THE VIET CONG SECURITY SERVICE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02646R000600180001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 129
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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Declassification/Release Instructions on File
TRAMPOLINE # 1
THE VIET CONG SECURITY SERVICE
July 1967
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THE VIET CONG SECURITY SERVICE
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FOREWORD
This study is the product of a joint effort of
U.S. civilian and military organizations in Saigon
and Washington. Based principally on captured
documents and POW reports, much of the information
contained herein is dated and may not reflect the most
recent organizational and operational, changes of the
Vietnamese Communist security apparatus. Such
changes will be dealt with in supplementary memoranda.
Specialized and more detailed supplements are also in
preparation.
Since the study is designed principally for use
in the field, a maximum effort was made to employ
standard translations of Viet Cong phraseology. Viet
Cong place-names are used throughout (See attached map).
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Foreword
Summary
Chapter I
Introduction
7
Chapter II
The Security Section of the Central Office of
19
Chapter III
South Vietnam
The Special Case of Region IV: The Saigon-
34
Chapter IV
Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Zone
Other Regional Security Sections
Chapter V
Provincial Security Sections
53
Chapter VI
The Viet Cong Security Apparatus in the Districts,
Villages, and Hamlets
Chart 3
Chart 4
Chart 5
Chart 6
Chart 7
CHARTS
Viet Cong Security Service Chain of Command 6
A Typical Viet Cong Organization
The Security Section of COSVN
Possible Composition of the Region IV
Security Apparatus
Possible Composition of a Region Security 50
Section
A Typical Province Security Section
Table of Organization of a District Security Section 78
South Vietnamese Government and Viet Cong
Administrative Boundaries
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The Allies in Vietnam face a large, well-organized, and highly
professional Communist security, apparatus. In its tasks of protecting
the Viet Cong infrastructure from Allied intelligence penetrations and in
maintaining security in Communist held territory in South Vietnam, the
apparatus, which is an organic part of the Ministry of Public Security
(Bo Cong An) of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, is both efficient
and ruthless. Possibly 15 - 20, 000 strong, it operates in regions
dominated by the Viet Cong9 in contested areas, and in regions under
South Vietnamese control.
Its functions in the government-controlled areas are the manifold
ones of a Communist State Security Service operating both at home and
abroad. They resemble those of the KGB in Soviet-occupied territory
or of the Ministry of Public Security of the Democratic Republic of China
as it operates in Hong Kong and Taiwan, Viet Cong security service
(often called An Ninh) case officers are tasked with penetrating Allied
security and intelligence organizations and in placing agents in South
Vietnamese political parties .and religious sects. A document captured
in March 1967 indicates that clerks, cryptographers, radio operators,
and workers at message centers at South Vietnamese military intelli-
gence and police agencies are given top priority for recruitment as
penetrations. An Ninh "Armed Reconnaissance" groups assassinate
("execute") or kidnap ("arrest") government police and intelligence
officials, and conduct raids on Allied intelligence and security instal-
lations. Other agents in government territory draw up black lists of
government officials to be executed in the event of a Viet Cong victory.
The role of the apparatus in areas dominated by the Viet Cong is.
principally defensive. It recruits large numbers of security agents and
informants in Viet Cong villages and hamlets and investigates suspected
Allied agents and "reactionaries." Its legal apparatus runs interrogation
facilities and jails throughout the Viet Cong areas of South Vietnam. It
executes suspects found guilty of cooperating with the Allies. Others are
given prison sentences. The number of such executions each year in Viet
Cong territory probably runs into the several thousands. Security
Service jails incarcerate additional thousands.
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Experience is one of the Viet Gong Security Service's principal
assets. Far older than the South Vietnamese police system, the Viet
Cong service probably began in the early thirties, shortly after the
creation of the Vietnamese Communist Party ("Workers" or Lao Dong
Party) by Ho Chi Minh. Histories of the Party during World War II
suggest that the service was active during the early forties. Its
existence was not openly acknowledged, however, until 1946, when Ho
Chi Minh announced the creation of the Ministry of Public Security
(MPS). Numerous documents indicate that the security apparatus,
under MPS control, was active throughout Vietnam during the struggle
against the French.
After the Geneva Accords of 1954, the apparatus in the North
became a typically pervasive -- but legal -- Communist police bureau-
cracy. In the South, with the accession of Diem to power in the spring
of 1954, the security apparatus went deep underground. MPS-guided
security officials continued to operate during Diem's early years, as
part of the clandestine Communist apparatus.
The Ho Chi Minh Government, acknowledging to itself that it
could not overthrow Diem by legal means, decided in 195,9 that violence
was the only course left open. Thus, in 1959 and 1960, the North
Vietnamese government began sending substantial numbers of infiltra-
tors South. Among the first were MPS security officials. To begin
with, these officials came individually, or in small groups attached to
larger groups of infiltrating personnel. In 1962, however,,the Ministry
apparently decided to systematize the infiltration of its personnel into
the South and began training large groups of them at its security school
in Ha Dong, just outside of Hanoi. The first seventy-man security
group probably arrived in South Vietnam in mid-1963. Similar groups
have been marching South ever since. It would be reasonable to
estimate that the infiltration rate of MPS personnel into the South is at
least 500 men a year. The rate may be considerably higher.
The significance of the infiltration of officials of the MPS is not
in their quantity but in the positions they hold. Infiltrators man many
of the top posts in the security apparatus throughout South Vietnam.
The chief of the Security Section of the Central Office of South Vietnam
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(COSVN), for example, is believed to have come from the North. So
have many chiefs of Security Sections in the lower echelons.
The organization of the security apparatus, although seemingly
complex, is actually quite simple. Each echelon owes allegiance to
two immediate masters: the security. hierarchy of the next higher
echelon, and the Current Affairs Committee of the party organization at
its own level. Each echelon above district level also is subject to orders
from the Ministry in Hanoi. The COSVN Security Section.is subordinate
both to the Current Affairs Committee of COSVN and to the Ministry of
Public Security in Hanoi but may have its channel to a subordinate region
bypassed by orders to the region from Hanoi. Located in War Zone "C, "
the COSVN Security Section is the highest security component in South
Vietnam. It is also the largest. Totalling 500 men, the COSVN Security
Section is divided into ten major subsections (codenamed BI through B10).
It runs a large counterintelligence /security school (B6) which graduates
over 500 students a year. COSVN Security Section also has an espionage
(or more accurately -- aggressive counterespionage) apparatus whose
case officers operate both in South Vietnam and Cambodia. The COSVN
Security Section's espionage component is closely connected:to the
Security Section of the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Zone (also called
Region IV).
The security apparatus of Region IV, unique because of its
proximity to the power mechanisms of the South Vietnamese govern-
ment, is organized to accommodate its position. Although .the Region IV
Security Section has all the functions'of an ordinary Viet Cong security
apparatus, its espionage component is unusually large. The size of its
espionage elements is almost certainly due to the abundance of targets
in Saigon city.
Other regional Security Sections have a more normal configura-
tion. Although there is relatively little .direct documentation on regional
Security Sections, available evidence implies the. presence at region
level of all the components found at province. (See. below.) In addition
to the provincial components, regional Security Sections run counterintel-
ligence schools, which altogether probably give security and counterintel-
ligence courses to thousands of students a year.
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The typical An Ninh provincial apparatus (which has a staff of
about 100) is divided into four parts: an Administrative. Subsection (B1),
which handles routine correspondence; a Political Protection Subsection
(B2), which runs internal security, Party security and counterintelli-
gence operations; an Espionage Subsection (B3), which operates in
government-controlled areas; and a Legal Affairs Subsection (B4),
which runs Viet Cong interrogation facilities and jails. Officials from
the Espionage Subsection ordinarily operate in the province capital,
either on their own or in cooperation with the province capital's own
Security Section.
The security apparatus at district level is much like that of the
province,; except that it is smaller. Averaging about twenty men, a
District Security Section is divided, according to a COSVN directive,
into three parts: an Administrative Subsection (Bl); an Internal Counter-
intelligence Subsection (B2), which operates in Viet Cong territory; and
an Espionage Subsection (B3), which operates in areas controlled by the
government -- particularly the district seat. A District Security
Section closely supervises the activities of the Village and Hamlet
Security machinery under its jurisdiction.
The size of Village Security Sections varies widely. A village
service in an area long controlled by the Viet Cong can have as many as
seven full-time security officials serving at village level, with additional
permanent officials attached to the hamlets in its administrative juris-
diction. A village section in an area dominated,by the government,
however, may contain only one or two security functionaries. As a
general rule, hamlets have no full-time security. officials of their own.
Security police serving at hamlet level are attached to villages.
Underlying the formal security machinery, of the Viet Cong is a
vast network of secret agents, secret associations, and informants.
Theoretically, a Viet Cong hamlet is permeated with agents and
individuals keeping watch on. one another. One of the principle jobs of
low-level security officials is to keep the networks strong and functioning
and to confince the people, by constant propaganda, that secrecy is of
paramount. importance. The number of security indoctrination sessions
given to people in Viet Cong territory almost certainly runs. into the
hundreds of thousands a year.
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Although.the Viet Cong security system is strong, it is.not
invulnerable. Military pressure, which has weakened the resolve of
many adherents to the enemy cause, has also. affected the spirit of a
small but growing number of security officials. In 1966, J or example,
over a hundred security functionaries defected to the Allies. It is
likely that an even.-larger number will defect in 1967. Such security
defectors are usually, low-level, but among them is as sprinkling of
district and province officials. If Allied pressures mount, and Viet Cong
fortunes correspondingly wane, the Communist security machinery will
almost certainly experience. further and more severe strains.
