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May 1, 1962
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25X6A Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R000400330001-7 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R000400330001-7 Approved For Release 1999/ 00400330001-7 011111M111111111111r THE IMPACT OF THE 22ND CPSU CONGRESS ON THE May 1962 COMMUNIST PARTIES OF THE FREE WORLD Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1-7 Approved For Release 1999/ 6R000400330001-7 al11111=111?1111111111111s TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE I. Introduction 1 1. Problems at the congress 1 2. Problems since the congress 1 3. The impact of the congress 2 4. Summary of positions taken by free world parties 2 5. The structure of the study 4 Problems Confronting the CPSU on the Eve of the Congress 5 1. Divergences 5 2. Sino -Soviet dispute 5 3. Chinese view on the 1960 declaration 5 4. CPSU draft program 6 5. Soviet-Albanian relations 6 6. Effect on other parties and fronts 7 7. The intolerable situation 7 Impact Sf the Congress on the Free World Delegates 9 1. Unexpected issues 9 2. First reactions of the free world delegations 9 3. France and Italy 10 4. India and Indonesia 10 5. Alignment on Albania 11 6. Alignment on Stalin and the anti-party group 11 7. Reasons for the alignment 12 8. Soviet influence on free world delegates 13 9. Free world parties at the end of the congress 14 IV. Reactions of the Free World Parties After the Congress 1. Opposition to the CPSU 2. Endorsement of the CPSU 15 15 15 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1-7 Approved For Release1l9/0 gs.111111imi 000400330001-7 PAGE 3. Agitation in the free world parties 15 4. Factors in the decisions 16 5. Three groups 17 6. Orthodox group 17 7. The reformers 18 8. The opposition 20 V. New Moves by the Main Contenders 22 1. Soviet actions 22 2. Albanian actions 23 3. Chinese actions 24 4. An inconclusive situation 24 VI. The Impact of the New Moves on the Free World Parties 26 1. Soviet attack on narrow nationalism 26 2. International unity 26 3. Italian Communist Party 27 4. CP of India 29 5. CP of Indonesia 30 6. CP of Australia 32 7. CP of New Zealand 32 8. French Communist Party 33 9. CP of Belgium 33 10. CP of Chile 36 11. Brazil and Paraguay 38 12. Soviet and Chinese maneuvers in the fronts 39 13. The World Peace Movement 40 14. IUS and WFDY 44 15. WFTU 45 VII. Conclusions and Forecast 47 1. Assessment of Soviet success 47 2. Impact on the free world parties and fronts 48 3. Forecast 48 ormillelNINNIM? it1.1.0.17 rd'ON'U Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R000400330001-7 Approved For Release 199 M'02646R000400330001-7 The Positions Taken by the Free World Communist Parties APPENDIX A: APPENDIX B: Questions Raised for the Free World Parties as a Result of the 22nd CPSU Congress 44111INNIMMIllo? PAGE Approved For Release 1999108124: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 50 54 1-7 Approved For Release /24: C T8-02646R000400330001-7 4.43' 3. The impact of the congress. As of mid-March most free world parties have shown that they know that the CPSU is determined to have its way. Most of them?including those which were reticent at the congress and immediately afterwards--had, by mid-February, made their acceptance of Soviet demands very clear. The Italian party, after attempting to gain support for a loosening of organi- zational discipline in the movement under the concept of "polycentrism", was compelled to retreat, formally at least. Only the Chinese party, the relatively isolated and immature parties in Southeast Asia that are dependent upon the Chinese, and the Japanese, Indonesian, and New Zealand parties were still stubbornly refusing to condemn the Albanians for their open and continued attack on Khrushchev. On the other hand, the dissension within many free world CPs, provoked or revealed after the 22nd congress, was still spreading and increasing in seriousness as of mid-March. Both left and right wing factions were under vigorous attack, and it is unlikely that these internal disputes can be quickly and easily resolved. Friction between the Italian and French parties was openly expressed, and a wide divergence, not yet amounting to conflict, developed between the Australian and New Zealand parties. While an open split in the Com- munist movement appears hard to avoid, the failure of either the CPSU or the Chinese party to make any new major move against its main opponent has kept the international and internal party conflicts from merging openly into a single struggle. Should an open split take place, the abandonment of the ambiguities in which many parties and dissidents have so far couched their statements of position would give a completely new and bitter tone to existing differences at both the national and international level. At present one faction in the movement believes that a Sino-Soviet split would lead to greater unity and efficiency in the parties that support the CPSU. The other faction still insists that a Sino-Soviet split cannot be considered as anything other than a major catastrophe for the world Communist movement. And both factions are powerful. 4. Summary of positions taken by free world parties. In Appendix A the positions taken by free world parties at and after the congress on the question of Soviet policy and on the three critical 2 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R0004003300 1-7 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R000400330001-7 I. Introduction 1. Problems at the congress. The purpose of this paper is to show how the 22nd congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October 1961 affected the Communist parties outside the bloc. The international Communist movement had serious problems in policy, coordination, and discipline before the congress opened. These problems, aggravated by frictions and disagreement between the Soviets and the Chinese, had resisted solution at the international conferences held on Soviet initiative in Buaiarest in June 1960 and in Moscow in November 1960, and were brought to a crisis at the 22nd congress when Khrushchev tried to force the whole movement to accept his policies and rule. By reviving the campaign against Stalin, elaborating and extending the charges against the anti-party group of Molotov, Malenkov, Kanganovich, and others, and attacking Albania, Khrushchev hoped to destroy resistance to his policies throughout the movement, including the USSR, and to force the Communist parties to obey Soviet mandates. Failing this, Khrushchev intended to isolate and discredit those who opposed him. 2. Problems since the congress. The Soviet offensive continued after the congress, and the outcome is not yet determined. The main foreign opponent, the Communist Party of China, has refused to surrender or to be provoked into breaking away; a number of Asian parties have sided with China and Albania in refusing to accept Soviet dictation; several parties and important elements within parties have shown resistance to rule by the CPSU; and a number of developments in the USSR that are hard to understand suggest that some resistance to Khrushchev continues to exist within the CPSU bureaucracy, even though it has not been effective. The main result of the congress was to expose the weakening of discipline within the movement and the inability of the CPSU to command unanimous and complete obedience to its will. CON 411111^111111111! Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R000400330001-7 Approved For Rele 46R000400330001-7 issues of Albania, Stalin, and China are scored on a scale of plus- three (full support for the CPSU position) to minus-three (hostility to the CPSU position). Full support of the CPSU on all four matters would give a score of +12. The following facts emerge from these tabulations: a. The average degree of explicit support the free world parties gave the CPSU at the congress on the full range of critical issues was relatively low, amounting to little more than would be justified if the parties had endorsed only the CPSU Program. b. In the tallies of positions taken at the congress, the groups of parties in Europe, Middle East-Africa, and Western Hemisphere were quite close ( +4.2, +5.5, and +4.9 respectively). c. The average response of the Far Eastern countries was distinctly colder (-0.4), as was widely observed in general terms at the time of the congress; it became even colder afterwards. d. The most pro-Soviet free world delegations at the congress itself were the following: Europe. Cyprus, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Sweden, Turkey. Middle East-Africa. Ceylon, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Reunion, Sudan, Tunisia. Western Hemisphere. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay, U. S., Venezuela. e. The parties outside the Far East shifted markedly in favor of the CPSU after the congress; scoring averages are: Europe +8.9, Middle East-Africa +9.5, Western Hemisphere +8.8. 3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 -7 Approved For Release 1999/08/24.: CIA-RDP78-02646R000400330001-7 41004111111111W 5. The structure of the study. The following sections show what the problems were on the eve of the congress that impelled the CPSU to decide on a show-down, how the show--down developed, and what the impact was on the free world delegates and their parties. There follows an analysis of the reactions of the free world parties after the congress, the new actions of the CPSLI, the Chinese, and the Albanians, and the impact of these new actiOns on the free world parties. The final section summarizes the impact of the congress and assesses the evolving and unresolved problems. In the first appendix the positions of the free world parties at and after the congress are rated and the impact of the congress upon them is noted. A second appendix outlines the most troublesome and ernbarassing questions that have arisen within the Communist parties as a result of the open denunciation of Stalin, the attack upon Albania, and the open opposition of the Chinese to these actions. 4 Approved For Release 999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000400330001 -T Approved For Rel DP78-02646R000400330001-7 Chinese were nevertheless pleased with some of the results of the conference. They had made the CPSU accept, for the sake of an appearance of unity, modifications in the declaration, which, as the Chinese exploited them, endangered the credibility and effective- ness of the Soviet propositions. They had also defeated a major Soviet effort to include in the declaration passages that condemned factionalism and nationalism within the international Communist movement and that would have established the principle of majority rule at international party conferences. The weakness of the endorsement in the declaration of CPSU congresses was also a result of resistance by the Chinese, who had held that the congresses of the CPSU were not binding on other parties. The general attitude of the Chinese toward the Moscow declaration of 1960 was that it gave them enough leeway to take positions consistent with their own concept of strategy and that it set a bench-mark for future struggle with the CPSU. 4. CPSU draft program. Although the open Sino-Soviet polemics of 1960 had not been repeated during 1961, there was ample evidence that disagreement continued behind the scenes. One evidence is the treatment of the main Soviet document of the year-- the draft program for the 22nd congress. It was published in China--but virtually without authoritative comment?and on China's national day, just before the 22nd congress opened, a speech by the Soviet agitprop chief Konstantinov was edited by the Chinese news service to delete all references to the program and to Soviet aid. 5. Soviet-Albanian relations. Soviet relations with Albania, on the other hand, publicly deteriorated after the November 1960 conference. At the conference, Hoxha had violently assailed Khrushchev personally, as well as particular Soviet policies and practices, and had declared solidarity with China in the international dispute. The deterioration after the conference was manifest in the Soviet treatment of the Albanian party congress in February 1961, in Albania's absence from various CEMA meetings, in Hoxha's absence from the meeting of the Warsaw Pact first secretaries in August, in the return from the USSR of Albanian students in May, 6 mall11.0111r Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1-7 Approved For Release 1999/08/ 000400330001-7 II. Problems Confronting the CPSU on the Eve of the Congress 1. Divergences. When the 22nd congress opened on 17 October 1961, the Soviet leaders were faced with continuing divergence within the international Communist movement over the question of strategy and policies and with a breakdown of their ability to control the movement. The disagreement with China was not resolved. Relations with Albania had deteriorated badly. Some parties shared the views of the Chinese and the Albanians. And important elements within parties and the international fronts had begun to lack confidence not only in the: doctrinal line of the CPSU but also in its leadership. Z. Sino-Soviet dispute. The Sino-Soviet dispute stemmed from basic disagreement over economic policy within the Com- munist bloc and over foreign policy, as well as from Chinese resistance to CPSU claims of dominance and to the methods used to enforce these claims. It had not been resolved by the declara- tion issued at the November 1960 conference of 81 parties. After November 1960 the Chinese still labelled, as an abandonment of Leninism and of principle, the Soviet-props ed principle of peaceful coexistence, with its emphasis on economic competition with the free world powers, the need to make Communism attractive as a political system, and the need to eschew war as an instrument of Communist international policy. They continued to treat peaceful coexistence as a temporary thing, and they held that all policies adopted by the CPSU should be consistent with this attitude: anything else would strengthen the enemy, weaken the positions of the bloc, and demoralize the Communist move- ment. The Chinese also resisted Soviet efforts to dictate policy, and they resisted the economic and other pressures that the Soviets exerted upon them to this end. 3. Chinese view on the 1960 declaration. Although official Chinese documents after the 1960 conference acknowledged the failure of the conference to resolve policy differences, the 5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R000400330001-7 Approved For Release 199 elarni111111111111Mii 46R000400330001-7 in the withdrawal of Soviet submarines from Albania in June, and in Albania's cold reaction to the CPSU draft program in August. The two parties exchanged recriminatory letters during the year, showing that relations had worsened immediately after the November 1960 conference, and that on the eve of the 22nd congress they were near the breaking point. 6. Effect on other parties and fronts. It was clear by mid-1961 that a number of parties--including the important ones of North Korea, North Vietnam, Indonesia, Italy, and Poland--shared, for reasons of their own, one or more of the attitudes of criticism that the Chinese and Albanians had expressed. Lack of confidence in the CPSU was widespread. During 1961 other parties, long accustomed to accepting Soviet decisions, were concerned over the unity of the movement, were questioning the ability of the Soviets to exert effective and firm control, and were losing confidence in the determination of the Soviets to enforce their decisions. Even staunch supporters of the post-Stalin strategy were disturbed by what they considered to be dangerous Soviet concessions in the language of the November 1960 declaration to the views of the Chinese-led opposition. Right-wing divergences were apparent within several parties (particularly in the Indian and Italian parties) and the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade Unions; left-wing elements were causing considerable trouble in Brazil; and the Japanese party was plagued by dissension on both the left and the right. 