and the democratic sultans."
B. Assets Located in Countries of the Free World
Subparagraph D, of Section IV above, lists the known
instances of covert and semi-covert distribution of propa-
ganda forgeries through Bloc assets located in countries
of the Free World. In only eight of these operations has
there been any identification of the assets so used. These
seven, however, have provided enough detail to shed some
light on Bloc methods of operating in the psychological
warfare field, and enough to establish the fact that identi-
fication of the individuals concerned in local handling of
propaganda forgeries is in itself an important step toward
identification of Bloc intelligence service clandestine assets
in the locality concerned. The assets known to have been used
in the covert and semi-covert phases of surfacing and replay
outside the Bloc in the period 1957-59 are:
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25X1X6
25X1X6
25X1X6
R e zidentura.
Soviet Embassy, Rangoon, Burma. KGB
Vladimir Us and
Boris Anatolievich Galashin of KGB, M
in the political intelligence
offices of the KGB rezidentura in Rangoon.
Soviet officials in Rangoon as mem-
bers of the "political
intelligence section", i.e., as working under
the direction of Ivan Mikhailovich Vozniy on
collection of political intelligence and on
covert political action and psychological war-
fare operations. The full list is outside the
scope of this paper, but the following partial
list gives an idea of the range of cover
designations used by KGB political intelli-
gence officers.
Ivan Mikhailovich Vozniy. Overt title: First
Secretary, Soviet Embassy. -
probably
chief of the Burmese rezidentura of KGB.
Boris Anatolievich Galashin. Overt title:
Attache, Soviet Embassy.
Ivan Nikolayevich Rogachev. Overt title:
Member of the Soviet Commercial repre-
sentation as representative of Sovek-
sportfilm, Soviet Embassy.
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25X1X6
25X1X6
25X1X6
25X1X6
25X1X6
25X1X6
25X1X6
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SECRET
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
Igor Rostislavovich Trushkovsky. Overt
title: Second Secretary in charge of
cultural affairs (i. e., VOIDS representa-
tive). Actually,
Trushkovsky was Vozniy's
second in command in the, "political
intelligence" section or, more
accurately, in the KGB rezidentura.
The psychological warfare operations of
the rezidentura included subsidies to several
Burmese newspapers for publication of
unattributable anti-American and anti-
Western propaganda, which the newspaper
concerned usually identified as "From Our
Correspondent in " another country
(Japan, Indonesia, etc.).
M the rezidentura had "direct control" of
the People's Journal, "lesser though close
control" of The Mirror and Botataung, and,
"in addition, often used Pyidaungsu, the
New Light of Burma and1he Burman."
(All of these newspapers were closed by the
Burmese Government during the spring of
1959.) The anti-American articles were
written in Moscow and sent as photocopies,
in Russian, to the rezidentura in Rangoon.
25X1 C5b
25X1 C5b
25X1X6
25X1X6
25X1X6
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Soviet Embassy, Paris. See paragraph C-6 of
Section IV, above, for the role of Mikhail
Stepanovich Rogov, Counselor of Embassy,
in promoting what seems to have been a part
of an international rumor /whispering chapter
in the Israeli General Staff propaganda forgery
campaign. (Rogov is known to be a highly
placed member of the KGB
25X1X6
25X1X6
25X1X6
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Soviet Propaganda Agent, Paris.
Soviet Embassy, Beirut. See paragraph D-1 of
Section IV above for a report (reliability
uncertain) that the copy of the forged Murphy
Letter which was channeled covertly into the
Jordanian Government had as its local poi nt
of origin an Armenian employee in the Press
Section of the Soviet Embassy in Beirut.
2. East German Assets
East German Trade Delegations, Cairo and
Damascus. See paragraph D-4 of Section IV
above for report on the role of the unidentified
fnu Aulbach, presumably of the East German
Trade Delegation in Cairo, in covert replay of
the Rockefeller Letter Campaign to the Arab
League member governments.
25X1X6
25X1X6
25X1X6
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East German IS Couriers Travelling in West
Germany. See paragraph D-3 of Section IV
above and paragraph C-1 of Section VII
below for evidence that the O'Shaughnessy
Letter was probably mailed "black" by an
HVA courier sent into West Germany for that
purpose.
3. Czechoslovakian Assets. See paragraph D-3 of
Section IV above for the role of Czech
intelligence in West Germany and Austria in
running the Ceske Slovo Campaign.
4. Chinese Communist Assets. See paragraph D-4
of Section IV above on anonymous distribution
of the overt NCNA daily press bulletin (in this
instance, containing replay of the Hoover
Letter) to the non-Communist press in
Morocco.
5. Non-CP Press Assets Used in Covert (Unattribut-
able)Surfacing and Replay of Bloc Propaganda
Forgeries.
Bloc forgery campaigns have frequently been
picked up for comment by the Western press
services, but always with some sort of warn-
ing that the material is probably false, and
always with the inclusion of any official denials
the victims may have issued. Comment of
this type is not considered as "replay", since
it does not present the forgery as a document
of unquestioned authenticity. It has occasionally
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happened, before the period of this study,
that a forgery has been planted' by a Bloc prop-
aganda agent in a newspaper which had no CP
or Bloc connections. Only one, instance of this
is known to have occurred in the period of this
discussion: the Damascus newspaper Al Qabas
replayed the Rockefeller Letter in March 1957.
Al Qabas was later infiltrated by a local pro-
Communist writerst group and began running
a high proportion of pro-Bloc material, but
this was not its usual practice in March 1957.
All other known instances of surfacing and
replay of Bloc forgeries during 1957-59 con-
cerned local newspapers to which a "type"
description can be given: newspapers of rela-
tively small circulation, having no official
connection with the local CP buit noted in every
case for their consistent role as vehicles for
Bloc propaganda, particularly of the "misinfor-
mation" variety (i. e., plot and atrocity charges
against the West, etc. ). There is not sufficient
information available on the operational rela-
tionships of these newspapers with the various
Bloc diplomatic missions to warrant placing
any one of them exclusively as, an asset of a
single Bloc mission. The listof non-CP news-
papers known for their role in distribution of
propaganda forgeries during the period of this
study, however, includes:
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Blitz, a weekly newspaper published in
Bombay, surfaced the entire Taipeh
Cables series in September and
October 1957, the Bishop Directive on
12 July 1957, the Kishi-Dulles Pact
on 12 October 1957 and the Chiang Kai-
shek/Eisenhower Letter on 13 Decem-
ber 1957. It replayed the Rockefeller
Letter on 23 March 1957, the Dulles
Memorandum on 13 April 1957, the
Rountree Circular on 2 August 1958,
the Berry Letter on 30 August 1958,
the Power Order on 29 November 1958
and the Israeli General Staff Campaign
on several occasions in 1957 and 1958.
The same newspaper published the
prelude to the Frost Letter Campaign
on 22 March 1958, and in the course of
1958 published two books (Arab Dawn
and Dagger of Israel) which were also
surfacing and replay media for forgeries.
Blitz is directed by an Indian
national named R. K. Karanjia. In
1947 Karanjia stated that he had once
been a CP member but had left the
Party. He has since denied ever having
been a member. He has consistently
used Blitz, however, as a vehicle for
pro-Soviet (and pro-Nasser) propaganda.