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VIET CONG
SECURITY SERVICE Chart 1
CHAIN OF COMMAND
DRV MINISTRY
OF
PUBLIC SECURITY
COSVN
COMMITTEE
T
OTHER SECTIONS
II
SECURITY
SECTION
REGION
COMMITTEE
OTHER SECTIONS SECURITY I
SECTION
F
OTHER SECTIONS
SECURITY
SECTION
SECURITY
SECTION
SECURITY
SECTION
NORTH VIETNAM
DMZ
SOUTH VIETNAM
Direct
Control
Radio
Communication*
* This implies that the MPS reserves
to itself direct operational control,
as it sees fit, over security com-
ponents at province level and
above, bypassing intermediate
echelons.
Village
Security
Official
serving in a Hamlet
PROVINCE
COMMITTEE
DISTRICT
COMMITTEE
T
OTHER SECTIONS
VILLAGE
CHAPTER
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CHAPTER I
I. Background -
1. The annals of the start of the Vietnamese Communist security
apparatus lie in the archives of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) in
Hanoi. They are not available to U. S. intelligence.
2. It would be reasonable to conjecture, however, that the, formal
security service began coincidentally with, or slightly after, the creation
of the Vietnamese Communist Party, constituted on 3 February 1930,
under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh.l It probably existed in rudimentary
form even earlier. Z Ho himself almost certainly received instruction..
about Communist Party security in the early 1930's in Moscow when he
attended the Lenin School, an academy for foreign Party, leaders. 3
Among the Lenin School's instructors were officials of the Soviet State
Security Service, presently called the "KGB," which, according to
experienced U. S. intelligence officials, the Viet Cong security apparatus
strongly resembles. Ho probably passed on some of the information.. he
acquired on security matters to Vietnamese students he lectured in
Moscow on Party organization.4
3. The practical necessity of a security component was impressed
on Vietnamese Communists almost from the beginning. In the early
Twenties, when Ho had a hand in forming the French Communist Party, 5
"two security agents" apparently of the French Surete "dogged him like s,
shadow." In April 1931, barely a year after the Vietnamese Party's
founding, the French Security Service succeeded in arresting almost the
entire membership of the Party Central Committee, as well as a number
of lower-level officials.7 Ho, who avoided the debagle, was himself
arrested and held briefly in Hong Kong in June 1931. The early success
of the French Surete may have inadvertently succeeded in imbuing the
Vietnamese Communists with their penchant for secrecy.
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4.. By its own account, the Party recovered within a year from
the blows dealt by the French security service. Its fortunes and its
security improved throughout the 1930's, and during World War II, despite
internecine Party struggles. References to "suppression of traitors" and
"elimination of spies" in a Party history of these periods strongly suggest
that a Party security apparatus existed and was at work.10
5. After Japan's surrender in World War II, Ho Chi Minh
proclaimed Vietnam's "independence" and, on 2 Selitember 1945,
announced the creation of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam. "11 Four
months later he created the Ministry of Public Security (Bo Cong An),
which then directed and now directs the Vietnamese Communist security
apparatus north and south of the seventeenth parallel. The functions of
the MPS in the Vietnamese struggle against the French (1945-1954) were
the same as they are now. They include the maintenance of internal
security and public order in Communist territory, active counter-
espionage, armed raids, and the kidnapping of enemy intelligence and
security officials.
6. After the Communist victory at Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva
Accords in 1954, the MPS in the north took on many of the trappings and
tasks of a pervasive Communist police bureaucracy. The chief of the
MPS, Tran Ouoc Hoan, moved into the old headquarters of the French
Surete in Hanoi proper, set up a training school for MPS officers at Ha
Dong City (a few miles southwest of Hanoi), and consolidated subordinate
MPS offices in each region, province, district, and village in the north.
7. In South Vietnam, the apparatus, many of whose officials had
regrouped to the north, submerged into the cities and countryside. It
did not begin to reassert fully its previous authority until 1959 or 1960,
when the Ho Chi Minh regime decided to topple the South Vietnamese
Government by force and sent the first MPS-trained infiltrators to the
south.
8. Infiltration of MPS personnel continues. As Tran Quoc Hoan
declared in the autumn of 1960, "The struggle against counter-revolution-
aries is a great and heavy revolutionary task for the entire Party and
people."12 To see that the task is done, Hoan oversees the large MPS
bureaucracy and encourages, as best he can, those he sends: to carry
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on the counter-revolutionary struggle in the south. He (or one of his
deputies) addresses each MPS infiltration class as it convenes at Ha Dong
and again as it aduates, before the infiltrators begin their long trek to
South Vietnam.
II. Infiltration
Summary
9. Security personnel from the MPS have been infiltrating into
South Vietnam from the North since at least 1960. At first the in~f:ltratrs
came individually or in small groups, attached to larger infiltration
groups of civilian and political cadres.. In late .1962, the decision was
apparently made to systematize the infiltration of security agents, and
the Ministry of Public Security School at Ha Dong began training i .l-
tration classes, Infiltration groups of Ha Dong graduates probably
started arriving in South Vietnam in mid- or late 1963. The rate of
infiltration probably reached at least 500 a year. The quantity of
infiltrators is less important, however, than their quality, which is
high, since almost all are cadres rather than rank-and-file.: On tha:lr
arrival in South Vietnam, the security infiltrators join the Security
Sections of the Party bureaucracy from COSVN down to district levels.
They are far more prevalent in the northern half of South Vietnam than
in the southern.
Early History
10 The Politburo of North Vietnam decided in the spring of 1959
to increase substantially its efforts to overthrow the Diem Regime in the
south. The decision was agreed to by. the Party's Central Committee
later in the year and was rubber stamped by the Third Party Congress
which met in September 1960. One of the consequences of the decision
was the dispatch of security personnel into South Vietnam. The first
security officials of which we have evidence infiltrated south in 1960, 14
One of these was assigned to a post in Ninh Thuan Province. Another,
who arrived in Ninh Thuan in April 1.961, became the deputy chief of the
Province Security Section. 15 There ig evidence of security infiltrators
also turning up in Binh Dinh in 1962. Presumably, the phenomenon
was nationwide rather than peculiar to Ninh Thuann and Binh Dinh.
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The Decision to Send Groups
11. In 1962, the Ministry of Public Security apparently decided
to systematize the infiltration of its personnel into the south. In the
latter part of the year its school at Ha Dong geared up to teach infiltra-
tion groups in classes. A security official's Personal History Statement,
picked up in 1966, indicated that in November 1962 he had "been trusted
by Headquarters to organize the cadre training course /in Ha Dong/"
for infiltrees into South Vietnam.17 According to another source,a
class of some 70 "regroupees" (that is, Southern Viet Minh who had
"regrouped" North in 1954 and 1955) started their infiltration training .at
Ha Dong at the end .of the year. It is l kely that this class infiltrated
some time around the middle of 1963.
12. Two other classes started in early 1963. One, composed of
a hundred southerners, started its infiltration on 7 September 1963.19
These infiltrators were mostly stationed in the northern part of South
Vietnam in such provinces as Quang Nam and Darlac. Another group,
also a hundred strong, composed of both northerners and southerners,
did not begin infiltration until 27 January 1964. Its code number was
"K3. "20
13. Information is spotty on the infiltration of Ha Dong trainees
thereafter. We have evidence, however, that three such groups left
North Vietnam in the spring or early summer of 1965. One infiltration
group, codenamed "B46, " left North Vietnam on 1 May; the group had
70 infiltrators. 21 This group was apparently assigned to various posts
in the northern part of the country. A second group, codenamed "K48,"
began its infiltration two weeks later; this group marched to War Zone C.
Some of its members were assigned to security sections in the Saigon
area. 22 A third infiltration group, codenamed "K49," was spotted in
War Zone C in August, probably having left the north sometime in the
late spring or early summer of the year. 23 "K49's" size, unknown,
was probably at least 50 men.
14. An analysis of available evidence concerning infiltration
does not indicate the rate at which security officials are entering South
Vietnam. Since 300-odd infiltrators started south in the spring of 1965
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alone, however, it is reasonable to assume that there are at least
500 security infiltrators a year. 24 The rate may be considerably
higher.
Quality
15. The number of infiltrators is not nearly as important as their
quality, which is very high. One source indicated that his 180-man
infiltration group was composed entirely of cadres, with ranks ranging
from Senior Sergeant to Major.25 Another source indicated that his
70-man infiltration group contained one Major, two Captains, six
Lieutenants, four aspirant Lieutenants, and teg Senior Sergeants, all of
whom were police or Public Security cadres. 2
16. Infiltrators form a large part of the leadership of the
Communist Security apparatus in South Vietnam, holding down such
positions as chief or deputy chief of security sections at various
echelons. 27 They also include such key cadres as interrogators,
communications personnel, prison camp officials, and espionage case
officers. The pattern of infiltration for security officials has so far
paralleled that of military units. Northerners are seldom, if ever,
found in the provinces of the Mekong Delta, 28 while they are frequently
assigned to Security Sections in the northern half of the country. As
early as November, 1965, for example, there were at least five
northerners attached to a single District Security Section in Thua Thien
Province. Z9
17. Although infiltrators hold many high positions,. they make:
up only a relatively small percentage of the overall Viet Cong security
apparatus in South Vietnam.
18. No direct evidence is available on the overall size of the
Viet Cong security service. A reasonable estimate can be derived,
however, by extrapolating from captured strength reports of Security
Sections of the various echelons and from Tables of Organization
(TO&E) which indicate the numbers the Communists are striving for.