7. The intolerable situation. After the 81-party conference of November 1960, statements and domestic policies of the Chinese party emphasized the existence of complete party unity. Whatever the reasons for such moves, they probably included the belief of the Chinese that they had nothing to fear from factionalism within their party and that it would be useful to exhibit this confidence. The Albanian leaders also, through their defiance of the CPSU, won a personal popularity at home they had never enjoyed before. In propaganda addressed to other parties both parties fully ex- ploited the concessions they had won from the CPSU in the 7 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 -7 ;t4' 11DENTIAL Approve0d or Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R000400330001-7 411111111111111M language of the November declaration, in particular linking the declaration with their unreserved endorsement of Soviet policy on nuclear testing and on the German issue. In the Soviet view, to continue to tolerate such behavior and these explanations of bloc policies would inevitably be interpreted, both inside and outside of the movement, as tacit Soviet agreement with them. And such an interpretation of their views, the Soviets must have felt, threatened to compromise--perhaps fatally--the very prertiises upon which their moves were based and to reduce the CPSIT to the position of a mere first among equals in the movement. 8 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78T02646R m 004 -"? Approved For Release 1999/08/24 . 6R000400330001-7 III. Impact of the Congress on the Free World Delegates 1. Unexpected issues. The delegates from the free world has been led to expect that the congress would focus on the new party program and statutes, but Khrushchev injected the three unexpected issues of Stalin, the anti-party group, and Albania. Except for a brief reference to Kaganovich as an opponent of the modernization of Soviet railroads, there was no hint, through the first three- fourths of Khrushchev's report for the Central Committee on 17 October, that these issues would be raised in any exceptional way. Whatever other reasons Khrushchev may have had for re- opening the attack on Stalin's political mistakes and crimes, it is clear from the Central Committee report that he used the attack to justify and reaffirm the strategy and policies of the 20th CPSU congress in 1956, to discredit the positions taken by the anti-party group and Albania, and to degrade their motives. Without naming the Chinese, Khrushchev's report extended the political criticism of the Albanian leaders to "anyone else" who opposed the line of the 20th congress. Later Soviet speakers, and Khrushchev himself in his speech of 27 October, developed this further by elaborating the criminal charges against the anti-party group and the Stalinist viciousness of the Albanian regime, and by coupling the elaboration with further attacks on the policy positions held by the group and the Albanian leaders. 2. First reactions of the free world delegations. The free world delegates were not prepared for these actions by Khrushchev. They knew that the problems between the Soviets and the Chinese had not been resolved, and there had been public evidence of continuing strain in Soviet relations with Albania. They expected an international conference to be held after the Soviet party congress and probably anticipated that these matters would be brought up then. Their first responses showed that they had not been prepared for the airing of these matters at the congress itself. They could also see that the congress was not going smoothly. Voroshilov, whom Khrushchev's political report included for the first time in a listing of the members 9 111111111111111111111111 ct, Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1-7 '7?c-2'1s Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : C1A-RDP/642646R000400330001-7 411111111111111111111111! of the anti-party group, was sitting in the congress presidium visibly shaken. The proceedings, which had been open to the non- Communist press for the first two days, were thereafter closed. The delegates from outside the bloc could see that the Chinese were cold to the Central Committee report when Chou En-lai was the only one not to rise in applause; and, on 19 October, when Chou criticized the open attack upon Albania, they knew that the Chinese had determined not to be cowed by the CPSU or '6tampeded into support of the CPSU's actions. Further evidence of Chinese opposition was offered on 21 October when Chou -laid on the mausoleum a wreath dedicated to Stalin "the great Marxist-Leninist." 3. France and Italy. The first two speeches by free world delegates--Thorez of France and Togliatti of Italy?showed divergent emphasis even in their support of the CPSU. Thorez endorsed fully the Soviet line on Stalin, the anti-party group, and Albania, and the current Soviet policies on Germany and nuclear testing; he also reaffirmed the vanguard role of the CPSU. He based his criticism of Albania on the opposition of the Albanian leaders to Soviet strategy. Togliatti, on the other hand, criticized the Albanian leaders mainly for rejecting the rules of democratic centralism' and for their "in- admissible internal regime. " Unlike Thorez, he said nothing' about the anti-party group, and concentrated more on purely Italian political matters and more on approval of the strategy for the movement than on individual Soviet foreign policies. Togliatti, in recalling that the Italian party had openly criticized the Albanians long before the 22nd congress had laid out a line on them, and by his treatment of the fundamental significance of the 20th congress, implied that he gave his support to the CPSU voluntarily and on the basis of equality with the CPSU. The support Thorez gave was more Orthodox and more in tune with Soviet desires. 4. India and Indonesia. On the next day, 21 October, further divergence from the CPSU positions was expressed. Ajoh Ghosh of India, while in full support of the line of the 20th congress, failed to take an explicit position on the critical issues raised at the present congress. Aidit of Indonesia actually attacked the Soviet actions, 10 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA- i78S2646R Approved For Release 1 ? 1?f7 - 2646R000400330001-7 411.11111?11Maft although the Soviets edited this out of his published speech. Divergence occurred also in the speeches of the leaders of some of the bloc countries, for Kim 11-song of North Korea and Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam failed to line up with the other bloc speakers in support of the controversial Soviet actions. In addition to these indications that the congress was not going the way the CPSU wanted, Chou En-lai left Moscow for home on 23 October, ostensibly "in connection with the coming session of the All-China Assembly of People's Representatives"--an event which, according to an announcement in late December, would not take place until March 1962. P'eng Chen was designated acting head of the Chinese delegation, and Chou never returned to relieve him. 5. Alignment on Albania. Of the eighty fraternal parties that Khrushchev said were represented at the congress, two were not publicly identified. Of the remaining seventy-eight parties, no publicity was given to the positions taken by three if, indeed, they took positions at all: Guatemala, Paraguay, and Luxembourg. On the basis of the published texts of speeches made or messages delivered, the line-up of the other seventy-five parties was as follows: open opposition to the Soviet censure, one (China); explicit support of censure, forty-seven (bloc, seven; free world, forty); no direct reference to Albania, twenty-seven (bloc, two; free world, twenty-five). The twenty-seven parties that failed to censure Albania explicitly were North Korea and North Vietnam; Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Burma, Canada, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Guadeloupe, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Northern Ireland, Irish Republic, Japan, Malaya, Martinique, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. 6. Alignment on Stalin and the anti-party group. On the issues of Stalin and the anti-party group, the bloc parties divided as they did on the Albanian issue. China, North Korea, and North Vietnam failed to mention either the cult of personality or the anti-party group. The other bloc parties endorsed the Soviet positions. Only three free world parties, Denmark, France, and Iraq, explicitly 11 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1 77 Approved For Releaselia#04480A---INA=RIV 8-02646R000400330001-7 1111111111111fte endorsed the Soviet attacks on both Stalin and tlile anti-party group. Another sixteen parties referred to the cult of Stalin directly and many more, by eulogizing the 20th congress, implicitly supported the Soviets. No free world delegate endorsed the attack on the anti- party group by itself. Three parties that had refrained from com- mitment on the Albanian question took pro-Soviet positions on Stalin: Denmark, Sweden, and South Africa. I-lagberg of Sweden was especially effusive in praise of Khrushchev for attacking Stalinism. 7. Reasons for the alignments. The wide range of the responses of the free world delegates at the congress on the three critical issues resulted from diversity in motives. The attitudes of some of the Asian parties--Indonesia, Burma, Malaya, Thailand, and, to a lesser extent, Japan--can be attributed to ties with the Chinese as well as to sympathy for the Chinese-Albanian position on how Communist parties can win state power.- The reservations of the New Zealand delegation may also have been a result of agree- ment with Chinese attitudes--a closeness that has grown in the past few years. The Indian party delegation, div. ided between leftists and rightists, probably could not agree tipon a firm stand on the critical issues, though Ghosh managed to convey fundamental support for the Soviets. The reserved position 0.ken by the British delegation is hard to explain, but, as later developments suggest, may have been inspired by distaste for the methods used by the Soviets to force a show-down or by anxiety for te unity of the move- ment. The Canadian delegate, Tim Buck, who did not commit himself on the critical issues at the congress, \leas strong in his praise of Khrushchev personally and enthusiastic about the CPSU. Some of the basically pro-Soviet delegations that failed to take a stand on the critical issues may have felt that the mandates from their parties did not extend far enough; others rriay have feared resistance in their parties. Some may have failed even to realize that a commitment was demanded by the CPSU. One Western delegation, in what may or may not have been a post facto rationalization of its silence on Albania, took th4 position that having been burned before (on the Yugoslav case), it would not commit 12 Approved For Release 199-9/08/24 1 C1A-RD1511.02B-46K0004003-Juuwi -r Approved For Release 1999/046R000400330001-7 41111110111111111111111. itself until it had had a documented case furnished by Soviet officials. Of the free world parties, the French showed up as the most completely loyal to the CPSU. 8. Soviet influence on free world delegates. The CPSU tried to influence the free world delegates in several ways--by the way the Soviet speakers developed the issues, by parliamentary devices, and by direct persuasion. The Soviets managed to link opposition to Khrushchev's strategy and policies to the complicity of the anti-party group in the crimes of the Stalin era, and the use of this argument culminated, on 27 October, in Khrushchev's call for the overthrow of the Albanian leaders and his rebuke of the Chinese for siding with them. The moral and political pressure of this argument on the free world delegates must have been very strong. In addition, the Soviets manipulated the order of speakers from the free world parties in an effort to overcome the set-back given them by the Korean, Vietnamese, and Indonesian delegates on the 21st. A group of reliable delegates (U.S., West German, and Spanish) was moved up on the schedule as the Soviets apparently tried to create a band-wagon in their favor. Soviet functionaries talked to free world delegates and there is circumstantial evidence, in the messages of the Haitian and Nicaraguan parties, that some of these delegates were persuaded to give explicit support to the CPSU on the Albanian question. These messages to the congress, although they were ostensibly signed before the congress opened, included condemnation of the Albanian leaders. Because there is no reason to believe that these parties knew in advance of the attack on Albania, the messages therefore look anachronistic. A similar case, though not quite so glaring, is the message of greetings signed by the General Secretary of the San Marino party, who was present at the congress: it condemns Albania. Soviet pressure on the free world delegates continued after the congress. Tim Buck, for example, who had refused to commit himself at the congress but who stayed on in the USSR for nearly two weeks after the congress ended, finally published an article in Pravda on 18 November strongly condemning the Albanian leaders for "senseless adventurism" which could end in putting Albania "outside the camp." 13 411111111111111111111111Mt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1-7 Approved For Releast?,R L9,RiFips, r7a1-02646R000400330001-7 igiNIMMINNINtr 9. Free world parties at the end of the congress. By the end of the congress on 31 October it was clear to the free world delegates that the CPSU had failed to coerce the Chinese or to force them into an open break with the CPSU, for which they would have to bear the onus. It was also clear that the Soviets were prepared to go far to achieve their ends and to force a show-down With the Chinese. Confusion over the meaning of the actions againtt Stalin and the anti-party group was cleared up, and the Soviet,decisions on these questions were made practically irreversible. The free world delegates were put into the position of knowing they could no longer avoid taking sides. The Chinese and their allieis could hope that unitary forces within the bloc might deter Moscow, but they could have little confidence in this. They could do little but uphold their positions and try, within the movement, to encoiirage resistance to the Soviet methods of didation. The Albanians liad begun an open counter-attack on the CPSU even before the congress closed, and this could only create new problems for the free world parties. The delegates were faced on their return home with the problems of justifying their commitments (or failure to commit) before their own parties, getting endorsements, controlling ferment and defeating factionalism, riding out the attacks of enemies and rivals launched on the basis of the revelations at the congress, and, in some countries, adjusting party policies and leadership to the new demands of Soviet strategy and policies. 14 N-4,01 N 1..,t1 i; L., pprove or e ease Approved For Release 1999/08/ 2646R000400330001-7 Isamu'Paw. IV. Reactions of the Free World Parties after the Congress 1. Opposition to the CPSU. After the congress many of the free world parties took formal action to ratify the positions taken by their delegations, to clarify their positions on the critical issues, and to set the stage for further discussion within the party. The parties that had most distinctly taken exception to the Soviet line at the congress (Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Indonesia) demonstrated their continued sympathy for Albania by sending laudatory messages in November and their opposition to de- Stalinization by making favorable references to Stalin. 2. Endorsement of the CPSU. Most of the hold-out parties endorsed the Soviet actions on Albania, particularly after Hoxha launched his counter-attack. These included the following parties: Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Guatemala, Martinique, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. There were, however, significant shadings in these responses, ranging from obvious reservations on the part of the British party to vigorous support of the CPSU by the head of the Guatemalan party. 