Blitz regarded the local Communist
Party and its affairs with a faintly
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jaundiced editorial eye until about
mid-1957, when it began to move in the
direction of approval of Indian Party
actions. It still criticizes the Party
from time to time, but was a consis-
tent and violent propagandist on behalf
of the Communist government of
Kerala. In the summer of 1958,
Karanjia made his first step toward
official identification with Communist-
sponsored organizations as such when
he attended the meeting' of the World
Peace Council in Stockholm and was
elected to membership in the Council.
On the return journey to India, he
stopped in London, Paris and Cairo.
Karanjia and his paper still have no
official connection with the Indian
Communist Party, but the role of both
as propagandists for the countries of
the Sino-Soviet bloc is frank and violent.
The role of the paper and its director
in propagandizing on behalf of President
Nasser has been equally frank for the
past four or five years, and the coup
d'etat in Iraq on 14 July 1958 added the
new Iraqi government (temporarily at
least) to the list of Blitz propaganda
beneficiaries. The UAR/Iraq quarrel
of late 1958 and early 059 and the
propaganda clash, during the same
period, between UAR and USSR, put
Karanjia and his paper in an awkward
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position. During the first half of 1959
he travelled to Cairo, Baghdad and
Moscow and interviewed Nasser,
Kassim and Khrushchev in a well-
publicized effort to end the two sets of
propaganda quarrels. During the same
period Blitz also dropped its role as
surfacing and replay vehicle for
propaganda forgeries, although its anti-
Western, pro-Bloc propaganda line did
not change.
In addition to a small staff of
correspondents in various parts of
India, Blitz maintains a London cor-
respondent, Paula Wiking. The paper
claims a circulation of 80, 000.
The Delhi Times. Replayed the Berry
Letter in June 1958. This newspaper,
described in a recent report as "a
second-rate imitation of Blitz", is a
weekly, published in New Delhi. The
paper is not connected with the Indian
Communist Party, but is a chronic
purveyor of Bloc propaganda, including
perennial "plot charges" against the
West. According to a 1958 report
the paper has a press
run of 3, 000 to 5, 000 copies and
regular buyers include:
Soviet Embassy, New Delhi..600 copies
Chinese Communist
Embassy, New Delhi ...... 150 copies
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UAR Embassy, New Delhi.. 100 copies
Other Embassies (mostly
East European & Asian).. 600 copies
Total Embassy
Circulation............ 1450 copies
News Agency circulation figures
for the paper in India total 1300 copies
(300 to North India, 500 to Kerala and
Andhra, 300 to West Bengal and 200
to Kashmir).
A report of July
1959 described a recent briefing of
East German journalists on the prob-
lems confronting East German
propaganda in India. The East German
official who gave the briefing men-
tioned his own efforts to place articles
on East Germany in the Indian press,
remarking that certain newspapers had
expressed interest in receiving such
material, but that "The Delhi Times,
on the other hand, will only accept East
German articles in return for
compensation. "
Berita Minggu, weekly published in
Djakarta, ran an article on 6 April
1958 "confirming" the authenticity of
T
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the Allison Cables (which had "proved"
U. S. efforts to overthrow Sukarno) as
surfaced in Blitz several months
earlier in the Taipeh Cables series,
Until 1956, Berita Minggu was a
spokesman for the Parti Nasjional
Indonesia, a nationalist party,
described as "secular, rather middle
of the road but a little closer to the
Right than to the Far Left." In 1956,
however, the paper was sold to an
individual who reportedly fronts for
the Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI), and it has since followed the
Communist propaganda line.
Bintang Timur, published in Djakarta,
replayed the Frost Letter Campaign
on 20 June 1958, The paper is a
chronic vehicle for Bloc 'plot charges'
and other anti-Western propaganda.
It has been variously reported as cta
small far-left but not officially
Communist Indonesian-language news-
paper", a "Chinese-owned pro-
Communist newspaper", and "a paper
subsidized by the Indonesian CPI'.
The Mirror (Kyemon), Burmese-language
daily published in Rangoon. The
Mirror surfaced the two propaganda
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forgeries (the Sjamsuddin Letter on
15 May 1958 and the Frost Letter on
8 June 1958) which made up the Frost
Letter Campaign and for which the
prelude had been supplied on 22 March
1958 by Blitz, in India. The Mirror
has no official connection with the
Burmese Communist Party but has
been a vehicle for pro-Bloc propaganda
since its establishment in March 1947.
See paragraph B-1 above concerning
the Soviet relationship with The Mirror
and Soviet origin of the Frost Letter.
Late in 1958 U Thaung, editor of
The Mirror, became acquainted with
a Western diplomat stationed in
Rangoon, and apparently began for the
first time to gain some understanding
of the Western viewpoint on various
controversial issues. On one occasion
the Western diplomat showed U Thaung
a Chinese Communist geography text
carrying Chinese Communist territorial
claims in Burma. U Thaung was so
incensed by these claims that he
published a front-page denunciation of
Communist China. He also began at
about that time to run an occasional
Western press handout. In April 1959,
The Mirror was closed by the Burmese
Government because of an article which
the Government regarded as distorting
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statements made by General Ne Win.
U Thaung, in panic because he had
heard he was about to be arrested,
appealed to his Western diplomat
acquaintance for asylum. The appeal
was unsuccessful, U Thaung was not
arrested, and The Mirror is still
closed as of the date of this study.
Thailand
La Patrie. Weekly published in Bangkok.
A late 1957 issue (date not given in
report) carried as its cover illustra-
tion a photographic reproduction of
the State Department Cable which had
originally been surfaced in Blitz as
part of the Taipeh Cables Campaign.
Described as a "very leftist, pro-
Communist, violently anti-U. S.
publication", La Patrie from time to
time publishes editorials, anti-
Western plot charges, etc., which are
played to Southeast Asian audiences
via Radio Hanoi (Communist North
Vietnam). There is no Communist
Party connection so far as known.
Svobodne Ceskoslovensko. Pro-regime
Czech-language monthly which has been
published in Chicago, Illinois, for about
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L
ten years. Its circulation is approxi-
mately 1200 copies. The paper and its
publishers are not connected with the
Communist Party but consistently
follow the propaganda line of the Czech
Communist regime. The publisher is
the Czech American National Alliance
In Chicago. In August 1958, the paper
replayed, as authentic, material from
the forged issue of Ceske Slovo.
(Comment: See paragraphs C-1 and
D-5 of Section IV for mention of the
newspapers La Tribune des Nations and
Beirut Al-Masaa, respectively. Neither
paper belongs in the above list--
La Tribune des Nations because it is
not known to have surfaced or replayed
any of the propaganda forgeries of
1957-59, and Beirut Al-Masaa because
at the time it surfaced one of the
forgeries it was not an overt publica-
tion--but the type description given at
the beginning of the "Non-CP Press"
Section applies to both. )
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VII - NOTES ON CENTRAL PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION
OF FORGERY CAMPAIGNS
A. Possible Soviet Origin of Internationally-Distributed
Forgeries
The elaborate orchestration of overt, covert and
official Bloc assets, particularly those of the USSR,
East Germany and China, through which each of the
internationally-distributed propaganda forgeries of
1957-59 has been delivered to its target audience,
would have been impossible without central planning
of some sort. There have been occasional fragmentary,
unconfirmed reports which suggest that the forgeries
for international distribution may all be written in
the USSR, but no definite statements can be made on
this point without more reliable, detailed information.