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We believe the number of full-time security officials in Viet Cong
territory in early 1966 (the date of most relevant documents) was in
the neighborhood of from fifteen to twenty thousand.
19. The estimate was arrived at by adding together estimated
strengths for the security service personnel serving at COSVN, region,
province, district, village and hamlet levels. The estimated number of
security personnel at each level is as follows-
COSVN
500
Region
1, 500
Province
3, 500
District
4, 600
Village & Hamlet
5,000
- 10,
000
TOTAL
15, 100
- 20,
100
20. The evidence to support a figure of about 500 at COSVN in
early 1966 is voluminous.30 The section may now be slightly larger.
21. Relatively little information is available on the strengths of
Regional Security Sections as of early 1966. Large numbers of docu-
ments indicate that such sections were extremely. active, however, and
that they contain all the components of a Province Security Section.
They have, in addition, permanent components which provinces lack,
such as internal counterintelligence schools.31 Furthermore, they
maintain large -- perhaps company size -- armed reconnaissance units.
Thus a Region Security Section is probably considerably, larger than a
province section (which averages about 100 men), but smaller than
COSVN's. A reasonable estimate might put the average strength of a
region section at 250. The overall regional strength of 1, 500 was
arrived at by multiplying 250 times six, the number of Viet Cong
regions in early. 1966.
22.. Better evidence is available on the size of Provincial
Security Sections. A Region III Table of Organization suggested a
standard security complement for provinces in its jurisdiction of around
135.32 Region III's Can Tho Province, with 133 security officials, came
close to the desired total, 33 while Rach Gia Province, with 120 officials,
still had a good way to go. 34 Some Provincial Security Sections appear
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to be considerably smaller (e. g. , Ba Ria Province, with 37), 35
while others are probably far larger. No strength figures are
available on the size of the Binh Dinh Province Security Section,
for example, but a captured activity report strongly im ies,that in
early 1966, the size of the section was in the hundreds. Recent docu-
ments suggest that special efforts :have been made to increase the
strengths of Provincial Security Sections, 37 so an estimate' of one
hundred as an average strength of a province section seems realistic,
if slightly conservative. The overall provincial strength of 3, 500 was
arrived at by multiplying 100 by 35, the number of Viet Cong provinces
in early 1966.
23. A COSVN table of organization for District Security Sections
calls for a strength of from forty to forty-three officials.38 Captured
documents indicate, however, that this ideal is seldom realized.
Although one district in Binh Dinh Province, with 50 officials in late
1965, actually exceeded the TO&E strength, reports for four other
districts show an average size of about twenty, 40 the figure used to.
compute the overall numbers of security personnel serving at district
levels. To reach the district total of 4, 600, 20 was multiplied by 230,
the approximate number of VC districts in South Vietnam.
24. The overall size of the apparatus at village and hamlet
levels is much more difficult to gauge, not only because of the enormous
variations between villages and hamlets (some have no security officials
at all), but because of the propensity of low-level Viet Cong functionaries
to wear more than one hat. Nonetheless, enough information is
available to allow for a broad approximation.
25. There are two ways to approach the problem: by. looking
at overall figures in one region (and extrapolating from them), or by
determining an average strength at village and hamlet and multiplying
by an estimate of the number of villages and hamlets in which the Viet
Cong have a security apparatus organized. Neither approach pretends .to
be exact.
26. The first approach employs a document captured in the lower
Delta. A Region III report of December, 1965, indicated there were then
13
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1,134 village-level security "cadre" serving in its jurisdiction. Whether
or not 1, 134 represented total number of security personnel in Region III
depends on the translation of the word "cadre," If, in the translation,.
Viet Cong usage was followed, and "cadre" means "officer" (equivalent
to assistant squad leader and up), the Region III report omitted the rank.
and-file. Were this the case, and one assumes that there are about as
many rank-and-file (clerks and guards, for example) as officers, then
the overall number of security personnel in the region was something over
2, 000. Extrapolations from the 2, 000 figure throughout the rest of
Vietnam (taking into account population control figures) would bring a
countrywide total of around 10, 000. If, on the other hand, "cadre" here
means "member" (U. S. and Vietnamese officials are prone to attach the
word "cadre" to everybody), then extrapolations from the 1, 134 figure
would result in a countrywide total of about 5, 000,
27. Or one can approach the problem by seeking a village average.
Available documents indicate that in the normal village in which the Viet
Cong have organized a Security Section, there are about three security
officials, 42 and that additional personnel -- administratively assigned to
the villages -- serve in the hamlets. If one assumes that the Viet Cong
have a three-man security apparatus in about half the 2, 700 villages in
South Vietnam and have at least one official in a quarter of Vietnam's
14, 000 hamlets -- an assumption broadly supported by documents -- one
arrives at a countrywide total of 7, 550, a figure about midway between
5, 000 and 10, 000.
IV. Effectiveness
28. The efficiency of the Viet Cong Security Service, although
generally high, varies with its tasks. So far it has been remarkably
effective in keeping Allied penetrations of the Viet Cong infrastructure
to a minimum. The reasons for its success in this task have been at
least threefold. First, its counterespionage operations in government-
controlled areas, which have penetrated large numbers of Allied
(particularly Vietnamese) security and intelligence organizations, have
been able to provide the Viet Cong with volumes of detailed information
on Allied intelligence plans and activities. Second, the service's
extensive networks of agents and informants in Viet Cong territory have
frequently spotted Allied intelligence operatives before they can do the
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Viet Cong substantial damage. And third, the reputation of the service
for efficiency and ruthlessness is such that many people who might
.otherwise become Allied agents decline to do so for fear of retaliation.
29. The Communist Security Service has been far less success-
ful in the matter of population control. Despite its best efforts, almost
two million people have fled Viet Cong territory in the last two years.
The amount of intelligence loss from refugees - c were they properly
exploited by the Allies -- could be incalculable. Second, the apparatus
has been unable to prevent the defection to the Allies of additional
thousands of Viet Cong officials and soldiers, many of whom have turned
out to be gold mines of information to the Allies. And, third, Viet Cong
Security Sections in many areas, both VC and contested, have still not
solved the increasing problem of desertion. Communist security officials
in Allied hands acknowledge that there are large numbers of ex-Viet Cong
soldiers in _'VC territory, whom they have been unable to detect or
persuade to return to the ranks.
30. The Security Service itself is by no means invulnerable. Of
a sample of some 6, 300 defectors who rallied in 1965 and 1966, about 35
were identified as security officials.43 This would suggest that over a
hundred such officials defected during 1966 (since there were about 20, 000
defections), and that the number should be considerably higher in 1967.
Although most security defectors have been low-level, some have served
in District or Province Security Sections. Having been imbued by the
Viet Cong security apparatus with the idea that the best way to survive is
to repent, Communist security officials are usually extremely cooperative
after turning themselves over to the Allies.
31. Another vulnerability of the apparatus appears on the reverse
side of the coin of its fearsome reputation. It is usually disliked. 44
Several ex-Viet Cong have indicated that it is by far the most unpopular
of Communist civilian agencies, and that individual security officials
are sometimes regarded with a mixture of fear and hatred -- particularly
by those who have lost relatives to Viet Cong justice.
V. Other Viet Cong Security and Intelligence Organizations
32. The Viet Cong Security Service is only one of several
Communist intelligence organs operating in South Vietnam. They should
not be confused. The others are briefly described below:
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A TYPICAL VIET CONG ORGANIZATION
PARTY
COMMITTEE
CURRENT
AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE
MILITARY
AFFAIRS
SECTION
CIVILIAN
PROSELYTING
(FRONT)
SECTION
ORGANIZATION
SECTION
PROPAGANDA AND
TRAINING SECTION
FINANCE AND
ECONOMY
SECTION
POSTAL
TRANSPORTATION
AND
COMMUNICATIONS
SECTION
MILITARY
PROSELYTI NG
SECTION
CIVIL HEALTH
SECTION
SECURITY
SECTION
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-1- lpffi"W&z
a. The Central Research Directorate (Cuc Ngieng Cuu, once
called the Cuc Tinh Bao) is the North Vietnamese strategic military
espionage apparatus, subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. It differs
from the Viet Cong Security Service in two respects. First, its
penetration operations, usually high-level, are aimed at gathering
positive intelligence on Allied political and military plans and activities.
(The Viet Cong Security Service's espionage components, on the other
hand, are principally directed at gathering counterintelligence informa-
tion.) Second, those operations visible to Allied intelligence so far
appear to be singleton agents or compartmented nets, run directly from
Hanoi. (This contrasts with the Viet Cong Security Service, whose
sections are intertwined with the Party organization at the various
echelons in South Vietnam.)
b. The Viet Cong Military Intelligence Service, which is
subordinate to the military staff of the Military Affairs Section45 of the
Party apparatus, is responsible for gathering positive information on
Allied military plans, organizations, and activities, in direct support of
tactical operations. Its agents are most frequently low-level penetrations
which supplement reconnaissance.
c. The Viet Cong :Military Security apparatus is subordinate to
the political staff of the Military Affairs Section of the Communist
organization at the various echelons in South Vietnam. 46 Many of its
tasks are similar to those of the Viet Cong Security Service, except that
its targets and the organizations it protects are primarily military. It
coordinates its activities with the Viet Cong Security Service. A Viet
Cong region-level document dated 17 May 1966 indicated that "the coordi-
nation consists of exchange of plans of activities, experiences, regular
and special reports, specialized training, documents captured from
Allied Forces, information on espionage activities of Allied Forces, and
recommendations to settle problems of both military and political nature,
indoctrination of civilians and enlisted men in the maintenance ofg47
security, (and) combined security activities in base areas. . .
d. The Military Proselyting Sections of the Communist apparatus
from COSVN to village levels are responsible for undermining the will of
Allied forces in Vietnam, and for persuading Allied soldiers to desert or
defect.48 Because the military proselyters are frequently in touch with
Allied (particularly South Vietnamese) soldiers, they often become
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privy to intelligence information, which they presumably forward,
through Party channels, to Viet Cong military intelligence units. Like
the Viet Cong Security Sections, Military Proselyting Sections run
prisons. Their prisons, however, are strictly military. Viet Gong
Security Service jails are for Allied intelligence and internal security
personnel (both civilian and military), for suspected Allied agents, and
for political prisoners.