3. Agitation in the free world parties. Many parties published statements acknowledging the disquieting effects of the congress on cadres and party ranks. In parties that formally endorsed the actions of the congress, members bitterly criticized Khrushchev in private, going so far as to call him an enemy agent. Some members attacked their leaders for past complicity with the Soviets in promoting Stalinism and for establishing their own cults. Some Communists declared that their faith still lay with Stalin, while others acknowledged the difficulty of reconciling the anti-Stalin line with their own statements praising him in the past. The decision to remove Stalin's corpse from the mausoleum was criticized, but it was rationalized either as a necessary consequence of the public revelation of crimes committed in the past or as a logically necessary symbol of the complete break with the past. 15 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1 -7 Approved For Release P78-02646R000400330001-7 gi1111?116... Some Western Communists expressed repugnance for mummifi- cation as such, likening Lenin to an Egyptian pharaoh. The de- nunciation of Voroshilov was criticized as dangerous and unnecessary. The decision to change the name of Stalingrad was even more widely and openly criticized. In Italy a vigorous and remarkably unrestrained debate took place, with strong and public demands by younger leaders (Amend?la and others) for more democracy within the party (including the right to register dissent from decisions), for the autonomy of parties within the movement and the right of parties to dissent from Soviet positions, a n d for the completion of de-Stalinization in the USSR. In other parties the debate was generally more tightly controlled and kept out of the press, but similar sentiments were expressed privately and it was obvious that the congress had raised more questions than answers and that these questions could not easily be turned aside by Soviet fiat as in 1956. A compilation of questions being asked most frequently inside the parties is attached as Appendix B. 4. Factors in the decisions. On the critical issues the range of reaction by party leaders was extremely broad, with all kinds of overlappings, shadings, and convergences and divergences, and for different reasons. The reactions were conditioned by the local political concerns of the parties, by their dependence upon or ties with Moscow or Peking, by the personality of individual leaders, and by the political maturity of the rank-and-file followers. In virtually every instance there is evidence that the reactions of the leaders were also influenced by the following more general factors. a. The Soviet general line and current policies (e.g., Berlin, nuclear testing). b. The reassertion of Soviet hegemony and the implications of this for the future rights of individual parties. c. The revelation of crimes, intrigues and pressure techniques. 16 11111111.1111W C tiFINitNrow Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-02646R 004 033 11" r 7 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78- 00400330001-7 941111M11111111.? d. The need for unity in the international Communist movement and the consequences of a split in the bloc. 5. Three groups. In taking positions on the issues, the leaders of the free world parties have fallen generally into three main groups. One group supports the CPSU completely and in orthodox terms; another supports the CPSU, but less mechanically, and only at the price of asserting a claim to independence and equality; the third group basically objects to the Soviet actions at the congress on the issues but endorses one or more of the particular features of the resolutions and actions of the congress. 6. Orthodox group. The leaders in the orthodox group, rep- resented by Thorez of France and De Groot of Holland, publicly endorse the CPSU, criticize the Chinese for giving aid to the Albanian leaders, and want the impact of the congress to be con- tained within limits that will leave the CPSU's authority intact. In contrast to their foot-dragging resistance in 1956, they now appear convinced that it is the CPSU rather than they who set the inter- national line and define its limits, while they themselves must discover how to respond to this fact of party life at the least possible cost to themselves and their party. In these instances the authority of the CPSU has been enhanced, even as it has been in most of the European satellite states. But this public position does not necessarily correspond with private convictions. a. De Groot, in particular, privately despises Khrushchev and is infuriated by Khrushchev's methods. The educational campaign demanded of the French and Dutch parties was carried on, but it was marked by an effort to limit debate and to get the official Soviet explanations of the congress accepted. b. Thorez, in presenting his case to the French Central Committee, asserted that only one person in the leadership had opposed the open censure of Albania and the revival of the Stalin and anti-party group issues, but this assertion of the absence of a dogmatic left opposition--probably false--appears intended to 17 4111011111111111mailb Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1 -7 Approved For Release an911111111111110146 400330001-7 obscure the fact that there is resistance to Thorez's reestablish- ment of his own authority by conforming to the CPSU's demands. The orthodox position of Thorez and his distrust of his right-wing opponents were also expressed in his criticism of autonomist sentiments in the Italian party and of a call by the Italian Communist youth organization for a more objective analysis of Soviet history, even of Trotsky's contribution to the revolution.E The concern of Thorez lest such unorthodox ideas achieve somd respectability in the party in Italy and stimulate revisionism in Prance and other West European parties led him to misrepresent the Italian views as calls for regionalism inspired by nationalist tendencies and as Trotskyite demands for the political rehabilitation of Trotsky. To prevent the French party from being infected, the leaders saw to it that the debate in Italy was kept out of the V_'rench Communist press. c. The position of this orthodox group :does not necessarily represent confidence in the long-range goals of peaceful coexistence as a strategy; the French party, for one, has never been noted for enthusiasm for the tactical flexibility which Could make such a strategy effective. Thorez and company are convinced that complete loyalty to the CPSU is necessary for their own futures and the fortunes of their parties, and that they must make a genuine effort to support Soviet foreign policy initiatives in return for Soviet approval of their leadership. 7. The reformers. The second group of leaders, represented by Togliatti and others in the Italian party and by the leadership of the Belgian party, wants in one way or another to complete the de-Stalinization process throughout the movement so that their parties may convincingly present themselves as respectable, patriotic, and democratic. As the debate in the Italian party showed, there are complex shadings of attitude and of approach to this problem. These range from a militant workers left, with ties with the Trotskyites and concerned with attracting youth, particularly working class youth, to join the Communist party and its mass pressure campaigns, to a nearly revisionist current on the right, 18 211111111111111mmi Approved For Release 1999/.0=MITEIMMffirMTMUrrimminmlm Approved For Release 199eIIJ4 tifieta4'MI446R000400330001-7 ammallmair more concerned with gaining acceptance by the conservative Socialist and even non-Socialist masses. Togliatti stands some- where in between. a. Concerned both with the credibility and the inter- national unity of the Communist movement, Togliatti wants the CPSU to push the examination of the rise of Stalinism back farther in time than the Soviets themselves want to, but he has tried to restrain those on both extremes of the party so as to establish a position that is generally acceptable to the CPSU and tolerable to other Communist parties as well. b. In the course of the Italian debate some leaders of the reformers objected to the methods that Khrushchev had used against the anti-party group. The proposition of 1956--that Stalinism represented a degeneration of the Soviet system--was revived. Some speakers suggested that the steps taken by the CPSU to reestablish democracy are not adequate and that some method must be found for "alternations in the leadership in a normal and dialectical way." Some called for the establishment of minority rights within the party, without, however, the formation of organized factions. c. A strong appeal was made for polycentrism in the international movement. This, Togliatti asserted later in refuting Thorez, means more autonomy for the parties and international mass organizations, and not the establishment of regional groupings of parties. One leader related this question to Albania by suggesting that the use of "moral and material coercion" was no longer per- missible. Another, the leader of the "renovationists, "* Amendola, The "ren.ovationists" are most concerned with reforming the Party's methods of handling internal problems. They want more democratic freedom within the party and fresh flexible policies. They think that this would help to weaken anti- communism and give them a big political boost. They are, of course, opposed by the conservative bureaucracy, and their ideas go beyond those of the center, represented by Togliatti in the Italian CP. 19 suileet" Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1-7 Approved For Rele="rgintflorr'78-02646R000400330001-7 criticized the existing methods of international coordination by means of bilateral meetings, secret polemics, summit meetings, and conferences and pointed to the "fictitious unanimity" of the 1957 and 1960 Moscow declarations. d. In the formal communique of the PCI Secretariat on the 22nd congress--a document attributed primarily to Togliatti-- mild versions of the renovationist arguments were incorporated, along with full support of the congress actions On the critical issues. Indirectly expressed Soviet exceptions'to Italian ideas, such as the editing out of renovationist portions of PCI statements republished in Moscow and statements in the Soviet press rebuking unnamed Communists for suggesting that the Soviet system had degenerated, appear not to have seriously constrained the party leaders. 8. The opposition. The third group of free world party leaders, represented by Aidit of Indonesia and the leader's of the parties in Iceland, Malaya, Burma, Thailand, New Zealand, and, to a lesser extent, Japan and Australia, disagrees with one aspect or another of Soviet policy and resists the efforts by the CPSU to impose its will upon other parties. In the latter respect, they join hands with those Italians who call for autonomy. In stressing unity at all costs, they resemble Thorez, but they believe that the CPSU should make concessions in policy to the Chinese and that the CPSU has no right to make policy without regard for their town positions. a. The Australian, New Zealand, Indohesian, Burmese, Thai, and Malayan parties sent greetings to Albknia in November (as did the Belgian party, whose message was, however, quite different in character). The shadings in these messages show that the Malayan, the Thai, and especially the Burmese, parties are closer to the Albanians and Chinese than the others are, at least in public. The Australian party eventually became critical of the Albanian leaders in late December after Hoxh.a s speech de- nouncing the "Kh.rushchev group." 20 4INOININNENIM. El g ) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RD 7 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RD 400330001-7 b. Aidit, who had strongly criticized the Soviet actions at the congress itself, issued a statement on 27 November, after returning from Peking, amplifying his position. He made these points: the Indonesian delegation had not known that Albania would be criticized at the congress; denunciation of a party at the congress of another party is wrong; differences should be settled by con- ferences and negotiations; the CPSU has a right to do what it pleases about Stalin and the anti-party group, but it cannot make other parties endorse such actions; and the Indonesian party continues to value Stalin and his speeches and writings on revolution in the East. c. Even more strongly pro-Stalin views have been publicly expressed by individuals and lower party organizations in India, while in Burma,a Communist youth organization wanted to hang Khrushchev in effigy. This youth group consists mainly of dissident Red Flag Communists, but also includes persons associated with the orthodox BCP and its fronts. d. The leaders of the Japanese party, while avoiding direct controversy, have indicated that they, too, object to the Soviet handling of the Albanian question. The dissident Kasuga group has assailed the JCP as pro-Chinese in its basic policies, claiming that their own views were more consistent with those of the CPSU. e. All these parties--even when they criticize Albania, as the Australian party has done--call for settlement of disputes in accordance with the terms of the 1960 Moscow declaration, and the New Zealand party has published views close to those of Aidit in criticism of the CPSU (see below, page 32). 21 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1 -7 Approved For Releas 78-02646R000400330001-7 V. New Moves by the Main Contenders 1. Soviet actions. Between the end of the congress and mid- March 1962, a series of moves by the CPSU, the Albanian CP, and the Chinese CP introduced new problems and considerations into the dispute over the CPSU's authority. These developments had an impact of their own on the free world patties. The most important Soviet moves were the following: a. Recalling the Soviet diplomatic staff from Albania and inspiring other European bloc states to reduce their links to a minimum. According to the Albanians, this move was initiated by the USSR on 25 November. Apparently trying again to put on the Albanians the onus for the break, the USSR Asserted that it took action on 3 December; among other reasons, it referred to the Albanians' hostile act of distributing documents to diplomatic offices in Moscow on 25 November. The documents were the Albanian party's Central Committee resolution of 20 October and Hoxha's 7 November speech. b. Injecting the attack on Albania into the activities of?the international Communist fronts. This was done directly through the secretariats of the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students, and indirectly with the World Federation of Trade Unions and the World Peace Council, where free world spokesmen publicly criticized the Albanians for positions they had taken at important meetings convened in December. c. Beginning, in February, broadcasts in Mandarin to China, which comprehensively attacked Albanian (and unspecifically, Chinese) positions; and by continuing to publish in Soviet journals articles asserting the justice of the congress actions and the fallaciousness of contrary attitudes. In such articles, and in Soviet press releases, an effort was made to show that other Com- munist parties were vigorously supporting the CPSU. In the January 1962 issue of the international Communi4 monthly, Problems of Peace and Socialism, the logical culmination of this 22 memonikm...T. "meettifttiltbitE Approved For Release 9991181 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP 000400330001-7 111111111.1.111Mon. particular campaign was reached in the assertion that the 22nd congress "to all intents and purposes was an international assembly of Communists" and, by implication, equal in status to the 1960 Moscow conference. d. Calling upon a number of free world parties to send letters to the Chinese party criticizing Chinese attempts to exert pressure on party delegates at international front meetings. Z. Albanian actions. The Albanian party responded to the severance of diplomatic relations by the following: a. Explicitly and publicly attacking the "Kh.rushchev group" for aiding the enemy by trying to split the Communist movement. b. Publicizing details concerning covert Soviet acts to control, subvert, and coerce Albanian nationals and the Albanian government. These exposures went beyond the revelations and charges embodied in Hoxha's 7 November speech, and were presented as direct refutations of specific Soviet statements and accusations, including speeches delivered at the 22nd CPSU congress. c. Circulating in foreign languages a resolution of 3 August 1961 which took an extreme position on the Berlin dead- line--"even at the risk of war", according to an article in the Brazilian Communist weekly Novos Rumos of 9-15 February. d. Publishing, and broadcasting in foreign languages, a long editorial in the party newspaper, Zen i i Popullit, in early January which summarized the Albanian case against the CPSU, and against Khrushchev in particular, and refuted the latest Soviet charges. It explicitly linked the efforts of the CPSU to subject the Albanian party to the CPSU's overall effort to assert its hegemony within the entire Communist movement while divesting itself of all responsibility for the actions of other parties 23 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1 -7 Approved For Release 17917/19R000400330001-7 4011111.11111111Pr and for the consequences of such actions. This article is as broad, detailed, and vigorous an attack as anything the Chinese CP has ever levelled against the CPSU in its interparty letters or in speeches by Chinese delegates to the Bucharest and Moscow conference of 1960. But it goes far beyond the Chinese by making the charges publicly. 