One such report was a statement made in June
1958 that the
forgeries surfaced in Neues Deutschland had been
"planted on the East Germans by the Soviets". The
writer of the report commented, "The Soviets may
not want to lower the prestige of Pravda or Izvestia
but are naturally unconcerned about Neues Deutschland,
although from the East German standpoint it is the
most important East German paper. " The fact that
most of the overt surfacing of forgeries has been
handled through satellite-country media and most of
the overt replay through Soviet media lends weight to
this comment.
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B. The Soviet Center
1 reports
up to early
1952 have mentioned specific "misinformation"
units within the Comintern, GRU, MVD and KI.
experience in Soviet intelligence
services beyond the dissolution of the
KI in 1951 and 1954, however, have
stated that the RIS in 1951-54 did
not distinguish organizationally between
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misinformation and other political /psychological
warfare operations or between this field of opera-
tion and intelligence collecting.
2. A _ (Soviet Military official
made the following
statement in mid-1958 concerning organizational
responsibility in the USSR for the conduct of black
propaganda and psychological warfare operations
outside the Communist bloc. This comment is the
projection of the situation as he
knew it into terms of present conditions within the
USSR:
"The Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU) directed and still directs political, black-
propaganda and psychological warfare operations
through various channels. These channels,
depending on time and place, would be
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ambassadors
and other top-echelon Soviet diplomats,
and the press department of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs);
TASS;
the Soviet press;
the political departments of the Soviet
armed forces and KGB;
operational units of GRU and KGB;
individual Soviet writers and propagandists;
the Soviet General Staff.
"It must be assumed that the direction of this
activity is well planned and organized by the CPSU
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itself. However, it would be wrong to assume
that the Department of Propaganda and Agitation
(Agitprop) of the Central Committee of the CPSU
is charged with this function. It would be more
correct to assume that one of the close lieutenants
of the CPSU's boss (Nikita Khrushchev at present,
for example) who is at the same time a member
of the Presidium (formerly the Politburo) is
charged with this function. This individual would
then be responsible to Khrushchev (in present-day
terms) and direct the whole job. This individual
would coordinate the political, black propaganda
and psychological warfare operations among the
various channels mentioned above."
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3. 25X1 C5b
"Official Soviet propaganda
originates within the Central Committee, probably
in the Foreign Directorate, and is distributed
abroad through VOKS, the Soviet Information
Bureau and TASS. "
"Special
or unusual propaganda and psychological warfare
assignments which cannot be handled through the
above channels are sometimes given to the MVD.
In all cases the Central Committee is the originator
and/or the final arbiter of propaganda and
psychological warfare material.... The Soviet
intelligence services often support or subsidize
96
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anti-American publications. Assignment of such
tasks as support of anti-American publications
comes to the Soviet intelligence service from
within the Central Committee, CPSU. "
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On the basis of the 1957-59 reports
the operational responsibility for covert
psychological warfare operations, including propa-
ganda forgeries, is divided as follows:
1. Political targets in West Germany and France are
reached through covert operations run by the East
German equivalent of the Soviet KGB. This is
HVA (Haupverwaltung Aufklaerung), which is the
foreign intelligence branch of the Ministry of
State Security (MfS) and is also a unit in the
structure of the Communist Party of East Germany
(SED). The organization works with a Soviet
adviser. While HVA conducted psychological
warfare operations prior to 1957, it was only in
January of that year that psychological warfare
was officially announced within HVA as a major
operational responsibility of that organization,
and HVA began exerting pressure on its personnel
to increase the number of such operations and to
keep their volume high. One unit within HVA is
responsible for control and coordination of
psychological warfare operations, and for
evaluation and dissemination of overt and covert
information and information requirements. The
objectives of HVA psychological warfare opera-
tions are:
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(a) to create antagonism among the Western
Allies;
(b) to mislead and frighten the populations
of the target areas;
(c) to channel misinformation into the hands
of Western intelligence organizations.
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VIII - ROLE OF UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
(UAR) MEDIA IN DISTRIBUTION OF
BLOC FORGERIES
During 1958, the disturbances in the Middle East and
the coincidence of the UAR and Bloc anti-Western propaganda
policies brought the UAR into close cooperation in surfacing
and replay of the Bloc propaganda forgeries which were
targeted at Middle Eastern audiences. (It should perhaps
be noted that during 1958 several other forgeries in the
anti-Western and anti-Israel campaign were surfaced and
replayed through UAR media only and are therefore not
included in this discussion.) The role of UAR media in
distribution of the 1958 Bloc forgeries included:
Press. The Cairo daily Al Ahram surfaced the Rountree
Circular on 26 July 1958, and the Cairo press
agency MENA picked it up the same day for replay
to the UAR and the Middle East. The next day the
rest of the Cairo press replayed the story. The
Sudan Government Documents forgery
(allegation form) was replayed by the Czech press agency
CTK on 4 December 1958 in a story crediting
the Cairo press" with original publication.
Radio. Radio Cairo replayed the Rountree Circular at the
time of surfacing, and on 6 December 1958
revived the story for further replay on the occasion
of Mr. Rountree's visit to the Middle East.
Official UAR Missions Abroad. In late July and early August
1958, the UAR Embassies in West Germany, India
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and Czechoslovakia distributed the Rountree
Circular, as an authentic document, to other
diplomatic missions in those countries. In Bonn,
the Egyptian Ambassador personally transmitted
the document to the West German Foreign Minister.
Except for Radio Cairo, the only non-Bloc distribution
of propaganda forgeries of known or apparent Bloc connection
was the surfacing (allegation form only) of the U. S. Para-
troopers' Cable in a news broadcast on Radio Baghdad
on 11 August 1958, i. e., about three weeks after the Iraq coup
d' a tat.
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IX - ROLE OF THE CP PRESS IN FORGERY
DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE THE BLOC
Investigation of non-Bloc press handling of internationally
distributed Bloc propaganda forgeries has so far extended
only to checking on the appearance of the Berry Letter
and its U.S. Pilot Letters follow-up in the London
Daily Worker and the French CP daily 1'Humanite. Both
papers limited their coverage to publication of the non-
Communist press agency releases, complete with the warning
adjective used in the original releases. Neither made any
effort to elaborate upon the press-agency releases or to sell
the propaganda theme to their own audiences as authentic.
The only instance in which an internationally distributed
propaganda forgery has been reported as receiving propaganda
play in CP newspapers outside the Bloc has been in the forgery
of the Czech emigre newspaper Ceske Slovo. In the promotion
of this campaign articles from the forged issue were quoted
as authentic in two Communist Party newspapers in Graz, Austria
(Neue Zeit and Wahrheit) and in the CP newspapers Volkstimme
of Vienna and Zeitung of Luxembourg, as well as in the
non-Communist Party but pro-regime Chicago paper
Svobodne Ceskoslovensko and the Prague Communist Party
daily Rude Pravo. In this connection, it may possibly be
more than coincidence that the Ceske Slovo Campaign was
the only one of the ten forgery campaigns of 1957-1959 which
received no replay by Radio Moscow or in any other Soviet
media.