33. Although, as indicated, the Communists have at least five
elements concerned with intelligence, counterintelligence, or internal
security, it should not be assumed that their chain of command is
unclear of that important intelligence information is lost in the shuffle
of competing bureaucracies. On the contrary, command lines are
direct, functions are clearly delineated, and the flow of information is
closely controlled,
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THE SECURITY SECTION OF
THE CENTRAL OFFICE OF SOUTH VIETNAM (COSVN)
1. Background
1. The Ho Chi Minh government created COSVN in late 1960, or
early 1961, following the decision in Hanoi to increase its efforts to over-
throw the Diem regime in South Vietnam. Designed to serve as Hanoi's
advance headquarters in the south, COSVN took over much of. the equip-
ment and many of the personnel of Nam Bo, then the largest command
entity below the 17th parallel.49 Among the elements COSVN probably
inherited from Nam Bo was its Security Section, Owhich had existed in
one form or another since 1946, if not earlier.
2. The COSVN Security Section, although subordinate to the
COSVN hierarchy, is ultimately responsible to the Ministry of Public
Security (MPS) in Hanoi, which supplies the section with many of its
members. The Section's chief in 1965 was identified as a former deputy
head of the MPS, 51 and MPS infiltrators have been reported entering the
COSVN area, some of whom presumably join the Section's staff. 52
Certain COSVN Security Section directives are sent to the MPS in Hanoi
for review, 53
3. In recent years, the Section has grown considerably. A
knowledgeable Viet Cong prisoner stated that it had .150 members in late
1962, of whom 70 were office personnel. 54 By 1964 it had increased to
250,55 and in November 1965 had reached a strength of 481, 56 with a
planned strength in 1966 of 602.57 The quality and political reliability. of
its members is undoubtedly high. In June 1965, when the Section's
strength was 362, two-hundred and five (or 56%) were Party members,
and 91 (or 25%) belonged to the Party Youth Group. 58 These percentages,
as a ratio of Party affiliation, are uncommonly. high for. any. level.
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4. The COSVN Security Section has a number of cover designa-
tions, among them C93 (an early one), or, in mid-1966, C289. It is also
occasionally called ANR (i. e. , The An Ninh of "R", which is the cover
designator of COSVN). Its letter box number in 1966 was 1418B.
5. The COSVN Security Section has at least five major functions.
First, it provides guidance and gives general direction to Security
Sections from region to hamlet level in South Vietnam. Second, it keeps
the COSVN hierarchy informed of security and counterintelligence matters
throughout the country, by periodic and ad hoc reporting. Third, it
provides internal security for COSVN and subordinate agencies in War
Zone "C," Fourth, it trains large numbers of security cadres serving at
district level and above in the south. Finally, it runs counterintelligence
and espionage operations of its own, both in government controlled areas
of South Vietnam and in Cambodia.
6. The security directive is the most straightforward means the
COSVN Security Section employs to guide the lower echelons of the
apparatus. The Section's annual "emulation" report for 1965 indicated
it had used this device on 208 occasions during the year. 59 Although
some captured An Ninh directives appear to have been issued under a
COSVN Current Affairs Committee letterhead (and others, ascribed to
COSVN, may have been composed in Hanoi), the. examples taken by
Allied units in various parts of South Vietnam illustrate the types of
activity over which the Section exercises at least nominal control. These
captured documents include:
a. A "secret" directive issued in late 1964 detailing the organic
zation of espionage subsections to be set up by the An Ninh apparatus in
government-held cities . 60
b. A circular, promulgated to province levels in 1965, stating
that the South Vietnamese police were about to be equipped with crypto
machines, and directing province s curity personnel to take steps to
acquire related "crypto material." 01
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c. A 1965 directive ordering "underground agents, secret agents
anc counterintelligence agents" to investigate the reintroduction of North
Vietnamese refugees by the GVN into North Vietnam to carry out
"sabotage and/or subversive activities." (The directive's recipients
were asked to obtain rosters of the infiltrators, training programs, and
dates and times of their infiltration into North Vietnam. Z)
d. A fourteen page "top secret" decree distributed in 1966 down to
district levels, concerning the-policies, missions, and modus operandi of
counterespionage operations. 6j
e. A nine page "top secret" directive issued in the summer of
64
1966 ordering a reorganization of District and Village Security Sections.
f. A memorandum distributed to regions in 1965 concerning
special steps to be taken for the 6r5 info rcement of security measures
along commo-liaison corridors.
g. A memorandum promulgated to region levels dictating Viet
Cong policies towards foreign newsmen. 66
h. A circular concerning Allied commando activities in Viet Cong
base areas. 67
i. A circular issued to regions in late 1966 warning of an increase
of U. S. espionage abc8ivities "to facilitate the conduct of Allied operations
in VC base areas."
7. The dispatch of inspection teams to lower echelons is a second
control device used by the COSVN Security Section. During 1965, for
example, at least eight such teams were sent to various areas in South 69
Vietnam "to enable the cadres (in local areas) to evaluate the real situation."
One of the teams appears,to have been sent to Viet Cong Region VI, 70
while a province report of 1966 indicates that a COSVN 7Slecurity Section
representative sat in on a provincial security meeting.
8, A third device the COSVN Security Section uses to supervise
lower levels is the calling to COSVN of various subordinate personnel,
either individually or in groups, in order to explain and elaborate to them
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COSVN policies. Although hard evidence is lacking of a COSVN security
conference having been held, there is little reason to believe that the
security apparatus behaves differently in this respect from other elements
of Vietnamese Communist officialdom. "Public Security" conventions
have been noted in North Vietnam and in the provinces in the south, 72
while other COSVN agencies have held national convocations or have
entertained lower-level "delegates."73 The presence of regional security
personnel at COSVN has frequently been noted in security documents;74
some probably were receiving instructions or explanations of Viet Cong
policy.
9. One key question remains concerning COSVN direction to
lower echelons: its detail. General directives have been picked up in
various sections of the country (see above), but none has been specific
as to area or course of action. None has been identified, for example,
as directing Security Section A to assassinate GVN official B, or to
arrest suspect C. Whether COSVN has files enabling it to issue such
orders on a regular basis is not known.
Information to Higher Levels
10. A captured COSVN Security Section report indicates that its
steering committee directs subsections to prepare "recurring and non-
recurring reports" on the enemy. and friendly situations, to pull together
'.'studies," and to maintain "statistics, data, and other assessments of
the situation."75 The document does not indicate where the reports and
assessments go, but copies are probably sent to the COSVN Current
Affairs Committee. Certain documents are also forwarded.to the
Ministry of Public Security in Hanoi. 76
11. If the situation reports resemble those submitted from
provinces to regions, 77 as seems likely, they would include assess-
ments of Allied intelligence operations, where intelligence threats are
likely to develop, and what is being done to meet them. Elaborate sets
of statistics are also probably included. Among them would be the
number of political unreliables suspected in Viet Cong territory, 78 a
tally of suspects arrested, their disposition (how many jailed, how many
executed), the number of GVN officials assassinated or kidnapped by
security personnel, and a reckoning of deserters and defectors from
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Viet Cong military and political organizations during the reporting
period. 79 Reports would probably include strength figures of VC
security organizations. at lower echelons.
Internal Security at COSVN
12. The protection of "The Party, agencies, base and corridors
within the area of COSVN" is another of the principal missions. of its
Security Section.80 Primarily, the mission is political, with the Security
Section assuming the role of the special branch policeman rather than
soldier. Much of the Section's internal police work is routine. It
coordinates with other COSVN agencies on the issuance and use of local
movement passes and gate permits, 81 and issues instructions concerning
the censorship of personnel mail "to detect anti-revolutionary thoughts
or loss of morale. . .and coded intelligence reports in the form of
personnel letters. "82 The Section also holds security indoctrination
classes for other COSVN agencies, cooperates with them in preventing
desertions, investigates the "many suspicious cases" that apparently
arise in the COSVN area and maintains files on "counter-revolutionary
persons."83 Those suspects whom the Section arrests it holds in its own
detention facility for "interrogation and reeducation." (The local
suspects share the facility with higher-level detainees, including occasional
Americans.)