3. Chinese actions. The Chinese reacted to the Soviet diplomatic moves against Albania by further strengthening their economic ties with Albania, particularly by creating a jointly owned shipping con- cern. It is also rumored--so far without direct 'confirmation?that the Chinese issued a new interparty letter late iri 1961 demanding the convening of a new conference of all Communist parties, in- cluding the Albanians. In spite of the lack of confirmation, such a move by the Chinese is considered likely to haVe occurred. A reliable source states that the Chinese are determined to have an interparty conference convened eventually and tol insist that the Albanian party be permitted to participate fully ih the conference. Chinese spokesmen in the international fronts again took the lead in an open defiance and criticism of the Soviet general strategy and its premises, particularly in the peace movement. But by mid-March the CP China had not made any overt official staAement endorsing the Albanian charges or validating, as party views, the views ex- pressed by Chinese spokesmen in the fronts. For the Chinese, the unity of November 1961 had been replaced by a second round of struggle, like that which they began with the publication of "Long Live Leninism" in April 1960 and their attack at the WFTU Conference. 4. An inconclusive situation. Despite such maneuvers, it was apparent by mid-March that neither side was prepared to make the move that would force a decisive show-down leading to capitulation, to mutual, real concessions, or to a break. The Albanians were not yet completely out of the bloc--even the Soviet-dominated sector of the bloc--but were being squeezed onto the periphery. They complained bitterly about being excluded from the Warsaw Pact conference that ended on 1 February and on the 9th expelled the Warsaw Pact rep- resentative from Tirana, but the Albanian Ambassador was still on 24 40111111lillata Approved For e ease Approved For Release 1999/0 70-p2646R000400330001-7 sPiNNINIIMMow duty in Sofia, trade and barter agreements were concluded with China, North Korea, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and the Chinese con- tinued to refer to the "12" countries of the bloc. Khrushchev made scathing remarks about "foreign critics" of the CPSU program at the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 5 March, but the plenum closed without any decisive open move in the dispute. The Chinese post- poned the National Peoples' Congress till mid-April and, though Peking Radio had begun Russian-language broadcasts on 25 February, these programs had refrained from entering into the dispute. The situation was still fluid, as of the middle of March. 25 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1-7 Approved For Release 1999/ 41.1111111111111r. VI. The Impact of the New Moves on the Free World Parties 1. Soviet attack on narrow nationalism. In the post-congress period the main thrust of the CPSU's effort to reestablish its authority was extended from the attack on Albania to a general attack on "narrow nationalism" as the source of resistance to Soviet policy inside the international Communist movement and of the threat to the successful carrying out of Soviet strategy. Some developments in the response and attitudes of free world parties can be attributed to this extension. Other developments (Belgium) came as a result of the party's effort to deepen the effects of the congress internally and thereby, to extract from them greater local political utility. Z. International unity. As it appeared to the free world parties increasingly possible that Albania would eventually be expelled from the socialist bloc or that a schism would occur in the international Communist movement, many of them by late December and during January-March became occupied with the question of international unity. a. The Italians, in the interest of unity, muted their own debate, made conciliatory moves toward the French party, and tried to shift the party's attention to local political tasks; but they persisted in defending the principle of CP autonomy, thus making themselves vulnerable to the charge of narrow nationalism. They did retreat, however, from their polycentric views. b. In India and Indonesia, the parties in mid-December moved to organize systematic discussion of the hasic issues, with the Indian leader promoting a pro-Soviet line and the Indonesians R a pro-Chinese line. In both parties there was resistance to the leadership's efforts. c. The French party, closely following the CPSU, built up its attack on the Chinese-Albanian dissidents. It played an important part in Soviet maneuvers in the international fronts. 26 x?kimeeriontrAL Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP7 -02646ROD-0401-1 Approved For Release I 9Q154'C1AJR1P78-02646R000400330001-7 11111111111111111r results of the 22nd congress and issued a statement that emphasized the importance and conclusiveness of the CPSU's program, statute revisions, and resolutions. It approved the communique issued in November by its secretariat, but it failed to repeat the demands for further democratization and public correction of historic records addressed to the CPSU in the November statement. Only Rino Serri, head of the Communist Youth Federation, addressing the federation's Central Committee on 22 December, persisted in the earlier pattern. As Togliatti had done earlier, Serri rejected Thorez's criticisms of alleged Trotskyite influence in the Italian party, and he supported the condemnation of the Albanian party leaders for their anti- democratic and repressive methods of domestic control; but he went on to demand that the CPSU's dispute with Albania be taken up in an interparty conference that should convene not merely to condemn the Albanians but to examine the substance of the charges and counter- charges that had been aired in the dispute. Echoing the earlier secretariat statement, Serri rejected the existence of a guide party or state, rejected undocumented condemnation of nationalism, and asserted that international decisions must be made by unanimous agreement even if this meant that agreement would be limited to partial conclusions. b. On 15 January 1962, the PCI published for party members a pamphlet of four documents relating to the November 1960 Moscow Conference: a memorandum of the Italian delegation to the preparatory commission for the conference, the two speeches of Longo at the conference, and a letter from the delegation to Khrushchev and the CPSU delegation. Very critical of the Chinese and Albanians and in full support of Soviet positions, these documents serve to put the PCI on record as having voluntarily adopted the positions it has expressed publ i c ly since the 22nd congress at an international conference. This justifies the party's attitude toward the 22nd congress and makes it clear that this attitude had not been formed as a result of any kind of pressure or the need to support a Soviet fait accompli. For the record, Longo, in his first speech at the 1960 conference, had challenged the Chinese for maintaining an attitude of exceptionalism toward the conference declaration draft 28 , Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1-7 Approved For Release 1999/08/ 02646R000400330001-7 -11111111111111111ft.h. d. In Belgium, an exhaustive discussion was opened in the party newspaper for the purpose of "renoviition" of internal party procedures, and for a "regeneration" of it political line to suit new conditions. This resulted in the public expression of dissent by one party leader and in his being formally criticized by the politbureau for holding pro-Chinese views. e. In some Latin American parties--notably the Chilean party, whOse attitude in most issues was like that of the French party--loyalty to the CPSU was made the okrerriding consideration. f. The pro-Soviet parties and factions advanced the argument that even the possibility of a split in the movement had to be considered with equanimity, since it would lead to more effective unity in the Soviet-led group of parties. The pro-Chinese parties and factions, appealing to the underdeveloped world, emphasized that toleration or promotion of a split was unthinkable because it would weaken the anti-imperialist struggle The actions of the Albanians after the 22nd congress made it more difficult for free world parties to support them. g. The dispute carried over into the international fronts, being especially acute in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organi- zation, the WPC, and at the Afro-Asian Writer's Conference. A number of parties responded to a Soviet request to officially protest Chinese views and factional activities in the fronts. h. There have been several reports and rumors of efforts to establish some kind of pro-Chinese alignment among parties. The latest of these stories (none of them confirmed) concern a proposal to convene a meeting of representatives of a. number of Asian parties in April, either in Hanoi or Peking. 3. Italian Communist Party. a. The Italian party's Central Committee, in a two-day session (20-22 December 1961) discussed the party's debates on the Approved For Release 27 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 :CIA-RDP78-0264 330001-7 gimal111111111M and had let it be known that the Chinese were reserving the right to interpret the declaration as they saw fit. The PCI documents serve to legitimize the 22nd congress as entirely in line with the 1960 declaration. In this way, the party asserts its essential independence at the very time it gives full support to the CPSU. It expresses complete opposition to any reversion to policies and practices of the pre-20th congress period. The PCI hoped for political reasons that publication of the documents would convince the rank and file of the party that its positions were firm and sincere. 4. CP of India. Ajoy Ghosh, secretary general of the Indian party, published a personal statement on the 22nd congress on 10 December and gave a press interview on 17 December neither of which the CPSU could have considered satisfactory. a. Like the Italians, Ghosh said that the 22nd congress proved that there was no infallible party or leader in the movement. He also said that the majority of Indian party members had been confused and distressed by de-Stalinization and disagreed with the renaming of Stalingrad. More important, Ghosh said that the Indian party's views on the 22nd congress could only be formulated by the party's National Council, and that the council could not be convened until after the national election, to be held during February. Ghosh, too, refused to grant that either the Albanian case or the rules and principles governing relations between Communist parties were no longer open to discussion. While he praised the new CPSU program and expressed sympathy for the CPSU's justifi- cation of its actions at the 22nd congress, he insisted that the rules of the 81-party declaration were still binding. At the press conference, in fact, he intimated that the public condemnations of Albania by the other parties were themselves violations of that declaration. b. Ghosh's stand obviously reflected his concern over maintaining party unity during the forthcoming election. It also showed that he personally faced a dilemma, in which his desire to retain full CPSU support for the Indian party and to keep the policies 29 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1-7 Approved For Release 111111111111111111mb -02646R000400330001-7 of the Indian party consistent with the general strategy since 1955 conflicted with his desire to :protect the status and influence of the Indian party itself in the international movement. His demand that all members of the CP India refrain from public expressions of personal views on the issues of the 22nd congrOss was the best tactic he could think of to postpone the moment when the CP India would formally take a stand. This tactic was consistent with his efforts, particularly since 1955, to mediate between factions of the CP India in the hope of restoring a healthy and real unity. But, at a time when the CPSU had moved decisively to crush and eliminate dissidence in the movement, Ghosh's stand was clearly outdated. After his death in January, the Indian party found itself without a spokesman of comparable caliber to put forward the basically pro-Soviet policy position. The CPSU congress, however, appears to have had no adverse effect upon the CPI's political appeal, for it did rather well in the elections. 5. CP of Indonesia. In South Asia, the Indonesian party's challenge to the CPSU became even clearer than it had been. On 1 December the Chinese published the text of a speech that D.N. Aidit had obviously drafted while in Peking and that he had delivered on 23 November privately to a group of PKI leader on his return from the bloc. This speech was published in Djakarta. on 15 December and was followed the next day by a politburo resolution that called for a study of the issues by the whole party. A Central Committee plenum in late December endorsed these actions. a. The politburo resolution published gn 16 December endorsed the actions of the PKI delegation to the 22nd congress and expanded upon the views expressed by D.N. Aidit privately on 23 November and publicly on 27 November. The resolution explicitly repeated the most crucial of Aidit's criticisms Of the CPSU--his insistence that the Albanian dispute should not have been made unilaterally and publicly by the CPSU at its congress. This was now the official party position; it also went beyond Aidit's opinion by explicitly stating that the CPSU's action contravened the 81-party declaration. The resolution also called on party members to study materials from the Soviet, Albanian, and other parties on the issues already in public debate. 