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X - EFFECTIVENESS OF FORGERY CAMPAIGNS
The effectiveness of a given forgery depends largely upon
the area at which it is targeted. In politically sophisticated
areas such as Western Europe the forged "secret document"
has been so heavily used by generations of secret police and
political extremists (e. g., the faux Henry of the Dreyfus case
in France, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion of Czarist
Russia, the products of the Hitler propaganda machine in
Germany, etc.) that any "disclosure of secret documents,"
true or false, is apt to be greeted with public scepticism.
Thus, public acceptance of the forgeries launched in obvious
propaganda instruments much as the East German Neues
Deutschland is so slight that Western installations in West
Germany have decided in several cases that counteraction
would be superfluous. (As noted elsewhere in this study,
the forgery technique has been used on a saturation scale by the East
German intelligence units operating against West Germany
and, to a lesser extent, against France. This particular use
must be regarded as a harassment device rather than as a
propaganda instrument per se, since the number of forgeries,
the regularity with which their falsity has been exposed, and
the fact that many of them are self-exposing --
e.g. , letters inducing their recipients to travel to non-
existent meetings, parties, etc. -- makes clear their objective
as nuisance rather than as propaganda. )
In the underdeveloped areas, however, the level of
political sophistication is low and the forgeries undoubtedly
find some acceptance as "confirmation" of the propaganda
charges which are constantly on the Bloc (and in some cases
UAR) airwaves. That the individuals who plan and direct the
forgery operations agree with this thesis is suggested by the
persistence with whichthe forgeries are replayed into the
underdeveloped areas of the world.
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Another type of forgery whose possible impact is particularly
dangerous is the "secret document" which is never published
or replayed but is transmitted -- officially or by planting
in covert intelligence channels -- to a Western or pro-Western
government in an effort to incite mutual suspicion among the
Western Powers and their pro-Western Allies. Forgeries
handled in this way have posed at times a threat of genuine
damage to the relationships of the governments thus victimized.
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UI
ANNEX 1
INDIVIDUAL FORGERIES SURFACED
1 JANUARY 1957 TO JULY 1959
S~iF
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MULTIPLE FORGERY PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGNS
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MULTIPLE
PROPAGANDA FO
1 January 19"5'k
(Listed in Chronological
CAMPAIGN
PRIMARY
DISTRIBUTION
TARGET
METHODS USED
AREA
Surfaced 1957
ROCKEFELLER LETTER
World
Overt and Covert
(2 - Rockefeller Letter
Dulles Memo)
ISRAELI GENERAL STAFF
Mid-East
Overt and Covert
(2 - French/ Israel Plan
Secret Strategic Plan)
TAIPEH CABLES
Asia
Unattributable
(5 - 2 RANKIN
surfacing and overt
2 ALLISON
replay
1 State Department)
BERRY LETTER
Europe
Overt, Covert
(7 - Berry Letter
and Diplomatic
4 U. S. Pilot Letters
Powers Order
Schlagzeug Envelope)
Surfaced 1958
HOOVER LETTER
Europe
Overt and Covert I
(2 - Hoover Letter
Bruce Letter)
FROST LETTER
Asia
Unattributable
(2 - Sjamsuddin Letter
surfacing and
Frost Letter)
overt replay
ROUNTREE CIRCULAR
Mid-East
Overt, Covert
(3 - Rountree Circular
and Diplomatic
State Dept. Directive
on UAR
Murphy Letter)
SUMMIT CONFERENCE
World
Overt
(2 - Erhard Letter
State Dept Directive)
CESKE SLOVO
Czech nationals
Overt and Covert
V
(3 - Ceske Slovo
and emigres
2 letter series)
U. S. SOLDIERS
Mid-East
Overt and Covert
I
IN LEBANON
(2 - U. S. Paratrooper
"John H" Letter)
SINGLE FOI
Surfaced 1957
O'SHAUGHNESSY LETTER
(part of an East German
IS operation)
BISHOP DIRECTIVE
KISHI/DULLES PACT
French
Government
Unattributable
surfacing
Unattributable
surfacing
Surfaced 1958
SUDAN GOVERNMENT
DOCUMENTS
CHIANG KAI SHEK
LETTER
Surfaced 1959
WELENSKY DOCUMENT
Unattributable
surfacing (? )
Unattributable
surfacing
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FORGERY
RGERY CAMPAIGN
o rJuly 1959
Order of First Appearance)
ANNEX 2
SURFACING
LOCATION OF REPLAY CHANNELS
DURATION OF
AREA.
CAMPAIGN (DATE
OF 1st MENTION
TO LATEST KNOWN
REPLAY)
East Germany
Mid-East: India, Syria, Egypt
21 months
Bloc: USSR, East Germany,
(15 Feb 1957 to
Czechoslovakia, Rumania
4 Nov 1958)
China
France and
Mid-East: Lebanon, UAR, India
Z years
India
Europe: France and Italy
(Mar 1957 to Apr 1959)
Bloc: USSR
India
Asia: Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan
7 months
USSR, China
(14 Sep 1957 to
6 Apr 1958)
East Germany
Mid-East: India
13 months
West Germany
Bloc: USSR, East Germany,
(22 Nov 1957 to
England
Rumania, China
Dec 1958)
East Germany
Bloc: USSR, East Germany,
1 month
rance
China
(22 Jan 1958 to
late Feb 1958)
Burma
Asia: Indonesia
3 months
Mid-East: India
(22 Mar 1958 to
Bloc: USSR, China
1 July 1958)
JAR
Mid-East: India, UAR, Lebanon,
1 year
,ebanon
Iraq, Jordan and allegedly,
(9 Apr 1958 to
Turkey and Iran
mid-Mar 1959)
Europe: West Germany and
allegedly Sweden
Bloc: USSR, East Germany,
Czechoslovakia and China
Czechoslovakia
Bloc: USSR, East Germany,
1 1/2 months
East Germany
Czechoslovakia, Rumania,
(22 May to 7 July 1958)
China
Vest Germany
Europe: Luxembourg, Austria
10 months
Lustria
WH: United States
(15 June 1958 to
Bloc: Czechoslovakia
April 1959)
raq
Bloc: USSR, China
2 weeks
jebanon
(11-28 Aug 1958)
Test Germany
idia (Blitz )
ndia (Blitz)
Egypt (press)
India (Blitz)
lungary
Bloc: Czechoslovakia
5 July 1957
13 July 1957
12 October 1957
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TELEGRAM AMERICAN EMBASSY, BArONDAD
CONFIDENTIAL
SE'URITT INPORMATION
#ASHIsGTON
TI.Ottd 4AGH Or CIRCULAR 11 April 17, 5 30 1*
Me circular letter is being sent by the Stag Doparta4at
to 49XI II.S. diplomatic representatives in the *1442s.3ast
Oft $bP tltib;*ot..of the United States' policy in rs and to
the tllttted Arab *spublie.
'fit $1;1-1e Department reaffirss that the basic ob3sottves
et the U.S. oolicf in.relation to the U.A.R. rose
uidohataled. it stresses anew that expansion of.
oE~yyes
s ere'of influence 1s caMntsr to the Joint, Rss,1w nVit
T the Congress on the Middle Ealt, strengthens Arab
nbti.onalisn, encourages anti-11*stern and particuWly
aAIJ.I or%dOsn tendencies in the Riddle East and Africa,
updermins the Baghdad pant, an important link in the
strategic n&tvork at the fret world, anti impairs the
poeitdora; of Saael %bw tnterests of 'which the.U:3. can
in ho rsy i grw".