13. The Security Section is only one of COSVN's protectors. There
are others, with which it keeps in close contact. These include:
a. The security subsections of other COSVN agencies (for
example, the security subsection of COSVN's Finance and Economy
Section). A COSVN Security Section document indicated that "all
/COSVN/ party civil agencies" had organized security guard sections
by the end of 1965, and that COSVN Security Section coordinated with the
other agencies security subsections on "internal political" matters. 84
b. The Security Sections of nearby provinces and districts. The
COSVN .-':-.'_-Section regularly exchanges information with the', provinces of
Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, Binh Long, and with the districts of northern Tay
Ninh Province, 85 the site of War Zone "C," The Section's directives
have been captured among material belonging to the Tay Ninh Security
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Section, 86 and vice versa.87 (Tay Ninh and Binh Long also occasionally
draw weapons from the COSVN Security Section's armory.88)
c. The 70th Guard Regiment. The 70th Regiment is the Main
Force unit assigned to protect COSVN militarily, Its subordinates
occasionally act on tactical information provided by the Security Section's
armed reconnaissance teams.
d. The "Physical Security Section" of COSVN. The "Physical
Security Section," formed in the summer of 1966, is a quasi-military
unit to which other agencies of COSVN (including the 70th Regiment)
supply personnel, Its functions include the development of guerrilla
units and reconnaissance units within War Zone "C, " the supervision of
local relations with Cambodia "in case evacuation is dictated by the
tactical situation, " and the protection of foreign visitors -- a function
it apparently took over from the COSVN Security Section.89 Documents
indicate it is closely associated with both the 70th Regiment and the
COSVN Security Section. 90
Security Training
14. Training is one of the most important functions of the COSVN
Security Section. Its security school provides instruction in security and
counterespionage.techniques to pupils serving at district level and above.
The number of students the school graduates is probably at least five
hundred a year. (A year-end report of 1965 claims that the school
trained "over 700 cadres" in security matters during the first nine months
of the year) Another report suggests a somewhat smaller total. 91
15. The school's students, although occasionally. of the rank-and-
file, usually serve, or are intended to serve, at command levels. The
chief of My Tho Province's Security Section probably attended the school, 92
for example, as have security executives at COSVN and region levels. 93
The higher-level positions in District Security Sections (particularly in
the southern portion of South Vietnam) are filled with the school's alumni.
In a district in the Delta, five of the top thirteen security cadres had
attended the COSVN school. The district's COSVN graduates included the
district security chief, his two deputies, the leadin% espionage cadre, and
an "intelligence cadre." All were Party members. 4
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16. The COSVN school gives a variety of courses, most of them
four months long. The number of trainees in each varies from approxi.
mately twenty to almost one-hundred and fifty. 95 On the average, there
are close to two hundred students at the school at any given time. The
subjects of instruction vary. At least one course a year (and probably
more) is given in basic espionage techniques.96 Other courses have been
referred to as "intelligence, " "legal affairs, 11 "security training, "
"border defense techniques," and "bodyguard? "97 The "legal affairs"
course probably includes instruction in interrogation, in running jails,
and in basic police methods, The "border defense" course, seemingly
anomolous, appears to be a reflection of the fact that the security
apparatus in the south is run by the MPS in Hanoi, whose school in Ha
Dong also gives instruction on the tactics of border defense to its Armed
Public Security elements.
Espionage and Counterespionage
17. Relatively little information is available on the espionage
operations of the COSVN Security Section. It is clear, nonetheless, that
the Section's case officers are active within South Vietnam and without. 98
Most of the external activity is probably in Cambodia, 99 whither from
time to time COSVN has removed for physical safety.
18. Because of its location -- in the remote forests of northern
Tay Ninh Province, away from heavily populated areas -- the section is
probably far,less active in domestic espionage! operations than security
components closer to cities such as the Security Section of Region IV,
also called the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Zone (See Chapter III.).
The COSVN Section's in-country espionage operations are probably small
and specialized, geared to high-level penetrations. It seems likely that
some agents employed by the Security Section's espionage element
communicate with the Section by radio. 100
19. Very little is known about the Section's operations in
Cambodia, other than their existence. It is known, for example, that the
COSVN Finance and Economy Section advances the finance office of the
Security Section sums of Cambodian riels on a quarterly basis, to be
used for "confidential" purposes.101 (The "confidential" riels are
accounted for separately from those used for routine purchases of
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THE SECURITY SECTION OF COSVN
SECURITY
SECTION
C289 (AKA) C93
ADMINISTRATION
(B1)
(CONFIRMED)
(63)
Twelve Cells Including
Finance
Correspondence
Management
Operations
Food Supply
INTERNAL
SECURITY
(B2)
(POSSIBLE)
(165)
Office Staff
Recon Units
Permanent
Section 9
GUARD
UNIT
(B4)
(PROBABLE)
(30)
(Composition
Unknown)
PRODUCTION
(B5)
(PROBABLE)
(Variable)
Production
Workers
Components Unident. ied as to Subordination:
Espionage Component
Signal Component (s)
Crypto Component (s)
Provisional Guerrilla Unit (cover designation: "Village 5")
RESEARCH
(B3)
(POSSIBLE)
(17)
(Composition
Unknown)
SCHOOL
(B6)
(CONFIRMED)
(24)
Admin. Staff
Medical Staff
Instructors
ORGANIC
MOBILE
UNIT (B7)
(POSSIBLE)
(102)
(Composition
Unknown)
INTERROGATION
AND
DETENTION
(B10)
(CONFIRMED)
(35)
Interrogation
Detention
Guards
LOGISTICS
(B9)
(CONFIRMED)
(39)
Armory
Food Storage
Distribution
(and others)
Possible Component:
Signal Intercept and Cryptanalysis Element
( ) = last known strength
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COMMO-LIAISON
(B8)
(CONFIRMED)
(35)
Couriers
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Cambodian food and supplies.) The Security Section finance office
thereafter issues the "confidential" riels to security officers as needed.102
20. The primary targets of the COSVN Security Section's
espionage operations are probably Allied intelligence and internal security
organizations: among them, MACV J-2, CIA, and the various police and
intelligence collection organs of the South Vietnamese government.103
Ill. Organization (See Chart)
Committee, has ten major subsections (codenamed (Bl through B10), 104
each of which has a number of subordinate cells. Most'of the subsections
are clearly identified through captured documents, some are not. Also
known to exist within the security organization are components whose
subordination is unclear.. (We know, for example, there is a domestic
espionage component. Which subsection it belongs to is uncertain.)
22. The Leadership Committee (also translated as "Command"
or "Steering" Committee) is composed of a chief, at least one permanent
deputy, and a number of representatives from the subsections. The
Committee makes the Section's major policy decisions, oversees the
more important operational activities of its subordinates, and supervises
in detail the financial and personnel transactions of the subsections. Most
of the major decision-making is done by one man, the chief of the
Committee.
23. A high-level defector has indicated that the head of the
Leadership Committee in 1965 was a Lieutenant Colonel "Ba Thai"
(probably a cover name), formerly the deputy chief of the Ministry of
Public Security in Hanoi.105 As head of the Security Section, "Ba Thai"
was probably also a member of the COSVN Current Affairs Con ittee,
and concurrently chief of the Security Section: Party committee. (His
cover name frequently changes, so it is probable that "Ba Thai" is now
called something else.107)
24. Many of the less important decisions, and most of the routine
and administrative and Party matters are handled.by the chief's deputy,
or by one of the representatives of the subsections. Security Section
21. The COSVN Security Section, run by a "Leadership"
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correspondence is frequently signed "on behalf of" or "for" the
Leadership Committee, or its chief.108
25. Subsection Bl is the administrative component of the Security
Section. It is divided into twelve elements, 109 five of which have been
positively identified (the correspondence, the "management," the food
supply, the "operational," and the financial cells ;110) The subsection's
strength, in early. 1966, was 63 men, 111 having dropped from a strength
of 96 men a year earlier.112 (During 1965, the Security Section was under
considerable pressure to reduce the number of administrative personnel113
-- a pressure that continues as the need for additional soldiers increases.)
26. The Financial Cell, many of whose account books were
captured during Operation JUNCTION CITY in early 1967, 114 keeps detailed
records of money transactions of the Security Section's components. Its.
books include not only the monies expended on regular administrative
matters, but also funds apparently spent on clandestine operations.
(Unfortunately, available translations do not breakdown the latter expen-
ditures.115) The cell also supervises the finan ial activities of the sub-
sections, by holding periodic audits of funds, 116 and by such means as
constantly dunning them. to "settle all accounts" by certain days of the
month. 117
27. The Correspondence Cell handles routine and sometimes
unusual letters, circulars, and directives, and maintains a log of all
incoming and outgoing correspondence. 118 It apparently takes care of the
Leadership Committee's paperwork, and keeps in close contact with the
Security Section's Commo-Liaison Subsection (B8), which delivers. the
mail. It also runs a rental library, whose books, as a Viet Cong
functionar recorded in 1965, were "loaned and returned 480 times" during
the year. 119
28. The other cells of the Administrative Subsection handle a
variety of routine matters. The food supply cell draws rations from
COSVN's Finance and Economy Section, the Operations Cell handles such
matters as clothing allowances, while the Management Cell apparently
takes care of personnel matters. The flood of paper which gushes from
the Administrative Subsection has included announcements of staff
meetings, outlines of procedures for establishing contact with the outside
world, postal regulations and a circular notifying subsections of the
hours of the COSVN PX. Ito
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29. Subsection B2, whose overall function is unclear, may be
one of the COSVN Section's internal security components. It is divided
into three major parts- an office staff (with 32 men), an armed recon-
naissance component (consisting of Units 15, 17, 19 and 21, , totalling 46
men), and a component entitled "Permanent Section 9" 121
(with 87 men).
In early,1966, its total complement was 165, almost double the number it
had a year earlier.122 It is one of the subsections about which we know
least.
30. One document of early 1966 indicates that B2's "office staff"
is composed primarily of researchers, but does not indicate what the
researchers do.123 The Armed Reconnaissance Units may be those
mentioned in another COSVN Security document concerning certain recon
teams "designated to study battlefields, " to administer "newly liberated
areas," and to guard exit and entries corridors, 124 but this is far from
sure. What the members of "Permanent Section 9" do is a complete
puzzle.