30 drall....1111106 CONFIDUlTiAl" Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-R Approved For Release 1999/08/24 a911.111.11111Wift- 0400330001-7 b. On virtually all other issues in dispute, the PKI, endorsing the CPSU program and accepting the CPSU's claim that action against the anti-party group and Stalin was necessary, clearly tried to make its views as palatable to the CPSU and Khrushchev as possible. Like Aidit on 23 November, it also tried to straddle the gap between Khrushchev and Mao by expressing its gratitude for the benefits the PKI derived from Aidit's discussions with both men. c. Other materials in the resolution that are drawn from Aidit's 23 November speech suggest PKI agreement with Chinese criticisms of Soviet foreign policy. Commenting on questions of international policy, the PKI, after endorsing the policy of peace- ful coexistence and the struggle for general and complete disarma- ment, went on to insist--as the Chinese have done--that the anti- imperialist, anti-colonial struggle must be given priority. By stating that Aidit had received guarantees from all the parties he consulted at Moscow that they would wholeheartedly suppoit the liberation of West Irian, the politburo at least intimated that the CPSU had committed itself without reservation to this particular liberation struggle. These features of the statement suggest that the PKI lacked confidence in the CPSU's commitment to all-out support of a direct anti-imperialist struggle and that it wished to make the assurances to the PKI a matter of record. Aidit's 23 November statement, finally published in Indonesia on 15 December, is more explicit than the resolution on this point. Aidit went to great lengths to identify the recovery of West Irian as a just, anti-imperialist liberation struggle, in the precise terms employed in the November 1960 declaration. d. Characteristically, the PKI also criticized Yugoslav revisionism as an attack upon the unity that is an essential condition for success in the anti-imperialist struggle. e. The Central Committee in late December endorsed the positions taken by the delegation to the 22nd congress--including, explicitly, the refusal to criticize Albania--and the politbureau 31 401111111.11iii? rrt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1 7 Approved For Release 190101104444?2646R000400330001-7 Ammo1111111111111111, resolution, as well as Aidit's speech of 23 November. Characte- ristically, Pravda's account on 6 January of the Central Committee meeting distorted its outcome: Albania is not mentioned, and it is made to appear that Aidit fully sympathized with de-Stalinization. Harian Rakjat's 9 and 10 January accounts of the deliberations make no mention of the Stalin issue. 6. CP of Australia. In December the Australian party's polit- buro issued a statement, which, like the Indonesian, approved the actions of its delegates to Moscow. It rejected the Albanian charges of revisionism against the CPSU and the Albanian post-congress attack on Khrushchev, and endorsed Khrushchev and the CPSU program. But it reaffirmed the Party's adherence to the provisions of the 81-party declaration governing relations between parties, and implicitly questioned the propriety of CPSU actions at the 22nd congress. The leadership was divided over these questions, but the majority (against a sub- stantial number of opponents and abstainers) brbught the Party officially into line with the CPSU, and a regional party leader identified with pro-Chinese views was purged in February. 7. CP of New Zealand. The New Zealand party, in a Political Committee statement published on 28 February, openly took issue with the CPSU's handling of the Stalin and Albanian problems. On Stalin, the party sided with the views of Aidit, and it complained that "some of the acts of 'de-Stalinization' had created misunderstanding and diversions"--particularly, the renaming of Stalingrad. The statement declared that it was "incorrect" to publicly air the Albanian question and to "introduce this question into the congress in the way in which it was done." The party had, it was announced, sent identical letters to the Soviet, Chinese, and Albanian parties calling upon them to meet and settle their differences, and proposing that "an inter- national conference might be necessary, in whicb case that would be the proper time and place for the New Zealand Party to put forward its opinions on the matters involved." The letter stated that the CPNZ would not take a partisan position, since 'our actions in any direction could only serve in widening and hardening the breach." Endorsing the letter, the Political Committee explicitly refused to 32 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA Approved For Release 1999/08/24 eiCLLaU,UwIL.m00.0400330001-7 0111111111111111.? denounce Hoxha as "non-Marxism, " as "many Parties have done", because "an objective discussion of the many points of criticism made of, and by, Comrade Hoxha and the Albanian Party.. .has not yet taken place." 8. French Communist Party. The French party, at the end of November, also made new and major moves. As part of its inner-party discussion of the 22nd congress it published, for party militants only, the full text of the speeches delivered by Thorez at the November 1960 Moscow conference. Like the publication of the Italian documents, this pamphlet incorporates all-out attacks on China and Albania, and is a significant step to create unity in- side the party. Contrasted with the FCP's efforts after the 20th congress to prevent any discussion of de-Stalinization in its ranks and its later efforts to conceal the extent and seriousness of the Soviet differences with the Chinese, it must be considered compelling evi- dence that the Thorez leadership was now convinced that the CPSU's determination to solve the questions of authority and discipline at any cost was firm. In this light, Thorez's attack in early December on the Italian party's right-wing and the 28 December attack by Raymond Guyot on both the Sino-Albanian left wing of the World Peace Council and on d'Astier de la Vigerie for his expression of right revisionist views concerning Soviet nuclear testing must be treated as purposeful steps by the leaders of a major free world party to carry out the simultaneous attack on the left and right dissidents that was called for by the Konstantinov article in Kommunist of early December. 9. CP of Belgium. After the congress, in November 1961, the Belgian party sent what was intended as a non-controversial letter of greetings to the Albanian party. While friendly, the message?unlike those from the Asian parties?pointedly referred to the lessons of the 20th, 21st, and 22nd CPSU congresses. When the message was exploited by Radio Tirana to imply CPB sympathy, the Central Com- mittee hastily adopted a resolution on 16 November condemning the Albanian leadership on all counts. Subsequently, acting on a Central Committee decision of 6-7 January, the party newspaper Drapeau Rouge published a series of discussion articles intended to contribute 33 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1 7 Approved For Release io111111111111111=7 -02646R000400330001-7 to the "renovation" of the party in accordance with the terms in which the leadership interpreted the 22nd congress. The articles stimulated a counter-action by a more conservative element within the leader- ship, in the form of a major dissident article on 22 February. The Politbureau issued a sharp rebuke in the same issue of Drapeau Rouge. The affair has not yet been settled, but the public discussion was suspended abruptly in March. a. Representative of the main discussion articles, is a series by Jean Terfve, appearing in Drapeau Rouge during January. In attacking the Albanians and Chinese, Terfve went further than the Soviets would themselves go publicly for fear of promoting revisionism in the Communist movement. He defined peaceful coexistence as a strategic objective upon which other Communist objectives depend. To accept the Chinese treatment of peaceful coexistence as a tactic would, he said, make alliances impossible and would alienate the neutral nations. The Chinese underestimate the dangers of thermonuclear war, a "qualitatively" different kind of a war. They overestimate the power of the imperialists and underestimate disagreements among imperialist leaders. They wrongly hold that the Soviet disarmament proposals undermine the national liberation struggle. On other -counts, Terfve challenged the Chinese. They failed to understand the need to raise living standards in the USSR and failed to see that "equalization" (massive Soviet aid to bloc economies) would weaken the USSR and the cause of peace. The "special" position reserved by the Chinese was due, perhaps, to idealism, backwardness, military experience, and nationalism. But this special position must be challenged because the Chinese line and the incompatibility of this line with that of Khrushchev affect not only the Communist movement, but the whole world. There- fore, Terfve concluded, the Belgian Communists had a "duty" to participate in the debate in the effort to achieve a "real synthesis." Meanwhile, disagreements should not be covered up and those who disagree should not be labelled "anti-Marxist. " b. The counter attack launched by Jacques Grippa on 22 February virtually called National Secretary Jean Blume a re- visionist and accused Terfve of at least advocating a split in the 34 ANIMMINemp Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : C Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA- 1111Nodimaft movement.* In most essentials, the arguments advanced by Grippa are similar to those of the Chinese. Peaceful coexistence is not a goal in itself, but a means to an end. Fear of war lulls the people. Material power alone is not enough and must be accompanied by political action. Imperialism must not be prettified and it is wrong to divide capitalists into "reasonable men" and "ultras." Ne- gotiations and disarmament proposals must be viewed as tactical maneuvers. Support for the peace struggle should not be sought from adversaries. National liberation struggles must be supported now, and so on. Concerning relations among parties, Grippa asserted that the PCB acceded to the criticism of Albania only on the grounds of violation of legality within that Party, but he deplored the fact that the matter was not discussed at an international conference, with the Albanians present, before the congress confronted the movement with a "fait accompli." The Soviets were wrong to break diplomatic relations, particularly in the light of the Yugoslav precedent. Terfve's criticisms of the Chinese amounted to a priori judgements with only one outcome: schism. He says that Blume asserts the right to pick and choose what he likes in the 81-Party Declaration of 1960. The CPSU has responsibilities to the other parties, said Grippa, and it is wrong for other parties to align mechanically with the CPSU. Finally, Terfve is wrong in alleging that the Chinese demand "equalization." c. The Politbureau's response to Grippa attacked his vehemence, his treatment of responsible comrades as if they were "enemies or agents of enemies, " and his "deliberate" manipulation of quotations from Blume. Basing its case largely on a refutation of Grippa's definition of peaceful coexistence as a intermediate, rather than a ultimate, objective, the Politbureau identified Grippa's positions All three are members of the Political Bureau. Grippa and Blume accompanied party chairman Burnelle to the 22nd congress. 35 4111111111/11111isso Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 -7 Approved For Release lv yoj4 41111111 2646R000400330001-7 as essentially those of the Chinese and proceeded to criticize them in the same terms the CPSU had been using since the Bucharest conference of 1960. Responsibility for the Sino-Soviet conflict was laid upon the Chinese for seizing upon the "restrictive clauses" of the 81-Party Declaration as the essence of the whole document, and the Soviet actions against Albania were justified as the only possible response to Albanian actions. d. Interpreting special significance of this exchange, with its extremely complex argumentation, is further complicated by the polemic techniques used. It seems likely that Grippa has tried to refute the Terfve criticisms of the Chinese case and, at the same time, to establish an ideological bridge between the Soviet and the Chinese stands. A total impression of his views is definitely close to the Chinese line and, in fact, he states that the Chinese are correct. On the other hand, on the question of the relationship of peace struggle and of peace policies, he stands on a position that Khrushchev himself has occupied. e. The dispute apparently caused considerable difficulty in the party. In late March Grippa was censured formally for his attacks, but no punitive measures have so far been taken against him. 10. CP of Chile. In Latin America the Chilean party secretary, Luis Corvalan, made a formal report to his Central Committee on 29 November that gives an excellent insight into the conclusions he drew from the CPSU's actions and the prelimin4ry discussions of them by Chilean party members. This report, the most explicit and coherent statement so far available from the pro-Soviet parties in the free world on the impact of the 22nd congress, was unanimously approved by the Central Committee on 1 December. a. Corvalan first drove home the ideaS that the CPSU was irrevocably committed to the new program, fully united and competent, and powerful enough to carry it through. Almost half his speech was devoted to this point. Acknowledging the existence in Chile of re- sistance to de-Stalinization, of demands for more details concerning 36 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: C Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R000400330L 001-7 CONHDENTIA allim11.11111111111P the charges made against the anti-party group, of confusion, demoralization, and mystification, he said that such reactions had to be expected and respected but that they would soon pass. He called for a display of confidence in the new course. b. Leaders, he said, had to show their confidence by the way they dealt with party members. He said that two kinds of mistakes were being made in dealing with questions and reactions from party members. He criticized those whose defensive reaction was to block discussion and to respond with criticisms of the failure of party members to do the work the party gave them. Speculation, on the other hand, he said, should be avoided, and arguments should be based on the facts already available. He said all talk of polycentrism should be rejected, since its recognition or acceptance would lead to nationalism, ideological confusion, and the weakening of international unity. All criticism of the CPSU's methods should be rejected, whether it dealt with methods against the anti-party group or against Albania. He said that the good luck of the anti-party group, who had not been shot and who still had the rights of every Soviet citizen, was enough to disprove the criticisms that had been expressed. c. The most important part of Corvalan's speech is his virtually Stalinist defense of the authority of the CPSU in his dis- cussion of the attack on Albania. He denied that the actions for which the Albanians were attacked were the internal affair of the Albanian party. Describing them as "ideological questions that recognize no frontiers," he said that the CPSU had always been and still was the directing center of the movement and had the responsi- bility, following Lenin's path, to carry on a principled struggle against left and right deviations in the international movement. In discussing this question he gave as a precedent the 1946 attack by Jacques Duclos on Browderite revisionism, which he said was absolutely just and appropriate. Corvalan's justification of the leading role of the CPSU is of considerable interest, for he said it was based neither on unilateral action by the CPSU nor on an agree- ment between parties but on historic circumstances. The obligation 37 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1-7 Approved For ReIeaseTr _ 441111111111111P ' of every Communist to be well disposed toward the USSR and the CPSU was not merely a matter of sentiment but of principle that had not in any way been changed by the denunciation of the crimes of Stalin's time. It was in this context that he explained the need to reject poly- centrism absolutely. He suggested also that a renewed attack on right revisionists would involve Yugoslavia, saying that true Communists there were obliged to struggle to reunite Yugoslavia with the bloc. d. Commenting on the question that had been raised in Chile concerning the Chinese party's position and the possibility of a schism in the Communist movement, Corvalan said that the future could not be predicted, but that in any event what was developing was a more solid unity of principle in the movement. Comparing the disputes and discussions of today to those that accompanied the creation of the Comintern, he said that "whatever the conduct of some, although some one or several may separate themselves fbr a time from the family of Communist parties, the unity, fraternity, health, and future of that family are assured." He committed the Chilean party to work along these lines, and to bring its members to abcept them. e. His final remarks suggested that factional maneuvering would no longer be tolerated in the party. He referred critically to steps taken in the Chilean party before the 22nd congress to conceal the reasons for the demotion of a regional secretary and to bypass a regional unit of the party in the preparations for an earlier party conference. 