2. The :act trot actual control over the tJanlrportutio:i
of 11ddle Fast oil to -Bkxops both throush the Sues Canal
concerTmted in Cairo seriously endangers Aberiean
,ta-LLthie area. The U.A.,i is now In a poillAon
exert pressure upon the U.S. and other.Nest*rn powers.
this possibility can become a formidable weapon in the
Winds Qt ;W 4ebt e1~~ if he happetpt to full Wo, pn
`he SOW00% bid in Us ft-ture.
# r p or e,Jeasej 199M BRA +.,044-14DR -02
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CONFIDENTIAL
SSCCRITY Ir!PoR ATION
- 2 - DEPT, Circular 11 April 17, 5 30 PM CUNTRO. 2271
4. Under present circumstances continuation of the former
course towards the U.A.R. can only embitter the Arabs Una
throw them into the arms of the Soviets. This necessitate,
certain changes in the methods of pursuing our policy.
The question is of some "liberalisation" of our reiatioa
with the U.A.R. No fundamental reappraisal of our policy
is implied, of course; it is a temporary, tactical
deviation prompted by neoeeeity. Accordingly, release
of Egyptian funds blocked in the U.S., a slackening of
ttk restrictions on trade xith the U.A.R., and other
ures are oeing contemplated at the present time.
States has reconciled itself to his rule and is now
willing to accept his terms, the inevitable result will be
a cooling off of the U.A.R.'s relationa'with the Communist
bloc. That such a development is possible is evident
from the many statements made in Egypt (even by Nasser
himself) to the effect that the close contacts between
Egypt and Russia have their roots in the refusal of the
(rest to co-operate with Egypt on Egyptian terms. An
improvement in the relations between the United States
and the U.A.R. is bound to cause suspicion in the 1!remlin
and can, in the long run, weaken or even completely -
disrupt the U-A.R.-Soviet relations.
6. It is imperative tnat the efforts to discredit the idea
of the Syrian-Egrptian union :tith a view to driving a wedge
between the twc countries snould continue unabated, for
reparation of :Syria frc^ ^gypt remains our chief ob;,ective
in the area. Poth the internal forces which share the
yell tern ideals and the external fortes which can, at an
opportune moment, interfere into any possible events in
1 the U.A.R. must be untiriarly consolidated. It styould be
remembered that disintegration of the LT..k.R. Will not only
real the fate of 11aF!ser's c:gypt tut ,will also make it
easier to fight back Arab nationalism, whatever shape or
form it may take in the riddle cast.
7. Our efforts will obvious y be more successful if
the U.A.R. ie Isolated frLm the rest of the Arab world.
In view of this the tar of the U.S. diplomatic ara
propaganda services in the Arab countries is to spread
the general t.elief that the U. .:i. constitutes a direct
threat to the present Arab regimes. In the monarchies
it must be fnreetully explained that the strengthening
of the U.A.R. male result in a downfall of the reigning
dynan.tlesi in the republics, the fear to be swallowed u;j
~y the Cairo junta must be stressed by all means. Finally.
utmost advantage must be taken of every opportunity to art
the Iraqi-iordanian federation, that will have continucus
U.G. support, ens niayria t1a union.
8. The present circular provides general orientation
for the U.L7. diplomatic repreeentativee in the Middle Bast.
Pore detailed instructions will be forwarded separately
to respective reoresentatives.
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R000300130001-0
Approved For R 8000300130001-0
 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
apEc w d For Release I 999/08/24L WBpp78-02646R0003Q,Q?IJ )Qpq-Tl,4Q,, l9i.7
CRISIS OF AMERICAN
COLONIALISM u. S. Ambassador ordered
To Screen Loyalties Of
Taipeh Fires Spread far ~ Thai King & Government
? From BLITZ's Special Correspondent
NEW YORK :
Recent developments in Formosa canrh the U. S hate
e
spa men y surprise. American officials are ri rb d d to
p1' u e in regar o
the international consequences of the anti-American
uprising and its
influ-
ence on other countries of Asia, whit h may demand
that U.N. should investi-
gate
gate the American Military Command's actions in
Teipeh and the violation
of sovereignty by American troops of such countries
as Japan. South Viet.
Nam, South Korea, Thailand and in South-East Asia.
solo. 'I't, ?nnR M u1,m
According to fresh information available from
',r11i
Im
sources close to UN, Mr. Hammw'skjoeld, Secretary-
,, ? ,. i11 ~1 ,g n
A n.? ii, It an o~ I.,v
Genera) of the IUN, took an evasive position on this ques-
tinn and did not go into the possibitities of a rlisrussion
, I 'I , ,nl,np 11 ti
of the Formosan uprising and status of Amrrit In n1i1i-
111, , 111 ,,I , I ? t1
A1?
tary forces on the territories of other Asian counties
by the Security Council,
apl,u
,err i-, rn,
World a
Concern Of Asian Telegram ad Site on the
Ihr 1". , III, 11u1' n ll
Taiprh Sha l,kil 1. a'hoh appruv.
111 ,11c 1
, 1.
Nations Admitted S,I,
ell ndlllnl'y arhana amt d. "rrih.
. as1
r
a
~
He admitted, however, that
many replrxentnllv,m of Allan
nations In the UN hall _joe'-d
to him their concern over Ine
stationing of Am,II-an talsanm?1
In their countries and abmlt the
brutality with which the paps.
tar uprising on Fornlnsa had
been rrtohed by the KMT and
American Ircrops.
Asian representatives In the
UN Were xhn'krd by Senator
8nowland'a sblrmenl to the re.
presentative of the New York
1'd ['hbng E:a stick's atrn'ilica
o F'ori`i^a 1x one nu lc penal
oft iii, dr' Ilan Ire' 1111' Ir,cdlnnn:,l
lrlcn,luhlp lalw,rn Nallonellal
rhino :rod IRA."
Meanw hire. American lib"
anti illplnmane aulharlliex e
tiusv making and 111 ndng
to ntrg itt Ihv spr.?ad of ana l-Auto
n -!en In Asia.
rl,Qu e r'
r ply. n entergenrn
w?ting was rolled by Mr. Du11,
L1S S,?rrrtary of State. and rcpr,?
st?ntativ,?a of LIS Joint ('hlrfs of
Get ahead-
with a ltd
The Hind Cycle marks it. owner as
n person or Wte and discemrxnt.
ftlerkneer of design coupled with
sturdy performance and economy of
price have given the Hind Cycle ^
wide'Anng reputation as the beer
buy for money.
a*" s.nIT
7 Pear instant relief from
Stoatadt, Gas, Acidity ?
Teething Troubles.
m-cai pus.. era.. of
20"r,"
te. a, 1,11-rung
B , . f 1st 1 e sour- 1 rev :dnd ni r.
to the rmrn,ntlal orarr.
di
res It
s[u:e that a la p?grl,xrd unrt ou? t'S.
Max Bishop, Us A111130-a- A Sit ls.:,dar xnatda l 111 ?I ,I..iv
feoeived a confidential
iiireclire from the state
tl''partment to utilise Al
Anlcriran intelligenii' men
;in(] other agents of the
lx Embassy in the 14', N'I.O
nl I bodies for close watch aver
i
.
ro.
e
nn
on
l onlrm ,
,
n
,
h
11, or 0111.
lar~ .?p1 a,l, nl IS I e t nt
I, ,I' SR s 1.1. 11tial
I A , t 111 II Iary
{1r+mml - I I 1b Ptdlp.
pine-s. 1(ar, a :, r S1,uth A' rt Nam.
wh,. h. Arca1'h u g to h F'I,
pea '1'prl,I Ills 01 ro'ntons
wants In 1 11 , , , . 1 ca nlrr'. Sat.