3 1. The strongest evidence suggesting that the COSVN "B2"
subsection has an internal police function is that "B2" subsections at
region, province, and district perform such a role. This, of course, is
evidence of the most tenuous kind and does not explain why the "research"
staff is so large (unless it maintains national files) or what the role is of
the 87-man "Permanent Section 9." In mid-1965, Subsection B2 ran the
COSVN Security Section jail.125 The jail was later transferred to
Subsection B10 (See Paragraph 43.).
32. Subsection B3's role appears to be one of research. B3 is
very small, having had a staff of four in January 1965,126 which grew to
17 men in early 1966, 127 with a programmed complement of 24.128
33. Its small size, its equipment, the type of memoranda it
produces suggest (but by no means prove) the research function. Among
the office supplies it asked for in 1966 were newspapers (in Vietnamese,
Chinese, Cambodian, French and English), maps and overlay papers
and films for pictures and documents.129 It maintains an extensive file
on "counter-revolutionary" personne1.130
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34. Its memoranda include a policy paper on Viet Cong attitudes
towards foreign newsmen ("especially French and Japanese"), and a
circular on the activities of certain "pro-American Cambodians. ?131
Among the documents it has reproduced is a GVN directive concerning
counterintelligence tasks in the Self-Defense Force.
35. Subsection B4 appears to be a small guard component, whose
duties include (or used to include, before the advent of the "COSVN
Physical Security Section") the protection of foreign visitors. 133 In early
1966, its complement was 30 men, 134 having grown from a strength of 14
the previous year.135
36. Subsection B5, according to the only. available document
describing it, is a "production" component. Production components
normally grow rice and raise cattle for consumption by their parent units.
Common throughout Viet Cong territory,. they are designed to make VC
base areas as self-sufficient as possible in food, in order to be a small
drain on the Viet Cong economy. Production workers are often transients,
or low-level personnel, assigned on temporary duty (sometimes as punish-
ment) from the parent unit. Subsection B5 is omitted from distribution of
routine COSVN Security Section information circulars, 137 and from
Security Section pay rosters ;13 8
37. Subsection B6 is the Security Section's Internal Security and
Intelligence School. Since many of its files were captured in Operation
BIRMINGHAM in the spring of 1966, information on it is relatively
abundant. 13 9
38. In early 1965, its staff was top heavy, with a strength of 87
in March. Under intense pressure to reduce administrative personnel
during the year, it grew progressively smaller, so that by March 1966,
only 24 staff members remained.140 They probably included the school
chief and his deputy, 141 a small administrative staff (a finance officer,
an accountant, a supply officer, an official in charge of trainee records
and one or two clerk-typists142), a medical staff (a doctor and a nursel3),
and a staff of instructors. The school does not have regular semesters.
Rather, classes start at irregular intervals, with as many as four going
on at the same time. 144
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39. Subsection B7 appears to be the Security Section's: permanent
military component. The only permanent Security Subsection armed with
a machine gun; it may be the ""organic mobile unit" occasionally referred
to in documents.145 As of October 1965, it had a strength of 102 men, with
a planned complement of 204.146
40. Subsection 88 is the Security Section's Commo-Liaison
component, with a staff (in 1966) of about 35 members.147 The subsection
delivers correspondence to other agencies of COSVN, to the regions,
and to nearby districts and provinces. In 1965, the subsection "made 164
routine trips, performed 83 unexpected escorts of visitors, transmitted
direct and express correspondence, and guided students and draftees.,,148
Permanent commo-liaison corridors appear to have been set up with
Regions I through IV, and with districts and provinces in the area of War
Zone I`C." A document of early 1966 suggests the COSVN-Saigon (Region
IV) corridor is. the one most heavily travelled.149
41. Subsection B9 is the COSVN Security Section's logistical
component;, It maintains an armory, 150 food depots, and has a distribu-
tion component, equipped with pack bicycles.151 The subsection's last
known strength was 39 people. r52
42. The armory contains ordinary pistols (Brownings, Walther
P38s, Czech 7.65 mms, "K. 54s"), rifles and carbines (Bloc, "CKCs, "
German Mausers, Bloc K44s, French MASS), submachine guns (folding
buttstock, Bloc A.Ks) and a stock of Claymore mines and grenades. The
armory also keeps a stock of silencer pistols, presumably for use by
assassins.153 Its customers include the COSVN Security Section's ten
subsections, members of the Tay Ninh and Binh Long Province Security
Sections, and the regions. In July 1965, for example, it was planning to
send to Saigon six K50 submachine guns, 20 Walther pistols, 5 silencers,
and 60 blocks of TNT, 154
43. Subsection B10 is the COSVN Security Section's interrogation
and detention facility.. Its last known strength (April 1966) was 35 men, 155
with a planned component of 50.156 The subsection is organized to
include a leadership committee, an interrogation and indoctrination
element, a jail administration component, and a guard unit.
31
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44. The number of detainees held. by the subsection rarely exceeds
twenty, They are of two types: Viet Cong personnel from COSVN agencies
suspected of harboring "antirevolutionary" sentiments, and various
military and civilian Allied officials. The latter type of prisoner
apparently includes "important" Vietnamese captives, 157 an occasional
U, S. POW: 158 and prisoners of particular interest to other subsections
of the Security Section, some of whom are brought from afar. It is
apparently a matter of policy to conceal from Allied captives the fact that
they are being questioned at COSVN,159 Whether any of the subsection's
interrogators speak English is unclear. In the questioning of an American
captive, a subsection inter logator used an English-speaking Vietnamese
prisoner as an interpreter.
Other Elements
45. Some elements of the COSVN Security Section are unclear as
to organizational subordination. These include-
a. The Espionage Component, traces of which are clearly
evident in several Security Section documents. The espionage component
appears to be organized in the standard manner of a typical Security
Section espionage component and includes a "city security" element, 161
(City security elements are discussed at some length in Chapters III and
IV.) Since COSVN Security Section's case officers operate in both
Cambodia and South Vietnam, 162 the espionage component may be
broken down into foreign and domestic bureaus. Much of the espionage
component's activity appears to be centered around Saigon. 163
b. A Signal Component (or components) which is almost certainly
present, because of the large amount of radio equipment -- including
transmitters and receivers -- mentioned in Security Section documents,164
It appears from some documents that certain security elements have
their own radio facilities (for example, one called "A3"165). Some Secjggity
Section radio operators appear to have been trained in North Vietnam.
c. Crypto Components. It seems, likely that the Security Section
has its own cryptographers, not only because of the number of radios
associated with the section, but also because lower echelons in the
security apparatus have been identified as having cryptographers. 167 It
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X-Mj
seems unlikely that a command element would lack what its subordinates
have as a matter of course.
d. A "Guerrilla Unit." Several documents indicate the existence of
a "Guerrilla Unit" (apparently codenamed "Village 5") attached to the
COSVN Security Section.168 Apparently the unit is not a permanent
formation, but seems to take shape onlywhen Allied sweep operations
threaten War Zone "C." A report of May 1966 listed its armament as
169
four machine guns, 14 submachine guns, and 114 rifles.
46. One component not mentioned in COSVN Security documents
but which may exist nonetheless is a radio-intercept and cryptanalysis
facility. Its presence is suggested by the COSVN Security Section
circular (picked up in VC Ba Ria Province) which directed provincial
security personnel to take steps to capture South Vietnamese police
crypto material.170 Almost certainly such material would be for.the use
of cryptanalysts, and radio monitoring personnel. Whether such personnel
are assigned to the COSVN Security Section cannot be ascertained with
available evidence.
NOTE: For an overall account of the COSVN bureaucracy, 'see MACV
J-2's The Central Office of South Vietnam (CICV Study ST 67-023,
29 April 1967).
33
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THE SPECIAL CASE OF REGION IV:
THE SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA DINH SPECIAL ZONE
I. Background
1. Viet Cong Region IV, dominated by the city of Saigon, is unique.
To the Viet Cong Security Service, its singularity is threefold. First,
Region IV is the most heavily populated area in South Vietnams second, it
contains most of the Service's high-level target installations; and third,
Allied security and counterintelligence personnel are far more plentiful
in Saigon than elsewhere.
2. Saigon is crowded not only by Vietnamese standards; it is the
most crowded city in the world. 171 In the last seven years, principally
because of the influx of refugees caused by the war, its population has
almost doubled and is now estimated at well over 2.5 million.172 The
immediate area surrounding Saigon is. also heavily peopled. To cope with
the peculiar demography, the apparatus has outsized "city security"
components.
3. As capital of South Vietnam, Saigon contains most of the
country's policymaking and governing machinery. Included are the
headquarters of the Viet Cong Security Service's highest priority targets:
the Directorate of National Police, the Directorate of the Military Security
Service, the Headquarters of the Central Intelligence Organization, the
Ministry of Security, and ARVN J-2. Likewise, Saigon quarters the
command components of Allied intelligence organs, which are also leading
targets: MACV J-2 and its subordinates, and the Vietnam headquarters
of various American civilian intelligence organizations. The city also
contains the leading elements of religious and political organizations the
Service attempts to penetrate: the leadership of the General Buddhist,
and of the United Buddhist Associations, the hierarchy of the Roman
Catholic Church in South Vietnam(and related lay organizations such as
the Catholic Greater Solidarity Force and the Catholic Citizen's Bloc),
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and the front offices of political groups such as the Dai Viet Party and
the Hoa Hao political party, among many others. Because of the abundance
of such targets, the Region's apparatus puts an unusually heavy emphasis
on the espionage components of its urban and suburban organization.