11. Brazil and Paraguay. a. Against the background of this part Df Corvalan's speech, the decision of the Brazilian party in December to expel a group of left-wing dissidents just after the secretary general, Luis Carlos Prestes, returned from discussions in Moscow may also be an out- growth of the CPSU's actions in October and November. An article in the party's weekly, Novos Rumos for 4-15 February, by one of the old-timers, Ivan Ramos Ribeiro, is of special interest. In addition to giving details on the circulation in several languages 38 4110111111111111111MW Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R 00400330001-7 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-R 0040 330001-7 41111.1111111mw of the Albanian resolution of 3 August 1961 on the Berlin dead-line-- a resolution characterized by Ribeiro as "dangerous" and "out- landish"--the article makes a distinction between "equality of rights" of all parties and "the idealist anarchorevisionist idea that these parties are equal." This argument of a more-equal- than-others CPSU is similar to one advanced by Ib Noerlund of the Danish CP in Tiden (January-February 1962), and the coin- cidence suggests Soviet inspiration. b. The resolution adopted by the Central Committee of CP Paraguay at the end of December falls into the pattern of the Brazilian actions. It gave unconditional support to the CPSU, attacked the Albanians for having in fact broken with the Com- munist movement and for putting weapons in the enemy's hands, and sharply criticized the Chinese for their support of Albania. The Paraguayan attack was replayed prominently by Pravda on 12 January, and its charges are similar to those set forth in the lead editorial of the January 1962 issue of Problems of Peace and Socialism. The March issue of this publication also cites the Paraguayan resolution, along with several others. 12. Soviet and Chinese maneuvers in the fronts. In the international fronts, the CPSU and its allies in the free world are moving cautiously, avoiding clashes in major meetings where the pro-Chinese representation is strong, but pushing hard to compro- mise and isolate the Chinese where they felt that they had pre- dominant influence. There is also evidence that the CPSU and its supporters have been provoking the Chinese at front meetings, while at the same time the most pro-Soviet of the Free World parties have been telling their own members that the Chinese have carried their factional activity into the international fronts, particularly in the peace movement. The maneuver in the secretariat of the IUS and WFDY can be considered as a characteristic Soviet-inspired effort to outflank and undermine the Chinese position to organizations where the Chinese are likely to have most support. The Chinese have held to their basic positions wherever clashes have occurred, but they have also 39 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1 7 Approved For Release ritel**144002646R000400330001-7 tried to avoid creating open factional splits, if only to deprive the CPSU of arguments to use against them. 13. The World Peace Movement. The peace campaign sparked through the World Peace Council is and will probably continue to be a major area of Sino-Soviet maneuvering in their dispute. A violent clash took place in the World Peace Council meeting in Stockholm, and a number of European Communist parties in letters sent to Peking later criticized asfactionalism Chinese efforts to influence their delegates to th.e meeting.. The Chinese efforts to enlist support in fact are concentrated mainly on Asian, African, and Latin American participants in organizations involved in the peace campaign. Within the Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) the Chinese have in effect accused the Russians of using "mechanical majorities" at the Stockholm WPC meeting for factional purposes. Although there appears to have been no open dissension at the most recent Vienna meeting of the WPC presidium in mid-March, the conflict continues. For the time being, the conflict in the peace movement is being felt at the level of national affiliates of the WPC and in other fronts. a. At the Stockholm WPC meeting (16-19 December), the top Chinese delegates Liao Cheng-chih and Liu sing-i promptly put on record their opposition to the general line of the WPC. As usual, they insisted that the struggle for peace required all peace forces to give full support to national liberation struggles as well as to campaigns for disarmament. They repeated standard Chinese views that the danger of nuclear war should not be stressed and that negotiations with imperialists and Soviet diplomatic aims should not be put ahead of revolutionary movements. On disarmament they said it could not be pushed to the point where it would affect countries still struggling for full national independence. The Soviet delegate Korneichuk tried to refute the Chinese aTguments, but the Chinese reportedly walked out on his speech. But the differences went far beyond this. b. A concerted attempt has been made by pro-Soviet leaders of the WPC since December 1961 to create the impression that 40 COW Approved For Release 1999/08 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: Cl 2646R000400330001-7 "0111111111111111110111111PP. the Chinese took the initiative in forcing a showdown at Stockholm over the title of the World Congress to be convened by the WPC in 1962. It has repeatedly been pointed out that, when a vote was taken on the question, the Chinese contingent was defeated by an overwhelming majority vote of 163 to 24. Raymond Guyot of the French party, Jean Terfve of the Belgian party, Velio Spano of the Italian party, and J. D. Bernal, president of the WPC, all have publicized this interpretation of the Stockholm events. But this seemingly simple explanation conceals what really happened. The Soviet-dominated Presidium of the WPC failed during the first three days of the meeting to overcome Chinese re- sistance or to isolate them. In fact, on the last day of the conference, draft resolutions prepared in all the commission meetings had been unanimously approved for submission to the final plenary session. It was in this final plenary that the Presidium entertained the resolution to call the World Congress a "Congress of Disarmament, Peace, and National Liberation," and called for a vote. It is not known who offered the resolution, but it seems most unlikely that the move was Chinese-inspired, for it was this vote, the first in the history of the WPC, that forced the Chinese to take a stand on a point of principle. The Chinese in fact privately attributed the decision to force this vote to the Soviet-dominated Presidium of the WPC. The Chinese also pointed out later that given the composition of the World Peace Council, a vote on a resolution so phrased was bound to be defeated, and the Chinese and their allies to be is olated. It seems likely therefore, that it was the Soviet group that created this test to expose the weakness of the Chinese faction. As a matter of fact, what the majority did endorse was the modified formula "Disarma- ment and Peace", which the Chinese group would under normal circumstances have endorsed without protest. The conference closed a day early, presumably at Soviet instigation. During most of the conference, the factional maneuvering actually centered on the discussions over the convening of a three- continent (Asia, Africa, Latin America) conference of national liberation and peace. The subject was put on the general agenda for the WPC 41 1111.111.1111111.11111111V Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1 -7 Approved For Release 1 99p1W24 ,..-crI,A-3,119F,',7p,,02646R000400330001-7 meeting at the last minute, although a delegatioh of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization came to Stockholm by pre-arrangement with the WPC secretariat to discuss the conference with Latin American delegates and to get an endorsement of their plan from the WPC. The first discussions of the three-continent conference took place in private between the Latin Americans and the Afro-Asian Solidarity delegation. It immediately became apparent that the pro- Soviet group among the Latin Americans were determined that the World Peace Council be accepted as one of the organizers of the three-continent conference. Earlier at Gaza the Chinese contingent had secured unanimous AAPSO approval of a plan that would have obliged the WPC to participate in the preparations only through its offshoot, the Peace Liaison Committee of the Asian and Pacific Region, located in Peking. One Brazilian also tried to predetermine the character of the three-continent conference by stipulating that it should take the same line on the interrelation .of national independence and peace that the March 1961 Latin American cOnference in Mexico city had followed. The AAPSO delegation refused to surrender on these points. At a hastily organized WPC plenaiy on the three- continent conference the next day, the Solidarity delegation head-- Hoang Muci, of North Vietnam?read to the gatliering the instructions given his delegation after the Gaza meeting of the AAPSO and then, during a speech by a Cuban delegate, led a walkout of all but the Soviet and Indian members of this delegation. Most of the African delegates to the meeting also walked out. In preparation for another meeting, six delegates--all pro-Soviet--from Cline, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Lebanon, and India, were empowered by the WPC Presidium to act as a committee for the WPC in,preparing the three- continent conference, thus depriving the AAPSO 'delegation of any basis for continuing their bilateral discussions directly with Latin American delegates, many of whom had earlier endorsed the main AAPSO proposals. This Presidium decision was announced when the meeting of all the Latin American and the AAPSQ delegations con- vened. The discussions were then broken off, with the Chinese protesting the Presidium's methods and the Soviet representative congratulating the Latin Americans for insisting on WPC partici- pation in future planning for the three-continent conference. 42 L Approved For Release 1999108/24 : CIA-RUP/WATZb4bKinni4w3.5IIIATT Approved For Release 1999/08/24: ceefffiftieffiligie0330001-7 The Chinese contingent, after the conference, privately criticized the Presidium's acts as those of a "fraction of the WPC", pointed to the absence of African representation on the Presidium, and said that "anti-imperialist militants" from Asia, Africa, and Latin America were never adequately represented in sessions and working bodies of the WPC. They also speculated that the methods of the WPC would never permit the organization to assume its "proper responsibilities toward the Afro-Asian peoples." Later in January, WPC president Bernal announced that the World Congress of Dis- armament and Peace would meet in Moscow in July. At Stockholm, it had been proposed that the three-continent conference meet in July. Here again, in the preempting of the date for a meeting, the "methods of the WPC Presidium" were being used to keep the Chinese at a disadvantage. c. At the WPC Presidium meeting in Vienna (17-19 March 1962), there was an apparent lull in the conflict within the WPC. A Chinese delegation attended, and all resolutions on preparations for the Moscow Congress were adopted unanimously. The WPC president, J. D. Bernal, said at a press conference that there had been no serious dissension during the meeting, although divergent views were, he claimed, still apparent. Other participants have made it clear that the Chinese still held to their basic views, but they also claimed that unity in the WPC had been restored. The only thing that can be said with confidence is that there was no effort made to provoke or isolate the Chinese, and the Chinese have not felt impelled to publicize their dissident views. d. Other such disputes as that which began between Terfve and Grippa in the Belgian party in January suggest that the impact of the dispute on the Peace movement is now being felt at the level of the national affiliates of the WPC, since Terfve is an important European Communist in the peace movement. Events in France, Japan, and Indonesia also suggest that this is the case. The WFTU too has become involved in the peace movement dispute. The question of giving a formal WFTU endorsement to the Disarma- ment Congress has apparently been discussed in WFTU headquarters 43 ONN/0/1///its, "ileettrah94444(1. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1-7 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 Cl - P78-02646R000400330001-7 but well-informed WFTU functionaries believed it likely that the WFTU would refrain from taking a stand and leave the matter of supporting the Congress up to each national affiliate. Such la formula would avert another direct confrontation between the USSR and China inside the WFTU. But factional maneuvering still occurs elsewhere. e. At the Afro-Asian Writers' Conference in Cairo (12-16 February 1962), Mao Tun, the Chinese Minister of Culture, denounced "unconditional peaceful coexistence" as opposed to "principled peaceful coexistence", saying that "sheep and wolves can never coexist peacefully." At one point, the Soviet delegate, Mirza Tursun-Zade, interrupted Mao to ask for respect and was caustically rebuked by Mao. Two pro-Soviet participants in the meeting, who had earlier participated in the Sto:ckholm WPC sessions, provoked and harrassed the Chinese-oriented group. The main policy clash occurred over a Soviet supported draft rebolution on disarma- ment offered by Nazim Hikmet, a Polish citizen, who nominally repre- sents Turkey in various international fronts. This resolution was denounced by the Chinese as "anti-national, anti-liberation", and was not carried. Mulk Raj Anand of India callea unsuccessfully for the throwing out of the general report of the organization's secretary. On two other less serious issues, --the choice of a site for the next writer's conference and the location of the Permanent Bureau--the Soviet contingent also lost out. An organizational change adopted at this meeting may, by increasing the Asian Communist and African representation in the policy-making machinery,- strengthen the position of those who diverge from Soviet policies in this offshoot of the Afro- Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization. Chinese factional strength in that organization is already apparent. 14. IUS and WFDY. Free world Communists supporting the CPSU in these fronts contributed to broadening the attack on the Albanians in the first post-Congress period. A Senegalese deputy secretary general of the International Union of Students and a Bolivian member of the secretariat of the World Federation of Democratic Youth who represented their organizations at the Albanian Youth Congress on 23-25 November, provided the basis in critical reports of the congress and of the treatment they receWed from the Albanians. 44 pprove or Release 999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R000400330001-7 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA- - 646R000400330001-7 The secretariats of the two organizations issued condemnations of Albania in early December, and the USSR and Poland publicized these actions fn mid-December. But neither organization had, as of mid-March, made any further move related to the dispute. A new attack on Albania was made at the Soviet Komsomal Congress in mid-April, in the presence of delegates from other national affiliates of the WFDY, but no open conflict developed. 