U.S. Troops Stationed
In 72 Countries
He .,A n,lttrd Ih:u Ihr its ha-
to
atlonod Its laps In 7 for'Igo
lours.. nd Iha, ...... drttrer?
coft nillrrn,m?' vl.nal I, num
.
her of tte'I t+.gnrdlrss of how
erm llheti ler attv?rn,m nIs sta
t y
Itcd States. Mr. Dol.
Inn Jtol Inca. hawt?v?r he
per
ore of .en by its It nips f1'
thee )untities the drfenslve
needs ~r his "Free Woe d ,?
The marling holed to r sell
B~-
-tolo.lon , thee 1a111rr of Amrv
Aran n'm,pa In Felt East, r
rlo s . Fm'r lRn rapm?I~tnt s111
l in
the UV d,-s,', lh,'r l his a ". neck
trial.. nl Amrrlraas a11111ary
pulley in ANa.^
the activities of the meln-
bers of pulittral and moist
I,Iga I, Isat inns of 'l?huilantl
with the object of screening
their loyalties.
Am11assndor Pi.hop Is h pay
xperi.1 au-ono. to Ihr .rnfio??non
of King P11ln pion Adtlnu a I.-I, M to
deals ilirli Tut rut burl In
I'h,ln hllvun, nlr,?ttor Irf 1'1111l'e
IM p I t 1 S I- r I1'
Ml '.1 I'1 I l"..
g d
a
b?uder of the nemoet;tl, P:n tv
Call To UNO
For Action !
BACKED by reports
of Increasing Afro-
Lion, BLITZ invites the
fi UNO to institute an in-
I sovereignty.
INDONESIAN STUDENTS
& PEASANTS CHALLENGE
AMERICAN COLONIALISM
HONGKtiNG American newspapers recently published
many t'vitorts fearful of the spread of anti-American
fires over the, count, tea of South-East Asia. The New
York Telegram and Sun published reports from its
correspond,?ot that he USA must accept responsibility
for the anti-Amen an attacks on Formosa "because
Formosa militarily and economically has been little
more than an Amen 'an colony." The report pointed out
that the Formosa uprising is not an isolated episode, but
shows how deep tht latent Asian hostility is.
711. Wall Street Jnsrnal etnlo elan on the Dutch the IIS sup-
naily nuggesrn that the anti. porta in the dispute over Wet
Amerl,?an demonstration, on For. tern Irian, the lecturer tried to
s reilae ,lueatinna getrding give an evasive reply, which
thi retire p[rliry of oh'.Ie Us in showed to those present that the
Iio11th Rivet Asia The a,i inc llava US does not want to net I1oWle
thou the Form,.. eon tagratk,n culnnlal rule over the disputed
_rd" spread anti. lmerlean territory.
(,'elms,.. over Japan. Th. hand, the Indonenlana could not help en.
Ph, llpplnea and speolelk Indone- pressing their resentment, and
as compelled the lecturer to leave
USIS Lecturer Forced
To Withdraw
News from Indonesia confirms
this rnn[?healnn of the lmerlean
press. The other day, 1818 held
a ireb.lre In one of the colleges
of Jakerts dedicated tc U6-In-
donesla relations. More than 200
lndnnrxise smdenw and teachers
were present The 118151 official
who read this lecture failed to
.?aplaln to he. listeners the left
posltlon?on she que~tlor of Wew-
n??
IhW gyp,' , ,~ ~ IK
taken In cold a yu r....,rl in
'1'Ir:11h, td 1,1i 1111' F',1 dy
tic, :,use, 111x1 111111 l' r,r'l,l,.I-.iv
11111 ?r,r,ia1? t.P, atil"1lce ,v.la
anti -11,1111, Ihr SI:.A1Ii x,.11111.
Kuomingtang Unrest
In Burma
(`heirs,Ills,' to the SI?;A'rtm I' mn-
1 1 v tell the I' 111 end at
111 111'11 Nall(,nali,.l nanl. n
Ilnrmn Infarnr1'fl by rail I,t'! on
1111' h, 'ad at he n I.S. 11illii:a, x 1.
t ''h:dland, r, n1'?
raj Fill -1 Partrigr, 11,0 Intl.
A1n,'r ml., In Fnrnx,,:1 hive
file ,Irv int1111'nr1'd nall,tt
trouyx l al lan1'd in nlIr,alio
Uu1' gno ln spatr'ofcnnllie.'ro and men
1m1'm1 tder to the nnr-
,1llhorlilies an(] , no 1
11hiok I11.,t It in time to it hill l de
la l'o1n1 cm ln[ China A, 111 re
Is die v'1 rorn ntun lea I ran wdh
F'ar , the Co u
nunnd of Its
Chi ra.wa tatloneellal n'aops, tae
asked Ih,' Alllerirana I. In-Ur.
flans and uxsixtanee,
In Ih is emr e-ctlon, Mr 1i101-op
and Map,,4. eneral R. Par-g.
lT1'nl lv formal a ..pedal group
consulting of Am-ft-an anti I'hi.
o -e nationalist Intelllgencv If.
firers working In the SEATO
1'ou sell and rushed It to Fla, Ina
to study the situation and take
the n resxary meauaerx.
The group la headed by Mr sea
Garland, Ale Attache of Ibt? II S.
Entbasnv and Mr. George Wilson,
Counsellor.
The mission I. directed to trans.
fee the rllxsal lathed wadies and
office's of ate oat Ionaltut Ir,x,pa
1. Burma to Thailand. Later,
tl u' 1,III he nest In F'arn,asa for
trial h?foe s court martial.
this tilatrlrt. The American
lul hoeines, au pporttd by the ,'e?
I.-loco . Indnnexian Ita'nl r nest.
gatmt, which endears In the
t'-oral G:avcrnment'e outer took
power to South Suman'e, -foes
ell to yield to the peaxanb' ape
P.W.
Peasants' Attack
On STAN VAC
The Ataavar authorlllea ieeatea
Pale,nbog district as an Asterl-
can colony. They financed the
Garud and assisted the eetablulh-
menl of this Illegal eouncll,
which Ignurrd the Central Go-
ernment's role and committed
serious crimes against Indon-
stun alerelgnty.
The pa?axan b' resentment oral
be ternrao took ? form alrnllar so
the Formosa uprlsing, They a5
tacked atasese station. and dies
smantled the oil pipeline. Sul.
dies who have been nnnm, by the
Ganid to punish the peaaana
refused to lake action against
them, and demanded that the
Central Government should inter
slew In this dispute on the aide
of the peasants.
Contrary to the propaganda
campaign which gives an enttee-
ly fal.e picture of relation beF
ween the Americans and Inhabi-
Cants of throe South-rust AsWs
countries n?rupled by them, UIes
relation, are no different Oran
mill bey egorta In Asia and the requeating Americans to pay Almost without eaerpuonraAm.-
agggreesnlve alliances spootle{rnorrdf~fbyy co mtnpenniultlont ffoorr ddaamage ttaa their rirlsntaanf Lm~ll{~Ien~1 RouthBast
"d~lan^b?It1~~"Noes-ui:tTi hew:. ~berVKirt/s~1'gj1tF31cOrk/st1iR~:k/Vh~ 1ot1Y(i~kalla'oMtheortrmar
the hall. He narrowly eacaped
open abuse on the part of the
students who, after she n?Irest
Well an anti American mreling
In front of the college which was
well attended by lndoneaiana.
