FRANC-TIREUR'S EDITORIAL POSITION, 22 MAY - 12 JUNE 1955

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02771R000100200002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 22, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

AM
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02771 R000100200002-4
une 1955
.TIRE ' S EDITORIAL POSITION, 22 MAY - 12 JUNE 1955
`T rs r, liberal, leftist, non-Communist French news-
paper claiming a circulation of 136,000, sass some increased
weeatI
recent
future of Europe in the recent T oslav'.USM
forthcoming Four-Power Summit Conference and the
saian a eproach to 'peat
The paper's editorials between 22 May and 12 Jura 19j were
highly critical of Moscow C nisae at some points, but did
ar to feel that the iJ8t's recent change In policy eight
bring so positive gains. Some wishful thinking seems indicated
by its etat. ent theft the Belgrade Accord "consolidated poace"
n l urope and holds hope for improved relations between the US
it felt that
ern and anti-Soviet, although it is considered an independent
h longer, even at tt
yrsnc Tix ur supports WED, it said
would not refuse reunification
of a neutral Geriw y.
Among other points, P g Tireur held that the Soviet recognition
of the right of a state to develop its own separate form of so-
cialism was a gain. It favored Adenausr' a acceptance of the Soviet
invitation to Moscow be
feronce, as an oppor-
tunity to learn Soviet intentions. It suggested that Krushchev'a
presence would facilitate negotiations at that eonferen cee.
it editorial position in the past has been pro-
paper. In general it is friendl
d State policy, al-
though not a rabid supporter of the US position. It has supported
Al
nch affairs, Ire -Tti ur has been especially critical of
And although
but like other wench newspapers opposed tWC. 'while
organ of a political party, it is socialist in orientation.
the policy in North Africa.
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02771 R000100200002-4
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02771 R000100200002-4
its lengthy sarcastic c nts on the Soviets' volte-
face on Tito, Fla- held that the Russian gesture to Yugo-
slavia does hold an excellent augury for countries whose rsl.a-
tions with the USSR are not normal--by implication the United
States. It saw in the Belgrade meeting between Tito and Krushchev
lid at bringing Tito back into the fold,
even going aso far as to say that the accord signed by Tito and
uIganin consolidated peace in Europe.
veer, Ftr :-'f,, ,rye? saw through the joint co tion of
military blocs, declaring that alone the condemnation could be
d a victory for Tito, but that the fact that 8ulganin signed
the use of the plural in the statement, indicated that
a not consider Itself one of the ailitary blocs.
The
of v iee t
c nt s on Ti to' s Improved position an a result
on were in line with its indeperstent socialist
It declared the Belgrade Accord was a tribute to
point of view.
Tito's courage
Yugoslav relations and pointed out that the split had permitted
the development of a more democratic and less static state,
notably in the economic and social spheres. It hailed the meeting
as one between state and state and as a collaboration based on
equality--a Soviet recognition of past blunders and recognition
of Yugoslav independence and the right of each state to develop
its own socialism even if at variance with the Moscow-Ccmtinfs
variety.
Prom -T reur did express some
of this change in Soviet policy,
will allow Poland, Czechoslovakia
pttctar as to the extent
ng that whether the USM
Hungary to develop their
wn forms of socialises remains to be seen. However, it felt
Belgrade Declaration will have wide impact on
since the 1948 break in Soviet-
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02771 R000100200002-4
 Approved For Release 1999/0 CIA-RDP78-02771 R000100200002-4
While Fie -T reur termed Tito' s joining in de nds for a
seat for Red China and for Formosa's return to the Peiping
regime a success for the U, it emphasized that an exchange
of socialist experiences" is far from ideological alignment of
Yugoslavia with the USSR. It felt that Yugoslavia had retained
its Independence,, waking the Soviet delegation aware that the
Yugoslav Communist Party dest
with Western socialist parties
traitors.
o maintain fraternal relations
ch the Kremlin regards as
took the opportunity offered by the Soviets' asking
pardon for the so-called errors of Berta to criticise Communist
principles, declaring that the Communist concept of truth is
relative. It charged that the leadership principle is the supreme
law for the Communist* and what the leader says is always right,
whether he be called Stalin, Berta, Malenkov or Kruahchev. It
ridiculed the French C , ist paper L' g a . njt+ for Its switch
from Its 19'53 denunciation of the Tito regime as 'a Joseph Brasr-
0esellsehaft" similar to a "Herman Goering Gesellschaft" to its
1955 friendship for Tito. It asked if the future might not bring
vindication for even the victims of the Soviet purges and the-
October Revolution.
rlYiYl. itrll C w9ftm ce
~Tt? ~f
?~Y1wYMy1MIY1lYY~
July Pour-Power
ween 22 Way and 12 June on the
v1 s presence at the conference would be extremely helpful
in permitting decisions to be reached quickly.
The paper said that President Eisenhower, head of his party
and govere
suit `bashington
by advisers. will not have to con-
d if both Krushchev,
first secretary of t
of the Soviet Government
C ni?t P
ttond the conference
to avoid the delay of consultations with Moseow.
and Bulganin, premier
will be able
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02771 R000100200002-4
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02771 R000100200002-4
? -Ti, like other Western newspapers, saw indications
that Krs:shchev actually wielded the power in Russia in his alight-
ing first from the airplane at Belgrade, making the first speech
and taking the most prrl