15. WFTU. The WFTU Congress held in Moscow 5-16 December was a setback for the right-wing parties of the free world in spite of the Italian efforts to attack the Sino-Albanian left. The Italian representatives, who had criticized the secretariat of the WFTU for "retaining sterile and outmoded organizational ideas" and for incorporating mechanically too much of the CPSU's program and line into the WFTU program, made the open charge (in a single radio broadcast of 12 December) that these organizational ideas had the support in WFTU of the Albanians and of the French. The French and Italian delegates at the congress were in fact bitterly opposed to each other, but Soviet support apparently was given, that time at least, to the French party contingent. The Italian vice-president, Novella, a strong advocate of autonomy and polycentrisrn, was replaced by another Italian CP member, Renato Bitossi, who has never been involved in the PCI polemics and is considered loyal to Togliatti. Neither the Albanians nor the Chinese were attacked openly at the Congress. They participated fully in the Congress work and endorsed, apparently without reservations, both the draft program and the report submitted by Saillant. The program and report were sufficiently broad and militant to be acceptable. But, as with the 81 party declaration in 1960, both the Soviet and Chinese spokesmen emphasized in speeches and statements the particular aspects of the documents which were consistent with their basic views. By the end of the congress on 16 December, the Italian delegation, having found itself without support, yielded and approved the congress documents but only after formally stating its reser- vations. This clearly was done in the interest of maintaining unity with the CPSU. The proof is in Luigi Longo's speech to the PCI Central Committee December plenum. Speaking of his conversations 45 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1-7 Approved For Release 19 02646R000400330001-7 with representatives of other parties in Moscow at the end of November, he said that on international questiofis the Italian party would be presumptuous to think it could not learii from other parties and that many aspects of international reality had been inadequately analyzed by the PCI. He also said that the Italii`..n talk of polycentrism had aroused fears in other parties that it would lead to a weakening of international unity, and he proposed that the pci drop the term as a possible source of error and confusion. 46 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R 004003300 1-7 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP7a2a= 4=01-7 VII. Conclusions and Forecast 1. Assessment of Soviet success. So long as the Sino-Soviet dispute remains an unresolved issue, the full impact of the 22nd congress and its aftermath will not be apparent. Nevertheless, certain judgments can be made about the extent to which the CPSU has so far succeeded in reestablishing its hegemony within the Communist movement. First, the CPSU failed in its attempt to coerce the Chinese at the congress itself, and failed to isolate and discredit them completely, as Khrushchev had hoped. Whether the actions at the congress and the Soviet campaign afterwards will ultimately have better results remains to be seen. Second, Khrushchev did not completely succeed in his attempt to coerce the Albanians or to isolate them, either at the congress or later, although the Albanians were discredited mt,r.tit almost all free world parties, either as a result of Khrushchevrs charges against them or as a consequence of their own actions after the congress. Third, he failed to bring the entire movement to support him on de- Stalinization. Against these partial but important failures, must be balanced a significant success: after the congress the CPSU won a formal commitment from almost every free world party to its disciplinary authority, its program, and Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence strategy. The importance of this accomplishment emerges in a comparison with the situation at the end of the conference of 81 parties in November 1960. There, most (but not all) delegations had criticized the Albanians and the views of the Chinese, but this did not involve a formal commitment, since the directly relevant portions of the Soviet position(i.e., those con- cerning majority rule, factionalism, and the authority of CPSU congresses) were not included in the Declaration. By endorsing this compromise document, the commitment of the parties was essentially ambiguous, since the Declaration was interpreted in different ways by the Soviets on the one hand and the Chinese on the other. Now, for almost all free world parties, the program and decisions of the 22nd CPSU congress have virtually superseded the 1960 Declaration. 47 411111111111.111111 ? Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1-7 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R000400330001-7 1?111Mmiw Z. Impact on the free world parties and fronts. The immediate effect on the congress was to shake discipline on both the international and national levels. In sharp contrast with 1956, very little moral revulsion has been observed. The overriding coticern now is over the practical, political consequences. Nevertheless, the 22nd congress has had little apparent effect on the political power of the parties, so far as it can be judged from limited tests. 3. Forecast. On one point all the contenders agree--that the strength of International Communism is now greit enough to justify a new strategy. But, since its inception, the dispute has involved conflicting views of what that new strategy should be. For the free world parties the pressing, practical, and still unresolved question involved in the dispute is its effect, and that of the strategy finally adopted, upon their future fortunes and programs. Those who seem willing to see the CPSU carry the dispute to its logical con- clusion, forcing China into isolation, face a basic dilemma. A split would inevitably involve a weakening of the movement, and would at the same time invalidate their main argument for their pro-Soviet stand, that the Soviet strategy is acceptable precisely because the movement is so strong. Some try to evade this question by virtually equating the strength of the USSR with that of the move- ment, but this fails to carry much conviction. Those who insist on unity, on the other hand, must face the fact that the CPSU is formally committed by the 22nd congress decisions to its stand on Albania and de-Stalinization, and cannot retreat, except at the cost of repudiating the acts of at least some of its leaders. For the moment a stalemate seems to exist. In the past, internal conflicts of critical importance to the movement have been resolved eventually by familiar "Stalinist" methods: the crude general purges of 1936-39, and the more selective but equally ruthless operations of 1948-1951. After the 20th and 22nd congresses repudiated the old methods, it would be necessary at least to find a new way to achieve the same end. The search for a new method so far appears unsuccessful. 48 pprove or e ease : CIA-RDP78-02646R 00400330001-7 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R000400330001-7 For both extremes, there are compelling reasons to seek a solution that will not involve a full break. One formula has appeared that might legitimize the stalemate, avert a showdown, and win broad if grudging acceptance in the movement. It simultaneously reaffirms the basic principle of democratic centralism--i.e., of majority rule on practical decisions, and adds the essentially new idea--for the Communist world--that a dissident opinion can be held and expressed without having to be condemned as proof of factional activity. But nothing in the past, including the treatment of the CPSUrs anti- Party group, can encourage the belief that tolerance of dissent will be lasting. The "loyal dissent" device has already been employed at the international level by the Italian party, specifically at the WFTU congress, without provoking any immediate criticism or condem- nation by either the CPSU or the Chinese. The absence of any critical exploitation of the unprecedented split vote in the WPC Stockholm meeting falls in the same pattern. But attempts to invoke the same device within individual free world parties (for example in the Italian and Belgian parties--by Amendola and Grippa re- spectively) have provoked countermeasures which barely miss being punitive in character. If the CPSU can avoid a major setback in its general program and is willing to abstain from further intensi- fying its attack on Albania, a new international crisis might be averted for some time on the basis of some such formula. But the erosive effect of such a formula on the unity, elan, and discipline within at least the free world parties cannot be averted. It would be difficult to convince dissident minorities, pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese depending upon the party involved, that the device could properly be used at the international level but not at the national level. Pressure for more "inner party democracy"- a basic threat to the combat party character of every CP--would certainly appear time and again, in many forms. It might well be then, that the next general crisis--which eventually must, we believe, occur?would arise from one or more such factional struggles within the major parties of the world. But sooner or later, a ruthless method, as efficient if not as crude as those of the Stalin era, will almost certainly be required if monolithic unity and Soviet hegemony are to be fully restored. 49 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1-7 A! Approved For Release 1999108124: tik-Rt1etl:26446R000400330001-7 ammismomir APPENDIX A: The Positions Taken by the Free World Communist Parties Explanation of Tally-Sheet 1. Purpose. This tally-sheet attempts to show, by means of symbols and a rating system, how the individual Free World Com- munist Parties stood relative to each of the test is Stalin, China, and international policy--at the 22nd congress and what positions they took after the congress. It also includes notes on the impact of the congress on the parties. 2. Scoring system. In general, a party is rated on a scale ranging from .1.3, indicating full support of the Soviet positions at the congress, down through -3, indicating maximum agreement with the Chinese or Albanians on each test issue. A zero stands for a non- committal attitude, failure to mention one of the_test issues, or a position midway between the Soviets on the one hand and the Chinese or Albanians on the other. A dash indicates either that not enough material was available in a policy statement--in many cases, we have had to depend on summaries or excerpts--to enable us to make a judgment, or that the statement itself was not explicit enough to assess. Scores given in parentheses indicate either an assessment based on intelligence reports, rather than official Party statements, or an incomplete net in cases where the party's position on some issues could not be determined from published summaries and excerpts. 3. Criteria used in scoring. On the test issues the following criteria were used as consistently as possible. Albania +3 Condemned for policy, internal regime, and for breaking unity. +2 Condemned for one or two of these. 50 S-411111011.11C "ttntioefivithoti Approved For Release 999/08/24: CIA-RD 78-02646R 004 0330001-7 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: C +1 Mildly rebuked and begged to recant. 0 No commitment. -1 Differences deplored, but Albania not blamed and hope expressed for settlement on the basis of the 1960 Moscow Declaration. - 2 Sympathy shown for Albania, but no endorsement of her leaders. - 3 Explicit endorsement of Albanian leaders. Stalin + 3 Condemned for policy, crimes, and cult trappings. + 2 Condemned for one or two of these. +1 Stereotyped mention of the liquidation of the cult. 0 No mention. -1 Reservations or exceptions taken to some aspects of de-Stalinization (e.g., renaming Stalingrad or removal of Stalin's corpse). - 2 Assertion of right to judge Stalin independently. _ 3 Praise of Stalin. China + 3 Rejection of Chinese position at the Congress and afterwards as harmful to unity and of Chinese policy as wrong. + 2 Strongly phrased general reproval of Chinese support for Albania. 51 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1-7 Approved For Release 1 wn1JjI14 rld7A-KUrto-ruzr346R000400330001-7 +1 Milder reproof. 0 No commitment. (Minus scorings, indicating support of the Chinese positions at the congress, were found not needed). Policy + 3 Endorsement of peaceful coexistence policies associated with Khrushchev as correct, necessary, and of positive value to the parties. Or, full and explicit endorsement of Khrushchev's Central Committee report or of the decisions of the 20th, or 22nd CPSU congresses. Acceptance of peaceful coexistence, but with more emphasis on Soviet power and pressure tactics. + 1 Stereotyped endorsement, 0 Indication of preference for a balanced policy between peaceful coexistence and anti-imperialist action. - 3 Rejection of peaceful coexistence; strong emphasis on anti-imperialism. 4. Caveat. A degree of subjectivity in scoring was unavoidable. This is particularly true of the assessment of a party's attitude toward Soviet policy as expressed in the traditional effusiveness of speeches at the congress itself. Also, it must be kept in mind that formal policy statements issued by parties do not necessarily reflect the real at- titudes of leaders or the extent of disagreement among them. Some, who openly attacked Stalin most vigorously and therefore were given a score of plus 3 on that issue, are privately still very fond of him. 52 Approved For For Release 199910:1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R000400330001-7 EUROPE 4.111111111111111.11.11 13 3 < (t? a AFTER AT IMPACT AT CONGRESS AFTER CONGRESS CONGRESS m 00 0 ,..., .4 g M LI .-4 4 d H E. C/3 0 AUSTRIA +4 +10 CONSIDERABLE DISSATISFACTION WITH CONGRESS EXPRESSED AT CC PLENUM 15-16 NOV. AND IN LOCAL PARTY DISCUSSIONS. LEADERS EVENTUALLY ADOPTED VERY PRO-SOVIET POSITION, BUT EVIDENCE OF INDEPENDENT THINKING, SIMILAR TO THAT IN ITALY, IS SUBSTANTIAL +2 0 0 +2 BELGIUM +3 +II CONSIDERABLE DISSATISFACTION EXPRESSED, LEADING TO OPEN EXPRESSION OF PRO-CHINESE VIEWS BY GRIPPA AND HIS CONDEMNATION BY POLITBUREAU. FREE DEBATE IN PARTY PRESS AT LEAST AS UNINHIBITED AS IN ITALY. BEGAN LATER AND EXTENDED OVER A LONGER TIME. 0 0 0 +3 CYPRUS (+3) +9 CONSIDERABLE DISSATISFACTION IN LEADERSHIP OVER RAISING OF STALIN ISSUE, PARTICULARLY AS IT COULD BE EXPLOITED BY THE OPPOSITION TO EMBARRASS THE PARTY. +3 - - DENMARK +5 +9 LARSEN'S DISSIDENT PARTY GAINED IN LOCAL ELECTIONS. 0 +2 0 +3 FINLAND +6 (+12) SOME IMPACT ON INTELLECTUALS. PARTY'S POLITICAL POSITION NOT HURT. +3 0 0 +3 FRANCE +7 .1-Il CONSIDERABLE IMPACT, PARTICULARLY AT LOWER LEVELS. LEADERSHIP CONTROL APPEARS UNHURT. DISSIDENT SPLINTERS VIGOROUSLY EXPLOITING ISSUES TO ATTACK PRESENT LEADERS. +3 +2 0 +2 GERMANY (WEST) +4 +9 NEGLIGIBLE. +2 0 0 +2 GREAT BRITAIN 0 +9 LEADERSHIP OBVIOUSLY UNHAPPY ABOUT CONGRESS ACTIONS ON ALBANIA, BUT APPARENTLY LITTLE IMPACT ON PARTY RANKS. CONCERN FOR FUTURE EXPRESSED BY SOME LEADERS. 0 0 0 0 GREECE +8 +9 BAD DEFEAT OF FRONT PARTY (PAME) BEING ATTRIBUTED BY SOME IN PART TO CONGRESS ACTIONS. THIS LED TO BICKERING IN (PAME) LEADERSHIP. +3 +2 0 +3 ICELAND +3 ( -3) CONSIDERABLE DEFENSE OF STALIN IN PARTY RANKS AND LEADERSHIP. SECRET RESOLUTION REPORTEDLY INCLUDED STRONG PRO-STALIN STATEMENTS. 