The meetingo passed a resolution
condemning American and Uuteh
colonises ^red demanding the
liberation of Western trans,
Another episode Is reported
from South Sumatra, veer Pale-
mbong, The local peasant. sub.
muted an is pplicathon to the
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ANNEX 11
TAIPEH CABLES
M
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 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/08/24 A RDP78-02646R000300130001-0 CPYRGHT
J'LII'III']1
The Black Record
* 1 HE Prime Minister and the Defence Minister deserve
to be complimented for the timely warning they
have delivered to the Western powers on the question
of Pakistani aggression.
The anegatvocal etafement he minaelly a hit eSTe..
that an foreign rmy, under nor. are d. I-%. aggressors
whateree flag, shall be per. and eaerales of the nano.
mltted on oar 11 ad the against whom aggree.loa is
categorical and blunt challenge eotnotlded. It N sometimes lino.
that toss shall be allowed to gotten that we are sun at wee
monkey with our notional with aggressor. ? d about
roverelgety with a bundle of halt of our territory A. J.mtna
renew he,. acme none too and Knohmi, I. seder enemy
see., eot.patlO..
Bid To Foist Foreign
Army On Kashmir
A very arias. situation,
.slots new, created by the
Western Power. and their
Pakletanl satellites. Is the
background of cruel ad row,
easily terror Gmpalga of boon.
Meg to death little boys
launched by Peklda.i egrets
I. KeehmM, the, Oeesrlty con..
all Ia to meet to discuss that
Jarring Report.
WE RAVE RELIABLE 1N.
FORMATION TO SUGGEST
THAT THE WESTERN POW.
sits HAVE PREPARED A
RFIMOLUTION TO FOIST A
FOREIGN ARMY IN OUR
TERRITORY,
at.. from the beginning of
the war in Eahmlr, this has
been a western plan. In the
acme of holding a plebiscite,
lime and no., tow In a
friendly tone, sow by way of
threat., the politician of Wes?
tern cold war, bere made
frultleee effort. to occupy
Kashmir. The t.domluble do-
termin rim of the I.d1a. Fee-
pie and their Goveramoet art
often the friendly aastetanoe of
the Soviet union base mood
he their way all these yeun.
When Soviet Union
Rescued IBdin
Is Jaa.ary 1gbt, at 0.
Eecarity Costal meeting In
Paris, the United Sates dele-
Calw was Wont Se to,,,.
e
rerolatios for a ..an" UN
army to be Soloist I. Keahstk.
By. wltteesen nn tees, /on
get the drama wbiels followed
the speech of Jacob Malik of
life Dulled Sat., line, on
her owe admlsoiea, peered
r,. In Pellets., met bea-
dreda of mil/nary 'advleern' to
tole Pakistani 6wopa-the
I.P. of the Invader.. Per-
ther, .he has maintained and
o(rth engthened~ the war ecor0ool
meet the name charge, which
the U.B. levelled agatn.t ffilno
at the dote of the Koran w
as be levelled agal.st her 1r.
reMfloo to the Reahmlr war.
Indian Traitors
Abuse Freedom
Take the broader depot of
this Amerlmn policy, The
arming of Pakistan hue forcrd
as to prepare our national de-
truce. better. It ban .,neat
diversion of our reaonrcea to
m/11ary purposes at a retrofit
jaeotare In our efforts to bnlld
up our economy. In "silly,
these efforts ha.e bee. sal
aged by the U.N.A. dAtllo
rotmntatite we co, draw from
the loans which the U.A..tetre
hat given us when It has del-
era no deeper and deeper is
eoonomte difae.lttest
Sanely, at least oar ow. on.
tloaals .at appreelate oil
this. And yet, we tied the
papers like "The Times of
India" sold to .ntirl.g eolotnea
of Amortas aid. We have
some odd Individuals who at.
tank one leaden and defend
and praise the black record Of
a fer.lgn power which arm.
Inraders of one rod, ecosoml.
tally bolster, then and in
ohjeetve reality creates grave
polltlal and economic pro-
home for as. IN OTR1OR
OOUNTRIEa, THEY WOULD
BB TREATED AS TRAITORS.
sera more. mael.'a escape s.
desaaeYden naaerred the
W.efern deleptes and foe a
few .,.at. there won ? dead
Master. E was only the
wave agility of ""' of Bell.
tall whirl. weed the attatbn
foe the Welt, Jebb moved an
adjnersmeat and the salsa,
rwoludon wu shelved.
Pier year. a d no have
Passed aisre the.. A lot has
happened sires. Mr, J.Mng
described it w "ehaaging P-11,
U-1, -ask and strat-91.
fasten" and ? he oha.g/ug
patter, of power reatione in
West sad south Ada". This to
the .at polite master in
which the black record of ft.
West ca. be described.
Aggressor's Abettor
Is Aggressor!
Often I. ear country we are
checked at the attitude of the
Pelted Staten and Banes I.
the Security Concd be hat
appe.n as to be truth. I. fact,
this attitude is only a eosae-
qumree of their pansies out.
so floe facts and realise that
during the tut nee 7tauw, the
United mate. 6r singWSrly
fdlowad a ponoy in nation
to Paki.tas which co.. eery
.sae to being hlmbml w an.
B is as elem story prinolpie
of laterudea.l law that thee.
U. S. Ambass
Loss Of
During The
0 From BLITZ'
HONGI{ONG: Rumours o
--t r
d d,"_,
e
-
his
opinion of Formosan circles,
the Ambassador's trouble is
secret documents by the US
the May riots.
These docuntenis, including
Some from the top- egret Cipher
Department, are believed to in-
War Against
Neutrality
KARACHI' According to reports
from Washingto among
questions discussed by President
Eisenhower and Suhraw.rdy at
[elks in mid-July was the policy
to be pursued towards the so-
celled neutralist countries. The
President, who described neutre.
Item as "an immoral phenomenon
against which every m s must
be used", advised coordinated
action by the Reghdad Pact and
Also eountrlee to that end.
T ONDON: Win king late a
fell Bi~hfs she. I be
came aware of faint tre-
mors in the floor and walls
and a humming sound that
grew quickly louder.
opening the window I found
the ekv filled witt the rots at
a steady stream of avcr:dt head-
leg South. For most of the night
thts went on, brio in back chill
sharks during the last war Moot
morning, e news of American air,
lift towards Syria from Europe,
North Africa and USA gave the
explanation of what it must have
been.
The Middle Fast crisis, deepen-
ed by reckless American Illow (If
force, I. causing the gravest an-
Soviets Wanted India
On Disarm Talks
But The West Refused
LONDON : The Soviet
tfnion has proposed no
fewer than 14 times that
the United Nations Sub-
committee on Disarmament
in London should hear an
Indian representative. Not
till the fourteenth time did
the Western powers reply
that this was an inadmiss-
ible procedure.
It. woo ut u privet. luncheon
given by the Load,,, Indian
Journal,atx.' Asv.rat?n to Mr.