4. Finally, Saigon and its environs abound with South Vietnamese
and Allied security personnel, There are more uniformed and plain-
clothes policemen in Saigon than in any other area of Vietnam. The city
also teems with Vietnamese and American military police and a variety of
Allied counterintelligence and counterespionage officials. These forces
(and the threat of them) have compelled the Region's Security Service to
emphasize secrecy to an uncommon degree and to employ the cell system
frequently for compartmentation.
5. Despite the problems and special conditions, the field
apparatus of the Ministry of Public Security in Region IV appears well-
developed. Although it has undergone a series of reorganizations and
shifts in mission, the apparatus in 1967 is similar in many respects to what
it was in the early and mid-fifties.173 A large proportion of its members
is highly experienced, having joined the Service in the late 1940's, if not
earlier.174 Many have also served with COSVN or with MPS offices in
North Vietnam.l75 Others have attended the COSVN Security School.176
6. The Viet Cong, in drawing the administrative divisions within
Region IV, use nomenclature different from that employed by the South
Vietnamese Government and from that which they themselves use in other
areas. Instead of splitting the region into rrprovinces" and "districts" --
the usual administrative divisions in a region - - the Viet Cong have
broken down Region IV into "Subregions" (or "Chanhs") and "Areas"
(or 'rVungs"). Thus, in descending the administrative ladder in Region
IV, one passes the Region, the Subregion, the Area, and the Village,
before arriving at the Hamlet. A Viet Cong "Subregion, " such as Nha Be,
is equivalent to a GVN District.
7. The Region IV Security Section, codenamed B33 (also coded
Y63, and with letter box numbers 303 /c and 603 /c), appears to be
operating in six subregions (Chanhs), which, in turn, are broken up into
from two to six areas (Vurigs) apiece.177 There have been occasional
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POSSIBLE COMPOSITION OF THE
REGION IV SECURITY APPARATUS
REGION
SECURITY SECTION
(B33, Y63)
I
ADMINISTRATIVE
SUBSECTION
POLITICAL
PROTECTION
SUBSECTION
ESPIONAGE
SUBSECTION
LEGAL AFFAIRS
SUBSECTION
Office Staff
Investigation
Research
Interrogation
Guard Element
Agency Security
Commo-liaison
Jail
Training Element
Armed Recon
Intelligence
Guards
Communications
Secret Security
Commo-liaison
Armed Reconnaissance
Element
SUBREGION
(CHANH)
SECURITY SECTION
ADMINISTRATIVE:
SUBSECTION
POLITICAL
PROTECTION
SUBSECTION
ESPIONAGE
SUBSECTION
AREA
(VUNG)
SECURITY SECTION
ADMINISTRATIVE
SUBSECTION
POLITICAL
PROTECTION
SUBSECTION
VILLAGE
SECURITY SECTION
ESPIONAGE
SUBSECTION
LEGAL AFFAIRS
SUBSECTION
LEGAL AFFAIRS
SUBSECTION
Village Official
serving in a Hamlet
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reports of other subregions in Region IV, but the evidence on them so far
has been inconclusive. The subregions identified to date are as follows:
a. Binh Tan (codenamed A23, whose Security Section Bode is
A536)
b. Cu Chi (codenamed A25, whose Security Section code is
H204)
c. Di An (codenamed A21, Security Section code presently
unknown)
d. Go Mon (codenamed A22, Security Section coded P58)
e. Nha Be (codenamed A24, Security Section code believed;r
to. be K450)
f. Thu Duc (codenamed A20, Security Section code presently
unknown)
8. A paramount question concerning the overall administrative
breakdown of Viet Cong Region IV remains unanswered: ~ whether.there is
a Saigon City Party Committee. Available evidence indicates there is
not; nor is one referred to. in captured documents. However, Hue,
Da Nang, and Can Tho, among other urban areas, have. City Committees,
so the existence of. a similar. institution in Saigon cannot be precluded.
If it exists, it almost certainly has a Security Section of its own, probably
parallel (although subordinate) to the Region IV security apparatus.
II. The Functions of the Region
9. The functions of the Security Section of Region IV are
basically similar to.those in other areas and echelons. (See Chapter V
for a discussion of the functions of a provincial .apparatus.) They include
the following activities :
a. Collection of information on the organization and activities of
Allied positive intelligence and counterintelligence services, 'and on
Vietnamese political parties and religious sects.
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b. The kidnapping or assassination of Allied intelligence and
security officials, and the sabotage, of Allied intelligence and security
installations
c. Aggressive counterespionage in areas contested by the Viet
Cong and the South Vietnamese Government.
d. Countermeasures against the GVN Chieu Hoi program and
against the increasing emigration of the populace away from Viet Cong
areas.
e. Detailed planning, contingent upon Viet Cong victory, for
nationwide state security operations in South Vietnam.
f. Training of security, espionage and counterespionage personnel.
10. In carrying out its missions, the Region Security Section
provides detailed guidance to subordinate the subregions and areas, often
levying on them intelligence requirements of a national significance.
Thus, the Region IV Security Section may order a subregion to obtain
information.on.a South Vietnamese National Police plan that applies to the
whole country rather than to the Saigon area alone. The Section also
deals with security matters. which extend well beyond, its geographic
confines. It is a .focal point for agents recruited by Security Sections
outside its jurisdiction for service in Saigon.
III. The Region Organization.
11. The Region IV Security Section, whose overall organization
is unclear,. appears to have at least four major elements: an Administra-
tive Component, an Internal Security/Counterintelligence Component, an
Espionage Component, and a Legal Affairs Component. Whether there are
others is not known. It is run by a Leadership Committee.
12. The Leadership Committee, according to a recent interrogation
report,. is headed by an ethnic northerner, 179 with the rank.of a major.180
The report indicated his two deputies are regroupees but did not mention
when they had infiltrated south. The committee probably also contains
representatives from the subsections. The Section Chief almost certainly
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sits on the regional Current Affairs Committee, to ensure that the
activities of his subordinates are coordinated with other Viet Cong
civilian and military components. He is probably in frequent touch
with the MPS in Hanoi and with the head of the CQSVN Security Section,
which appears to pay particularly close attention to the Service's
activities in the Saigon zone, 181
13. The Administrative Component performs routine support and
administrative duties. Considering the amount of correspondence the
Region IV Security Section produces, both its courier element and office
staff are probably large. Region IV security couriers frequently traverse
the corridor between region headquartees and COSVN in War Zone "C" --
where several captured documents have indicated their presence. 182
They also carry messages to Subregion Security Sections and apparently
to the Security Services of Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces as well,183
The Security Section Administrative Component may also handle the
Section's electrical communications facilities, which are probably exten-
sive.
14. The Internal Security / Counte rintelligence* Component of
Region IV performs duties in Viet Cong "liberated" areas similar to
many of those performed by the South Vietnamese Special Branch police
in government-controlled territory. The duties include the protection of
the region base area against Allied intelligence penetrations, and the
investigation of suspected Allied agents. Although its members undoubtedly
cooperate with the investigative-internal security elements of the sub-
regions and the areas and directs many of their activities, the extent of
such cooperation and direction is unclear.
15. The Espionage Component of Region IV's Security Section is
its most active and aggressive element. The component engages in
espionage and counterespionage operations, probably in Saigon City, and
possibly in the capitals of the subregions.184 It also engages in terrorism,
including assassination, kidnapping, and sabotage. (As noted in Chapter II,
silencer pistols and blocks of TNT were among the supplies forwarded to
the Region IV Security Section from the COSVN Security Section's arsenal
in 1965.185) The Espionage Component is also responsible for developing
counterintelligence informant nets in government -controlled areas.
*Labelled "Political Protection" in Chart #4.
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25X1A2g
16. The Legal Affairs Component maintains interrogation and
detention facilities. The jail's inmates probably include captured
policemen and South Vietnamese intelligence officials, as well as
suspects and "reactionaries. "186 Little information is available on this
component.
17. It is evident from captured documents that Region IV main-
tains a counterbit.elligence and espionage school, although neither its
size nor whereabouts are certain. A recently captured notebook, for
example, contained an entry which noted the presence outside Saigon of a
school for "large numbers of agents, " whose instructors "had been
trained. at the Security School" in North Vietnam.187 The North Vietnamese
"Security School" referred to was probably the MPS Academy at Ha Dong.
IV. The Subregions, Areas and Villages
18. Subregion; (or Chanh) Security Sections are subordinate
both to the Subregion Current Affairs Committee and to the Region IV
Security Section. They are responsible. for overseeing the activities of
their subordinates, for running counterintelligence operations of their
own, for training the security personnel of the lower echelons, and for
conducting espionage and armed reconnaissance operations in government-
controlled areas.
19. Direction to lower echelons most frequently takes the form
of security missives, which are sent to the areas or -- apparently
bypassing the areas -- directly to villages.188 Such directives, which
cover a, variety of subjects, are frequently concerned with combatting
Allied pacification activity.189 The investigations carried on by subregion
counterintelligence personnel are both independent and in coordination
with the lower echelons. Although areas exercise some autonomy over
local informant nets, final responsibility and overall control of village
counterespionage appears to be retained by the subregions, 190 which also
conduct periodic training courses for their subordinate personnel.191
20. All six subregions conduct espionage and counterespionage
operations in government-controlled areas outside Saigon City. There
is conclusive evidence that Binh Tan Subregion also operates within
Saigon itself. (See paragraphs 23 - 26, below.) Whether Binh Tan is 25X1A2g
typical or unique is unknown. One recent report
suggests the Nha Be Subregion Service also operates in Saigon.