0 0 0 +3 IRELAND (NORTH) +3 0 0 0 +3 0 b lin -., (tO CT +3 +3 +1 +3 A) w 4:0 +3 .2 +3 +3 CD (.0 03 +3 +3 0 +3 FJ 4=k +3 +3 0 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +2 Co +2 +2 +2 +3 a I%) +3 +3 0 +3 Ci) 4=k +3 +3 0 +3 a a + (+3) + - CD CD 04 CD - .4 fililiali1111111* - 1 aminspi. -C) IMPACT AT AFTER CONGRESS CONGRESS AFTER AT CONGRESS CD a 1-4 2 H a E. 0 -n IRELAND (REPUBLIC) +3 0 0 0+3 0 2 IMPACT STRONGER EVEN THAN IN 1956. REMARKABLY OPEN EXPRESSIONS OF X INDEPENDENCE. YOUTH ORGANIZATION, CALUNG FOR RE-EXAMINATION OF ITALY +9 1-10 TROTSKY, HAD TO BE DISCIPLINED. TOGLIATTI APPEARS TO HAVE OUT- MANEUVERED"RENOVATIONIST"WING IN DEBATE SO FAR, BUT MANEUVERING FOR CONTROL OF POSITIONS STILL IN PROGRESS. LUXEMBOURG - +7 ANTI-SOVIET STATENENTS MADE PRIVATELY BY ONE CF THE RIVALS FOR LEADERSHIP. SONE DISSATISFACTION IN LEADERSHIP WITH DE GROOT'S TACTIC AT THE CONGRESS OF BASING HIS POSITIONS ON THOREZ. CRITICISM OF PARTY NETHERLANDS +5 -18 NEWSPAPER FOR TAKING DEFENSIVE ATTITUDE DURING CONGRESS. RE- SENTMENT IN PARTY ABOUT RE-NAMING STALINGRAD. NORWAY +3 (-F6) * MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, AS PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA 29 OCTOBER. SAN MARINO ( +5 ) (+2) ** IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THE PARTY'S POSITION ON SOVIET POLICY DID NOT CHANGE AFTER THE CONGRESS. +3 +3 0 +3 +3 +3 +1 +3 +2 +3 0 +2 +3 0 0 +2 +3 +3 0 +2 0 0 0 +3 +3 - - +3 +2* 0 0 +3* -1 - - (+3)** 4:1 c7 A) (f) 4:1 C.0 C.0 C.0 CD 03 .....?, 4N. ? ? PROBABLY NEGLIGIBLE, ALTHOUGH THERE IS SOME SLIGHT AND INDIRECT SPAIN +5 -112 EVIDENCE OF FRICTION IN THE LEADERSHIP. PARTY NEWSPAPER, WHICH INDIRECTLY EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION WITH CONGRESS, AND PARTY LEADER HAGBERG, WHOpRAGGED HIS FEET ON SWEDEN +6 +II CONGRESS ISSUES AFTERWARDS, WERE BOTH UNDER ATTACK BY STRONGLY PRO-CPSU YOUNG GUARD. ATTEMPTS MADE TO DIVERT PARTY MEMBERS' ATTENTION FROM ISSUES IN DISPUTE, AND TO MOBILIZE SUPPORT FOR SOVIET POSITIONS. DISSENSION, SWITZERLAND +3 +7 AND ACKNOWLEDGENE NT OF SERIOUSNESS OF DISPUTE EXPRESSED BY A REGIONAL PARTY LEADER TO A REGIONAL MEETING. TURKEY -1-6 PORTUGAL +5 +8 +3 0 0 +2 +3 +3 +3 +3 0 +3 0 +3 +3 +3 +2 +3 0 0 0 +3 +2 +2 +1 +2 +3 0 0 +3 +2 0 0 +3 +3 +2 0 +3 0 )1> Ai 0 "0 > 1:3 -0 3 < CD m 0 X CD CD 13.1 Cn CD CD CD CD Co 17.;....) 4=1. . . 0 5. 0 13 "..1 a) cb IN3 co 4=1. co 73 a a a 4N. a a CA) C) a a MIDDLE EAST/AFRICA .-._.--1 ? , L -.......,,, AT CONGRESS . ?., ...', AFTER 41011/11111111111111gr ......"-r-.1,. , IMPACT AT CONGRESS 0 . 0 m '49 DI CD 44 AFTER CONGFE SS 0 . ri LO 0 4 V -0 -0 3 CD a. M 0 7:1 CD ALGERIA +3 +70 0 0 +3 +2 +2 0 +3 al ao CEYLON +7 ( +3) REPORTED THAT POLITBUREAU DECIDED DURING THE CONGRESS TO OMIT PASSAGES FROM KHRUSHCHEV 17 OCT. SPEECH CRITICIZING ALBANIA AND INSTRUCTED KEUNEMAN TO AVOID COMMITMENT ON ALBANIA AND STALIN. SONE MEMBERS PRIVATELY CRITICAL OF REMOVAL OF STALIN CORPSE. NATIONAL ORGANIZER SILVA, FORMERLY PRO-CHINESE, BECAME PRO- SOVIET SINCE CONGRESS. +2 +2 0 +3 - - 0 +3 (i) CD CD CD CD INDIA +3 - LEADERSHIP DECIDED NOT TO TAKE OFFICIAL POSITION TILL AFTER ELECTIONS, LEST DEBATE PRODUCE A SPLIT AND HURT POLITICAL CHANCES. SOME REGIONAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS ISSUED PRO- STALIN AND PRO-ALBANIAN STATEMENTS. PARTY DID WELL IN THE ELECTIONS 0 0 0 +3 Co IRAN +5 ( +6) +2 0 0 +3 +3 +3 0 IRAQ +8 +12 +2 +3 0 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 I .; ISRAEL +8 +12 CONSIDERABLE CRITICISM BY PARTY RANKS OF LEADERS' FAILURE TO GIVE GUIDANCE ON STALIN, ALBANIAN, AND CHINESE ISSUES AND FOR TAKING PRO KHRUSHCHEV POSITION AT THE CONGRESS. PARTY NEWS PAPER NOTED EXISTENCE OF SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE FOR FIRST TIME ON 24 NOV. DESPITE CC COMMITMENT TO FULL SUPPORT OF CONGRESS ACTIONS, SECRETARY GENERAL MIKUNIS ADMITTED STALIN: S MERITS AT CLOSED MEETING 16 DEC. +3 +2 0 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 0 13 -...4 03 4:5 K.) 01 JORDAN +5 - +2 0 0 +3 LEBANON +6 (+3) +3 0 0 +3 - .3 MOROCCO +7 +9 +2 +2 0 +3 +3 0 +3 J3. NEPAL - (-I) PRO-SOVIET FACTION WANTED TO KEEP SILENCE ON STALIN, BUT PRO- CHINESE FACTION PUBLISHED PAMPHLET PRAISING STALIN. (NOT RJBLIGLY IDENTI- FIND AS ABSENT) - -1 - - CD (A) 4.1 CD (7 AT AFTER A) CONGRESS 0 CD mai I MI 1 I I I I II P 111 P IMPACT C CD PAKISTAN +3 CD (.0 REUNION +6 CD 03 SOUTH AFRICA +4 +7 LITTLE IMPACT. *POSMONS ASSESSED FROM EDITORIAL IN AFRICAN COMMUNIST, AN SACP ORGAN. 4=k SUDAN +6 IMPACT INSIGNIFICANT, BUT PARTY RANKS CONTINUE TO PRAISE STALIN AND TO EXCUSE HIS FAULTS. SYRIA +5 THE ONLY EXPRESSION OF VIEWS AVAILABLE IS THAT OF SECRETARY GENERAL BAKDASH, WHO LIVES IN THE SOVIET BLOC. TUNISIA +6 +10 *ON BASIS OF SCORE ON POLICY AT THE CONGRESS, THIS SHOULD PROBABLY BE +3. AT CONGRESS 2 5 AFTER CONGRESS - CD a.0 CD CD CD CD en 6 0 0 +3 CD +3 0 0 +3 Co 0 +1 0 +3 +2* +2* 13* +3* 4=k +3 0 0 +3 +2 0 0 +3 +3 0 0 +3 +3 +3 +1 (+)k) 5.3 /11.000??0017000N9179Z0-8/dC1N-V10 : 17Z/80/6661. eseeieN .10d peACMCIdV WESTERN HEMISPHERE AT CONGRESS AFTER IMPACT AT CONGRESS A g ca 2 AFTER CONGRESS A c (t? a -n 0 (i) CT) 11.1 ARGENTINA +9 +9 DEBATE SUPPRESSED BY LEADERSHIP TO AVOID EXPLOITATION BY-OPPOSITION, PARTICULARLY TROTSKYITES. SUCCESS OF PARTY?PERONISTA ALLIANCE IN MARCH ELECTIONS INDICATES CONGRESS HAD NO ADVERSE LOCAL POLITICAL EFFECT. +3 +3 0 +3 +3 +3 0 +3 fp C.0 C.0 W BOLIVIA +5 _ +2 0 0 +3 a co BRAZIL +7 +8 LEFTIST MINORITY FACTION CONTINUES TO BE REMOVED FROM POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY; NOW FORMING NEW GROUP AND LOOKING FOR CHINESE SUPPORT. +2 +2 0 43 *3 +2 0 +3 ilZ3 4=k . . CANADA -1-3 +5 0 0 0 +3 +2 .. * +3 0 CHILE +6 +12 PARTY MEMBERS DISTURBED BY 22ND CONGRESS AND BY CORVALANS PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT OF IT WITHOUT CONSULTING LOWER UNITS. CORVALAN PRIVATELY UNHAPPY ABOUT TREATMENT OF ALBANIA. SERIOUS DISSENSION REPORTED IN COMMUNIST YOUTH ORGANIZATION. +2 +2 0 +2 *3 +3 +3 +3 COLOMBIA +6 +6 +3 0 0 +3 +2 +2 0 +2 03 COSTA RICA +3 +8 PARTY SENT LETTER TO CPSU ENDORSING CONGRESS ACTIONS. .3 0 0 +3 +2 0 +3 a 11/41 CUBA +6 +7 +2 +2 0 +2 *2 +2 0 +3 CD 4=k DOMINICAN REPUBLIC +3 ? 0 0 0 .3 X ECUADOR +2 ? LEADERSHIP DECIDED NOT TO ISSUE STATEMENT FOR FEAR CF RAISING PROBLEMS, BUT IT SUPPORTS CPSU. +2 0 0 0 (+2)(+2) ? ? CD a a CD a CD (7) a) CD CD CD CD a co 0111111MMIIIIImo GQ41614;04+64. AT CONGRESS AFTER IMPACT GUADELOUPE +2 GUATEMALA +6 HAITI +5 MARTINIQUE +I +9 MEXICO -1-3 +9 REMOVAL OF SOME CC NE.MBERS IN DECEMBER IS RELATED TO SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE. LEADERS ARE PRO-SOVIET, BUT SOME MEMBERS ARE PRO- CHINESE. NICARAGUA +6 PANAMA +6 NO APPARENT IMPACT. PARAGUAY +12 PERU +5 PARTY LEADER HAS SAID THAT ISSUES WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT A PARTY CONGRESS AND THAT IT COULD CAUSE A DIVISION IN THE RANKS. SALVADOR +2 URUGUAY +9 +12 PARTY WAS FIRST IN LATIN AMERICA TO IMPLENENT CPSU CONGRESS LINE IN PRACTICE. ORDERED BOOKSTORE TO DESTROY CHINESE MATERIALS AND STALIN WRITINGS, PISCONTENT AT LOWER 1-EVELE CAUSED LEADERSHIP TO OPEN PARTY-WIDE DEBATE. DISCONTENT CONTINUES. ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS DROPPED. PARTY CONGRESS POSTPONED FROM FEB. TO MAY. U. S. +6 +12 PUBLICATION OF ATTACK ON "DISRUPTERS" 28 JAN. INDICATES EXISTENCE OF SIGNIFICANT SYMPATHY FOR ALBANIA AND CHINESE. PRO-ALBANIANS EXPELLED. VENEZUELA +6 PARTY PREOCCUPIED WITH VIOLENCE AND SABOTAGE. NO FORMAL PRO- NOUNCEMENT ISSUED. AT CONGRESS AFTER CONGRESS 1 0 +3 0 +1 +3 +3 +2 +2 +3 +3 +3 .5 5 g 4 0 0 +2 +3 - - +3 - 0 *2 0 0 *1 +3 +3 0 +3 0 0 +2 +3 +3 0 +3 0 0 +3 +1 0 +2 +3 +3 +3 +3 0 0 +3 0 0 0 .3 0 +3 +3.3 +2 +3 0 0 +3 +3 +3 +2 +3 0 0 +3 CONFID L. ? 03 6 K.) 4b? 43k ID 0 Ca,i) itaa4 CD CD fl) Cl) CD" CD FAR EAST AT CONGRESS AFTER IMPACT AT CONGRESS 0 r. m Pi .4 n AFTER CONGRESS m z =HA? P '12 CD CD Co AUSTRALIA 0 +8 SENT GREETINGS TO ALBANIA, BUT LATER CONDEMNED HOXHA FOR HIS SPEECH OF 7 NOVEMBER. LEADERSHIP SHIFTED POSITION ON ALBANIA AND AWAY FROM CHINA IN FAVOR OF THE CPSU. OPPOSITION TO SHIFT EXISTS IN LEADERSHIP. REGIONAL PARTY LEADER PURGED. 0 0 0 U .3+2 0+3 4=k . . 0 BURMA 0 --6* EXTREME LEFTIST RED FLAG PARTY AND YOUTH OPPOSE CPSU. OPENLY DEFY DE-STALINIZATION. THE RECOGNIZED BCP OPPOSES CPSU ON ALBANIA LEGAL FRONT BWP-NUF SEEMS TO SUPPORT CPSU. *RED FLAG POSITION. 0 0 0 0 .3_3*- 0 INDONESIA (-4) ?5 SHIFT OF FORMERLY PRO-SOVIET LEADERSHIP TOWARD CHINA ON ALBANIAN AND STALIN ISSUES HAS STRENGTHENED UNITY. SOME EVIDENCE THAT LINE ON DOMESTIC POLICY MAY ALSO BE SHIFTING TO LEFT. IMPENDING SPECIAL CONGRESS ACTIONS COMPLICATED BY SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT. (-3)(-1) 0 0 -2 0 -3. 03 cb JAPAN 0 0 CONTINUED FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP TO TAKE A PARTISAN POSITION MAY BE DUE TO FEAR THAT IT WOULD AGGRAVATE LONG?STANDING FACTIONALISM, BUT IT ALSO CONTRIBUTES TO INCREASING LOSS OF DISCIPLINE. EXPELLED KASUGA FACTION EXPLOITING CONGRESS CONCLUSIONS. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4o. MALAYA 0 ?3 0 0 0 0 a a NEW ZEALAND 41 ?4 LEADERSHIP PRIVATELY VERY BITTER ABOUT ATTACK ON ALBANIA. ISSUED STATEMENT CRITICIZING ACTIONS ON STALIN AND ALBANIA. CONCERN FOR FUTURE EXPRESSED. 0 0 0 +1 -2-2-0 a 4o. THAILAND 0 U 0 0 a a a a a CD (7 su Cl) CD ?a CD CD CD a oo 4)k -o Co 4)k CD rleVIIPPM78-02646R000400330001-7 . . CHART SHOWING SHIFTS OF POSITION OF FREE WORLD PARTIES AFTER THE CONGRESS EUROPE 2 1 0 5, 1133TRITA BELGIUM CYPRUS DENMARK FINLAND nANCE GERMANY (WES ) GREAT BRITAIN GREECE ICELAND IRELAND (NORTH) IRELAND (REPUBLIC) ITALY LUXEMBOURG NETHERLANDS NORWAY PORTUGAL SAN MARINO SPAIN SWEDEN SWITZERLAND TURKEY NEAR EAST-AFRICA ALGERIA CEYLON INDIA IRAN IRAQ ISRAEL JORDAN LEBANON MOROCCO PAKISTAN REUNION SUDAN SYRIA TUNISIA SOUTH AFRICA 7 5 5 10 Ii .2 WESTERN HEMISPHERE ARGENTINA BOLIVIA BRAZIL CANADA COLOMBIACHI LE COSTA RICA CUBA DOMINICAN REPUB LTC ECUADOR -GUADELOUPE GUATEMALA. HAITI MARTINIQUE MEXICO NICARAGUA PANAMA PARAGLI.Y PERU SALVADOR URUGUAY U. 5.A. VENEZUELA FAR EAST AUSTRALIA BURMA INDONESIA JAPAN MALAYA NEW ZEALAND THAILAND 9 10 11 12 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA- Approved For Release 1999/ ? CIA-RDP7,8-02646R000400330001-7 11111111.1111.114111.111.00 Explanation of the Chart Showing Shifts of Position of Free World Parties after the Congress 1. The parties are grouped regionally. 2. Parties are accorded the scores as shown in the Tally-Sheet at and after the congress. The direction of shifts in position is indicated by arrows. A dashed arrow indicates a presumed shift from an unknown or incompletely documented position at the congress to a known position afterwards. A single dot without an arrow in- dicates the score accorded the party at the congress; its post-congress position is not sufficiently known to score it. A circled dot indicates that the net score at and after the congress has not changed. 3. Average net regional scores, taking into account only adequately documented positions, are as follows: At the congress After Europe + 4.2 + 8.9 Middle East-Africa + 5. 5 + 9. 5 Western Hemisphere + 4. 9 + 8. 8 Far East - 0. 4 - 1. 4 Note the closeness of the average scores of the pro-Soviet areas at and after the congress. 53 111111111111Nalliniiift Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1 -7 Approved For Release 00400330001-7 APPENDIX B: Questions Raised for the rree World Parties as a Result of the 22nd CPSU Congress On Stalin and the Anti-Party Croup* Revisionist questions 1. Does the phenomenon of Stalin have roots in some basic defects of the Soviet system? Why did the CPSU choose to ignore Lenin's warning about Stalin's character and what other critical choices did the CPSU make in subsequent years that contributed to Stalin's omnipotence? Do the principles of the monolithic party, the rule of unanimity, and the one-party tradition have something to do with this? Why was the party unable to resist Stalin and why did it take so long after his death to even begin the process of de-Stalinization? 2. Is the Soviet explanation of Stalinism Marxist-Leninist and is it convincing? How can the argument that Stalin decided everything be reconciled with the argument that the party remained sound and that democracy prevailed below the t41? Is the argument that Stalinism was a cancer in a basically sound body consonant with historical materialism or is it not an idealistic argument? How can it be that a leader who has been good suddenly becomes bad? If Stalin was wrong about his victims during the great purges of the 1930's, might he not also have been wrong earlier? Is it not advisable to re-examine the historical position of Trotsky and others purged by Stalin? 3. Does the unilateral denunciation of Stalin by people who rose to high positions under him really guarantee that Stalinism Note: On this question, a pattern of divisio-n between re- visionist and oppositionist questioning is discernible and is treated accordingly. No such pattern emerges very clearly on the other issues. 54 4.111MIOMIT COI( -+U diEt ft tAL Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : C Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA 000400330001-7 - aseum111111Mmitip is finished? Are not these people doing things the way Stalin himself did? Why was Molotov prevented from defending his views. Are the present Soviet leaders credible when they claim that they were ignorant of what Stalin was doing, and does this claim not prove the dangers of a closed society? To what extent do Khrushchev and his team share responsibility for Stalin's mistakes and crimes, and should they be relieved of the necessity of personal self-criticism? Oppositionist questions 1. What right has Khrushchev to expose the Stalinist period as one of crimes, deceit, and sycophancy? What right has he to make other parties historically guilty of Stalinism and to provoke anti-leadership movements in other parties? 2. Why does Khrushchev minimize Stalin's achievements--which made the USSR what it is today? How can these achievements be recon- ciled with the Soviet argument that Stalin seriously damaged the cause of Communism? Questions asked by pro-Soviet and oppositionist leaders alike 1. Was it necessary to remove Stalin's corpse from Lenin's mausoleum? 2. Was it necessary and proper to re-name Stalingrad and to do away with other relics of Stalin? 3. Was it proper to attack Voroshilov? Albania and China 1. Was it proper to condemn Albania publicly and without an adequate hearing? Does the action of the CPSU bind other parties to take the same position? Is it proper for the Chinese--and other -A, parties--to take different positions? 55 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1-7 Approved For Release 1999/08/04.1i16R000400330001-7 4?11111111Miiilltb 2. Why did the leaders persist in denying rumors of differences of opinion? (In some countries, why did the party newspaper delete critical passages from Congress materials?) 3. What is the real reason for Sino-Soviet differences: strategic economic, or a result of different historical experiences and psychology? 4. Has the CPSU in fact resorted to improper pressures and intrigues against Albania (and China)? National Leadership and Discipline 1. To what extent are Communist leaders Outside the bloc responsible for Stalinism? Were they really so ignorant as they now claim? Do they now really understand what is happening and should party members accept their perhaps still faulty ?planations as correct? 2. To what extent should free world parties try to influence the CPSU to complete the de-Stalinization proce4s and to provide a better explanation for what happened and more convincing guarantees that it cannot happen again? 3. How independent and critical can a party be toward the CPSU? Should the parties be autonomous? Is regional decentra- lization of authority ("polycentrism") advisable or permissible. To what extent is it proper to openly criticize other CPs (other than the CPSU)? 4. What is the proper method for settling differences between parties and for arriving at international decisions? Should state- ments be compromised so as to obtain unanimity that is.formal but not real? Should unresolved problems be left out of joint statements? Should majority rule prevail? 56 41011111111111m Approved For Release 1999/0 /24 : CIA-RDP78.02646R 00400330001-7 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA- 000400330001-7 IAL dilisiiiiiimila 5. How much democracy should be allowed inside a party? Should a minority be allowed to publish its position? 6. How can Communists retain confidence in the ability and wisdom of the CPSU in light of all the mistakes that have been expo sed? 7. How can Communists convince others that the CPSU is doing the right thing now and that its policies should be supported as sincere ones? 57 ZIERIRMIIIIIIIIP Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R00040033000 1-7