Zo, In, leaner of the Soviet dele-
gallon to the Sal. committee,
hat the latter pointed this out.
The Soviet Union, he said
held and ...hosed m hold -
sdatiots with India on mules
gale.. of disarmaoteut-
When Mrhon ex last here
they had to ra1 meetings
tad many dioeowb.ae.
Indian Proposals
Go Unheeded
The Soviet Union was moot
anxious loot tilt S.,bcommittce
should pay regard I, the Indian
e, we, p' ocularly the Indian
propoxals to rod th1 Hydrogen
Bomb testa.
Yet Stasaen and Moch, the
America,, and P7rne1l repreeenta-
tiveo. s veral tune: during the
five month long talk; here, went
to the CContinrnt tt, consult the
NATO Council and other F so-
pean powers.
This wax lmportaat
Bros, Zarin twndlnued, why
he I. omvinced that the
Western power. really had so
desire m atear'm. Ia al1 these
e months ate Omelet Unlo. has
pettedly (Mneri. la, April
13, April 30, June It and :inguet
97) ,.or practical o rm
mciudtag the reduction n Mm-
ed forces, redaction of iat
trymbbudgets, ce.eation of H-
Bo teat, abolition of nuclear
weapons, oven accepting ma-
trole and Inspection insisted on
by the West- agrees"td an
all Of which old have
reduced world teseloa.
The Soviet Union made many
concessions but the Western
powers made no move to take
even o e simple pearl lea] m -
sure of uncoaditional trseation
of nuclear testa as a first step
and by insisting on tying up testa
with the whole 'vnngr of other
questions in the 6o-called "pack-
age proposals,, the West woe in
fact making agreement lmpossi.
bie.
Zorin gave as an a ample of
the Western argunznt that
ucleoe weapons could not be
honed because each notion most
have the right to u them in
self-defence. This a unto in
fact to the sanctioning the as
of such weapons any tuns, any
country claimed it was attacked.
For Inamaee, he coataued,
Paklsa. could my India had
stacked her cad would then
be free to ate neclear Neap.-
xiety here and In widening the
rift between Britain and Ame-
rica. Though a British No, sign
meet blessing the W-hing-
ton action, It x notebiv half
hearted and coupled with the de.
claration that Whitehall saw no
need to asset USA.
The British press is almost on-
animaue in condemning American
action which Ia universally sneer.
ed at here as "highly dramati..
ca."
Ayra'a firm stand, fully saw
parted by l+,gypt and followed
by Waehingbn's own pro?
legs, the Jordsn Fore1Rn Mi.
sister Rafal, who declared
there was . i,eiiflceiM, far
IateHering In Syria's internal
aR61M, base badly shaken Am,
rleaa Patti, opinion.
According to reports reaching
London, many Washington per.
eon lltlee, Including Mr. Adlal
Stevenson, and leading Democra-
tic Senator. view the Americas
airlift as . dengerouely abort-term
poltcy." Economic aid, to their
opinion, would heve been much
more effective buttress against
bverslon."
Trouble - Shooter
Henderson
many felt that Mr. Loy Bela.
derson, whom they describe as
"trouble - shooter Henderson",
would have been better advised
to stop off Cairo and listen to Pre-
sident Nasser, opinion.
Some Seoul.r. aloe felt
Nehra'o neuters should have
been enlisted last week. fine
he has again said he waam
peaceful aolntloa It may still
.at be too into to appeal to biro
sow.
With the consensus of opinion
even among its own Alllea agalnat
it, It to regarded as unlikely that
Washington will go beyond
threats, However, President
Eisenhower's weekend inclle-
ent to Syrian people to "set", In-
terpreted here as a call to over-
throw their Government. aloe.
mingly recalls similar incitement
of Western sources to the Hun-
garian people during the crisis
last autumn.
British and American govern-
ments, taken aback by the boom.
erang Rect of American policy,
are both now concerned to brteige
their differences and seek great,-,
co-operation in the Middle East.
OTTO DILBAHAR
f
'So different..,' once yet do fee
Taipeh Riots
Correspondent
Mr. Karl Rankin's propoo-
confirmed here. In the
e of the main reasons for
valve the U.S. State Iepsetr,eert[
and the Pentagon In a conspiracy
dam of iodcpend,mt countries of
Routh and East iota.
The U.S. authorltles are natur-
any anxious to " onceal the lose
and recover the documents.
The document, were lost dur-
g the anti Amrrlcan diatonic
Infuriated Chmeoe crowds raided
the Embas.y premise..
A special comn,iselon is mp.rb
t to he working now m establish
hen documente are missing and
your choice loss! Why
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Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R000300130001-0
 CPYRGHT
Ali-"Fror Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R000300130001-0
fruitless efforts to occup
termination of the Indian
pie and their Government
In their way all these years.
When Soviet Union
Rescued India
In January 1962. at
army to be foisted in Kashmir.
Eye witnesses can never for-
get the drama which followed
the speech of Jacob Malik of
the U.S.S.R. denouncing any
such move. Malik's outspoken
denunciation unnerved the
Western delegates and for a
few minutes there was a dead
silence. It was only the
suave agility of Jebb, of Bri-
tain, which saved the situation
for the West. Jebb moved an
adjournment and the sinister
resolution was shelved.
Five years and more have
tical, economic and ~strategi
which the black record of th
West can be described.
Aggressor's Abettor
Is Aggressor !
Often In oar country we
shocked at the attitude of th
this attitude is only a cone.
quence of their policies out.
side the United Nations. Let
us face facts and realise that
daring the last five years, the
United States has singularly
followed a policy in relation
to Pakistan which comes very
Rear to being inimical to as.
It is as elementary principle
of International law that those
the loans which the U.S. states
has given no when it has dri-
economic difficulties!
India" sold to untiring eulogies
of American aid. We have
some odd individuals who at.
tack our leaders and defend
and praise the black record of
a foreign power which arms
invaders of our soil, economi-
cally bolsters them and in
objective reality creates grave
political and economic pro-
blems for as. IN OTHER
COUNTRIES, THEY WOULD
BE TREATED AS TRAITORS.
Go Unheeded
The Soviet Union was most
anxious that the Subcommittee
should pay regard to the Indian
views, particularly the Indian
proposals to end the Hydrogen
Bomb tests.
Yet Stassen and Moch, the
American and French representa-
tives, several times during the
five-month long talks here, went
to the Continent to consult the
NATO Council and other Euro?
pean powers.
They had no hesitation in tak-
ing the advice of those who
obstruct disarmament but would
not listen to India and others
who want disarmament.
This was one important
reason, Zorin ?->stin,....i_
U. S. Ambassador In Fix Over
Loss O f State Secrets
During The Taipeh Riots
? From t l T Corres
d
pon
an 111 s pro
nuclear weapons could not be
banned because each nation must
have the right to use them in
self-defence. This amounts in
fact to the sanctioning the use
of such weapons any time, any
country claimed it was attacked.
For instance, he continued,
Pakistan could say India had
attacked her and would then
be free to use unclear weapons.
CPYRGHT
(erpreLeu Here as a
throw their Govt
mingly recalls Simi:
of Western source
garian people durii
last autumn.
British and Ame
ments, taken aback
erang effect of An-
are both now concel
their differences an
co-operation in the
OTTO DILBAHAI