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21. Area (Vung) Security Sections, the intermediate. echelon
between subregion and village Security Sections, are responsible for,
running operations both in Viet Cong and in government-controlled
territory. With an average strength believed to be in the neighborhood
of from 10 to 15 men, the Vung Security Section probably has limited
capabilities. The Vung Service, which has a counterintelligence role in
the "liberated Zone, " performs executive actions in regions dominated by
the South Vietnamese Government.
section had once received instructions to kill a Viet
Gong military officer who had defected to the South Vietnamese
Government.193 This task, although carried out in territory out of Viet
Cong control, has the legal status of an execution under Vietnamese
Communist Party law and is analogous to similar executive acts
performed by the KGB in non-Soviet territory.
22. Village Security Sections, which directly control security
officials serving in the hamlets, appear to be the same in Region IV as
they are in the other regions of South Vietnam. (See Chapter VI.) They
are responsible for maintaining informant nets in Viet Cong territory and
for keeping track of the whereabouts and allegiance of the local inhabitants.
In doing so, Village Sections keep extensive records of suspects and of
where the population resides, 194 thus combining the functions of public
;safety, internal security and collection of operational counterintelligence.
V. The Binh Tan Security Section
23. Binh Tan is one of the six confirmed subregions in Viet Cong
Region IV. (See paragraph 4, above.) Captured documents indicate that
its Security Section is heavily involved in espionage, armed reconnais-
sance, and counterintelligence activities in Saigon City.
24. The Section is organized for activities in both Viet Cong
and government areas. A document written on Christmas Day, 1964,
indicates that it then consisted of ''ra chief of section, two 'members,
an unspecified number of office personnel, covert security elements
operating throughout /Saigon/ City to collect information, and armed
reconnaissance elements whose special mission was to eliminate
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dangerous RVN personnel. "195 Another report, written at approximately
the same time, indicated that the Binh Tan Service planned to have a total
of 632 agents working in Precincts II and IV of Saigon City by the end of
1965, organized into "147 Secret Security Cells and 11 Armed Intelligence
/possibly Armed Reconnaissance/ Cells."196 Whether Binh Tan realized
its agent recruitment plan is not known, but its "armed elements" --
whose equipment included a stock of grenades -- were probably involved
in the rash of bomb-throwing incidents directed at police targets through-
out 1965 in Saigon.
25. An action plan -- also of late 1964 vintage -- revealed that
the Binh Tan Section had drawn up a set of contingency plans on what to
do in the event of a coup d'etat.197 The plans called for not only assassi-
nation of "dangerous RVN security and administrative personnel,
politicians and newsmen," but also for the capture of documents, and the
"occupation" of key posts -- including prisons and the "United States
Information Service . " Although the plan is probably outdated, it would
seem probable that another, revised, version exists.
26. The Binh Tan Security Service is also involved in counter-
intelligence activities in Viet Gong territory. Its security plan for
"liberated areas" for the first quarter of 1967 dealt with the "resettlement
and protection of the population," and "the classification of people living
in the liberated areas, including persons who shuttle between government
and VC-controlled areas. "198 Among the people it was keeping track of
were GVN intelligence agents, 199 and Viet Cong deserters. 200
NOTES: a. A supplementary memorandum on the Region IV Security
Service is in process.
b. A supplementary memorandum on the Espionage and City
Security Elements of the Viet Cong Security apparatus is
also in process.
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OTHER
REGIONAL SECURITY SECTIONS
I. Region Subordination
1. There are now seven Viet Cong regions: Regions I through VI,
and the newly-created Region X (See map.). The first four were formed
out of Nam Bo, COSVN's predecessor, and are clearly subordinate to
COSVN. So is Region VI, and so, 'probably, is Region X. The subordi-
nation of the security apparatus of Region V, which encompasses the
northern half of South Vietnam, is less clear. It may be run directly
from the MPS in North Vietnam, sending only certain of its documents to
COSVN for "report." 201 Some of Region V's security officials have
attended the COSVN Internal Security /Counterintelligence School (See
Chapter II, Paragraphs 14 - 16, and 37 - 38.), but many others have
attended the MPS School at Ha Dong.202 A determination of the subor-
dination of the Region V security apparatus must await further evidence.
2. Regional Security Sections have most of the same tasks as
their provincial subordinates. Basically, they are responsible for
keeping COSVN, the region's Party hierarchy, and almost certainly the
MPS informed, for supervising and occasionally assisting in the activities
of the lower echelons, for maintaining internal security in region base
areas, for conducting active counterespionage operations in government
areas, and for training security personnel from region through village
levels.
Keeping the. Higher Levels Informed
3. The Region Security Section has two immediate masters:
the COSVN Security Section (possibly excepting Region V), and the
Region Current Affairs Committee. On certain matters it is responsible
to a third -~ the MPS in Hanoi.
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4. Like the Province Security Section, the region apparatus
produces both periodic and ad hoc intelligence reports. Its periodi
41 c 203
reports, produced monthly, quarterly, semiannually, and annually,
are partially distillations of the periodic reports it receives from the
provinces in its jurisdiction, and partly an interpretation of region-wide
security events, as seen from region headquarters. 204 A draft of the
annual report of Region III for..1965, for example, covered seven subjects:
the "enemy" (i . e . , Allied) situation, an overall view of security activities
in the region, an outline of the region security mission, a short review of
city espionage and city security apparatus, an appraisal of the security
service's growth during the year, a review of strong and weak points of
the Party's leadership, and a critique .of the year's achievements. 205
Such reports are sent as a matter of routine to a Region Security Section's
hierarchical overseers.
5. As a backup for such reports, the Security Section keeps
extensive files of correspondence and reports from below. The files
include reports on enemy espionage (U. S., police, etc.), on local
political parties, on the GVN armed forces, and on religious organiza-
tions. For a list of files kept by Region III in 1966, see Annex C.
6. High-level cadre from Region Security Sections occasionally
visit COSVN for consultation and probably attend the periodic security
conferences almost certainly convened at COSVN from time to time.
Region Security Sections (with the possible exceptions of Region V= and
VI) maintain permanent commo-liaison corridors with COSVN, 2.06 and
are probably-in radio contact with both COSVN and the MPS in Hanoi. 207
Some of the region's communication equipment is forwarded through the
COSVN Security Section's supply and equipment depot. 208
Supervising and Aiding, the Lower Echelons
7. Regions Security Sections supervise the. lower echelons with
the same devices used by COSVN: directives, inspection teams,. and
the summoning of provincial cadre to the region for consultation.
8. Regional directives, although not as detailed as those of the
provinces and districts, are more specific than COSVN directives,
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which tend to be general statements of Viet Cong security policy. A few
examples of regional directives are listed below:
a. A Region I Security Section directive, dated .7 April. 1967,
addressed to provincial security sections in its jurisdiction, about
"civilian spy forces indirectly controlled by the U. S. CIA." The
directive re que ste d. information on the organization, functions, operating
procedures, relationship to "U. S.. spies," of the "training program at
Vung Tau, " together with the number of students . in attendance 209
b. A Region VI directive which indicates that clerks, crypto-
graphers, radio operators, and workers at message centers at South
Vietnamese military; intelligence and police agencies are given:top
priority for recruitment as penetrations. 210
c. A Region III directive to province .and district Security
Sections.concerning the guarding and surveillance of prisoners held .in
security jails. 211
d. A Region V directive of 12 July 1966 addressed to VC Daklak
Province outlining the security missions to be accomplished by,the
province in the latter. half of the year. 212
e. A Region III organization plan (in draft) outlining force goals
for province, district, and village Security Sections within its juris-
diction. The plan -e probably based on an overall COSVN directive
takes .into account the differences in size and situation of the various
provinces. 213
9. The Region Security Sections also send inspection teams to
the provinces to "give them assistance" in grasping the security
situation. 214 Furthermore, they summon province cadres for consul-
tation, both individually and at periodic region-level security conference s.
Region III,f for example,. held a security conference in 1963215 and in
March 1966, 216 while Region V apparently held such conferences in both
.1966 and. arly 1967. 217
45
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Internal Security and Counterintelligence
10. Region Security Sections are responsible for maintaining
internal political security within region base areas, 218 and to an undeter-
mined extent, for running investigations in support of counterintelligence
operations conducted at the lower echelons. They also act as a region-
wide clearing house for counterintelligence information.
11. To protect the region base area, the Security Section sends
teams of investigators, or "reconnaissance units" to areas deemed
threatened by the Allied intelligence. The Section also supervises the
creation of "security guard" units for other agencies in the region bureau-
cracy. A Region III Security Section report of March 1966 noted, for
example, that "15 of the 16 sections and units" belonging to the region had
activated security guard sections under the Security Section's guidance. 219
Another region document indicated that the Security Section was conducting
186 investigations, and that a "security cadre team had been sent to the
provinces to assist them in security operations. "220
12. Region Security Sections maintain jails to hold prisoners and
suspects. A recent defector from a province Security Section indicated
that provinces send their most important prisoners to region for interro-
gation. He stated that if an American. intelligence or counterintelligence
official were captured, he would probably be questioned..at a region
interrogation facility, if not that of COSVN. 221
13. Large numbers of regional intelligence reports and circulars
indicate that region Security Sections act as a depository and dissemina-
tion point for counterintelligence information throughout their jurisdiction.
Sorme